

Shelter: Need and Response

*Housing, Land and Settlement Policies
in Seventeen Third World Nations*

JORGE E. HARDOY

and

DAVID SATTERTHWAITE

*Both of the International Institute for
Environment and Development, London*

JOHN WILEY & SONS

Chichester · New York · Brisbane · Toronto

Copyright © 1981 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, nor transmitted, nor translated into a machine language without the written permission of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:

Hardoy, Jorge Enrique

Shelter, need and response.

1. Underdeveloped areas—Housing

I. Title II. Satterthwaite, David

301.5'4'091724 HD7391 80-41417

ISBN 0 471 27919 6

Text set in 10/12 pt Linotron 202 Times, printed
and bound in Great Britain at The Pitman Press, Bath

Contents

Preface	xi
Introduction	1
Background	1
The Project	2
Statistics and Definitions	4
 <i>SECTION I ARAB NATIONS: EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, THE SUDAN AND TUNISIA</i>	
Background	9
National Settlement Policies	26
Land	33
Shelter, Infrastructure and Services	39
 <i>SECTION II ASIA: INDIA, INDONESIA, NEPAL, THE PHILIPPINES AND SINGAPORE</i>	
Background	55
National Settlement Policies	74
Land	82
Shelter, Infrastructure and Services	88
 <i>SECTION III LATIN AMERICA: BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA AND MEXICO</i>	
Background	107
National Settlement Policies	123
Land	133
Shelter, Infrastructure and Services	140
 <i>SECTION IV SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: KENYA, NIGERIA AND TANZANIA</i>	
Background	155
National Settlement Policies	166
Land	172
Shelter, Infrastructure and Services	176

SECTION V COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Background	191
Colonial Influences	191
World Economic Forces	195
Settlement Trends	199
Current Settlement Problems	203
National Settlement Policies	207
The Habitat Recommendations	207
National Action	208
Assessment	211
Settlement Policies and the National Economy	212
Settlement Policies and the Socioeconomic Structure	216
Settlement Policies and Political Models	221
Settlement Policies and Level of Development	224
Land	226
The Habitat Recommendations	226
National Action	227
Patterns of Ownership	227
Control of Land-use Changes	229
Public Ownership	229
Recapturing Plus Value	231
Assessment	232
Land for Housing	232
Controlling Land-use	235
A Note on Rural Land Policies	237
Shelter, Infrastructure and Services	239
The Habitat Recommendations	239
National Action	240
Urban Housing	240
Rural Housing	243
Basic Services	243
Building Industry	246
Assessment	248
Public Housing Programmes	251
Serviced-site Schemes	254
Slum and Squatter Upgrading	255
Standards	256
Building Materials and Technology	257
Housing Finance	259
 <i>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</i>	 265
Statistical Annex	272
Index	277

SECTION V

Comparative Analysis



Background

Despite enormous diversity among the seventeen nations in such factors as size, population, climate, degree of urban and industrial development, economic growth rates, resource endowments, life expectancy and per capita wealth, there are four important areas where governments are faced with similar or at least comparable circumstances. The first is a settlement pattern still showing the profound influence of colonial rule. The second is the way world economic forces have influenced and moulded the settlement pattern since independence. The third is in current settlement trends—the move to an increasingly urban and non-agricultural society. And the fourth is in current settlement problems, many of which arise from or are linked to this move. Before assessing the seventeen nations' housing, land and settlement policies, we will examine the background to these policies under these four subject-headings: colonial influences, world economic forces, settlement trends and current settlement problems.

Colonial Influences

A nation's settlement pattern—the spatial distribution and relative size of the various metropolitan regions, cities, towns and villages—inevitably reflects its political, social and economic development over time. Clearly, it has been influenced by physical factors with permanent settlements drawn to areas with fertile land, plentiful water resources, temperate and healthy climate, mineral resources and access to building materials. As interregional trade develops, settlements are also drawn to convenient points along transport routes—for instance to natural harbours or to places on the transition between two ecological areas to facilitate trade between them. The history of different settlements' growth, stagnation or decline naturally coincides with the area's economic and political history. Indeed, a study of changing settlement patterns and hierarchies through time within any nation or region provides important and interesting insights into the development both of the economy and of the society.

In looking at the seventeen nations, each with their own unique society, culture and history, one is struck by the fact that all but Nepal have the legacy of an urban system largely implanted and developed under colonial rule.¹ This is as true for East Africa as it is for Latin America, even if the colonial process was three centuries or more apart. In all four of the Third World regions, present economic structure remains profoundly influenced by colonial developments. For Latin America, colonization brought this region into inter-continental trade; for Africa, Asia and the Middle East, where such trade links were centuries old, colonial powers came to expand and then dominate these links. Although such matters of economic history may seem of little immediate

relevance when looking at government housing, land and settlement policies (after all Spain and Portugal began colonizing Latin America nearly five centuries ago), settlement patterns established during colonial times have played a major role in defining primate cities and those which have become major regional, industrial or administrative centres. They brought about significant (and often radical) changes in rural–urban linkages and in the distribution of population from precolonial settlement patterns and trends. And they played a major role in defining which regions have been linked to the monetary economy (producing for domestic consumption or for export), and which remain largely outside the monetary economy with a large proportion of their population largely deriving their living from growing subsistence crops or cattle raising.

Settlement patterns, especially the growth and distribution of major cities, reflect economies that grew and developed as exporters of minerals or cash crops. Port cities, developed in colonial times, are very often the largest or second largest cities today: Manila, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Mombasa, Alexandria, Port Sudan, Tunis and the city of Singapore. Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, India's first, second and fourth largest urban areas, were the major colonial ports.

In Latin America, the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors founded trading posts on the coast and settlements inland to secure control of territory and facilitate resource exploitation. Where the colonizers came up against advanced urban cultures, they also formed settlements to utilize the indigenous peoples' labour. Thus we see early Spanish towns developing in the interior close to population centres of the Aztecs in Mexico, the Incas in Peru and in the highlands of Bolivia and the Chibchas in Colombia. Most of Latin America's principal cities and ports were founded between 1530 and 1600, including La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Potosi in Bolivia; Bogota, Cali and Cartagena in Colombia; São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Salvador and Santos in Brazil; and Mexico City, Puebla, Guadalajara, Monterrey and Veracruz in Mexico. Although urban populations as percentages of national populations remained low, the population of ports and administration centres generally grew steadily under colonial rule while those of mining centres varied as the profitability of mining operations rose or fell. Thus, the major settlements grew and developed only because they benefited (directly or indirectly) from trade links with the colonial powers and as administrative/political/military centres.

Among the five Asian nations, Singapore owes its foundation in 1819 and its subsequent development as a port and entrepôt centre to colonial rule. In India, the British East India Company founded trading posts in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in the seventeenth century. Their regional (and national) primacy was reinforced by their role as major colonial ports and centres on the railway system. Under British rule, many millions of formerly self-sufficient peasants were brought into the export market and thus into reliance on fluctuating world market prices for their livelihood. Industrial development was either suppressed or strictly controlled. In both Indonesia and the Philippines, the economies were developed by Western powers to serve their primary produce needs. Both Jakarta and Manila were developed as early colonial ports and trading posts. India and the Philippines still rely on the export of cash crops developed under colonial rule for a considerable portion of their export earnings. So too would Indonesia if it did not have oil as its major export. And in all

three nations, a large proportion of the national population depend on earnings from cash crop production for their livelihood.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are important parallels with regard to how and why major settlements developed, even though colonization of the interior took place much later and the mode of colonization and treatment of the native population was very different. Initial European trading posts were established as early as the mid-fifteenth century. But until the nineteenth century, they nearly always remained only on the coast to facilitate either the export of slaves or of ivory and precious metals. Lagos in Nigeria, for example, emerged as a major settlement through its role as a slave trade centre. Then, when the European powers partitioned Africa, economic development took place in those regions that became involved in the export of primary produce back to Europe. Mombasa in Kenya, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Lagos and Port Harcourt in Nigeria developed as colonial ports. In Nigeria, the railways were developed in the last few years of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century to bring cash crops and minerals to Lagos and Port Harcourt for export. In Kenya, the line from Mombasa to Kisumu on Lake Victoria built between 1898 and 1902 and later extended into Uganda sought to consolidate British power in Uganda. But then settlement was encouraged close to the railway to help pay for its operation. Nairobi was no more than a convenient waterhole for the new railway. Once the railway was built, however, it became an important settlement as its climate and surrounding land were found to suit agriculture and thus exploitation by European farmers. It also became a provincial capital in 1902 and then a capital for the whole East Africa Protectorate in 1905. Similarly, Dar es Salaam was no more than a small port until it became the capital of German East Africa in 1891 and then the starting point for a railway to exploit rich agricultural areas in the interior in 1907.

There are also important parallels in the five Arab nations included in this study. Although urban civilizations originate in the Middle East, most particularly in Egypt and Iraq, each of the five nations studied still shows the profound effect of colonialism both in economic structure and settlement pattern. The Ottoman Empire's indifference to commercial development allowed western powers to gain considerable rights, concessions and privileges for trading and the exploitation of resources. Much of the region's railway system was developed (and owned) by foreign interests. Although in Tunisia, Egypt and Iraq, major urban centres had existed for centuries (or even millenia) sustained by international trade, the colonial period reinforced the primacy of some centres. Cairo, located at the head of the Nile Delta at a convenient crossing-point, became the centre of the nation's railway system, well located close to fertile land and linking the major cotton-growing areas with the port of Alexandria. In the Sudan, both the capital (Khartoum-Khartoum North-Omdurman) and the major port (Port Sudan) were developed from very small settlements under colonial rule. In Jordan, Amman was little more than a watering place for nomads in the nineteenth century. It was only developed as a city after the British separated Transjordan from western Palestine after the First World War and made Amman the capital.

Thus, the colonial period played a major role in shaping most of the seventeen nations' national economies and the distribution of major settlements over space. But urban settlement patterns established during colonial rule have also exerted powerful influences on subsequent settlement development. Industrial developments were usually drawn to pre-eminent colonial centres since only these had the markets,

infrastructure, financial institutions, transport links (both internally and internationally), labour force and government contacts the new industries needed. Obviously, there are exceptions, but major colonial centres usually monopolized much of the industrial and commercial development after independence. We noted earlier how Nairobi contained more than half of Kenya's wage-earners in 1977, how Dar es Salaam had half of Tanzania's urban manufacturing employment in 1974, how São Paulo's metropolitan area encompasses most of Brazil's high productivity manufacturing enterprises, how the Valley of Mexico in which Mexico City is located contained two-fifths of industrial sector and half tertiary sector output in 1970 and how Khartoum Province (in which the capital is located) contained two-thirds of all manufacturing output in 1970–1.² The metropolitan areas of Cairo, Amman, Lagos, Manila and Bogota have comparable concentrations of their nation's modern industry and service sector employment.

The concentration of much of the modern industrial and service sector in one or two cities within each nation was, no doubt, reinforced by governments' general concentration on economic growth since the 1950s. Indeed, economists from the industrialized nations advised them to do so, suggesting that the benefits of rapid economic growth would 'trickle down' to encourage development in the peripheral regions and that once a nation achieved economic maturity, differentials in regional per capita incomes that diverged with early developments would then converge.

A second colonial legacy which had profound implications on the way settlements developed was the introduction of new patterns of rural and urban landownership and of new concepts under which land was owned. In rural areas, the imbalance between small percentages of landowners who control much of the best land and the majority with little or no land in nations such as Brazil, Colombia, and the Philippines dates back to colonial times. Rural landownership patterns in nations such as Mexico, Bolivia, Egypt and Tunisia were also profoundly influenced by colonial rule, although efforts have been made in recent decades to lessen the inequalities. Clearly, the pattern of agricultural land ownership profoundly affects the type and volume of economic activities villages or market towns will support. It also has considerable bearing on population growth rates, on migration patterns and on the interest of governments in installing basic services.

The new concepts of private ownership rights over land that colonial rule introduced have generally proved more intractable blocks to housing and settlement policies than in the former colonial powers' own development. In the Philippines, the Americans legalized the essentially feudal landholding pattern, leaving vast landholdings in urban (and incidentally rural) areas in the hands of comparatively few families and institutions. In Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Tunisia (among others), traditional ownership concepts were disrupted by the new stress on individual ownership rights. Ottoman Land Law, traditional law in many parts of SubSaharan Africa, and Indonesian traditional land law had stressed the importance of community rights over land. In Latin America, Portuguese and Spanish rulers alike stressed the rights of private landowners over those of the community.

A third colonial legacy which has continued to influence settlements' development is the mass of building and planning concepts and regulations which were developed in Europe and North America in response to what were (or are) seen as their major settlement problems. Building codes, infrastructure standards and planning legisla-

tion in Third World nations may even date from colonial times, especially in Africa or Asia. Or they may be based on European or North American models. This legacy is further reinforced by the fact that Third World professional staff's perception of settlement problems and their response are also powerfully influenced by the 'conventional wisdom' developed in the industrialized nations. Of course, many of their planners, administrators and engineers were trained in the West or in institutions whose curricula were based on those used in the West. And foreign consultants working in the Third World also bring with them a perception of problems and a range of skills and techniques developed in the West in response to settlement problems there. An obvious illustration, evident in many of the national settlements policies examined earlier, is a central concern in national and city plans for improving the road system. What the planners fail to tackle is the fact that the majority of the nation's population still live in poor, ill-serviced houses on inadequate incomes. Another illustration is in building codes and infrastructure standards which bear little relation to the basic needs and resources of the population and the resources available to governments. We will return to this point later. A third illustration is the continual development of masterplans for which little or no legislative base or administrative and financial capacity exists to implement them. An over-preoccupation with growth poles and new towns can be seen in the same light.

Thus, in this very brief summary, it becomes clear that the colonial period has had important and lasting influences on the growth, development and distribution of settlements. Although it would be naïve to blame all Third World settlement problems on colonial legacies, their importance should not be underestimated when examining the way national governments have sought to change their 'geography of development' and control urban land markets.

World Economic Forces

After a Third World nation finally achieves political independence, clearly the international market continues to exert a powerful influence on the national economy. And for all seventeen nations, world economic forces have tended to help maintain and often reinforce the settlement hierarchies first formed during the colonial period.

This is particularly evident in Latin America where Third World nations first achieved political independence. National economies' dependence on the export of primary commodities remained and was further reinforced as demand rose in Europe and then North America for industrial raw materials and for food. This demand, coupled with far cheaper transportation costs, first by sea and then overland because of the railway, allowed the export of a greater variety of cash crops and minerals which had formerly been too expensive to transport to the coast and then ship overseas. These developments also stimulated the import of manufactured goods from the West's rapidly growing industrial sector. The advances in transport technology reinforced the primacy of ports and main railway stations while regional economies often stagnated as their products were undercut by imports. For instance, in Mexico, cities such as Guadalajara and Monterrey were developing independently of Mexico City with Mexico City's growth being comparatively slow for much of the nineteenth century. But with its central place in the railway system and in the nation's

finance system, Mexico City's primacy over other urban centres was reinforced as Mexico's economy responded to increased world demand for primary produce.

In addition, ports and strategically placed urban centres became the centres of increasing national and foreign investment in new transport and communications technology and in commercial activities related to the export of primary produce. Many new settlements were founded during this period but these tended to be new administration centres, service and transport centres for areas producing agricultural or mineral goods or tourist centres. Very few have grown into major cities to challenge the dominance of the older established centres. Belo Horizonte and towns along the Mexico–United States border are obvious exceptions.

The older established centres generally became natural centres for industrial development. They had the transportation and communications, infrastructure and banking facilities. If industrial produce was for export, then the factory had to be on major transport routes with good access to the port. If the produce was for internal consumption, the major cities had large, easily accessible consumer markets including a high proportion of the middle and higher-income groups. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the collapse of prices for primary produce exported to Europe spurred industrial development in many Latin American nations, especially those with some industrial infrastructure and an internal market such as Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. The growth of the major cities was swelled by rural migrants, forced off the land by the collapse in primary produce prices, as they had been in (for instance) Brazil, by waves of immigrants some three decades previously.

Among the nations in other continents, all of whom (bar Nepal) only achieved political independence in the last 50 years, there were comparable developments. Industrial and commercial investment was drawn to existing cities for the same reason as in Latin America. And efforts by national governments to change the 'colonial' economic structure and hence colonial settlement patterns have been inhibited by their lack of power in the world market and thus by other economic priorities. Each of these nations has to exist within this market. And attempts to increase their power and earning capacity within this market generally reinforces the concentration of investments and high productivity (and hence higher income) jobs in the richer and more developed regions and settlements.

A priority given by government to increasing the nation's industrial capacity—and on developing the infrastructure and services this needs—will tend to further reinforce the concentration of investment and new jobs in major urban centres. Such a priority involved the import of technology since no nation at Independence had the skilled manpower and the technological base needed to produce and develop their own. Indeed, few have the beginnings of such a base today. Machinery and transport equipment accounted for a third or more of all merchandise imports in 1977 for Kenya, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia, Colombia and Jordan while for Nigeria it was close to half and for Iraq it was more than half. Although statistics for 1977 for Tanzania, the Sudan and Nepal were not available, no doubt machinery and transport equipment figure large in their import costs.

In addition, among the seventeen nations, most are partially or totally dependent on the import of oil or oil-derived fuels. In 1977, fuel imports accounted for more than a tenth of total merchandise imports for Tunisia and Tanzania, more than a fifth for Kenya and the Philippines and more than a quarter for India and Singapore. With

rapid oil price rises in 1979/80, import costs for oil are likely to have risen faster than export earnings. Estimates for 1980 suggest that roughly half of India's and Tanzania's total import bill is for oil. Only five nations—Iraq, Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia—aren't net importers of oil.

Meanwhile, increasing export earnings has to be a high priority to pay for needed imports. Most of the seventeen nations have serious balance of payments problems and rapidly growing debts. To give only one example, estimates for 1980 suggest that for Brazil, the cost of oil imports and servicing the foreign debt will exceed total export revenues. Yet most of the seventeen nations still rely on the export of primary produce to generate most of their export earnings. In 1977, primary products other than oil or oil-derived fuels accounted for half or more of total merchandise exports in the Philippines, Tunisia, Jordan and Brazil and three-quarters or more in Nepal, Tanzania, Kenya, the Sudan, Colombia and Bolivia. Certainly from the mid-50s to the early 70s, the price of primary commodities on the world market declined relative to the price of manufactured goods. And world prices for many primary commodities have been subject to wild fluctuations which removes the long term economic stability governments need to implement development plans.

Thus, government policies are with good reason oriented towards increasing and diversifying exports. Those with the technological base to do so have sought to increase the contribution of industrial goods to exports. For nations such as India, Egypt, the Philippines, Tunisia, Mexico, Brazil and Singapore, manufactured goods are major export earners, accounting for a quarter or more of total merchandise exports in 1977. But once again, industrial development for the export market will tend to go to the few regions and settlements with the infrastructure to support such development and with good transport links with the international market. So new export industries tend to develop in existing major cities, reinforcing their primacy.

For nations such as Nepal, the Sudan and Tanzania, building or developing industries for export could also mean less dependence on fluctuating world prices for primary produce. Yet this means entering a competitive world market and competing against other nations with advanced industrial infrastructures (and the many major institutions and services a major industrial sector needs) already in place and many decades of industrial development behind them. And it means doing so during a major global recession with increasing protectionism protecting most of the major markets for the kinds of industrial exports they might develop. Inevitably, they have to turn back to increased cash crop exports to earn the foreign exchange to pay for the oil, machinery and transport equipment their economy needs. But this usually means increasing production in the more developed and prosperous regions. These tend to have the fertile soil, water resources and developed infrastructure that is needed to do so. The return they give in terms of increased output per unit of capital invested is far quicker and generally higher than the return from investing in more peripheral regions. Alternatively, mineral production can be increased, again centred on deposits already developed. Unexploited or underexploited resources in the more peripheral regions may have great potential. But the lead time needed to develop them—and the capital too—deters the needed public investment in, for instance, roads and electricity provision when the government urgently needs to increase exports to pay for rapidly rising import costs. So the richer, more developed regions are usually the main beneficiaries of a drive to increase exports.

In addition, continuing dependence on cash crop exports not only helps maintain their lack of power in world markets and their lack of capital for development. It also helps maintain their dependence on food imports. A concentration on increasing cash crop production for export is usually at the expense of increased food production for the home market. In 1977, every one of the seventeen nations we have statistics for except Brazil and Kenya had food representing 10 or more per cent of total merchandise imports. Thus, Nigeria, Tanzania, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Colombia, Mexico, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia each had food imports in this year representing a tenth or more of total merchandise imports. For Egypt, they represented 23 per cent.

Table 1 Structure of merchandise imports 1977 (percentage shares of merchandise imports)

Countries	Food	Fuels	Other primary commodities	Machinery and transport equipment	Other manufactures
<i>Africa</i>					
Kenya	6	22	4	34	34
Nigeria	13	2	2	47	36
Tanzania*	10	18	5	35	32
<i>Asia</i>					
India	16	26	15	19	24
Indonesia	16	12	5	37	30
Nepal	—	—	—	—	—
Philippines	10	24	7	26	33
Singapore	12	26	9	26	27
<i>Latin America</i>					
Bolivia	—	—	—	—	—
Brazil	7	34	7	26	26
Colombia	12	7	7	38	36
Mexico	13	3	8	45	31
<i>Arab nations</i>					
Egypt	23	2	10	35	30
Iraq	15	—	3	54	28
Jordan	18	9	3	35	35
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—
Tunisia	13	11	7	34	35

Source: *World Development Report 1980*, World Bank

— Not available

* The figures for Tanzania are for 1976.

Thus, a concentration on building up an industrial sector and on increasing exports—which may well be essential to economic survival—tends to reinforce the existing pattern of economic development over the nation. Here we come across a contradiction which surfaces in many development plans—that the need to concentrate on economic priorities conflicts with stated government goals of spreading economic development more widely and fostering urban and industrial development away from the major centres.

However, although there are very considerable constraints imposed on government action by world market forces and by economies still locked into dependence on primary produce exports, this does not mean that governments remain completely powerless to change their 'geography of development'. Although such constraints limit govern-

ment action—and here one should note the special difficulties faced by landlocked nations such as Nepal and Bolivia whose lack of access to the sea increases the cost of importing and exporting goods—several among the seventeen nations have effected considerable changes in the spatial spread of development in the last twenty years. These efforts are examined (and assessed) under ‘National Settlement Policies’.

Settlement Trends

Of the seventeen nations, all but Singapore experienced rapid growth rates in their urban population between 1960 and 1980. Singapore is the exception only because most of its population is already in the central city and because its size ensures there is very little rural population. All comparisons between the remaining sixteen nations’ urban growth rates listed in Table 2 (and indeed between the percentages of their population in rural and urban areas) are open to misinterpretation because of the very different criteria used by each nation to define what constitutes an ‘urban’ settlement.³ The reader should refer to the note on ‘Statistics and Definitions’ in the Background section which discusses why such international comparisons are only of limited validity. But since we have no other statistics to work with—and at least all national ‘urban’ definitions include all major settlements—the text will draw broad conclusions based on these. For the sixteen nations, annual average urban growth rates exceeded 3 per cent for this period. For Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria and Jordan they exceeded 4 per cent, while in Iraq it exceeded 5 per cent, and in Kenya, Tanzania and the Sudan they exceeded 6 per cent.

Since national population growth rates varied so much, it is worth looking at the differences between annual average urban growth rates and population growth rates. This difference was 1 or more per cent for all nations except Singapore and the Philippines. For Nigeria, Nepal and Iraq it exceeded 2 per cent, while for Kenya, the Sudan and Tanzania it exceeded 3 per cent. The reason the Philippines appears to have a relatively slow rate of urban growth seems to be due to the official criteria by which a settlement is defined as urban not being related to its population size.⁴ Certainly for settlements with 10 000 or more people in 1960, annual growth rates between 1960 and 1970 exceeded population growth rates by more than 1 per cent.

Table 2 Urbanization

Countries	Urban population			
	As percentage of total population		Annual average growth (per cent)	
	1960	1980	1960–70	1970–80
<i>Africa</i>				
Kenya	7	14	6.6	6.8
Nigeria	13	20	4.7	4.9
Tanzania	5	12	6.3	8.3
<i>Asia</i>				
India	18	22	3.3	3.3
Indonesia	15	20	3.8	3.6
Nepal	3	5	4.3	4.7

Table 2 *cont.*

Countries	Urban population			
	As percentage of total population		Annual average growth (per cent)	
	1960	1980	1960-70	1970-80
Philippines	30	36	3.9	3.6
Singapore	100	100	2.4	1.5
<i>Latin America</i>				
Bolivia	24	33	4.1	4.3
Brazil	46	65	4.8	4.3
Colombia	48	70	5.2	3.9
Mexico	51	67	4.8	4.5
<i>Arab nations</i>				
Egypt	38	45	3.6	3.0
Iraq	43	72	6.2	5.4
Jordan	43	56	4.5	4.5
Sudan	10	25	6.9	6.8
Tunisia	36	52	3.8	3.8

Source: *World Development Report 1980* (World Bank)

Note. Other sources suggest Iraq's percentage of population in urban areas is somewhat lower (see note 8, Section I, page 50) while Nigeria's is somewhat higher (see note 5, Section IV, page 185).

Of the seventeen nations, only Singapore, Iraq and the three richer Latin American nations (Mexico, Brazil and Colombia) had three-fifths or more of their population in urban areas in 1980. India, Kenya, Indonesia, the Sudan, Tanzania and Nigeria had a quarter or less of national population in urban areas on that same date while Nepal had less than a tenth. Clearly, the larger the percentage of population in rural areas, the larger the potential role of rural-to-urban migration as a cause of urban growth.

In all but India, Colombia and Brazil, the largest urban agglomeration contained around one-quarter or more of the entire nation's urban population in the late 1970s. In Nepal, it contained more than half, in Kenya, Egypt and Jordan, it contained around half while in Tunisia, Iraq, Bolivia, the Philippines, Tanzania and Mexico it contained around a third or more.⁵ Both India and Brazil are somewhat in a class of their own, being by far the largest among the seventeen nations. Even so, Brazil had more than a quarter of its urban population in two metropolitan areas in the centre-south region, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Colombia's urban pattern is unusual in that its mountainous terrain inhibited interregional transport links so its major cities developed and grew in the different regions where minerals or fertile land could be exploited. But even so, Bogota in 1977 had more than a fifth of the nation's total urban population.

Table 3 The three largest urban agglomerations in each nation

	1950	Most recent figure (mostly estimates)	Projection
<i>Kenya</i>			
Nairobi	135 000	959 000 (1978)	1.895m (1990)
Mombasa	159 000 (1960)	401 000 (1978)	504 000 (1983)
Kisumu	23 526* (1962)	115 000 (1978)	169 000 (1983)

Table 3 cont.

	1950	Most recent figure (mostly estimates)	Projection
<i>Nigeria</i>			
Lagos	267 407* (1952)	3.5m (1975)	5.443m (1990)
Ibadan	459 196* (1952)	847 000* (1975)	1.625m (1990)
Kano	127 205* (1952)	399 000* (1975)	—
<i>Tanzania</i>			
Dar es Salaam	148 000* (1960)	600 000* (1976)	911 600* (1981)
Arusha	—	89 000* (1976)	101 900* (1981)
Tanga	—	70 000* (1976)	120 600* (1981)
<i>India</i>			
Calcutta	5.15m	7.03m (1971)	13.7 m (1990)
Bombay	3.34m	5.97m (1971)	13.11m (1990)
Delhi	1.74m	3.65m (1971)	8.96m (1990)
<i>Indonesia</i>			
Jakarta	1.45m*	6.18m (1977)	11.45m (1990)
Surabaya	679 000*	2.27m (1980)	3.46m (1990)
Bandung	511,000*	1.84m (1980)	2.82m (1990)
<i>Nepal</i>			
Kathmandu	121 000	415 000 (1976)	
Biratnagar		45 100* (1971)	
Nepalgunj		23 523* (1971)	
<i>Philippines</i>			
Manila	1.78m	7.7m (1980)	10.5m (1990)
Cebu	178 000*	418 517* (1975)	
Davao	124 000	515 520* (1975)	
<i>Singapore</i>			
Singapore	938 000 (1947)	2.33m (1978)	
<i>Bolivia</i>			
La Paz	300 000*	654 713* (1976)	1.13m (1990)
Santa Cruz		255 568* (1976)	
Cochabamba		204 414* (1976)	
<i>Brazil</i>			
São Paulo	2.45m	12.49m (1980)	18.66m (1990)
Rio de Janeiro	3.05m	8.33m (1975)	14.15m (1990)
Belo Horizonte	353 000	2.59m (1980)	4.05m (1990)
<i>Colombia</i>			
Bogota	607 000*	3.5m (1977)	6.84m (1990)
Medellin	341 000*	1.75m (1977)	2.72m (1990)
Cali	269 000*	1.19m (1977)	2.47m (1990)
<i>Mexico</i>			
Mexico City	3.19m	13.99m (1978)	21.63m (1990)
Guadalajara	378 000*	2.34m (1978)	4.17m (1990)
Monterrey	332 000*	1.92m (1978)	3.23m (1990)
<i>Egypt</i>			
Cairo	2.50m	8.5m (1979)	11.98m (1990)
Alexandria	1.04m*	2.32m* (1976)	4.11m (1990)
Mahallah al Kubrah	129 000*	292 853* (1976)	
<i>Iraq</i>			
Baghdad	540 000	2.92m* (1977)	7.45m (1990)

Table 3 *cont.*

	1950	Most recent figure (mostly estimates)	Projection
Mosul	140 000	350 000 (1974)	
Basrah	100 000	423 000 (1974)	
<i>Jordan</i>			
Amman	25 000* (1948)	775 800* (1978)	
Zerqa	106 080* (1961)	282 700* (1978)	
Irbid		146 070* (1978)	
<i>The Sudan</i>			
Khartoum	253 600 (1955/6)	1.05m (1978)	2.5m (1990)
Port Sudan	47 600* (1955/6)	250 000 (1978)	530 000 (1990)
Wad Medani	47 700* (1955/6)	112 000* (1973)	
<i>Tunisia</i>			
Tunis	615 000	925 000 (1975)	1.31m (1986)
Sfax		174 900* (1975)	247 300* (1986)
Sousse		80 500* (1975)	113 800* (1986)

m million

Figures with * are city populations, not urban agglomeration populations.

Virtually all the figures in this table are estimates or projections. The source of each statistic is listed in note (6) at the end of this section. Rather than rely on census information for the most recent figure—which can mean having to give figures for the early Sixties for some nations—we have used estimates drawn from a wide range of sources. In many instances, we found widely differing figures for the same city or urban agglomeration for the same year. When listing the sources for the statistics, mention is made of when the statistic's accuracy is open to question. Furthermore, when giving a city's population, many sources did not specify whether the figures was for the city or the urban agglomeration.

Furthermore, in each of the seventeen nations, between 1950 and the late 1970s (Table 3), the largest urban agglomeration more than doubled its population. Cairo more than tripled its population in this period while the population of Mexico City, Manila, Jakarta, Bogota and the Sudan's three town capital (Khartoum–Khartoum North–Omdurman) more than quadrupled. Meanwhile, São Paulo's and Baghdad's population grew more than five-fold, that of Nairobi, Lagos and Dar es Salaam by more than seven times and Amman more than 20-fold.

No simple generalizations can be made about growth rates for other urban centres, due mainly to a lack of data. In nations such as Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Jordan, the Sudan, Egypt, Indonesia, Colombia, Iraq, Nepal and the Philippines, the largest urban agglomeration remains among the fastest-growing urban settlements. In India, Brazil and Mexico, this is no longer the case. In Brazil, cities such as Fortaleza and Porto Alegre were growing at roughly the same rate as São Paulo and a lot faster than Rio de Janeiro between 1950 and 1980 while Belo Horizonte, Brasilia and Curitiba were growing a lot faster than both. All these Brazilian cities had more than a million inhabitants by 1980. In Mexico, Guadalajara and Monterrey grew faster than Mexico City between 1950 and 1980. And in India, Calcutta was actually one of the slowest growing of the thirteen cities that had more than a million inhabitants in 1980 between 1950 and 1980. But the sheer size of population in Calcutta, São Paulo and Mexico City will ensure that their share of total urban population will only decline slowly, if this trend is sustained. Unfortunately, information on the population and the growth rates of other settlements is too scanty for any generalizations to be possible.

Table 4 Labour-force

Countries	Percentage of Labour-Force in					
	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978
<i>Africa</i>						
Kenya	86	79	5	8	9	13
Nigeria	71	56	10	17	19	27
Tanzania	89	83	4	6	7	11
<i>Asia</i>						
India	74	74	11	11	15	15
Indonesia	75	60	8	11	17	29
Nepal	95	93	2	2	3	5
Philippines	61	48	15	16	24	36
Singapore	8	2	23	38	69	60
<i>Latin America</i>						
Bolivia	61	51	18	24	21	25
Brazil	52	41	15	22	33	37
Colombia	52	30	19	23	29	47
Mexico	55	39	20	26	25	35
<i>Arab nations</i>						
Egypt	58	51	12	26	30	23
Iraq	53	42	18	25	29	33
Jordan	44	27	26	39	30	34
Sudan	86	79	6	9	8	12
Tunisia	56	45	18	24	26	31

Source: Table 19, *World Development Report 1980* (World Bank)

Not surprisingly, the percentage of the workforce in the industrial sector and this sector's contribution to GDP reflected the rapid growth in urban population. In virtually all seventeen nations, the proportion of GDP produced by agriculture fell between 1960 and 1978 while the contribution of industry rose (Table 8). Similarly, the percentage of the labour force in agriculture fell while that in the industrial sector grew. One notable exception was India. Here, the percentage of the labour-force in the agricultural and the industrial sector were the same in 1978 as they had been in 1960 even though the industrial sector's contribution to GDP grew from 20 to 26 per cent while that of agriculture declined from 50 to 40 per cent in that same period.

Current Settlement Problems

All seventeen governments are or have been confronted with comparable housing and settlement problems. On the one hand, most have large urban centres growing more rapidly than their housing, infrastructure and services base. It is not uncommon to find half or more of a major city's population inadequately served by potable water and sanitary waste disposal. Smaller cities' populations tend to be even worse served. Cities with a million or more people living in squatter settlements are becoming increasingly common. The formal construction sector provides housing units for only a small minority of the urban population. On the other hand, much of the rural population and those living in smaller settlements are often largely excluded from economic development and lack basic services. Very few governments have managed to extend services as basic as potable water to villages and small towns. Even fewer have successfully improved housing conditions in rural areas.

Among the seventeen nations studied, we found the majority of people badly housed and lacking direct access to the most basic services. It is worth recalling some of the statistics given earlier. In Egypt, the quantitative urban housing deficit was put at more than 1.5 million in 1975. On that date, urban housing needs were growing by some 150 000 a year while the combined efforts of both public and private enterprises in the formal sector was some 61 700 units. In East Jordan, official estimates suggest that housing needs are growing by more than 16 000 units a year between 1976 and 1985 (not including efforts to reduce the existing deficit) and yet the formal sector's target for 1976-80 was for 6200 units annually. In the Philippines, the housing backlog in urban areas was put at 981 000 units in 1977 while a recent estimate suggested that 4 million urban dwellers were living in slums and squatter settlements with very limited access to water, often no sanitary facilities at all and very often considerable danger from floods during the rainy season. In India, in 1973, the urban housing shortage was put at 3.8 million units. In Nigeria, the quantitative urban housing deficit was put at between 840 000 and 1 025 000 in the mid-1970s. In Kenya, urban housing needs grew by some 160 000 units between 1974 and 1978. The government aimed to meet half of these needs through publicly funded low-cost housing and serviced sites. It probably met no more than 5 per cent of these needs. In Bolivia, the formal sector (including publicly funded units) met only a few per cent of the annual growth in urban housing needs between 1970 and 1975. In Colombia, the quantitative urban housing deficit grew to three-quarters of a million units by 1974. In Bogota alone, in the mid-1970s, close to 70 per cent of the housing was categorized as substandard with the total quantitative deficit put at 247 000 units.

Although such figures are not directly comparable with each other since different criteria are used to estimate housing deficits, they do show how housing needs in major urban centres have far outstripped housing construction by the formal sector. Statistics on the state of rural housing are usually less precise or less up-to-date. Actual deficits are usually far less serious, since acquiring a site on which to build is less of a problem and materials are usually to hand. However, the condition of rural housing (particularly the health hazards presented by the use of traditional materials and the environment in which the rural population live) make it as pressing a problem as urban housing. This is especially so in nations with a large portion of their population in rural areas. Among the seventeen nations, Kenya, Tanzania, Nepal, Nigeria, Indonesia, India and the Sudan have three-quarters or more of their populations in rural areas in 1980. And yet, the tendency in each of these nations has been for government housing, infrastructure and services budgets to concentrate on serving urban populations, especially those in the largest settlements.

Most or all of the seventeen nations share other problems related to settlements. An obvious one is the list of environmental problems faced by large portions of their populations: lack of adequate sanitation, lack of efficient garbage collection, lack of primary health care and lack of control over dangerous discharges from industries and commercial enterprises. Another is the lack of basic services such as education or public transport. Such problems are not easily resolved since local governments so often lack the resource base and authority to do so. And the people most in need of improved services are usually those with the least ability to pay for them. In urban areas, it is certain sectors of the lower income groups who suffer most from poor public transport systems since the cheapest housing sites tend to be those with poorest access to employment opportunities and central city services. Thus, those least able to afford long busrides are often those who have to make them.

There are, of course, many other shared problems which do not relate directly to housing conditions but have a major bearing on living standards. The most obvious example is the lack of income sources to match the needs and aspirations of the growing population. In all seventeen nations bar Singapore, the labour-force is likely to grow at an annual average of 1.8 per cent a year or more between 1980 and 2000. For Tanzania, the Philippines, Colombia, Nigeria, Bolivia, Tunisia and Brazil, the figure is 2.5 per cent or more while for Mexico, Iraq and Kenya it is 3 per cent or more. This gives one an idea of the speed with which economic development must create new jobs.

However, the number of jobs that guarantee individuals or households a steady income above any reasonable definition of minimum subsistence is already far short of needs. Even with generally rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the growth in the labour-force usually far outstripped the creation of what are often referred to as 'formal sector' jobs. The result is an increasing proportion of the labour force working in the 'informal sector' which is characterized by fluctuating and generally below subsistence-level incomes. We do not have figures for the rate at which formal sector employment is expanding for each of the seventeen nations. But the *World Development Report 1979* stated that in the 1960s, the low-income nations (which include Nepal, Tanzania, Kenya, India the Sudan and Indonesia) absorbed less than 20 per cent of the growth in their labour-force each year.⁷ For the middle-income nations (which includes all the other nations in this study) with their generally more rapid industrial growth, less than 35 per cent of the growth in their labour force was absorbed into the industrial sector.

The result is unemployment or underemployment for large numbers of people with all that this implies in terms of incomes below subsistence level. For rural areas, surplus labour is not automatically drawn off to new urban employment opportunities. And in the urban areas, unemployment and underemployment becomes endemic with large percentages of the labour-force having to rely on insecure sources of income and, often, very low hourly returns for their work. With regard to housing conditions, this lack of secure income-earning opportunities relative to growing needs in both rural and urban areas implies a large and possibly growing proportion of households lacking the income to pay for improved housing or for charges to pay for basic services. This, perhaps more than any other factor, constrains any government attempt to improve housing conditions. In addition, the lack of purchasing power among the majority of people limits the generation of new economic activities within settlements to meet local consumer needs.

However, basic settlement problems—deteriorating housing conditions and lack of basic services—have been compounded by the generally low priority these have received in the allocation of government resources. Indeed, in most of the seventeen nations, they still are. The major multilateral lending agencies have also given little support to housing and basic service projects. Up to 1978, fifteen major multilateral agencies had committed only 1.8 per cent of their loans and grants to housing, site and services, slum upgrading, urban development and urban transport in their entire history. Only 5.2 per cent had gone to water supply and waste disposal projects, and 0.5 per cent had gone to building material projects. And the trend is for much of this multilateral aid to be concentrated in projects in the larger urban agglomerations.

However, rapidly deteriorating settlement conditions and the failure of economic development (by itself) to begin to tackle such problems have been forcing a rethink. As the earlier sections have shown, all seventeen governments are giving more attention to settlement problems. A few have done so to considerable effect over a

number of years. Some have done so over a similar period but to relatively little effect. And others are only just beginning to consider what policies are appropriate in dealing with mounting settlement problems. We will now assess the extent to which national settlement, land and shelter policies are contributing to 'the rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life' and the 'satisfaction of basic needs'. For these are the cornerstones of all the *Habitat Recommendations*.

Table 5 Multilateral aid agency commitments to settlement projects (Selected years, US\$ millions)

Agency	Period during which aid was given	Total agency commitments	Amount and percentage of total agency commitments to projects of 'direct impact' (see notes below)					
			Urbanization urban transport, urban housing		Water supply, waste disposal		Building materials	
			Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ^d	1947-78	58 419	864.1	1.4	2048.7	3.5	193.0	0.3
European Development Fund	1960-78	2 308	8.7	0.3	129.5	5.6	—	—
United Nations Development Programme ^b	1959-77	2 513.5	7.8	0.3	39.2	1.5	0.8	—
Interamerican Development Bank	1961-78	13 988	533.0	3.8	1330.0	9.5	91.8	0.6
Caribbean Development Bank	1971-78	180.1	15.1	8.4	39.0	21.7	—	—
Central American Bank for Economic Integration	1961-77	899.0	103.3	11.5	109.6	12.2	—	—
Andean Development Corporation	1971-78	352.6	—	—	—	—	11.0	3.1
Latin American Savings and Loan Bank	1975-78	66.0	66.0	100	—	—	—	—
Asian Development Bank	1968-78	5404.0	37.7	0.7	512.5	9.5	—	—
African Development Bank	1967-78	753.2	—	—	102.6	13.6	8.2	1.2
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	1974-78	576.2	—	—	157.3	27.3	—	—
Islamic Development Bank	1975-78	282.7	—	—	14.0	5.0	32.8	11.6
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	1976-78	452.5	5.13	1.1	8.6	1.9	47.7	10.5
OPEC Special Fund	1974-77	1074.5	—	—	113.9	10.6	57.0	5.3
Totals	1976-78	927.2	—	—	6.9	3.4	—	—
Totals	Various	88 296.5	1640.8	1.8	4611.8	5.2	442.3	0.5

Source: Blitzer, Silvia and Hardoy, Jorge E. (1980). *Aid for Human Settlements in the Third World: A Summary of the Activities of Multilateral Agencies during 1977 and 1978*, International Institute for Environment and Development

Notes

Care should be taken in quoting or interpreting this data. Researchers wishing to use this should refer to the original paper from which it is drawn which explains how the projects which the multilateral aid agencies sponsor are broken down into those of 'direct', 'less direct' and 'indirect' impact on settlements.

^a Includes International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association and International Finance Corporation.

^b As all of UNDP resources are in the form of technical assistance, the assistance has been broken down according to category, and not included as a lump sum.

^c Construction of roads, electricity and water supply are included in this category, according to the Caribbean Development Bank's 1978 *Annual Report*.

National Settlement Policies

The Habitat Recommendations

The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most important objective of every human settlement policy. These policies must facilitate the rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs of food, shelter, clean water, employment, health, education, training, and social security without any discrimination. . . . In striving to achieve this objective, priority must be given to the needs of the most disadvantaged people.
Declaration of Principles, General Principles, paras 1-2

All countries should establish as a matter of urgency a national policy on human settlements, embodying the distribution of population and related economic and social activities, over the national territory.

Recommendation A1

Such a policy should . . . embody a firm political commitment and . . . be based on a critical assessment of the present situation of human settlements, the emerging trends, and the impact of past policies.

Text below Recommendation A1

A national policy for human settlements and the environment should be an integral part of any national economic and social development policy.

Recommendation A2

Human settlement policies should aim to improve the condition of human settlements particularly by promoting a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development among regions; and by making such benefits and public services equally accessible to all groups.

Recommendation A4

National human settlements strategies must be explicit, comprehensive and flexible.

Recommendation A5

There must be institutions at national, ministerial and other appropriate levels of government responsible for the formulation and implementation of

settlement policies and strategies for national, regional and local development.

Recommendation FI

National Action

As the sections on each nation's national settlement policy show, the general trend among the seventeen nations is for governments to become more involved in guiding economic development and give more consideration to the spatial distribution of social and economic investments. There is a growing acknowledgement that market forces operating both within and from outside the nation cannot by themselves promote development in the poorer and more undeveloped regions and cannot solve many of the settlement problems confronting both national and local governments. The pattern of industrial and agricultural development which market forces and past government policies have produced are recognized as one of the root causes of rapid urban growth in larger urban centres and, very often, economic stagnation in less urbanized regions and rural areas.

In the 1950s and 1960s, virtually every national development budget or development plan concentrated on promoting economic growth. The emphasis was on expanding the 'productive sector'—which usually meant industry and the infrastructure such as roads and powerplants that supported its development. Most of the seventeen nations had annual growth rates in GDP and in industrial production averaging 5 or more percent between 1960 and 1970. The exceptions tended to be the poorer nations such as the Sudan and Nepal. In some, emphasis was also placed on expanding agricultural production although concentration was usually on cash crops for export. We noted earlier the dependence of many of the seventeen nations on food imports while cash crops remain their major export.

The emphasis on expanding the productive sectors usually meant that social investment received low priority. And spatially, certain agglomerations (plus their hinterlands) and agricultural areas benefited from an expanding economic base while the rest of the nation was largely excluded from the development process. The concentration of industrial and commercial investment in a few major cities often resulted in much of the nation's public investment also being concentrated there as city governments struggled to keep up with infrastructure and service demands both for the expanding industrial base and for rapidly growing populations. The concentration of both private and public investment in a few settlements and regions inevitably exacerbated regional inequalities in both income levels and development.

By 1974, when preparations for the Habitat Conference began, most of the seventeen nations had much of their modern industrial sector in a few (or even one or two) cities. Per capita incomes and levels of service provision varied very considerably among regions, and large portions of the population still lacked access to basic services.

However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, national development plans were giving more attention to the provision of social services and were trying to make explicit their intention to spread social and economic development more widely. National Plans for Economic Development now became National Plans for Social and Economic Development. All seventeen nations now have national development

plans, most taking the form of five-year plans. And by 1979, each of the national governments was claiming that one of their key goals was to steer the benefits of economic development more widely than the operation of market forces alone would produce. Most of the national plans—including those of Egypt, Tanzania, India, the Philippines, Kenya, Jordan, Colombia and Mexico—talk of slowing migration to the major urban centres and encouraging industrial and commercial development in smaller urban centres. Several national plans including those of Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt and the Philippines identify specific settlements which are to be developed to counteract the attractions of the major city or cities. In both Brazil and Mexico, more attention is being given to a national urban policy. We should also recall Egypt's ambitious long-term settlement strategy to steer population growth away from Cairo and other 'overcongested' areas to rapidly developing cities along the Suez Canal, to satellite cities around Cairo and to new developments in previously undeveloped areas. Some governments, those of Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mexico among them, are seeking to reach a large portion of their rural population with improved services and infrastructure for settlements spread over the national territory. This development of 'intermediate centres' to counter the attraction of major metropolises and the spread of basic services to the rural population is very much in line with the *Habitat Recommendations* (especially B5). But despite certain similarities in the trend by governments to give more attention to spatial aspects of development policies—and certain similarities in strategy—enormous differences exist both in their scope and in the scale of political support they enjoy.

These differences are perhaps best highlighted by contrasting the experiences of five very diverse nations: India and the Sudan which have yet to develop anything approaching the beginnings of a national settlements policy and Singapore, Mexico and Tanzania where policies are more developed. India's Five-Year Plans have provided the framework for its national development policies for more than 30 years. The early Plans in the 1950s contained statements about the need for balanced regional development even if they included no major initiatives to try and achieve this. The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Plans (covering 1969–83) have sought to identify people and areas largely bypassed by development. There have been discussions about the need for a national urbanization policy. The Janata government, in power between 1977 and 1979, included major spatial goals in its development policies including more emphasis on rural development, on meeting basic needs and on steering new industrial and commercial developments to the smaller urban centres. But such major spatial goals had no national settlement policy within which to operate. As the *Asian Report* points out, 'there is no clear idea . . . of the type of settlement structure the new policies are going to promote'.⁸ The nation lacks a long-term development (and thus a long term national settlement) policy which addresses the fundamental causes of poverty and underdevelopment. Policies tend to be statements of intent that remain unimplemented.

In the Sudan, the Six-Year Plan (1977–8–1982–3) states that it intends to help more backward areas develop. But despite this, and despite the fact that the government recognizes that settlement policy should be intimately linked to socioeconomic development policy, the plan remains essentially sectoral in nature with its major emphasis being on expanding 'the productive sector'—agriculture and industry. And since much of the public and private investment continues to be in the three-town

capital and below it adjoining the Blue and White Nile, the more backward areas seem unlikely to receive much benefit from economic development.

In Singapore, the government has been committed to reaching the whole population with improved infrastructure and services. Together with successful economic development since 1960, most of the national population has benefited very considerably both in terms of income, and education, health and quality of life. Although there is no explicit national settlements policy, the government has in effect pursued a consistent long-term settlements policy through a masterplan and through government controls on type and location of development. But Singapore's size, population and economic base makes it a special case. Any comparison with nations such as the Sudan has limited validity: the one being a tiny nation with high population density and a booming economy; the other, huge, underpopulated and lacking economic development. The main island of Singapore covers only some 600 square kilometres. It is best seen as a metropolitan area where city government has successfully decentralized urban growth to new towns (which are essentially residential suburbs) and to new nuclei within the metropolitan region. In doing so, it has brought most of the area's population into the development process.

Tanzania is unique in several ways. It was one of the first Third World nations to come close to an explicit settlements policy and to use such a settlements policy as the spatial framework within which socioeconomic development policy occurred. Furthermore, the settlements policy concentrated on rural areas. A villagization programme starting in the late 1960s and accelerating in the mid-1970s has brought most of a formerly scattered rural population in or close to villages. The aim was to stimulate new economic activities, to provide the rural population with basic services and to encourage communal enterprises. Since more than four-fifths of the population live in rural areas,⁹ the long-term aim is to slow migration to the major urban centres and bring the whole nation into the development process. While there is no sign of urban migration being slowed—indeed, available figures suggest Tanzania has one of the world's most rapidly growing urban populations—and the programme's economic impact has been criticized, the villagization programme has allowed a very considerable proportion of the rural population to benefit from better health care, education and water supply and from more involvement in government development plans. For urban areas, although there is no explicit long-term policy, successive Five-Year Plans have been consistent in seeking to promote industrial and commercial development in regional capitals (especially in nine designated as 'growth centres'), on steering migrants away from Dar es Salaam and, more recently, on moving the government to a new capital in Dodoma. Again, the aim is a better spread of urban and industrial development throughout the national territory.

In Section III, we noted Mexico's increased commitment to a national settlements policy and to setting up the institutional structure such a policy demands. In 1975, committees to promote regional development were set up to cover the whole nation except the Federal District (the centre of Mexico City metropolitan area). In 1976, amendments to the Constitution and a General Law on Human Settlements set the legal framework for a national settlements policy. The Ministry of Public Works became the Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works. Its Minister became chairman of the interministry National Commission for Urban Development set up in 1977, which aimed to coordinate the work of all the various sectoral government

agencies and thus make their plans and national settlement plans compatible. The Commission was to work with the new Ministry in implementing the National Plan for Urban Development. The draft plan being discussed in 1978 would aim to encourage the growth and development of smaller cities and to improve infrastructure and service standards in rural areas.

Simply picking on these examples does not mean that other governments among the seventeen nations have also not begun to evolve settlement policies. The Philippines, like Mexico, has been developing a national settlement policy and setting up the institutional structure to implement it. Kenya's 1974–8 Plan included nine intermediate towns designated as growth centres to which industry was to be steered and where infrastructure and services were to be improved. The Plan also outlined a National Service Centre Hierarchy of small urban centres, market centres, local centres and rural centres through which the government intends to reach most of the rural population with improved services. The 1979–83 Plan's spatial aims remains consistent with those of its predecessor and some new growth centres are also to get special attention. The Indonesian 1974–9 Plan identified 87 small and medium-sized cities as potential growth centres within 26 provinces (from where most of the development action is implemented) and groups the provinces into four economic development regions to promote coordination and cooperation between provincial development plans. The Nepali government is seeking to spread urban and industrial development more widely. The nation has been divided into four development regions, each with its own development centre. And in each, growth axes linking major settlements on a north south axis are to be developed.

In fact, each country section on national settlement policies noted some government attempts to spread urban and industrial development more widely than has been the case in the past. But there are enormous contrasts as to the success of spatial strategies, to their realism, and to their long-term effects.

Assessment

A settlement policy of the kind envisaged by the *Habitat Recommendations* is essentially political for it arises from the need to address social and spatial inequalities created by economic development. The aim of such a policy is no less than the 'rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs' that the Declaration of Principles explicitly states. It must also include special attention to the most disadvantaged. Most governments claim these are among their most important goals; but few have made a major attempt to put into place a policy that has some hope of achieving such goals.

Policies to achieve such goals demand certain preconditions which the *Recommendations* spell out. They must embody a firm political commitment, which implies long-term financial support too. They must have the institutional framework to implement such a policy. This implies some concept of the settlement pattern and population distribution pattern the policy seeks to promote. They must be based on a critical assessment of current trends, past policies and the present settlement pattern. And they must be explicit. Since these points—and a commitment to a more equitable spread of development and to meeting basic needs—are the essence

of Habitat's *Settlement Policy and Planning Recommendations*, these will be the main focus of the assessment.

In fact, most of the seventeen nations fail on the majority of these counts. Only Tanzania and Singapore, each in their own very different ways, come close to meeting these preconditions. Tunisia has moved some way towards doing so in the last ten years. Mexico, Kenya and the Philippines have also moved some way, although the initiatives are too recent for any results to be in evidence.

Settlement Policies and the National Economy

As we have seen, several among the seventeen governments are giving settlement policies more political (and even financial) support. Institutional changes are being made. But emerging settlement policies are so often not based on a critical assessment of current trends and past policies. Governments are not recognizing the limits and constraints imposed on settlements policy by national and international forces over which they have little or no control.

Each nation's settlement pattern and its change over time inevitably reflects the pattern of economic activities and how this is changing. If a nation has rapidly expanding metropolitan centres and stagnant villages, this simply reflects economic trends. If a backward region is to be developed, the government has to reverse or modify social and economic trends which caused the region to be backward. If there is to be economic development, it has to increase the region's comparative advantage either within the national or the international market.

Governments use three direct methods of increasing investment in specific towns or regions. The first is direct investment in basic services—improving health and education services, providing protected water supplies and so on. The second is by public investment in new economic activities there—say a new publicly owned factory or state plantation. The third is by using public funds to encourage private investment there by, for instance, developing infrastructure or giving cheap credit. (There are also structural reforms such as changes in taxation or agrarian reforms which can have profound effects on the spatial distribution of private investment but these are discussed in the next subsection).

The first option, direct investment in improving basic services, is perhaps the most direct way of improving living conditions for lower-income groups without major structural reforms. And yet, few governments have maintained a sustained programme to reach most of their population with basic services. The various responses (and the beginnings of a change in government attitudes) will be examined in more detail later. But only a minority of governments have shown a serious commitment to providing rural populations with improved services, even when they represent half or more of total population.

The second option is only open to governments who are responsible for part (or most) of productive sector investment. But there are constraints here to the public sector's ability to more equitably spread industrial growth and development across the nation. A new enterprise, whether publicly or privately owned, will have to sell its products or services to create incomes (and thus contribute to the area's economy). Public sector industrial investment is often located with no careful assessments as to which location will best serve both economic efficiency and a more equitable spread of

industrial development. The location of such investment may well be determined by political bargaining—a point to which we will return in the next subsection. The result is often government-owned enterprises working below capacity with few local linkages or producing relatively expensive goods since the location does not suit the operation.

But in addition, powerful sectoral ministries such as the Ministry of Industry must agree that the benefits of locating one of the new government funded plants in a backward area outweighs the possible diseconomies. Officials from industry ministries or from national economic planning offices are under pressures to maximize their own sectoral achievements, regardless of wider social and spatial goals.

The third option open to governments is to use public funds to encourage private investment in specific towns or regions. This can take the form of improved infrastructure such as the provision of electric power or upgraded road networks. Or it can take the form of financial incentives such as cheap credit or special tax allowances. A combination of these have been widely used in both First and Third World nations. In most of the seventeen nations, the location of private investment was a (if not *the*) major factor in determining where development took place. Private investment will not go to a relatively backward or undeveloped region or settlement unless this appears the most profitable course. Government incentives to encourage investment in such regions can only achieve their objective if they make it worthwhile for private investors to do so.

But even if a government programme is successful in steering industrial and commercial development to a backward region, this by itself does not guarantee development that benefits a substantial proportion of the population. Third World governments do not have much control over the type of technology used although this has important implications on the type of development that takes place, the number of jobs created (directly or indirectly), the associated economic activities it will generate or support locally and so on. If the result of a regional development programme is simply a few capital intensive industries or mines, in the region itself, a small élite will benefit. The products are very often destined for markets outside the region or even the nation; so too are the operations' profits. Meanwhile, the majority of people in the region have seen little improvement in their life as a result, despite economic growth in the region's GDP (and even an increase in the proportion of national GDP the region produces).

Indeed, public investment in a relatively poor region may even help impoverish lower income groups still further. Improved transport infrastructure may allow enterprises from outside the region to take over markets formerly supplied by local enterprises who had remained competitive only because of poor (and thus expensive) interregional transport links. In addition, most of the population in a poor region lacks the resources to take advantage of government incentives to help increase production. Thus, the élite may strengthen their position by having access to cheap credit. Or they may be in the best position to take advantage of, for instance, public investment in water projects encouraging wider use of irrigation. Incentives offered to local farmers to help them increase production usually results in the displacement of rural labour (through increased mechanization) and tenants being dispossessed since it is now more profitable for the landlords to farm the land themselves. There are numerous examples in nations such as the Philippines or India or Indonesia where the more

wealthy landowners have had the resources to make use of new technology and new seeds so they become the main beneficiaries of agricultural development programmes. And there have even been cases where agricultural development programmes have increased the price of basic crops for the local population since the development is geared to increasing exports, not increasing national consumption.

Thus, there are internal limitations as to what a government can achieve in changing the 'geography of development' spatially and who benefits within each area's society. There are also external limitations, as we discussed in the previous section from world economic forces. The drive to increase exports because of serious balance-of-payments problems may go against development aims. No government can fund a major social investment programme without a reasonably healthy economy. Tanzania's ambitious social and spatial development programmes will suffer if it is forced to adopt economic policies (such as increasing cash crop exports or cutting public expenditures on basic services) that go against the longer term social and spatial goals.

In most of the government policies studied, there seems to be an inadequate understanding firstly of what a settlement policy should be and secondly of what it can and cannot achieve. There is a lack of 'critical assessment of the present situation . . . the emerging trends and the impact of past policies' (*Recommendation A2*). There is, for instance, little attempt among most nations to carefully examine the spatial distribution of public investments the various sectoral development plans imply with careful projections as to the pattern of private investment this will promote. Many proposed policies or strategies do not take full account of the factors limiting the spread of economic and social development more widely or preventing the slowing of the growth of major urban areas. And there seems to be an inadequate understanding of the possible conflict between social and economic development. It is significant that according to *Recommendation A4*, settlement policies should aim to improve settlement conditions by 'promoting a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development among regions and by making such benefits and public services equally accessible to all groups'.

Perhaps the major failing in emerging settlement policies is the lack of sectoral coordination. A settlement policy is intended as the spatial framework within which all public investments are made. It seeks to guide private investment while recognizing the limitations on its abilities to do so. It is not only a question of steering new investment to a certain region or settlement but of devising complementary social and economic investment patterns at local or regional levels which fit within national policies.

Examples of the limited success of regional development programmes are common. In India, encouraging industrial development at Rourkela and Bhilai did little to stimulate development around them and raise living standards for their local population. In Mexico, the regional development commissions for coastal basins on the Gulf and the Pacific based on the Tennessee Valley Authority model did not produce the hoped-for boost to industrial and urban development and thus some decentralization of industrial investment away from the Central Valley. In Brazil, we have noted already the failure of regional programmes in the Northeast to address the basic needs of the region's population. The same is true for the Brazilian government's programme to develop the vast Amazon region. At one time, the construction

of the Trans-Amazon Highway was to be accompanied by land distribution to settlers from the Northeast each side of the new road. But emphasis switched from providing low-income families with land to encouraging development by large companies by giving generous incentives to encourage investment there. Although some of these developments may have created many jobs, most of them have displaced indigenous Indians, settlers and squatters while having worrying long-term implications regarding the stability of the region's soil and micro-climate. Furthermore, the products from the large estates owned by companies there are primarily for export.

Certainly, some of the settlement policy goals formulated in the last few years seem unrealistic, even though it may be too early for evidence of whether or not they are working. For instance, an official publication on the Philippine's settlement policy states that part of a policy of industrial dispersal includes 'a ban on new industrial establishments within a 50 kilometre radius of the city of Manila'.¹⁰ It seems unlikely that new industrial investments will be severely curtailed in what is the nation's economic core. Similarly, one wonders to what extent the Janata government in India succeeded in its policy to steer industrial investment away from major cities to village and small-scale industries.

Even in the richer, more urban and more developed nations such as Brazil and Colombia, emerging spatial goals do not seem to be backed with policies that might allow the goals to be met. In Brazil's 1975-9 National Development Plan, there is talk of a national integration strategy to achieve a more equitable spread of social and economic development, the aim being 'to compensate for the diseconomies and disutilities generated by the acceleration of the industrialization and/or urbanization process'.¹¹ Regional inequalities are to be minimized by regional industrial complexes, with special 'integrated' programmes for Amazonia, the Northeast and Brasilia. But the Plan does not specify the economic policy tools to achieve these goals and to steer industrial development to the more backward regions. Nor has it been made clear how the national policy is to be made compatible with regional, state and municipal level plans and with basic social problems. Colombia's new programme aiming to raise living standards for the poorest half of the urban population in smaller cities also aims to reduce migration to the four major urban centres. But if private industrial and commercial investment continues to concentrate in these four cities, it is unlikely to achieve this second aim, however successful it is at improving living conditions.

Tanzania's 1976-81 Plan claims that the policy of encouraging growth in nine growth centres, first formulated in the 1969-74 Plan, has failed because 'Dar es Salaam has remained a major gravitational centre for investments, population and other social utilities'.¹² It is unrealistic to assume that they could make such rapid changes in prevailing settlement trends. The results of Tanzania's settlement policy can only be judged in ten or more years. By then, it should be possible to see whether a concentration on rural development has slowed rural-to-urban migration, whether the development of alternative growth centres has reduced Dar es Salaam's primacy and whether urban and industrial development has been decentralized without too great a cost to economic efficiency.

With good reason, Egypt's long-term spatial plans seek to accommodate virtually all population growth over the next two decades in areas away from the Nile Delta and Valley. Rural population densities are among the highest in the world there, but

there are limits on what can be achieved. As Tanzania has discovered—and many other nations before them—stating in government plans that a settlement's growth is to be slowed or controlled is no guarantee that it will happen. The Egyptian plans have designated certain settlements as 'overcongested' so they will have population decreases over the next two decades. Meanwhile 'saturated' areas are to have no more population growth while what are today virtually uninhabited 'virgin' areas are to accommodate 14 or more million people by 2000. It seems unlikely that the Egyptian government can effect such radical changes in the distribution of population and development. Despite the very real boost to the economy that oil production (and exports) are already bringing, one wonders where the government can raise the money needed to develop areas in the Western Desert so they support 10 million people by the end of the century. No doubt, there are new settlements which can be developed with new irrigated lands in the New Valley and new industries around Mirsa Matruh if the Qattara Depression can be developed to produce cheap electricity. But are these two regions likely to absorb the equivalent of one third of all Egypt's population growth between 1979 and 2000? One wonders if Cairo's growth can be suddenly halted and reversed. Previous plans to limit it met with little success. One also wonders if private investment will go to 'virgin areas' and at what cost to the government in having to develop infrastructure and offer incentives. Such an ambitious plan can only drain government resources much needed in improving basic services and infrastructure in the villages, towns and cities where the population is living now. Thus, part of the Egyptian long-term spatial strategy does not seem to take full account of what government intervention is able to achieve.

Clearly, settlement policies which make use of economic trends are likely to have far more success. In Nepal, when malaria was virtually eradicated from the Terai, an underpopulated region with fertile soil was opened up. Not surprisingly, there was rapid migration from the Hill and Mountain areas with generally less fertile soil and very often serious population pressures and soil erosion. Thus, the Nepali government's policy of encouraging migration to this region was likely to meet with success. In fact, the government company set up to manage the resettlement programme could not cope with the rush of migrants, and illegal settlements sprang up. Similarly, the Egyptian government is likely to have more success in the part of its spatial strategy which aims to encourage the growth and development of cities along the Suez Canal. This is an area whose economic base is growing and likely to continue doing so. It also has well-established (and relatively short) transport links with Cairo. In conclusion, then, although it is somewhat of a truism to state that changes in settlement pattern can only reflect changes in the pattern of economic activity, it seems that most emerging national settlement policies do not take full note of this.

Settlement Policies and the Socioeconomic Structure

Clearly, the different levels of income, access to basic services and quality of the living environment within any nation reflect the differences in the economic and political strength of the various social groups that make up the nation. The nation's socioeconomic structure largely determines who benefits (and who does not) from economic development. We noted in the previous subsection how richer income groups or larger enterprises are obviously in a better position to benefit from the

development of infrastructure or special incentives offered by government to encourage investment in a backward area. And clearly, settlement policies (or the lack of them) are moulded or influenced by powerful groups so they serve the group's interest. The type and distribution of public investment in national development plans can point to the relative strength of certain pressure groups in influencing government policies since the policies so obviously serve their interests. The low priority given by a development plan to social investment shows the lack of political strength for the group demanding this. And the general concentration of social investment in urban areas shows the relative strength of the urban population in influencing resource allocations compared to their rural counterparts.

Throughout the *Habitat Recommendations*, meeting basic needs, special help for the most disadvantaged and bringing the whole population into the development process are continually stressed. But although national development plans increasingly claim that these are among their principal aims, few governments have shown a serious commitment to implementing the structural changes that are a precondition for progress towards them. Furthermore, the type and distribution of public investment in national development plans has not generally changed to reflect such aims.

Perhaps the most pertinent example of where structural change is a precondition for settlement policies of the kind Habitat recommended is in land legislation. The legislation governing who has what right over what land (and the extent to which the legislation is enforced) is a major influence on settlement development. It also powerfully influences the distribution of wealth and the spatial distribution of income (and hence settlement development). Although an analysis of government land policies belongs to a later page, lack of government action in this area illustrates the lack of serious commitment to achieving the *Recommendations'* central goals. The *Recommendations* note that land 'cannot be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled by individuals and subject to the pressures and inefficiencies of the market'. They also state that an unchecked land market 'may become a major obstacle in the planning and implementation of development schemes'. And yet few of the governments have made fundamental structural changes in the last five years; none have done so in rural areas. So although the concept of 'meeting basic needs' is becoming more popular in national development plans, there have been few efforts to actually change the prevailing landownership pattern that helps lock both rural and urban poor into continuing poverty.

Implicit in many government plans seems to be the belief that basic needs can be met and development spread to include the rural and urban poor with few (or indeed no) structural changes. As we noted in the previous section, the present workings of the economic system do not guarantee the distribution of wealth to peripheral regions and to lower income groups, even if the system's wealth is growing rapidly. But few among the seventeen governments seem prepared to make changes that would improve that distribution. There is a wide range of structural changes that could have a profound effect on the distribution of benefits. One obvious example is tax reform; another is in agricultural policies that do not exclude small farmers and enterprises from government-sponsored credit and incentive schemes. For instance, cheap loans are likely to benefit lower-income families if less rigid guarantees and less collateral is demanded as the condition for the loan. A third is the terms of trade between rural and urban areas which are affected by government controls on the price

of crops. Tax structure and the whole system of government supports for agricultural and industrial production profoundly influences the distribution of income and all that this implies in terms of each settlement's or region's purchasing power and thus the type of additional economic activities it will support and the living standards of the population.

Although our survey of the seventeen nations did not examine in detail either agricultural policies or tax structure, we did find many of the national 'social and economic development plans' with powerful biases running counter to stated social and spatial aims. The most common, not surprisingly, was the the rhetoric of 'uplifting the poor' with policies that best served the elites. One major example we will examine in detail in a later section is the gap between stated aims in improving housing conditions and the realities of a housing programme that chiefly serves relatively prosperous urban households.

Another major example is evident in development plans which concentrate public investment in urban areas, especially the largest cities. In fact, the bias is more social than spatial in that it reflects the relative power of social groups based in urban centres rather than the urban centres themselves. At the same time, public investment in rural areas can also reflect the relative political power of social groups there since such investment (as we have seen) chiefly benefits the larger and more prosperous landowners.

Nigeria's Third Development Plan 1975–80 illustrates this bias. One of its stated objectives is 'to enhance the quality of life of all citizens as development progresses'. Yet public investment continues to be heavily concentrated in urban areas, despite the fact that more than four-fifths of the population still lived in rural areas at the beginning of the Plan. The Plan also gave unprecedented support to housing provision for low-income urban groups entailing public investments of more than \$3 billion during the Plan period. Relatively little went to provide basic services in the smaller towns and rural areas while nothing was planned to improve rural housing conditions. As we noted in Section IV, a detailed study of allocations to town and country planning in Kano and Lagos states showed an emphasis on urban development in major administrative centres to the virtual exclusion of rural development. After years of neglect, the agricultural sector is receiving more support. But the major thrust of this support seems to be incentives to encourage agribusiness to develop large commercial farms. Such a policy is unlikely to promote improved living conditions for the vast majority of rural people and will probably hasten migration to the major urban areas where the new public housing programmes are making little impression on rapidly deteriorating housing conditions.

There are similar biases in the Sudan's development budget, despite the 1977–8 to 1982–3 Plan's stated intention to help more backward areas develop and check migration to urban areas. More than four-fifths of the nation's population lived in rural areas in 1975. Yet development expenditure in the Plan is concentrated in urban areas and in specific, large agricultural schemes in the areas to the south and east of Khartoum. The same is true in Kenya during the 1974–8 Development Plan. By the end of the Plan period, the eleven municipalities and Nairobi in particular had monopolized much of central government's grants to the 50 or so local government units. And as local governments lack their own funding base for development investment—as in many other nations—a lack of supra-local development funds limits basic service and infrastructure provision.

This kind of bias in sectoral allocation of public investment and in overall development policies in most of the seventeen nations further enhances the attraction of major cities

(or indeed one or two cities) to private capital. Housing budgets tend to concentrate on urban housing and usually only on projects in major cities. Very few have any major component for improving rural housing conditions despite the fact that in 1980, ten of the seventeen nations had more than half their population in rural areas while six had more than three-quarters. Rural housing programmes in Tunisia and, more recently, Tanzania, are the only notable exceptions. Mexico, too, has had some modest programmes and projects with some emphasis on improving living conditions in rural settlements. Infrastructure and service expenditure also tends to concentrate on major urban areas and urban services may be heavily subsidized while rural services remain almost non-existent. A more subtle form of urban bias is the fact that commerce, industry, financial services and major building enterprises may have to be close to government offices to function properly. Only through such close proximity can they easily secure the trade licences, import licences, low-interest credit and government orders on which their profits depend. Clearly, vested interests based in urban areas are far more successful at influencing development expenditure to serve their needs than are rural groups.

Urban biases in development investment are also reflected in the grants and loans given to Third World nations by the major multilateral aid agencies. When the spatial distribution of loans and grants from eight major multilateral aid agencies in Latin America were analysed, the general trend was for projects to favour large urban agglomerations with very little support given to projects in smaller towns and rural areas.¹³

Rural policies, too, often work against such commonly stated national objectives as 'slowing rural-to-urban migration'. Both the Nigerian and the Sudanese plans show this. In each, agricultural development programmes tend to benefit large commercial farming operations. Although arguments such as the need to increase export earnings or to rapidly increase food production may be advanced to justify such programmes, if these remain the major thrust of agricultural policy in nations with surplus rural labour, increased urban migration is the likely result. Alternatively, agricultural policies based on a revision of land tenure and encouragement of crop production that increases poorer rural households' income may slow such rural outmigration.

But governments seem unprepared, unwilling or incapable of making the needed structural changes to put such a policy into practice. Land redistribution and then technical and financial support for the smallholder to increase his contribution to national production has proved an effective remedy for lessening rural poverty and for increasing social and economic development. But it is not a path followed by such nations as Brazil, the Philippines and Colombia, despite the reserves of unutilized or underutilized land each nation has. Mexico in the 1930s and Bolivia and Egypt in the 1950s began major land redistribution programmes. But later development policies have not consolidated this redistribution by supporting the smallholder in developing the land and increasing his income. And legislation on maximum landholdings has been moderated or evaded for much of the richest agricultural land in all three nations.

The powerful vested interests influencing the type and spatial spread of public investment do not only act from outside government. Powerful sectoral ministries such as a Ministry for Industry must agree that the benefits of locating one of the new government funded or backed plants in a backward area outweighs the possible

diseconomies. Officials from industry ministries or from national economic planning offices are under pressure to maximize their own sectoral achievements, regardless of wider social and spatial aims. Similarly, powerful state or city governments with their own resource bases and political influence at national level must also agree to work within national guidelines if an effective national settlements policy is to be put into place. Teriba and Kayode noted that in Nigeria, the location of many federally funded industries had been 'determined by the sheer balance of political bargaining by the regional political pressure groups in the federal government rather than by any conscious policy of achieving a rationally distributed pattern of industries among the regions'.¹⁴

Thus, a national settlement policy has no hope of working unless it has the support of sectoral ministries and subnational levels of government. It also has no hope of achieving some of the major Habitat goals unless it has sufficient powers and resources to enable it to implement policies that inevitably conflict with powerful private interests. This is why the *Recommendations* suggest that institutions and national, ministerial and other appropriate levels of government will be needed to formulate and implement settlement policies (*FI*). Only in Mexico and the Philippines have ministerial-level bodies concerned with national settlement policy emerged. And even there it is not clear whether their efforts to spread the benefits of development more widely, socially and spatially, will not be shackled by powerful interest groups. Nor is it clear whether these can convince powerful public bodies to work within their framework.

Mention could be made of many other government policies which go against explicitly stated government goals. For instance, government intervention in keeping food prices down or in appropriating a larger share of the revenues from cash crop revenues inevitably restricts rural development. And it may be that policy-makers know full well that such goals as 'slowing rural-to-urban migration' and 'spreading development over the whole national territory', stated in national plans, have no chance of being fulfilled because needed structural changes and appropriate sectoral policies are not in place.

But when reading government plans, one gets the impression that government planners are quite surprised that such goals are not being achieved. It seems they still believe that poverty can be attacked and a far wider proportion of the population brought into the development process without any major changes in the socio-economic structure. It also seems that they still believe the problem of regions largely bypassed by the nation's economic development will be solved by continued economic growth; the effects of the economic cores' growth eventually stimulating growth and development in the peripheral areas.

Although the national studies on which this is based did not make a special study of, for instance, how regional income disparities had changed over time (the data was simply not available for most nations), we found no evidence to support either of the above hypotheses regarding automatic redistributive mechanisms spreading the benefits of economic development both socially and spatially. Furthermore, even if such mechanisms do eventually come into play once a certain level of economic development and per capita wealth is achieved, many Third World nations may never achieve such levels. Thus, government planners relying on such mechanisms to increase the share of benefits reaching the poor majority in both rural and urban areas are likely to continue waiting in vain.

Settlement Policies and Political Models

A government's ability to implement an effective settlements policy must relate to the strength and nature of its power base, that is, to the strength and nature of the group or groups that keep it in power. Combating poverty in large portions of the national territory may depend on fundamental structural changes that the government cannot (or is not prepared to) make. While social investments such as improved health care, education or protected water supplies can improve living standards for the poor, they do not necessarily get to the root of the poverty—lack of land or lack of income. Structural changes such as land redistribution or legislation limiting landlords' tenancy terms may be a precondition to an effective basic needs policy in rural areas. It may also be a precondition for stimulating growth and development in villages or small towns. Only with broadly based agricultural development can the community's purchasing power increase sufficiently to support increasing commercial activity and possibly some light industrial development too.

No simple generalizations are possible about the type of government which can implement a settlements policy based on the *Recommendations*. Clearly, it must be committed to a high level of social investment and meeting basic needs. It will need a strong power base since some policies will inevitably conflict with the interests of powerful groups. And within the government, there will generally have to be a group that continually promotes the cause of the rural poor. In many of the seventeen nations, the rural population's illiteracy, lack of organization and isolation from politicians' eyes ensures that their needs are usually ignored, since they have relatively little power as a political force, despite their numbers.

There also has to be some consensus in government as to what the settlement policy is seeking to achieve and as to what form it should take. The policy has to have long-term goals and needs consistent policies to support these goals. Two nations with major differences in size, ideology, wealth and level of urban and industrial development—Singapore and Tanzania—have both had a long-term settlement policy stretching back a decade or more. But there are interesting points of comparison in their political models. Both have what are often judged to be authoritarian or even almost totalitarian regimes. Both have what are essentially one party states (although with periodic elections). But it seems that the majority of each nation's population endorses or at least accepts their government's actions over the last 20 years. Both governments have been in power since the early 1960s unchallenged by serious social dissent. Both have a strong commitment to improving living standards for the whole population and both, in very different ways, have met with some success in doing so. And both have had a certain consistency in their settlement strategies and in the way they have been implemented.

A strong and comparatively long-term power base seems a necessary (if not sufficient) precondition for a successful national settlements policy. In Brazil, rapid economic growth rates between the middle 1960s and middle 1970s with a strong military government not answerable to an electorate could have allowed for effective state action in implementing a national settlement policy. *Políticas de asentamientos humanos*¹⁵ suggests that Brazil's social policies after the military took over in 1964 can be seen to reflect the degree of social control the government achieved. After coming to power, government housing policies sought to obtain the support of the urban

lower-income groups. But once firmly entrenched, the new government's policies switched to supporting the private sector while doing little to tackle mounting income disparities and continued poverty for large portions of the national population. More recently, increased support for social programmes and low-income housing can be seen as ways of dispelling tensions created by overconcentration on economic growth.

A similar reason may be suggested for increased commitment to a settlements policy in the Philippines and for more concern with settlement problems in Indonesia. They, like Brazil, have a highly centralized administrative system and a national government in which a small group wield enormous power and in which military or ex-military personnel figure prominently. Economic power is also in the hands of a relatively small élite who have prospered (directly or indirectly) from rapid industrial and economic growth over the last two decades. All three have large portions of their population benefiting little (if at all) from such development. And in all three, the government has claimed to support the uplifting of the poor, but in the past has done far less than its rhetoric has suggested. The tendency has been to sidestep changing the socioeconomic structure. Past experience suggests that their new commitment will not actually help the poor much, although it is too soon to judge the results of new initiatives. Certainly, in the Philippines the government's commitment to a major human settlements policy has been constantly stated with a ministerial-level body—the Ministry of Human Settlements—recently set up to direct the new initiatives.

Countries with powerful polarized interests continually competing for office will usually have the greatest difficulty in formulating and implementing any long term development policy. If government ideology changes every few years, a consistent settlements policy is not likely to be implemented. In Colombia, between 1957 and 1975, a coalition 'National Front' ruled with two major parties, Conservatives and Liberals, taking turns for Presidency every four years. But spatial policies tended to change with each president. The Regionalization model with its eight planning regions and hierarchy of settlements to be developed to check Bogota's growth and bring the whole nation into the development process was dropped in 1971. The new Conservation government that came to power in 1970 under Misael Pastrana regarded the model as involving excessive government interference. The development plan that replaced it was more sectoral in nature.

One reason for India's lack of a long-term settlement policy seems to be the opposing factions who concentrate on short-term political issues. For instance, the polarized debate between rural and urban supporters obscures the real issues and prevents the implementation of a consistent development policy (and hence a consistent settlements policy). Another is its sheer size of population. Administrative and legislative power are centred at state and federal levels. With such centralization (many states have more than 40 million inhabitants while Uttar Pradesh has more than 100 million), national and state representatives remain distant from local problems while local governments lack the resources to tackle them.

Clearly in all nations, the spatial organization of government and the relative powers (and resources) available to different levels of government down the hierarchy from national to local has a major bearing on the distribution of public investment and thus development. Nigeria is a particularly interesting case. In response to strong political differences between the north, east and west—and then within these regions—the number of states was increased from three in 1956 to five, then twelve

and finally, in 1976, to nineteen. Although Lagos remains the dominant commercial and industrial centre, major manufacturing centres have developed in many of the states. Since the 1950s, state governments have sought to develop their own industrial base. Federal investments could not afford to favour only a few select states with industrial investment. Despite the problems already discussed of federally funded industrial projects' locations being guided more by politics than by careful choice, this has ensured a comparatively decentralized pattern of urban and industrial development nationally, even if within each state, this development has tended to concentrate in the regional capital.

By its nature, a federal government will tend to address inequalities in development levels among its states in a way unitary governments do not feel obliged to do. Perhaps the Mexican government's concern with regional development programmes which dates back to the 1940s and the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme under President Echevarria (1970-6) owe their origin to demands by state-level groups for a more equitable spread of development. And the new institutional developments including a new sub-ministry to head national settlement policies (as Habitat recommended) suggests a new commitment to addressing the needs of the rural population and the less prosperous states. But it is too early to judge whether the new institutional arrangements will have the political and financial power to ensure that an effective settlements policy is formulated and implemented.

However, the generalization that a federal government will tend to address regional inequalities more than a unitary government does not hold true for Brazil. A large portion of the nation's most productive export agriculture and much of its industry are concentrated in the state of São Paulo. Within nations, whether federal or unitary governments prevail, the relative strength of regional political forces in the decision making process must be a major factor influencing the spatial distribution of government funds. This also relates to the relative role of regional, district and local authorities in formulating development plans and in implementing them. Few generalizations are possible about the seventeen nations, as each has its own unique political structure. But despite the prevailing tendency for major planning decisions to remain concentrated in the hands of central government, several nations have recently strengthened the role of subnational levels of government. In the Philippines, regional and local bodies have been given more planning powers. And the National Economic and Development Authority's long-term plans suggest that this will be further consolidated when the twelve planning regions have their own regional governments with their own legislature and executive councils. Tanzania has also given its 21 regions more power both in formulating and implementing development programmes. With two-fifths of the budget and the civil service decentralized to the regional level in 1971, the planning and implementation of regional programmes was reported to have improved very considerably.¹⁶ In Kenya, regional (provincial) and district authorities are being given a greater role in planning as well as implementation. In the Sudan, a new physical planning law seeks to decentralize settlement planning and implementation to the regional level, to work along the same lines as local government structure, decentralized in the early 1970s. The Tunisian government has recently strengthened both the regulatory powers and the funding base of municipal governments and has decentralized the institution in charge of housing construction for lower income groups into four; one each to serve the north, Tunis, the centre and the south.

In some other nations, subnational levels of government play major roles in implementing development programmes but remain comparatively weak in actually formulating development plans. This is true for nations as diverse as Nepal, Indonesia and Egypt. In Indonesia, provincial administrations under the governor implement development programmes while the 26 provinces are also grouped into four economic development regions to promote interprovincial cooperation. But major planning decisions remain at central government level. In Nepal, district level offices play the leading role in implementing development programmes with the 75 districts grouped into four development regions. But again, all major planning decisions remain in the hands of central government. Egypt has the hierarchy of governorate, town/district and village councils but these subnational levels are hardly involved in policy formulation at all. In some cases, the lack of plan formulation at subnational levels of government may relate to the lack of professional staff. In others, it relates more to central government's desire to retain control over all major decisions. This second reason seems to apply in several of the seventeen nations, including Indonesia, the Philippines and the Sudan. National borders tend to be somewhat arbitrary lines drawn during the colonial period which brought culturally and ethnically diverse peoples into the same nation or divided a strong single group. Central government's control of major decisions may relate to its attempt to unify the nation and suppress regional groups' powers.

Settlement Policies and Level of Development

As we noted in the Background (page 195), a nation's performance in the world market inevitably affects development possibilities and hence the possibility of effective settlement policies. For poorer nations, desperate to close widening balance-of-payments deficits or find investment capital for their plans, a concentration on developing those settlements and areas which give the quickest payoff in terms of industrial or agricultural development is an almost inevitable response. The result is often platitudes in national development plans about the need for regional balance or for improving living standards for everyone but with plans which have little or no hope of doing so. Alternatively, it may be ambitious settlement policies whose achievements depend on a level of economic success which the country is unable to attain. Tanzania planned to move its capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma as one of several policies designed to lessen Dar's primacy. However, Dodoma's growth and the movement of ministries and other government offices have had to be slowed due to national economic problems. Settlement policy, like the whole development effort, will inevitably be constrained by economic difficulties.

However, the poorer and relatively rural nations do have the advantage of being latecomers in that their urban pattern is still in the process of formation. Despite the formidable problems confronting nations such as the Sudan, Nepal, Tanzania, Kenya and Bolivia, the governments could have the ability to influence the pattern of industrial and economic development while essentially directing the pattern of social development in a way that other nations with longer urban traditions and a higher percentage of people in urban areas do not have. In 1978, none of these nations had a city with a million people, even if Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and the Sudan's three-town capital were approaching this figure. A careful assessment of what each government

can achieve, given its limited powers and lack of financial resources, could help to produce a national development pattern and settlement pattern less inequitable both spatially and socially than those of societies with longer histories of urban and economic development. Clearly, Tanzania is aiming at just this, and has already done much of the groundwork. Kenya has gone some way too, and so has Nepal. In the Sudan, there is evidence of government planners giving more consideration to spatial issues. But current development expenditure is concentrated in the few major towns and in major agricultural schemes in the central region around the three-town capital.

Thus, the governments of such nations have the possibility of steering social and economic development in a way that mitigates such development's tendency to concentrate in a few select areas or settlements without sacrificing economic efficiency. Clearly, some regions and settlements will inevitably continue to be relatively more prosperous than others. But as experiences have shown in Tanzania (and in such nations as China and South Korea not covered by this survey), basic services can be extended to reach a large proportion of the rural population without excessive government expenditure. And as we noted earlier, some economic development can often be stimulated in the poorer regions, if the government is able and willing to make the needed structural reforms. Such changes may be more easy to put into place in nations with a high proportion of their population still in rural areas and most of their labour force still in agriculture. In such nations, the urban-industrial élite are not sufficiently strong to block changes that moderate inherent urban biases in development plans. As Galbraith commented, 'with increasing well-being, all people become aware, sooner or later, that they have something to protect'. One of a national settlement policy's goals is to put into place the type and spread of public investment and guidance of private investment that precedes the emergence of an urban-industrial élite sufficiently strong to ensure that all government policies become biased in its favour.

Land

The Habitat Recommendations

Land, because of its unique nature and the crucial role it plays in human settlements, cannot be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled by individuals and subject to the pressures and inefficiencies of the market. Private landownership is also a principal instrument of accumulation and concentration of wealth and therefore contributes to social injustice; if unchecked, it may become a major obstacle in the planning and implementation of development schemes. Social justice, urban renewal and development, the provision of decent dwellings and healthy conditions for the people can only be achieved if land is used in the interests of society as a whole. (*Preamble*)

Land is a scarce resource whose management should be subject to public surveillance or control in the interest of the nation.

(Recommendation D1)

Changes in the use of land, especially from agricultural to urban, should be subject to public control and regulation.

(Recommendation D2)

The unearned increment resulting from the rise in land values resulting from change in use of land from public investment or decision or due to the general growth of the community must be subject to appropriate recapture by public bodies (the community) unless the situation calls for other additional measures such as new patterns of ownership, the general acquisition of land by public bodies.

(Recommendation D3)

Public ownership, transitional or permanent, should be used wherever appropriate, to secure and control areas of urban expansion and protection and to implement urban and rural land reform processes and supply serviced land at price levels which can secure socially acceptable patterns of development.

(Recommendation D4)

Past patterns of ownership rights should be transformed to match the changing needs of society and be collectively beneficial.

(Recommendation D5)

The supply of usable land should be maintained by all appropriate methods . . .
 (Recommendation D6)

Comprehensive information on land capability, characteristics tenure, use
 and legislation should be collected and constantly updated. . . .
 (Recommendation D7)

National Action

Among the seventeen nations, there is evidence of governments seeking to increase public control over land-use and, in certain cases, limit private ownership rights. Many of the initiatives to do so have come in the 1970s. And most governments would now admit that private land markets and land-use in urban areas have to be guided and controlled by public policy. We noted in Section III (page 136) the Colombian document which stated that 'the belief in private initiative, so necessary in other areas of the economy, has led in urban issues to the supply of a hardly satisfactory and in many cases chaotic product. Vast extensions of utility networks and buildings are under-used or deteriorating while the urbanization process, guided by the incentive of private profit, proceeds with no control to the confines of the country's most productive land.'¹⁷ Officials in the other sixteen nations would no doubt agree with this diagnosis (even if some may have reservations about the judgement on private initiative's role in other sectors).

However, the scope of the seventeen governments' control over landownership and use varies enormously. So too does the effectiveness of this control in tackling settlement problems. At the risk of repeating what was stated in earlier sections, it is worth recalling briefly some of the urban land policies under four headings: patterns of ownership, (the definition of public and private rights); control of land-use changes; public ownership; and recapture of plus value. Government policies will then be assessed.

Patterns of Ownership (Recommendation D5)

The first step in any comprehensive urban land policy has to be the clear and unambiguous definition of public (or community) rights and private rights over landownership and use to ensure that society's needs are safeguarded. This is the essence of *Recommendation D5*. Considerable progress was made in the 1970s in establishing the principle of public (or community) rights that limit private landowners' rights. But the legislation and the political will to follow this up have not been so forthcoming.

Public authorities in each of the seventeen nations have the right to expropriate land in the public interest. In the four Latin American nations, the national constitutions establish the principle that individual rights over private property are not absolute. A new Constitution in the Philippines, introduced in 1973, allowed for the expropriation of private land for public purpose. In Mexico, the Constitution was amended in 1976 to give the nation 'the right to impose on private property the modes determined by public interest'.

But in several of the seventeen nations, despite the constitutional basis for government land expropriation 'in the public interest', government action has been very limited. Little attempt has been made to formulate and implement effective legislation that, for instance, allows public authorities to acquire land for low-income housing or serviced-site projects. In Indonesia, the public authorities have faced considerable difficulties in acquiring land for such projects, the land acquisition being hindered by no clear definition of what constitutes 'public interest' and no clearly stated guidelines for assessing compensation. In Colombia, attempts to pass a law clarifying public rights to land expropriation and control date back more than a decade. As yet, no law has been passed. Bolivia's 1976-80 Plan included a proposal 'to control the use and appropriation of urban land' but gave no details of how this was to be done.

In four of the seventeen nations—Singapore, Tunisia, the Sudan and Tanzania—substantial progress has been made. In two others—Nigeria and Mexico—there have recently been major changes. And in Brazil, initial steps towards such a policy may have begun.

In Tanzania and the Sudan, virtually all land is publicly owned. This ensures public authorities have the powers to guarantee public rights in land-use. We also noted how in Tunisia, despite widespread private ownership of urban land, two public agencies have the power to expropriate land they need for housing developments. The Agencie Foncière d'Habitation buys undeveloped urban land (by expropriation if necessary), develops it and sells it at cost price to private developers. The Société Nationale de la Tunisie (SNIT), set up to undertake 'social interest' housing projects for lower-income groups, can also expropriate land needed for public housing schemes.

In Singapore, the government laid down clear and explicit expropriation procedures, including the definition of how much compensation should be paid. Public authorities, including the major public housing agency, the Housing and Development Board, have considerable powers for the compulsory purchase of land. Although assessments of government urban housing policies belong to later pages, it is worth noting that these four nations, the Sudan, Singapore, Tunisia and Tanzania, have among the largest urban housing or serviced-site programmes relative to the size of their urban populations.

During Nigeria's 1970-4 Plan, the public authorities found it difficult to acquire land for public projects. Despite expropriation powers, public land acquisition was hampered by the level of compensation demanded by private landowners. Various initiatives were taken in 1975 and 1976 including a decision to set up land banks and to streamline compensation procedures. But the most fundamental change was made in 1978 with the Land Use Decree. This stated that all land was to be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all under the state governors' authority.

In Mexico, the new General Law on Human Settlements backed by the changes to the Constitution set the legal basis for more effective land-use control by public authorities. Land-use powers at federal, state and municipal levels were strengthened. The Law also allows for specific urban development plans to set up reserve areas for accommodating future growth. Although no Federal Law on urban development had emerged by 1978, two state laws show the direction urban land policies are taking. The State of Mexico's Urban Development Law established the public authorities'

rights to set up and enforce land-use plans while the State of Jalisco's Human Settlements Law enables public authorities to regulate land speculation and establishes a tax on unearned increments in land value.

In Brazil, the National Commission on Metropolitan Regions and Urban Policy's Draft Law on Urban Development seeks to separate ownership rights from development rights. This separation is evident in two measures: the fact that private builders would have to gain approval for and pay for any 'created area' their development involves; and the fact that government would have the power to force private landowners in areas of 'social interest' to develop or improve their land.

Control of Land-use Changes (Recommendation D2)

In virtually all settlements in the Third World that have experienced rapid population increases, urban growth has been haphazard and unplanned. Even when masterplans have been prepared, they are not usually enforced. It is to this problem that this *Recommendation* is addressed. And it makes special note of the need for public control of unplanned urban encroachments onto agricultural land since many major settlements are sited next to fertile soil and their uncontrolled growth has been at the expense of this valuable resource.

Earlier sections have shown how certain nations have recently sought to improve public control of changes in land-use. In the Philippines, some 600 square kilometres of land encompassing much of metropolitan Manila's population was proclaimed an 'urban land reform zone' in September 1979. The President stated that no more land could be sold and no building constructed without permission from the regulatory commission of the Human Settlements Ministry. In addition, more effort is being made to control urban growth in other major urban centres.

In Tunisia, the regulatory powers of municipal masterplans were strengthened during the 1973-6 Plan. In Mexico, changes to the Constitution and the new Human Settlements Law should provide the legal basis for more effective land-use control by state and municipal authorities.

In Egypt, a Comprehensive Planning Law has been under discussion for several years. If implemented, this would demand both rural and urban masterplans covering all settled areas and give governates and local authorities more power to control illegal subdivisions and protect agricultural land. In Singapore, the masterplan defines the way in which all land can be used. Planning permission is needed for all development projects, and the public authorities' control of changes in land-use is effectively enforced through such a system. In the Sudan, the fact that land is publicly owned allows the public authorities sufficient scope to control changes in land-use and to protect valuable agricultural land.

Public Ownership (Recommendation D4)

This recommends the use of public ownership (transitional or permanent) where appropriate for three distinct tasks. The *Recommendation* is very specific about the first two: securing and controlling areas of urban expansion; and implementing urban (and rural) land reform. The third is less specific: the supply of serviced land 'at price levels which can secure socially acceptable patterns of development'. For our analysis,

this is taken to mean the supply of serviced land at price levels which do not automatically exclude lower-income groups. Few students of urban problems would disagree that the exclusion of large portions of the population of most Third World cities from the urban land market (because they cannot afford to enter it) is the most 'socially unacceptable' aspect of land policies.

Many of the seventeen nations have examples of local or national governments increasingly using public ownership as an important part of urban land policies. As we noted earlier for Tanzania and the Sudan, virtually all land is publicly owned. However, it is worth noting that *Recommendation D4* includes the comment that 'public ownership of land cannot be an end in itself; it is justified in so far as it is exercised in favour of the common good rather than to protect the interests of the already privileged.' There have been instances in both industrialized western nations and in countries with centrally planned economies where replacing land-use allocation by market forces with allocation by public authorities, has not led either to more efficient or more egalitarian practices. However, in Tanzania, and increasingly in the Sudan, public ownership of urban land has led to a marked increase in the supply of urban land for housing at a price low-income groups can afford. The scale of both nations' housing-plot schemes would not have been possible without public landownership. The governments would not have had the resources to purchase needed land from private owners at market prices and then supply plots at a price lower-income groups could afford.

Singapore's case is somewhat similar for it too has made good use of public land reserves in settlement policies. In the early 1960s, when confronted with massive housing problems, Singapore's public authorities were fortunate in having a large portion of the national territory under public ownership including land located in or close to the city centre. The scale of their public housing programme since then would not have been possible if the government had had to expropriate all the land needed both for public housing estates in or near the city centre and for the new towns built around the island.

In both Jordan and Iraq, state land has been used both for public housing and for selling to housing cooperatives. It has been sold at prices well below market rates in order to stimulate housing construction (and presumably keep unit costs down). In Egypt too, publicly developed land is sold at cost (rather than at market value) to encourage housing construction.

In Tunisia and Kenya, public authorities have been active in buying up land needed for expanding urban areas. City councils in Mombasa and Nairobi have been buying up land both for public developments and for low-cost housing projects (although high compensation costs have hindered this programme). Nigeria's public housing programme has also been hindered by such high compensation costs. In Tunisia, the Agencie Foncière d'Habitation was set up to acquire land in advance of need, install infrastructure and sell it to developers. Mexico's Human Settlements Law allows for specific urban development plans to set aside areas that will accommodate future urban growth—but the initiative is too recent for any results to be in evidence.

In Bolivia, India and Nigeria, initiatives have sought to place ceilings on urban land holdings. Bolivia's Law on the Reform of Ownership of Urban Land dates from 1954. In the other two nations, the initiatives have been more recent. India's Land Ceiling and Regulation Act in 1976 set ceilings on urban land holdings and state governments

were empowered to acquire surplus land with a specified formula set to determine compensation. In Nigeria, the Land Use Decree set ceilings on undeveloped urban land-holdings of half a hectare in each state. In the Philippines, as part of the recently declared 'urban land reform zone' within metropolitan Manila, large landowners were asked to sell land to squatters who had illegally occupied it for more than ten years while a \$20 million fund was set up for land expropriation, this land to be allocated to landless and homeless people.

Recapturing Plus Value (Recommendation D3)

This includes a list of the various ways public authorities can recapture the unearned increment in land values which result from changes in land-use, from public investment or from the community's own growth. They include taxes such as capital gains tax on land sales, annual taxes based on land values with special rates for lands left vacant and betterment charges. They can also take the form of development charges for allowing changes in use which increase the property's value. Compensation rates for land expropriated by public authorities may be fixed according to the land's value at a specified time rather than its commercial value once the possibility of the public development becomes known. Land which is leased from public authorities can be on terms that ensures the unearned increments in value return to the community. All these in theory tend to reduce land speculation.

Taxation is the method most commonly used among the seventeen nations. Property taxes are levied in many of them although, it seems, with no special attempts to recapture unearned increments by having land values regularly reassessed and special rates for land left vacant. Singapore is an exception with property taxes levied on all lands and buildings based on the gross amount for which the property could be let, the rate of taxation varying with location. In addition, all developments have to be approved by the public authorities and development charges can be levied before permission is granted. Planning permission remains valid for only two years to ensure that land is not left vacant. And in 1978, compensation payments for land expropriated for public purpose were fixed at the property's value in November 1973.¹⁸ In Tanzania, a Land Rent and Service charge plays the same role as a property tax; 10 per cent of the economic value of unimproved urban land is levied annually with land values periodically reassessed. Kenya, too, has a site value tax based on the value of the unimproved site together with an estate (or death duty) tax applicable to land holdings and a capital gains tax (introduced in 1975).

In Colombia, land transactions are also subject to capital gains tax. In addition, Colombia has a betterment levy (or tax on unearned increment) which dates from 1921 when it was put in place to recoup some government expenditure on irrigation and flood control. In 1943 it was extended to cover 'works of public service' and in 1966 to cover 'works of public interest'. This has been used to recapture some of the costs of street construction and road improvement, of establishing parks and of redeveloping deteriorating communities in Colombia's larger cities. Although no federal law in Mexico deals with the recapture of unearned increment, the state of Jalisco's Human Settlements Law established a tax on unearned increment.

In Jordan and Iraq, the public authorities have the right to appropriate one-quarter of a property without compensation if the value of that property has appreciated in

value as a direct result of public works. Iraq also has a tax on vacant land while Jordan's 1976-80 Plan includes proposals for such a tax, for a capital gains tax and for an increase in the proportion of land which can be appropriated free of charge to 35 per cent. Both Jordan and Egypt have a tax based on a percentage of the sale price of land. And in Egypt, an annual tax on vacant land has been proposed.

Many of the measures outlined under previous headings help public authorities recapture some of the unearned increments in land values. For example, Brazil's Draft Law on Urban Development could recoup unearned increment through the development charges for 'created area'. And any measure that dampens the speed with which land values rise helps reduce the scale of the 'unearned increment'.

Assessment

All growing urban areas have conflicts of interest between the various groups seeking land for specific uses—from the lowest-income groups seeking accommodation close to possible sources of income, to a multinational seeking a site for a new factory, to an individual seeking to invest in urban land (and leave it undeveloped) since this gives a non-depreciating investment which rapidly grows in market value (in real terms). The major conflict in most urban centres was found to be between the private landowners and the housing needs of a large portion of the population. Another major conflict is between the public authorities in their efforts to control and guide the settlement's growth and those who operated contrary to public regulations: by squatting; by selling illegally subdivided land; by setting up commercial or industrial operations contrary to an area's zoning regulations; by individuals or enterprises constructing buildings contrary to official standards. The purpose of an urban land policy is to define the balance between individual citizens' land-use rights, every citizen's own land-use needs (for instance housing) and community needs (for instance public works and community facilities). It is to this task that the *Habitat Recommendations* were addressed.

Rather than seek to analyse in detail what each specific measure by each national government has achieved—a task beyond the scope of this study—we shall concentrate on two aspects. Firstly, how successful have national urban land policies been in ensuring a sufficient supply of land for housing with a price range that ensures every urban citizens' individual land-use needs for housing are met. Secondly, have urban land policies succeeded in guiding and controlling urban development.

Land for Housing

In most of the major urban areas in the seventeen nations, there is an inadequate supply of serviced land for housing. The price of legal, serviced plots generally puts them—and even the lowest cost units built on them—beyond the range of the majority of households. The market, by itself, does not cater for this need, nor have the public authorities met with much success in influencing the market so that it does so. The only response open to those who cannot find accommodation in existing houses is to go outside the law—to squat on public or private land or to purchase or lease illegally subdivided land. Since such land is illegally occupied, only very rarely does it have basic services. Very often, it is ill-suited to permanent habitation. Squatter

settlements appear, sometimes almost overnight, on swamps, dangerous slopes, ravines and areas subject to flooding if these can give the occupants the access they need to possible sources of income. In Cairo, an estimated million people are squatting in the City of the Dead. In Bogota, more than a million people live on illegally subdivided land. In 1973, metropolitan Manila had well over a million squatters in settlements in or around the city. Up-to-date statistics on the extent of squatting in most major cities proved impossible to get. However, the *Global Review of Settlements* produced by the United Nations for the Habitat Conference showed that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 30 per cent or more of the population of Nairobi, Mombasa, Ibadan, Rio de Janeiro, Port Sudan, Tunis, Dar es Salaam, Bogota, Buenaventura, Mexico City, Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Manila lived in 'slums and squatter settlements'. Official up-to-date statistics on the number of people living in overcrowded, unsanitary and ill-serviced units are rarely available. It is, for instance, usually impossible to obtain a breakdown as to the percentages of a city's population living in slums, on illegally occupied land or on illegally subdivided land. But in virtually every urban area where statistics were available, the slum and squatter populations were growing far faster than the total population. We have no reason to suspect this trend has changed much. Indeed, when current rates of formal sector housing construction are compared to urban population growth rates and when local researchers' estimates are considered, we would suggest that the few available official statistics considerably understate the magnitude of the problem.

Darin Drabkin points to the peculiar nature of the urban land market as being the major factor in this widening gap between the land needs of the low income urban majority and the reality of what they can obtain legally.¹⁹ This peculiar nature is seen most clearly in the fact that urban land's value is largely created by society's development but appropriated by a small elite of private individuals. Urban land's value is largely created by the development of the whole settlement (including public investment in infrastructure, services, and social/cultural facilities) but private landowners usually receive most or all the benefits of its rising value. Indeed, the landowners frequently leave the land undeveloped since the land itself does not suffer from depreciation over time and rising demand further increases its value. Such speculative withholding of urban land from development further limits supply and thus further pushes up land prices.

In addition, since the value of urban land relates as much (or more) to its location as to the building on it, its supply does not automatically expand to moderate rapid price increases as a result of rapidly growing demand. The value of urban land relates to the access it gives the user (whether living or working there) to income earning opportunities, services and infrastructure, important contacts, pleasant environment and so on. Although public investment in services and infrastructure can increase the supply of well located and serviced urban land, the reality in most Third World cities is that demand for such land is growing far more rapidly than city governments can increase supply.

As both private and public investment continues to concentrate in the major cities, and as these cities' populations continue to grow rapidly, obviously the demand for well located and serviced land also grows rapidly. Its scarcity and non-depreciating character makes it an attractive investment without the need (and expense) of developing it. This is especially so in nations with high inflation and limited

investment opportunities. And rapidly growing urban areas will demand more land for commercial and residential use so landowners may further limit the supply of land for development by not selling or developing their land in anticipation of changes in use which will enormously increase its value.

Thus, the amount of well located and serviced urban land can only be expanded slowly. In most cities among the seventeen nations, demand for such land is rising rapidly. In examining government responses in the previous sub-section, clearly most governments are trying to limit private gains from the urban land market and are increasingly entering the urban land market themselves to increase the supply of land for housing. In most cases, neither has been successfully used to ensure there is an adequate supply of serviced land for housing the growing urban population. Controls on land speculation are usually ineffective. Nor do the public authorities attempt or seriously commit themselves to recapture much of this unearned increment. The *Arab Report*²⁰ noted that in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, this recapture has not been successful. In both Amman and Cairo, large amounts of well-located land remain undeveloped since they represent valuable speculative investments. New initiatives in Jordan and Egypt may help remedy this. In Kenyan urban areas, speculation has not been controlled by three property taxes—capital gains, estate (or death duty) and site value. Site value tax is very low, estate tax has been avoided by subdividing landholdings while clandestine land transactions have avoided capital gains. In Colombia, too, forged selling prices in private land sales have minimized the 'capital gained' and thus the tax due. In the Philippines, the government has shown little ability to control very rapid rises in urban land prices and well-located urban land is often left undeveloped. However, the tax in Colombia on unearned increment seemed 'to have been instrumental in enlarging the choice and accessibility of lower-income groups to jobs and residential building sites' and to 'have important financial benefits' for the municipality, according to a World Bank paper in March 1977.

Regarding the success of public authorities entering the urban land market themselves, there are a few more examples of success. Perhaps the most fundamental has been governments' slow and generally unwilling recognition that legalizing tenure for squatters or those living on illegally subdivided land is more effective than destroying their settlements—or trying to rehouse them elsewhere through public projects. This seems to be the principle behind Colombia's Programme for the Integration of Services and Community Participation which is seeking to improve living conditions for the poorest half of the urban population in 23 intermediate cities. Its aim is to minimize the number of households relocated and to give secure tenure to those living on illegally occupied or subdivided land. Another important trend has been that of governments recognizing that the major block to low-income households finding accommodation is not so much lack of houses but lack of serviced plots on which houses can be built. But both of these kinds of project are best assessed under 'shelter' and will be looked at in the next subsection.

Apart from some notable serviced-site and squatter legalization programmes, most public authorities have been reluctant to enter into urban land markets on a scale which has some hope of lowering the cost of housing projects or indeed moderating speculation. Tanzania and the Sudan are, once again, exceptions because virtually all land is publicly owned. Despite the fact that on a per capita basis, these two nations

are among the poorest of the seventeen, the public authorities' control of urban land markets and their willingness to keep the price of leaseholds or 'rights of occupancy' down is at the basis of their large and relatively successful housing-plot programmes.

Singapore, too, presents rather a special case. We should recall that large amounts of the island belong to the public authorities who also have strong and efficient expropriation procedures as well as an array of property taxes and development charges. Although land prices have risen rapidly over the last 20 years and although public authorities often prefer to negotiate with private owners rather than expropriate (thus avoiding expropriation procedure), the combination of public land reserves and public control have undoubtedly checked land speculation and thus the level of compensation private landowners have to be paid. Indeed, for a city with serious constraints on the land area over which the urban area can expand and with one of the fastest-growing economies in the world between 1960 and 1978, the government's achievement in controlling land prices and guaranteeing a supply of land for housing that ensured the houses were not too expensive for low-income groups is very considerable.

We noted that public authorities in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt have sold urban land at well below market prices to stimulate housing construction. But none of them complemented this with steady public investment in urban land in advance of need. And although this policy may have increased housing construction in the short term, the massive and still rapidly rising urban housing deficits in each nation suggest the policy has little long-term significance.

In nations such as Tunisia, Mexico, Kenya, Nigeria and the Philippines, the initiatives are too new for results to be much in evidence. The entry of public authorities into the land market in Tunisia and Kenya could help ease housing shortages if undertaken on a scale that gets close to need and in a way that does not make the land too expensive. The Tunisian programme may be beginning to achieve this already. But in the Philippines, the ineffectiveness of longstanding agrarian reforms does not augur well for the prospects of urban land reform being implemented. And in Kenya, the allocation of public land to serviced-site and low-income housing projects in Nairobi in the past at very low cost made little impression on deteriorating housing conditions.

Controlling Land-use

Not surprisingly, there is a clear link between national (or city) governments who have successfully increased the supply of urban land for housing and those that have had some success in guiding and controlling urban development. The fact that a public agency in Tunisia has become the major supplier of subdivided and serviced land for housing in major urban centres allows such developments to conform to city plans. Government policies supplying cheap land for housing in Tanzania and the Sudan has the same effect. This kind of policy lies at the heart of Singapore's housing strategy. No doubt, this is one of the aims of public authorities in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu in Kenya who have been purchasing large quantities of land for housing. This suggests that either the use of public land reserves or advance acquisition of land by public authorities (or both) can play a major role in helping to guide and control urban development, especially in rapidly growing urban areas.

There have been few successful attempts among the seventeen nations to improve land use control through negative controls—the enforcement of zoning, subdivision and

building regulations or masterplans containing a combination of these. The rapid and unplanned physical expansion of urban areas which characterized Third World cities in the 1950s and 1960s is even more generally true today. The picture is one of municipal governments lacking the political power, the legislative and financial base and the trained personnel needed to guide and control the growth and development of the area under their jurisdiction. The land use controls they have at their disposal are so often based on those developed in the West for controlling their own cities' growth. These ill-serve the community's needs and the planners' real responsibilities. There are also numerous problems of overlapping jurisdiction. The area over which the city authorities have jurisdiction often does not grow with the city itself. Unplanned urban growth very often occurs over valuable agricultural land outside city limits. No doubt public authorities in Egypt echo the cry of the Colombian quoted earlier bemoaning the fact that the urbanization process proceeds with no control to the confines of the nation's best agricultural land. Between 1950 and the late 1970s, Egypt lost more than 10 per cent of its most productive farmland to urban encroachment—much of it through illegal squatting or subdivision. And this is in a nation desperately short of fertile and well watered land.

One basic dilemma in seeking to improve public control of land-use (and indeed in wider questions related to limiting private rights over land-use and ownership) is in regard to the level at which land policies should be formulated and implemented. Legislation by governments far removed from municipal authorities often lacks an appreciation of what needs to be done and what local authorities can actually achieve. And yet if local governments' powers to formulate and implement land-use policies are increased, local vested interests may be the chief beneficiaries. This problem is especially acute in large and populous nations such as India. Here, central government can and does give directives on the use and control of land but only state government legislation can actually put the directives into practice. Only state governments have the power to devise policies regarding the control and use of land. But even though this formulation and implementation of land legislation is decentralized to state level authorities, these authorities are also distant from local government. Several Indian states have populations exceeding 40 or 50 million while Uttar Pradesh alone with 88.3 million in 1971 was more populous than all but Brazil and Indonesia among the other sixteen nations.

In fact, state level legislation in India on which urban land-use planning is based is both inadequate and outdated. Most of it is still based on the concept of rigid masterplans which ill suit the tasks urban authorities must tackle. This is, no doubt, one major reason why 'more than 500 masterplans prepared in the last twenty to twenty five years in the country lie mostly as documents on paper. Perhaps only about 20 per cent of these plans have been implemented in one form or another.'²⁰

But if a large portion of the urban population can only afford accommodation by going outside the law, the public authorities can never hope to guide and control urban development. If a quarter or more of the urban households (including most of the lowest-income households) and much of the increase in population every year is housed 'illegally' at little cost to the public authorities, any enforcement of negative controls by themselves can only make housing problems worse. It seems that the only effective strategy to halt or control haphazard and unplanned sprawl and to control land-use changes involves substantial government intervention into the land market

for housing. This may—and often does—go against the ideology of the government in power. It almost certainly goes against the wishes of powerful vested interests, who are so often well represented in local government. Zoning and subdivision regulations are frequently used to protect the élite's interests. But this does not invalidate the conclusion—that only where the legal land (and housing) market does not exclude a large portion of an urban area's population (because they cannot afford to enter the market) will government have some hope of guiding and controlling land-use.

In summary, we find only four nations—Singapore, Tanzania, the Sudan and Tunisia—where urban land policies are seriously addressing housing shortages. Singapore's has done so for years while initiatives in the other three are more recent. In a few others, new initiatives have tried to increase government powers although it is not clear whether these powers will actually promote 'public and community' interests. Indeed, they may be used to enforce negative controls which actually make it harder for low-income households to find accommodation. In the rest, there has been little attempt to undertake the first step of an urban land policy—to change the prevailing pattern of landownership and land-use rights. And in so many of the seventeen nations, there are increasingly large commitments to public housing programmes but with little recognition that these are bound to fail or to have only very limited impact if more fundamental land issues are not addressed first.

A Note on Rural Land Policies

For rural land, the *Recommendations* are not very specific about policies governing ownership and use. There is a strong stress on the need to maintain the supply of usable land through, for instance, soil conservation and control of salination and desertification (*Recommendation D6*). There is a mention of public ownership being used to 'implement urban and rural land reform processes' (*Recommendation D4*). And there is a stress on ownership rights being transformed 'to match the changing needs of society' (*Recommendation D5*).

Although this study did not cover rural land policies in much depth—indeed, this would be a major study in itself—we found no evidence of new agrarian reforms in the seventeen nations. The distribution of landownership and the terms under which tenants lease land inevitably influences the pattern of income distribution and thus the settlement pattern in rural areas. A region's poverty and the fact that the economy of its villages is stagnant may result largely from the fact that much of the best agricultural land is owned by absentee landlords and by companies who steer profits out of the region. Examples of this were found in many instances in the seventeen national studies. As we noted earlier, rural land policies are an important part of a comprehensive national settlement policy. Thus, it is discouraging to find few governments paying much attention to the question of transforming ownership rights to match the needs of the rural poor. In all of the nations studied bar Singapore, the rural poor made up a significant portion of both the rural and the national population.

Some national governments have implemented land reforms with tangible results—for instance in Tanzania, Kenya, Mexico, Bolivia and Egypt. Others have passed legislation but to little effect as in, for instance, Colombia, India, Brazil, Nepal and the Philippines. But even in nations such as Kenya, Mexico, Bolivia and Egypt where considerable land redistribution took place, there is a need for further reforms

238

and for policies that support the small farmer and for those who will never receive land because of its scarcity. There was little sign of such initiatives in evidence in the 1970s.

Shelter, Infrastructure and Services

The Habitat Recommendations

The overriding objectives of settlement policies should be to make shelter, infrastructure and services available to those who need them, in the sequence in which they are needed and at a monetary or social cost they can afford. ✓

(Preamble)

National Housing Policies must aim at providing adequate shelter and services to the lower income groups, distributing available resources on the basis of greatest needs. ✓✓

(Recommendation C9)

A major part of housing policy efforts should consist of programmes and instruments which actively assist people in continuing to provide better quality housing for themselves, individually or cooperatively. ✓✓

(Recommendation C10)

Infrastructure policy should be geared to achieve greater equity in the provision of services and utilities, access to places of work and recreational areas . . . ✓✓

(Recommendation C11)

Safe water supply and hygienic waste disposal should receive priority with a view to achieving measurable qualitative and quantitative targets serving all the population by a certain date. ✓✓

(Recommendation C12)

The provision of health, nutrition, education, security, recreation and other essential services in all parts of the country should be geared to the needs of the community and receive an effective priority in national and development planning and in the allocation of resources. ✓

(Recommendation C15)

Governments should concentrate on the provision of services and on the physical and spatial reorganization of spontaneous settlements in ways that encourage community initiative and link 'marginal' groups to the national development process. ✓

(Recommendation C17)

Standards for shelter, infrastructure and services should be compatible with local resources, be evolutionary, realistic, and sufficiently adaptable to local culture and conditions . . .

(Recommendation C3)

The choice of designs and technologies for shelter, infrastructure and services should reflect present demands while being able to adapt to future needs and make the best use of local resources and skills and be capable of incremental improvement.

(Recommendation C4)

The special importance of the construction industry should be recognized by every nation and the industry should be given the political, financial and technical support it requires to attain the national objectives and the production targets required for human settlements.

(Recommendation C7)

The informal sector should be supported in its efforts to provide shelter, infrastructure and services, especially for the less advantaged.

(Recommendation C8)

National Action

Although many among the seventeen nations have government sponsored housing programmes dating back to the 1950s or early 1960s, the scale of their operations was generally small. Indeed, it was not uncommon to find most of a government's housing budget going on constructing a few houses for government officials. In actual numbers, these represented a tiny percentage of growing need. Rural housing was generally ignored. So too were inner city slums, except where these were demolished to make way for other developments. The needs of the squatter population were also generally ignored, although many governments did try and eliminate their settlements by bulldozing them (with or without associated resettlement schemes).

Since 1970, there has been a noticeable increase in government support for housing programmes and, in several cases, for a wider provision of basic services. There have been some major changes in the kind of shelter policy implemented. Before assessing government action, which is still very inadequate and often ill directed, we will briefly summarize government policies described in more depth in earlier sections under four headings: urban housing, rural housing; services and infrastructure; and the building industry.²² The reader should note that most of the figures quoted in this summary are targets from development plans, not units actually constructed. As the Assessment will show, what figures we could find for actual achievements showed that targets are often not met.

Urban Housing

Every one of the seventeen national governments is (or claims to be) increasing its support for urban housing programmes. In eight—Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan,

Tanzania, Jordan, Tunisia, the Philippines and Indonesia—this is evident through notable contrasts in the scale of proposed government action between the early and the later part of the 1970s. In several other nations—notably India, Singapore, Egypt and Brazil—the scale of government programmes has increased in the 1970s, although the programmes themselves date from the 1960s.

In Kenya, the 1974–8 Development Plan aimed at a four-fold increase in urban housing construction over the previous plan period 1970–4 when some 25 000 urban housing units were completed, around 20 000 funded by the government. The National Housing Corporation was to expand enormously its construction of 'low-cost' units while housing development departments were established in major urban areas such as Nairobi and Mombasa to undertake serviced-site and squatter upgrading schemes. In Nigeria, the government planned a major new initiative. The first evidence of a housing programme aiming to reach lower income groups came in 1973 when the federal government announced it was to build 54 000 units for low and middle-income groups. The National Housing Programme was widened for the 1975–80 Plan, the revised version of the plan setting a target of 202 000 units by 1980, 50 000 in Lagos metropolitan area, the rest built under the direction of the nineteen state governments in their major urban areas. Prior to this, the very little government money that had gone to housing went to support middle and higher-income housing, mostly for civil service or other public employees. And in Tanzania, both the scale and the type of programme changed. Between 1969 and 1974, the National Housing Corporation and other public bodies were only constructing some 2000 units a year. The emphasis switched to squatter upgrading and serviced-site schemes. Between 1974 and 1977, nearly 9000 serviced-sites were provided and 8800 existing houses upgraded. Between 1978 and 1981, the programme's target was for roughly double this. Both Nigeria and Tanzania reformed the financial institutions giving housing loans. In Nigeria, a new Federal Mortgage Bank and in Tanzania, a Housing Bank were set up.²³

Among the five Arab nations, new initiatives were most evident in the Sudan, Tunisia and Jordan. In the Sudan, the Six-Year Plan 1977–8 to 1982–3 is seen as the first phase of a long-term housing strategy after, by its own admission, the previous plan 'did not address itself in any comprehensive way to the housing problem'.²⁴ 129 000 serviced sites, 5000 public housing units and 18 000 private sector units were planned with 42 000 units to be upgraded. In Jordan, the government's Housing Corporation has received more support since 1973. For 1973–5, 3900 units were constructed while 7050 were planned for 1976–80. In Tunisia, a new commitment to improving urban housing conditions became apparent in the 1973–6 Plan during which some 72 500 units were built, three-fifths with government aid. The 1977–81 Plan aimed at 125 000 units, more than two-thirds with government aid. Institutions connected to housing programmes were decentralized in all three nations. In Tunisia, the agency in charge of implementing 'social interest' public housing programmes began to work through four regional agencies. In the Sudan, the official housing loan agency, the Estates Bank, opened new branches in towns other than the capital. And in Jordan, the Housing Bank opened new branch offices in several towns.

Among the five Asian nations, we found major new programmes in the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines, a National Housing Authority was set up in 1975 to bring all existing agencies concerned with housing under one organization. This is in

charge of a programme to build over 200 000 units between 1978 and 1987 (72 137 in the first five years), mostly for low-income groups. Major slum and squatter upgrading and serviced-site programmes were also proposed. Along with various other housing programmes, the intention is to reach more than half a million households in the first five years and 1.1 million within the decade. This compares with an annual average of just over 10 000 units built or financed by the government between 1968 and 1971.²⁵ In Indonesia, a National Housing Policy Board was set up to formulate housing policies at the beginning of the 1974-9 Plan while a new National Urban Development Corporation was to be in charge of implementing low-cost housing and serviced-site programmes, and a Housing Mortgage Bank was to provide low-income households with long-term credit. For 1974-9, 90 000 low-cost housing units were planned, 20 000 of which were to be built by the new Corporation. And more than 200 000 serviced sites were planned, this Corporation undertaking 53 000 of them. For the 1979-84 Plan, the target is for 150 000 low-cost houses to be built through this corporation and the Housing Mortgage Bank.

In Singapore, Egypt, Brazil, India and Colombia, urban housing programmes expanded in the 1970s. Singapore's was certainly the largest relative to national population. By 1980, more than two-thirds of the national population lived in units built under the direction of the Housing and Development Board which had only been set up two decades before. In Egypt, targets for public housing programmes were considerably increased in the late 1970s. In 1977, the target was for 34 000 public housing units compared to annual achievements which never exceeded 11 000 units between 1966-7 and 1974,²⁶ and a new National Housing Fund was set up in 1976. In India, the target for publicly sponsored housing units was 2 million for the 1978-82 Plan to be undertaken by state governments and their agencies, 85 per cent of which were to be for economically weaker sections of the population.

In Colombia, the Institute of Territorial Credit, the government's urban housing agency, has expanded and diversified its operations since 1971. For the five years leading up to this date, it supported an average of some 12 700 units a year. Between 1972 and 1975, 20 000 or more households were reached by its programmes annually, including serviced-site and housing upgrading schemes. In 1975-6, 25 000 units were constructed through its programmes while a major new programme launched in 1976 seeks to raise living standards for the poorest half of the population in 23 major cities (not including the four largest cities). In Brazil, various attempts have been made since 1973 to make the urban housing programme reach lower-income groups with improved housing. The National Housing Bank's programme, set up in 1964, had largely failed to do so. A National Low Cost Housing Plan was launched in 1973 to build some 2 million units in ten years for lower-income groups. Repayment conditions for housing loans were made softer for lower-income groups, and a new programme aimed to provide serviced plots.

We should also recall that among the seventeen nations all the others had some evidence of increased government support for urban housing programmes. In Mexico, a new Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers was set up in 1972, largely funded by a payroll tax, to give loans to those wishing to buy or enlarge their house. This, along with other public agencies, brought about a marked increase in the number of units constructed with public support. In Iraq, public housing programmes have expanded and it is the government's intention to increasingly take over from the

private sector as the major housing supplier. In Nepal, the government was proposing to establish a Housing Corporation during the 1975–80 Plan. In Bolivia, a new Housing and Construction Bank was set up in 1974 to help promote and finance the construction, repair and expansion of houses as well as the construction of infrastructure and the building industry's modernization.

Rural Housing

There are fewer and less coherent government efforts to improve living conditions in rural areas, apart from the extension of basic services which will be looked at in the next subsection. Some nations such as Jordan and Iraq do have rural housing programmes with publicly funded units being built. Although no figures on the breakdown between rural and urban public housing programmes were found, from the information we did gather it seems unlikely that these were making much impact on rural housing conditions. Among the other Arab nations, Egypt and the Sudan had no major rural housing programme. Tunisia's housing policies were unique in that they had a major rural housing component. During the 1977–81 Plan, the government aimed to aid the construction of 40 000 rural units. This means that nearly half the housing units which were to receive government support were in rural areas; and the units built were the most heavily subsidized.

Among the Asian nations, India has the largest and longest-established rural housing programme. A scheme to provide free house sites for landless workers was reported to have produced over 5.8 million sites by the end of 1975. The state of Kerala launched a major rural housing programme in the early 1970s, mobilizing local government committees who, with volunteers and students, built more than 50 000 houses for the landless. Indonesia too is giving more attention to improving rural housing conditions through extension services and demonstration projects that assist and encourage villagers to upgrade their own houses. In the Philippines, there were no major government initiatives to improve rural housing conditions up to 1977 although the 1978–82 Plan had ambitious targets for a new rural housing programme. This includes the promotion of housing improvement through self-help to reach 48 713 households by the end of the Plan.

Among the three SubSaharan nations, only Tanzania has a major programme to improve rural housing conditions. The Tanzanian Housing Bank has extended its lending activities to rural areas. The target for 1981 was for 32 000 permanent village houses. In Kenya, government resources in rural areas concentrate on providing basic services, while in Nigeria little government action is evident in seeking to improve rural living and housing conditions.

Basic Services

The Habitat Conference recommended the establishment of national targets to reach all their population with safe water and hygienic waste disposal by a certain date. The Water Conference held a year later recommended that 1981–90 be designated the 'International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade' and that national plans should aim to provide safe drinking water and basic sanitation to all by 1990 if possible. A survey of water supply and sanitation services by the World Health

Organization for 1975 revealed that only two people out of five in the Third World had access to safe drinking water and that only one out of three had any kind of sanitary facility. Estimates for 1980 suggest that there has been no significant improvement. For instance, although more people in rural areas have been reached with safe water, the percentage of the Third World's population so served had actually dropped. The statistics for 1980 submitted by national governments show a quarter or less of the rural population with 'reasonable access' to safe water in Kenya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Nepal, Brazil and Iraq with no figures available for Bolivia. Less than a third of the rural population were so served in India, Tanzania and Tunisia. Urban households are generally better served although one does have serious doubts about government claims that 97 or more per cent of the urban population in Egypt, Bolivia and Kenya have reasonable access to safe water.

Table 6 Community water supply and sanitation

Countries	Community water supply		Sanitation	
	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
<i>Africa</i>				
Kenya	100	13	50	45 (1970)
Nigeria	92	14	41	—
Tanzania	82	28	93	40
<i>Asia</i>				
India	82	30	47	2
Indonesia	36	15	73	19
Nepal	81	6	18	—
Philippines	73	46	32	27
Singapore	74 (1970)	—	93 (1970)	—
<i>Latin America</i>				
Bolivia	100	2 (1970)	100	4 (1970)
Brazil	75	5	35	25
Colombia	73	46	60	14
Mexico	62	42	50	12
<i>Arab Nations</i>				
Egypt	97	74	70	5
Iraq	97	22	—	—
Jordan	100	55	100	35
Sudan	49	45	80	—
Tunisia	96	29	64	60

Source: Report on the 'International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade' for the United Nations General Assembly. One should note that these are only approximations supplied by governments and are not directly comparable due to the lack of adequate monitoring systems and lack of standardization in the definitions used. For water supply, the percentage is that proportion of the population with reasonable access which is to say that person(s) in the household collecting water do not spend a disproportionate part of their day doing so. For sanitation, the percentage given is that proportion of the population with adequate excreta disposal facilities.

For sanitation, again, urban residents appear better served than their rural counterparts in all the nations for which we have statistics. A quarter or less of the rural population in Brazil, Egypt, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia and India have any

kind of sanitary excreta disposal. Once again, some of the higher figures such as those of Jordan and Bolivia with 100 per cent of urban residents adequately served seem exaggerated. Such statistics were supplied by national governments in response to a request from the United Nations. Our field experience suggests that in many instances, the percentage of the population given by national governments as having reasonable access to potable water and to basic sanitation is grossly exaggerated.

Educational statistics for the mid-1970s also show large sectors of the population excluded from educational programmes. In the Sudan and Nigeria, more than half the primary school age children were not at primary schools. Half or more of the adult population was illiterate in Nepal, India, Kenya, the Sudan and Egypt while a third or more were illiterate in Tunisia, Jordan, Bolivia, Tanzania and Indonesia. And life-expectancy statistics demonstrate the continuing poverty and lack of health care. In 1978, life expectancy remained below 50 in Nigeria, Indonesia, the Sudan and Nepal, and below 55 in Tanzania, India, Kenya, Egypt and Bolivia.

Although programmes to extend basic services to the national population date back many years in all seventeen nations, recently there have been more serious attempts to spread basic services such as potable water, hygienic waste disposal, primary education and basic health care in many of the seventeen nations. The 'basic' or 'minimum needs' approach so stressed throughout the *Habitat Recommendations* is thus receiving more support.

India's Basic Minimum Needs Programme, started in 1972, shows this new commitment with the Sixth Plan, beginning in 1978, further increasing support for this Programme. A rural health programme aims to provide much improved primary health care. The government aims to provide safe drinking water to all India's villages by the early 1980s. Central government's support for water supply and sanitation increased very considerably in 1972 with the Fifth Plan and then again in 1978. And more support was given during the 1970s to slum improvement programmes which included provision of basic services.

All four other Asian nations also show an increased commitment to providing basic services. In Nepal, health and education services have received more support since 1971. The Fifth Plan, 1975-80, gives more support to water supply and sanitation, after the previous plan had initiated water supply and sewerage schemes in several towns and villages. In the Philippines, both the 1978-82 Plan and longer-term strategy point to more support for the provision of safe drinking water, sewerage and flood control. Health and education programmes are to be strengthened, and projections for 1975, 1982, 1987 and 2000 show social infrastructure, health and medical facilities, water supply and sewerage each receiving increased support in terms of percentages of GNP devoted to them. In addition, in the late 1970s, there has been more support for extending basic services to existing slums and squatter communities, whereas before government efforts often tried to relocate squatters.

Such an approach has also received more support in Indonesia. A 'Kampung Improvement Programme', begun in 1969 in Jakarta, aimed to reach some 3.5 million people in that city with minimum basic services by the end of 1979. During the 1979-84 Plan, the aim is to reach all urban low-income residential areas with minimum basic services. In addition, the government is expanding primary health care services throughout the nation.

In two of the three SubSaharan African nations—Kenya and Tanzania—the 'basic

needs' approach is embodied in their development plans. In Nigeria it is not, although the new civilian administration may increasingly veer towards such an approach. In Tanzania, the commitment to meeting basic service needs for the whole population dates back to independence in 1961. By 1977, its achievements were impressive. Universal primary education had been achieved. Primary health care facilities were far more widely available in both rural and urban communities. Provision of piped water within less than half a kilometre of all consumers is the target for 1991 with intermediate solutions being devised before then. Adult literacy programmes have raised literacy levels to one of the highest in Africa. And slum improvement programmes with the extension of basic services to slum and squatter areas is now a major part of the housing programme.

Kenya, too, is stressing the basic needs approach. The 1974–8 Plan included a stress on primary health care and on bringing a safe, sufficient and convenient water source to the entire population by 2000. An accelerated public works programme aimed to install sewerage in all major urban areas. Universal primary education and increased adult literacy are major goals. And squatter upgrading programmes are gradually becoming more acceptable to local and national governments.

Among the group of Arab nations, there is less commitment to meeting basic service needs in rural areas and generally less acceptance of slum and squatter upgrading programmes. In Egypt, little attention is given to providing basic services to villages or to households living on illegally occupied or subdivided land. In Iraq, the government's concentration is on expanding public housing construction and replacing slums rather than seeking to extend basic services and help upgrade existing housing. However, the 1975–9 Plan did give strong support to education, social services, sewerage in urban areas, provision of potable water in rural communities and health. In Tunisia, the government's commitment to improving housing and service standards has come to include a new concentration on slum upgrading rather than slum clearance. For water supply, by 1981 the target is for two-thirds of the national population to have access to a fountain or direct connection to a water system while a nationwide sewer construction programme expects to be able to reach all areas now served with water systems by the late 1980s.

Building Industry

When looking at all seventeen nations, it is possible to identify four scales of operation in housing construction. All seventeen have three of these while most have all four. At the top is the large construction company, often part of a multinational corporation, which has large capital assets and uses industrialized building techniques. At the next level, there are smaller national firms with lower labour productivity and less capital assets which utilize industrial building materials (and perhaps some prefabricated components). At the third level, there are small building firms which usually use traditional craft techniques and often rely on traditional building materials. Typically, this scale of operation is only involved in the construction of one or two houses at any one time. Then finally, there is self-help where the household itself—perhaps assisted by friends and, for certain jobs, skilled artisans—build the house.

There is no simple division of these scales of operation between formal and informal sector. The largest two scales of operation operate in the formal sector and tend to get

public housing contracts. The third scale may operate in both sectors, building houses to official standards and with official permission for middle or upper-income groups and, when such work is not available, building (say) units on illegal subdivisions. The self-help sector may also build what becomes a unit meeting official standards. But most self-help construction activity remains in the informal sector. Formal sector activities remain heavily concentrated in urban areas while the housing construction activities of the larger companies are usually concentrated in major cities.

Although no national building industry falls into four exclusive categories like these and no simple division can categorize a building enterprise as being in the formal or informal sector (since it may work in both), it is useful to use these distinctions in examining who builds houses for whom. The large construction company using prefabricated building systems or components is evident in virtually all nations with major public housing programmes: Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Jordan, Iraq, the Philippines, Indonesia and Egypt. In Iraq, the Philippines and Indonesia, public agencies have established prefabricated housing factories. And in Egypt, the government is working with various foreign firms to greatly expand annual production of prefabricated housing units.

Apart from publicly financed housing units, the scale of formal sector housing construction will obviously depend on the number of households that can afford the kind of units it builds. In Brazil, for instance, this private sector is very large; in Nepal, it hardly exists. Obviously, among the seventeen nations, the size of the formal sector's contribution to total housing activity differs enormously.

In many of the seventeen nations much of the building materials the formal sector uses have to be imported. The result is escalating housing costs as cost of materials rise. There are also interruptions in supplies (and thus shortages which also tend to push up prices). The high price and high-import cost of modern building materials were noted in the Philippines, Bolivia, the Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria. The cost of building materials alone in total construction costs in 1975 (excluding land) was found to be 66 per cent in India, 63.6 per cent in the Philippines, 57.2 per cent in Iraq and 55.8 per cent in Jordan. The average for a survey of eighteen nations for dates between 1965 and 1975 was 55.6 per cent.²⁷

Government support for the building industry is almost exclusively directed towards the formal sector. If publicly owned companies do not build public housing units themselves, it is the larger, more modern private construction companies that get the contracts. In addition, there is very little government funding to support the development and production of cheaper building materials based on indigenous resources. Publicly funded housing projects are usually built to designs and standards developed for the industrialized nations and do not seek to use locally produced materials to reduce unit costs.

Thus, the trend seems to be away from developing and improving local building materials and towards more reliance on industrialized building materials and systems. In the Background (page 205), we noted the very low priority that building materials had received in multilateral aid. In fact, virtually all multilateral aid devoted to building materials had gone to cement plants up to 1978. There are a few exceptions. In the Sudan, the Building and Road Research Institute (formerly the National Building Research Station) is seeking to improve the quality and durability of local building materials and a new plant is being constructed to produce mudblocks

stabilized with asphalt. In Kenya, research is going on into similar types of stabilized mudbricks and into soil-cement blocks. In Tanzania, the use of locally produced burnt bricks is being encouraged. And the Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa has given a loan for a brick, tile and concrete industries integrated project in Dodoma, a major departure from usual multilateral-aid backed projects. In India, mini-cement plants have been developed at a capital cost and capacity to suit the needs of a small group of villages. Despite these and a few other projects, governments have not shown much inclination to encourage the use of local building materials. Nor have they undertaken such basic changes as reformulating building regulations so these allow the use of such materials in legal housing units.

Assessment

The impression one gets from examining national development plans for the seventeen nations is thus one of increasing support for shelter provision and improvement and the extension of basic services to a wider proportion of the population, especially in urban areas. As we noted earlier, there is a notable contrast between proposed government policies in urban shelter provision between the early and the late 1970s. However, the contrast is usually only notable because governments were doing virtually nothing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The scale of government action usually remains far below anything approaching the scale of needs. And government targets must not be confused with actual achievements. In most of the cases where we found statistics on progress in achieving official targets, the number of units actually built or under construction falls far short of goals. For instance, Kenya's 1979-83 Plan admitted that the previous Plan's targets were not met: 'Over the last plan period, only 8 per cent of the low cost units planned were in fact completed and these cost on average five times the expected cost'.²⁸ It also seems that the serviced-site programme for the 1974-8 Plan was way behind its ambitious targets. Between 1975 and 1977, only 1031 had been completed in Nairobi and 815 elsewhere.²⁹ For the whole of Kenya, total urban housing needs were estimated to grow by 160 000 units between 1974 and 1978. Kenya's national report to Habitat claimed that half of these needs would be met through government funded programmes and projects. The final achievement was probably no more than 5 per cent.

Initial reports about other public housing targets—for instance Nigeria's 1975-80 target of over 200 000 public funded units or Indonesia's target of 73 000 low-cost and units and serviced sites built by the National Urban Development Corporation—suggest that final achievements will be well below targets. In the Philippines, although no statistics were found as to progress with its massive public shelter programme, the targets seem far beyond the capabilities of even its expanded institutional base. We recall that between 1948 and 1972, only 13 500 units were constructed by public funds for low-income households and that government-built or financed units averaged just over 10 000 units a year between 1968 and 1971. Government funded 'low-cost' units have usually been too expensive for low-income households. But the government housing programme 1978-82 is aiming at more than quarter of a million units, many of which are claimed to be for lower-income groups, and nearly 200 000 units upgraded, 144 245 of them in urban areas.³⁰

Official statistics often provide little clue as to the precise nature of current shelter problems and trends and as to where the major problems are located. As the Background

showed (page 204), what statistics and estimates do exist show that all governments bar Singapore's are faced with a massive (and often growing) stock of poor quality and unserviced or badly serviced dwellings. If a government counts (or estimates) the number of legal housing units nationally which meet official standards and then compares this with the number of households, the two figures will bear little relation to each other. Similarly, if the government estimates the number of units needed annually to keep up with rising demands and to gradually replace deteriorating and substandard stock and then compares it to the output of the formal construction sector, again the figures will bear little relation to each other. If the difference between the two figures is used to give a 'housing deficit'—the figure has little meaning; for it would imply that a quarter, a half or even more of the national population—and most of the new households formed every year—are homeless. But they are not. Virtually everyone is housed—even if a large and even growing proportion have to endure very poor and often overcrowded living conditions.

We have seen how virtually all the rural houses and a large proportion of the urban houses are built (and have been built) by the informal construction sector in all seventeen nations bar Singapore. Only through such activities are most of their populations housed—and housed at a price within reach of lower-income groups. A concentration on estimating figures for the amount of units needed per year serves little purpose in formulating housing policies. We learn very little from knowing that in Egypt, an average of some 200 000 urban units and 116 000 rural units are needed annually between 1975 and 2000 except that it does contrast sharply with the 1977 target of 100 000 formal sector units. And we learn little from the official estimate that from 1972, 1.5 million units are needed annually in Indonesia although this, too, puts the target of some 60 000 low-cost housing units a year during the 1975–9 Plan into perspective. In neither nation are officially approved units likely to meet more than a small fraction of these needs.

At this point it is important to distinguish between rural and urban housing. National housing targets become very misleading, for housing needs are quantitatively and qualitatively different for rural and urban areas. The *World Housing Survey 1974* estimated that India, the Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Nepal (among others) must construct eight or more units annually per 1000 inhabitants to meet housing requirements. For Tanzania, the figure is 13.8 annually.³¹ Then we find that official housing targets for both private and public sectors only represent one unit per 1000 inhabitants or less, despite rapidly expanded housing programmes. However, since most of these nations' households are still in rural areas, the new programmes may be making substantial contributions to improving housing conditions in urban areas, although the total appears very inadequate for the national population. And with the level of rural per capita incomes in these nations, nobody could expect the formal construction sector to have a major role in housing the rural population without a level of public subsidy per unit that is far beyond the range of their governments.

In addition, the rate at which new households are being formed differs enormously between rural and urban settlements (and indeed between different urban settlements). Generally, urban settlements have quantitative housing needs growing far faster than rural settlements. Indeed, quantitative needs are not actually growing in many rural settlements. And a rapidly growing urban settlement may have

quantitative housing needs growing by fifteen or more units per 1000 population annually.

There are also fundamental qualitative differences between the needs rural and urban houses fulfil. A house gives its occupants access to an income, shelter from the elements, access to basic services, and to family and friends, and some security and privacy. In urban areas, access to an income may be the primary need; it often is for lower-income households. Access to family and friends and water may be the next most important need. These are often more important to the household's health (or indeed survival) than a reasonable quality home. For this reason, the needs of low-income households are often better served by very poor-quality shacks on land subject to flooding or landslides, or even on the local garbage dump, which gives them good access to income-earning possibilities. Higher standard serviced sites or public housing units on the urban periphery may appear to give them better-quality living environments while in fact making them even worse off by lowering their access to income.

By comparison, in rural areas, the site of the house is usually close to (or even in the middle of) the place where the household derives its living. Only rarely is the cost of the site itself a major household expense. Only very rarely would a rural householder consider employing a builder to construct a unit to official housing standards. Generally lower density settlements mean some of the dangers of city dwellings—lack of light and ventilation, overcrowding, contamination of water supply—are lessened.

The fact that basic shelter needs in rural and urban settlements are both qualitatively and quantitatively different makes any concentration on annual national targets for units built by the formal sector or by public funds almost irrelevant for nations with a substantial rural population. The *Habitat Recommendations* recognize the need for new approaches to housing policies. The type of approach they outline is very different from the conventional concentration on annual targets. Indeed, no mention is made of annual targets per 1000 inhabitants. And no explicit mention is made of public housing programmes.

Perhaps the two most fundamental differences between conventional policies and the *Recommendations* is the latter's stress on seeking to reach everyone with improved standards and its acceptance of the informal sector's role in doing this. On this first difference, the priority given to 'meeting basic needs' for all is apparent throughout the *Recommendations for National Action*. The *Preamble to Section C* states that the 'over-riding objective of settlement policies should be to make shelter, infrastructure and services available to those who need them in the sequence in which they are needed and at a monetary or social cost they can afford'. *Recommendation C9* states that national housing policies should aim at 'providing adequate shelter and services to the lower income groups, distributing available resources on the basis of greatest needs'. *Recommendation C11* says that 'infrastructure policy should be geared to achieve greater equity in the provision of services and utilities . . .' while *Recommendation C15* states that the provision of health, education and other essential services should receive 'an effective priority in national and development planning and in the allocation of resources'. Safe water supply and hygienic waste disposal should receive special attention 'with a view to achieving measurable qualitative and quantitative targets serving all the population by a certain date' (*Recommendation C12*).

The second difference, the acceptance of the informal sector's major role in housing provision, is also evident in many of the *Recommendations*—*C10* states that 'a major

part of a housing policy's efforts should consist of programmes and instruments which actively assist people in continuing to provide better quality housing for themselves, individually or cooperatively. C8 states that the informal sector be supported 'in its efforts to provide shelter, infrastructure and services, especially for the less advantaged'. C17 suggests that governments 'concentrate on the provision of services and on the physical and spatial reorganization of spontaneous settlements in ways that encourage community initiative and link 'marginal' groups to the national development process'. Although this is not very specific, it does state that governments should work with the inhabitants of squatter settlements and concentrate on providing them with basic services. C4 stresses that the choice of designs and technologies for housing should reflect present demands. And with C3, the stress is on ensuring housing standards, designs and technologies are compatible with local skills and resources. In all these one sees the recognition that the informal sector plays a major role in shelter provision—and will continue to do so. For this reason, government policies must be oriented towards helping and assisting this sector. With regard to standards, they recommend that these be revised so they fulfil their primary purpose—of reconciling the population's shelter needs with a reasonable level of safety, health and environmental quality.

In assessing governments' performance in the light of the *Habitat Recommendations*, we shall look briefly at six aspects of government policies: public housing programmes; serviced-site schemes; slum and squatter upgrading; standards; building materials and technology; and housing finance. In each of these, two questions will be asked. Are government policies using their resources to reach as many people as possible with improved housing conditions and basic services? And do their policies recognize (and support) the role the informal sector plays in this?

Public Housing Programmes

The *Preamble* to *Recommendation C9* notes that 'in many parts of the world, the cheapest available contract-built housing is too expensive for the majority of households'. Furthermore, 'publicly provided housing because of the limited available resources can only provide for a small fraction of the real need'. This generalization is true for all seventeen nations except Singapore. Since unit costs are high—considerably more than low-income households can (or are prepared to) pay—each unit has to have a large subsidy if it is to benefit low-income households. Alternatively, if the subsidy is reduced so more units can be built, it puts the cost of the units beyond the range of low-income groups. The result, apparent in most of the seventeen nations, is either relatively few households benefiting from heavily subsidized units or lower-middle and middle-income groups being the main beneficiaries of public housing programmes.

Alternatively, the government may rely on private or semi-public construction firms to build the units with public money going to provide long-term loans for households wanting to purchase such units. But the same problem remains. To reach lower-income groups, a heavily subsidized loan is needed so the number of loans that can be given is limited. Or if loans are not heavily subsidized, lower income groups are excluded.

By 1976, housing policies in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Brazil, Singapore, India, Iraq, Nigeria, Colombia and Bolivia were dominated by public housing programmes (that is, publicly financed housing or public loans to increase demand for housing). Such

programmes were also a major part of housing policies in Kenya, Indonesia and the Philippines. In most cases, the scale of government effort fell far short of need. In Jordan, the Housing Corporation's five-year target for 1975–80 actually met less than six months' growth in housing need. In Egypt, the public housing target for 1977 was 34 000 units although urban housing needs grew by some 150 000 units that year. In Bolivia, the combined efforts of various public bodies between 1970 and 1975 supported the construction of some 1300 units a year when annual urban needs were estimated to grow by some 20 000 units a year. In Nigeria, Colombia and India too, public housing efforts were producing only a small proportion of the annual growth in needs.

Tunisia and Brazil had somewhat larger public housing programmes. By the end of 1976, Brazil's National Housing Bank had funded nearly 1.5 million units including around 400 000 loans to low-income households. But estimates put the need for new housing units at between 8 and 11 million for 1960–75, including six million for lower income households. The Tunisian government aimed to construct 120 000 publicly sponsored units between 1973 and 1981, a very considerable number for a nation with 6 million inhabitants in 1978. After Singapore, this is by far the largest public housing programme relative to population size among the seventeen nations. But even so, housing production to official standards falls short of needs. Once again, the deficit will be made up by informal sector activity and by overcrowding in existing dwellings.

In fact, Singapore was the only nation among the seventeen to have a public housing programme that got close to meeting needs. By 1980, some two-thirds of the total population was living in units built by the public housing body, the Housing and Development Board. Elsewhere, programmes usually met only a small proportion of need. Where housing policies concentrated on giving little or no subsidy—as in Brazil—lower-income groups were largely excluded. And the size of the programme was limited by the fact that a substantial proportion of the population could not afford to take part in it. Where government gave sufficient subsidy to bring publicly sponsored units within reach of lower income groups—as in Egypt and India—high unit costs meant the programme could only reach a small percentage of those in need.

Singapore's relatively successful public housing programme has encouraged other governments to embark on similar courses. Thus, it is worth asking why they succeeded while other nations met with far less success. When looking at Singapore's background, we were struck by several unique characteristics which help explain this.

- (1) Firstly, immigration to the city was very slow, despite a rapidly growing economic base. Singapore as a nation has very little rural land and thus few poor rural households migrating to the city in search of a better life. Any city in one of the other sixteen nations with an economy growing as fast as Singapore's would have attracted an enormous wave of immigration.
- (2) Secondly, and related to this first point, Singapore's per capita GNP grew at a phenomenal 7.4 per cent a year between 1960 and 1978, far higher than any nation—and probably any city—among the other sixteen nations. With a rapidly growing economic base, relatively few unemployment problems and growing purchasing power among much of the population, public and private funds for housing are more easy to mobilize.
- (3) Thirdly, Singapore's government enjoyed on a valuable colonial legacy—very extensive amounts of publicly owned land, including public land in or close to the city

centre. Thus, public housing estates could be built close to the city centre without involving the government in prohibitively expensive (and lengthy) land expropriation procedures. With low-income households sited close to the major employment opportunities and with good wage-earning prospects (because of the booming economy), some of the often more intractable problems with public housing projects for low-income families are removed. How many other Third World nations can claim rapid and sustained economic growth rates with very little immigration from other areas? In addition, how many major Third World cities can build on the extensive reserves of well-located public land Singapore had in the early 1960s? Certainly none of the sixteen other nations we included in this study had comparable conditions.

Given the unique circumstances surrounding Singapore's public housing programme, the relevance of its experiences seems to be that effective urban land policies are the only basis for successful urban housing policies. The type of housing built in Singapore has far less relevance. Even if other nations could afford to construct similar tower blocks on a scale to get close to meeting rising housing needs, such units do not seem the best way of improving housing conditions. The housing programme demanded a degree of public control that few other societies would have tolerated. As one commentator living in Singapore stated, 'perhaps urban disturbances or riots have not occurred in Singapore only because the present economic prosperity has enough crumbs even for the urban poor'.³² Many of the thousands of households affected by slum clearance and redevelopment schemes could not afford to stay in public housing despite concessional rates on what were already subsidized rents.

Furthermore, some commentators suggest that the concentration on constructing small flats in large monoblocks has contributed greatly to stress, delinquency and a lessening of traditional, communal aspects of living. Even given Singapore's unique space constraints, residential developments could have achieved sufficiently high density without total reliance on high-rise apartment blocks.

Another serious drawback to public housing policies—and one that Singapore's shares with those of other nations—is the problem of maintenance. As *Recommendation C6* notes, in choosing alternatives for shelter, account should be taken of social, environmental and economic costs and benefits 'including that of future management, maintenance and operations as well as capital costs'. If a government housing programme leases houses or flats to the public and does not provide for broad participation in management and upkeep, then the tenants will feel little incentive to maintain the housing structure since it is not their responsibility. Furthermore, blocks of flats demand maintenance operations beyond the scope and abilities of individual households. There was evidence of maintenance problems in several of the public housing programmes—although the housing authorities are not very ready to admit to such problems. In Singapore, some of the earliest Housing and Development Board's flats have sunk into almost slum-like conditions within 20 years of being built. And every effort is being made by the Housing and Development Board to encourage public housing tenants to buy their own flats so that responsibility for internal maintenance passes from the public authorities to individual households. In fact, generous subsidies are given to encourage this. In Egypt, the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction is encouraging public housing tenants to become owners by offering generous terms for converting rents into long-term purchase payments. In Indonesia, no doubt the very rapid expansion in the number of people employed by the National

Urban Development Authority relates to the number of areas it has to cover including planning, acquiring land, financing and constructing low-cost housing and being responsible for rent collection and for overseeing maintenance and repair. In December 1977, just three years after its foundation, it had 983 staff and was said to be grossly understaffed.³³ By contrast, the Nigerian government admits that it does not have the professional staff to cope with maintenance and repair of federal housing estates and is proposing to contract the maintenance of estates out to private sector enterprises.³⁴

Thus, most public housing programmes do not ensure that government resources devoted to housing reach as many people as possible with improved housing conditions and basic services. Singapore is the exception because of unique circumstances. Besides Singapore, perhaps Tunisia is closest to achieving this, relative to population size. But in Tunisia, recent initiatives suggest less concentration on public housing units and more support for informal sector construction through slum upgrading and serviced-site schemes. It is a policy change that all other governments with large public housing programmes might consider, if they are serious about improving housing conditions.

Serviced-site Schemes

The first sign of governments moving away from exclusive concentration on public housing programmes is usually the support of serviced-site schemes. These bring down unit costs since no house is constructed before the lot is sold or leased. Cost recovery is easier since serviced lots are usually within the price range of a far wider proportion of the population (although very often not the lowest-income groups). Responsibility for maintaining and upgrading the unit is also taken out of the hands of the public authorities. In the Sudan, Tanzania, the Philippines, Kenya, India, Colombia, and Indonesia, such programmes are playing major roles in government shelter policies. In Brazil, Egypt, Tunisia, and Nepal, such programmes—or individual projects—are also in evidence.

Serviced-site schemes do represent a step towards more widely based housing programmes which support informal sector construction activities. But only in the Sudan and Tanzania have they become the central part of urban housing policies. Although serviced-site schemes generally represent less subsidy per unit (indeed, cost recovery may be total) and can reach far more people with improved living conditions, they also suffer from some of the disadvantages of public housing programmes. Firstly, they divert attention away from the real priority—reforming the urban land market so it does not automatically exclude lower-income groups from legal housing. Secondly, they, like public housing programmes, define where lower-income groups can live. This may—and in many cases does—ill match their needs. In seeking to minimize costs, land for such schemes is often purchased on the urban periphery, the lots developed and then sold or leased to low-income households. But the cost in time and money to both primary and secondary wage-earners in getting to work or in lost income-generating activities can nullify much or all of the benefits of the new sites. For this reason, many serviced-site projects have found difficulties in attracting customers and have failed, like the public housing projects which usually preceded them, to improve living conditions for lower-income households.

Furthermore, if serviced-site schemes are to be implemented on a scale which gets close to meeting growing shelter needs, the public authorities will have to have the power and the institutional framework to ensure that land costs for serviced lots are not

prohibitively expensive. This they may choose to do with taxes, relying on the private sector to sell the land for serviced lots or by entry into the land market themselves to guarantee an adequate supply of land for serviced-site schemes. As we noted under Land, only a small minority of the seventeen nations have legislation and institutions in place to ensure that this is possible.

One should also note in passing that many government officials still regard serviced-site schemes as no more than officially sponsored slum or squatter settlement construction. There is also a tendency for government agencies to make standards too high—so unit costs are beyond the reach of the lower-income groups—or even to begin constructing core houses or ‘low-cost’ houses which again defeats the intention of minimizing unit costs. This is particularly noticeable in Indonesia. Their *National Report* to Habitat talked of government efforts focusing ‘on stimulating sites and services and low-cost housing for the low and moderate income groups’.³⁵ But public projects are concentrating on the construction of houses and core units which do not get allocated to the lowest-income groups.

Slum and Squatter Upgrading

In the last ten years, slum and squatter upgrading programmes have generally replaced slum demolition and squatter ‘resettlement’ (although there are notable exceptions in many of the seventeen nations, including the large squatter eviction programmes in Delhi during 1975–7). In the Philippines, since 1975 public authorities have given more support to slum and squatter upgrading projects which minimize the need to relocate families. We noted that in Indonesia, the Kampung Improvement Programme has successfully improved living conditions in some of Jakarta’s poorest living quarters and the programme has been extended to other major cities. India’s Central Scheme for Environmental Improvement in Slum Areas has concentrated on bringing basic services to some of the poorest households in major cities. In Tunisia, slum upgrading programmes seem to be replacing the earlier concentration on slum clearance. In Tanzania, slum clearance schemes were abandoned in the late 1960s and replaced with slum and squatter upgrading and serviced-site programmes. In Colombia, since 1972, there has been increasing government support for extending basic services and encouraging housing improvement for lower-income urban households.

However, in some nations, slum and squatter upgrading are not seen as appropriate government policies. In Iraq, the concentration is still on condemning temporary buildings and *sarifas* and seeking to rehouse some of those displaced in new settlements. Little attention is given to improving conditions in older housing stock. The *Arab Report* pointed to the contrast ‘between the care devoted to the luxurious, high-technology prestige buildings in Baghdad and the neglect suffered by the debilitated housing within the same neighbourhood’.³⁶

Slum and squatter upgrading programmes do seek to reach a large portion of urban households normally bypassed by housing programmes. They also encourage informal sector activity. *Recommendation C8* notes that priority areas for action should include ‘ensuring security of land tenure for unplanned settlements where appropriate’ while *Recommendation C17* notes that governments should concentrate on providing services and on the ‘physical and spatial reorganization of spontaneous settlements in ways that encourage community initiative’. It may be that the relative success of this

approach in nations mentioned above (including the relatively low costs per household reached) and the relative failure to date of slum and squatter eradication programmes will encourage the wider use of such upgrading schemes in future.

Standards

Official standards are often entirely inappropriate to what should be the most pressing task; improving living conditions for the widest possible percentage of the population. Infrastructure and service standards aren't related to actual needs and local resources. The result is public works budgets dominated by providing 'western' standards for, say, water supply which benefit only a tiny minority of the population. Similarly, building codes and regulations in most of the seventeen nations make the construction of legal buildings more expensive and more difficult than those needed to meet basic health and safety standards. Official standards usually prohibit the use of local traditional materials and may demand the use of materials or components which have to be imported.

In fact, the standards were often 'imported' too. Many date from colonial times, imposing standards on lot sizes, housing designs and construction standards that happened to be current in the former colonial power's own country, when they were instituted several decades ago. In Latin America, they are frequently based on western models, again introduced many decades ago with little or no attempt since then to modify them. Thus, in the Sudan, building regulations can still demand minimum floor-to-ceiling heights of 3 metres while those in Nigeria can demand a minimum amount of rooms or the use of expensive, imported materials. It is worth noting that public housing units in Singapore built in the beginning of the Housing and Development Board's programme were mainly low standard one-room flats. The public authorities recognized that only with relatively low standards could they reach lower-income groups without unit subsidies severely restricting the size of the programme.

A possible indication of the extent to which inappropriate standards inhibits housing construction is the emphasis given to their revision in the *Recommendations*. We recall that standards for shelter should be 'compatible with local resources, be evolutionary, realistic and sufficiently adaptable to local culture and conditions' (C3). C7 states that special attention should be given to 'establishing performance standards suited to local requirements and capable of being met by local industry' and to 'simplifying formal procedures so that they can be clearly understood and followed by local entrepreneurs'. C8, which states that the informal sector's efforts should receive support, mentions that priority areas for action include 'simplifying and adapting building and licensing codes without sacrificing recognized basic health requirements'. C10 suggests that procedures for acquiring sites, short and long-term finance, building permits and codes and zoning be simplified.

Our survey found that only a few governments were thinking of reformulating building standards and regulations—the Philippines, Iraq, and Kenya being among them. Several others seem to acknowledge that existing standards and regulations are a major block to development since officially sponsored squatter upgrading, slum improvement, and serviced-site projects do not conform to these. In the Sudan, the government simply accepts that households on the cheaper, shorter-term lease plots cannot afford to meet official standards.

But no government seemed to see the true role of standards—whether defining use intensity, technological specifications or criteria for services and community facilities—as that of encouraging better-quality living environments. If the standards are realistic, evolutionary and compatible with local resources, they can fulfil such a role. If the public authorities revise existing regulations so they promote what is desirable (in terms of health and safety) and attainable by both large and small construction operations, then a far higher proportion of the houses constructed in urban areas are likely to be in the now expanded formal sector. More builders can afford to work within it while more households can afford to live in units meeting basic health and safety standards. If existing official standards remain, they will continue to be largely ignored and the informal sector will remain the major housing constructor. In addition, inappropriate standards will be used by public officials to justify inappropriate squatter settlement demolition or forced resettlement and to continue building overexpensive public housing units.

The *Recommendations* point to a new approach to standard setting and enforcing. Indeed, the new regulations become what is essentially an education programme, assisting and advising builders (including self-helpers) to ensure basic health and safety standards are met at least cost to government and to user. Demonstration projects, building advice centres and suggested building designs become part of this process. And it is a process that covers both rural and urban houses—even if different standards and regulations may be used for rural and urban units. Many existing standards such as minimum house size or the precise definition of internal facilities or permanence of structure may have to be waived altogether, at least until most of the population have some hope of affording houses built to such standards.

Such an approach to standard setting gives the only framework through which a poor, predominantly rural-based nation can hope to improve housing conditions. Whereas in urban areas the informal sector plays a major role in housing construction, in rural areas it builds the vast majority of houses. It is encouraging to see more broadly based rural housing improvement programmes in nations such as Tanzania and Indonesia where extension services and demonstration programmes seek to help rural households and builders to improve housing standards. We also found evidence in certain nations of finance institutions decentralizing their operations so that these can also reach rural and small-town households.

Building Materials and Technology

The need to encourage the development and use of local building materials is stated in many of the *Habitat Recommendations*. C4 states that the choice of designs and technologies should 'make the best use of local resources and skills'. C8, under the heading of the need to encourage informal sector construction, states that the system for marketing and distributing building materials be restructured 'to favour purchase in small quantities at irregular intervals and under easy credit terms. C10, on aided self-help, suggests that incentives be given 'to the imaginative use of local materials, e.g. through demonstration projects and construction of prototypes suitable to local conditions'. And C3 suggests, as we have noted already, that standards be compatible with local resources and in particular should 'conserve scarce resources and reduce dependence on foreign technologies, resources and materials'. Thus, throughout the

Recommendations there is a stress on supporting the informal sector, on developing and encouraging the use of local materials and on revising standards and regulations to allow their use in legal housing construction.

In fact, as we noted in an earlier section, government support goes almost exclusively to the formal sector, even though the informal sector is responsible for constructing the households of virtually all low-income families. Only in Singapore has such a policy resulted in improved living conditions for a large portion of the population—and as we noted this was due to unique circumstances not apparent in the other sixteen nations. Yet there are few signs of governments radically changing their policies, except indirectly in increased support to slum and squatter upgrading and in serviced-site schemes. For instance, governments in Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt, the Philippines, Jordan, and Indonesia still have faith in advanced, imported industrial building systems as a key component of housing policies. Other governments—among them the Sudan and Tunisia—are also considering this route. Yet there is little evidence that such systems can meet growing housing needs, as they do not have a very good record to date in the western nations where they were developed. Public housing programmes based on such units have run into extensive—and expensive—maintenance problems. We found no evidence that prefabricated housing units can be built cheaply enough for them to be constructed in sufficient numbers. This is especially true for nations with major balance-of-payments problems since these systems involve heavy import costs for materials, machinery and the right to use techniques developed elsewhere. In addition, an increasing number of blocks built using these techniques are having to be demolished in Europe and North America within 20 years of being constructed because either the design proved to be faulty or because the social problems they generated proved intractable.

Where such systems are transferred with little modification to countries with very different climates and cultures, the design is unlikely to suit the living requirements of the families for whom it is intended. There are also important considerations here, not only regarding physical comfort, but as to the maintenance and support for local values and culture.

Our study does not suggest that all such advanced industrial construction activities are inappropriate. They may well serve the needs of middle and upper-income urban households for apartments. They are also in demand for offices and other commercial buildings. But when viewed only from the need to improve housing conditions, they do not seem to provide a realistic solution. They have met with little success in Nigeria, Brazil and India to date. And governments' support for this type of housing construction, and lack of support for the development and use of other building technologies and materials better suited to the informal sector's capabilities, can only further exacerbate housing problems.

As we noted, there is little government support for developing and promoting the use of local building materials. But apart from access to land and basic services, nothing could more rapidly and effectively improve living conditions than steady, readily available supplies of cheap, durable building materials. It is worth noting that Singapore's Housing and Development Board took steps to ensure a steady supply of building materials for its housing construction programme. It established its own quarries and brickworks, and it used stockpiles and bulk orders placed well in advance of needs to ensure that no bottlenecks in supply hampered construction activities. All

other sixteen nations have the raw materials on which to base indigenous building material industries. If governments are serious about improving housing conditions, they must make far more effort to utilize and develop these.

Housing Finance

Public policies in many of the seventeen nations seek to encourage savings for housing and encourage households to purchase, rent, construct or improve housing units. A housing bank is the central institution of Brazil's public housing programme since 1964. We noted earlier that within the last ten years there are new or much expanded housing finance institutions in Tanzania, Jordan, the Sudan, Tunisia, Indonesia, Egypt, India, Mexico, Bolivia, and Nigeria. In the poorer, less urbanized nations, the lack of financial institutions willing to give long-term loans for housing even to middle and higher-income groups seriously constrained building activity. In many of the seventeen nations, important progress has been made recently in this field. In some—Singapore, Brazil and Colombia among them—major programmes date from the 1960s rather than the 1970s.

However, financial programmes suffer from many of the problems faced by public housing programmes—and these originate in the low and often irregular incomes of much of the population. A large portion of the urban population cannot afford to pay any rent, let alone purchase even the cheapest 'legal' house through a loan with unsubsidized interest rates. Thus, either the housing finance programme caters only for those able to afford market—or close-to-market—rates or it reaches a small proportion of lower-income households with heavily subsidized rates. In Brazil, it was the former. Despite a very considerable increase in housing production generated and supported by the National Housing Bank, unsubsidized loans were too expensive for low-income households. To attract private funds, the housing bank had to rely on generous interest payments (which were index-linked). It also had to draw on a forced savings scheme. But there is a contradiction between attracting private savings and entrepreneurial initiative and building unsubsidized houses for people with very low purchasing power. In addition, if both housing loans and savings deposits are corrected for inflation, this will benefit the depositor and cost the loaner in times of inflation. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of lower-income households that bought housing units on the National Housing Bank's loan fell behind on payments or even abandoned their units.

The alternative is heavy unit subsidies. Egypt's policy of subsidizing loans to private housing cooperatives and subsidized rents in public housing units ensures that government housing money does not go far. In Tunisia, for the 1973–6 and 1977–81 Plans, generous subsidies are given to reduce the price of 'social interest' housing units. Housing loans for lower-income groups are also subsidized. Rural housing units are the most heavily subsidized with rural households paying little more than half the real cost of the unit. Although such policies do show governments trying to bring publicly funded units within reach of low-income groups, they are likely to reach far more people with improved living conditions if subsidies per unit were reduced and standards were set to encourage more informal sector activity. By 1977, it looked as if Tunisian housing policies were changing to do this.

If governments resort to a forced savings programme to guarantee the supply of funds for expanding the provision of housing loans, then the forced savings may simply go to

assisting an élite. In Brazil, the National Housing Bank's funding base was widened in 1967 by what was essentially a compulsory savings programme. Each employee of both the private and public sector had 8 per cent of his or her salary deposited with the National Housing Bank which could then be used to obtain a housing loan or could be withdrawn on retirement, illness, unemployment or other specified circumstances. Every registered worker thus had to contribute to this fund. But an analysis of the income groups that benefited from the Housing Bank's programmes up to 1974 shows lower-income groups contributing far more to the Bank through the forced savings than they actually received in housing loans. In effect, the whole programme used money drawn from lower-income groups to help fund housing loans for middle and upper-income groups.

Singapore has also used a compulsory savings scheme as one of the bases of its housing programme. All employers and employees earning more than a stated minimum contribute with contributions varying with wage levels. Individuals can withdraw a lump sum after reaching the age of 55. Or they can use it to purchase a unit in public housing projects. It seems that in Singapore this forced savings scheme has not adversely affected the lower-income groups in the same way that it has in Brazil. In Singapore, a far higher percentage of people have benefited from improved living conditions both through economic development and through government's social expenditure.

Tanzania and Tunisia both have payroll taxes that fund low-interest housing loans for low-income groups, and thus a mechanism that redistributes benefits the opposite way to that of Brazil's compulsory savings programme. Mexico has a payroll tax of 5 per cent paid by all employers which goes to help fund the Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers. This—along with special agencies for the armed forces and government employees—loan funds to those wishing to buy or enlarge their house. Although this fund has reached some lower-income families, when the whole housing finance programme is examined most of the units it supported were only affordable by middle or lower-middle-income groups.

A housing finance policy that aims to encourage far more housing construction or improvement, and includes informal sector activity in this, has to have in place the framework that keeps unit costs low—that is, appropriate standards, land prices that do not make urban housing units prohibitively expensive for low-income groups, readily available, reasonably priced building materials and so on. It will also have to take due note of the needs of rural households and build up the institutional framework so these can be reached. Only then will the policy become effective.

One notes in passing that rent controls have constrained housing construction in the private sector and have discouraged the maintenance of privately let dwellings. Rent controls have contributed to poor and generally deteriorating conditions in privately owned tenement blocks in Cairo, La Paz, Dar es Salaam, Mexico City and many Indian cities. Public authorities are caught between the need to lower housing costs and the need to encourage private sector operations in constructing rental accommodation. Private rental accommodation is open to much abuse by exploitative landlords and yet it can provide valuable accommodation especially for people who need to be able to move at short notice to new job opportunities (and can afford the rent). Once rent control is enforced, it creates a powerful constituency who demand it be kept in place. No mechanism exists in practice to update the rates of controlled rents so as to

keep up with inflation and increasing maintenance and service costs. Thus, private sector investment in units for rent is discouraged.

Notes

1. Even if the pattern of Nepal's major towns within the national territory is not directly influenced by colonial rule, its longstanding dependence on India both for imports and as an export market is easily seen in the extent to which urban growth and development has been concentrated in towns on the main Nepal-India transport routes.

2. This refers to Khartoum Province as defined prior to the 1974 reform which changes the nine provinces which had been defined under colonial rule into eighteen provinces.

3. The criteria used for each nation to define what constitutes an 'urban' settlement are described in each nation's Background.

4. See the Philippines Background section for the criteria used to define what constitutes an 'urban' settlement.

5. These figures are based on those given in Table 3. For Nepal, around half the nation's urban population lives in Kathmandu, Lalitpur (also known as Patan and separated from Kathmandu only by the river Baghmati) and Bhaktapur (also known as Bhadgaon) which is essentially one urban agglomeration within the Kathmandu Valley.

6. Sources for Table 3 on the Three Largest Urban Agglomerations in each nation. 1950 and 1960 urban agglomeration populations (unless otherwise stated) from Davis, Kingsley (1976), *World Urbanization 1950-1970 Volume 1*, Revised Edition, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, USA, Table E. 1990 Urban Agglomeration projections from United Nations (1976), *Statistical Annex, Global Review of Human Settlements*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 6.

Kenya: Nairobi (1978), Mombasa (1978 and 1983) and Kisumu (1978 and 1983) from Kenya, Republic of (1979), *Development Plan 1979-83 Part I*, table 2.4. Kisumu (1962) from United Nations (1973), *Urban Land Policies and Land Use Control Measures Volume 1 Africa*, ST/ECA/197, Annex 3.

Nigeria: As we noted in Section IV, note (4), there were no reliable and up-to-date statistics on city size in Nigeria as we went to press. These figures must be taken as rough estimates.

Lagos (1975) from United Nations Development Program/Lagos State Masterplan Project (1975). Ibadan (1975) and Kano (1975) from United Nations (1979), *Demographic Yearbook 1978*. Lagos (1952), Ibadan (1952) and Kano (1952) from Table 1, Aradeon, David (1979), *Post Habitat Evaluation Regional Reports on Human Settlements Volume 1 Nigeria*, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Lagos. Other sources give very different figures. For instance, the Nigerian Report to Habitat put Kano's population in 1972 at 500 000 and that of Ibadan at 895 000 without making it clear whether these were the urban agglomeration or the city populations. And the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1978 put Ogbomosho as the third largest city with 432 000 inhabitants in 1975.

Tanzania: Figures from the 1978 census were not available as we went to press so these figures are all estimates. Dar es Salaam (1976), Arusha (1976) and Tanga (1976) from Mayao, G. and Kulaba, S. M. (1978), *Post Habitat Evaluation Report on Human Settlements in Tanzania*, Mazingira Institute, Nairobi, table 1.3. Dar es Salaam (1981), Arusha (1981) and Tanga (1981) from Tanzania, United Republic of (1976), *Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development*, table 43. Dar es Salaam (1960) from Kingsley Davis. Different sources give very different estimates for Tanga's population. The Third Five Year Plan gives its estimated population at 85 700 in 1974 while the Post Habitat Evaluation Report on Human Settlements in Tanzania gives an estimate for 1976 at 70 000.

India: Calcutta (1971), Bombay (1971) and Delhi (1971) from census data quoted in United Nations (1979) *Demographic Yearbook 1978*. The figure for Delhi's population includes New Delhi.

Indonesia: Jakarta (1977) from Encyclopaedia Britannica (1978), *Book of the Year 1978*, page 370. Surabaya (1980) and Bandung (1980) are projections from United Nations (1976), *Statistical Annex—Global Review of Human Settlements*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 6.

Nepal: Kathmandu (1976) from the Economist (1978), *The World in Figures*. This figure of 415 000 inhabitants includes the town of Lalitpur (also called Patan) with a 1976 population of 135 000 and Bhaktapur (also known as Bhadgaon) with 84 000. Encyclopaedia Britannica's *Book of the Year 1978* put Kathmandu City's population at 171 400 in 1976. Biratnagar (1971) and Nepalganj (1971) from census data quoted in Bhooshan, B. S. (1979). *The Development Experience of Nepal*, Concept, India, Appendix C.

Philippines: Manila (1980) and (1990) from Apacible, M. S. and Yaxley, M., *Manila through the eyes of the Manilenos and the Consultant*, PTRC Summer Annual Meeting, 1979. Cebu (1975) and Davao (1975) from United Nations (1979), *Demographic Yearbook 1978*.

Singapore: Population figures for 1947 and 1978 are for whole nation. Singapore (1947) from Yeh, Stephen, H. K. (1975), *Public Housing in Singapore*, University of Singapore Press, page 4. Singapore (1978) from United Nations (1979), *Demographic Yearbook 1978*.

Bolivia: La Paz (1976). Santa Cruz (1976) and Cochabamba (1976) from 1976 census data.

Brazil: São Paulo (1980), Rio de Janeiro (1975) and Belo Horizonte (1980) are projections from United Nations (1976), *Statistical Annex—Global Review of Human Settlements*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 6.

Colombia: Bogota (1977) Medellin (1977) and Cali (1977) are estimates from Banco de la Republica (1979). *Colombia's Socio-Economic Indicators 1970–78*, Economic Research Department, Table 3, page 13.

Mexico: Mexico City (1978), Guadalajara (1978) and Monterrey (1978) from United Nations (1979), *Demographic Yearbook 1978*.

Egypt: Metropolitan Cairo (1979) from Europe (1980), *The Middle East and North Africa*. The figure includes Giza (whose population was put at 1.25 million in 1976) and Subra-El Khema (whose population was put at 393 700 in 1976). Mahalla al Kubrah (1976) and Alexandria (1976) from United Nations (1979), *Demographic Yearbook 1978*.

Iraq: Baghdad (1977) from census data. Mosul (1974) and Basrah (1974) from Fisher, W. B. (1978), *The Middle East*, seventh edition, Methuen and Co, page 396. This does not state whether these estimates are for the city proper or the urban agglomeration. As we discussed in note (8), Section I, there are enormous differences between the various estimates given by different statistical sources. Many still give figures based on 1965 census data. These were still used by the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1978* (printed in 1979) which gives Basrah's population in 1965 as 310 950 and that of Mosul at 264 146. The official statistics based on the 1977 census have not, to date, included individual city populations.

Jordan: Amman (1978), Zerqa (1978) and Irbid (1978) from Europa (1980), *North Africa and the Middle East*. Amman (1948) from Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of (1975), *National Report to Habitat*. Zerqa (1961) from United Nations (1973), *Urban Land Policies and Land Use Control Measures Volume V, Middle East*, ST/ECA/167/Add 4, page 5.

The Sudan: The figures for Khartoum include Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. Khartoum (1955–6 and 1978), Port Sudan (1955/6 and 1978) and Wad Medani (1955/6) from Agency for International Development (1978), *Sudan Shelter Sector Assessment*, Office of Housing, USA, Appendices A–4 and A–5. Wad Medani (1973) from Sudan, Democratic Republic of (1975), *National Report to Habitat*.

Tunisia: Tunis (1975 and 1986), Sfax (1975 and 1986) and Sousse (1975 and 1986) from Agency for International Development (1979), *Tunisia: Shelter Sector Survey*, Office of Housing, USA. The figure for Tunis is for the District of Tunis. Sfax's metropolitan area was reported by the above source to have 257 000 inhabitants in 1975.

7. World Bank (1979). *World Development Report, 1979*, page 46.

8. Misra, R. P. and Bhooshan, B. S. (1979). *Human Settlements in Asia*, (New Delhi: Heritage).

9. The percentage of the national population living in rural areas in 1976 was 12.8 per cent (estimated) if 'urban areas' are settlements with more than 5000 inhabitants.

10. Task Force on Human Settlements (1975). *Human Settlements—The Vision of a New Society*, G1/HC/PH1/501.

11. Lu, Martin (1976). 'II PND. PODE O EMPRESARIO INTEGRAR-SE?', *Journal Visao*, 19 April.

12. Tanzania, United Republic of (1976). *Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1976–81* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printers).

13. Blitzer, Silvia and Hardoy, Jorge, E. (1980). *Aid for Human Settlements in Latin America, a Summary of the Activities of Multilateral Agencies during 1977 and 1978*, IIED.
14. Teriba, O. and Kayode, M. O. (1978). 'Industrial location and development policy in developing countries' in Misra, R. P., Urs, D. V., and Natraj, V. K. (editors) *Regional Planning and National Development*, (India: Vikas).
15. Cuenya, B., Gazzoli, R., and Yujnovsky, O. (1979). *Políticas de asentamientos humanos*, (Argentina: Ediciones SIAP).
16. Kulaba, S. M. and Mayao, G. (1978). *Post-Habitat Evaluation Report on Human Settlements in Tanzania* (Mazingira Institute), July.
17. Sierra, Pedro Javier Soto (1977). 'Transformacion en el sector urbano', VI Congreso Interamericano de Vivienda, Interhabitat, Medellin.
18. Varma, Rameswari, and Sastry, N. N. (1979), *Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses, Volume III: Japan and Singapore* stated that Singapore's Land Acquisition Act enables the government to acquire land based on the value of the property in November 1973 (page 149). This may well have been changed by now.
19. Darin-Drabkin, H. (1976). *Land Policy and Urban Growth* (Oxford: Pergamon Press).
20. El Agraa, Omer, M. A., and Admad, Adil M. (1979). *Assessment of Human Settlements in Arab Countries*, study sponsored by the International Institute for Environment and Development, London. (A revised version was published by the University of Khartoum Press in 1980).
21. Misra, R. P., and Bhooshan, B. S. (1979). *Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses, Volume I: India* (India: Concept), page 196.
22. Virtually all the figures quoted in this summary are drawn from earlier sections describing in more depth each nation's housing policies. The reader should refer back to these for sources.
23. Nigeria's Federal Mortgage Bank was formed out of the Nigerian Building Society while the Tanzanian Housing Bank took over the assets and liabilities of the Permanent Housing Finance Company of Tanzania which had financed the construction of houses for upper income groups on a commercial basis.
24. Sudan, Democratic Republic of (1975). *National Report on Human Settlements*, Department of Housing Services and Engineering Affairs, Ministry of People's Local Government.
25. De Vera, Jacobo (1974-5). 'Housing needs up to the year 2000 and its financing implications', *NEDA Journal of Development*, I and II, page 61, Table 14.
26. Egypt, Arab Republic of, Ministry of Planning with Office of Housing, US AID (1976). *Statistical Appendix—Immediate Action Proposals for Housing in Egypt*, Table IV-1, page 51.
27. United Nations (1976). *World Housing Survey 1974*, Table 28, pages 103-5.
28. Kenya, Republic of (1979). *Development Plan 1979-83 Part I*, page 50.
29. Kenya, Republic of (1979). *Statistical Abstract 1978*, Central Bureau of Statistics, page 163, Table 145(b).
30. Philippines, Republic of (1977). *Five-Year Philippine Development Plan*, National Economic and Development Authority, Table 11.2, pages 225-7.
31. United Nations (1976). *World Housing Survey 1974*, Table VI-3.
32. Lim, William (1975). *Equity and Urban Environment in the Third World*, DP Consultant Service, Singapore.
33. Moochtar, Radinal (1979). 'Urban housing in Indonesia', *Habitat International*, 4, no. 3.
34. Osobukola, F. O. (1977). 'Socio-economic Problems of Low Cost Housing Schemes in Nigeria', paper presented at the Fourth Conference on Housing in Africa, Tunisia (May 1977), sponsored by US AID.
35. Public Works, Ministry of (1975). *National Interim Report on Human Settlements in Indonesia*, the National Preparatory Committee of Habitat, page 31.
36. El Agraa, Omer, M. A., and Ahmad, Adil M. (1979). *Assessment of Human Settlements in Arab Countries*.



Conclusions and Recommendations



Conclusions and Recommendations

In virtually all the nations studied, most of the population are faced with poor and often deteriorating living conditions. The concentration of much of the public and private investment in a few major urban centres over the last few decades has led to their rapid growth. It has usually meant the exclusion of large portions of the population and much of the national territory from social and economic development. The labour force in the major urban centres has generally grown far faster than the creation of secure employment opportunities there. The population of these urban centres has also grown faster than their stock of housing and the network of basic infrastructure and services. There is generally serious overcrowding in existing houses while the construction of new units to official standards by both private and public sector investment meets only a small proportion of the growth in housing needs every year.

The result is a large and even growing number of the national population with no secure source of livelihood above any reasonable definition of subsistence level, no access to potable water or to basic health care services, and no adequate arrangements for the sanitary removal of human and household wastes. Access to education is also far from universal. Most housing continues to be built without official permission and without meeting official standards. But only through such building operations are the vast majority of people housed—and housed at a price and in a location they can afford.

Despite widely differing national responses to such problems, each of the seventeen governments was found to be giving more attention to housing problems and to the wider distribution of benefits from social and economic investments. Most are trying to move away from the simple concentration on economic growth and sectoral national development plans that characterize the 1960s and early 1970s. For settlement policies, new institutions are emerging to provide a spatial framework for development investment. In two nations, Mexico and the Philippines, new ministerial-level bodies have emerged. For land policies, many nations including Mexico, Tunisia, Nigeria, Brazil and the Philippines have had major initiatives in the second half of the 1970s. Increased support is being given to more widely based shelter programmes with a new emphasis on slum or squatter upgrading and serviced-site schemes. In the Sudan and Tanzania, such schemes are the central element of urban housing policies. In nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Colombia, they are also receiving far more support.

However, despite such promising signs, government action is virtually always inadequate and often ill-directed. Assessments as to the success of government policies

are hampered by the lack of accurate and up-to-date social data. But when looking back on the 1970s, only in Singapore, Tanzania and Tunisia does there seem to be a significant proportion of the population whose access to basic services or housing conditions have improved. In Tanzania's case, such progress is threatened by major economic problems which partly relate to its lack of power within the world market. Only a handful of nations show signs of giving serious attention to the Habitat *Recommendations* they officially endorsed at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. Most claimed to, but have picked on only those *Recommendations* that serve their political ends. In many nations, urban-based publicly funded housing programmes still dominate government policies even though, to date, these have made little impression on improving living conditions, especially for lower-income groups. As we examined in detail earlier (page 252), Singapore's relative success was due to a series of factors, unique to Singapore, which had little or nothing to do with the actual houses themselves.

It is dangerous to attempt to make any general conclusions about a group of nations that includes Nepal (one of the world's poorest and most rural nations) and Brazil or Mexico (both major economic powers in Latin America and indeed in the world). But some of our conclusions seem of general validity and are backed up by the few examples of successful programmes or policies we came across.

1. Unless there is a firm political and financial commitment to the struggle against poverty with such a commitment becoming evident in national development plans and in specific programmes (such as employment creation, technical education and social development) no effective housing or settlement policy can emerge. Several of the nations covered in this volume could solve most of the problems relating to the poor and deteriorating conditions much of their population endures with foresight and with some degree of generosity in the attitude of those social groups who have benefited and indeed are benefiting from the process of development. These nations do not necessarily lack the funds or the technical skills and data for social development. But these resources are not put to adequate use. And even the poorest nations we examined, which did lack such resources, could have a deeper impact on improving the living conditions of their population if they followed suggestions made in (3) below.

2. National development plans must consider their spatial implications. The pattern of economic and social development over the national territory is powerfully influenced by the type and location of social and economic investments (by both private and public sectors). Most national development plans show little sign of having considered the spatial implications of the sectoral investments they propose—and thus of the kind of development they will promote. Despite ambitious social and spatial aims stated in such plans, they rarely contain policies that have any hope of meeting such aims and all too frequently end up enriching already privileged social groups, regions and large agglomerations. Since such plans outline the sectors to which all public investments are made—and frequently take note of (and try and influence) private investments—such plans must consider the spatial distribution of development funds among cities, towns, villages and regions and the type of development such a distribution will promote. Only by considering such spatial

complete by
→

politics
resource
distribution

equity

distribution

implications can national development plans seek to spread both social and economic development so they reach a wider proportion of the population and the national territory, *and* recognize their limitations in being able to do so. Many of the national development plans our assessment looked at remain sectoral in nature with no consideration of the pattern of development they were promoting. Several others professed spatial aims which were beyond the scope and power of the plan to achieve. Indeed, the plan's actual distribution of development funds often ran counter to these spatial aims.

3. For housing policies, the government must recognize that a large proportion of households cannot afford even the lowest-cost unit built by private or public contractors. A squatter's shack is often all the household can afford. Given its needs and priorities in the use of a limited and often fluctuating income, this may serve it far better than a heavily subsidized public housing unit elsewhere. Recognizing this, the government's primary task becomes that of encouraging the general improvement of living conditions putting its limited resources where they can have maximum effect. Any attempt by the government to build conventional houses for the population runs into the 'bottomless pit' problem. However much they spend, there are always more units needed. But our analysis of housing problems showed five crucial areas where government action can (and in some instances has) had a major effect on improving living conditions at little (or no) cost.

The government at national and sub-national levels must use its legal powers to ensure there is an adequate supply of land for housing in urban areas. The price of such land should not be so high as to automatically exclude the poor majority. Usually, the National Constitution gives government the constitutional basis on which to formulate needed legislation. Because of the urban land market's peculiar nature (which was discussed earlier) and because of the poverty of so many households, without such action by government, a legal housing site will remain beyond the price range of most families. This is especially true in rapidly urbanizing societies. Without an effective urban land policy which allows a large proportion of urban households to enter it—and choose where to live—no government has any chance of tackling mounting housing deficits and inadequate service provision.

It is also worth noting that taxes on land (whether on the land itself or on the unearned increment in land values) can also provide local governments with valuable revenues. These could help fund the extension of basic services and infrastructure to all the population under their jurisdiction.

The government must revise ~~official standards~~—building codes minimum plot sizes, building permits etc. Their purpose is (or should be) to encourage better quality living environments. This was their original intention. They will only do so if they strike a balance between what is *desirable* (in terms of health and safety), *attainable* (by both large and small construction operations) and *affordable* by the majority of households and by the nation as a whole. Otherwise, they will continue to be irrelevant to most housing construction operations.

The new commitment by governments to considering the spatial implications of

development plans and to clearly articulating what they intend to do with regard to settlements must be backed up with more comprehensive data collection. In most Third World nations, the quantity and quality of basic social data is very deficient and seriously hinders the task of designing, implementing and continuously evaluating settlement policies and programmes. This lack of data is apparent at national level but even more so at the level of the regions and individual settlements. Each major settlement or region should have basic information about such things as population size, structure and movement, public (and where possible private) expenditures and their spatial distribution, housing conditions and housing production (both formal and informal sectors), land ownership patterns, employment patterns and trends, and building material production. However, lack of such data should not delay decision makers from making preliminary decisions which can be adjusted as more information becomes available. Use can be made of research documents, specialized reports and local statistics (even if they are sketchy and not very precise). Use can also be made of selected local informants in each locality and region to give policy makers information based on their direct experience and observations, if statistical information is not available.

One major area where government action is needed is in the building materials industry. The lack of cheap, readily available, reasonable quality building materials is a major constraint on all construction operations. Government support to the development and widespread use of building materials based on indigenous resources is very inadequate. Again, this will probably demand a revision of urban building codes which often expressly forbid the use of such materials.

Training programmes concerned with settlement policies must receive a lot more support. The institutional changes recommended above need implementation. This cannot be achieved without skilled personnel. Similarly, new initiatives to spread, say, potable water will simply not work unless there is adequate provision for maintenance of new machinery *and* adequate training, education and information programmes to back up new technology or practices the development programme is promoting.

In making these recommendations, however, we do note that for many Third World nations, governments' financial resource base is so weak as to seriously constrain even the modest expenditure entailed by these recommendations. In most of the seventeen nations we looked at, human and material resources are available to tackle the most pressing problems of poverty. But for some—Nepal, Tanzania and the Sudan among them—government resources are limited by these nations' lack of earning power within the world community. For each, the return they receive for the primary produce on which their export earnings depend fluctuates—and has shown a long term trend over the last thirty years of declining in value relative to the manufactured goods and, more recently, the oil they import. Diversifying their exports is constrained by their lack of industrial development and by increasingly competitive markets in this time of economic recession. They are also seriously constrained by rising protectionism in the rich, industrialized nations both for manufactured goods and on processed or semi-processed primary products. Inevitably, development programmes are constrained by lack of capital. Economic imperatives such as

increasing export earnings may and often do run against basic development aims—decreasing food imports or a better distribution of social and economic development among their population. The success of such nations in tackling poverty and thus improving living conditions is seriously curtailed by such factors. Only by restructuring the world economic system so it does not constantly turn all economic bargains against the needs of the poorest nations will such basic problems be resolved. Thus, housing problems within nations should be seen as part of a world economic system which must itself be changed if the world community is serious about meeting basic needs for all.

Statistical Annex

Table 7 Physical indicators

Countries	1 Geographical area (1000 km ²)	2 Population		3 Population density (number of people per km ²) 1978	4 Average annual population growth (%)	
		(millions)			1960-70	1970-8
		1970	1978			
<i>Africa</i>						
Kenya	583	11.2	14.7	25	3.4	3.3
Nigeria	924	66.2	80.6	87	2.5	2.5
Tanzania	945	13.0	16.9	18	2.7	3.0
<i>Asia</i>						
India	3288	538.1	643.9	196	2.5	2.0
Indonesia	2027	115.6	136.0	67	2.2	1.8
Nepal	141	11.1	13.6	96	2.0	2.2
Philippines	300	36.9	45.6	152	3.0	2.7
Singapore	0.6	2.1	2.3	3833	2.4	1.5
<i>Latin America</i>						
Bolivia	1099	4.9	5.3	5	2.5	2.6
Brazil	8512	92.8	119.5	14	2.9	2.8
Colombia	1139	21.6	25.6	22	3.0	2.3
Mexico	1973	50.7	65.4	33	3.3	3.3
<i>Arab nations</i>						
Egypt	1001	33.3	39.9	40	2.5	2.2
Iraq	435	9.4	12.2	28	3.1	3.3
Jordan	98	2.3	3.0	31	3.0	3.3
Sudan	2506	15.7	17.4	7	2.2	2.6
Tunisia	164	5.1	6.0	37	1.9	2.0

Sources: Columns 1 and 4: from *World Development Report 1980* (World Bank)
 Column 2: from *World Development Report 1980* and *World Bank Tables, 1977* (World Bank)
 Column 3: Derived

Table 8 Economic indicators

Countries	GNP per capita		Distribution of GDP (%)					
	(US\$) 1978	average annual growth (%) 1960-78	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
			1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978
<i>Africa</i>								
Kenya	330	2.2	38	41	18	19	44	40
Nigeria	560	3.6	63	34	11	43	26	23
Tanzania	230	2.7	57	51	11	13	32	36
<i>Asia</i>								
India	180	1.4	50	40	20	26	30	34
Indonesia	360	4.1	54	31	14	33	32	36
Nepal	120	0.8	—	62	—	12	—	26
Philippines	510	2.6	26	27	28	35	46	38
Singapore	3,290	7.4	4	2	18	35	78	63
<i>Latin America</i>								
Bolivia	510	2.2	26	17	25	28	49	55
Brazil	1,570	4.9	16	11	35	37	49	52
Colombia	850	3.0	34	31	26	27	40	42
Mexico	1,290	2.7	16	11	29	37	55	52
<i>Arab nations</i>								
Egypt	390	3.3	30	29	24	30	46	41
Iraq	1,860	4.1	17	—	52	—	31	—
Jordan	1,050	—	—	11	—	29	—	60
Sudan	320	0.1	58	43	15	12	27	45
Tunisia	950	4.8	24	18	18	30	58	52

Source: World Development Report 1980 (World Bank)

Note: Figures for Tunisia's 1960 Distribution of GDP are for 1961 while figures for Kenya, Nepali, Sudanese and Nigerian 1978 Distribution of GDP are for 1977.

Table 9 Social indicators

Countries	1		2	3		4
	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)	Adult literacy (%)		Education spending (per capita US\$)
	1960	1978		1960	1975	1974
<i>Africa</i>						
Kenya	47	53	114	20	40	7
Nigeria	39	48	157	15	—	13
Tanzania	42	51	163	10	66	5
<i>Asia</i>						
India	43	51	129	28	36	3
Indonesia	41	47	137	39	62	4
Nepal	36	43	152	9	19	1
Philippines	51	60	80	72	87	8
Singapore	64	70	12	—	75	55
<i>Latin America</i>						
Bolivia	43	52	157	39	63	12
Brazil	57	62	109	61	76	33
Colombia	53	62	90	63	81	10
Mexico	58	65	66	65	76	28
<i>Arab nations</i>						
Egypt	46	54	162	26	44	2
Iraq	46	55	104	18	—	38
Jordan	47	56	97	32	70	18
Sudan	39	46	167	13	20	5
Tunisia	48	57	135	16	55	34

Sources: Columns 1 and 3: *World Development Report, 1980* (World Bank)
 Columns 2 and 4: *The United States and World Development Agenda 1979* (Overseas Development Council)

Note: Figures for infant mortality are latest available estimates and some may not reflect current trends.
 Figures for adult literacy either on or within two years of specified date.

Table 10 Rural/agricultural indicators

Countries	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Rural Population as % total population		Arable Land and Land Under Permanent Crops 1977			
	1960	1980	Area (1000 h)	% under irrigation	Hectares per capita	Hectares per agricultural population
<i>Africa</i>						
Kenya	93	86	2,270	2	0.16	0.20
Nigeria	87	80	23,990	0.1	0.30	0.64
Tanzania	95	88	5,100	1	0.31	0.38
<i>Asia</i>						
India	82	78	169,400	21	0.27	0.40
Indonesia	85	80	17,200	28	0.13	0.20
Nepal	97	95	2,314	9	0.17	0.19
Philippines	70	64	8,100	14	0.18	0.38
Singapore	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Latin America</i>						
Bolivia	76	67	3,305	4	0.64	1.34
Brazil	54	35	40,720	2	0.35	0.87
Colombia	52	30	5,505	5	0.22	0.72
Mexico	49	33	23,220	22	0.37	0.95
<i>Arab nations</i>						
Egypt	62	55	2,831	100	0.07	0.15
Iraq	57	28	5,290	22	0.45	1.06
Jordan	57	44	1,365	4	0.47	2.33
Sudan	90	75	7,495	21	0.44	0.59
Tunisia	64	48	4,410	3	0.75	1.69

Sources: Columns 1 and 2 *World Development Report 1980*

Column 3 *FAO Production Yearbook 1978* Most of the figures are FAO estimates

Columns 4, 5 and 6 derived. Area under irrigation (1977) and agriculture population (1977) from *FAO Production Yearbook 1978*; 1977 national populations from *World Development Report 1979*. The agricultural population includes all persons depending on agriculture for their livelihood (including non-working dependents).

