**Issue paper no. 137**

# Lessons learned from conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster

**Richard Grahn**

March 2005

# Lessons learned from conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster

**Richard Grahn**

## Acknowledgements

**About the author**

**Richard Grahn** specialises in developing policy and programmes in arid and semi-arid environments. He has worked with AU/IBAR on a DFID and USAID funded programme of field-level and policy work in Kenya, Uganda, southern Sudan and Ethiopia for the last two and a half years. Other areas of interest include conflict management, livelihood diversification and the interface between traditional and modern systems of governance. The other contributors to this paper are AU/IBAR staff members. Address for correspondence: richard@grahn.net

# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AU | African Union |
| AU/DREA | Directorate for Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU) |
| AU/IBAR | Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU) |
| AU/PSD | Peace and Security Department (AU) |
| CAHW | Community-based Animal Health Worker |
| CAPE | Community-based Animal health and Participatory Epidemiology |
| CATS | Conflict and Activity Tracking System |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisation |
| CDTF | Community Development Trust Fund (European Union) |
| CEWARN | Conflict Early Warning mechanism |
| CEWARU | Conflict Early Warning Unit |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DPDC | District Peace and Development Committee |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ITDG | Intermediate Technology Development Group |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NSCCM | National Steering Committee on Conflict Management |
| REDSO | Regional Economic Development Services Office (USAID) |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| USAID | US Agency for International Development |

# Contents

# 1. Introduction

This paper documents the changes that have taken place during the lifetime of the conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster undertaken by the Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources (AU/IBAR), a specialised technical agency of the African Union's Directorate for Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU/DREA) Union mandated to support and improve animal health and production in the continent of Africa.

AU/IBAR's conflict management work evolved out of veterinary interventions aimed at eradicating the cattle disease rinderpest[1] and establishing sustainable community-based animal health systems in predominantly pastoralist parts of the Greater Horn of Africa. This paper explains the processes through which the project evolved and situates these within the wider policy and institutional environment in which the project operated. In particular, the paper describes the reasons for shifts in the focus of the project, and the various opportunities and constraints encountered during the period 1998-2005. As such it is intended to complement other analytical and practical outputs of the project, including two early analytical reviews (Waithaka 2001, Minear 2002) and a full impact assessment of the project completed in 2004 (AU/IBAR 2004a). AU/IBAR has also separately documented the methodologies used (AU/IBAR 2005a) and an analysis of the conflict situation in the Karimojong Cluster (AU/IBAR2005b). This paper therefore offers a more reflective, broader and more contextualised perspective on the work, with the aim of complementing these more practically focussed publications.

In publishing this review, AU/IBAR hopes to contribute to debates among the peacebuilding community in the region and more widely, and to build on the contributions of Oxfam GB, ITDG and others who have offered documentation of lessons learned through field-based peacebuilding efforts.

This paper begins with an introduction to the Karimojong Cluster and AU/IBAR's conflict project. The remainder of the paper is structured around the three main phases of the project, each of which is followed by the key lessons learned during that phase.

---

1. Rinderpest is an acute, highly infectious viral cattle disease which is generally fatal and can decimate herds with incredible rapidity.

# 2. Background

## 2.1 The Karimojong Cluster

The Karimojong Cluster is located in the remote low-lying border areas of Northwest Kenya, Northeast Uganda, Southeast Sudan, and Southwest Ethiopia. Deriving its name from the Karimojong tribe of Uganda but including fourteen other tribes linked by linguistic and cultural ties,[2] the Karimojong Cluster comprises mostly semi-nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The total population exceeds one million people, although accurate recent data is not readily available. The main settlements are Moroto in Uganda, Lodwar and Lokichoggio in Kenya and Omorate in Ethiopia, most of which lie more than two days drive from their respective capitals.

Much of the Karimojong Cluster is characterized by harsh arid to semi-arid conditions receiving 300 mm or less rainfall per annum. Precipitation is seasonal but highly variable in volume, distribution and timing. The cattle-keeping communities living in the Cluster have developed sophisticated strategies to cope with the high level of risks inherent to this marginal environment. These strategies include seasonal mobility, split herd management, keeping several livestock species and supplementing food supplies and income with small-scale rain-fed sorghum cultivation, fishing, trading, hunting and fruit-gathering. Periods of acute seasonal hardship form part of the annual and longer-term drought cycles within the Karimojong Cluster. Consequently systems of natural resource management and social organization have evolved to suit the climatic circumstances and are generally based on common land tenure in order to use efficiently the resources available, mainly for livestock herding.

---

2. There is no precise agreement on which ethnic communities belong to the 'Karimojong Cluster'. Boundaries may be drawn according to language, culture, degree of pastoralism or other criteria such as place of residence. We include 13 separate groups, 11 of which have historically spoken the 'Karimojong language' and shared its culture as well as 2 others which have assimilated aspects of that culture. The 'Karimojong proper' (residing in Karamoja, Uganda) are made up of the Pian, Matheniko, Bokora, and a number of smaller sub-groups. The other ethnic groups of the Cluster sharing social practices with the Karimojong are the Jie, Dodoth, Tepeth, Toposa, Nyang'atom, (also known as Dongiro), Merille (also known as Dassenetch or Geleb) and Turkana. The Pokot (referred to as Upe in Uganda) and the Didinga speak Kalenjin-derived languages but are economically and socially integrated with the Karimojong Cluster groups. Another term used by anthropologies for the Cluster is Ateker.

Turkana origin myths link their ancestry to a split in the Jie community along the Tarach River (Soper 1985). The Turkana community are thought to have moved southwards into what is presently referred to as the Karimojong Cluster in the second half of the eighteenth century. The available data indicates that from that period onwards (and probably prior to this) relationships between the ethnic communities living in the Karimojong Cluster have ranged along a continuum from negotiated peace through tension to open hostility and conflict. The process of the formation and alteration of group ethnic identities has not remained static: for example the evolution of differentiated Bokora, Pian, Matheniko and other sections from a single Karimojong identity illustrates the way in which ethnic identities continue to change, in this case through a process of fragmentation (Dyson-Hudson 1966, Soper ibid).

The marginal nature of the environment and the highly variable quantity and distribution of rainfall mean that buffer zones between different ethnic communities are always shifting with the availability of pasture and water. Access to these key resources has traditionally been negotiated by elders and has often been the subject of violent inter-community hostility. Traditional raiding involved groups of several hundred youths attacking homesteads and capturing herds of animals in attacks that were ritually and politically approved by the elders of their community. However, the nature of conflict in the Karimojong Cluster has changed in recent decades due to the influx of small arms from neighbouring conflicts, particularly the protracted civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. Much current conflict involves the 'theft' (as opposed to raiding) of animals, commonly carried out by small groups of raiders with automatic weapons such as the AK-47. This leads to an intensification of wider hostility, revenge killings, attacks and other incidents.[3]

Since the colonial era, the communities of the Karimojong Cluster have been at best marginalised and at worst deliberately undermined by development planning and policy making. For example, opportunities for livestock marketing remain limited, with restrictions on livestock movements dating from colonial times still in force. This marginalisation continues, in spite of some progress in Kenya where there is growing understanding of some of the 'new thinking' on pastoralist mobility of the 1980s and institutions such as the Arid Lands Resource Management

---

3. For a fuller description of conflict drivers and dynamics in the Karimojong Cluster see AU/IBAR (2005b)

Project in the Office of the President, thought to be more progressive towards pastoralists, have been created. Political representation is of highly variable quality in each of the countries of the Cluster, leading to the absence of cogent arguments in favour of the viability of pastoralism and mechanisms to ensure that government policies reflect their needs.

**Figure 1. Map of the Karimojong Cluster**



## 2.2 AU/IBAR and its programmes

AU/IBAR is housed within one of eight AU departments, the Directorate for Rural Economy and Agriculture. The CAPE (Community-based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology)[4] within AU/IBAR has been working on pastoral conflict with the Karimojong Cluster since 1999.

CAPE's engagement in conflict management work evolved out of the challenges posed by conflict and insecurity to the delivery of animal

---

4. Funded by the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID)

health services to pastoralist communities in the Karimojong Cluster. It was supported by the creation of a heat stable rinderpest vaccine reducing the need for a cold chain, and more importantly, by the development of participatory development principles that led to the establishment of community-based animal health delivery systems in many parts of Horn of African from the late 1980s onwards. These systems proved to be a useful mechanism for vaccinating cattle against rinderpest in remote, conflict-prone areas. For example, in Karamoja, Uganda and Turkana, Kenya rinderpest had been controlled using CAHS vaccination by 1998. Based on this experience, AU/IBAR worked to foster the sustainability of community-based animal health delivery systems through promoting government recognition, regulation and privatisation of such systems[5]. However, it became increasingly apparent that conflict and insecurity were major constraints to both community-based animal health services and to livestock-based livelihoods as a whole in the Karimojong Cluster.

## 2.3 The three phases of the project

AU/IBAR's conflict work between 1998 and 2005 can be divided into three main phases each with key foci and learning points. These are however more readily discernable in retrospect, since at the time much of the evolution of the project was the result of challenging boundaries, learning and adapting through experience. These phases and foci are presented in simplified form in Figure 2 below.

Phase 1, from the mid-1990s until mid-2000, began with a focus on animal health which subsequently broadened into conflict management. Activities included the establishment of community-based animal health delivery systems and rinderpest vaccination campaigns undertaken in the northernmost part of Turkana and with the neighbouring Toposa community in southern Sudan. Towards the end of the phase, conflict management activities were introduced.

During Phase 2, from mid-2000 until mid-2003, the focus of AU/IBAR's work was on the implementation of community-based conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster. During this extremely busy period of implementation many large and small scale peace meetings and other

---

5. See for example Catley, Blakeway and Leyland 'Community-based animal healthcare' ITDG/Vetwork London UK.

field-based activities were carried out and a number of specific method-ologies were developed, including methods for working with and through pastoralist women, working across international borders, and working with elders.[6]

Phase 3 was more reflective and evaluative in nature. Running from mid-2003 until the present day, this period is characterised by two main evolutions: increasing reflection on the lessons learned; and greater attention to processes of policy and institutional change.

| Figure 2. The 3 main phases of AU/IBAR's conflict work | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Phase** | **Dates** | **Main Focus** | **Key activities** |
| 1 | 1995-2000 | veterinary professionals<br>government officials<br>elders and opinion leaders | veterinary campaigns<br>community-based animal health<br>start of conflict management:<br>community dialogue workshops<br>border harmonisation campaigns |
| 2 | 2000-2003 | elders<br>district and national officials<br>women<br>communities | elders' peace meetings<br>landmark meetings<br>women's peace crusades<br>peace committees |
| 3 | 2003-present | communities<br>policymakers<br>partner organisations | gender study<br>impact assessment<br>3 methods study<br>increasing conflict policy work |

---

6. These methodologies have been documented by AU/IBAR in *Three Methodologies for working with conflict in pastoralist areas* Nairobi: AU/IBAR (2005a) and are also referred to in *Drought Cycle Management: a toolkit for the drylands of East Africa* Nairobi: International Institute of Rural Reconstruction and Acacia Consultants 2004.

# 3. Phase One: Border harmonisation meetings and the start of conflict work within AU/IBAR

## 3.1 Phase One activities: mid-1990s to 2000

At the beginning of Phase 1, AU/IBAR's work focused on establishing community-based animal health delivery systems that could support the eradication of rinderpest. As noted above, the development of a thermostable vaccine made it possible for the rinderpest campaign to penetrate pastoralist areas with poor physical infrastructure and limited presence of veterinary professionals. At the same time, AU/IBAR was developing, along with others, participatory approaches to animal health, including the training of Community-based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), to prevent and treat a limited range of animal health problems. CAHWs live and work among their communities, practicing their skills under the supervision of animal health auxiliaries and private veterinarians.

By the late 1998s AU/IBAR was promoting these community-based systems to government and developing their financial sustainability. CAHWs were linked to drugs suppliers, where possible through veterinarians (who however tend to establish themselves in more profitable higher potential agricultural areas which are better served with services and are less affected by the persistent insecurity in most arid and semi-arid areas in the Horn of Africa).

Community-based animal health delivery systems were seen by pastoralists to address numerous disease problems of which rinderpest control is only one aspect. In Turkana District in Kenya, pastoralists appreciated the consultative nature of AU/IBAR's initiative as well as the tangible benefits it brought them. Through the training of CAHWs and mobilisation for the rinderpest vaccinations, the AU/IBAR veterinary staff working in the field developed close relationships with the pastoralist community, particularly with traditional leaders such as elders, 'seers' and 'generals', who tended to be overlooked by development interventions and government structures. As a result of these developing relationships, Turkana pastoralist leaders became willing to confide their concerns about conflict in AU/IBAR staff and its impact on the sustainability of animal health services.

Working with and responding to the requests of these traditional leaders a conflict management programme was developed. This began with a number of community dialogue workshops under a 'Border Harmonisation Campaign', designed to improve community-based animal health delivery systems and rinderpest control in Turkana. The meetings focussed on the border areas and the Turkana's neighbours across the borders in Uganda and Ethiopia. Initially they involved mostly administrators from the neighbouring districts. However, by April 1999, the focus of the programme shifted to include elders for the first time and gradually the meetings expanded to include wider constraints such as conflict, a radical departure from current practice at the time[7].

## 3.2 Key innovations and lessons learned during Phase One

### The role of traditional elders in the management of natural resources and of conflict

Pastoralist leadership (particularly among the Turkana and Karimojong communities) can appear relatively difficult for outsiders to identify and categorise, partly as a result of the mobile nature of pastoralist grazing units. Through the Border Harmonisation Meetings elders[8] were found to be key opinion leaders with the ability to persuade community members to participate or reject interventions. Deriving their authority from their status as respected livestock keepers and breeders, tacticians and brave warriors, the elders' opinions still carry significant weight. They organize the daily use of available pasture and water, as well as the seasonal migrations to and from dry season grazing areas (which in the case of the Turkana often lie across international borders). Elders often send 'scouts' to survey distant areas to determine the best site for migra-

---

7. The expanded Border Harmonisation Meetings were funded by USAID Regional Economic Development Services (REDSO) with additional support from the European Union Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF).

8. The role of elders is complex and varies from individual to individual. It encompasses a wide range of social relationships including oversight of traditional practices and values. External modern organisations such as the police or the army might view elders as a reactionary force, or as a challenge to their own form and sphere of authority. However, elders still maintain a strong degree of influence in many areas such as politics. Councillors or MPs have been known to seek the support and counsel of elders realising that their influence over their own communities is extremely significant. Many dimensions of the power and influence of elders are not readily identifiable by outsiders.

tion, in order to ensure consistent and adequate access to water and grazing areas throughout the year. Traditionally, this process of natural resource management is co-ordinated with the other communities who also make use of the dry season pasture, through the council of elders (*ekitoingikilok* or 'tree of men'). This leads to a complex set of interrelations built up by individual elders negotiating access with their counterparts on behalf of their communities.

In the field of conflict management the role of elders is no less crucial, although not immune from the socio-economic changes[9] sweeping the communities of the Karimojong Cluster. Elders traditionally gave their blessing to raids which would be planned and carried out by youths under their supervision, and this social control of raiding was a key feature during pre-colonial and the immediate post-colonial period[10]. Seers (*ngimurok*) predict the future through reading entrails, through dreams or by casting sandals. They also have the power to warn of impending attacks or calamities.

Through interaction with Dr Akabwai, AU/IBAR's chief veterinary field officer in Turkana, key seers have been convinced to support vaccination campaigns, for example by using their authority to dispel popularly held myths about the impact of vaccines on animals (Akabwai n.d.: 7). The same actors were also closely involved in the peacebuilding and reconciliation elements of the conflict project. The influence and authority of seers was drawn on during ceremonies such as the 'burial of the hatchet'[11] at Nadapal from 1-4 October, when guns, swords and knives were buried by sections of the Turkana and Toposa communities as part of a peace agreement. At this important ceremony, constituting the culmination of fourteen previous peace meetings, notable seers used their power to curse those who would break the peace pact represented by the buried weapons. Other modified but traditional symbols of peace were also important during the project, including the exchange of traditional stools between warring parties (AU/IBAR 2003e)[12].

---

9. Such as the perceived general weakening of the authority of elders, for example, the growing disrespect by youths of traditional supernatural sanctions controlled and invoked by elders.

10 .Although it should not be overlooked that youths have always challenged the authority of elders (Dyson-Hudson 1966, AU/IBAR 2001c).

11. The burial of the hatchet is a traditional ceremony in Karimojong Cluster societies, used to symbolize a peace accord between two groups.

12. See also 'Honey and heifer, grasses milk and water' Somjee ed Mennonite Central Committee/NMK Nairobi.

## The *epiding* as a focus for peace making

An *epiding* is literally a pass or path. However the term is also used to denote the contested resources between two communities and the trajectory of these communities back and forth, towards and away from each other, as the availability of natural resources varies. One of AU/IBAR's key innovations has been to use the notion of the *epiding* as a focus of the peacebuilding work, bringing together the traditional leaders of the two (or sometimes more) communities sharing the *epiding* and mapping the social institutions that govern the use of the *epiding*.

## Recognising and working with youth leaders

Also vitally important within the project has been the recognition of individual young men (sharp-shooters or ringleaders) who lead their age sets. The work started with involving youths as CAHWs. Youth CAHWs were able to access remote herds and, being trusted by their own community members, were able to vaccinate even stolen stock which the community would not normally bring forward for treatment or vaccination by the government. In terms of the conflict work, 'ring-leaders' and 'age-set leaders' were found to have great influence over their peers in the management of security and the carrying out of raiding. This approach led to positive progress in internal border areas such as Lokwamosing and Lochuakula between Turkana and West Pokot districts. Here youth leaders from the two communities wishing to put a stop to persistent raiding involved were able to establish joint security patrols to manage security issues together and to prevent members of their own community from carrying out raids in these areas. Working with such youths has led to positive progress in border areas such as Lokwamosing and Lochuakula between Turkana and Pokot districts. This identification and trust building process is similar, if not more delicate than that with elders.

---

**Box 1. The *Epiding***

The notion of the *epiding* was used to identify the resource users even when some of these users are seasonal and often remote. In north Turkana the notion of the *epiding* was used to bring together groups from Turkana and Toposa to make plans on how to manage grazing and water resources during the dry season. *Epiding* leaders were identified as the key actors in deciding how these resources are used by the cattle camps under their influence. Eventually *epiding* leaders decided to bury the hatchet as a symbol of their commitment to peace.

## The key role of field staff

AU/IBAR has learned that the experience, understanding and relation-ships of key field staff are a vital component of peacebuilding work. Dr Darlington Akabwai, the senior veterinary field officer behind the inno-vation of conflict work within AU/IBAR, originates from the Iteso ethnic group of Uganda, but has worked in Turkana District in Kenya for more than twenty years. The Iteso are closely related to the Karimojong, and thus understand the Karimojong language and culture well. The impor-tance of the key experience and understanding of particular individuals such as Dr Akabwai in the success of AU/IBAR's peacebuilding initiatives cannot be overstated. The challenge is how these personal relationships and understandings can be captured in programme work, and in expand-ing fieldwork coverage.

## The importance of location

Through the experience of the first dialogue meetings, it became clear to AU/IBAR that the location of the meetings was a vital significance. The initial meetings took place in the urban settlements such as Lokichoggio, Moroto, and Lodwar. While it was possible to transport elders and seers to these urban locations, it became clear that they felt less comfortable than in rural settings, in part because of the propensity of urban dwellers to dominate (numerically and psychologically) urban-based meetings. Once AU/IBAR shifted the location of meetings to the rural areas, in particular to locations of concern or importance to the elders, the elders' feeling of ownership and control increased. As the 1999 Toposa and Turkana elders meeting in Lokichoggio pointed out '[T]he most critical observation is that, the talking was done by the pastoralists themselves guided by their traditional leadership. No government agent or any outsider lectured to them to start living peacefully with each other.' (AU/IBAR 1999).

Holding peace meetings at symbolic or contested locations proved partic-ularly important. Some locations such as Lokiriama on the Kenya-Uganda border are strongly associated with peace and peacebuilding, in Lokiriama's case because it was the site of the 1973 burial of the hatchet between the Matheniko and the Kamatak section of the Turkana. In other cases, hosting meetings in locations such as Lochuakula on the Pokot-Turkana border in southern Turkana District constitutes part of the peacebuilding process itself. By bringing government authorities, elders

and youths to a contested area, peace-builders can sensitise the authorities to the significance of a place and at the same time build confidence between elders that such a location may eventually be made accessible to both parties.

The young men who look after the remote grazing herds are the main group involved in carrying out raids and thus the ultimate target of peacebuilding interventions. However they have been difficult to engage in peace processes, in part because of their (physical and psychological) distance from the urban centres. Holding peace meetings in rural locations therefore also significantly increases the likelihood of strong participation by the youths, often through the urging of elders or senior women, and facilitates the rapid communication of messages of peace or negotiated outcomes.

# 4. Phase Two: peacebuilding between the Turkana and their neighbours

## 4.1 Key innovations and lessons learned during Phase Two

### Facilitation style

In the process of organising community dialogues and peace meetings, AU/IBAR developed a particular style of facilitation. Based on the lessons learned in Phase One, meetings were held as close as possible to the area or areas in question. Highly respected local mobilisers were used to liaise with and prepare elders and other participants well in advance of the meeting. At the meeting these local mobilisers acted as translators and interlocutors for the group they were most familiar with.[13] The meeting agenda was very open in nature, allowing elders considerable time to speak at length on the issues as they saw them. Field staff would intervene only minimally in the meeting, even when discussions became heated. This technique allowed the elders and participants to express their grievances against one another and clear the air for further, more practical discussion. Over a period of one to three days, through gentle prompting and questioning, field staff would encourage participants to propose their own measures and mechanisms for resolving the conflict. Local government officials would not drive the process, but would be a witness and party to the agreement, a crucial partner in the application of agreed penalties.

### The *alogita* – women's peace crusade

Through the experience of carrying out fieldwork and action research and organising meetings, AU/IBAR discovered that pastoral women play a significant role in conflict and in peacemaking. This role, which is commonly overlooked, to the detriment of field-based conflict management operations, is complex, typically informal and often hidden from outsiders and non-household members (AU/IBAR 2003a). Women may incite their sons and husbands to go for raids, or privately persuade them

---

13. Several of these local mobilisers have gone on to create their own CBOs, following their involvement in the project, including Lokichoggio Youth Association (LYAS) and Pastoralist Integrated Management Organisation (PIMO).

to work towards peace. One of the challenges for those working with pastoral women lies in tapping into these powerful informal roles in appropriate and effective ways.

The *alogita a ng'aberu* is a traditional social institution among the communities of the Karimojong Cluster, the meaning of which can roughly be expressed as 'a group of women united for a purpose.' This

---

**Box 2 Phase Two activities: mid-2000 to mid-2003**

During Phase Two, AU/IBAR focused on the implementation of community-based conflict management activities in the Karimojong Cluster. The overarching aim was to bring peace between the Turkana and their neighbours through improving community relations and facilitating peace agreements between communities with the support of local government.

During this period the major activities carried out in the field included: a women's border harmonisation workshop (March 2001); a youth workshop; three Women's Peace Crusades (June/July 2001, August 2001 and Feb 2002); and numerous smaller peace-building and conflict management activities. Innovative methodologies for working with women (through women's peace crusades); for working across international borders; and for working with elders, were developed during this time, and are documented in detail elsewhere (see AU/IBAR 2005a). AU/IBAR also developed and implemented a monitoring and evaluation system (Conflict and Activity Tracking System – CATS) to monitor impact and levels of conflict.

During this period, AU/IBAR received funding from USAID for specific activities. However, from October 2003 DFID provided vital core funding for conflict management activities within the Karimojong Cluster enabling a consolidation of the programme and allowing an animal health programme to work explicitly on conflict issues. This important development provided increased flexibility in the funding of innovative events such as the women's peace crusades, as well as enabling the recruitment of additional staff. AU/IBAR was also fortunate to develop a positive synergistic relationship with Vétérinaires Sans Frontières – Belgium (VSF-B) over this period, whereby VSF-B provided funding for AU/IBAR to carry out peacebuilding activities which would further their own livestock marketing and CAHW training activities. This maintained a link between the conflict management work of AU/IBAR and broader animal health goals in the area of operation.

The other major development during this phase of work was the beginning of AU/IBAR's policy and institutional work on conflict management, at the same time as a number of significant changes in the external policy and institutional environment, particularly with the 2002 elections in Kenya.

purpose can include appeasing evil spirits, praising elders in exchange for animals and raising demands or grievances in public. The *alogita* provides a forum for women to air their grievances in public.

Based on the alogita, AU/IBAR developed the methodology of Women's Peace Crusades. The crusades enable women to act as ambassadors of peace, bearing messages through songs, poems, dances and speeches performed for neighbouring communities. The women travel along the length of a border area between two communities in conflict. On the way, meetings and discussions are led by the women, but also include elders, youths and officials. These meetings serve multiple purposes, opening up space for further dialogue, resolving specific grievances asso-ciated with particular areas and mobilising support for further efforts.

### Cross-border landmark meetings

Many of the challenges facing the Karimojong Cluster – including animal health and marketing, infrastructure, and access to natural resources, as well as conflict – are transboundary in nature. It follows therefore, that working on only one side of a national boundary is unlikely to resolve the problem. A major challenge for outside organisations lies in bringing together various stakeholders across borders to improve dialogue on these issues facing pastoralist communities.

In order to address this issue, and building on the early community dialogues, AU/IBAR organised a series of landmark cross-border meetings, held in Lodwar in 1999, Mbale in 2001, and Moroto in 2003[14]. The Mbale meeting covered the entire Karimojong Cluster, while the meetings in Lodwar and Moroto focused on the Kenyan-Ugandan border. At each of these meetings, politicians, administrators, NGOs, CBOs, elders, women and youths from each of the communities met together to discuss the issues.

It is very rare for such an inclusive group of stakeholders to meet together as equal participants, deliberating the way forward for their communi-ties. The meetings were structured so that community members could interact with and ask questions directly of their MPs, local government officials, and even Ministers of State. At the same time, they were able to

---

14. Mbale Meeting Report May 2001, AU/IBAR 2001b; The Moroto Cross-Border Peace Meeting 6-7 June 2003, AU/IBAR 2003c

speak directly to their counterparts from the communities with whom they are in conflict, also a rare opportunity. The creation of these vertical and horizontal linkages has been a key component of AU/IBAR's cross-border peace meetings.

## The use of video

During Phase Two, AU/IBAR also explored the creative use of video in its conflict management work. Video recordings, playback and dissemination were all in use from 2001 to 2004 and continue to be used in the fieldwork in Southern Sudan. The main technique involves videoing key speeches and peace meetings on a Hi 8 video camera and playing them back at subsequent meetings using a television screen and loudspeakers.

This use of video has three key functions. First, the playing back of key speeches and resolutions acts as a powerful reminder of commitments made. For example, the *'Talking Peace'* video (AU/IBAR 2001a) captured outcomes of the first women's harmonisation meeting. This video was then shown during the first peace crusade of Turkana women to Toposa areas. The resolutions are clearly recorded in this video in the vernacular, making them accessible to illiterate pastoralist women in a way that meeting reports produced in English or Kiswahili could never be.

Second, video helps to communicate messages of peace from community to community. For example, at a tense peace meeting at the Lotikippi plains in November 2002, Turkana elders and community members vehemently demanded the return of animals stolen by the Toposa in accordance with the hatchet burial ceremony at Nadapal in October 2002. A video of this meeting was then shown to the Toposa to stress to them the urgency of the situation and their own response was recorded and played back to the Turkana, diffusing the tension somewhat. In this way video recordings can enable messages to be sent or positions to be negotiated between community leaders who cannot meet face-to-face for logistical or security reasons.

Third, video is also used as an advocacy tool for communicating the impact of raids and conflict to policymakers at both the regional and national levels. For example, following the large scale raids at Kaabong in Uganda between the Dodoth and the Turkana in April 2004, video footage was shown to the Turkana District Security Committee (DSG) to

communicate to them the scale of the problem. The DSG were immediately convinced of the urgent need to act.

Finally, video can also be used as an advocacy tool to promote a community-based approach to conflict management to policymakers who are often not convinced of the ability or desire of elders to broker or maintain peace. For example, a number of video recordings, particularly *'Cooling the Earth'* and *'Talking Peace'*, were shown to district security committees in Lodwar, Moroto, Kotido and Narus in late 2001 and early 2002. These screenings were identified by project staff as extremely influential in convincing local administrators (District Commissioner, District Officers, Local Councillors and others) that a community-based approach was worth attempting.

## 4.2 Challenges and constraints during Phases One and Two

By the end of Phase Two, it was clear that AU/IBAR's conflict work was achieving some successes on the ground – peace meetings, dialogues and crusades all seemed to be having some sort of impact. However, many of the achievements made seemed eventually to falter due to the unremitting harshness of the environment and the situation would gradually slip backwards. As AU/IBAR came to the end of the second phase, a number of key constraints and challenges impeding lasting impact began to emerge:

● **Breadth of coverage**
During the first two phases of the project, a field team of eight staff was attempting to implement peacebuilding and conflict management activities in four countries and across extremely rugged terrain. While the team planned activities in a structured way, their very success in implementing activities on the ground would very often lead to unanticipated requests from local communities for them to become involved in responding to particular conflicts, for example in south Turkana working on Pokot-Turkana relationships. The project's Conflict and Activity Tracking System (CATS) and the recent impact assessment both confirmed that the impact of AU/IBAR's peace work has been limited by the sheer size of the operational area. Impact has consequently been broad and shallow, with effective sensitisation of communities but limited impact on root causes. Stretching the staff across such a large area also meant that the task of

enabling communities to handle future occurrences of conflict without external assistance was not prioritised.

- **Implementation of peace agreements**

In spite of its success in facilitating negotiated peace agreements, AU/IBAR noted that many of them gradually broke down over time. It was concluded that there had been insufficient focus on penalties and on the maintenance of peace. For example, communities would agree on a particular pattern of resource sharing and discuss penalties for punishing those who broke the agreement. These penalties were to be applied by elders on the youths of their own communities and generally took the form of fines. Such a system worked for a time at locations such as Oropoi along the Kenya-Uganda border. However, in general, the team was not able to give sufficient attention to the mechanisms for enforcing the agreed penalties and on the maintenance of day-to-day security. Severe pressures of staff turnover and problems with funding continuity exacerbated this problem.

In many cases, both the communities and AU/IBAR felt that local authorities ought to take the lead in implementing penalties and monitoring the implementation of peace agreements. However, despite their regular involvement in the process of negotiations, local authorities in all of the countries involved lacked the resources and institutional incentives to implement such agreements.

- **Co-operation and competition**

The issue of co-ordination and competition between NGOs became a significant operational and planning constraint in Turkana District during the first two phases of the project. A multiplication of peace initiatives with different approaches arose, led by different NGOs and government co-ordination mechanisms, tended to depend on the strength and approach of the individual DC concerned.

A particular example concerns the creation of peace committees. The potential usefulness of such committees for levying penalties and for NGOs to interact more sustainably with traditional institutions (such as the council of elders) was recognised by outside organisations working on conflict mitigation in Turkana. However, these organisations (including AU/IBAR itself) were unable to agree together on a common approach, leading to the absurd situation where one location might

contain two different peace committees, related to and visited by two different supporting organisations.

This situation was finally at least partially resolved through a process of strengthening the District Steering Committee and the creation by Oxfam of the District Peace and Development Committee (DPDC). The DPDC, as part of the government infrastructure (albeit with participation and funds from civil society), has considerably more authority than any individual non-governmental organisation.

There were also constraints affecting NGOs wishing to work more closely with CBOs, including those that had been created as a result of the conflict management work in the District. First, donor restrictions prevented the transfer of funds to some CBOs, many of whom had a limited track record in managing funds. Second, the NGOs working in the region were unable to agree on a modus operandi for co-operating with these CBOs.

In general, and in spite of the more positive progress in co-ordination by the local authorities between 2000 and 2001, it can be concluded that failures of co-ordination between NGOs have been a major hindrance to effective peacebuilding operations within Turkana and surrounding countries.

# 5. Phase Three: moving towards policy work

## 5.1 Phase Three activities: mid-2003 to early 2005

In Phase Three, operational work was gradually scaled back in Turkana, making way for increasing reflection upon the lessons learned thus far and placing more emphasis on the processes of policy and institutional change.

Key activities during this phase included an external impact assessment of the field operation, undertaken in late 2003 and early 2004 (AU/IBAR 2004a), informed by an earlier external consultancy looking at the gender dimensions of the project (AU/IBAR 2003a). AU/IBAR also published a policy briefing on conflict in pastoralist areas (AU/IBAR 2003d), plus a book about pastoralism in the Karimojong Cluster (Pastoral Visions AU/IBAR 2003b).

At the same time, AU/IBAR began engaging with politicians and policy makers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. A study tour of Turkana and West Pokot Districts for parliamentarians from Kenya and Uganda was organised with the Amani Forum (Amani 2004). AU/IBAR also commissioned policy-relevant studies on the success of agricultural irrigation schemes as peace interventions in Northern Kenya (2004b).

During this third phase of the project AU/IBAR also joined the USAID-funded Sudan Peace Fund lead by the US NGO PACT. This enabled AU/IBAR to test and further refine its methods and approaches through a limited expansion of community-based fieldwork with the Toposa in Eastern Equatoria, Southern Sudan.

Horizontal expansion also occurred as other organisations adopted and adapted some of the methods developed during the first two phases of the AU/IBAR peace work. In Sudan for example, UNDP Northern Sector has proposed a Pastoralist Communities Harmonisation Initiative for the Abyei area on the fault line between North and South, while the National Council of Churches of Kenya has experimented with the Women's Peace Crusade approach. Vétérinaires Sans Frontières – Germany has also sought to apply some of the approaches in its own field work in Ny'angachor and Boma in the eastern part of Southern Sudan.

## 5.2 Lessons learned during Phase Three

### The limited impact of field-based approaches on the root causes of conflict

From the experience of its conflict work on the ground, AU/IBAR has gradually become aware that field-based approaches to conflict management – whilst important in themselves - can only have a limited impact on the root causes of conflict because the focus of the interventions is on the actors themselves, rather than on the factors that contribute to and maintain the conflict situation.

These factors may be divided into structural and proximate causes. Structural causes include the decreasing size of the rangeland accessible to pastoralists, the reduction in household herd size through repeated drought and the associated loss of animals, and social factors such as the tradition of bridewealth (AU/IBAR 2003d; AU/IBAR 2005b). 'Proximate' or intermediate causes of conflict include for example the availability of automatic weapons, poor governance and the commercialisation of cattle raiding, and are difficult to tackle through community level work.

AU/IBAR's community-based methods can, and do, impact on some of the structural causes of conflict, but they do so in a very limited way. For example, the women's peace crusades often lead to passionate discussion at the community level about the contribution of bridewealth and it is possible that certain exceptionally strong women subsequently raised this issue in their own communities and their own families. However, most of these structural problems need to be tackled at both the level of the community and that of the national and regional policy organs responsible for development and security.

### The need to link traditional community-based conflict management with local government structures

One new area of work that emerged fully during the third phase of the AU/IBAR peace work was the formal recognition of traditional community-based conflict management mechanisms and the consequent integration of these mechanisms into government-related structures. This has taken place largely through the establishment of DPDCs. DPDCs were pioneered by Oxfam in Wajir District and have been adopted by the Government of Kenya in many of the arid and semi-arid districts of the

country over the last ten years. Within Turkana, the main NGOs working on peacebuilding have come together in support of this approach, setting aside many of their previous differences in methodology and approach.

DPDCs provide a standing joint government-civil society body able to respond to incidents of violent conflict quickly. A typical committee would include notable elders, government officials, NGOs, CBOs and women's organisations. Sometimes such committees are chaired by the DC, although this is not always the case. Their mandates are wide ranging and not uniform within the country although the National Steering Committee on conflict management is working on a set of standard terms of reference for the committees. Many of the committees have been funded through the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) within the Office of the President and Oxfam GB, although there is now pressure for the Government to bring them onto the national and local budgets. The committees are strongly linked with the District Steering Group with a wide mandate to co-ordinate all development activities and with the District Security Group. Many times they have proved successful in managing and reducing violent conflict. They have also improved co-ordination between NGOs by creating a legitimate forum for discussing issues of approach and by assuming a co-ordinating role in peace-building and conflict management. Perhaps most importantly, DPDCs have put local government at the heart of overseeing conflict management and peacebuilding work. The success of these structures has had an influence on other parts of the region (Oxfam 2003, IIED 2002, Responding to Conflict n.d.).

Building on these lessons, AU/IBAR has attempted to give greater weight to local authority participation in DPDC-type structures in the fieldwork undertaken in Southern Sudan during Phase Three of the project. AU/IBAR has sought to improve the implementation and maintenance of peace agreements through encouraging the participation of local authorities with the elders, by ensuring the proper documentation of agreements using legal experts, and by using crusades as methods to disseminate the agreements. In addition, AU/IBAR has tried to incorporate lessons learned from the Oxfam experience, for example by proposing a tiered structure of peace and development committees from county down to village level, to be closely linked to the emerging local government structures in those areas under the control of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Oxfam GB is also applying these approaches in Cuiebet, Rumbek and Mundri elsewhere in Southern Sudan.

In spite of the success of DPDCs and linked village peace committees, these structures remain legally ambiguous. They are not covered by any statute and in many ways their activities appear to be outside the formal law, particularly where the payment of fines is involved to settle cases. The interface between customary dispute settlement mechanisms and statuary law still requires further exploration and the resolution of possible tensions such as the human rights aspects, definition of jurisdiction, and procedures for appeals.

## The importance of a national policy co-ordination body and its potential role

The change in government at the end of 2002 marked a shift in the policy context in Kenya. One particular outcome was the successful creation of the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management (NSCCM)[15]. This multi-stakeholder body, situated within the Office of the President, is now the focal point for peace and security-related debates between government and civil society in Kenya. The NSCCM has proven influential on regional bodies such as USAID REDSO, which has encouraged neighbouring countries to take up the initiative. As a result, Uganda is currently planning to establish a similar national policy co-ordinating body for conflict management.

The NSCCM has many shortcomings of course. Pastoral issues only represent one area of their work and one might observe that there are few actual pastoralists on the committee (if any). Nevertheless, there is, at least at present, a willingness among many actors to give the NSCCM time to settle into place and to review current policies. Although there is always pressure to engage in fire fighting the immediate conflicts to hand, the early signs are that the body is taking time to understand the root causes of conflict. At this stage it is still too early to tell whether the policy and institutional environment will permit meaningful co-ordinated actions to be taken to tackle both the root causes and the manifestations of conflict.

15. The NSCCM was pioneered and is supported by Oxfam GB and ITDG, with additional funding from UNDP, USAID and DFID. Its establishment had become bogged down by the former government's distrust of the National Council of Churches in Kenya, which was to be a member of the committee. The NSCCM was launched soon after the change of government in 2002. The remaining members are: African Peace Forum, Security Research Information Centre, Saferworld, the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims, and PEACENET-Kenya, together with the Commissioner of Police and the Permanent Secretary from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There are a number of key issues which the NSCCM is well placed to address. First, the issue of customary penalties, in which AU/IBAR has a particular interest, needs urgent resolution. Throughout Northern Kenya, pastoral areas of Ethiopia, Karamoja in Uganda and many parts of Southern Sudan, the practice of settling disputes through compensation using livestock is widespread and helps to avoid escalation of the dispute into violent conflict. Integrating these customary systems into the statutory legal system in Kenya is a key urgent challenge, in particular the establishment of mechanisms to respect human rights and ensure that penalties are proportionate.

Second, there is a strong argument that the NSCCM should be mandated as the national focal point for all District Peace and Development Committee structures and given co-ordinating powers over them. These committees need legal recognition, with a clear definition of the mandate, roles and responsibilities (at present, without formal recognition, the effectiveness of these peace structures often depends on the goodwill of the incumbent District Commissioner). At the same time there is a need to clarify the linkages between the DPDCs and other District-level government bodies such as the District Focus for Rural Development and the District Steering Group. Further clarification is also needed on the principles for the use of force by government in the course of conflict management, possibly through strengthening the active role of District Officers in conflict management and supporting District Commissioners to intervene with the use of force when necessary.

Whilst the involvement of a large number of civil society organisations in the NSCCM forms part of its strength, it also presents the risk that other government departments may not take the initiative seriously and view any policy reforms proposed by the NSCCM as an 'NGO document' rather than an integral part of government policy. It is therefore important that the participation of other government departments be strengthened to encourage greater ownership by the government of the process and particularly of the outcomes.

## The importance of fieldwork experience for credibility in the policy arena

AU/IBAR has been a player in the policy debate, alongside the NSCCM and organisations such as Oxfam GB and ITDG. Its ability to participate in this

debate however is closely linked to the credibility and experience of the organisation through a significant body of fieldwork. Without this AU/IBAR's influence would have been greatly diminished.

## The significance of external factors

Whilst AU/IBAR's policy work on conflict management grew out of its field experience during the first two phases of the project, this involvement in the policy debate would not have been possible without some significant changes in the external policy context. First, Oxfam GB's vital fieldwork in the arid districts of Kenya had a significant effect on the policy context. Second, the change of government in late 2002 had a considerable impact on the relationships between civil society and government.

## The importance of up-to-date conflict-related data

Traditional government to government handling of insecurity do not always take advantage of the knowledge and resources from the ground. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has created the Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) to monitor and report on conflict in the IGAD member states[16]. CEWARN is now partially operational within the Karimojong Cluster, collecting data through field monitors based in conflict-prone locations which is fed through a national coordinator to a national research organization. This information is subjected to a multi-stakeholder Conflict Early Warning Unit (CEWARU) review as well as a peer review mechanism and passed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before action is taken.

Although CEWARN data remains extremely difficult for the public to access, there is a knock-on policy impact of the mechanism. Governments in the region are becoming aware of the scale of pastoralist conflict along their borders and this information will slowly percolate into the public domain.

---

16. Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

# 6. Future peacebuilding and conflict management work

One of the key learning points from AU/IBAR's conflict management work has been the realisation that community-based work alone cannot adequately address the structural and proximate causes of conflict in pastoralist areas. Structural causes include acute poverty, the cultural traditions of bridewealth, raiding and warriorhood, as well as the colonial and post-colonial inheritance of ethnically based administrative units and arbitrary international borders.

However, the limitations of community-based approaches do not mean that community-based conflict management work cannot make a significant contribution to managing conflict in the Karimojong Cluster. Fieldwork has also proven extremely important in generating lessons and giving AU/IBAR a 'right to speak' in a new policy arena. AU/IBAR's experience would therefore suggest that both community-level and policy/institutional level work are necessary.

The challenge for AU/IBAR's conflict work, as in its veterinary and animal health work, is to ascertain where its added value lies. For AU/IBAR the best institutional fit would appear to be in partnering with national and local government as well as regional institutions to develop the analytical frameworks, policies and organisations that can tackle the visible signs of conflict as well as the underlying causes.

Based on its experience in the Karimojong Cluster, AU/IBAR has become convinced that NGOs and CBOs are best placed to carry out the type of community-based fieldwork described above. They are close to communities, have relatively low overheads and are, in many cases, more adaptable to local circumstances than governmental and intergovernmental organisations. AU/IBAR's vision of the future is to take contribute at regional level on conflict and insecurity policy issues. This would include the interface between formal and informal law, the handling of raiding and insecurity by security forces, disarmament issues in pastoralist areas, linking local level officials across international borders and the establishment of common understandings and operating procedures for dealing with conflict. AU/IBAR would also like to act as a link between

selected NGOs/CBOs and governments nationally and regionally, feeding further lessons and experiences from the ground into policy and linking up experiences within the region.

With this in mind, AU/IBAR has proposed a much closer relationship with the African Union Peace and Security Department (AU/PSD) in Addis Ababa for future peace and conflict work. Work would still be grounded in a livelihoods-based understanding of the pastoralist system, but would be more closely linked to the conflict mandate of the AU/PSD. The recent recognition by AU/PSD of the capacity and ability of AU/IBAR to engage in conflict management work has been a significant step forwards.

The future AU/IBAR programme will be implemented in collaboration with IGAD and particularly with the CEWARN mechanism, and focus on policy issues of significance to arid and semi-arid areas in the Greater Horn of Africa. It will work at regional level and aim to improve conflict management and responses co-ordinated by government institutions; improve cross-border livestock marketing opportunities and access to animal health services; and strengthen the influence of poor pastoralists over regional policy issues for arid and semi-arid border areas.

In conclusion, this paper has attempted to share some of the experiences, successes and critical reflections gained by AU/IBAR through more than five years of operational fieldwork in the Karimojong Cluster. In this process, AU/IBAR has been inspired by other organisations that have similarly shared their experiences and would encourage others working in the field to engage in a similar process, for their own benefit and that of others.

# Bibliography

Akabwai, D. (n.d.) *Extension and livestock development: Experience from among the Turkana Pastoralists of Kenya* ODI Pastoral Development Network Papers 33b [Online] Available http://www.odi.org.uk/pdn/ papers/33b.pdf

Amani Forum (2004) *Fact finding mission to the North Rift August 2004* Nairobi: Amani Forum

AU/IBAR (1999) *Toposa-Nyangatom-Turkana Elders Meeting Lokichoggio, July 1999* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2001a) *Talking Peace* Video documentary of Women's Border Harmonisation Meeting, Lokichoggio, Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2001b) *Mbale Meeting Report May 2001* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2001c) *Formalisation of Village Peace Committees in the Karamoja Cluster* consultancy report prepared by Nathalie Gomes Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2003a) *Pastoral Women as Peacemakers*: A Consultancy Report Prepared for AU/IBAR by Cathy Watson Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2003b) *Pastoral Visions: Photographs and Voices from the Karimojong Cluster* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2003c) *The Moroto Cross-Border Peace Meeting 6-7 June 2003* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2003d) *Policy Briefing No 10: Pastoralism and Conflict* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2003e) *Akoret-Kapedo-Chemolingot Follow Up Peace Meeting* Nairobi: AU/IBAR 2003

AU/IBAR (2004a) *Assessing the Impact of Conflict Management Activities in the Karimojong Cluster*: A Consultancy Report Prepared for AU/IBAR by Acacia Consultants Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2004b) *The peace centre model: learning from experience in Kenya* A consultancy report produced for AU/IBAR by Acacia consultants Nairobi: AU/IBAR

AU/IBAR (2005a) *Three methodologies for working with conflict in pastoralist areas* Nairobi: AU/IBAR:

AU/IBAR (2005b) *Conflict in the Karimojong Cluster* Nairobi: AU/IBAR

Birch, I. & Shuria, H.A.O. (2002) *Taking charge of the future: pastoral institution building in Northern Kenya* Drylands Issue Paper No 114 London: IIED

Dyson-Hudson, N. (1966) *Karimojong Politics* Oxford: Clarendon Press

IIRR and Acacia Consultants (2004) *Drought Cycle Management: A toolkit for the drylands of East Africa*. Nairobi: International Institute of Rural Reconstruction and Acacia Consultants

Minear, L. (2002) *Pastoralist Community Harmonisation in the Karamoja Cluster: Taking it to the Next Level* Nairobi: OAU/IBAR

Oxfam (2003) *Oxfam GB-Funded Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Arid Districts of Kenya: Lessons and Challenges* Nairobi: Oxfam GB

Responding to Conflict (n.d) *The Wajir Story* Birmingham: Responding to Conflict/Coalition for Peace in Africa

Somjee, S.H. (ed.) (1998) *Honey and Heifer, Grasses, Milk and Water: A Heritage of Diversity in Reconciliation*. Nairobi.

Soper, R.C. (ed.) (1985) *Socio-Cultural Profile of Turkana District* Nairobi: Institute of African Studies, University of Nairobi and Ministry of Finance and Planning

Waithaka ,D. (2001) *Breaking the Spears and Cooling the Earth* Nairobi: OAU/IBAR

# iied

Promoting better and more sustainable livlihoods for people in Africa's drylands – that is the objective of IIED's Drylands Programme.

Our priorities are:
- to strengthen the capacity of local people to manage their resources sustainably and equitably;
- to promote policies and institutions that enable participation and subsidiarity in decision-making;
- to influence global processes that further the development needs of dryland peoples.

In partnership with African and European organisations, we carry out research and foster informed debate on key policy issues of direct concern to poor people's livelihoods. Our work covers a broad variety of fields, ranging from land tenure and equitable resource access to the future of family farming in a globalised world; from pastoral development and the management of the commons to managing transnational resources; from good governance and social inclusion to rural-urban links; from literacy and democratic participation to regional integration, and international migration.

These Issue Papers provide a forum for practitioners and policy makers to share ideas and experiences on the wide range of development issues that affect people living in dryland areas.

They are available in English and French and can be downloaded from our website at www.iied.org/drylands/pubs/issuepapers.html