A Rapid Review of the Enabling Environment and Existing Examples of Collaborative Special-Use Forest Management in Vietnam

Report to WWF Greater Mekong - Vietnam Country Programme. Prepared by Steve Swan, 2 April 2008

I. Terminology

- 1. Before a discussion of collaborative management can take place, terminology should be reviewed and standardised. A number of different terms in English are often used synonymously apropos 'collaborative management' of protected areas: co-management, decentralised management, participatory management, shared governance, socialised management, etc.
- 2. For the purposes of this assignment, the term collaborative management will be used to describe a spectrum, or continuum, of stakeholder engagement in protected area management as depicted in Figure 1: moving from isolated state management (SUF management board only), through to complete transferral of authority and responsibility to a non-state stakeholder (e.g. private enterprise or 'Community Conserved Area' not currently possible under current national policy/legislative/regulatory frameworks).




Figure 1 Schematic representation of the collaborative management concept

- = current status of collaborative SUF management in Vietnam
 = limit of collaboration that is achievable under current regulations
- 3. Within this theoretical concept of collaborative protected area management, the term 'comanagement' specifically equates to the form of collaborative management characterised by

formal sharing of management responsibilities and benefits in a system of shared governance and/or land/resource tenure and access rights. As such, co-management currently lies outside of what is permitted by current policy, law and regulations (as discussion in section II below and indicated by the solid line in Figure 1). It is advised that the Bi Doup-Nui Ba (BD-NB) project use the boarder conceptual term 'collaborative management' to describe interventions, and avoid the use of 'co-management'.

4. There are cultural and political reasons too for choosing and using 'collaborative' over 'comanagement'. Co-management can be perceived by national and local government as a threatening concept, which promotes transferral of *authority* from state to non-state actors. In a top-down, hierarchical governance and cultural context of Vietnam. Transferral of authority from state to local, often ethnic minority communities is not desirable. Co-management also has connotations of 'collectivised' forest management, a post-war policy experiment that contributed to rapid deforestation rates as a result of a dispersal of responsibility, rather than a sharing of it.

II. National policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks

- 5. In line with the government's Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 2000-2005 and subsequent Socio-economic Development Plan 2006-2010, the government of Vietnam (GoV) is currently engaged in a policy experiment of socialising the forestry sector¹. 'Socialisation' here means the state (Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development, Department of Forestry) sharing some of the responsibilities, and resultant benefits from managing the forest estate with other stakeholders (other government agencies, local communities, emerging civil society, international NGOs, private sector, etc.). This policy of socialisation is a response to the ever increasing and complex management demands from forests in the 21st century: timber, non-timber products (NTFPs), sustainable rural livelihoods, recreation (tourism), ecosystem services (e.g. water and carbon cycle management), etc., and intention of the government to encourage non-state stakeholder involvement in the management and use of forest resources in an effort to further increase the contribution of the forest sector to poverty alleviation and national economic growth
- 6. This policy experiment of socialisation is relatively advanced in two of the three categories of forest management: production and protection forests. Community forestry, contributing to sustainable rural livelihoods in these forest management types has a relatively well established history in Vietnam; after a number of Official Development Assistance (ODA) -funded projects across the country the government has recently issued regulations² governing a state-funded 40-commune pilot community forestry programme.
- 7. Extension of the socialisation experiment to special-use forests (SUF) is supported by national-level policy³ and legislation⁴. For example, the National Forest Development Strategy promotes the continuation of piloting community-based forest (and other collaborative) management modalities, and even introduces the concept of multiple-use zoning within a SUF (specifically that degraded Ecological Restoration Sub-Zones within a given SUF may be used for sustainable NTFP production to benefit people living in and adjacent to the protected area).

¹ Decision 18/2007/QD-TTg, dated 05.02.07, promulgating the National Forest Development Strategy.

² Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development Decision No. 106/2006/QD-BNN, dated 27.11.06, Promulgating the Instruction on Management of Village Community Forests.

³ Prime Ministerial Decision No. 192/2003/QD-TTg, dated 17.09.03, Approval of the Management Strategy for a Protected Area System in Vietnam to 2010; and Decision 18/2007/QD-TTg, dated 05.02.07, promulgating the National Forest Development Strategy.

⁴ Law on Forest Protection & Development (No. 29/2004/QH11); Decree No. 181/2004/ND-CP on the Implementation of the Land Law.

Through socialisation of SUF management, it is expected (by foreign donors and advisers at least) that communities having a stake in managing forest resources should lead to both sustainable management and reduction of illegal activities within the protected areas; contributing to both sustainable rural livelihoods and effective biodiversity conservation. However, a significant gap remains between policy and regulatory frameworks, with recently revised regulations on forest management⁵ largely prescribing a no-use regime for natural resources within SUFs, and it is the national regulations, not policy, that local government (Forest Protection Departments and SUF management boards) follow.

- 8. Decision 186⁵, which regulates management of the three forest categories (production, protection and special-use) strictly prohibits all acts of natural resource exploitation (hunting, logging, NTFP collection, etc.) within the core zone of SUFs (with the exception of the service-administration sub-zones Article 18). Thus, sustainable extractive resource use, as an incentive for collaborative management, is currently not a legally tenable option in Vietnam at present.
- 9. It should be noted that despite the strict no-use statements presented in Article 18 of Decision 186, Article 20 of the same regulations indicate some (unclear notion) of 'rational use'. Within ecological restoration sub-zones of SUF core zones 'bio-forestrial techniques' (silivculture?) are allowed with the purpose of raising the quality and accelerating the process of forest restoration. Within service-administration sub-zones exploitation of (non-legally protected species of) NTFP, dead/fallen timber, and trees cut to make way for infrastructure development, is permitted. Some commentators have optimistically cited Article 20's rational use as a potential 'loop hole' that presents an opportunity to explore collaborative management agreements based on sustainable extractive resource use. It is the opinion of this author that such weak and nebulous statements comprising Article 20, vis-à-vis preceding strong and unambiguous clauses of strict no-use (Article 18), present no significant legal justification to pursue community forestry-type resource use agreements; no provision is made within Decision 186 (or its associated implementation circular⁶) for any kind of benefit sharing mechanism from extractive or non-extractive resource use.
- 10. Perhaps the most significant positive inclusion in the revised forest management regulations (Decision 186), from a collaborative management perspective, is Article 18.4a: forest owner's (management boards) may organise specialised forest protection forces using salary funds, or package contracting of forest protection to local communities. This provides justification for SUF management boards to: a) hire community rangers; and b) contract out some protection responsibilities similar to the 'green book' certificate scheme of the Five Million Hectare Reforestation Programme (5MHRP)⁷ in protection forests. It should be noted that this article confers no direct extractive benefit sharing mechanism of natural resources; simple compensatory payments are made for nominal protection as with 661 green books.
- 11. In the case of community rangers there may be both wider incentives and disincentives for management boards to employ local community rangers on a short-term (i.e. annual) basis to augment SUF staff and any associated government rangers. Incentives may come obliquely from the recent reorganisation of the provincial Forest Protection Service (previously reporting

⁵ Prime Ministerial Decision No. 186/2006/QD-TTg, dated 14.08.06, Promulgating the Regulation on Forest Management.

⁶ Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development Circular No. 99/2006/TT-BNN, dated 06.11.06, Guiding the Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Regulation on Forest Management, Issued Together with the Prime Minister's Decision No. 186/2006/QD-TTg, dated 14.08.06.

⁷ Prime Ministerial Decision No. 661/QD-TTg, dated 29.07.98, on Objectives, Tasks, Policies & Organization for the Establishment of Five Million Hectares of New Forest.

directly to the provincial People's Committee - PPC) to be line managed by provincial Departments of Agriculture & Rural Development (DARD)⁸. In moving provincial Forest Protection Departments (FPD) under DARD, Decree 119 has removed the responsibility of 'forest owners' (i.e. SUF management boards) to directly line manage FPD rangers (in the cases where the SUFs are large enough to warrant their own Forest Protection Bureau - FPB). Thus, FPD could be considered more of an emergency service, a forest fire brigade and police, serving the SUF management boards. However, Decree 119 provides no mechanism for how SUF management boards and FPBs might co-operate. In the context of resultant inter-governmental agency confusion and /or conflict, community rangers might appeal to SUF management boards as an expedient and cost-effective alternative or addition to working with state rangers of the FPBs. Disincentives still remain, as the state has already invested in one ranger force – FPD; so there maybe insufficient justification for FPD to approach PPCs to request addition funds to cover operational costs of a supplementary, community ranger force (and no incentive for FPD to share their existing budgets with non-government employees).

- 12. A key recent regulatory development that could be deployed to support collaborative SUF management is the new decree on collaborative groups⁹. This decree focuses on the development of local agricultural co-operatives and makes no reference to collaborative natural resource management. However, there is no reason why the same principles cannot be employed in the context of engaging local communities in SUF management, and could be exploited to institutionally strengthen the handful of emerging pilot 'Forest Protection Councils', 'Management Co-operatives', or 'Collaborative Management Steering Committees' (multi-stakeholder advisory bodies to SUF management boards).
- 13. Most recently, new regulations on 'eco-'tourism activity management in national parks and nature conservation areas ¹⁰ could present significant opportunities for non-extractive resource incentives (benefits) for increased community participation in SUF management. Decision 104 develops the pro-tourism position of the forest management regulations (Decision 186, as articulated in Article 22) to promote community involvement and benefit capture from SUF tourism activities: 'Local communities are able to participate and gain benefit form eco-tourism activities to increase their income and improve their awareness and responsibility of nature and biodiversity conservation' (Article 4.3). Article 7.3 goes on to elucidate that local communities should be given priority and favorable conditions to participate in, and benefit from, in ecotourism activities to improve their livelihoods. Community-based, pro-poor tourism is, therefore, a priority area of potential collaborative management development, justified by national regulations.
- 14. In the context of the BD-NB project, one potential opportunity for exploring collaborative management agreements has been presented in a Prime Ministerial decision11 to pilot contractual assignment of forests for protection to ethnic minority communities in the Central Highlands. This pilot programme permitted state-funded contractual assignment (not allotment or allocation) of SUF to local ethnic minority communities. Compensatory (both cash and inkind, i.e. rice) payments, not sustainable resource use agreements, was the mechanism employed for community contributions to forest protection. The author is not aware of any pilots

⁸ Government Decree No.119/2006/ND-CP, dated 16.10.06, on Organization and Operation of The Forest Protection Service

 $^{^9}$ Government Decree No. 151/2007/NĐ-CP, dated 10.10.07, on the Organization and Activities of Collaborative Groups.

¹⁰ Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development Decision No. 104/2007/QD-BNN, dated 27.12.07, Promulgating the Management Regulations for Ecotourism Activities in National Parks and Nature Conservation Areas.

¹¹ Prime Ministerial Decision No. 304/2005/QD-TTg, dated 23.11.05, on the Pilot Allotment of Forests and Contractual Assignment of Forests for Protection to Ethnic Minority Households, Communities in Hamlets and Villages in the Central Highlands Provinces.

implemented, outside Lam Dong province, based on this 'special case' version of the national 5MHRP; nor is he aware of any evaluation of the pilot programme, which ran till 2006, or subsequent developments in the Highlands or elsewhere in Vietnam.

15. Finally, there are two national-level developments that might have significant (positive and/or negative) impacts on the enabling environment for collaborative management of SUFs. Firstly the new Biodiversity Law (currently being codified by the Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment), which in draft versions, has called for a unified protected area system under interministerial management. The final approved version of the law may or may not promote collaborative management. Secondly, in signing a contract with the World Bank for the Vietnam Conservation Fund (VCF), MARD has agreed to elaborating and implementing negotiated natural resource agreements where SUF conservation activities are proposed that restrict local communities' access to resources that are integral to their cultural practices or that they rely on for their subsistence (see Appendix 9 of the VCF Operational Manual for details). Such social safeguard requirement of the Bank is clearly in contravention of national forest management regulations for SUFs (Decision 186). It remains to be seen whether the Bank's attempt to strategically force this issue will be acknowledged by government; or whether MARD will opt for compensatory payments (cf. decisions 661 and 304) conventionally employed to protect public goods and services provided by the forest estate. **Developments in** both the Biodiversity Law and the VCF should be monitored by any project with aspirations of putting collaborative management principles into practice in the field.

III. Examples of previous and existing attempts and developing collaborative management

- 16. A brief summary of foreign-funded (and largely NGO-implemented) projects in Vietnam that have attempted some form of collaborative management is presented in Annex I.
- 17. Before a review of these various projects is attempted it may be instructive to consider a stratified concept of collaborative management with increasing levels of community engagement, commitment, responsibility and indeed, expectations. Below are four theoretical levels of collaborative management, with increasing levels of stakeholder participation moving from 1 to 4; examples of the kinds of activity each level constitutes are also given:

1) Participatory SUF planning

- Zonation & demarcation Participatory Land Use Planning (PLUP)
- Gazettement contributions to investment plans
- Operational Management Planning contributions to OMPs

2) Participatory SUF functioning

- Village-level regulations on forest protection negotiated agreement
- Community ranger forces biodiversity, community outreach, law enforcement and fire control

3) Participatory SUF management agreements

- Negotiating specific agreements (benefit and responsibility sharing arrangements) between stakeholders
- New institutional structures & mechanisms to facilitate negotiations

4) Participatory SUF decision-making

• Genuine 'co-management' characterized by shared governance and/or land/resource tenure for non-state stakeholders

- New institutional structures & mechanisms to facilitate decision-making and/or community representation on SUF management boards
- 18. As the regulatory review in section II and Figure 1 indicate, participatory SUF decision-making has not yet been achieved, nor is it currently possible or desirable from the perspective of the GoV.
- 19. Most attempts at collaborative management in Vietnam have been at the participatory development (land use planning/zonation) and functioning (village-level regulations and community rangers in particular) levels of engagement.
- 20. Most interventions instigated by foreign-funded/-implemented projects have yet to attain (technical and financial) sustainability free of continual external inputs. This reflects a number factors that deny an enabling environment for sustain collaborative management in Vietnam:
 - i) Poor understanding of collaborative management by the international conservation community. Projects are often over-ambitious and do not fully comprehend the necessary factors required to achieve collaborative management (the 'enabling environment'); a common indicator of this is the use of the term and concept of co-management, as defined here, in all phases of Project Cycle Management.
 - ii) **Poor understanding of collaborative management by national and local government.**Collaborative management is a foreign concept to government natural resource mangers and decision-makers, and co-management is possibly undesirable and even threatening to competent authorities tasked with managing SUFs.
 - iii) **Pilot projects fail to influence central government.** All projects attempting some form of collaborative management in Vietnam has been locally site-based with weak or no links to the policy/legislative/regulatory centre in Hanoi, hence the limited impact of these projects in the top-down system of governance: changes in awareness, attitude and behaviour (management practices) needs to be made at the central level of decision-makers and ordinance-drafters. There is currently no (effective) central forum or platform for site-based projects to contribute collaborative management learning experiences to the central policy/legislative/regulatory centre.
 - iv) Collaborative management is a long-term process. Planning and implementation horizons of both donors and NGOs are inadequate to achieve sustainability. Most projects with collaborative management components implemented to date have been three to five years in duration. Experiences form other parts of the Southeast Asian region have demonstrated a c. 10 year period of dedicated commitment and engagement of stakeholders to achieve sustainable co-management. Indeed, within Vietnam, socialisation of non-SUF forests (production and protection) in the form of community forestry has taken more than 10 years of learning from individual pilot projects feeding into a ministerial technical working group before having impact on legislation and regulations.
- 21. No effective and sustainable 'systems' of collaborative management have yet been demonstrated for SUFs in Vietnam (despite successful introduction of community forestry in other forest management categories). For reasons cited above, nearly all attempts at collaborative management in Vietnam to date still require further external technical and financial inputs to realise their potential as instructive pilots of good practice in the Vietnamese context. Due to a near complete absence of impact monitoring, the collective experiences in Vietnam have thus far failed to demonstrated unequivocally significant gains for either biodiversity conservation or rural livelihoods.

- 22. Lessons can be learnt from the various attempts at participatory SUF planning, functioning and negotiating of specific agreements; participatory decision-making is currently beyond the realms of what is legally possible under current national legislation.
- 23. Participatory SUF planning is currently feasible, but is (mostly time and human) resource consumptive; in the absence of any national guidelines for SUF gazettement processes that might promote a collaborative approach, such processes are not adopted by government agencies engaged in SUF feasibility studies and investment planning. (Plus, there is a current, indefinite moratorium on gazettement of new SUFs without special approval of the Prime Minister.
- 24. Attempts at participatory SUF functioning have largely been manifested as pilot community ranger teams, which have (for reasons indicated above in section II) largely proven to be unsustainable in terms of local government adoption and institutionalisation.
- 25. As Figure 1 would suggest, participatory negotiation of specific agreements appears to be the current technical challenge for collaborative management pilots in Vietnamese SUF: pursuing such agreements would extend collaborative management experiences in Vietnam into new territory and maximise the opportunities presented under current (restrictive) regulations. Due to deep-rooted cultural and political resistance to open up the public goods and services that SUFs represent, it is likely that non-extractive incentives (benefits from) collaborative management are like to be more feasible and successful. Such non-extractive benefits would be obtained through ecosystem services: recreational (tourism) in the first instance, and possibly water and carbon cycle management at later dates (e.g. over the next 5-10 years).
- 26. A recently published synthesis¹² of lessons learnt about livelihoods, biodiversity, collaborative management initiatives and governance through the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) indicates significant failings in the collaborative management approach and the agenda to harmonize poverty reduction with protected area performance. The review draws on only a single case study for each of the three countries of the GMS (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam); the site chosen for Vietnam was Song Thanh Nature Reserve, a focus for collaborative management pilots in Vietnam over the past five years. The cautionary conclusions are summarized here for reference; these lessons are largely corroborated by community-based conservation experiences throughout Vietnam (see Annex I):
 - Lesson 1: Without more effective strategies, market forces will exhaust protected area resources
 - Lesson 2: Strengthen Government commitment first, other interventions [such as collaborative management pilots] can then follow
 - Lesson 3: The key to power sharing: transferring responsibilities *and* rights (avoid 'paper partnerships') [this is well known and understood from international experiences of collaborative management]
 - Lesson 4: Increase communities' economic stake in sustainable (and zoned) protected area utilisation
 - Lesson 5: The importance of promoting good governance at community level for sustainable, pro-poor 'co-management' [again, well understood and documented from wider international experiences]

¹² Corbett J. (2008). Paper Parks and Paper Partnerships: Lessons for protected areas and biodiversity corridors in the Greater Mekong Subregion. IUCN.

• Lesson 6: Simple, but appropriate management structures, tools and systems must be established to fit the operating needs and realities of decentralised comanagers

• Lesson 7: Pro-poor co-management of protected areas is very difficult, but existing institutional forces do not encourage crucial lesson learning from failures

Annex I List of foreign-funded projects attempting to develop collaborative protected area management in Vietnam

SUF	Province	Project (principal implementer)	Interventions	Pro	Con
Hoang Lien NP Hoang Lien-Van Ban NR Mu Cang Chai SHCA	Lao Cai Lao Cai Yen Bai	HLSP (FFI)	- collaborative management institutional development - community rangers - compensatory livelihood models - participatory gazettement processes - participatory Operational Management Planning processes - participatory zonation & demarcation - village-level forest protection regulations	- novel model of collaborative institutional management structure ('Forest Protection Council') nominally institutionalised by local government - demonstrated community role in SUF development and functioning - community ranger force partially sustainable - protected areas developed with attention to community concerns - agreements on reserve zonation - awareness of communities and local government mutually raised - relationship between communities and government improved - communities' more confident in investing in legal livelihood alternatives apropos forest management	- new collaborative management institutional model inactive without external support - 5 % of community ranger forces still operating without external support - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations - despite local achievements no national level guidelines on gazettement processes available to promote good practice - lack of state funding hinders local government turning changed attitudes into changed behaviours - village-level agreements do not yield substantive benefits for local communities - limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers
Cao Vit SHCA	Can Bang	Vietnam Primate Programme (FFI)	- community rangers	- demonstrated community role in SUF functioning	- demonstrated that the enabling environment for co-management currently not present in Vietnam - ranger forces still require external financial & technical inputs to operate - limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations
Na Hang NR	Tuyen Quang	Mo Pen Conservation Project (Centre for Biodiversity Conservation)	- community rangers - farmers joining community rangers - compensatory livelihood models	- demonstrated community role in SUF functioning - community ranger force partially sustainable:	- ranger forces still require additional external financial inputs to operate, since salary too low to serve as effective incentive

SUF	Province	Project (principal implementer)	Interventions	Pro	Con
				since April 2007 basic salary for 25 community rangers provided by province - awareness of communities and local government mutually raised	- low interest of farmers to continue joining the community rangers (again, incentives not identified) - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations
Nam Xuan Lac SHCA	Bac Can	PARC (MARD), (PRCF)	- community rangers - compensatory livelihood models - local community representation on management board - stewardship agreements - participatory Operational Management Planning processes	- demonstrated role of local communities in SUF development & functioning - protected areas developed with attention to community concerns - novel model of collaborative institutional management structure (community reps. on management board) nominally institutionalised by local government - community-government relationships mutually supported	- continuous technical and financial inputs are required to maintain interventions - biodiversity & livelihood impacts yet to be demonstrated
Ba Be NP	Bac Can	Strengthening Ba Be Lake Management Co-operative (PRCF)	- community monitors fish catch and stewards lake resources - lakeside co-management co-operative leading in conservation management of the lake, in collaboration with national park and district authorities - Management Co-operative linked to Village Self-help Groups	- lake management co-operative providing collaborative management options for national park and lakeside villagers - demonstrated functional role and commitment of co-operative members in resource management - novel model of collaborative institutional management structure (co-operative) nominally institutionalised by local communities & government - incentives for local communities to monitor resource use - involvement of management co-operative members in other village development options and opportunities	- challenging endorsements by the national park authorities as it pertains to involvement of boatsmen (funding) - unclear jurisdictions between national park authority and district authorities - external guidance is needed continuously during the first few years of operation
Van Long	Ninh Binh	EPRC (Frankfurt Zoo)	- community rangers	- demonstrated community role in SUF functioning	- ranger forces still require external financial & technical inputs to operate

SUF	Province	Project (principal implementer)	Interventions	Pro	Con
					- community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations
Pu Huong NR	Nghe An	Forest Protection & Watershed Management Project (Danish Hunter's Association)	- community rangers 'Wildlife Management Clubs' (WMC) - village-level forest protection/sustainable use regulations	- novel variation on community ranger theme permitting sustainable hunting rights to WMCs in SUF buffer zone	- village-level agreements on wildlife protection and sustainable hunting appear to apply only to buffer zone - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations - limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers - involvement of district-level government limited, threatening institutional sustainability
Phong Nha-Ke Bang NP	Quang Binh	Forest Garden Project (FFI)	 collaborative management institutional development community rangers 	- demonstrated community role in SUF functioning	- community ranger forces still require external financial & technical inputs to operate - limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations
Song Thanh NR	Quang Nam	MOSAIC project (WWF)	 joint reserve-community ranger patrols participatory land use planning village-level forest protection regulations establishing community forest regulations and mechanisms in buffer zone and community use area in core zone 	- demonstrated community role in SUF development, functioning and benefit sharing - agreements on reserve zoning - clear community use rights planned in core zone - incentives for local communities to monitor resource use	- community patrols require support from reserve rangers and insufficient support is provided (community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations) - Sustainable funding mechanisms not yet functioning without external support - limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers - insufficient intuitional sustainability
Dakrong NR Bac Huong Hoa NR	Quang Tri	SSGs (Birdlife)	- community ranger forces	- demonstrated local community contributions to SUF management	- limited incentives for more effective participation of community rangers - community rangers cannot enforce laws or local regulations

SUF	Province	Project (principal	Interventions	Pro	Con
		implementer)			
Pu Luong/ Ngoc Son – Ngo Luong	Thanh Hoa/ Hoa Binh	PLCP (FFI)	- GoV rangers support local communities in livelihood improvement - participatory Operational Management Planning	- Improving relations between forest rangers and local communities - The needs of both SUF and local people are harmonised - awareness of communities and local authorities mutually raised	- relations between rangers and communities are based on personal relationships; if the rangers move to other places, the relations will be interrupted - No (strong) mechanism or system which can monitor or evaluate the implementation of collaborative
					management elements