

# Outside the Large Cities

*Annotated Bibliography and Guide  
to the Literature on Small and Intermediate  
Urban Centres in the Third World*

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INTERNATIONAL  
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ENVIRONMENT AND  
DEVELOPMENT

**HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME**

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## PREFACE

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## INTRODUCTION

### A. AIMS OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography contains annotations of some 170 published works on the subject of small and intermediate urban centres in the Third World. It is one of a series of publications on this subject arising from collaborative research undertaken by a network of Third World institutions and coordinated by the Human Settlements Programme of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED); the scope and purpose of this other research is described in sections (d) and (e) of this introduction. A Spanish language version of this annotated bibliography has already been published with a more limited coverage of case studies outside Latin America.<sup>3</sup>

The aim of the bibliography is to provide the reader with a large number of annotations organised in such a way as to allow them to identify work of particular relevance to their interest and with sufficient detail in the annotations to provide a clear idea of the scope, coverage and conclusions of each work. In seeking to make this volume more useful and accessible to users (especially those in the Third World), it has certain features which distinguish it from most other annotated bibliographies.

The first is that it draws from a large literature review, much of it based on a review of 53 journals. In doing so, it seeks to promote greater use of some of the less well known and (particularly in the Third World) less accessible literature on the rather broad subject of 'small and intermediate urban centres in the Third World'. It intentionally includes a considerable proportion of work published in journals which are not widely used by urban researchers and publications which only achieve limited distribution. This is especially so for certain journals whose distribution is essentially limited to one nation or continent. Other journals included in the literature review have limited distribution in much of the Third World (and indeed in much of Europe and North America too) because subscription costs and the difficulties in obtaining the currency needed for the subscription, price them out of the range of most research centres, teaching institutions and libraries. Others are not consulted by researchers interested in this subject because their title suggests that they do not deal with urban issues. One example of this is *The Journal of Peasant Studies* which was found to include some of the most detailed case studies of the development of small urban centres. In addition, the review included material written in Spanish and certain publications in Portuguese and French so many annotations included in this volume are for works not published in English. Many people interested in this subject do not read material in these languages and so by covering some of the relevant journals published in Latin America, Africa or Europe, the bibliography also seeks to bring work in languages other than English on this subject to the attention of English speakers.

A second difference from conventional annotated bibliographies is the greater length and detail given in annotations. Each annotation seeks to give the reader a clear idea of the coverage of the paper, its main findings and – where given – its conclusions. The intention is to make it easier for the reader to decide which original works they need to obtain. While the annotations are not recommended as a substitute for reading the original work, it is unrealistic to assume that most research institutions, libraries or teaching or training institutions have more than a few of the 53 journals and the other publications from which annotations have been drawn.

A third difference is that this volume is sold at a price which at best, only allows the recovery of publishing costs. This has been done in the hope that more Third World institutions, researchers and students will be able to afford it. This only proved possible because grants were given to allow the researchers to undertake the annotations. In this instance, it was through the generous support of the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC), the Swedish Council for Building Research and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). These institutions' support for our research included staff time to allow the production of this volume. Producing this volume at a relatively low price also precluded the possibility of publishing through a commercial publisher. Although commercial publishers were interested in it, none would publish it at a price to allow it to be affordable to those for whom it is intended.

In addition, the authors have written the annotations, keeping in mind that many potential readers will not have English as their first language. Specialist terms have been kept to a minimum and footnotes are used to explain those that are used. Comments on the usefulness of this volume or suggestions as to other works which should be included are welcomed; correspondence can be addressed either to the office in Buenos Aires or London given on the back cover. We hope in the future to have the time to expand and up-date this work so as to include annotations drawn from a wider literature search.

### B. ORGANIZATION OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Annotations of papers, articles, reports or chapters which concentrate on specific small or intermediate urban centres are grouped in Part I, entitled Urban Case Studies while those with a focus wider than one or two urban centres are in Part II, Spatial Aspects of Development.

On occasion, it proved difficult to decide whether to place an annotation in Part I or Part II. For instance, there are papers which look at migration movements to and from one particular urban centre. If the work's main concentration is on some aspect of that particular urban centre's social or economic structure which help determine or explain in- and out-migration, it would be within Part I. If the paper's concentration is on how that urban centre is linked to the wider regional and national

economic and social structure with migration flows being examined as an aspect of such links, then it would be placed in Part II.

In Part I, Urban Case Studies, the annotations of the case studies are organised under nine headings:

- (a) Economic organization
- (b) Social organization
- (c) Political structure
- (d) Social stratification and social mobility
- (e) Structural change
- (f) Relations between local centre and national society
- (g) Historical studies
- (h) Planning
- (i) Other

Most of the works included in Part I adopt what might be termed an anthropological point of view and often concentrate on descriptions of one particular aspect of the society represented by the inhabitants of the centre in question. Research methods for these studies tends to be qualitative. The interest of authors tend to be on gaining a detailed understanding of specifics within the centre or centres under study. Many have no interest in deriving conclusions from the research which is then claimed to have relevance to other urban centres.

There are obvious problems in choosing sub-headings under which the literature can be organised. For example, some historical studies of particular urban centres contain information about economic structure or social organisation. Thus, the reader is urged to review annotations under sub-headings other than the ones for which they have a particular interest. Certainly, some of the historical case studies contain detailed information of great interest and relevance to such subjects as economic and political structure, social organisation and relations between the urban centre and national society.

In Part II, Spatial Aspects of Development, the literature is organised under four main headings, each with sub-headings:

- (a) Migration
  - Theoretical and general
  - Case studies
- (b) Settlement patterns and trends
  - General
  - The links with socio-economic change
  - Historical
- (c) Productive organisation
  - General
  - Case studies
- (d) Government strategies
  - General
  - National strategies
  - Regional/city strategies

The division of works on Migration into 'theoretical and general' and 'case studies' is self explanatory. For the section on Settlement Patterns, 'general' includes papers with information on small and intermediate urban centres at a regional, national or international level while the sub-section on 'the links with socio-economic change' includes work which examines the interaction between settlements (or settlement systems) and socio-economic change. The term 'settlement system' should be understood as similar to 'urban system' but with the inclusion of settlements which have urban characteristics (for instance a significant concentration of population not deriving an income directly from agriculture) but which do not qualify as 'urban centres' according to the census definitions in use in that nation at that time. This and other questions of definition will be discussed further in section (f).

Under the heading Productive Organisation, 'general' includes papers on this topic which could not be termed case studies. Papers which present information about productive activities within a defined group of small and intermediate urban centres are classified under the sub-heading 'case studies'.

Under Government Strategies, most papers cover national, regional or city strategies and so sub-headings divide the annotations into these three different geographic scales. More wide ranging papers, most of them discussing in broad terms the usefulness of a policy on small and intermediate urban centres, are included under 'general'.

There are four indexes at the end of the volume where all the literature included in this volume is listed alphabetically by author, nation, urban centre and source. With these indexes and with annotations organised under subject headings, we hope that readers can easily identify the literature which is of most interest to them.

## C. THE BIBLIOGRAPHY'S COVERAGE

Most of the annotations in this volume are drawn from the 53 journals listed at the end of the Introduction. This list includes details of the issues covered for each journal; in general, coverage was for issues between 1970 and 1983. Also included in this volume are annotations of empirical studies on small or intermediate urban centres in a volume entitled *Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa* (Southall, Editor, 1979). The decision to include these was prompted by the fact that the original volume was never distributed commercially and seems to have had limited circulation. The studies within it rarely seem to be used (or quoted) in published literature.

In the selection of papers from the journals reviewed, the decision was made not to narrow the choice to those for which small or intermediate urban centres are the primary focus. It seems more useful to include annotations on papers covering such subjects as migratory patterns or rural development or national settlement policies which include material on small and intermediate urban centres. The term 'small and intermediate urban centres' was interpreted rather widely; the definitional questions with regard to the distinction between rural and urban settlements and as to which settlements are included within the category of 'small and intermediate urban centres' are discussed in section (e).

Finally, the reader should note that all papers in the journals reviewed which contained material on small and intermediate urban centres are included in this bibliography. Although our own research on this subject may give us grounds to question the validity of some of these papers' conclusions and recommendations, we have not sought to exclude such works from this volume. Critical reviews of the literature included in this volume have been published elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

As noted earlier, to some extent this bibliography has sacrificed comprehensive coverage – in terms of covering all published literature – for detail – in terms of including a wide range of papers from the literature reviewed and in terms of providing long and detailed annotations. When we began our research on this subject in 1978, the aim was to be more comprehensive in the coverage of the literature. But with an increasing interest in the subject from researchers, governments, aid agencies and NGOs, the volume of material has grown steadily.

One way in which the bibliography's coverage was limited was a decision not to include commercially published books but to concentrate on articles in development journals. The main justification is that much of the material in recently published books on this subject had been published or summarised in articles in the journals covered by this bibliography. Where papers annotated in the bibliography are known to be summaries of books, details are included about the book. In addition, libraries are more likely to have recent books published on this subject than the range of journals covered in this volume.

Another reason for not including commercially published books is the fact that most are based on reviews of other people's work and do not themselves contain the findings of original empirical research. We hope that this annotated bibliography does include a high proportion of the published work reporting on the findings of empirical research on this subject published since 1970. One of the concerns arising from our review of empirical research is that so much of it brings into question the validity of some of the generalisations commonly made about 'small and intermediate urban centres in the Third World'. If the reader examines the findings of the empirical research within this volume, it will be found to bring into question any assumption about the possibility of generalising about small and intermediate urban centres in terms of comparable functions, occupational structures, development potentials or population growth rates.

There remains a considerable body of literature of great relevance to the subject of this bibliography which is not included as its focus is not on small or intermediate urban centres. Three subjects of particular relevance to small and intermediate urban centres need emphasising: local government; the spatial impacts of governments' macro-economic policies and sectoral priorities; and governments' agricultural pricing policies.

On the question of local government, there is a growing volume of literature related to the issue of appropriate policies for small and intermediate urban centres. This includes analyses of local government capacity and effectiveness in specific nations or urban centres and justifications as to the need to develop its capacity to plan, implement and support development initiatives within its own area of jurisdiction. Most local and regional governments have as their headquarters small or intermediate urban centres. The possibility of such urban centres providing their inhabitants and those in surrounding areas with basic infrastructure and services and of developing stronger economic bases depends to a considerable extent on the resources and capacities of the local government located there – or the local government within whose jurisdiction they fall. For readers interested in exploring this aspect further, Note 3 lists some recent publications on local government which were found to have considerable relevance to the subject of small and intermediate urban centres. This list does not pretend to be comprehensive.

On the spatial impact of governments' macro-economic policies and sectoral priorities, there is also a growing literature. Macro-economic policies or sectoral priorities can be powerful influences on a continuing concentration of new productive investments in major cities and, in effect, subsidise productive investment in one or two large cities. As such, they can act as disincentives to productive investment in most smaller urban centres. There are also many examples of macro-economic policies having significant direct or indirect impacts on economic change within certain small and intermediate urban centres. Indeed, one recent paper by Andrew Hamer comments that 'eliminating sectoral distortions may do more for decentralised development than all the myriad spatial efforts conventionally proposed by Third World policy makers'. Note 5 at the end of this section lists some recent publications on this subject, although (as in the list on local government) this has no claim to being comprehensive.

The issue of the social and spatial impact of agricultural pricing policies has considerable relevance. To give but one example, if many enterprises in many small and intermediate urban centres largely depend on demand for production or consumption goods and services arising from farmers, agricultural pricing policies which influence the disposable income of farmers and agricultural workers are likely to have significant impacts on the economies of these urban centres. Note 6 gives some examples of some recent publications on this subject.



## D. THE SCOPE OF IIED'S RESEARCH ON SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE URBAN CENTRES

Since the publications arising from our research on small and intermediate urban centres are not annotated in this volume, this section outlines the scope of this research. It also describes other completed or on-going research on this topic such as that developed by IIED-America Latina, IIED's office in Latin America, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and a number of country-based research groups.

This bibliography was produced as part of a long term research programme on the present and potential role of small and intermediate urban centres in the Third World's development process. Five empirical regional studies were also undertaken by collaborating Third World institutions. These institutions are the Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales (Buenos Aires, Argentina); the Institute for Development Studies (Mysore, India); the International Institute for Development Research (Allahabad, India); the Department of Architecture, the Sudanese Group for Assessment of Human Settlements, Khartoum University (the Sudan); and the Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Lagos (Nigeria).

These regional studies examined the growth and development of urban systems and the influence on them of social, economic and political forces in two regions in India, and one each in Nigeria, Argentina and the Sudan. The regions chosen were the Upper Valley of Rio Negro and its periphery within the Comahue Region in Argentina, the Gezira region in the Sudan, the Districts of Bangalore, Mandya and Mysore in Karnataka State, South India, the Districts of Rae Bareilly, Sultanpur and Pratapgarh in Uttar Pradesh, North India, and Southwest Nigeria covering the coastal area between Lagos and the Nigerian-Benin border.

Each regional study covered a period of 100 years or more and thus sought to show how changes in the region's economies and social structures influenced the development of the urban system there. They included considerable detail on changes in agricultural production and changes in the land-owning or holding structure, both of which proved to have major influences on the development of small and intermediate urban centres. So too did the changes in political structure in terms of the location of different levels of local administration and the power, resources and skilled personnel at the disposal of each level. Although most emphasis was placed on the influence of economic, social and political forces internal to the region on its urban system, each regional study also showed the considerable influence on urban change there of forces coming across the regional boundaries and, in some instances, arising from the international market.

The findings of these five regional studies have been summarised in 15- 20,000 word chapters in a single volume. Other chapters in this book review other empirical work on this subject and review Government policies and their impact on small and intermediate urban centres. The regional studies in Argentina and the Sudan have also been published in full in separate volumes while various papers published in different journals have summarised the findings of the research. Note 7 at the end of this section lists the publications which arose from this work.

Most work since the completion of the five regional studies has been in Latin America, largely through two research projects, each including several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Both projects consisted of the selection and examination of case studies of small and intermediate urban centres. The aim of both projects was to gather empirical evidence on the present role of such centres in the regional and the national development process, so as to assist governments and international development agencies in incorporating – in a more effective and realistic fashion – such centres in their development agendas. A common starting point for both projects was the observation that the problems of Latin America's large cities are reaching unprecedented proportions, incommensurate with the resources at the disposal of governments in the region. Thus, the need arises to seek alternatives to the present urban development pattern.

The first project, funded by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), centred on an assessment of the capacity of small and intermediate urban centres to retain population or attract migrant population and of the living standards that they can offer to inhabitants. This included case studies in Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Paraguay. The second project, funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sought, among other things, to examine the impact that the economic recession has had upon the distribution of national population within the urban system of selected countries in the region, and upon the economies of selected small and intermediate urban centres. On-going or planned development projects which could assist in the further development of such centres and their regions were also identified. This project included case studies in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador.

As part of the research project on "Rethinking the Latin American City", developed by IIED America Latina, the two projects above have been complemented by further research in some of the urban centres selected as case studies in these two projects, as well as new case studies. This has looked in more detail at the urban land market and local government in smaller municipalities. As in the previous work, the aims of these studies include a desire to understand, on the one hand, to what extent processes that have been identified and documented extensively for large cities also operate in smaller urban centres and, on the other, to identify the potential of local government in such urban centres in promoting development and improved living conditions within different national contexts.

The findings from the regional studies were also used to provide some guidelines for the European Commission's Directorate General for Development. During 1982-3, this Directorate requested IIED's help in assembling background material on 'Secondary Towns in Africa: their role and functions in national and regional development'. The work was undertaken in collaboration with Agence Cooperation et Amenagement and the Organisation for Overseas Scientific and Technical Research (ORSTOM) in France, the Sudanese Group for Assessment of Human Settlements in Khartoum and the Overseas Development Institute in London. A report prepared for the European Commission drew heavily on the already completed regional studies, especially those in the Sudan and Nigeria. Background reports were also prepared on Tanzania (by Deborah Bryceson of St. Antony's College, Oxford), Nigeria (by Anthony O'Connor of the Department of

Geography, University College London) and the Sudan (by Ian Simpson from the University of Leeds' School of Economic Studies) with a regional report prepared by Ian Simpson and the Sudanese Group for Assessment of Human Settlements in the Sudan.

## E. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ON SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE URBAN CENTRES

The research programme (of which the production of this bibliography is part) has two main aims. The first is to provide a better understanding of how economic, social and political forces act to shape or mould urban systems over time, and the impact of such forces on social and economic development in such centres and their surrounding areas. The second is to provide a better understanding of the rationale for different kinds of government intervention in such centres and their regions and of the costs and benefits of the different policy options.

IIED's interest in the subject arose from a concern to explore alternatives to processes which concentrate higher productivity and higher income jobs, savings and investments in one (or a few) cities within each nation. It also originated from a concern to understand better how the performance of regional economies can be improved and how a more equitable spread of the benefits of economic growth can be promoted in terms of increasing the proportion of people with adequate, stable livelihoods and access to basic social and physical services (for instance safe, sufficient supplies of piped water, adequate sanitation, a full range of the services which are part of a primary health care system and educational services and, where needed, public transport and services for solid waste disposal).

Our work in this subject area seeks to clarify what kinds of government policies on small and intermediate urban centres could increase the proportion of the national population with access to social and physical services and adequate livelihoods. The question of whether spatial policies – including those on small and intermediate urban centres – can achieve such social and economic objectives is of considerable relevance, given Third World governments' increasing concern about the failure of development policies and plans to spread social and economic benefits more widely. Increasingly, this concern has been translated into a number of national plans which espouse spatial goals such as raising living standards in poorer and less developed regions, slowing migration to major cities (or metropolitan areas) and encouraging industrial development outside the major cities or existing industrial concentrations.

An assessment of the last 30 years or so demonstrates the cause of their concern. Although most Third World nations have made considerable progress in this period in expanding and developing their economic bases, very few have successfully spread the benefits of this development. This lack of success can be seen in social terms by the fact that the benefits have been concentrated in a small group of relatively high income people while the poorest 20 to 40 per cent of the population often hardly benefitted at all, and may indeed have become poorer.

This lack of success can also be seen in spatial terms. Most of the urban population living outside the major cities (or metropolitan areas) also benefitted little. This is not meant to imply that the poorer majority of those living in the major cities and metropolitan areas necessarily benefitted; there is some evidence to suggest that most were as inadequately served by public services and facilities and suffered comparable or worse problems of malnutrition, poor health and premature death as most inhabitants of rural areas and small urban centres<sup>8</sup>. But it is generally within the major cities and metropolitan areas that most of the high productivity and high paid jobs are located. Investments in both public and private enterprises and institutions have usually concentrated here, as have a high proportion of public investment in infrastructure and services.

There is little evidence to suggest that the majority of the agricultural population (on whose purchasing power the economies of many small and intermediate urban centres largely depend) experienced significant increases in income in this period. This is apparent in the large and often widening economic disparities between the more urbanised regions (with the major cities) and regions which are more peripheral in economic and spatial terms. There is no shortage of policy advice for Third World governments. As can be seen from annotations in Part II, Third World governments do not suffer from a shortage of policy advice on correcting these disparities. But amongst all the advice, little consensus exists on what governments can and should do.

The reader will also find certain basic contradictions between the empirical studies annotated in Part I and some of the policy advice given to governments in the literature annotated in Part II. Certainly, one aim of this annotated bibliography is to bring to the attention of policy-makers, the range of empirical studies on such urban centres. These studies may include no conclusions about what governments policies should or should not do but still contain findings of considerable relevance – for instance of the forces and factors behind one particular urban centre's growth and development and of the constraints and possibilities for further developments. The case studies in Part I help emphasise the great diversity in the factors which underly the development of settlements into 'small' or 'intermediate' urban centres and the even greater diversity in the factors which have influenced and continue to influence demographic, social and economic change there.

One aspect which receives little attention in the literature is the links between the economies of small or intermediate urban centres and the region or nation. Few papers give consideration to this aspect or to the forces internal or external to any region which influence changes in regional economies and urban systems; this is one reason why the decision was made to concentrate on this subject in our own empirical research. Without an understanding of the dynamics behind present urban trends in any particular region or nation, it is difficult to see how realistic policy advice can be given to the local, regional or national government intent on changing these trends.

We hope that this volume and the other publications arising from our work will contribute to a better understanding of these and other questions such as: the ways in which social, economic and political forces shape regional and national urban systems over time; the policy options open to governments if they wish to influence urban trends; and the costs and

benefits of the various options. There may be a growing consensus among governments and international agencies that action is needed to change present settlement patterns and trends. But here too, there seems to be a relatively poor understanding of certain subjects. These include the public measures needed to steer urban development away from the major cities and the very real limitations on the ability of governments to do so in market or mixed economies. They include an appreciation of the range of possible measures which can be taken and a methodology for determining which are appropriate to any particular urban centre or regional urban system – and of the different costs and benefits likely to stem from different options. Perhaps more critically, a better understanding must be sought of who actually benefits from the measures proposed. A final subject rarely discussed is the fact that for a national programme on small and intermediate urban centres to be effective, it is likely to need an explicit programme aimed at increasing the developmental role and representative nature of local government.

Attempts by Third World governments to divert urban growth and development to 'growth poles', 'growth centres', 'growth axes' and 'new towns' have generally met with relatively little success in terms of promoting growth in real income or raising living standards for the majority of people within their region. Such schemes have generally involved considerable expense (both in terms of capital investment and scarce managerial and technical skills). In most instances, they have been based on tools, techniques and research devised for and implemented in countries (mainly Western Europe and North America) whose problems and possibilities may bear little resemblance to the problems of poorer regions within Third World nations. In addition, there is a tendency to confuse social inequality with spatial inequality so that increasing production in a relatively poor region is assumed to benefit the poorer groups living there. As Gore has suggested, there is a "conflation of social problems located in cities and regions with the problems of those cities and regions . . . and confusion of 'place prosperity' with 'people prosperity'"<sup>9</sup>.

What seems to be lacking is a clear understanding of the 'settlement' or 'urban' component of government policies to spread economic and social benefits to those in need and of the role of government at local, state (provincial) and national level in this. There is a need to understand the interplay and strength of private interests, both within nations and impinging on them from the wider system, in shaping the spatial distribution of development. Then there is a need to understand what might be termed the 'urban' component of rural and agricultural development strategies. As Hayward notes, in his paper on three small urban centres in Ghana<sup>10</sup>, these are 'the crucial interface between the state and its institutional structures and the rural populace; the point at which rural interests are aggregated and expressed to government . . . sources of politicisation, mobilisation and national integration: points of enforcement of national policy and distribution of national services'. Publicly funded services for the rural population such as education, health care and agricultural extension (where they exist) are provided through a network of settlements. It is usually through small urban centres that lower level services (such as a dispensary and a primary school) are provided while higher level services (such as secondary schools and perhaps a small hospital) are located in intermediate urban centres.

One important question may arise from these considerations – why should the research be oriented to small and intermediate urban centres? Among many possible answers, some relating to virtually all Third World nations, others of relevance only to a few, four general justifications stand out. The first is the fact that most of the published literature on urban issues in the Third World is about capital cities or large cities and yet a high proportion of many nations' urban populations live in small and intermediate urban centres. Most of the concern expressed about urban problems is about problems in large cities with little consideration given to the problems faced by inhabitants in small and intermediate urban centres both in terms of adequate livelihoods and in terms of access to basic services and facilities. Little consideration is also given to the problems facing local governments at this level to provide the infrastructure, services and planning which are an essential part of urban government. In fact, only a small proportion of the Third World's population lives in large cities. For instance, despite the attention given in development literature to India's twelve largest urban centres each with more than a million inhabitants in 1981, these contained only one quarter of India's total urban population. In 1981, Havana contained just 30 per cent of Cuba's urban population while in 1985, Colombia's four largest urban centres contained just 43.1 per cent of total urban population<sup>11</sup>.

The second justification is the fact that enterprises and facilities located in small and intermediate urban centres meet important needs for rural producers and consumers for goods, services and markets. Yet little consideration is given to the role of public and private institutions in such centres in supporting social and economic development within rural areas – for instance in providing rural inhabitants with access to schools and health care centres or being the location for agricultural extension services, irrigation offices and agro-industries linked to local products.

It is sometimes forgotten that in many Third World nations, 'urban centres' include most or all settlements with as few as 1,500 or 2,000 inhabitants while in some, 'urban centres' include all settlements with only a few hundred inhabitants; such definitional issues are discussed further, in the next section. What we choose to call small and intermediate urban centres remain the least studied and perhaps the least understood elements within national and regional urban systems. Since the purpose of the research was never to study any particular category of urban centre (however defined) in isolation, this meant the study of small and intermediate urban centres both in relation to the rural population and economy and in relation to larger centres and the economic activities they concentrate.

A third reason for a special interest in small and intermediate urban centres relates to their political and administrative functions. Sub-national and sub-regional levels of government administration are usually located in small and intermediate urban centres. It is through local government in such centres that the needs and priorities of sub-national and sub-regional populations should be channelled to influence policies and resource allocations at higher levels of government. In addition, without detailed local knowledge gathered and analyzed by local governments, special national programmes for small and intermediate urban centres are likely to misunderstand the unique characteristics of each urban centre and its links with its surrounds and the wider regional and national economy and urban system. The failure (or only partial success) of so many attempts by governments to stimulate urban development away from larger cities is frequently due to a poor understanding of local circumstances, local needs and local possibilities in the urban centres meant to serve as alternative locations for new investments.

A fourth reason why small and intermediate urban centres deserve special attention in many nations is the fact that certain such centres already contain industries, services or facilities which are important for the achievement of national government's development objectives. For instance, goals such as increasing agricultural production or replacing food imports with local production imply the need for increased investments in infrastructure, services and facilities within certain strategically located small and intermediate urban centres.

## F. A NOTE ON THE DEFINITION OF SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE URBAN CENTRES

In selecting papers or reports to be annotated, two criteria were needed. The first was to define when an urban centre has developed beyond a 'small' or 'intermediate' urban centre. The second was to define when a nucleated concentration of population (eg a settlement) is sufficiently large or acquires certain characteristics to become 'a small urban centre' rather than a rural settlement. In this bibliography, no attempt is made to distinguish between 'small' and 'intermediate' urban centres although such a distinction did prove useful in our empirical research<sup>12</sup>.

To define a limit above which an urban centre has developed beyond an 'intermediate urban centre', the simplest criterion would be a specified population size. This is the criterion most commonly used in literature. But if the division of urban centres into different size categories (eg small, intermediate and large) is intended as a methodological device to aid an understanding of urban development within specific regional or national contexts, no universally applicable population size threshold can be chosen.

To give but one example as to why this is the case, consider the differences between nations with very different population sizes. In Brazil, India, Mexico and many other Third World nations, there are many urban centres of more than 250,000 inhabitants which do not concentrate sufficient economic activities to be of major significance nationally to be termed 'large urban centres'. And yet these have population sizes and concentrations of economic activities which are greater than many of the largest cities and national capitals in the smaller and poorer Third World nations.

Thus, the criterion used to distinguish 'large' from 'intermediate' urban centres was whether the urban centre in question could be judged to concentrate sufficient activities to be of major importance to national production or service provision. Although this is not very precise for it means that qualitative judgements have to be made, nation by nation, this appeared the most valid criterion for this upper limit.

The easiest way to resolve the question of the lower limit above which a settlement is judged to be 'urban' would have been to include only literature in which the term 'urban centre' appears. But the literature revealed a considerable arbitrariness in what researchers and writers referred to as cities, towns, villages and rural areas. In some instances, a paper describing a settlement with many thousands of inhabitants and obvious urban characteristics still referred to the settlement as rural. Papers which stated that they were about 'rural industrialisation' included settlements with up to 20,000 inhabitants which in virtually all nations would be counted as urban.

For the lower limit above which a settlement is judged 'urban', the decision was made to include literature about any population concentration of 1,000 or more inhabitants which had a substantial proportion of the labour-force employed in non-agricultural activities. Some case studies gave a wealth of detail about one particular settlement but did not give the settlement's population. This made it difficult to judge whether it should be included. Annotations of such case studies were included, if the information given about the settlement implied a population of 1,000 or more inhabitants.

This explains why several annotations are about 'villages'. For instance, there is a paper on 'the village' of Paniar in India which had around 2,500 inhabitants in 1981. If one applied the 1981 Indian census definition for what constitutes an urban centre, Paniar would not be urban. But other papers about officially recognised 'towns' or 'urban settlements' include settlements which are both less populous than Paniar and less urban in terms of a nucleated settlement where a substantial proportion of the workforce is employed in non-agricultural activities. We also included some papers on the subject of 'rural industrialisation' because these were about industries in nucleated settlements with 1,000 or more inhabitants. Papers on Tanzania's villagisation programme are included since most of the villages created by this programme have between 1,250 and 7,500 inhabitants and many are intended as major service centres and as centres for the development of some small-scale industrial activity<sup>13</sup>. Also included are papers about Algeria's socialist village programme since these can have populations of up to 4,900 inhabitants and are also becoming centres of agricultural processing and industry as well as service centres<sup>14</sup>.

This inclusion of settlements with as few as 1,000 inhabitants is open to criticism but it can be justified by the fact that it allows the inclusion of literature which can contribute to a better understanding of the constraints on population growth and development within small settlements. In addition, there are no other obvious criteria. It is not possible to turn to the criteria used by Third World nations to separate rural settlements from small urban centres. While most major Third World nations do have explicit population thresholds for the number of inhabitants above which a settlement is 'an urban centre', in different nations this threshold varies from a few hundred (or less) or up to 50,000 inhabitants. Most fall within the range of 1,500 to 5,000 inhabitants<sup>15</sup>. Faced with such a diversity in the way national governments distinguish 'urban centres' from rural population, the criteria used in this annotated bibliography seemed the best way to ensure a diverse set on annotations on urban centres of different sizes and economic structures.

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12. From the five regional studies whose scope was outlined in section d. of the Introduction, it was found useful to distinguish between small and intermediate urban centres - small centres having less than 20,000 inhabitants; intermediate having more than 20,000. It was possible to identify certain characteristics which most urban centres with less than 20,000 inhabitants shared - for instance a substantial proportion of their labour force engaged in non-agricultural activities; a relatively minor level of local government located there; and relatively low order public services and facilities which served both the urban centre's population and those in surrounding rural areas. It was also possible to identify characteristics for urban centres with 20,000 or more inhabitants which distinguished them from those with less than 20,000, in the same region. These included a higher level of local government, a more diverse range of professionals and public and private services and better location of regional and national transport and communications systems. But the figure of 20,000 population is no more than a distinction which proved convenient to highlight differences in different size urban centres within the same region. See Chapter 7 of Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1986) op. cit. 7 for a discussion of this.

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15. Two other kinds of urban criteria, not based on population thresholds, are widely used to set the lower limit for what constitutes an 'urban centre'. The first is simply limited to stating that certain specified settlements are to be regarded as 'urban centres'; this is widely used in small-population and in relatively un-urbanised nations with just a few named settlements being the only ones regarded as urban. In some of the smallest nations, just one settlement is regarded as urban. The second is based on the population in settlements which perform government functions; a settlement is 'urban' if it is the seat of a certain level of local government. In some nations, local government status and population size are combined - so a settlement is urban if its population exceeds a defined threshold and it is the administrative headquarters of a certain level of local government. Or more sophisticated criteria are added to population thresholds or local government status such as the proportion of the labour force working in non-agricultural activities or population density or other characteristics thought to be typical of an 'urban centre'. And in a few nations, the 'urban population' are those people living in 'townships' or 'municipalities' or other forms of administrative area within which most of the population lives in one or more nucleated settlement said to have 'urban' characteristics.

In some instances, researchers writing about urban systems may choose their own criteria for what constitutes an urban settlement. To illustrate the need for a certain caution in interpreting 'rural-urban' differences in this volume, consider the question of the urban criteria used in Taiwan and the use made of it by two papers included in this bibliography. Samuel Ho in a paper entitled 'Decentralized industrialization and rural development: evidence from Taiwan', (*Economic Development and Cultural Change* Vol 28, No 1, October 1979) reports that in 1950, Taiwan was reorganised into five cities and 16 counties, the counties in turn being divided into 318 administrative units designated as county cities, urban townships and rural townships. Alden Speare in 'Urbanization and migration in Taiwan' (*Economic Development and Cultural Change* Vol 22, No 2 January 1974) states that urban and rural townships typically consist of an urban area surrounded by a rural area and that the townships designated as urban tend to be larger and have more urban population than rural areas, although there is no clear dividing line. Thus, many urban townships, as well as rural townships, include a high proportion of rural area.

When looking at the distribution of employment between rural and urban areas for 1956 and 1966, Ho chose to consider both urban townships and rural townships as 'rural', taking only Greater Taipei, other metropolitan areas and eight county cities as 'urban'. Even this definition is not entirely satisfactory when one notes that in 1956, some 15 per cent of employment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and hunting was in what he termed 'urban' areas. But Ho then had to change his definition of 'rural' and 'urban' to look at rural industrial establishments since government data did not permit the use of the categories previously used. In this, he considered only those establishments in the five major cities as 'urban', thus including in his comments on rural industry industries located in relatively populous towns and cities.

Speare chose different criteria for 'rural' and 'urban', since he chose to call urban townships 'urban' (when Ho had called them 'rural') and thus only rural townships as 'rural'. In his more detailed look at migration for the years 1967 and 1968, Speare distinguished between major cities, large urban townships and small rural townships. To give one final example of the somewhat arbitrary definition of what is 'urban', Liedholm and Chuta in their study of the role of rural and urban small-scale industry in Sierra Leone (*Rural Africana* No 6, 1979-80, pp 1-13) decided to adopt the figure of 20,000 inhabitants which might be judged by others to be excessively high given Sierra Leone's low level of development and relatively small population.

PART I



URBAN CASE  
STUDIES



## 1a ECONOMIC ORGANISATION

- BECKER, Socio-Economic Analysis of the Atyra District
- DANNHAEUSER, The Role of the Neighbourhood Store In Developing Economies: the Case of Dagupan City, Philippines
- DIKE, Growth and Development Patterns of Awka and Nsukka, Nigeria
- ESTEVA FABREGAT, A Market In Chinchero, Cuzco
- GRANT ANDERSON, The Rural Market in West Java
- GUIBBERT, The Role of the Informal Sector in the Urban Economy Circuits: the Case of Sefrou, Morocco
- HANNERZ, Town and Country in Southern Zaria: a View from Kafanchan
- HARRISS and HARRISS, 'Generative' or 'Parasitic' Urbanism? Some Observations from the Recent History of a South Indian Market Town
- HERBERT, A Community Facing the Capitalism of a Social Structure
- HIGDON, Navrongo's Economic Base, a Cautionary Tale
- HJORT, Sedentary Pastoralists and Peasants: the Inhabitants of a Small Town
- HOPKINS, The Small Urban Centre in Rural Development: Kita (Mali) and Testour (Tunisia)
- ISAAC, Price, Competition and Profits among Hawkers and Shopkeepers in Pendembu, Sierra Leone: an Inventory Approach
- ISELL, The Influence of Migrants upon Traditional Social and Political Concepts: a Peruvian Case Study
- MARSHALL and TORRICO ANGULO, Socio-Economic Changes in the High Valley of Cochabamba since 1952: the Provincial Towns of Cliza, Punata, Tiraque, Arani, Sacaba and Tarata
- MIDDLETON, Home-Town: a Study of an Urban Centre in Southern Ghana
- MIRACLE, Commercial Links between Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, and Rural Populations in West Africa
- MORAWETZ, Castro Market: Slices of Economic Life in a Poor Chilean Fishing Town
- PRADO, Intermediate Cities in the Region of Santa Cruz, Bolivia: the Case of Montero
- SAXENA, Chandigarh City – Its Influence on Regional Growth
- SINGH, Changing Structure of a Punjab Village – Paniar
- WALLACE, The Impact of a Large-Scale Irrigation Scheme on Two Wards in a Small Town in Kano State, Nigeria: Its Implications for Rural Development.

## BECKER, WILHELMUS

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ATYRA DISTRICT

(Análisis socio-económico del distrito de Atyra)

*Revista Paraguaya de Sociología*, Sixth Year, No 16, 1969, pp 116–131.

The paper summarizes the findings of a socio-economic study in Atyra district, Paraguay. This study was undertaken prior to a community development project, and was based on participant observation and open interviews.

The district of Atyra is 65 kilometres east of Asunción, the national capital. In 1968 it had 8,803 inhabitants and had had an annual population growth of 0.3 per cent since 1962. The district capital, also called Atyra, had 1,650 inhabitants. Migrants had left, usually heading for Asunción or Buenos Aires (in Argentina). The district's economic base was agriculture carried out on small landholdings. The size of plots and poor soils seem to be the most serious problems and contribute to a pessimistic

attitude among landholders.

A number of landless peasants make up the agricultural proletariat and suffer the worst living conditions. A second category are farmers who own 1–5 hectares. Better-off farmers own more than 20 hectares and are able to produce a surplus for the market, to specialize in certain products and to improve their farms. There were also five individuals whom the author called 'capitalist entrepreneurs' who own between 200 and 500 hectares, modern machinery, and farm intensively.

The paper describes the different institutions and organisations which exist in Atyra, the district capital. National institutions are concentrated there since Atyra is the chief town of a district. There is a police station, a city hall, a market building and law courts, and a high concentration of schools.

The role of national institutions, health commissions and educational and religious institutions in the community are described. The district's only industry is a coconut oil factory employing 24 people (coconuts and wheat are the principal local crops). Leather craft related activities are also important.

The paper suggests that future projects should aim to solve the district's two basic problems: minifundia (ie. the small plot sizes) and poor soil. General suggestions are also included such as the relationship which should exist between a single project and the government's broader aims for the country's development.

DANNHAEUSER, NORBERT

## THE ROLE OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD STORE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF DAGUPAN CITY, PHILIPPINES

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 14, January 1980, pp 157-174.

The paper looks at the role of neighbourhood retail stores in Dagupan City in the Philippines. It describes the market within which they operate, the competition between them both in buying and selling goods and their effectiveness from the perspective of operators, suppliers and consumers. Its concluding section draws from other work on retail trade in the Third World and suggests a general role that such stores play. Most of the data is drawn from standard interviews with over 200 neighbourhood store operators undertaken in 1974, and from more detailed examinations of a few stores' operations.

By way of introduction, the paper notes that the model usually employed to describe Third World societies' market system is through dividing it in two. An upper circuit has relatively few, large, capital-intensive marketing firms organized along rational and formal lines. A lower circuit, by contrast, includes a multiplicity of small, capital-weak units, largely organized within families. The paper chooses as its focus the 'sari-sari' store, which is a small to medium size retail outlet typically run by Filipinos from within, or attached to their house. Most are in urban or rural residential neighbourhoods or along highways. Some are scattered along commercial strips in urban business districts or in market places with permanent stalls – although those in market places function as neighbourhood stores and are excluded, where possible, from the analysis. Sari-sari stores tend to stock groceries, soaps and some toiletries, some paper products, cigarettes and soft drinks. They may also sell drugs, kerosene, rice and vegetables, batteries, alcoholic beverages and other items which nearby households may need at short notice and in small quantities – and these goods are more in evidence in rural areas. Locally produced items have lost some of their importance and are just as likely to be bought from grocery stores, small market place vendors or peddlers. In 1969, 70 per cent of all retail establishments in the Philippines were sari-sari stores, and they handled 20 per cent of all retail turn-over. There was one such store for every 207 individuals, compared to one for 398 individuals in 1961. During the 1960s, their number grew by 200 per cent. Population growth, increasing commercialization, intensified marketing efforts by Manila-based companies and the growing need for household members to seek supplementary sources of income help explain this.

Dagupan City is the major urban centre and commercial node for the north-central end of Luzon Island's Central Plain<sup>1</sup>. It is the major entrepot for the distribution of processed and manufactured products coming from Manila. The wholesale trade hinterland extends over more than 5,000 square kilometres and includes more than a million people. By 1974, the city's population was an estimated 90,000 of whom 39,000 were residents in the central urbanised districts<sup>2</sup>.

If the 150 sari-sari stores found in the markets are discounted, 42 per cent of all stationary commercial units in the city are neighbourhood stores and they handle 15 per cent of total trade. On average, for each one, there were 112 Dagupenos in 1974 compared to one to 169 in 1969. They were densest in suburban residential areas surrounding the urban core, as in Greater Manila.

The paper looks in some detail at the relations these neighbourhood stores have with their suppliers both in terms of obtaining goods and obtaining credit, and at differences between rural and urban-based stores. Relations with customers both for selling goods and for providing credit are also examined. Both the purchase and the sale of goods 'are characterised by a few and highly stable trade linkages, many of them personalised'. This is especially the case in the smaller and more isolated stores. 'Neighbourhood stores are the most convenient and stable conduits by which local wholesalers can reach the consumer level. They are also the most readily available credit source for those consumers . . .' (p.167).

Prices and competition are also examined. A situation close to oligopoly exists between the major suppliers of Dagupan's neighbourhood stores. The stores obtain most of their Manila-derived goods from several local grocery merchants who combine some retail activity in larger stores in the centre of town with wholesale operations to neighbourhood stores. There is considerable price uniformity at this subwholesale level. In terms of selling price, uniformity is highest between the outlets but progressive from urban to rural neighbourhood stores as consumers have fewer alternative sources to purchasing the goods they stock. Most customers choose particular neighbourhood stores because of their convenient location. Each store 'relies on a set of proximate household customers that regularly and exclusively obtain their day to day needs from it . . . The wide spacing of these stores gives them territorial monopolies which allow them, deliberately or not, to vary prices and other services within a broad range' (p. 168).

'Through their willingness to cater to numerous minute individual transactions and to contend with marginal turnover rates, neighbourhood store operators provide a means by which Manila companies and Dagupan's wholesale-retailers are able to reach the widely dispersed and capital-weak consumer populations. Alternatively, through their location near their customers, their more liberal credit policy vis a vis especially the poorer consumers, and their role as social meeting place in the neighbourhood, sari-sari stores give services to the residential communities that in their absence the larger enterprises of the city – not to mention Manila companies – would find difficult to fill' (p. 169).

These stores do not generally provide a high income. They are generally a sideline for additional income, very often operated by the wife or daughter who also undertake household duties. However, larger neighbourhood stores in urban districts usually form the main source of household income and are operated by males or husband and wife teams.

A concluding section seeks to place neighbourhood stores in a wider context. It notes that their importance is dependent on the region's socio-economic development. If the population is physically and economically isolated from the upper economic circuit and lacks purchasing power, then rotating markets will probably be the main retail operation. In richer and more economically developed societies, most consumers can directly tap

upper circuit retail institutions so that neighbourhood stores lose importance. But only in the intermediate stage of development 'in which cash resources among a consuming population are slowly developing and into which distributive channels that are linked to a manufacturing-import sector begin to penetrate, is the neighbourhood store likely to be a dominant feature in the landscape of retail activities. This is especially the case if the labour market is characterised by chronic underemployment. It is no accident that most accounts of this retail type are derived from societies that are currently moving slowly on the road towards depeasantisation and development' (p. 174)<sup>3</sup>.

1. Editor's note: Luzon is the largest and most populous of the many islands which make up the Philippines and contains more than half the national population and the national capital, Manila.

2. This includes the central 'poblacion' and those areas contiguous to it that show a high density in the distribution of permanent buildings. Surrounding this urban centre are numerous rural districts where agriculture and fishing are the main economic activities.

3. Editors' Note: Footnotes in this paper contain many references to other papers on retail trade and its development.

## DIKE, AZUKA A.

### GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS OF AWKA AND NSUKKA, NIGERIA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 231-225.

The paper describes the growth and development of two Nigerian towns. Awka has grown from a pre-industrial urban centre to a semi-modern community. Nsukka, which was not much more than a typical Igbo village, is now a centre of national importance after a university was established there.

Awka has a long history as a town and has depended on surrounding villages to supply it with food. This permitted specialisation to develop for its itinerant tradesmen. Its population grew from around 35,000 before the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) to approximately 90,000 (when the paper was written). Its rapid growth was largely due to the Civil War which forced the mass return of people originally from the area to make the town their permanent base and also led to the stationing of two army brigades there. The town is in the core area of Igboland. Travellers at the turn of the century or before reported that some towns in what was then the Eastern Region were already densely populated, permanent and diversified units of compound land and woodland, and distinctively urban with a proportion of secondary occupations (generally over 15 per cent) and marketing facilities. Some, including Awka, were ringed by defensive earthworks. Towns like Awka probably had not changed greatly for several centuries and remained much the same until after World War II. The paper describes 'pre-European' Awka's physical layout, social structure and

occupational structure. It had a variety of specialists such as carvers, native doctors and smiths who travelled around the Niger delta, Yorubaland and Igala County. Its people's skills as smiths were well-known and apprenticeship and recruitment, the Guild system and its secret language are described. In smithing, as in other trades, the guild system limited and regulated it and mostly confined its practice to Awka people. Secret languages helped to keep the skills as the secret property of craftsmen. A similar apprenticeship system is described for native doctors. A money economy developed in Awka to facilitate trade and the text describes the different kinds of currencies (such as cowries and urnumu 'arrowhead').

A section on contemporary Awka notes that the traditional settlement pattern of compounds and traditional building techniques are still evident. But foreign influence is seen in the use of more cement and corrugated iron or asbestos sheets, in the attempt to impose a grid-iron pattern in three sub-villages and in the gradual dispersal of kin group clusters, although paternal relatives still live as close together as possible. The earthworks have largely disappeared and the encircling woodland has been cut down in many places. Most smiths, carvers and other tradesmen now reside in Awka and practice their trade there. People within the area now travel to Awka to purchase iron crafts. The large influx of people into the town created the need for a large daily market and Awka became a market town. Many kinds of small-scale consumer industries have developed, including construction, electrical and engineering works, food processing and catering, and textiles. The fact that a considerable amount of money changes hands in the town is shown by the establishment of three banks there. The town has also always been a district headquarters and the home of a district officer and his staff, a post office, the judiciary and other government agencies. After the Civil War, most government agencies were enlarged. More recently, a College of Education was established.

Nsukka is traditionally an agricultural settlement; it and its surrounds produce a large food surplus in fertile areas near the Anambra River. Before the establishment of a university there in 1960, it was essentially a small, isolated farming town on the periphery of Igboland. Farming was its economy's mainstay although traditional basket and weaving industries had developed. Farmers supplemented their farming activities with basket-making during the slack period. Women used simple looms for spinning and weaving after purchasing cotton from an adjoining area. These and palm wine and carving, two other important industries, are described. Many of Nsukka's inhabitants travelled to Enugu or Awka or elsewhere as farm or unskilled labourers. The text notes that the introduction of manufactured cloth meant a decline in the cloth weaving industry, while the out-migration of young males has meant a decline in basket production. By 1939, the town had a Divisional Officer and his staff in charge of all the government agencies (including a native court) and the divisional prison and postal agency. There was also a field medical unit, a mission maternity home and a dispensary. Untarred roads linked Nsukka with neighbouring towns and when lorry services began in 1939, there was a gradual movement of petty traders into the town. Nsukka's population grew from 9,000 in 1931 to 14,674 in 1953 and to 26,206 in 1963.

The establishment of a University in the town in 1960 represents a new phase in its development. The

construction of university buildings attracted skilled and unskilled building labour. Its functioning from senior staff down to the service jobs it generated became the economic mainstay of the town. The text describes the town's various industries and service enterprises from a bakery with 52 employees and capital of 120,000 naira and a concrete cement firm with 130 employees and 50,000 naira capital to the many smaller operations like tinkering, leatherwork, bicycle repairs, mattress-making and carpentry. Managers of small industries do not use government or bank loans but rely on their own savings and on friends and relatives for the capital needed. The text notes that there are village commuters, many of whom plough their money back into their villages which helps generate employment there. It also stated that 'small-scale industries contribute directly to employment and the development of industrial skill, the production of cheap goods, capital accumulation and urban as well as industrial expansion, while encouraging the training of apprentices and entrepreneurs' (p. 222).

Finally, the paper notes that prostitution is an important economic activity in both Awka and Nsukka. In both towns, the stationing of troops there has been an important factor in this. The results of a survey with responses from 54 prostitutes in Nsukka are presented. Most come from very poor homes and lack formal education. A significant number were sole bread-winners for their families and many engage in their trade from their parents' compounds or are visited in the brothels by their siblings which suggests that Nsukka parents approve or are indifferent to the extra-sexual activities of their unmarried daughters or daughters separated from their husbands.

In conclusion, the paper points to the differences between factors accounting for the two towns' growth. Awka is almost at the centre of Igboland while Nsukka is on the periphery. Awka's growth is essentially a function of its pre-industrial urban nature, its central location and, in the 1970s, the massive movement of Awka tradesmen and people from the surrounding area into the town after the Civil War. Nsukka's development has been greatly stimulated by the establishment of the University. In both towns, the traditional settlement pattern is still evident. In Awka, the pre-industrial narrow pathways (sometimes motorable) still predominate. In Nsukka, the residential area of the University is the only part of town which is properly planned. Awka has many good houses with modern utilities which stand side by side with sub-standard houses. In Nsukka, there are scattered standard houses.

## ESTEVA FABREGAT, CLAUDIO

### A MARKET IN CHINGHERO, CUZCO (Un mercado en Chinchero, Cuzco)

*Anuario Indigenista, (Special Issue), Actas del XXXIX Congreso Internacional de Americanistas (Peru 1970), published by El Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, Vol XXX, Mexico, December 1970, pp 213-254.*

Chinchero is a Quechua-speaking town 27 kilometres north-west of Cuzco, Peru. When the study was carried out in 1966-70, it had 7,500 inhabitants. The town has existed since the Inca Empire. During the colonial period and even today, it fulfils both market and religious functions for its own and for neighbouring populations.

Barter still takes place in its market. Among the most important products exchanged are those from the warm valleys such as maize, coca, fruit and vegetables and those from the highlands such as potatoes and quinoa<sup>1</sup>. Salt is also in demand. These exchanges are not very different from those prevailing in this and in similar markets during the pre-Colonial period and correspond to a productive system which barely exceeds subsistence level and is largely based on potatoes and beans.

Most of the local and neighbouring population take part in the weekly or fortnightly markets. Urban influences have introduced consumption demands which can only be satisfied by exchanges in the Chinchero market (p. 215). In the market place the local inhabitants acquire foodstuffs through barter or sell their produce for cash which they use to buy coca, liquor and other goods. Most of the buyers and sellers, and the people who sell chicha (home-made liquor), refreshments and food are women, reflecting a sexual division of labour. Quechua is the language commonly used. And hands are still used to assess the weight of foodstuffs.

To the outsider, the market place is only of commercial interest. But for the Chinchero, it also represents the chance to go to Mass (for the market is held on Sunday), to amuse himself and to participate in the 'ayllus' meetings which take place in the square after Mass (although these have declined in importance in recent years).

The local producer apportions the surplus available for exchange during the year as a security measure and because there is a strong trend towards celebrations and feasts in which the men struggle for prestige and status through their offerings. Surpluses are exchanged and the money used to buy industrial products which cannot be obtained by barter. Thus, to obtain money is a necessity for the family economy and a stimulus to local production. But the possibilities of acquiring money within the area are limited because of few local jobs. The aim of the young people is to get jobs outside - in Cuzco, Arequipa, Urubamba, Lima, etc.

The market is administered by a representative who obtains the right to do so in a yearly public bid, but he is controlled by one or more Council members. This representative charges a rent for each stall.

1. A cereal, native to the Chilean and Peruvian Andes.

GRANT ANDERSON, A.

## THE RURAL MARKET IN WEST JAVA

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*,  
Vol 28, No 4, July 1980, pp 753-778

The paper presents the findings from a survey of markets in three regencies<sup>1</sup> in West Java, Indonesia: Garut, Majalengka and Indramayu. These throw doubt on the validity of Dewey's propositions that:

a. the market place serves an important function in both the progressive step-wise bulking of local produce moving into local and inter-regional trade and the breaking down of consignments of consumer goods and other commodities for local consumption;

b. the network of markets forms a system through which almost everything bought and sold by the average rural/town Javanese person passes; and

c. this system has proved extremely resilient and survived the economic distortions of the colonial period.

The paper explores whether the commodity movements, especially those involving local produce bulking for shipment out of the area, follow the step-wise progression through the hierarchy.

The market places in Cimanuk Basin generally serve an area larger than the village in which they are located. A survey of all villages in the basin in 1975 showed that around 80 per cent had no market place. But it seems that most villages are within 5 kilometres of the nearest market place and that average travelling time to market was 22 minutes. So market places were distributed in such a way as to be accessible to the rural population.

There were 5 broad groups of traders: those who sold services rather than goods such as barbers or mechanics; sellers of food and drink (serving the people within the market); sellers of consumer goods (mostly factory produced); traders in primary products; and traders in products of home industries. The study's main focus was primary produce traders and those dealing in the products of home industries. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the traders came from these two groups.

Commodity flows were dominated by the downward flow of products coming from other areas in the regency for local consumption and by horizontal flows of these commodities within a very limited geographical area. It seems that the movement of primary produce does not follow the sequence suggested by Dewey. In fact, the rural market is more a buyer's than a seller's market since the sale of consumer goods and fresh foods dominated transactions there. It seems that locally produced agricultural commodities are funnelled through specialised flows which take place outside the traditional peasant market. This is especially so when goods move long distances to the major urban centres of West Java. Wholesalers or their agents seem to be increasingly buying agricultural goods direct from producers in the village and thus reducing the bulking process to one stage.

The author assumes that marketing in the region once conformed to Dewey's model. The changes may be attributed to five factors:

1. Improved village accessibility allows urban-based traders to reach most of the villages in the three regencies by road.

2. While the traditional market network could deal effectively with short distance commodity movements in local trade, it has proved less efficient in meeting the need for rapid movement of food staples over long distances, especially the more perishable commodities bound for West Java's major urban centres.

3. A decline in the number of market places reflects a weakening in the degree of monopoly which the market network may once have had over rural trade and reduces market accessibility to the rural population.

4. Population pressure has led increasing numbers of people to seek employment in some narrow, specialised niche in the market network.

5. The market place has been neglected by administering authorities who have provided no improvements.

In conclusion, the paper notes that the traditional peasant market network in the studied area does not monopolise internal trade and is best seen as a subsystem of a more elaborate marketing structure. It is not autonomous and is being affected by wider socio-economic changes in Javanese society. These changes reflect the dichotomy between modern, formal economic structures and the traditional, informal bazaar organisation of the peasant economy.

The changes seem likely to weaken the producers' position, unless investments in new facilities are made to upgrade existing markets and to protect the producer to help maintain the labour-absorption capacity associated with traditional marketing structures.

1. Editors' note: Regencies are sub-provincial, predominantly agricultural administrative units.

GUIBBERT, JEAN JACQUES

## THE ROLE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE URBAN ECONOMIC CIRCUITS: THE CASE OF SEFROU, MOROCCO

(Role du secteur 'informel' dans les circuits de drainage de l'économie urbaine: le cas de Sefrou-Maroc)

*Meturb 8 ENDA (Senegal) Sessions Utiles et Methodes pour la Planification Environnementale des Villes Moyennes en Afrique, 29 Septembre-10 Octobre 1981. Mopti, Mali.*

Guibbert's thesis is that the informal sector is not a marginal phenomenon but one of the fundamental elements of dependent capitalist urbanization. It cannot be replaced and it exists to satisfy the needs of lower income groups. It is also functional to the capitalist mode of production. The Moroccan town of Sefrou, 28 kilometres from Fez, is used as a case study. In 1978 Sefrou had around 40,000 inhabitants.

The author shows that the traditional approach by which economic activities are analyzed in terms of the

primary, secondary and tertiary sectors is no longer useful. Economic structure is much more complicated. Guibbert prefers to talk of a traditional informal sector and a modern formal sector. The former is intimately linked to the latter and the infra-capitalist urban sector cannot survive without the infra-capitalist sector of the countryside.

Guibbert supports his thesis by analysing crafts, the building industry, shoe-making, tailors' workshops, foodstuff production and trade. Activities now developed by capitalist enterprises which set the rules and cater for higher income groups once began as small workshops or activities undertaken by tradesmen. Now these extract the surplus from poorer groups who work for them and displace them from their previous positions in the economic structure.

According to Guibbert, the capitalist mode of production cannot be completely incorporated into the underdeveloped countries unless it takes into account the existing, pre-capitalist modes of production without which these countries' economies cannot survive.

**HANNERZ, ULF**

## **TOWN AND COUNTRY IN SOUTHERN ZARIA: A VIEW FROM KAFANCHAN**

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 226–240

The paper describes the growth and development of Kafanchan town in Nigeria and its links with surrounding rural areas and with other parts of Nigeria. Its main focus is the town's employment structure and how, over time, people from Southern Zaria (an area which covers the southern-most quarter of present-day Kaduna State) have become integrated into the town's economy. The town was originally established almost entirely by migrants from other parts of the country. Much of the information presented comes from fieldwork undertaken in 1974–75.

Kafanchan is the largest urban community in Southern Zaria; a mid-1970s estimate suggested its population was roughly 15,000. It is 104 kilometres from Jos (capital of Plateau state) and around twice as far from Kaduna (capital of Kaduna State and one of Nigeria's largest cities). The town owes its existence to the railway and it was established in 1927 on the new mainline between Port Harcourt and Kaduna, at the junction with a branch line to Jos. The Nigerian Railway Corporation built technical facilities in the town and has been the largest single employer ever since.

Kafanchan developed first as an isolated enclave in a traditional society since its population was almost completely made up of migrants, especially Ibo and Yoruba (the major southern ethnic groups) and Hausa (the major northern group). Southern Nigerians tended to have European skills and held a wide range of positions in the railways, administration and in other institutions controlled by Europeans. The Hausa in wage employment were

usually in unskilled work while both Hausa and southern Nigerians came as self-employed traders and craftsmen. The 1952 census gave the town a population of 7,016 with 44 per cent Ibo, 30 per cent Hausa and some 10 per cent Yoruba. The Ibo influx must have been relatively late in that an administrative report in the 1930s described Kafanchan as 'a typical new Hausa town'. At this point, the people of the area (who will be referred to as Southern Zairians), a large number of mostly small ethnic groups engaged in agriculture and sharing similar traditional cultures, made up less than four per cent of the town's population. There was no significant cash crop production in the area in the early decades of the 20th Century. But Southern Zairians gradually took a greater role in relation to townspeople. For instance, new settlements came closer to town, farm produce was sold in its market and village markets nearby attracted town traders. Labour from villages was recruited for certain kinds of temporary work.

By the late 1950s, the Ibo made up half the town's population and held an even higher proportion of the better paid and higher status jobs. One possible reason for the lack of publicly funded development in the town and surrounding area may have been the lack of support from the Ibos and Yorubas for the ruling Northern Peoples Congress, whose power base was in the northern emirates. Similarly, the Southern Zairians remained largely non-Muslim and their political allegiances were usually in opposition to the Northern Peoples Congress. Christian missions have had a major influence on the area and the fact that Christianity came to be the strongest religion there was not unrelated to the fact that it meshed with the old opposition of local groups to Hausa/Muslim domination.

Although the Ibo's position was strong before the Civil War, the northernisation policy of the regional government increasingly awarded contracts to Hausa and Southern Zairian enterprises. And jobs in administration and schools were being taken up by local people who had been educated in the extensive mission school system which had developed. Although the town did not have the outright attacks on the Ibo that happened elsewhere, eventually, in 1966, the Ibo were warned that they should join the exodus.

Kafanchan became something of a ghost town after that although, in time, local people and new in-migrants took over the niches left by the Ibo. When, after some years, the Biafran War came to an end, some Ibo returned. They found a community which had learnt to manage without them. Some Ibo reclaimed their property (where they could) and sold out before leaving town. Others began a new life in the town.

Kafanchan by the mid-1970s had changed considerably from what it had been prior to 1966. It was connected to the tarred road network and received an electricity supply in 1975. The town was less of a strangers enclave and had developed more as a regional nodal point. Road traffic had increased and the town was a centre of road transport to Jos, Kaduna and larger villages. The town had five primary schools and, on the outskirts, a secondary school and teachers' training college. It also had a bank, a government catering rest house, a post and telegraph station, a new police station, four courts of law, various local authority offices, a unit of the Nigerian army and a small prison yard. Some 15 Christian denominations were present and there were various mosques. Commerce centred on a large daily market which, on a day when sellers were counted in

November 1975, had 1,337 stalls. (This would have been a fairly busy day, the number of sellers varied, especially with seasons). In addition, there were a number of shops, street stalls and bars, some with rental rooms for prostitutes and a larger number of palmwine and guineacorn beer bars. There were also a couple of small hotels and three petrol stations which were out of operation for much of the time due to the chronic fuel shortage in northern Nigeria in the mid-1970s. Apart from the main thoroughfare and its extension to the Emir's palace<sup>1</sup>, roads were untarred. Most buildings had corrugated zinc roofs which has made the great fires leaping from one thatched roof to another a thing of the past.

The paper describes in some detail the different kinds of employment available in Kafanchan and the extent to which Southern Zairians participated in these. The author divides Kafanchan's employment base into seven categories. The largest are the public sector, retail trade, and craftsmen. The public sector includes all branches of federal, state and local government, government corporations and quasi-official organisations and covers, among others, railway personnel, teachers, hospital staff, policemen and road-workers. A fourth category, minor services, is rather small and includes mostly unskilled or semi-skilled people involved in shoe-shining, nail-cutting, water-carrying, load-carrying and prostitution. The final three categories are even smaller: modern entrepreneurs (which include the people with business interests that link the town with larger cities), wholesale trading in local rural produce and symbolic specialists (a diverse group including pastors and other office holders in Christian churches, Muslim learned men, healers, musicians and praise singers). The paper discusses the difficulties in categorising employment since, for instance, some people earn a living by various activities which come into more than one of the seven categories and many people will in the course of their working life change categories.

Southern Zairians have made considerable inroads into public sector employment in the previous 10–15 years. In work requiring less in the way of education such as some railway work and some public works employment, this has allowed some men from villages around the town to earn wages while still living in the villages and continuing to farm. Others have moved into town. The fact that Southern Zairians are relatively well-educated because of the strong influence of Christian mission schools has meant that many are in white collar public service in Kafanchan and indeed in other northern towns including Kaduna – although, in recent years, local government has taken over many schools. Note should be made that the railways and the police tend to recruit from a wide area. Although the dominance of the Ibo has been replaced, it is not necessarily by Southern Zairians.

In the daily market, a survey based on one day's count found that slightly less than two thirds of the sellers sold foodstuffs, while the rest sold other goods (the line between the two is not precise since some of the latter sold canned goods or packaged western-style foodstuffs). Around half the foodstuff sellers were not town residents but overwhelmingly women bringing produce from nearby villages. Most of the people selling other goods were town residents but very few were Southern Zairians. The market suffered greatly when the Ibo left in 1966 – many of the market-stalls were empty for some time.

The Ibo who came to the town after the war managed to recapture the retail market more successfully than any of

their other former economic niches. There are now very few Southern Zairians left selling goods other than foodstuffs in the market place, and among the sellers of such goods the Ibo now, once again, outnumber the Hausa and the Yoruba.

Under the heading craftsmanship one includes both tradition-based crafts such as butchering, blacksmithing and leatherwork, and those introduced through European influence such as carpentry, tailoring and barbering of a western kind, and watch and radio repair. Traditional crafts are part of the Hausa culture and the skills involved tend to be transmitted within kin groups, so few Southern Zairians have become involved in these. The less traditional craftsmanship was generally brought to the town by southern Nigerians but there have been more opportunities for local people here due to a relatively open apprenticeship system which allows boys and young men to stay with a master and, for a fee, learn the trade.

The paper then discusses the extent to which Southern Zairians have come to play a significant part in the other three categories of employment. Some Southern Zairians have become modern entrepreneurs, usually by developing a sideline business while working in the public sector and then leaving this to work at the business full-time, or by building up from petty trading. Hausas dominate the wholesale trade for ginger, the only important cash crop in the region. The pig trade, which the Ibos dominated, is now largely in the hands of local people. Southern Zairians are not much involved in minor services (most of the men in casual minor services like shoeshiners and truckpushers are Hausa migrants from the far North). Nor are they involved much as symbolic specialists; the learned men, praise-singers and emirate courtiers are not surprisingly usually Hausa although a Southern Zairian presence is more evident in Christian churches.

The paper finishes with a discussion of Kafanchan's role in providing employment and incomes for the local area. Clearly, the town has become more of a Southern Zairian town. But people with a higher education are often drawn to administrative or clerical jobs in larger centres. Less skilled labour also migrates to these centres. For instance, in Kaduna, there is a suburb called Kukuri with a considerable proportion of Southern Zairian inhabitants. There is no large-scale industrial concern providing stable jobs. There is talk of industrial development but, so far, no action.

The town has stimulated development in the surrounding villages and provides a market for rural produce. Kafanchan's daily market is part of a network of once weekly markets in surrounding villages of varying size. While the villages will normally have their own resident traders in industrially-produced merchandise whose stalls are open the whole week, the markets closer to Kafanchan attract town traders. And since foodstuffs are usually cheaper in these village markets, visiting townsmen usually buy food here for their own needs and some traders will buy on a larger scale for resale in Kafanchan's market. Kafanchan also provides some amenities to the surrounding population such as health and educational services. However, one notes that educational and (to some extent) health services have been provided by Christian missions and some larger missions took some of these direct to certain villages.

Thus, over time, there has been a partial take-over of the old stranger settlement by people from the area. But local people seem to mix rural and urban undertakings

more than strangers and perhaps are more responsive to the needs and wishes of the rural population, since they come from a common cultural background. Finally, locally-recruited urban people are perhaps a better market for local produce and thus will better support local production.

1. The Fulani who, after the Hausa, are the largest ethnic group in the North, established a muslim emirate in the Southern Zaria area in the early 19th Century. Most of the local population remained non-Muslim and were not easily controlled by the emirate. However, under the British system of indirect rule, the emirate's control was somewhat strengthened and its headquarters were transferred to a site close to Kafanchan in 1933, which gradually merged with the town.

**HARRISS, BARBARA and  
HARRISS, JOHN**

### 'GENERATIVE' OR 'PARASITIC' URBANISM? SOME OBSERVATIONS FROM THE RECENT HISTORY OF A SOUTH INDIAN MARKET TOWN

*Journal of Development Studies*, Vol 20, No 3, pp  
82-101.

This paper presents the findings from fieldwork in Arni, a market town in Tamil Nadu state, India, undertaken in 1973 and 1982/3. The findings are used to examine the models of Mellor and Lipton on the nature of rural-urban linkages arising from growing agricultural production.

The paper begins with a discussion which contrasts these two models and draws on the work of Harvey and of Kautsky in doing so. Mellor suggests that growing agricultural production can produce 'generative growth' through higher rural incomes encouraging decentralized small-scale industrial production of consumer goods. Lipton essentially views towns as being 'parasitic' in relation to their hinterlands.

Arni is in North Arcot district within one of Tamil Nadu's most important paddy producing areas. Rice production has increased rapidly since the introduction of high yielding variety seeds in 1967; estimates suggest that production grew by more than 50 per cent in North Arcot district between 1973/4 and 1982/3. Meanwhile, Arni's population also grew - by 27 per cent between 1971 and 1981 - to reach 49,284. The value of commodity flows through Arni was found by the fieldwork to have increased by almost 400 per cent between 1973 and 1982/3 in real terms.

In 1973 and 1982/3, the authors mapped and listed all business and other activities in Arni's built-up area and drew at each survey point, six per cent random samples from private and public sector production, trading and service units from their lists. Owners (or managers) from each chosen unit were interviewed about: the history of their firms; background of the owners; sources of capital; value; locations and destinations of inputs and outputs; business expansion and investment; credit; and employment. Findings from this research are summarized in a series of tables.

Drawing from this and from other information acquired

during the periods when the authors lived in Arni, the changes in Arni's economy over this ten year period are examined in considerable detail. The principal economic activities on both dates were rice milling/paddy trading and the manufacture of silk saris. The value of agricultural products grew by 390 per cent at constant prices during the decade while that of silk manufacture grew by more than 800 per cent. However, the growth in silk manufacture is exaggerated in that the industry was undergoing a crisis when surveyed in 1973 and a boom when surveyed in 1982/3. During the ten year period, the number of silk weavers roughly tripled with a considerable expansion in employment for inhabitants of nearby rural villages. Employment for rural inhabitants increased more than for Arni's inhabitants. However, in real terms, wage levels remained constant or declined while gross value added (of which profit is the main component) increased by 15 per cent.

The ten year period saw a more rapid increase in the real value of per capita retail sales to the inhabitants of Arni's modal market area than in the per capita figure for Arni's inhabitants. The result was a diminishing of the rural: urban ratio from 1:6 in 1973 to around 1:3 in 1982/3. However, an increasing proportion of commodities sold in Arni were either destined for markets outside the district or came from producers located outside the district. An analysis as to the place of origin of 'new' items (ie those which had rarely or never been sold in 1973 such as modern cosmetics, ready-made clothing and bottled cold drinks) and of those whose sale had expanded considerably, found that most were produced in large cities, especially Madras and Coimbatore (the two largest cities in Tamil Nadu state) and Bombay and Calcutta (India's two largest metropolitan centres). Rural consumers purchased 39 per cent of items produced in metropolitan cities outside the state in 1982/3 compared to 25 per cent in 1973.

In examining the origin of goods sold in Arni in 1982/3, most came from Madras or from urban areas in other states. Arni's agricultural hinterland produced only 15 per cent and virtually all this was grain. In total, grain accounted for 31 per cent of the value of commodity flows with that not drawn from the hinterland coming from distant districts both within Tamil Nadu and the adjacent state of Andhra Pradesh. Raw materials for the silk industry accounted for 22 per cent of goods sold in Arni and none were produced locally. Consumer goods accounted for 28 per cent with virtually all of them produced in Madras, metropolitan centres in other states, Coimbatore and Vellore (North Arcot's district capital).

In total, 54 per cent of all goods sold in Arni in 1982/3 came either from Madras or from extra-state metropolitan centres. Apart from silk and rice industries, Arni produces very little. However, Arni is important as a wholesale centre for consumer and intermediate goods manufactured in metropolitan centres and of silk products sold to metropolitan wholesalers, paddy resold to rice mills within Arni and rice wholesale to Coimbatore, Madras and their surrounding areas. Flows to non-final destinations accounted for 65 per cent of total commodity flows in 1982/3 compared to 46 per cent a decade earlier. Despite this drop in the relative importance of retail sales, their value in real terms trebled during the decade, as shown by the growth in the value of urban and rural per capita retail sales noted earlier.

The paper also examines Arni's two main kinds of financial institution, the pawnbrokers whose clientele is



mainly farmers and agricultural labourers and 'finance corporations' whose clientele is overwhelmingly urban. During the decades, loans from pawnbrokers more than doubled in real terms while the number of pawnbrokers also grew. Although their business drew mostly from those engaged in agriculture, no pawnbroker had invested profits back into agriculture. In 1982/3, the returns from pawnbroking were being invested in commercial and residential property in Arni, or in vehicles, or put back into the business, or saved for education and dowries, or invested in shares in finance corporations. A quarter of the sample of pawnbrokers were hereditarily landowners with their land rented out.

An examination of where businesses raise starting capital showed that agricultural profits and sales of agricultural land have been important but never dominant. In the 1973 sample, 44 per cent of business people owned agricultural land while in 1983 it was 46 per cent. Some 20 per cent of the business people in each sample had invested in agriculture but only in very few cases, in either year, was agriculture a major avenue for investment. Investment in urban property (mostly houses, although some in shops), some form of money-lending and trading in consumer goods were the three most common areas of business investment.

The paper ends with a discussion of what the research findings show in the light of the models of Lipton and Mellor. It notes that the real world of Arni and its hinterland appear much more complicated than those in the theoretical schemes discussed at the beginning of the paper. Certainly there is little evidence to show that urban inhabitants or businesses put much surplus value back into circulation in the rural hinterland, so Arni could be said to function as a growth pole for its hinterland. The only major expansion in a decentralized industry is the silk handloom industry but neither through inputs nor through outputs is this industry strongly linked to the local agricultural economy. Apart from this, agricultural expansion has not encouraged decentralized labour intensive production, although the paper notes that the state government has not pursued the kinds of policies recommended by Mellor. Agricultural expansion has brought much stronger metropolitan trading links which means a greater flow of money from Arni to the large metropolitan centres. And while rural effective demand probably increased about twice as much as urban effective demand during the decade, it is not known how this was distributed. It may be that this has come disproportionately from relatively large farmers so this does not necessarily imply evidence contrary to the 'urban bias' argument, since it could be viewed as the dominant rural group compensated for its part in the 'urban class alliance'.

"To argue that there is an 'urban bias' in the relations of a small town with its hinterland (in the sense that it plays a 'parasitic' rather than a 'generative' role) does not necessarily imply an acceptance of Lipton's model as an explanatory framework. We have pointed out that his thesis postulates a political alliance of large farmers and of dominant urban groups, and that it is the power and the policy preferences of this coalition which determines the 'bias' that is observed in resource flows and allocations. The argument that the 'bias' which we have observed can be explained more adequately in these terms rather than by reference to a model like Kautsky's of the development of commodity production remains, to say the least, contentious" (p. 100).

HERBERT, JEAN LOUP

## A COMMUNITY FACING THE CAPITALISM OF A SOCIAL STRUCTURE

(Una comunidad frente al capitalismo de una estructura social)

*Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol XXXII, No 1, 1970, pp 119-145.

The author's aim is to critically evaluate the concept of community since he questions the general belief that a community has no internal contradictions. To test this, he studies a small town in the Guatemalan highlands, Santa Maria, which was considered a good example of a typical traditional town – closed, depressed, isolated from the modern world, and where old habits persist.

Santa Maria had 17,000 inhabitants in 1970. It imports much of its basic foodstuffs since its own land is poor and eroded. Herbert summarises the struggles the town's inhabitants have had with local and national civil and military power structures to obtain land. Through these struggles, the author hopes to show that a community does not necessarily live a pleasant, happy life. Half the people from Santa Maria are dispersed throughout the nation. In all of Guatemala's major cities one may find its former inhabitants. The town's market has products from all over the country. Half the population is Protestant.

It seems that the inhabitants of Santa Maria are among the most mobile and entrepreneurial in Guatemala but, at the same time, they are very attached to their town. The article includes a general description of the community, commercial links between the community and the rest of the country and the role of different institutions – such as the school, Church, municipality and army – located there. The paper is based on a study of secondary data and historical records, and on personal interviews. The author does not use participant observation since he regards this as a form of spying.

More than 10 per cent of local landowners devote almost half their cultivable land to wheat, which is sold to the mills in major cities or made into bread which is sold in neighbouring settlements. Meanwhile, much of the local staple, maize, has to be imported. Other local products are wood, timber and lime. Tailors' workshops have developed into small industries. These, together with agriculture, provide for some inhabitants' livelihood. Santa Maria's most important activity is trade at the national or international level including smuggling from Mexico. Thus, there is little sense in describing it as a subsistence economy, for subsistence production plays an insignificant role in the town's economy. All goods are objects of monetary exchange, including labour.

Herbert describes the cultural decomposition that Santa Maria's community has undergone. There is no communal endogamy<sup>1</sup> and because of high geographical mobility, marriages are very unstable. There is no family solidarity except in the case of death, and many conflicts arise among family members. Cultural decomposition began with the arrival of the Spanish conquerors, and was especially affected by the action of the Church. The destruction of religious traditions and the development of

a social structure in which trade and monetary exchange are so important gave rise to Protestantism. Protestants save money and plan their future, again an attitude which shows that the town's inhabitants are not the passive, fearful people that the dominant ideology in anthropology describes. Protestantism in Santa Maria is one of those social phenomena which emerges from a changing society.

The paper stresses the ambivalent, contradictory aspects of Santa Maria. Its people are, and have always been, in conflict with Spaniards, judges, priests, public officials, the military, and *ladinos* (the outsiders who usually occupy posts such as employers, teachers, nurses and policemen).

Three conclusions can be drawn. First, the community of Santa Maria lacks the economic base which would enable its reproduction as a community. It lacks the land and thus it is a mistake to call it a community. Secondly, as a result, the labour force has become more and more oriented to the national and international capitalist market. Thirdly, this has resulted in social decomposition which is reflected in (a) polarisation between production means and wealth; (b) commercialisation of subsistence means (land and labour); (c) high social and technical division of labour at the regional level (including Santa Maria); (d) development of mercantile capitalist links to small domestic industry; and (e) the emergence of multiple religious groups which re-organise traditional behavioural patterns.

1. Marriage within the same group.

## HIGDON, DAVID

### NAVRONGO'S ECONOMIC BASE, A CAUTIONARY TALE

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 1, Spring 1980, pp 100-110.

This article concentrates on how the author as a teacher at Kumasi's Science and Technology University failed to get his students to understand the limitations of the master plan approach and to deal with real and immediate problems in a small town in which they did extensive fieldwork during a three week field trip. It also notes the incomprehension of the University authorities and the external examiners incomprehension as to the usefulness of the field trip and the survey undertaken there. But there are some interesting comments about a small market town and how it works. Navrongo is a town of some 3,000 residents in northern Ghana which, every third day, holds a market to which about 18,000 people come from as far as 80 kilometres by road and 15 kilometres by foot. The purpose of three weeks fieldwork there with a group of students was to increase their understanding of how a small town like this actually works and an enquiry as to what action could be taken to improve conditions in the town. Extensive analyses of economic activities within the market and within the town during non-market days, of traffic flows (where they came from, what were the people going to do) and socio-economic house-to-house surveys

produced some interesting points.

Used clothing at the market was sold for a price not far short of new clothing sold in the port town of Takoradi (some of the used clothing actually arriving as a gift from Western charities). For imported goods sold at the market, the price had increased at every link in the chain, up to its arrival and sale at the market. Meanwhile, these same intermediate links involved in getting locally produced crops to major markets (perhaps eventually foreign markets) meant very low prices were paid. The critical base for the whole market is the amount a close to subsistence farming household can spare for sale at different times in the year. Some women living in the town would go out to strategic outlying points to intercept incoming peasants and buy their produce. Having collected a considerable volume, they would take it back to the market for resale. Neighbouring towns also had markets on different days – and many merchants did a regular round.

Because the one mixing machine for bread-making had broken down almost two years previously (it needed one spare part), the bread ingredients, once milled and assembled, had to be taken 32 kilometres to another town before being returned for proving and baking.

Street lighting was felt to be the most important need by the community, even before improved water standpoints. But problems of collecting a revenue base to pay for this were enormous. To collect market dues more effectively, for instance, would require a large staff, whose wages would cost almost as much as could be collected. In theory, government agencies buying crops at reasonable prices would help greatly as would government run shops with fixed prices for essential commodities. But management problems in such large complex organisations are great, especially in remote rural areas and with the little actual produce and purchasing power in the communities to be served.

## HJORT, ANDERS

### SEDENTARY PASTORALISTS AND PEASANTS: THE INHABITANTS OF A SMALL TOWN

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 45-55.

The paper looks at how the town of Isiolo in northern Kenya offers survival opportunities for poor sections of a rural population while also presenting opportunities for the exploitation of the town's inhabitants through unequal trade relations and the use of cheap labour.

Economic opportunities in the town, which has roughly 6,000 inhabitants, are found both at subsistence level – the cultivation of irrigated plots (*shambas*) and some stock raising – and through cash incomes – wage labour and other forms of employment or activity within an informal sector. Many of the town's inhabitants produce food largely for their own consumption in the *shambas* and

earn cash incomes. Of the cultivators, 28 per cent earn cash selling some of their produce while 40 per cent have some income from employment. Incomes are very low. Townsmen are employed at various levels within the local, district and provincial administration as labourers, messengers, drivers and typists. Some cash income can be derived from, for instance, the labour needed in the maize mills, loading and unloading lorries and building houses. Game parks to the North allow some traders and craftsmen to make a living and there is a considerable illegal trade in game trophies and hence poaching. The wealthy households, which are involved in commerce and administration, generate some demand for maids, consumer goods and entertainment. Small-scale traders serve those with a regular cash income.

The paper describes how access to economic opportunity is strongly associated with ethnic ascription and caused by the various roles the different major groups have played in the township's history. The paper discusses the differences and similarities in the role of Isiolo town for members of the two largest groups of sedentary pastoralists, the Turkana and the Borana. It describes how both groups are among the many town dwellers who moved to Isiolo more or less in desperation. They may be former herdsmen from neighbouring pastoral areas which suffered major losses of domestic animals through drought, floods, locusts or disease; or widowed and divorced women who have been left without support in their home areas; or impoverished Somalis who lost their wealth during a recent war. Differences between Turkana and Borana migrants are discussed: Turkana households in Isiolo have usually cut contacts with the 'sender area' while Borana often have close relatives active in pastoralism 'at home', and regard their migration as temporary to relieve the household at home of a mouth to feed while the family herd is rebuilt. When this goal is achieved, they will return home. The paper explains how this difference in migration pattern corresponds to a difference in the importance ascribed to clan systems and the traditional forms for devolution of property and inheritance and for social control.

The paper notes that 'urban' and 'rural' are not opposite poles for most Isiolians. Combining subsistence production and some involvement in cash earning activities with households combining incomes from as many different sources as possible is the way of spreading risks. High unemployment forces wages down so that survival is only possible with a supportive subsistence economy. There is nothing new about such a dependence on cash and subsistence production; one could argue that the early British policy with its hut tax and other efforts, aimed to create such a situation. Under colonial rule, the need for cheap labour and the desire to restrict households' movement to urban slums could be alleviated by forcing the household to split; the worker would move to the urban centre leaving remaining household members 'at home' to take care of food production for themselves and, to a considerable extent, for absent members. Both parts of the split household became dependent on each other; one for food, the other for cash. The traditional division of labour can be efficiently exploited through access to an immense 'reserve labour force' and a dependence of rural households on wage incomes. Salaries can be kept to a minimum and the labour of all household members exploited.

Thus the role for the small town can be seen as one of a supplier of alternative sources of income for those who

need such, but equally as a sign of increased inequality in the rural areas. The emergence of Isiolo indicates not only an expanding capitalist economy but also to some extent an exploitation of a rural area through unequal trade relationships or the use of cheap labour. The town also helps keep people out of the cities; a sedentary pastoralist might wait his entire life for his herd to be rebuilt by subsisting on irrigated farming and maybe investing some small surplus in sheep or goats. Thus the town helps to disperse the poverty problems of the urban slum in the rural areas.

HOPKINS, NICHOLAS S.

### THE SMALL URBAN CENTRE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: KITA (MALI) AND TESTOUR (TUNISIA)

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 21-35.

The paper examines the role of Kita in Mali and Testour in Tunisia in promoting rural development. After giving background information about each town, the paper looks at their economic, political and religious role with respect to the surrounding countryside. Fieldwork was carried out in Kita in 1964-65 and in Testour in 1971-73.

Kita's origins as a town date from 1881 when the French built a fort near a cluster of villages and encouraged French and African merchants to settle there. It became the eastern terminus of a railroad from 1902-4. With a population of 8,000 in 1965, it can be placed in the third rank of the national/urban hierarchy below Bamako (the capital) and the six regional capitals. It is a local government centre but poor roads and communications keep it isolated from much of the administrative unit for which it is the capital. Testour is an older town, being founded early in the 17th Century, and it resisted colonialism. With 7,375 inhabitants in the 1975 census, it too is a centre of local government for the second tier of sub-national administrative units.

The paper compares and contrasts these towns and their relations with surrounding rural areas. The two towns are roughly the same size, having something of an urban atmosphere and play similar roles in their nations' political economy. In Kita, surplus is extracted from agriculture through trade. The absence of private property in rural areas means that wealthy urban people (merchants or government officials) cannot invest in land. Around Bamako, there is private appropriation of land, and its produce is marketed in the city but this pattern has not reached Kita. Surrounding rural areas are largely self-sufficient both in food production and in crafts. Most productive activity is for direct rural consumption with some cash crop production (peanuts) for sale. The paper notes that the decline in the availability of consumer goods after 1960 caused most farmers to withdraw into the subsistence economy, growing more food and less peanuts.

In Testour, rural-urban relations are heavily influenced by the system of private land ownership and the fact that many town residents own and farm land in the rural areas. While share-cropping was common in the past, land owners are increasingly farming their own land and hiring workers by the day as they need them, giving rise to a class of large farmers and a class of workers. The paper describes the different government initiatives to change land ownership patterns. Craft activity is more monetized and more centred in Testour. The town's market is part of a five market cycle involving neighbouring towns. Testour (and indeed other small Tunisian towns) can be seen to play two functions. Their markets act as the point of articulation between the capitalist mode of production and the family operating according to the domestic mode of production. They also act as the centre for the administrative and political apparatus, but with major decisions remaining in the hands of national government.

The paper notes that in Kita 'the basic split was between town and country, despite many connecting threads' (such as kinship and patron-client links); 'in Testour, it was between a dominant and a subordinate class within the town whose opposition spilled over into the country' (p. 34). In terms of politics, in Kita the most important feature was the alliance between civil servants (22 per cent of family heads were government employees) and merchants which after Independence turned into rivalry. 'In Testour, it was the emergence of an alliance between the new intellectuals' (typically schoolteachers) 'and the modern farmers against the working class' (p. 34).

Kita's links with the surrounding country were strong and its inhabitants were suspicious of central government initiatives. In Testour, politics centred around the party branch and are much more concerned with links to the national government; most local projects depend on financial support from the state. Information is also given as to the different religious roles the towns play and 'religious symbolism in Mali does not stress urban dominance as it does in Tunisia' (p. 34).

ISAAC, BARRY L.

## PRICE, COMPETITION AND PROFITS AMONG HAWKERS AND SHOPKEEPERS IN PENDEMBU, SIERRA LEONE: AN INVENTORY APPROACH

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 29, No 2, January 1981, pp 353-373.

The paper looks in some detail at the economics of petty shopkeepers' and hawkers' operations in the Sierra Leone town of Pendembu. It is based on data gathered from 1966 to 1968, which included a complete census of Pendembu's 505 separate households<sup>1</sup>.

Pendembu is in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. Up to 1908, it was an ethnically homogenous Mende chiefdom headquarters town of some 1,000 people, who devoted themselves almost entirely to subsistence

farming. In 1908, Pendembu became the eastern hinterland's railhead. There was an immediate influx of Lebanese and European traders. During the 1920s and 1930s, 'stranger' African retailers and palm-produce bulkers began settling in the town. And since the late 1940s, many of the indigenous Mende have become traders. By the 1940s, government's promotion of coffee and cocoa production was changing local agriculture away from subsistence to cash crop production.

In early 1967, the town's main street had the 14 largest trading firms: branches of three European-based companies; eight Lebanese traders; and three local African traders. To varying extents, these were direct retailers, wholesalers to smaller traders and middlemen in farm produce (coffee, cocoa and palm kernels). Pendembu also had 22 small-scale cattle and produce middlemen, 182 market women (foodstuff vendors at the daily market place), 26 hawkers and 28 petty shopkeepers.

The paper examines the inventories, capitalization, unit prices, competition (in terms of price, items stocked and credit) and profits of petty shopkeepers and hawkers. Petty shopkeepers have small retail stores which form part of a residence, and some are simply 'veranda traders' with tables on their verandas, set up in the morning and cleared in the evening. Of the 24 hawking businesses, two were operated by women, who were basically market place traders. 18 of the male-owned businesses were ambulant firms operating on the outskirts of the town and in many surrounding villages while four were engaged largely in sedentary trading under the eaves of the daily market place, or from their residences.

A stock inventory of 22 of the 28 petty shopkeepers (which did not include the two largest) showed that they handled 92 different commodities. The 24 hawking firms dealt with 33 different kinds of commodity (not including the foodstuffs handled by the two women hawkers). The capital required for entry into hawking and petty shopkeeping was not drastically different. And the hawkers generally sold more costly items than the petty shopkeepers. By and large, petty shopkeepers did not compete with hawkers since they sold different items.

The paper then examines competition between petty shopkeepers and between hawkers, the profits these operations make and the ethnic background of the people who engage in such businesses. Petty shopkeepers handle many foodstuffs and other frequently purchased items with low unit prices. They tend to be long-term residents of the town and members of one of the two predominant ethnic groups. They sell mainly to a finite number of neighbours, kin and old friends. Despite purchasing the goods they sell at different prices, petty shopkeepers tend to sell goods at similar prices. By contrast, hawkers tend to stock clothing and other relatively expensive items which are purchased sporadically at the best of times and even less frequently (or not at all) when the economy slows down. Economic prosperity brings many new hawking firms. Hawkers are typically drawn from newcomers and minority ethnic groups. They are more dependent than petty shopkeepers on trading for their livelihood. And there is considerable price competition between hawkers. Most petty shopkeepers extend credit, but typically only to regular customers and most frequently to kin-clients. Only six out of 20 hawkers extended credit.

Both hawkers' and petty shopkeepers' profits compare favourably with the earnings of agricultural labourers and

cash-crop farmers, while the more successful in both have relatively high incomes. Thus, the data shows that petty trading is more lucrative and makes a much larger contribution to goods circulation than might have otherwise been suspected from a more casual inspection. The impression presented by some writers of a multiplicity of impoverished petty traders with marginal economic roles was not evident in this town. 'At least in the case of Pendembu, the inventory approach allows us to lay to rest the idea – all too commonly held by Western trained economists – that the numerous petty traders are merely the impoverished and redundant jetsam of a stagnant or foundering economy' (p. 371).

1. Footnotes list other publicised works based on the data gathered including work on the interactions between other kinds of entrepreneurs.

## ISBELL, BILLIE JEAN

### THE INFLUENCE OF MIGRANTS UPON TRADITIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS: A PERUVIAN CASE STUDY

*Latin American Urban Research*, Vol IV, Sage Publications Beverly Hills, 1974, pp 237–259.

The paper looks at returning migrants' influence on social and political concepts in a Peruvian village. It is based on fieldwork undertaken during the years 1967, 1969 and 1970.

Chuschi is a village in the highlands of Peru, 120 kilometres south-west of Ayacucho. In 1961, it had 1,099 inhabitants. Up to 1961, its only connection with Ayacucho was a footpath. The construction of an earth road allowed the start of a bus service twice a week, which facilitated the migration of Chuschinos to Lima.

Chuschinos possess an average of 1–1.5 hectares of agricultural land per family and use communal pastureland for their sheep, cows and llamas. Land scarcity and the low subsistence level of farming are the main causes of out-migration. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1970 names Chuschi as an independent peasant community governed by an administrative council and by a vigilance council<sup>1</sup>. It abolished private property and established a system of usufruct (or right of use) for plots of between three and five hectares. The law required that a 'comunero' live near the plot, although this contradicted traditional habits whereby each family had plots to cultivate at different heights, to minimise the risk of harvest loss. As a consequence, migrants began to return to the village so they would not lose their land. Migrants who had returned presided over the first village councils.

The Quecha-speaking peasants see themselves as comuneros and live in the village, adhering to traditional civil and religious hierarchies and mutual exchange systems. Mestizos and all foreigners are called 'qalas' (which means naked). Qalas live close to the village square where the church, schools, general stores and administrative buildings are located. They speak Spanish and take part in national politics. The shop-owners,

teachers and priest are qalas. Comuneros see themselves as being opposed to the outside world and they ridicule foreigners in their rituals.

Migrants who have returned to the village occupy control positions of prestige both in the village and in the district. They have more political knowledge and capacity to organise. They also see themselves as members of the local and national culture. Knowledge of these was acquired as members of Lima-based trade unions and during their stay in the 7 de Octubre community in Lima (where 275 Chuschinos lived) and in San Cosme squatter settlement (where another 45 lived). Most of them worked in the building sector, or as street vendors.

In spite of the comuneros' opposition, Isbell predicts that returning migrants will bring changes to the village, but that the degree of resistance or acceptance by the comuneros will, in part, define the value of their position in the socio-economic structure.

1. These were set up after 1968 by the military government for the support of the revolution; their role was essentially political.

## MARSHALL, KATHERINE B., and TORRICO ANGULO, JUAN

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE HIGH VALLEY OF COCHABAMBA SINCE 1952: THE PROVINCIAL TOWNS OF CLIZA, PUNATA, TIRAQUE, ARANI, SACABA AND TARATA (Cambios socio-economicos en el alto valle de Cochabamba desde 1952: las localidades provinciales de Cliza, Punata, Tiraque, Arani, Sacaba y Tarata).

*Estudios Andinos*, Vol 2, No 1, 1971, pp 141–171.

The paper looks at the changes undergone by seven provincial towns<sup>1</sup> in Bolivia since the 1952 Agrarian Reform. It looks at economic, social and political changes. The paper's main concern is the peasants' new role after the Reform. Fieldwork was carried out by one of the authors between 1970 and 1971. Eight peasants and seven merchants were interviewed and the opinions of the informants are included in the text.

After 1953, large landholders were eliminated and peasants were freed for the tasks they formerly had to carry out for the landholders. They were able to sell their own produce and even to keep this produce until after harvest time so that a better price could be obtained.

A powerful commercial sector emerged, controlling transportation, chicha sale<sup>2</sup>, and land ownership regulation. The action of this sector meant that some markets disappeared while others merged, giving rise to conflicts between different towns. Given the increasing number of merchants, more distant regions were able to introduce their produce into the market.

However, this new commercial sector replaced the landholders in the highland peasants' exploitation,

although those in the Valley fixed their prices for their own products. These changes in the marketing system were the origin of changes in the social stratification system and in the power structure. The new commercial sector replaced landholders at the top of the pyramid and, together with those who supported the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement<sup>3</sup>, had the most important roles in local politics.

1. Another town, Misque, was added as a control.

2. Chicha is a strong liquor made with malze.

3. Editor's note: The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) overthrew the military regime in 1952.

## MIDDLETON, JOHN

### HOME TOWN: A STUDY OF AN URBAN CENTRE IN SOUTHERN GHANA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 356-370.

The paper describes how Akropong, a town in southern Ghana with an everyday population of some 6,000 inhabitants, is actually 'hometown' to a far larger group of people who live and work elsewhere but return for family, funeral and other gatherings. This wider 'non-resident' population bound to those living in Akropong by complex clan links. These links are particularly important for the survival of Akropong as a town, since it lacks its own strong economic base.

Akropong is the state capital of Akuapem, some 30 miles north-east of Accra, the national capital. It is part of a network of 17 traditional towns set along two north-south ridges of hills. Akropong is politically the most important of these towns as the seat of the state administration under its King.

The paper describes how the town's population is organised in sub-clans (the part of the clan which lives in the town) with sub-clans divided into 'houses'. Each sub-clan in the town sees its central family house as the nucleus of a web of sub-clan ties which spread across the state and indeed across all southern Ghana. The paper describes the social and economic roles these fulfil - like safeguarding local assets (each sub-clan owns its own lands and villages, the land being worked by tenants), taking care of inheritance matters, settling internal disputes and arranging funerals and marriages. It is common for people to leave the town for much or all their working life because of a lack of opportunity to acquire cash income, high social status or political office in the town itself. Thus, most people work outside it - either as farmers nearby or as labourers, teachers, traders or businessmen in Accra or other centres. But they usually return at regular intervals. Migrants' children are often sent to the town for education (the town's schools from primary up to teacher training are famous in the region). Many migrants return most weekends (when the town's population doubles), while those working further afield come regularly, if less often. During an annual festival and

at Christmas, the population becomes four to five times the everyday population with every house filled with visiting kin. Migrants frequently retire to Akropong.

Economically, Akropong is hardly viable as an independent unit. It can produce some of its own food but not enough to feed its normally resident population, let alone weekend and other visitors. Visitors bring a great deal of money to the town, distributed through their kin by the many customary gifts made at visits, funerals and other family occasions. Those who do not visit often send remittances.

Akropong has never been an isolated settlement. Cocoa was introduced in the 1880s and quickly became an important crop; but prior to this there had been much trade in slaves, palm oil, rubber, cloth and other commodities. Today the town is well-connected to other ridge towns and to Accra by regular bus services. The town has around a dozen shops of various sizes with consumer items of all kinds and many stalls set up outside individual houses, selling foodstuffs and everyday goods. In the evenings, many street stalls sell cooked foods. There are also several bars, hairdressing salons, seamstresses and cloth sellers. One large market is held twice weekly with several hundred women traders and there is also a small daily market. Most goods are brought into the town from outside and consumed locally, bought with money which has also been brought into the town by 'hometown' members working elsewhere.

After briefly describing the town's economy, its historic development and the network of migration, the paper describes the continued importance of the town's role as the seat of the King and discusses why the town remains important to those living elsewhere who regard themselves as Akropong people. Among these are the fact that the sub-clans and houses continue to play important roles in the lives of their members, wherever they may be and that this gives them a sense of tradition, loyalty and cohesion. The Presbyterian Church and its schools are an additional factor (most of the population are Christians).

The paper stresses that adherence to such tradition does not imply the people are backward-looking in any negative sense; it notes that people from the town (and the state within which it is located) have been among the most adaptive, innovative and risk-taking entrepreneurs in West Africa. It also notes that most of the features described for the town are shared by the other ridge towns, although these are neither seats of a King nor major Christian and education centres.

The paper also points to the difference between a 'hometown' like Akropong and the larger more developed urban centre of Nsawam nearby. Nsawam is the largest town in the state with 20,000 inhabitants. But it is not a 'hometown'. Nsawam is a meeting place, founded as a trading or administrative settlement and acts as the centre of articulation between two different systems of production or of two levels of government. Many of Nsawam's inhabitants do not wish to bear their children or to die there. These are proper only in their 'hometown'.

In conclusion, the paper notes that rapid population growth would seem to occur mainly in centres like Nsawam. In 'hometowns', it is the complexity of this structure which grows and indeed everyday population may decline over time (although balanced by 'real' total population, as in the case of Akropong).

MIRACLE, MARVIN P., and  
MIRACLE, DIANA S.

## COMMERCIAL LINKS BETWEEN GRAND BASSAM, IVORY COAST AND RURAL POPULATIONS IN WEST AFRICA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 175-198.

The paper outlines the origin and final destination of major commodities found in a town market in the Ivory Coast. The information comes from fieldwork undertaken in 1965 in the town of Grand Bassam and is based on interviews in the market and on journeys tracing the origin or destination of imported or exported commodities.

Grand Bassam was the first French colonial capital of the Ivory Coast. With a population estimated at 1,000 in 1910, it grew to around 7,000 by 1921 and was an estimated 16,500 by 1965. The town is the hub of a well-developed transport network since it is on the ocean, is linked by lagoons and canals to coastal areas for at least 150 kilometres to the east and west and is at the confluence of the Me and Comoe rivers. It is also linked to inland areas by hard-surface roads. The town's population was extremely diverse, ethnically: 111 ethnic groups were found during the interviews of which 67 could be identified. And there were ethnic groups from almost all West African nations.

The paper concentrates on the role Grand Bassam plays as a centre of commerce and finance and as a centre for bulking, breaking-bulk, trans-shipping, storing and processing commodities. Most of its residents appear to have some involvement with commerce and most people in and around Grand Bassam were producing commodities for sale. The paper notes that nowhere in the immediate hinterland nor in the distant hinterland 'which extended from the onion-growers near Niamey to the nomadic cattle producers all across the desert fringe of West Africa to the urban kola nut consumers in Dakar' (Senegal) was there evidence of producers who were even nearly self-sufficient (p. 176). In Grand Bassam market, there were at least 112 commodities and a great number of services. A table lists the commodities sold in and around the market place, giving details of where they were produced and where they were consumed under four headings: overseas trade (with industrialised countries, mainly France); trade with other African countries; trade with the savanna zone 200-700 kilometres to the North; and trade with the south-eastern forest zone 5 to 200 kilometres to the North.

Appendices describe the organisation of trade in some of the more important commodities - cattle, kola nuts, fish and plantain. One reason for this development of long distance trade relates to the different production potential of different ecological areas. Tsetse fly prevented substantial cattle-raising around Grand Bassam but the climate there is well-suited to kola nut production. Kola nuts were exported to the North and to Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta and Niger. Meanwhile, it was a major market

for cattle raised to the North in the Sahel and adjacent savanna zones.

There was evidence of considerable specialisation in crop production. Many local farmers specialise in crops to sell and buy their own foodstuffs. There was even specialisation in the production of starchy staples like plantain, yams and manioc. There was also specialisation in their processing. For instance, a number of women in Grand Bassam bought one starchy staple daily and processed it (for instance into some form of dough ball, cooked and/or fermented) and sold most of this to obtain money to purchase other prepared products.

Grand Bassam also served as a centre for bulking local produce - mostly kola nuts but also other tree crops, fish, snails and many starchy staples. Then, it acted as a centre for the distribution of goods bought in bulk - cigarettes (often sold singly in the market), tomato paste from Italy (which may be sold by the teaspoon in the market), dried fish, onions, millet, peanuts and sorghum. It was also a centre for local processing - for instance fish-smoking, soap production (homemade), charcoal, various types of bread and hand-dyed cloth.

Grand Bassam was also a centre for an extensive, informal credit network. There was no local bank. But there were long credit chains which may start at Abidjan where a bank gave credit to a Syrian or Lebanese merchant, who then lent to African merchants who then lent to others with credit chains, eventually reaching the producers - for instance farmers whose loan was often secured by the pledging of crops. Such credit arrangements often link distant rural populations with Grand Bassam's residents. Merchants from the town often sold to merchants in smaller towns or villages or to peddlers selling in rural areas on consignment, ie with goods given partially or entirely on credit.

Cartels were evident in Grand Bassam and may also be important sources of credit. One example of a cartel was for kola nut dealers, with each member of the cartel allocated a buying zone, while in most consuming areas the dealers sold to a sellers' cartel. Similarly, the plantain trade was controlled by women organised in a cartel. The head of this cartel allocated market place locations and collected fines if members were found buying or selling at other than the agreed prices. The head also extended credit to members.

In conclusion, the paper notes that in many commercial centres like Grand Bassam, the magnitude and scope of economic activities are perhaps far greater than is generally recognised. Urban-based officials are often more concerned with commodities directly linked to the industrialised world. Published statistics on employment, production and trade usually ignore or under-estimate production which is primarily for local consumption.

## MORAWETZ, DAVID

## CASTRO MARKET: SLICES OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN A POOR CHILEAN FISHING TOWN

*World Development*, Vol 6, No 6, June 1978, pp 861–880.

The paper describes life in Castro, a fishing town in Southern Chile with a population of 18,000. Much of the description concentrates on how people earn a living in or close to the market. The article is based on observations made by the author during six weeks residence there in 1976. The town is on Chiloe island.

Inhabitants' main sources of income are fishing, petty trading, working on municipal 'minimum employment' (which includes road sweeping and house and road construction), knitting traditional woollen clothing, agriculture (mostly potato-growing) and forestry. The waterfront market is the town's economic centre.

There are sections describing the market on Saturday morning, the life and work of a former fisherman (who now hires out boats to others to fish in, and sells fish), a vegetable-seller, activities in a small indoor market, a clothing trader, a group of shoeshiners, and a migrant worker. There is high un/under-employment and economic opportunities are not good. Many of Castro's inhabitants go to work in southern Chile as sheep-shearers, or on ranches in Chile or Southern Argentina for part of the year. The article also describes the town's freight system of handcarts, horse-drawn carts and taxis which are available for hire, and how young boys work as newspaper sellers.

Although the author states that the study is descriptive rather than analytical, he gives some conclusions about life in the town. He notes that economic opportunities are not good in Castro. Families are forced to live apart as the husband migrates to find seasonal work. Most migrant workers come from the poorer sections of the town, but not the poorest. Most are young men, often unmarried. The life of one migrant worker is described. He has taken a boat to Punta Arenas each August for seven years and works as a tractor driver on a ranch in Argentina for nine months of the year, returning home to his family for three months when snow prevents any work on the ranch. The region around Castro has the resources (the food supply, timber for better houses and warm clothes) to better house, feed and clothe the population, but the potatoes and warm clothes are exported. A lot of people are forced to do very low productivity jobs to survive. The people interviewed revealed quite sophisticated abilities to make rational economic choices in the changing economic climate. Children play a major role in providing income for families – for instance the boys selling newspapers give most of their income to the family, while the shoeshine boys who are older also give a large slice of their income to the family. The only boom recently was when potato prices were high in the early '70s. Interestingly enough, at this point, there was also a boom in people buying cars as taxis, since the rural potato producers could afford to use these to transport their produce. But as prices went down and bus services improved, the taxi operators found it more difficult to make a living. Better-educated people in

Castro have little opportunity and are likely to move away. The main factors inhibiting Castro's development are its distance from major markets (especially Santiago, the capital) and the fact that its exports, mainly shellfish and potatoes, can be grown or collected far closer to Santiago. Thus, the cost of transporting goods to Santiago inhibits exports. A shellfish canning plant might help. But the most abundant shellfish around Castro tend to be the low value kinds – mussels and clams. A private shellfish canning plant in Castro failed a few years previously. Perhaps the exploitation of the large stands of virgin timber on the other side of the island would help, or perhaps improved transport links with the mainland.

## PRADO, FERNANDO

## INTERMEDIATE CITIES IN THE REGION OF SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA: THE CASE OF MONTERO

(Las ciudades intermedias en la region de Santa Cruz, Bolivia: el caso de Montero)

*Ciudades en Conflicto: poder local, participacion popular y planificacion en las ciudades intermedias de America Latina*, Carrion D., Hardoy J.E., Herzer H. and Garcia A. (Editors) El Conejo – Ciudad, Quito, 1986, pp 175–200.

The paper examines the development of the urban system of the region of Santa Cruz, in Eastern Bolivia, and devotes particular attention to the growth of Montero, presently the region's second largest city. In particular, the author shows why this hamlet of only 2,000 inhabitants in 1950 grew to its 1980 population of over 40,000, whereas other nearby and older urban centres either stagnated or grew at a much slower pace.

Up to the early 1950s mining had been the primary force shaping the region's urban system. The smaller urban centres generally serviced their regions and were relatively self-sufficient. The regional economy received a boost in the 1950s and this had profound effects on its urban system. The main changes were a result of oil exploitation, Government support to agriculture and agro-industries (particularly sugar plantations and refineries), the construction of a road and the expansion of the railway network linking the region to the centre of the country and to neighbouring countries and, finally, a large-scale migration to the region from all over the country. As a result of these changes, the region's capital, Santa Cruz, soon became the country's second largest city while Montero became eighth in population terms. The first major changes to the national urban hierarchy in four centuries were taking place.

Economic growth has steered the region towards a 'highly imbalanced and polarized' spatial development whereby the old urban centres have tended to stagnate while the newer ones, better located for the needs of the new type of development, have expanded considerably. An important element in promoting this concentration was



the use of oil royalties largely in supplying infrastructure to the regional capital. This the paper blames for an 'excessive concentration of investment' in the city with little being given to other areas or smaller urban centres.

Montero's growth may be explained by its location precisely in the area where the region's development was concentrated. Montero is located at a crossroads, 50 km north of the city of Santa Cruz on the road to Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest city, and in an area where new land has been recently opened to agricultural production. The paper provides a brief historical account of the growth of the city, with some details of the main infrastructural works and the expansion in the service and manufacturing sectors (each of which generates around one fourth of the city's output) as well as of the growth in government institutions. The growth and processing of coca leaves into cocaine, a booming activity since the mid-1970s, accounts for at least part of the city's more recent expansion.

All these activities have given rise to considerable changes in the area's socio-economic structure. On the whole, migrants to Montero do not come from depressed areas; most of them come from the region of Santa Cruz and about two-fifths come from Cochabamba. Migration has been selective: Montero has much lower illiteracy rates than the country as a whole, and higher proportions of people with a high-school education. The distribution of wealth among the migrant population is more equitable than among the city's native population<sup>1</sup>. On a scale of four categories based on income levels, most of the migrant population can be classified as either 'poor', 'middle-income' or 'upper-class', whereas most of the native population fall into the 'very poor' category. A brief description is given of the activities in which each one of these groups is typically engaged, with a distinction being made between migrant and native population. The paper also lists some of the city's most important private and State institutions and relates some of these to the social and political forces which have shaped the city's growth. Some strong groups representing large parts of the population are the transport union and the merchants' guild. Neighbourhood organizations are potential sources of social mobilization, but so far have had no disruptive role.

The paper ends with some general reflections on some of the possible reasons underlying the growth of intermediate cities in a region such as Santa Cruz. For instance, it arrives at the conclusion that 'the chances of an intermediate city to develop are greater if there is no strong local elite blocking innovations, social mobility mechanisms and trickling-down effects. A rapid immigration to a weak centre facilitates such a type of development' (p. 200). Finally, the case of Santa Cruz shows that State policies have been ineffective in revitalizing intermediate cities and checking urban concentration, because the State does not have effective means of controlling industrial location, the supply and demand of local basic products and the power of the urban social groups in the region's main urban centre.

1. No details are given in the paper about the date and the sources of information on which this classification is based.

SAXENA, K.K

## CHANDIGARH CITY – ITS INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL GROWTH

*Habitat International*, Vol 5, No 5/6, 1981, pp 637–651.

The paper describes the growth of Chandigarh City and of towns and economic activities in its surrounding region. Because of the agricultural development the city has stimulated in the wider region, the paper suggests the need for a careful study to compare the cost and the effect of Chandigarh (or other new towns or cities) to that of intensive agricultural programmes in rural areas.

A background section describes the early choice of Chandigarh village as the site for a new capital of the Punjab (rather than placing the capital in one of a number of flourishing cities), and its early development. The new capital was needed when the Punjab was divided between India and the newly formed Pakistan, with the previous capital, Lahore, in Pakistan. Prior to this, Chandigarh village was close to a road junction and a railway, but at some distance from any prominent urban centre. The original plan was ready by 1950, but when the original architect was killed in a plane crash, Le Corbusier was appointed to replace him. Le Corbusier also made considerable modifications to the town plan. Chandigarh's early development was complicated by political problems. In 1966, Punjab state was divided into the states of Punjab and Haryana with both states claiming Chandigarh as its capital. Central government took over the city on a caretaker basis, declaring it a union territory and, though the city was awarded to Punjab state in 1970, this decision has not been implemented. Central government is still responsible for the administration and development of the 114 square kilometre city area and both states have their seat of government there. Both states also control land close to the city, and began developing towns nearby: Punjab state government developing Mohali as an industrial town while Haryana state government set up the new town of Panchkula; both are just outside the city boundary. With the Chandigarh military cantonment also established close by, a multinucleated city complex has emerged. In 1975, central government set up a regional development committee to coordinate the region's development and prepare a regional plan.

A wider region was defined, encompassing 2,421 square kilometres. In 1971, Chandigarh city had a population of 257,000 while the larger region had 845,000 inhabitants. This region's population grew by 45.2 per cent for the inter-census period 1961–71, which was unusually high compared to figures for Punjab and Haryana states. Small towns close to the Chandigarh-Mohali-Panchkula complex also had relatively high population growth rates during this period. Projections for the year 2000 suggest that Chandigarh city's population will grow to over 500,000 and that of the urban complex will grow to 1.25 million (which is much larger than the original masterplan, which suggested a total population of 500,000). The wider region's population is expected to be between 2.5 and 3.1 million by 2000.

A table on Chandigarh city's employment base shows

how it is dominated by those in government service; they accounted for 61.5 per cent of workers in 1971. Another table shows how this gave the city a substantially larger proportion of higher income residents than the average for Indian urban areas.

In a section on the city's influence on the surrounding area, maps and a table show how the influence zone has grown. A study in 1968 looked at the city's influence zone for agricultural produce, vegetable and milk supplies for commuter zones and retail trade, and for college and university and for hospital zones. In 1968, these extended up to 30 kilometres south and west but less to the north and east where mountains and choe-infested area limit the influence area.

Estimates for 1977, also presented in the table, suggest a considerable extension of the influence area, reaching up to 48 kilometres for vegetable and milk supplies, commuter zone, and college and university and hospital zones to the south and west. Industrial development has not been so pronounced in the region, although industrial employment has expanded. Much of the new industrial employment is located within the Chandigarh urban complex. The paper notes that footloose industries tend to locate near state capitals to be close to state governments, with their powers of control and licensing. In addition, the city's construction attracted a large number of unskilled and skilled construction workers and many stayed in their own unplanned settlements. This ready supply of labour was an added attraction for industry.

In a concluding section, the author suggests the need for a careful study assessing Chandigarh's costs and benefits, especially the stimulus it has given to agricultural development in the wider region. This, or similar studies of other new administrative cities or industrial towns in India (or in other Third World nations), could compare these to the costs and benefits of intensive agricultural programmes in rural areas.

**SINGH, SARUP**

## **CHANGING STRUCTURE OF A PUNJAB VILLAGE – PANIAR**

*Ekistics*, 291, November–December 1981, pp 419–422.

The paper looks at changes in the physical, administrative, social and economic base of a large village in the Punjab (India), since 1947. And it makes recommendations as to the need for a stronger and better organised village government structure, and for a more rational, integrated approach by higher levels of government to service and infrastructure provision within the settlement hierarchy.

Paniar is in Punjab State which has experienced rapid rural development since Independence. The Punjab is India's largest cereal supplier and in 1980 was the state with the highest per capita income. Paniar had around 2,500 inhabitants in 1981, compared to 1,518 in 1951. Its economic base is agriculture and the use of modern inputs such as fertilisers, improved seeds and power,

along with credit facilities and marketing, have helped increase production considerably. Double-cropping is widespread. Tractor use is limited because most landholdings are small. About 90 per cent of the landowners possess between 2 and 6 hectares. There are roughly equal numbers of cultivators (landowners, landowners-cum-tenants, tenants) and agricultural labourers. Landowners with smallholdings and landless cultivators using land belonging to others dominate the agricultural economy. 25.8 per cent of Paniar's workforce are in secondary or tertiary activities, although most of these work in urban centres nearby.

The growing economic base of the village over the last 35 years can be seen both in expanded commerce and in improved housing standards and service provision. Although there has been little new house construction – only eight new residential buildings have been recorded since 1947 – the quality of houses has improved. At Independence, only 15–20 per cent of houses were built of materials like burnt bricks, steel and cement (so-called 'pucca houses') with virtually all the rest made of mud. Now, 70 per cent of the houses are judged to be 'pucca'. During the 1960s, streets were paved and open cement drains installed. While in 1947 the village had a primary school, an inn and two or three shops, today it has a high school, a veterinary centre, a post office, street lights, piped water, a dispensary and about 30 shops. Most of the new facilities have come in the last ten years. In addition, the state government has established a sugar mill within the village area.

The village acts as an important service centre for eight smaller villages which are within a radius of two–three kilometres. In turn, its inhabitants depend on two nearby urban centres for specialised needs. Paniar is on National Highway no. 15 and is linked to surrounding villages by three paved roads. The village has not expanded much in the last 30 years. Apart from the eight residential buildings constructed since 1947, six additional buildings (such as the high school, cooperative store, water works and veterinary centre) have been added. The major reason for such a small physical expansion has been out-migration due to little new employment in the agricultural sector and the absence of employment opportunities in other sectors. The village is physically linked with another village, with which it forms a 'twin village' and has a common street, but administratively, it is separate.

The paper notes changes in the social structure. Before 1947, the village contained four communities – Rajputs, Brahmins, Muslims and scheduled castes – which had little or no social interaction. The Muslims were despatched to Pakistan after Partition, new groups were introduced with an influx of refugees and over time, the dominance of the Rajputs as the large landowners has been eroded. The paper states that community life started to disintegrate, mainly due to the increased number of social groups and in-fighting among them. 'Social changes and economic forces have changed community values . . .' and 'Theft, consumption and distillation of illicit liquor, gambling, fights, murders and land disputes, etc. are increasing day by day' (p. 421).

The paper notes the ineffectiveness of village government in coming to terms with the law and order problem. It also seems ineffective in terms of maintaining public facilities and services. The piped water system is often out of order. Street cleaning is poor and many street lights do not work. Part of the problem is that district level government controls the funds. Also, local government's

effectiveness seems to depend on the character of the person who leads the five to eight people elected to the Gram Panchayat, the local government unit. The paper notes that the village's affairs functioned more smoothly, and that new facilities were obtained before the person who led the local government left in 1978, and that the new leader is less effective.

Finally, the paper notes the need for a rational and integrated approach to service and infrastructure provision in villages, and for administrative changes which will improve their maintenance.

## WALLACE, TINA

### THE IMPACT OF A LARGE-SCALE IRRIGATION SCHEME ON TWO WARDS IN A SMALL TOWN IN KANO STATE, NIGERIA: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 241–256.

The paper examines the social and economic effects of the Kano River Project upon two of the four wards in which the town of Chiromawa (total population: 3,500), in Kano State, Northern Nigeria is administratively divided. At the time of writing, the scheme, which had begun its implementation in 1970, covered 5,000 acres (2,023 hectares) although two further phases had been planned to include 44,000 acres (17,807 hectares) and 56,000 acres (22,663 hectares) respectively.

The paper describes the two wards. Waziri is the largest of the four wards, and its relative prosperity and abundance of non-agricultural activities are in stark contrast to those in the second ward of the study, Kwari, a hamlet five kilometres away from the town itself. People in Kwari are less affluent and need their women's labour, particularly for planting and harvesting, whereas women in Waziri are kept in seclusion, making cooked foods or other small items which their children sell. These differences bear testimony to the effects of the project in the area.

The Kano River Project is one of several planned irrigation schemes designed to increase the annual production of wheat primarily for sale to the urban population as bread, and thereby reduce the country's rising food import bill. The area where the project is located is fertile, well-populated and a key grain production area in Nigeria.

The irrigation scheme, as laid out in the plan, is meant to reorganise farmers into units where essential inputs and services can be provided more easily and cheaply, and also 'meet the requirements of efficient irrigated agriculture'. The advantages provided to farmers by resettlement close to a service centre will, in the opinion of the consultants, considerably outweigh disadvantages such as the loss of farmland, small financial compensation

and social and economic disruption.

The introduction of the scheme affected the land in different ways. Thirteen thousand persons were removed from their land to make way for Tiga Dam and resettled in villages outside the scheme while others were removed from scattered villages and resettled in small urban centres in the scheme; some farmers lost much of their land for the building of roads and canals, while others had their land irrigated and were enabled to undertake dry season farming. Because of land shortages in the area and rising prices of irrigated land, many found it impossible to replace their lost land with the small compensation they were given.

Just undertaking irrigated farming does not lead to increased incomes. A considerable amount of extra money must be invested in labour, seeds, fertilizers and so on, for which the farmer is dependent on the project's bureaucracy. The evidence from Waziri suggests that richer farmers with larger landholdings were more likely to profit from the irrigation scheme, whilst those with smaller plots had to rent them to the former to supplement poor incomes from service activities. The farmers in Kwari, on the other hand, were excluded from the scheme but the damming of the river now prevents them from cultivating sugar cane and vegetables in their flooded fields during the dry season. The ward now imports sugar cane. In general terms, 'the relationship of the farmer to his land has been drastically altered...all of them are increasingly dependent on an external bureaucracy and are required to grow primarily for the market; they are no longer allowed to grow their staple food, guinea corn' (p. 246).

As the agricultural base is being modified, so are patterns of labour use and migration. Waziri is growing as intended, but contrary to planners' predictions the bulk of the expansion is made up of temporary migrant labourers who come to work in construction and agricultural wage labour, instead of resettled population from neighbouring areas. In Kwari, on the other hand, with the undermining of fishing and dry season farming, young men have been forced to move to nearby fishing areas or to the country's southern regions during the dry season. Not many are able to stay and work in the scheme because they have not been given first preference to outside labourers.

While in Waziri some occupations such as house construction and renting, tailoring, trading, bike and radio repair appear to be thriving, the immense government input of money into altering the agricultural base of the farmers on the scheme has left Kwari's economy unaffected. The people of the ward go to town and enjoy the benefits of the changes, but they lack the income to fully participate, as indeed do many people in the town.

The paper then turns to the question of the potential benefits that can accrue to the local populations from an integrated rural development plan such as the Kano River Project. Education is one of the areas of concern of the project, according to which at least one full primary school should be established in each primary centre. Chiromawa already had a primary school in Waziri, but it has been underutilized. The majority of the households are reluctant to send their children to school, either because of conflicts with Islamic beliefs (eg children undertake economic activities which allow their mothers to stay in seclusion) or because school keeps them from productive activities for many years.

Regarding health and sanitation, Wallace states that concentration of rural population is causing water shortages and forcing people to use polluted canal water.

Nonetheless, government programmes have concentrated more on health centres (which are underutilized mostly for cultural reasons) than on potable water which the author believes is the population's main concern.

The delivery and distribution of agricultural inputs are affected by problems that cannot be remedied simply by giving the farmers easier access to a distribution centre. Distribution through the traditional hierarchy tends to be corrupt, with people close to the Village Head benefitting more than the majority.

The paper points out that marketing, another area of action contemplated in the project, has been practised for centuries in the region and this makes the planners' concern to build new markets irrelevant. They should be concerned with existing poverty and the inability of many farmers to sell their crops when prices are high, not the spatial reorganization of an already sophisticated marketing system.

By way of conclusion, the paper stresses two points which in the author's view are the main lessons from the Kano River Project. The first is that a rise in agricultural productivity does not necessarily lead to higher rural welfare. The project's main goal was to boost agricultural production and feed the growing urban population. Farmers lost control over production and were faced with the need to commercialize their crops and buy their food with cash instead of producing it themselves. This makes the farmers more vulnerable. Moreover, the distribution mechanisms led to an unequal concentration of wealth and resources among the farmers.

The second point is that the provision of certain institutions in small urban centres does not necessarily meet the needs of rural people. Planners' perception of the problems did not necessarily coincide with the people's felt needs, while the emphasis on small urban centres seems to create enclaves within rural areas, whereby those farmers who are outside the scheme or the urban centres are largely excluded from participating in these centres.

## 1b SOCIAL ORGANISATION

CHANCE, Kinship and Urban Residence: Family Group and Its Organisation in a Suburb of Oaxaca, Mexico

HERMITTE and HERRAN, Patronage or Cooperativism? Constraints for the Modification of the Social Interaction System in a Community in the Argentine Northwest

HIGGINS, Social Relations among the Poor of Oaxaca

ROTBLAT, Social Organisation and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar

CHANCE, JOHN

### KINSHIP AND URBAN RESIDENCE: FAMILY GROUP AND ITS ORGANISATION IN A SUBURB OF OAXACA, MEXICO

(Parentesco y residencia urbana: grupo familiar y su organizacion en un suburbio de Oaxaca, Mexico)

*America Indigena*, Vol XXXIII, No 1,  
January-March 1973, pp 187-212.

Chance points to the lack of hypotheses linking particular social patterns to specific settlement types. He suggests we now know that particular settlement types in cities may exert a considerable influence on social life and that the city as a whole is too complex an ecological environment from which to deduce broad conclusions on urbanism as a way of life. Bearing this in mind, the paper describes a suburban settlement in the city of Oaxaca, Mexico, to show how it is associated with specific family and residence patterns which are present in all ethnic and economic divisions in the same settlement.

The settlement is San Juan, a colony which had 3,500 inhabitants in 1969. It is described as a colony because its degree of dependence on the city of Oaxaca is comparable to that of spontaneous suburban settlements which, unlike San Juan, are within city limits.

Oaxaca City is a state capital in the south of Mexico. By 1970, it had around 100,000 inhabitants and its population has grown rapidly since 1940. It is essentially an administrative and commercial centre. Much of the population is in self-formed settlements on the urban periphery, along the highways leading to the city.

The paper describes the physical layout of San Juan, the building materials used for house construction, the population's access to facilities and services and the commercial establishments there. A sample of 40 family groups was taken. Most residents of this sample were rural migrants from the Valley of Oaxaca. Virtually all the adult males work in the city, mostly as tradesmen or craftsmen and most have stable or semi-stable jobs. Most are poor, although the sample showed different income levels. Adults' education level was very low. Many parents send their children to schools in the city. The paper describes the mechanisms by which people acquire housing plots.

But the paper's main objective is to show that the extended family does not disappear when migrants move to urban squatter settlements. By means of a

questionnaire and two case studies, Chance shows that family groups are organised in terms of nuclear families but are also strongly attached to the extended family. Thus, he points to the importance of kinship ties in the new settlement.

HERMITTE, ESTHER and  
HERRAN, CARLOS

### PATRONAGE OR COOPERATIVISM? CONSTRAINTS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM IN A COMMUNITY IN THE ARGENTINE NORTHWEST

(Patronazgo o cooperativismo?  
Obstaculos a la modificacion del sistema  
de interaccion social en una comunidad  
del Noreste Argentino)

*Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia*,  
(Buenos Aires) No 2, 1970, pp 293-317.

The authors study certain aspects of the social structure in the chief city in Catamarca Province (Argentina). The paper looks at inter-personal relations in the community where most people (cultivators and textile artisans) have very limited access to markets and resources. Thus, they are tied into co-parenthood and patron-client links to guarantee the circulation of goods and services. The existence of traditional ties explains the failure of cooperative efforts.

Huarco is the chief town of a department also called Huarco. According to a pilot census in 1969, the town had 6,000 inhabitants. It is in a river valley bordered by mountains. Population growth is constrained by lack of water. The town is far from important urban centres in the region and access to the town is not easy. The most important immigrant group is Syrian-Lebanese.

The authors describe Huarco as the nucleus of a relations network which goes from local to national level: Huarco provides migrant labour for the national market when there is no work in agriculture and has national or provincial authorities responsible for local services and tax collection. The communication channels between the community and the nation are only open to a minority

which have a strategic position at local level. This, and the absence of extended cooperative groups reinforces the existence of patron-client and co-parenthood links.

Huarco cannot be described as a homogenous and self-sufficient community. There are sharp social and economic differences among its inhabitants: small landholders, traders and numerous public officials and professionals (since the town is the department's chief town and has representatives of national, provincial and municipal government living there). Huarco, like Catamarca, is strongly dependent on national government funds, since it lacks sufficient economic resources. For this reason, the town's basic services are supervised by national institutions.

With regard to patron-client relations, even if local banks do give loans, peasants do not have sufficient income to be able to serve them. So they are lent money by money-lenders who do not have much money themselves and can only lend to a small number of people. The main characteristic of Huarco's credit system is the non-cancellation of debts. A monthly payment which partially reduces the debt is a warranty of the debtor's credit-worthiness. Money-lenders and debtors have benefited; the lender because it ensures a flow of goods (and even services); the debtor because it solves the problem of lack of money. This relationship is strengthened when the debtor asks the person with whom he already has an economic link to be his child's godparent. Thus, a co-parenthood link is established between debtor and money-lender. The strength of economic and 'family' links constrains the success of cooperative efforts.

## HIGGINS, MICHAEL JAMES

### SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG THE POOR OF OAXACA

(Relaciones sociales entre los pobres de la ciudad de Oaxaca)

*América Indígena*, (Ciudad de México), Vol XXXVIII, No 4, October–December 1977, pp 997–1017.

The paper seeks to explore the nature of social relations among the urban poor. The theoretical starting point is Marx's theory of opposition between capital and labour whereby the distribution of resources and the access and participation in the means of production that exist in a particular social system define the limits within which social relations are structured.

Information for the paper was obtained in the colony of Linda Vista, 3 kilometres from Oaxaca. The colony was formed 15 years previously, with a low cost urban development. Total population was about 3,000. All 13 households included in the sample used some kind of informal credit arrangement. The author studied feasts and social relations linked to them, and marriage and household composition.

There are two types of feast: public and private. The latter offer a better vision of social inter-relations of which co-parenthood and patron-client links are the most

important. These are based almost exclusively on economic factors, since poor families choose wealthier godfathers who will support them in times of need. Godfathers of the same status are chosen for less important occasions. Thus, alliances are established between poor and richer families. Friendship ties are restricted within the colony. On household structure, the most common type is the nuclear family, followed by the matrifocal type<sup>1</sup>, extended family, etc. Higgins believes that these types are stages, more than ideal static types.

The author draws various conclusions. In terms of the opposition between labour surplus and capital, Higgins redefines these households in the following way: a nuclear family represents a unit with an internal division of labour where the man is expected to produce what is needed for the household. However, there are a number of contradictions. The man obtains his capital by alienating his labour and selling it at an inferior price. Women must work too, and therefore have the same status as men, because both contribute supplies to the household. Nuclear households are the principal household organisation. When the man is unemployed or his income too low, the woman earns a salary or establishes credit networks which enable the family to survive. This is only possible when the number of family members is low. An extended family household usually includes several single people. In the colony, these households are examples of the contradiction between capital and labour. They lack the means to turn the increase in labour into the necessary capital to support all members.

The main thesis of the article is that the poor, in a capitalist market system, live through structural contradictions while trying to generate the needed surplus to support themselves. Feasts, godfathers, friends and household labour division may be seen as survival strategies for the poor.

1. Matrifocal family: one in which supplies of capital and labour are produced by one person, usually a woman.

## ROTLAT, HOWARD J.

### SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN IRANIAN PROVINCIAL BAZAAR

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 23, No 2, January 1975, pp 292–305.

The paper looks at traditional patterns of kinship and friendship and at the function of religion as they affect the potential for change in Iranian bazaars. It is based on observations of the bazaar in Qazvin, a small Iranian city<sup>1</sup>, undertaken over an eighteen month period in 1969–70.

The author notes that most discussions on Iranian bazaars focus on the Tehran bazaar or those of major cities where bazaars are no longer the centre of virtually all economic activities and have become specialised in limited wholesaling, retailing and import-export functions. Factories, administrative offices and most retail stores have become dispersed either along major thoroughfares or in small clusters in residential areas. Such changes

have been spurred by the economic and demographic growth of these cities, by their role as special centres for religion, tourism or industry, and by programmes of government investment and urban planning.

Although similar changes are beginning to appear in smaller provincial cities, their bazaars continue to be the major centres for wholesaling, retailing, finance and production. These bazaars link rural areas with local and regional urban consumers' markets, by collecting and distributing agricultural produce and by serving as centres for the distribution and sale of industrial goods.

However, businesses are moving from the bazaars to new locations on thoroughfares and many trades are declining. Bazaars are no longer considered sources of economic innovation. This is partly due to Tehran's pre-eminent position in Iranian political, social and economic life, which drains the provinces of investment and of the more mobile and potentially innovative segments of the population. Qazvin, one of Iran's older cities, was historically an important commercial centre since it lay at the crossroads of several important trade routes. Since the 1920s, the city's fortunes have declined steadily. The centralisation of government functions in Tehran, only 150 kilometres away, drew to Tehran most of the country's international import-export trade and with this, much of Qazvin's source of wealth. The effects of World War II and the post-war years greatly disrupted Qazvin's economy and society. Public and private investment during the 1960s began to revitalise agriculture and industry in the Qazvin region but the bazaar's traditional patterns of organisation changed very little, and show little potential for further development. After looking at the traditional patterns of kinship and friendship and at the function of religion as these affect the potential of change in the bazaar, the author concludes that these maintain a high degree of social distance between marketplace actors. This in turn helps fragment the bazaar's organisation, inhibits the formation of normative systems appropriate to a developed market, and helps keep businesses small. Thus, while structural changes in the national economy are weakening the role of the bazaar, social factors operating within the bazaar inhibit its own economic development.

1. A 1972 estimate put the city's population at 100,000.

## 1c POLITICAL STRUCTURE

ABU-LABAN, Social Change and Local Politics in Sidon, Lebanon

ALLOU, SERGE and VELARDE, PATRICIO, Urban Development, Popular Organization and the Origins of Local Government in Santo Domingo de los Colorados, Ecuador

GREENFIELD, The Cabo Eleitoral and the Articulation between the Local Community and Brazilian National Society before 1968

LEICHTER, Political Change and Policy Change: The Case of Two Philippine Cities

MURATORIO, Street Lawyers: The Role of Judicial Brokers in a Bolivian Community

SIGAL, Participation and National Society: The Case of Latin American Rural Communities

## ABU-LABAN, BAHA

### SOCIAL CHANGE AND LOCAL POLITICS IN SIDON, LEBANON

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 5, October 1970, pp 27-42.

The paper presents the findings from interviews with 'reputed community leaders' in the Lebanese town of Sidon which asked them about recent changes in the town, the major problems facing the town and their assessments of how Sidonians reacted to changes taking place in the Arab world. Leaders were identified by asking a diverse group of local residents to list the ten most influential people in Sidon, regardless of whether they agreed with or supported them. The main interests of the paper are first the changes in local politics and their relationship to economic and institutional changes, and secondly the influence of larger-than-local political issues on local political structures and ideologies.

Sidon lies some 40 kilometres south of Lebanon's capital, Beirut. Its population grew from 11,700 in 1920 to 21,000 in 1956 and 35-40,000 'at present'. Around 80 per cent of the population are Muslims and most of the rest are Christians.

The town is the seat of the 'mohafazat' (province) of South Lebanon and a trade and service centre for the rural South. Although not highly industrialised, it has a fairly developed division of labour and orientation towards national and international markets. Until recently, surrounding olive and citrus groves, fishing, small-scale handicraft and commerce were the economic base. But since 1950, with the opening of an oil refinery, two fruit-packing industries and a terminal on the Trans-Arabian pipeline just south of the town, the industrial base has grown. Citrus production has grown rapidly with the development of irrigation and use of modern techniques. An earthquake in 1956 damaged a large part of the old town. The Lebanese government helped finance the construction of 1,000 public housing units between 1959 and 1963. There were 17 financial institutions, most of them established in the previous 20 years. Substantial improvements have been made in education and the number of Sidonian college graduates had multiplied many times since the 1930s. The paper also notes the rapid recent development of trade and labour unions and of local voluntary social, recreational and civic

associations.

In local politics, a local school-teacher from a 'common' rather than a 'notable' family was elected deputy in 1957 and was re-elected in 1960 and 1964. This is notable in that many residents saw this as a triumph of the people over the 'aristocracy'. In all three elections the deputy campaigned as a representative of the 'people' while accusing his opponent of representing the interests of the traditional aristocracy and coming from a 'notable' family.

One section of the paper describes the methodology of the study, including the 'reputational approach' used to identify community leaders. Another describes general characteristics of the local leaders selected. The study's findings are presented in sections entitled 'Social and Economic Change as Perceived by Local Leaders' and 'Sidonian and National Political Interaction as Perceived by Local Leaders.' The first of these includes a table listing important economic, social, educational, political, religious and health changes as seen by local leaders and a table on their perceptions of economic, political, educational and social problems. Expansion of the construction industry, rise in living standards, increase in agricultural productivity, emancipation of women, increase in voluntary associations, decline in traditional social ties, spread of education and, in politics, leadership changes and the development of intense political rivalries were among the most commonly cited changes. Decline in religious and moral standards were also mentioned by several of those interviewed.

The paper discusses some of these. It seems that increasing economic independence for children in their adulthood has weakened parents' traditional influence. One leader noted that 'political orientations used to be based on acceptance of a traditional leader or a family notable. At present, political orientations are based on an ideological commitment to socialism . . .' (p. 35). Interviews with a prominent industrialist, a landowner and a local trade and labour union movement leader suggest a polarisation of attitudes between employers and labourers. One leader credited trade unions with raising workers' social and economic standards, while unions were commonly believed to have influenced parliamentary elections in 1957 and thereafter.

In listing problems, poverty and/or unemployment, housing and related problems and services, political polarisation, emotionalism and extremism in language, and inadequacy of health services were the most commonly cited. Around one fifth of respondents also explicitly recognised the need for more effective community leadership embracing a larger proportion of the younger generation. Decline in ethical and moral



standards among youth was the most commonly cited social problem.

To sum up in terms of the paper's special interest, 'it seems that social and economic development of Sidon has contributed to the erosion of the traditional bonds of integration in every major institutional area. In this setting, the political system appears to reflect three tendencies: 1) decline of traditional political loyalties; 2) activation of the working class; and 3) political polarisation of the community. Evidently, these conditions combined to make room for emergent leadership, and in 1957 witnessed a successful appeal to the voters on the basis of social class symbolism and an emphasis on egalitarianism and socialism' (p. 37).

On local leaders' perception of national politics, the paper notes the very complex ethnic and religious make-up in Lebanon and the sectarian character of its politics. It also notes that two nationalisms are displayed in Lebanese politics: Arab and Lebanese. The former, popular among Muslims, reflects Arab unity and over half those interviewed attributed to Sidonians a strong orientation towards this. Furthermore, Egypt had replaced Syria as an object of identification. Christian leaders who were interviewed spoke fondly of Lebanese independence and a developing Lebanese identity, but acknowledged the general pan-Arab trend in the community.

Another aspect of congruence between local and national settings relates to political parties. One scholar noted that the party system in Lebanon 'is to a large extent a modern facade to the system of communities (religious) which lies behind it' (p. 40). In Sidon, it seems that there is virtually no political party life — at least beyond the boundaries of religious groups.

In a concluding section, the author notes that 'the emerging pattern of change from traditional to segmentalised (or modern) role relationships in certain important sectors of the community has undoubtedly contributed to the decline of traditional political orientations, particularly among the working class. Assuming that the leaders projected a valid image of the community, Sidon's experience is by no means unique. Students of developing countries frequently observe that rapid urbanisation is likely to sharpen social class differences among a population' (p. 41).

The author goes on to note that despite the decline in traditional political loyalties, the nature of the former leader-follower relations has not changed. The shift in leadership did not involve the adoption of a programme or platform. 'What appears to be more important is the extension (by a leader) of various kinds of personal services and assistance, in exchange for loyalty and public support. Sidon's new deputy, who at the time of the study was also the mayor of Sidon, seemed to be deeply imbedded in these reciprocities. It appears that sectarian politics and lack of a strong party system in Lebanon place similar pressures and restrictions on public leaders, regardless of who supports them or which area they represent' (p. 41).

1. It is not clear whether this figure refers to the date the paper was published (1970) or the date when fieldwork was undertaken (1964-65). But a footnote suggests that all Lebanese population figures are 'guesstimates' since, for political reasons, no census has been taken since 1923.

## ALLOU, SERGE and VELARDE, PATRICIO

### URBAN DEVELOPMENT, POPULAR ORGANIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SANTO DOMINGO DE LOS COLORADOS, ECUADOR

(Desarrollo urbano organizacion popular y nacimiento de los poderes locales en Santo Domingo de los Colorados, Ecuador)

*Ciudades en Conflicto: poder local, participacion popular y planificacion en las ciudades intermedias de America Latina*, Carrion, D., Hardoy, J.E., Herzer, H. and Garcia, A. (Editors) El Conejo-CIUDAD, Quito, 1986, pp 147-174.

The paper examines the origins and the evolution of local government in Ecuador's fastest growing intermediate city in recent decades, Santo Domingo de los Colorados. The city's growth and development are the result of 'an economic model based on agricultural exports and the (institutional) support given to small and medium-sized agricultural plots in newly settled regions' (p. 149). Santo Domingo is an interesting example of a process of 'urban socialization', whereby a rapidly expanding population 'appropriates' a city while the city simultaneously becomes functionally integrated to the country's social system as a whole. The authors wish to examine more closely this process in the light of the emergence and the diversification of urban voluntary associations and community organizations (*organizaciones populares urbanas*).

Santo Domingo's population grew from 1,500 in 1950 to 69,000 in 1982, a growth rate of 12.7 per cent per year. The history of this expansion is similar to that of other urban centres in Ecuador's coastal region, in that it is underpinned by the opening of new land to agricultural exploitation. Ecuador has traditionally been an agro-export economy. A succession of cash crops for international markets have dominated the national economy. But one after the other left the area around Santo Domingo practically untouched, and what is presently a prosperous city remained little more than a hamlet until the 1950s. The opening of a road linking the region to Quito, in 1943, brought new settlers to the area. And while other cities in the regions where agricultural exports were produced boomed and declined according to the current strength of these exports' markets with these, Santo Domingo's privileged location at a crossroads linking some of Ecuador's most productive regions provided the city with a continuous source of income and commerce. And because the region around it had a diversified product mix catering for the national market, these provided another source of continuous growth for the city's economy throughout the three decades examined in the paper.

Other factors which played a central role in maintaining the city's rapid growth rate were the continuous support

given by the government to the opening of new land and the technical support to the new settlers, including new roads which soon made the city and the surrounding area the most important point of contact between the country's two main regions, the Sierra (mountain region) and the Costa (coastal region), as well as among the coastal sub-regions. Thus, for instance, following the expulsion of population from flooded or high-density regions in the 1960s, this newly opened region and its city became an attraction pole for migrants. And although between 1970 and 1982 the rural population around the city experienced a slight decline, largely as a result of a concentration of land-ownership, the city remained an important destination for migrants from all over the country.

Community organization in Santo Domingo, the authors claim, must be understood in the light of people's acceptance of a social logic and of their search for a satisfaction of their urban needs. People comply with and participate in, the logic of 'dependent modernity' of which the country is a part. Two main groups whose origins date back to the first years of rapid growth, formed the basis of the city's social structure in the first years of growth. On the one hand, there is the city's business sector, which expanded through the provision of those goods and services which the Central Government should have supplied as part of their support to the new settlers. And, on the other, the settlers themselves, most of whom lived in shacks in the city centre but worked in nearby farms. Both of these developed as self-sufficient groups, used to take on responsibilities without relying on outside help to fulfill their needs. The roots of the city's first community organizations go back to this rare partnership between peasants and local businessmen.

As the city grew and its population diversified further, new ways of dealing with common problems appeared. The *minga*, a traditional form of collective collaboration which had played an important role in supplying collective goods and services (such as a water-supply network), was eventually replaced by more impersonal mechanisms, commensurate with the city's new, more differentiated social structure. For instance, in a situation of high pressure over land, housing co-operatives became the most viable form of housing supply for the poorer inhabitants. In these conditions, people's aspirations became initially embodied in the municipal government. But, the authors argue, as an intermediary between the State and civil society, the municipal government was also a response to the logic of development which had given the city a particular role in the process of economic development.

Finally, the paper goes into some details about the inception of Santo Domingo's municipal government. Some examples are given of the ways in which local communities found the funds to equip their own neighbourhoods with services and infrastructure. For instance, the electricity network in one area was installed by a co-operative initially financed with funds from the US government in the early 1960s. But with the end of this type of aid, communities had to turn to Ecuador's central government for support. Up to 1967, the city was dependent on Quito's municipality. In this year, it was granted the status of 'canton', and given its own autonomous local government. And although the municipal government initially responded to the pressures of local communities, growing financial difficulties and the need to undertake larger scale works made it more dependent on Central Government funds and technical

guidelines. Thus, by the mid-1970s, the municipality ceased to be a genuine representative of people's needs, and became an instrument of Central Government (p. 172). As a result of this process of gradual alienation, 'today civil society is articulated more around housing co-operatives (which are more responsive to their problems) than around local government, and little or no attention is paid (by the people) to institutional channels of power (whether the municipality or political parties)'. Because the municipality has lost the credibility it once had, local communities prefer to voice their needs directly to the Central Government, rather than channelling them through the institutional embodiment of local power, the municipality.

## GREENFIELD, SIDNEY

### THE CABO ELEITORAL AND THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND BRAZILIAN NATIONAL SOCIETY BEFORE 1968 (El 'cabo eleitoral' y la articulacion de la comunidad local y la sociedad nacional brasilenas anteriores a 1968)

*Procesos de Articulacion Social*, Hermitte, E. and Bartolome, L. (editors), CLACSO-Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 1977, pp 23-56.

The paper looks at the role played by the cabo eleitoral, the person who mobilises voters in the electoral system, as an element of social articulation. The study was made in several municipalities in Minas Gerais State, Brazil in 1965, where there were political campaigns for several posts including state governor. Greenfield concentrates on the cabos who articulated the local communities' social systems with those of the state and national systems.

Through interviews, the paper describes the political rivalries, the possible candidates and the way in which these candidates tried to gain people's vote and approval through 'demagogic' methods. It also describes the patronage networks that emerged.

Each candidate had his own team of cabos. Cabos are usually doctors or lawyers since their work allows them to exert considerable influence over people. Each cabo may work in several municipalities. There are also local leaders or patrons who join together, such as the grocer with the landholder, the chemist or another shopkeeper, to form a group which represents part of a broader patronage network. In turn, the group looks to the support of a cabo (a professional) who has contacts with political leaders in the state or national government. These cabos work as intermediaries between the local community and outside contacts and resources. In exchange for the group's (and its followers') votes, state and national leaders offer jobs, public works projects and other resources which the community lacks.

More recently, cabos ceased to exist, since no elections were called. Officials were appointed with no participation by the people. Cabos have turned to industry

and services. It seems that the patronage links still exist with a central role but new research is needed to discover the details of the links between local communities and productive bodies in the nation and the state.

LEICHTER, HOWARD M

## POLITICAL CHANGE AND POLICY CHANGE: THE CASE OF TWO PHILIPPINE CITIES

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 10, October 1975, pp 83-96.

The paper looks at political change and its impact on policy change in two cities in the Philippines - Iloilo which had 210,000 inhabitants in 1970 and Bacolod which had 187,000. It presents data on the extent to which each city governments' total expenditure and sectoral distribution of this expenditure changed over time and compared these since Iloilo went through a major political change in 1955 and Bacolod did not. While the data suggests that changes in city expenditures and in their sectoral distribution are generally incremental, there were considerable differences between the two cities in terms of the magnitude of yearly change. And the political change that only one of the cities went through is an important factor in explaining this.

The paper begins with a review of the work of various authors which shows the incrementalism in federal, state and local government levels of expenditure over time in the United States. Three factors are suggested as explanations for this in democratic political systems. The first is the decision-making process which was outlined by Lindblom in his essay 'The Science of Muddling Through'. The lack of a rational and comprehensive model of decision-making (and the complete and reliable information base that this would require) means that budget makers limit their task by considering only increments of change for new budgets. The second is the fact that a large part of a government budget is inevitably for maintaining mandatory and/or expected public services, fulfilling previous program commitments, debt obligations and the costs related to maintaining the government bureaucracy. Policy-makers are also constrained by the flow of revenues with which they must work and these change slowly, especially at local level. Finally, in pluralist societies, as Etzioni stated, 'power is distributed among a large variety of actors such as interest groups, parties, executives and factions of national legislatures . . . Policies are the outcomes of a give-and-take among numerous partisans; this is another reason for the disjointed and incremental nature of these policies'.<sup>7</sup>

The study of the two cities covers the years after World War II up to 1970 and thus prior to the imposition of martial law in the Philippines. Iloilo and Bacolod are cities with similar histories, sizes and socio-economic backgrounds and with common cultural traditions. Both grew up, underpinned by the expansion of sugar production. Iloilo is on the south-eastern portion of the island of Panay some

440 kilometres south of Manila. Bacolod is on the north-west of the island of Negros, 234 kilometres west of Iloilo.

Iloilo was known as the Queen City of the South. Up to 1945, it was considered one of the most socially and economically progressive and prosperous cities in the Philippines, drawing much of its wealth from its position as a major sugar exporting centre. A small elite group or oligarchy, largely connected with the sugar industry, dominated social and economic life. Plantation owners, sugar mill operators, financiers, exporters and importers maintained their political base through their control over the livelihoods of a large number of plantation and factory workers, farm tenants and renters. Most planters lived in Iloilo where they built mansions but had their plantations on the island of Negros. A tightly knit group of no more than 150 families out of a city population of 86,000 in 1935 made up this oligarchy. After 1945, the city went through a period of economic decline and political change. Owing to changes in sugar technology and increasing labour problems, the sugar on which its economy depended was slowly diverted from its port and by the mid-1950s, the storage and handling of sugar had all but disappeared. The need for plantation owners to be in Iloilo to deal with sugar buyers, freight agents or shippers all but disappeared. When sugar planters and those involved in sugar storage and handling began to leave, others who derived their income from the sugar industry also began to look outside the city to pursue their business interests. The 1955 local election brought about the traditional oligarchy's overthrow. The new city government was led by a young man from a lower middle class family and since that date, all the city's mayors and most of its councillors have come from a lower middle class background. 'In a real sense, the victory of the nascent middle-class leadership in 1955 was based upon an atrophy of the traditional links between the masses and the oligarchs, and the creation of a new electoral linkage between the masses and the middle class political elite' (p. 89).

Bacolod, by contrast, did not go through a comparable political change. From the mid 1800s up to 1970, the city's economic base has always been heavily dependent on the growing and milling of sugarcane and it is known as the capital of the Philippine sugar-bowl. Unlike Iloilo, Bacolod's economy did not decline after 1945 and during the sugarboom of the 1960s it was one of the nation's wealthiest cities. Politics in the city continued to be dominated by the traditional patron-client relationship in which the sugar planter or landowner demands and receives political support from those economically dependent on him, just as in Iloilo up to 1955.

Examining changes in each city's expenditures over time shows greater continuity between past and current expenditures in Bacolod, compared to Iloilo in each policy area. Some non-incremental changes are noted. In Iloilo, between 1960 and 1961, per capita expenditure increased 30 per cent due to the introduction of a sales tax. In Bacolod, the introduction of a similar sales tax showed up as an increase in per capita expenditure of 32 per cent between 1964 and 1965. In both cities, the expenditure pattern is heavily influenced by the restrictions placed upon local governments' revenue raising powers by the national government. National government defines local revenue raising powers, including rates, levels and categories of taxation. 'These powers have been extended only grudgingly and slowly to Philippine city governments over the last 25 years' (p. 91). The paper also

noted that in Iloilo, expenditures in the repayment of debts and loans showed wide yearly variations. These are largely explained by the fact that the city had to resort to borrowing when it was unable to generate sufficient local revenue to finance public services or undertake public improvements. And it notes how Iloilo's budget for general administration increased from 23 to 34 per cent of the budget between 1955 and 1957. It suggests that the new elite, lacking the power base of the old oligarchs through patron-client relationships, had to expand the city bureaucracy to accommodate their political supporters. In addition, the new regime replaced current staff with its own supporters in some departments, which did not show up in increased expenditures.

Thus, 'in examining the rate of expenditure change, it was found that the city characterised by regime change displayed a less incremental expenditure pattern in every substantive policy area but one, than the city which had experienced regime stability. I then attempted to isolate the cause of the lower correlations (ie the less incremental pattern) in Iloilo by examining the magnitude of expenditure change which occurred during the first critical years of the new middle-class political regime. The data presented confirm the prediction that public spending in Iloilo during that period was less incremental than previously had been the case in the city or in Bacolod. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that regime continuity and change do influence the rate of policy change' (p. 95).

1. *The Active Society*, New York, Free Press, 1968

## MURATORIO, BLANCA

### STREET LAWYERS: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL BROKERS IN A BOLIVIAN COMMUNITY

(Los tinterillos o 'abogados callejeros': el papel de los intermediarios judiciales en una comunidad boliviana)

*Procesos de Articulacion Social*, Hermitte, E. and Bartolome, L., (editors), CLACSO-Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 1977, pp 112-135.

The paper looks at political modernisation and asks how a successful modernisation of peasant societies could be achieved in terms of political development. To achieve this, the existing specific power ties in rural areas would have to be replaced by central institutions of social control. Thus, the paper studies the way in which justice is administered in Coroico, the capital of Bolivia's Nor-Yungas Province.

The paper begins by describing the administration of justice prior to 1953 under the oligarchic power and closed social structure of the haciendas<sup>1</sup>. Before the 1953 Agrarian Reform, the Indians were day-labourers (peones) on the haciendas; after the Reform, they had their own land. It then describes how 'brokers' and street lawyers operate. Muratorio concludes that these lawyers

are legal intermediaries but, being the link between peasants and state institutions, they control the key mechanisms by which the dominant classes' interests are protected.

Street lawyers (non-professional lawyers) are the intermediaries between the people and the law courts, between the illiterate population and the complex state bureaucracy. Thus, they occupy a powerful position in the community but do not enjoy much prestige among the people. Their attitude towards the community is the same as the one of the elite before the revolution in 1952. They defend the status quo based on unequal ethnic relations, paternalistic ties, no upward mobility for Indians, and rigid social stratification. The state authorities have the same attitude. Thus, it is easy to understand why they still defend the interests of the dominant class.

1. Editor's Note: Hacienda: large landed estates which originated in the colonial period.

## SIGAL, SILVIA

### PARTICIPATION AND NATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICAN RURAL COMMUNITIES (Participacion y sociedad nacional: el caso de las comunidades rurales latinoamericanas)

*Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia*, No 2, 1967, pp 232-289.

The paper analyses 23 Latin American communities in terms of a theoretical framework which was presented in an article in *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia*, 67-1. These 23 cases illustrate a typology of communities according to the kind and degree of their participation in local and national power structures and the kind of work relationships within the community.

By degree of participation in the local and national power structure, the paper classifies communities in terms of greater or lesser contact with the system of urban values, and thus a measure of the link with the national power structure. Work relationships within each community are examined in terms of a homogenous or differentiated economic structure. A homogenous community is one in which there is no appropriation of surplus labour. Differentiated communities are those in which at least half the population maintains stable working relations with owners belonging to the same community.

The main objective of this study is to construct a system of categories for the analysis of social change in Latin American communities, with this paper classifying the 23 communities in terms of these categories.

## 1d SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

ACKERMAN, To Become a 'Criollo': Power and Mutual Acculturation in an Argentine Border Town

BALAN, Social Classes in a Rural, Non-Indigenous Municipality in Mexico

BARTOLOME, Activity Systems and Adaptive Strategies in the Regional and National Articulation of Ethnic Agricultural Colonies: The Case of Apostoles (Misiones)

BLANCHE, Inter-Ethnic Relations and Migrational Motivations in Some Ethnic Groups of Misiones Province

CARMACK, Stratification and Social Change in the Western Highlands of Guatemala, the Case of Tecpanaco

HIGGINS, The Internal Stratification System in a Poor Urban Colony in Mexico

McEWEN, The Effort and the Eagle, Social Stratification in a Provincial Community

WHITTEN, Ecology of Racial Relations in the North-West of Ecuador

ACKERMAN, KENNETH

**TO BECOME A 'CRIOLLO'<sup>1</sup>: POWER AND MUTUAL ACCULTURATION IN AN ARGENTINE BORDER TOWN**  
(Convertirse en criollo: poder y aculturación recíproca en un pueblo fronterizo argentino)

*Proceso de Articulación Social*, Hermitte, E. and Bartolome, L., (editors), CLACSO-Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 1977, pp 136-170.

The paper studies inter-ethnic relations in Brilho, a town in Misiones, Argentina. Its population has a very complex ethnic composition, including people from several parts of Europe. Ackerman studies the structural conditions which enabled the criollos to become adapted to the habits and customs of the foreigners. Among these, the distribution of power is important. Foreigners used to have more economic power while natives lacked the resources to exert control.

Ackerman makes a historic reconstruction of certain processes linked to the development of certain aspects of what Goodenough termed 'public culture' (public knowledge and beliefs, public system of values, rules and conventions concerning behaviour and operational procedures). Up to 1943, a 'power vacuum' existed in Brilho since there were no political parties, bodies or clubs which brought criollos together. After 1943, criollos began to exert influence in the town. In that year, after a military coup, a nationalist government came to power. All public posts were filled by Argentines. And Brilho came into contact with the rest of the country. A law, forbidding religious education in primary schools, was abolished. Brilho inhabitants became Peronists (supporter of Peron, the President from 1946 to 1955) and thereafter nationalists. Criollos acquired greater political power which they used to nationalise foreign-occupied jobs. New schools were built, more teachers were sent to Brilho and mixed marriages increased.

Brilho became a municipality when Misiones became a province in 1953. Prior to this, it had been a national territory. Between 1955 and 1962, the population doubled and Brilho was declared a city. The increase was largely

caused by improvements in roads and in tea and yerba mate production. This attracted people, including professionals. Criollos became the majority in all activities.

The hypothesis which suggests that in Argentina, people always imitate foreigners was not confirmed in Brilho, perhaps because of the foreigners' heterogeneity. The foreign settlers' generation was disappearing by 1962 both in absolute and in percentage terms. Their children were criollos. A new race emerged. The mutual acculturation<sup>2</sup> process which took place was in one direction, for foreigners always chose to become criollos.

1. In colonial times, Spanish children born in Argentina; more recently, all children born in Argentina.

2. Contact between two cultures in which there is an exchange of cultural patterns.

BALAN, JORGE

**SOCIAL CLASSES IN A RURAL, NON-INDIGENOUS MUNICIPALITY IN MEXICO**

(Clases sociales en un municipio rural no indígena en México)

*Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol XXXII, 1970, pp 227-249.

In the introduction, Balan explains that most of the studies on rural communities in Mexico have been done in regions with strong indigenous traditions. These were mostly aimed at describing the process of cultural change, acculturation<sup>1</sup> and integration of indigenous communities into national society as a result of which a process of social mobility takes place among the indigenous community. Thus, a dual culture emerges: indigenous and ladino, where ladinos usually occupy higher positions and enjoy better living conditions than Indians.

Quoting Stavenhagen, the paper draws attention to the fact that colonial social relations should not be confused with class relationships arising from agricultural commercialisation. Balan's main aim is to describe and analyse class relationships in a community where

indigenous cultural traits have been lost (so colonial social relationships no longer exist), but where the economic structure is similar to those in other Mexican regions. The question Balan hopes to answer is whether class relations in commercial agriculture in homogenous, nationally integrated communities are the same as those that exist in dual Indian-Ladino communities and how commercial and subsistence agriculture are linked.

Cedral is the community studied, the main town in the municipality of Cedral in a very poor and arid region. The municipality's population is mainly rural and dispersed, living off agriculture and forestry. Indian culture has never been important. The municipality's population was around 13,000 in 1970 with around one quarter of this living in Cedral town. With high population growth but also high out-migration (to Monterrey), Cedral is linked to other regional centres and to the nation. Basic services, introduced to Cedral, have improved conditions. Contacts with the outside world have increased – through newspapers and radios and through trips. But the area's economy has not changed much. Rapid population increase and economic stagnation promote out-migration.

To describe social classes in Cedral, Balan studied the characteristics of productive activities, especially land ownership and exploitation. The author found that in the main urban centre, there were two prevailing kinds of social relations of production: between employers and employees; and between money-lenders and peasants. These relationships may be described as differences in the degree of capital accumulation, with no conflict between class positions. Balan concludes that cultural homogeneity (the lack of dualism between Indians and Ladinos) prevents the formation of rival groups (eg money-lenders or employers do not form an aristocracy), facilitates social mobility and favours migration. The author stresses that the possibility of migration weakens class divisions in the local community since many in the lower strata leave the town and that this possibility exists in communities which are culturally integrated into the national society.

1. Process by which one culture takes on traits from another.

## BARTOLOME, LEOPOLDO

### ACTIVITY SYSTEMS AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES IN THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ARTICULATION OF ETHNIC AGRICULTURAL COLONIES: THE CASE OF APOSTOLES (MISIONES) (Sistemas de actividad y estrategias de adaptacion en la articulacion regional y nacional de colonias agricolas etnicas: el caso de Apostoles (Misiones))

*Procesos de Articulacion Social*, Hermitte, E. and Bartolome, L., (editors), CLACSO-Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 1977, pp 257–281.

The paper's main concern is the problem of articulation between social segments which are 'limited' in one way or another by ethnic, cultural and organisational discontinuities. A Misiones colony in Argentina with some 10,000 inhabitants in 1973 is studied. Most of the inhabitants were of Polish or Ukrainian origin. There is a description of the settlement's history and its original pattern of social organisation. The paper also describes how this organisation changed, according to different productive cycles and systems.

Agriculture is the economic base with industrial crops prevailing, largely produced on family farms. Various production cycles are evident through time: intensive exploitation of natural yerba (herb for mate tea); yerba mate plantation cycle between 1908 and the 1940s; introduction and expansion of tung growing from World War II (largely because China, the principal producer was isolated); the tea boom from 1955; and paper and wood pulp production since 1960.

Yerba mate was originally the only product. Yerba mills were established and this led to the creation of offices which linked the colony with the surrounding area, through a network of bureaucratic channels. This network enabled brokers to emerge, who operated not only within the yerba growing system but in all aspects of the community's social life. This stage of production placed the colonisers in a dependent position with respect to decisions adopted outside the community and meant that they had to learn to handle 'influence devices'. Although colonisers kept their ethnic homogeneity, they were later compelled to interact with other workers. They were the ones who had to learn Spanish and a new cultural style. Many settlers became employers or patrons of their workers but although few achieved this role, Apostoles was no longer an ethnic colony and an ethnic-cultural enclave.

Various cycles in settlers' adaptation are evident. Between 1897 and 1920, the colonisers and their families worked on growing cereals and vegetables and raised cattle. By 1920, yerba was the only commercial crop grown. Prior to this, the family unit had been self-sufficient but at this stage it needed external contacts to sell the crop. The stage at which settlers changed from peasants into commercial farmers with the growing of yerba was crucial in their adaptive process.

BLANCHE, MARTHA

**INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND  
MIGRATION MOTIVATIONS IN SOME  
ETHNIC GROUPS OF MISIONES  
PROVINCE**

(Relaciones inter-étnicas y motivaciones migracionales en algunos grupos étnicos de la provincia de Misiones)

*Informes del Instituto Nacional de Antropología, Relevamiento cultural de la provincia de Misiones, Buenos Aires, 1974, pp 129–141.*

The aim of the paper is twofold. The first is to study relations between certain ethnic groups and try to detect the elements that one group takes from another. The second is to find out about migration motivations and compare these to the findings of studies made in other Argentine regions. The towns chosen for study were Azara, San Javier and El Dorado. The groups studied were: natives; Brazilians and Paraguayans; and people of European origin. Data was obtained through a questionnaire to people of both sexes and with different occupations.

Neoguarani is the name given to the people living in the province of Misiones before the Spanish conquest. They constitute the lower stratum in the rural social structure and live in the worst conditions. Since the Spaniards' arrival, they have been dominated by other groups. When Spanish colonisation ended, the Neoguaranies were still dominated by European groups who arrived as settlers.

There are three groups among the Neoguaranies: criollos (natives), Paraguayans and Brazilians. A horizontal relationship is established between these sub-groups. Conflicts do arise, especially in matters of job opportunity. For example, in San Javier, a criollo is preferred to a Brazilian but in the settlements along the Alto Paraná, a Paraguayan would be given preference.

A vertical relationship of domination is established between Europeans and Neoguaranies. Europeans enjoy many privileges such as grants of land. They do not replace the rural worker but dominate him. Europeans introduced improvements into the province but because of their privileges, the Neoguaranies despise them while the Europeans consider the Neoguaranies inferior, lazy and incapable of progress. Thus, German, Ukrainian and Polish settlers are totally against mixed marriages with the Neoguaranies.

With regard to migration motivations, the most significant reasons were found to be: economic; the lack of sanitary and medical services; scarce educational opportunities; lack of entertainment; and the attraction provided through communication media and roads which put the population in contact with the outside world. For example, the annual trips which younger people make to the city (which is when they meet those who have migrated) is another 'push' factor. Migrants, while rising from their rural worker status, keep their subordinate relationship in the city, but they have better economic and educational chances.

CARMACK, ROBERT

**STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL  
CHANGE IN THE WESTERN  
HIGHLANDS OF GUATEMALA, THE  
CASE OF TECPANACO**

(Estratificación y cambio social en las tierras altas occidentales de Guatemala: el caso de Tecpanaco)

*América Indígena, Vol XXXVI, No 2, April–June 1976, pp 253–301.*

The paper describes social stratification in Tecpanaco, a large Indian community in western Guatemala's highlands. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were around 8,000 urban and 42,000 rural inhabitants. There were two groups in the community: Indians and Ladinos.

Caste and ethnicity continue to be important factors in social life. Within the Ladino caste, ethnic status prevails over class divisions, owing to the Ladinos' struggle to keep their dominance over the Indians. However, caste structure has been affected by the emergence of class divisions, especially among the Indians. Thus, the urban bourgeoisie and rural proletarianised peasants have turned into dynamic forces in Tecpanaco's social life. The Indian bourgeoisie have become a new social class and politically powerful as intermediaries between peasants and Ladino society. Tecpanaco seems to increasingly respond to the authoritarian model in which the local bourgeoisie prevails under conditions of severe inequality and peasant repression.

HIGGINS, MICHAEL JAMES

**THE INTERNAL STRATIFICATION  
SYSTEM IN A POOR URBAN COLONY  
IN MEXICO**

(El sistema de estratificación interna de una colonia urbana pobre en México)

*Anuario Indigenista, Vol XXXIII, December 1973, pp 229–244.*

The paper looks at social stratification in a poor colony in Oaxaca, Mexico. The colony is San Carlos with 3,000 inhabitants.

The stratification system is considered at three levels: empirical, 'subjective', and 'inter-active'. For the empirical part, a statistical hierarchy was constructed based on data from 87 families. San Carlos' population was divided into five strata: professionals, skilled workers, those who worked at home, unskilled workers and household workers. Professionals were those with a special education such as teachers, who had salaries between \$900 and \$2,500 per month. Skilled workers were those with a special skill such as drivers, painters, policemen or

carpenters and had salaries between \$600 and \$1,500 per month. Home workers were those who earned their income at home such as small shop owners, craftsmen and sellers. Their salaries were between \$300 and \$900 per month. Unskilled workers were those whose training limited them to very modest tasks such as washer-women, doormen and public workers. Salaries were between \$140 and \$600 per month. Household workers such as cooks and maids had salaries below \$140 a month.

The 'subjective' part of the analysis was based on information obtained through personal interviews with 52 people. The author asked how the interviewee saw others in terms of their position in the stratification hierarchy. But if the interviewee did not know one of the families, he asked his spouse or a friend who happened to be near. So the information obtained reflected the opinion of more people than the interviewees. The criterion used to place a person in a particular stratum was the amount of social goods they owned, ie not only material goods but also what they did for the community and how they participated.

By 'inter-active' the third way of considering stratification, the author means membership of a reference group, ie people taking into account their own status in order to place others. People interacted with those who belonged to the group with the same status as them.

The paper concludes that contrary to the belief that there is always conflict between Indians, Ladinos and half-breeds, in San Carlos no-one was placed in a lower level category because they were Indians or in a higher level because they were Ladino. Another belief the author found to be false in San Carlos was the separation between manual and non-manual work. The criterion accepted by the people was the amount of social goods a person owned.

**McEWEN, WILLIAM**  
(together with the RISM team<sup>1</sup>)

**THE EFFORT AND THE EAGLE:  
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN A  
PROVINCIAL COMMUNITY**  
(El esfuerzo y el aguila: la estratificacion  
social en una comunidad de provincia)

*Estudios Andinos*, Year 2, Vol II, No 2, 1971-2,  
pp 53-65.

The paper describes changes in stratification in San Lorenzo, a fictitious name for the capital of a Bolivian province (the fictitious name being given because interviewees preferred to remain anonymous). Through dialogue with the town's residents, the reader learns about the situation before and after the decade of the 1930s, with special concentration on after the 1952 revolution.

Up to the 1950s, San Lorenzo had a classical stratification system. At the upper level, the 'decent' families, of European origin, owned the large landholdings and shops. Their attitudes, habits and behaviour reflected the European way of life. With the decline of national and

international trade in the 1930s and 1940s and the 1952 revolution, this elite lost power and many of its members left San Lorenzo to live in the cities.

When the revolution liberated the peasants, many went to work in the goldmines of Tipuani and Mapiriri, and only those who succeeded returned to the town. As a result of political and economic changes, the traditional stratification system was broken and the means of social mobility altered. While the distinction between whites and Indians is still in force, the correlation between race and status weakened. Europeans have left, while mixed races have mixed with whites and improved their social status. Before, peasants received no education but now their children are compelled to go to school. This is considered an important factor in peasant integration into the cities. A large proportion of San Lorenzo's population are 'cholos' (people of mixed race) who now have an improved status in the community, against the 'decent' families who have lost their fortunes but not their prestige.

A better status can be achieved in several ways. A peasant may become a cholo if he has had economic success. Another way is through politics. The elite, despite having lost their fortunes, still retain the same social status and have not lost prestige. Marriages between people of different status are not frequent, and if they do occur, they are looked down on by the rest of the community. An important characteristic in San Lorenzo is the rivalry between people of different social status expressed, for example, in the refusal to meet in social gatherings.

1. Research Institute for the Study of Man.

**WHITTEN, NORMAN J.**

**ECOLOGY OF RACIAL RELATIONS IN  
THE NORTHWEST OF ECUADOR**  
(Ecologia de las relaciones sociales al  
noroeste del Ecuador)

*America Indigena*, Vol XXX, No 2, April 1970, pp  
345-358.

The paper looks at relations between ethnic categories in the north-west of Ecuador and compares them to the evolution of black-white relations in the world. The author suggests that Ecuadorian society in the north west is still in a pre-segregation stage, in that the criteria for the eventual exclusion of certain ethnic categories based on colour are accumulating.

San Lorenzo was the town chosen for the case study. It had 6,000 inhabitants in 1968. When Whitten compared the situation there in 1968 to that in 1965, he found a change in race relations which suggested a general 'disenfranchisement'<sup>1</sup> of blacks. Ethnicity was becoming more important in determining who will succeed (and who will not), although categories of ethnicity had not changed. The author talks of whites and blacks. He also mentions half-breeds (mestizos) who show racist attitudes towards negroes.

1. The word used in the paper is 'desemancipacion', ie a depriving of legal rights. Blacks are increasingly deprived of their access to income sources such as land.



## 1e STRUCTURAL CHANGE

AMARASIRI DE SILVA, Structural Change in a Coastal Fishing Community in Southern Sri Lanka

CASAGRANDE and PIPER, The Structural Change of a Rural Community in the Highlands of Ecuador

MATOS MAR, Indian Communities in the Andean Area

SABOGAL WIESSE, The Village of Santiago de Cao Yesterday: Don Enrique's Narration

AMARASIRI DE SILVA, M.W.

### STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A COASTAL FISHING COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN SRI LANKA

*Marga*, Vol 4, No 2, 1977, pp 67–88.

This paper's analysis is based on a study of Mirissa South, a relatively large fishing community with some 545 households in 1972. Mirissa South is in Sri Lanka's Southern Province. The paper looks at aspects of social change which came about as the result of the introduction of new fishing technology.

First, Mirissa is placed in the context of a traditional fishing community. The community was highly stratified and could be divided into about nine groups of fishermen, these groupings relating to the ownership and use of fishing equipment. The owners of equipment formed one social class and were the settlement's elite. Below them were the people who lived solely on their labour by, for instance, hauling nets, manning canoes or hiring small canoes and nets and undertaking individual fishing operations. Within this broad division, it was possible to distinguish a fairly complex social hierarchy with several gradations of status and power.

A government programme for the improvement of the fishing industry was launched in the late 1950s. Its main element was the government decision to issue boats to fishermen who were actively engaged in the fishing industry through hire purchase arrangements which provided for cost recovery over five years. In selecting beneficiaries, government chose workers who were not owners of traditional boats. This had major consequences for the social hierarchy and the structure of power as it had evolved through the traditional system of fishing based on traditional technology. The programme raised the social and economic status of a group of fishermen who had not previously owned fishing equipment. But the change in the structure of ownership did not significantly alter the relationships between the new group of boat owners and workers. Initially, the government had expected that disparities in income between boat owners and their crew would not be significant. But given the ready availability of crewmen, the boat owners were in a superior bargaining position to decide on the distribution of gains.

The paper ends by summarizing the changes which took place in the structure of fishing in Mirissa and contrasts the existing situation with that which had prevailed under traditional technology.

CASAGRANDE, JOSEPH and PIPER, ARTHUR

### THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF A RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE HIGHLANDS OF ECUADOR (La transformacion estructural de una comunidad rural en las tierras altas del Ecuador)

*America Indigena*, Vol XXIX, No 4, October 1969, pp 1039–1064.

The authors seek to explain the process of structural transformation in San Juan, a parish in Ecuador's highlands, over a 50 year period. The parish included a central town with around 780 inhabitants and 12 Indian settlements called 'anejos' with 4,250 inhabitants. The paper describes the changes which have occurred in key roles played by certain kinds of people who play an important part in connecting the local population to national society. These roles are the landholder ('hacendado') political representative ('teniente politico') priest and 'apu' (intermediary between Indians and the priest and political leader). The apu is a leader with religious and non-religious connotations.

The paper describes the early years in San Juan. It was a typical, traditional community with a rigid stratification system and strong religious links, wholly controlled by the hacendado, priest, political leader and apu. Power came from the national centre to the province and the 'canton' down to Indian settlements. But there were few possibilities for claims and demands to rise through the same channels. Thus, Indians searched for submission and protection in patron-client relationships.

Over a 50 year period, owing to San Juan's separation from Calpi to form a new parish (Calpi remained an example of the old, traditional society), a series of changes transformed it. Those who traditionally had power (landholder, priest and political representative) lost control. Traditional intermediaries disappeared and Indians sought the help of lawyers to defend their cause. The apu disappeared. A clear process of secularization may be seen in the fact that the complex system of religious feasts was replaced by civic celebrations organized by the schoolteacher. The teacher now played a very important role. National emblems and heroes replaced religious images. Landholders lost power as land was subdivided by inheritance, and as alternative employment possibilities arose such as working in new plantations on the coast or in road construction and as

railway workers. New crops such as onions allowed many Sanjuanenos to acquire economic independence. Others found jobs at a cement plant which began operating in 1954, and others left the parish to work in the cities.

The priests' power declined because of the introduction of non-religious education, the arrival of new missionaries who preached the orthodox religion and changes introduced by the Pope (John XXIII). The political representative remained important but his control was reduced, for some of his tasks were taken over by other offices. The schoolteacher became a key intermediary, rather than the *apu*, and this symbolized the structural changes occurring in San Juan.

Dispersed settlements became nucleated villages with their own public offices. All these changes created conflicts between tradition and modern practices. Also, politics in the new nucleated villages gave rise to opposing groups. However, Indians have not improved their status and are caught between the old system and a new society.

## MATOS MAR, JOSE

### INDIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE ANDEAN AREA (Comunidades indigenas del area andina)

*Anuario Indigenista*, Vol XXXVII,  
December 1977, pp 9-36.

The author seeks to interpret how Peruvian Indian communities have changed. The paper begins with a description of the communities, and then seeks to identify the most important changes which affected them prior to the 1969 Agrarian Reform's implementation.

Indian communities in the Andean region were important as one of the bases for the Andean agrarian structure. These communities can be defined by three characteristics: collective land ownership; social organization based on reciprocity and participation; and maintenance of an Andean cultural pattern.

Matos Mar looks at the origin of these communities, which probably related to the 'reducciones' of the colonial period or to the evolution of the 'ayllus'. In spite of Spanish domination, these communities did not change much until the mid-19th Century. After describing in detail the three characteristics mentioned above, the author concludes that by 'indigenous community' he understands a certain pattern of social organization which has these three characteristics.

In the second part of the paper, the factors which caused the communities to change are described. These are: an increasing acculturation process; economic transformation (with the addition of trade to the traditional subsistence agriculture); demographic growth; labour migration (especially of younger members); double status of some community members as *comuneros* and as wage labourers; changes in communications and transportation systems which increased the links between the community and the outside; new social stratification because of private land ownership; weaker communal

participation and the ending of the community's physical isolation; introduction of formal education which helped to weaken traditional culture; and compulsory military service. All these helped to weaken the community.

1. *Ayllus* - clans, exogenous groups of kinsmen with a recognized leader.

## SABOGAL WIESSE, JOSE

### THE TOWN OF SANTIAGO DE CAO YESTERDAY: DON ENRIQUE'S NARRATION (La villa de Santiago de Cao ayer: narracion de Don Enrique)

*Anuario Indigenista*, Vol XXXIV, December 1974,  
pp 91-151.

The article presents the narration by an inhabitant of Santiago de Cao about life there and about how this has changed. Don Enrique's narration tells of the modernization process which took place in this town on Peru's northern coast during the previous 50 years. The town is 600 kilometres north of Lima.

Sugar cane is the valley's most important product. Santiago de Cao had 1,415 inhabitants in 1967 and around 2,000 by 1974. It is in Peru's most fertile valley. But its municipality has always been bankrupt, despite being one of the richest districts, because the owners of sugar plantations do not pay their taxes. There were 196 landowners with plots of between 1 and 100 hectares. 0.5 percent of these possessed 67 percent of the land so that more than 99 percent of the owners possessed only 33 percent.

Don Enrique tells his interviewer of the good weather which they used to have, of the abundant products which were sold at low prices, of the mutual help systems (*mingas*) for working the land which reflected the solidarity among neighbours, of the large families (Don Enrique was one of 19 children and had nine of his own), and of the strong parental authority. Once, everyone owned a plot of land. When the interview was undertaken, there were only 18 people out of the 2,000 inhabitants whose main income was from farming. The rest had to work at some other activity or for another landowner. This had stimulated out-migration. Only one of Don Enrique's children lived in Santiago de Cao. Industries which were formerly important sources of employment included saltpetre, leather, charcoal, iron-works and weaving. Don Enrique tells of the land tenure systems at the beginning of the century. There were landowners who lived in the town and hired other workers, small owners and tenants. Don Enrique remembers Santiago de Cao as a real community with people helping each other. Later, things changed. Modernization meant the modification of education and religious beliefs, different relationships between parents and children and a greater politicization replacing studies and work on the land. The climate became drier, the cost of living increased and many people decided to leave, so Santiago de Cao lost population. Trujillo and Ascope were the towns to which most people migrated.

## 1f RELATIONS BETWEEN LOCAL CENTRE AND NATIONAL SOCIETY

- AHMED AND RAHMAN, *Small and Urban Centres: Vanguard of Exploitation: Two Cases from Sudan*
- CASTANEDA, MURPHY and STEPICK, *The Articulation of an Intermediate City with the Mexican Economy and its Effects on Living Standards: the Case of Oaxaca*
- COHEN, *Conflict and Development in a Small Urban Centre*
- DENIS, *Recent Changes in the Peripheral Villages of Quito: the Cases of San Juan de Calderon and San Miguel de Collacoto*
- ESCOBAR MOSCOSO, *Interaction between Economy and Politics in Two Andean Communities*
- HAYWARD, *The Growth and Erosion of Development Potential: Changing Mass Attitudes in Three Ghanalan Small Urban Centres*
- HERMITTE and HERRAN, *Productive System, Interstitial Institutions and Ways of Social Articulation in an Argentine North-Western Community*
- LEE, *Medenine: Regional Capital and Small Urban Centre in the Tunisian South*
- MYERS, *Cultural Links of Squatter Inhabitants with their Andean Land*

AHMED, ABDEL GHAFAR M. and  
RAHMAN, MUSTAPHA ABDEL

**SMALL URBAN CENTRES:  
VANGUARDS OF EXPLOITATION: TWO  
CASES FROM SUDAN**

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 101–118.*

The paper examines the role played by two towns in the southern Sudan in their surrounding region. For the authors, small urban centres fit into neither the rural nor the urban sector proposed by dualist theories and models of development. Their aim in examining the two case study towns is to show that in neither case does the imaginary urban-rural divide hold, because the centres have played a role in incorporating their surroundings into active participation in the national and international economy. 'Being the marketing centres (small urban centres) are the points at which the contribution of African peasants to the cash crop industry crystallizes and the bond between the African hinterland and the world economy is sealed' (p. 101)

Small urban centres have been growing in Africa for centuries, and from the earliest times they have been associated with trade and with the administrative expansion of the state; in the Sudan, their development was particularly notable during the pre-colonial Funj rule (1504–1821). Under British colonial rule, new relations between these centres and the countryside began to be established through taxation and the appropriation of land in the centres, together with the introduction of money as the only medium of exchange. As a consequence of the abolition of slavery towards the late 19th Century, small urban centres started to absorb labour from neighbouring areas to perform tasks previously undertaken by slaves. Hence, with the support of measures on land ownership and pressure from the collection of taxes, labour became

a commodity whilst rural to urban migration gained momentum. At the present time, 'small urban centres are strategic in that they transmit labour migration information and tax revenue onward from villages to larger urban centres while also transmitting orders, decisions and market goods in the reverse direction' (p. 104).

The paper then looks at the two case studies, Radoam and Kongor, in the southern Sudan. Radoam is an administrative and trade centre created as a result of a resettlement of population imposed by the British rulers in the 1920s. In the 1950s some government offices and services such as education, health and police were extended to the area, thereby giving the town a 'semi-urban image'. There is some migration out of the town, especially of young educated people. Over the past decades, the economy of the town has been based upon trade in three major areas of activity: ivory, feathers and game animal skins, for which licences are required; hashish cultivation; and (more recently) groundnut crops and fruit orchards on large farms.

The area around the town of Kongor has been badly affected by flooding for decades which has led to an increasing impoverishment of agriculture and to a scarcity of woodfuel and building materials. Kongor emerged as an administrative post in 1919 during the Anglo-Egyptian Government of the Sudan. Government services came gradually to the area, but practically all activities were paralysed between 1955 and 1972 due to floods and political upheavals during the country's civil war. Kongor is seen by the Twic Dinka tribe living in the area as the seat of authority where the court lies and the representatives of government live. The importance of the town lies in it being the seat of the court and in its marketing facilities. More recently it has acted as a stopping place for migrants on their way to larger urban centres. The town is a net exporter of labour, especially among the educated in the 20 to 29 year old age group. According to the authors, the subsistence activities of the region's population generate limited purchasing power. The paper also presents some details about the shops in the town, such as region of origin of the owners, an example of the costs of setting up a shop, examples of articles sold, and prices charged by one shop for some articles (which tend to be higher than in nearby urban centres due to transport costs).

The authors conclude that in both cases the urban

centre's role has been 'to draw its surroundings into active participation in the national and international economy', whilst the dominance of traditional modes of production is gradually replaced by that of the capitalist mode. Exploitation of the rural inhabitants by the towns' elite and merchants are thereby facilitated, 'since all the services rendered (by the towns) clearly in the long run serve the interest of the leading classes in the centre. The way planning of development goes in Africa it may be expected that the rural centres will continue this exploitation and will assist external powers to do likewise' (p. 115).

**CASTANEDA, AIDA, MURPHY,  
ARTHUR D., and STEPICK, ALEX**

**THE ARTICULATION OF AN  
INTERMEDIATE CITY WITH THE  
MEXICAN ECONOMY AND ITS  
EFFECTS ON LIVING STANDARDS:  
THE CASE OF OAXACA**

**(La articulacion de una ciudad intermedia  
con la economia mexicana y el efecto  
sobre los niveles de vida: el caso de  
Oaxaca)**

*Revista Interamericana de Planificacion*, Vol  
XVIII, No 71, September 1984, pp 115–128.

The paper starts with the observation that the interest of policy-makers and planners in governments and international agencies (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) in the contribution of intermediate cities to national development in developing countries is largely unfounded. Such interest stems from the belief that a reduction in spatial inequalities can be brought about through investment policies aimed at enhancing the productive capacity of marginal regions within a nation. This, it is hoped, will improve the ability of these regions to retain a migrant population which would otherwise be concentrated in the larger urban centres, where most investments have historically been concentrated.

Instead of lessening inequalities, past investment trends – which by and large have further integrated these marginal areas into the national economy – have in fact aggravated inequalities, both at the regional and at the social level. The historical increase in capital-intensive productive activities has generated two distinct groups in the labour force: an elite, enjoying most of the benefits associated with industrial, and 'industrialised reserve army' of poor inhabitants who are largely left to cater for their own needs with no external help. The paper argues that this process of social differentiation has also taken place in the Mexican city of Oaxaca, not as a result of industrialization, but largely as a by-product of the growth in the city's tourist industry and State administration, the two main sources of formal employment.

Oaxaca's function throughout most of Mexico's history

was largely that of an administrative centre. As such, it was relatively impervious to developments at the national or the international level. The city's full integration into the national economy dates back to the opening of the Panamerican Highway in the 1940s. This improved communications with the rest of the nation, and provided the means for an improved articulation with the national economy, through an increased penetration of both national and, especially, north-american products and tourism.

In classical economics, tourism is seen as a desirable development for a developing economy as it attracts foreign exchange with little investment. But with reference to Oaxaca, the authors point out that although growth in the tourist industry has increased the city's income, it has also exacerbated inequality among its labour force. Workers in the tourist sector represented a third of the total labour force in the 1950s and 1960s. Most were unskilled and badly paid, with little or no legal protection and no access to existing social security schemes. For the purposes of the paper, they meet the requirements which classify them as 'informal'.

Increased government intervention which characterised the Mexican economy in the 1970s led to a growth in the proportion of State employees in the city's labour force, from 9.7 per cent of the total in 1970, to 21.9 per cent in 1977. However, as in tourism, this contributed little to reducing the number of workers in the informal sector. As in tourism, this type of employment is characterised by a small number of highly paid employees and a much larger number of workers earning the legal minimum wage or perhaps even less. In addition, State investments during this period were largely oriented towards the construction industry, where a similar differentiation took place. The authors remark that 'although the intervention of the federal government in Oaxaca contributed significantly to an increase in the city's regional product, its main effect has been that of creating a large number of city dwellers who barely earn a subsistence salary' (p. 117).

Half the city's labourers can be classified as 'informal'. They include half of those in self employment, and all those whose income is below the legal minimum wage. 28 per cent of informal sector workers are employed in the tourist sector, where in theory they are entitled to employment-linked benefits; in fact, those who press on their employers to obtain their full legal rights may be sacked at any time and easily replaced with any member of the city's vast 'industrial reserve army'.

Construction workers, the second largest group of informal sector workers, account for 20 per cent of this sector. Although some are members of a government-controlled union, most contractors prefer to hire non-unionized workers to whom they can pay lower wages. The trade sector employs a share of informal labourers similar to construction, and it is composed largely of female shop-owners in low-income neighbourhoods, and street peddlers. A quarter of the informal sector workforce consists of industrial workers, craftsmen, private employees and state employees. Many have a regular salary but lack security of employment and social benefits. The authors note that in 1978, 40 per cent of all the employees of the State oil company PEMEX were classified as 'temporary'.

The paper examines in some detail the results of a survey carried out in 1977 on the characteristics of employment in Oaxaca. In the survey, the city's households were divided into four economic categories

on the basis of the households' income. Tabulated information on several aspects of Oaxaca's employment are presented. For the four household types, the tables present data on the occupation of the head of household, the number of persons working in the household, the number of household members, the occupation of the second worker in the household, the stability of employment of the head of household and the number of dependents. One of the main findings is that two-thirds of the city's households do not earn enough to participate in Mexico's modern economy without the help of some sort of subsidy. Even if 70 per cent of households earn more than the legal minimum wage, this is not reckoned to be sufficient to cover the subsistence needs of an average-size family. Moreover, one third of the city's households are in practice excluded from existing social assistance programmes.

The paper concludes with the observation that owing to its recent industrialization, Mexico's per capita income has increased substantially. However, this increase has been higher among some of the richer social groups (ie those in the 80th to 95th percentile of the population), at the expense of both the richest and especially the poorest 60 per cent. Growth has also been unequally distributed from a regional viewpoint, with the fruits of industrialization largely concentrated in the centre of the country, in the industrial and agricultural production areas, and in the oil producing settlements.

The south of the country, where Oaxaca is located, has been somewhat marginal in this growth. In the course of Oaxaca's integration to the national economy, social inequality rose. Oaxaca houses some of Mexico's poorest households where the contribution of a second income-earner is crucial. The poor in the informal sector are constantly hit by a frail urban economy whose control lies beyond the reach of the city's elite. Their only hope is that the State grants them higher social benefits. This would signify more State intervention, and one which the Mexican Government cannot afford under the present crisis. What is even worse for Oaxaca's poor, an eventual increase in social spending would inevitably lead to a larger bureaucracy, and a closer integration of the city into the national and international economies, precisely those factors which led to the situation they face today.

1. Many of the city's formal sector workers are employed by the government (43 per cent) or in non-industrial enterprises (32 per cent). Most are between 25 and 50 years old and have, on the whole, higher levels of skill than their fellow-workers in the 51-plus age range.

COHEN, RONALD

## CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT IN A SMALL URBAN CENTRE

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 189-212.

The paper looks at the development of the town of Biu, in northern Nigeria. The author wishes to show how urban development in one particular part of Nigeria has been a function of local conflict and the relation of that conflict to the wider political forces of the Nigerian nation. In so doing, Cohen espouses the view that urbanization is an inexorable process which is not simply a function of the exploitative nature of class formation and its assumed relation to a world system characterized by inequality. Other factors come into play in the process such as education, the development of an administrative structure and internal political competition.

The paper examines historical developments in the region around Biu (called Buraland by the author), in present-day Borno State, from pre-colonial times to the present. Before the establishment of British colonial administration, three quarters of the region's population (the Bura) lived in villages and hamlets ranging in size from a few dozen people to several hundreds. The remaining 25 per cent (the Pabir) occupied the northern part of the region living in walled towns of up to several thousand people, each of which housed a hierarchical society headed by a town king, the *Kuthli*. Muslim incursions in the nineteenth century were repelled by unified Pabir forces under the leadership of the *Kuthli* of Biu. Such campaigns lie at the origins of the walling of towns, of the highly hierarchical society and of the centralised state encountered by the British upon their arrival in 1902-3.

The *Kuthli* of Biu (referred to as 'Emir' from 1918) set up a close working relationship with the British colonial administration in the 1910s. Biu was chosen as the headquarters of an emirate-type of government forcibly placed over a non-Muslim Bura majority whose traditions of village autonomy stimulated a wave of armed rebellions. The arrival of British missionaries in the 1920s to preach among the Bura had two important effects: firstly, it started a tradition of Western education which 'aided and abetted a tendency for migratory labor or more or less permanent labor outside the home area'; secondly, it gave rise to a political awareness among the Bura in relation to the centralisation of regional power in Biu.

Biu's population grew from 3,500 in the 1920s to 7,000 in the 1940s and then to 10,000 in the late 1970s. The administrative importance of the town has been reflected over the decades in a wealth of development projects and constructions including government offices, expensive European-style houses and services (schools, a dispensary, a hotel). Few of the hundred or more towns in the country's former northern region with a similar population size as Biu possess so well developed an infrastructure.

With a focus on urban-rural relationships, the paper then examines the possible causes of the town's

development over the period of study. In pre-colonial times, the town grew and developed as a result of the Muslim raids which forced some rural inhabitants to seek protection and services. Because trade and commerce remained relatively un-developed until Independence (in 1968), the town's pre-Independence improvements were financed with revenues extracted from the surrounding rural population. These rose very slowly up to 1945, but then grew six-fold between 1945 and 1960. In the post-Independence era, tax revenues failed to grow substantially in real terms and the town's unprecedented developments were financed with State and Federal funds.

The paper goes into some details about the political developments which have affected the town since the 1920s: competing political groupings at the State, regional and national levels incorporated local political conflict and used these conflicts to help advance their own ends. In the process, Biu gained a disproportionate share of national development inputs. The paper rejects the generalisation that the world capitalist system will inexorably extract surplus from the smaller population centres through the largest centres in the Third World, on the grounds that it overlooks certain factors. The example of Biu demonstrates that "local conflict can act as a catalyst to produce very consequential 'trickle-down' effects in which dominant groups outside the conflict try to mollify or 'buy off' a threat of withdrawal of support from the conflicting area" (p. 209).

DENIS, P.Y.

### RECENT CHANGES IN THE PERIPHERAL VILLAGES OF QUITO: THE CASE OF SAN JUAN DE CALDERON AND SAN MIGUEL DE COLLACOTO

*Actas del XLII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, Vol 1, Paris 1976, pp 549-567.*

The paper looks at recent changes in San Juan de Calderon, 15 kilometres north of Quito (Ecuador's capital) and in San Miguel de Collacoto which is a few kilometres west of Quito.

San Juan had 1,213 inhabitants at the beginning of the 1970s and is the centre of a small agricultural area with 13,000 inhabitants. In spite of being linked to Quito by the Pan-American highway, poor public transport services kept San Juan isolated. Small landholdings, scarce rainfall and lack of irrigation possibilities plus adequate agricultural technology explain this area's low yields. Agriculture is no longer profitable and has become a supplementary activity. The study found that 39 per cent of the population are unemployed, and many made daily trips to Quito to work as gardeners or maids or in some other occupation. But owing to the development of crafts in San Juan, many people no longer travel daily to Quito, because they find work in their own town making furniture.

San Juan's population was found to be young with nearly half under 16 years old, and only 10 per cent older

than 50. Illiteracy was low. Water supply systems were old and inefficient, which could help explain the high rates of infant mortality. San Juan is a linear town with its main shops along the road running north to south.

San Miguel had only 270 inhabitants in the 1960s. Most of its working population also travel daily to Quito, and households cultivate poor soils for household subsistence. San Miguel's isolation is almost complete in spite of the short distance which separates it from Quito. Over half the population was under 15 years old. Illiteracy was only 15 per cent, but only 44.5 per cent of the poor finished primary school. As in San Juan, there was no secondary education in the settlement. Low incomes and poor living standards, under-nourishment, lack of sanitary services and medicine, and low literacy are the characteristics of this isolated community which will inevitably become a suburb of Quito as Quito's physical growth continues.

ESCOBAR MOSCOSO, GABRIEL

### INTERACTION BETWEEN ECONOMY AND POLITICS IN TWO ANDEAN COMMUNITIES

(Interacción de la economía y la política en dos comunidades andinas)

*Anuario Indigenista, Special Issue published for: Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, Peru 1970 by the Instituto Indigenista Americano, Vol XXX, Mexico, December 1970, pp 205-212.*

The paper begins by stating the need to increase theoretical knowledge concerning two aspects: first, how peasant societies are integrated into their respective regions depending, to different degrees, on their region's political and economic structures; and secondly, how any technological change introduced into peasant societies brings about economic and political change which affects their stability and the way in which they are linked to national society.

The paper looks at the political and economic effects of technological change in two regions in the Peruvian highlands: the district and community of Sicaya, an agricultural and artisan town with 4,500 inhabitants in the central Sierra of Peru, near the town of Huancayo; and the district and community of Nunoa with around 8,000 inhabitants in the southern highlands<sup>1</sup>. The paper's hypothesis is that social and cultural changes in a country like Peru take place following generalised ideological orientations which originate in the nation's economic and political power centres and depend on the means of communication. These orientations are adopted to different degrees in regions according to their geographical position and ecological and cultural constraints. Ideological orientations are defined as the ideas by which a society works, justifies its achievements and failures, and appraises its present situation and future perspectives.

Sicaya's demographic growth began around 1850,

which prompted the out-migration of a significant number of its inhabitants to cotton haciendas on the coast, because of the lack of cultivable land and pasture. When the railway reached Huancayo, Sicaya's participation in the wider region's commercial economy increased. Out-migration flows turned to Lima after 1945 and continued during the following decades. Many migrants return regularly to Sicaya, and these have turned it into a bilingual mestizo community. Individuals and groups in Sicaya are aware that they must make an effort to increase their prestige and promote their community's progress. Their political action is linked to the need for public works (especially potable water supply), schools and 'ornamental structures' (public works without a true public service function such as monuments or flower-covered arcades). Most of the community's members take part in these actions. This opening to the outside world caused important changes – from being a semi-Indian community with subsistence agriculture dominated by the haciendas and the church, it is gradually turning into a bilingual half breed community with a mobile class system which at the same time increases its participation in the country's economic and political life.

By way of contrast, Nunoa was isolated until it was reached by a road in 1950. The most important changes occurred after this date and were due to the action of state agencies; health centres, a secondary school, some coverage of social security and municipal elections in 1963. Few changes were due to local initiatives. 'The contact with the outside world, being so recent, has produced an increase in local hostilities and rivalries in the inhabitants' political and economic interests' (p. 208). The 'community feeling' is present as a negative ethnocentrism, which is strengthened by a feeling of failure in their actions in search of more help from the state. The mestizos' lack of security and the strong ethnocentrism are reflected in a lack of the district's integration into the regional economy, the avoidance of progressive orientations in the lower strata, and restricted communication channels both within the district and with other districts.

1. Editor's Note: No date is given for the population figures. And the text does not make clear whether the population figures are for Nunoa town or Nunoa district.

HAYWARD, FRED M.

## THE GROWTH AND EROSION OF DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL: CHANGING MASS ATTITUDES IN THREE GHANAIAN SMALL URBAN CENTRES

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan, African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 334–355.

The paper looks at people's links with and attitudes to government in three small urban centres in Ghana, and at how these changed over a five year period. It is based on surveys undertaken in 1970 and 1975, each involving interviews with some 380 people.

The three urban centres had populations of between 2,000 and 5,000. All three were centres of education both for their own inhabitants and for those in smaller settlements nearby. All three were involved in government agricultural extension demonstration projects; in two of them, the government was trying to re-establish or rebuild cocoa production. The largest proportion of their population was engaged in agriculture although more than half had other occupations including traders and businessmen (12 per cent), artisans, technicians and industrial workers (15 per cent) and professionals (14 per cent).

Most of the paper is devoted to examining mass attitudes in these urban centres including their populations' evaluation of government, sense of 'political competence' and perception of well-being. Tables contrast responses for 1970 and 1975 and cover such subjects as length of residence in the centre, confidence in government, treatment by government officials, evaluation of personal contacts with government, evaluation of incumbent regime compared to its predecessor, and conditions today compared to childhood. The survey showed high levels of mobility in the three centres; over 80 per cent of the respondents in 1975 had lived in another town at some point in their life and more than 40 per cent had lived in towns with more than 30,000 inhabitants. Between 1970 and 1975, the proportion of the population born in the centres dropped from over 50 per cent to slightly more than 25 per cent.

In its introduction, the paper notes that small urban centres 'are the crucial interface between the state and its institutional structures and the rural populace; the point at which rural interests are aggregated and expressed to government sources of politicization, mobilization and national integration; points of enforcement of national policy and distribution of national services. In this context, the links between individuals in small urban centres and the national government have profound effects both on government policy options and reactions to them in the small urban centres and the surrounding villages and towns which are tied to them' (p. 334). In a section on conclusions, the paper notes that the urban centres' inhabitants 'have become increasingly aware of the major role of government in their daily lives and in the development of their area' and this awareness increased

between 1970 and 1975. People increasingly looked to government to solve vital problems and public confidence in government remained high, even though Ghana was facing major economic problems despite other problems such as corruption and shortages in foodstuffs and other necessities. In addition, a number of government policies had had adverse effects: price controls kept food out of rural areas (since legal mark-ups did not reflect transport costs); and import substitution had meant restrictions of imported goods with shortages in small towns and rural areas more severe than in cities. 'With little to buy, the incentive to produce decreased and one saw parts of the economy moving rapidly back towards a mere subsistence economy . . . Efforts to reverse that trend with increased prices paid to the farmer for cocoa and other products did not help. While higher prices resulted in more money for the rural farmer, there was little if anything to buy with it' (p. 349).

Various other disquieting problems are described. One was the idea in government that large-scale farming and state farms are a way of dealing with food shortages, despite the disruption and loss of land and livelihood that these imply for rural masses. Another is the demise of a parliamentary system so the rural population no longer feels connected to the political system. A third was the move to more centralised local government. A fourth was the respondents' increasing sense that things were getting worse.

'Continued erosion of public satisfaction is a potentially explosive problem . . . It is clear that real possibilities for development and satisfaction still exist in the small urban centres in Ghana. Whether the state can reverse the downward cycle in a manner which will allow it to build on what remains of a remarkable reservoir of goodwill in rural Ghana remains to be seen' (p. 350).

1. Political competence was assessed by asking individuals what they thought they could and would do about government policies and directives on which they disagreed and how they would respond to a law they felt was harmful or unjust.

**HERMITTE, ESTHER and  
HERRAN, CARLOS**

**PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, INTERSTITIAL  
INSTITUTIONS AND WAYS OF SOCIAL  
ARTICULATION IN AN ARGENTINE  
NORTH-WESTERN COMMUNITY**  
(Sistema productivo, instituciones  
intersticiales y formas de articulacion  
social en una comunidad del noreste  
argentino)

*Procesos de Articulacion Social*, Hermitte E. and  
Bartolome L., (Editors), CLACSO-Amorrortu,  
Buenos Aires 1977, pp 238-256.

The paper looks at the links between national society and local community, taking Belen, chief town of Catamarca department in Argentina as its local community (the town

had 6,000 inhabitants in 1970). It analyses the flow of resources from national society to Belen, the actions taken by the community to use those resources, and the kind of cases which reveal differences between the intention of the State and the particular way in which the community distributes those resources.

After a brief description of the town's productive system which is largely based on textile production for sale outside the city and commercial crops (but with most households also producing subsistence crops), the paper outlines different forms of social articulation between the community and the rest of society: the migrant who links his household to the outside; patron-client relations which cover a broader range of articulation possibilities; and coalitions between patrons with a considerable control of political power.

The authors state that the most efficient elements in attracting external resources to Belen (money, infrastructure, contacts) are certain institutions such as the household group, asymmetric coalitions (patrons and clients) and symmetric coalitions among members of superior groups. Resource flows back to Belen, such as cash from migrants selling household products in the city or migrants who help town inhabitants find employment.

Patron-client links are established because agriculture is not profitable enough. So peasants have to count on a patron's help to be sure that their produce will be sold in the national market. Thus, a group of patrons is able to accumulate capital in exchange for political support from clients. Patron-client relations are also evident in weaving. One example of a coalition among patrons was when patrons joined together to prevent the creation of a weavers' cooperative. If the cooperative had been created, the patrons would have lost their power and control over the weaving commercialisation process. As a result, no cooperative was created.

The authors conclude that Belen's articulation with the larger social system is fragmentary and it is through the action of intermediaries that this articulation is mediated. Belen's inhabitants do not defend their own rights before the State, but through the action of patrons.

**LEE, CONCEPCION E.**

**MEDENINE: REGIONAL CAPITAL AND  
SMALL URBAN CENTRE IN THE  
TUNISIAN SOUTH**

*Small Urban Centres in Rural  
Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan  
(Editor), African Studies Program,  
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979,  
pp 257-273.

The paper looks at the failure of regional development policy to involve the region's population and to fully consider regional needs in its formulation and implementation. The region (gouvernorat<sup>1</sup>) under study is Medenine, Tunisia's largest and least densely populated region, to the south.



The city of Medenine is the regional capital and had 15,826 inhabitants in 1975. It was the region's most populous urban settlement and the hub of economic and transport links. It also had the strongest transport links to outside the region – with the city of Gabes, in Gabes gouvernorat, to its northwest.

Under the French, Medenine city was chosen as a military base more because of its strategic location than its urban role within the region. In 1931, it had only 1,752 inhabitants while Zarzis in the same gouvernorat had 7157. Medenine city became an important centre of distribution in the South and the only link to many smaller settlements. But it did not act as a centre for the collection and transport of regionally produced goods to the outside. Because of climate and lack of natural resources, the region's population depended largely on traditional subsistence agriculture or on livestock production in a semi-nomadic economy. Within Medenine, small weekly markets were held where local produce was exchanged:

After World War II, urban growth increased in Medenine city, along with other centres in the south, and further increased after independence in 1956. Within the region, migration movements tended to be towards the coastal zone which had a more stable economic base. In recent years, this has been further enhanced by an expanding tourist industry. What was once a dispersed regional population has become more focused in small centres where basic services and goods are available. The region's agricultural potential has not been exploited. Food has to be imported to meet even basic requirements. Medenine city serves as the seat of the region's bureaucracy and the decision-making centre.

The paper then outlines the changes in national economic planning since 1962 and the role of gouvernorat-level officials and of the population within this. While on paper channels allow for the involvement both of citizens and of local party cells in regional development plan formulation, in practice national government goals and guidelines are dominant. Neither the governor nor most of the highest administrative posts are filled by people from the region. 'It is evident that while the government pays lip service to decentralisation efforts, the manner in which regional plans are formulated, the degree of participation possible at the lowest levels and the centralised allocation of resources emanating from the ministries in the capital, are all open contradictions to the stated aims' (p. 265). Regional plans lack a long-term development strategy based on a grassroots evaluation of needs and available resources, and of significance to the region itself. While the achievements of the Bourguiba regime should not be discounted, the problem to be solved is 'not simply the one of creating a reasonable and well-balanced program of development, but rather the one of institutionalising an ideological commitment to regional development at the level of the bureaucratic contingent in charge of policy implementation' (p. 260).

1. The country is divided into 18 gouvernorats.

MYERS, SARAH

## CULTURAL LINKS OF SQUATTER INHABITANTS WITH THEIR ANDEAN LAND

(Lazos culturales de los habitantes de barriadas con su tierra andina)

*Estudios Andinos*, Year II, Vol II, No 3, 1971–73, pp 115–136.

The author seeks to identify the characteristics of migrants from the highlands who live in Lima and keep in contact with their place of origin. Information was gathered in 1969–70 among highland out-migrants who were living in two 'pueblos jóvenes' in Lima. 158 people were interviewed. Their different trips are described and then bi- and multi-variable analysis is carried out on the data gathered.

There are various reasons given for trips to the place of origin. Some people who originally migrated to haciendas or to the coast returned to their place of origin and then migrated to Lima and settled there. Others returned to their place of origin just for short visits. Most people made these visits because they missed their relatives or to take care of their land.

With regard to reasons given by migrants for returning to Lima, after going back to their place of origin, 37 per cent did so for economic reasons, 21 per cent to start or continue a claim for tenure of a land plot, 16 per cent for no specific reason, 10 per cent to recover from an illness, 10 per cent to meet a wife or husband, and five per cent because of difficult adaptation to the place of origin.

77 per cent of migrants to Lima return to their place of origin for short periods. Those who do so are generally migrants who have succeeded in Lima and have improved their status in economic terms and in terms of education. Most return for short visits. Successful migrants are likely to return, boasting in front of their relatives. Migrants who do visit their place of origin are important agents for the diffusion of 'western culture' in the Andes. At the same time, links with the Andean region are strengthened on their return. Under the 'then-revolutionary' government which promoted 'Peruanisation', Indians' situation improved.

The paper concludes that it is certain types of migrants who are more likely to visit their place of origin: including those who left to improve their situation or by chance; those who believe life is better in Lima; men and those who are better employed.

1. Editor's note: meaning literally 'young communities', name given to squatter settlements after a 1968 military coup brought General Velasco to power, and after this regime stressed the positive features of illegal settlements and sought to support their development.

## 1g HISTORICAL STUDIES

AGIRI, *The Changing Socio-Economic Relationship Between Ikorodu and its Neighbouring Villages*

KANO, *City Development and Occupational Change in Iran: a Case Study of Hamadan*

KULKARNI, *Cantonment Towns of India*

NWAKA, *Owerri: Development of a Nigerian State Capital*

ONYEMELUKWE, *Some Factors in the Growth of West African Market Towns: the Example of Pre-Civil War Onitsha, Nigeria*

SMITH, *Socio-Economic Differentiation and Relations of Production among Rural-Based Petty Producers In Central Peru*

SOIFFER and HOWE, *Patrons, Clients and the Articulation of Modes of Production: an Examination of the Penetration of Capitalism Into Peripheral Agriculture in Northeastern Brazil*

THAXTON, *The Peasants of Yaocun: Memories of Exploitation, Injustice, and Liberation in a Chinese Village*

VERDUZCO, *Gustavo, Urban Growth and Regional Development: the case of Zamora, Michoacan*

## AGIRI, BABATUNDE

### THE CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IKORODU AND ITS NEIGHBOURING VILLAGES, 1950-1970

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 131-137.

The paper outlines the development of the Nigerian town of Ikorodu since 1900 and its interactions with nearby villages and towns and with Lagos.

Ikorodu has been the most populous and commercially important town in the area since the 19th Century. It achieved this through the control its inhabitants had of trade between its hinterland and Lagos. Its markets were the most important in the area and when two smaller settlements, Agbowo<sup>1</sup> and Imota fixed their own market days to coincide with Ikorodu's, a war ensued which forced them to change their days.

Under the British, Ikorodu's status was enhanced. It became the administrative headquarters of the new district. In 1904, the colonial government established an agricultural station in the town to sell cocoa, coffee, rubber and cola nitida seedlings to local farmers to encourage the development of cash crop production for export. Earlier attempts to introduce plantation agriculture through sugar cane production in Agbowo, the second largest town in the area, had failed. The land was not suited to sugar cane cultivation and the capital and technology for molasses and sugar manufacture was lacking. The failure of the Agbowo experiment ensured that Ikorodu's pre-eminence as a service centre for cash crop production was not challenged.

In 1922, a motor launch service from Lagos to Ikorodu and lagoon posts east of Ikorodu was introduced. The production of cash crops around Agbowo intensified and these could be exported to Lagos without passing through Ikorodu's markets. In response, Ikorodu inhabitants built the Ikorodu-Agbowo road in 1926, aided by the British

administration. And a native of Ikorodu introduced a rival motor launch service which encouraged more trade links between Ikorodu and Lagos.

By 1931, Ikorodu had 14,000 inhabitants while Agbowo had 5,000. The 1930s and 1940s saw rapid migration away from Ikorodu to Lagos and by 1952 its population had shrunk to 9,000 while that of Agbowo had shrunk to 1,800.

In 1950, Ikorodu District was merged with Western Nigeria. During the 1950s, two new factories were established in Ikorodu town while the government established a farm institute. A Lagos-Ikorodu road was constructed, which again meant that trade goods from villages and smaller towns, for transport to Lagos, came through Ikorodu.

In 1964, the Western Nigeria government introduced a programme to encourage cocoa production in Ikorodu district, and the government of Lagos State inherited this programme when Ikorodu became part of this state in 1967. By 1963, Ikorodu's population was 20,000 while that of Agbowo was 8,000.

By 1973, Ikorodu still did not have a strong economic base. There was still large-scale migration from the town and surrounding areas to Lagos.

The paper briefly describes the development of Ijede, a fishing village with 300 inhabitants in 1952. It owed its importance, prior to 1950, to its role as a port for the transport of crops produced in neighbouring villages to Lagos. Its inhabitants' attempts to grow cocoa between 1964 and 1966 were essentially destroyed by neighbouring agricultural villages boycotting its market. The paper then describes the programmes initiated in Ijede by the Institute of Cultural Affairs from 1977 to develop and diversify the economic base and provide basic services.

1. The name of this town is spelt both as 'Agbowo' and 'Agbowa' in the article. The former spelling is used throughout this summary.

## KANO, HIROMASA

CITY DEVELOPMENT AND  
OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE IN IRAN : A  
CASE STUDY OF HAMADAN

*The Developing Economies*, Vol XVI, No 3,  
September 1978, pp 298–328.

The paper begins with the classification of Iran's towns and cities according to their population growth rates between 1956 and 1976 (and some classification of the basis for the rapid growth of certain city types). It then examines development and change in city-structure in Hamadan, an ancient city with some 150,000 inhabitants in 1978, and suggests the reasons for the relatively slow growth in population there over the last forty years. The paper includes findings from a survey of merchants and handicraftsmen in the bazaar to see where they, their fathers and their grandfathers had come from and their occupation and that of their fathers and grandfathers. These findings are compared to those of a comparable survey carried out in Malayer, the second largest city in Hamadan Province (after Hamadan), which had 47,009 inhabitants in 1976 and was growing more rapidly than Hamadan. Finally, some conclusions are given as to why Hamadan city has grown very slowly while Malayer is growing more rapidly.

In examining urban growth between 1956 and 1976 in Iran, Tehran has grown rapidly and has slowly increased its share in housing Iran's urban population to 28.6 per cent in 1976. Below Tehran, within an urban hierarchy, one can distinguish between:

- a) the four next largest cities, each with around 600,000 inhabitants, all of which grew rapidly in this 20-year period;
- b) provincial capitals;
- c) medium-size cities other than provincial capitals;
- d) smaller cities.

The provincial capitals and medium-size cities which have grown rapidly in this 20-year period are modern industrial cities, cities in the Greater Tehran area, administrative cities, cities on major transport routes and 'redevelopment cities'. Hamadan is an example of a provincial city whose economy has been virtually stagnant over the last 20 years.

Traditionally, Iran had many major cities but often relatively isolated from each other, separated by stretches of desert. Hamadan became famous in the Middle Ages as one of the cities on the Silk Road. Although it collapsed when Mongol armies overran it in the early 13th Century, its major role as a commercial city on a much used trade route was restored in the second half of the 19th Century with the inflow of goods from Britain and British India sent to Tehran via Baghdad and Hamadan. The city had long been famous for its carpets and leather industries, the industries being based on traditional handicraft techniques. After World War I, Hamadan retained its important role as a transport centre for some time, with an outflow of exports through it as well as an inflow via Baghdad. But by the late 1930s, when all of Iran had been pacified and as the Trans-Iranian railroad was completed (1938) and the central highway (built during World War II), so the main trade lines came to by-pass Hamadan. Since

becoming a provincial capital in 1966, Hamadan has increasingly come to function as an administrative city. There has been a considerable increase in the number of schools, banks, libraries and civil servants while little or no investment has been evident in the traditional carpet and leather working sectors to increase productivity. Hamadan has not grown sufficiently to have a fully fledged 'western' commercial area to draw the commercial focus away from the bazaar. The survey of merchants and handicraftsmen in the bazaar revealed that relatively few had been born in the surrounding rural areas. This contrasted with findings from a comparable survey in the small city of Malayer, where a far higher percentage of people in the bazaar had come from rural communities. Malayer's population was in fact growing more rapidly than Hamadan's possibly because Malayer had better developed road connections with Tehran.

Thus, while Hamadan was on the transit point for international trade, the city prospered, without undergoing any basic changes in the structure of its manufacturing base. Over the last 30 years, in Iran those cities on the main long distance trade routes have prospered. This is most evident in the cities with a population of over 100,000 along the Trans-Iranian Highway which links the modern petrochemical industries with the industrial cities in the Tehran area. Since Hamadan was not located on one of these major trade routes, it has been largely by-passed by new investment.

## KULKARNI, K.M.

## CANTONMENT TOWNS OF INDIA

*Ekistics*, 277, July–August 1979, pp 214–220.

In India, a cantonment is a stable military settlement as opposed to a camp (which suggests a settlement of only temporary or semi-permanent nature). The paper looks briefly at their location in India and at some of their changing economic and demographic characteristics.

Created by the British, they were located in a climate suited to outdoor training, away from ravines where enemy forces might hide and concentrated in those areas where a land army could most easily penetrate India—hence the concentration in the northwest. Most were established in the 19th Century with none established in the 20th Century.

In the 1971 census, there were 54 independent cantonment towns and another nine which had merged with municipal towns. The paper looks only at the independent cantonments, 29 of these are located close to a district headquarters and are identified by the name of that town. It notes that between 1961 and 1971 there was an increase in employment (in order of significance) of transport, storage and communication; trade and commerce; and manufacturing associated with defence purposes with a significant decline in the workforce in other services, household industries, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying. The paper suggests that these indicate the involvement of the cantonment workforce in roadbuilding, restoring and maintaining communications lines and preserving food supplies and military equipment. Certain towns' manufacturing base had

developed because of the production of defence-related goods (for instance ammunition) while others had developed good reputations as centres for good tailors. Not surprisingly, cantonment towns are well-known for their low female proportion although the trend 1901–71 was for overall improvement in the sex ratio – one reason being the trend for officers to live with their families in cantonment towns.

Clearly, the existence of a cantonment town means a demand for food and other basic commodities and the paper notes that this increased cash incomes in surrounding villages and hamlets. A cantonment town can increase the cost of living in a neighbouring town if it is small with an undiversified economic base and has mainly administrative and service functions – but the impact on the cost of living is much less when it is near a more developed town. On balance, the establishment of a cantonment town benefits the surrounding villages.

The paper gives no details as to population growth trends.

NWAKA, GEOFFREY I.

## OWERRI, DEVELOPMENT OF A NIGERIAN STATE CAPITAL

*Third World Planning Review* Vol II, No 2, Autumn 1980, pp 233–242.

The paper looks at the master plan prepared for Owerri, capital of Imo State in Nigeria in the light of previous Nigerian town planning experiences and in the light of Owerri's historical development. Drawing from this, it questions the plan's approach, the assumptions on which it is based and the possibility of its implementation<sup>1</sup>.

The paper begins by noting the relatively short history of formal town planning in Nigeria. The first planning legislation was only introduced after World War II. It mentions the early planning schemes prepared in the mid-1940s and the more ambitious master plans produced more recently and notes their lack of implementation. Imo State was created in 1976 and it had a population of over five million. Many civil servants, professionals and traders came to help staff the administration and services for the new State. Most headed for the three largest cities, Aba, Umuahia and Owerri. And since the decision was made not to decentralise the State Administration, Owerri became the centre for numerous Federal and State government departments, para-statal organizations and corporations. The new State Government in a panic hired a Swiss firm to rapidly prepare a comprehensive land use plan and this was duly published in 1977.

The author describes the plan's intention of building a new city next to the existing town but separated from it by a river and its valley. The plan allows for Owerri to develop as a multi-functional city with a projected population of 275,000 inhabitants by the year 2000. The author notes the State Government's initial enthusiasm for the plan; a special Owerri Capital Development Authority was set up to take over the responsibilities of the former town planning authority and it was given wide statutory powers to recruit staff, raise funds and coordinate the work of all

the agencies involved. The paper also notes that Owerri had room for expansion, that the Federal Government's 1978 Land Use Decree in theory makes it easy for State Governments to acquire needed land and that the State had already reserved 7,200 hectares where the new city is to be built.

The paper then looks at Owerri's historical development. The modern town's growth dates from 1902 when British expeditionary forces established a small military/administrative post. Prior to this, the town had had very little regional role. It was not on an important trade route and the local people were predominantly farmers working poor sandy soil with pre-industrial tools with no tradition of urban government. The town expanded slowly under colonial rule. After Owerri District was constituted in 1902, a Native Court was set up as were a government station, bungalows for Europeans, barracks and quarters for soldiers and African administrative staff, a prison and school. The European quarters were relatively well constructed with streets lined with trees and shrubs and separated from the rest of the town with a wide open space used for a golf course and tennis courts.

The town became a provincial headquarters in 1914, although this did little to boost its economic base, given the colonial policy of indirect rule through local chiefs and traditional institutions. The Townships Ordinance of 1917 made Owerri a Third Class Township but the town remained largely undeveloped. It was by-passed by the railway constructed from Port Harcourt through Aba and Umuahia to Enugu's coalmines. Other river ports nearby had most of the important import and export trade in this early colonial period. Despite official pressure, European trading firms refused to establish branch depots. Various initiatives sought to boost its economic base but to little avail and the Residency and Consulate of the Province were moved to Port Harcourt in 1927.

The post World War II administrative and planning reforms also did little to give impetus to Owerri's growth. By 1953, it had only 9,331 inhabitants compared to 57,789 for Aba and 12,259 for Umuahia. Aba and Umuahia have grown to well over 200,000 today, much larger than Owerri<sup>2</sup>. The 1950s and 1960s brought some growth with the establishment of a 'Shell Camp' looking for oil in the area but this moved to Port Harcourt in 1963. An advanced teacher training college, new market and timber market were built, as were a modern shoe factory (though this has not performed very satisfactorily). Ancillary commercial activities and services kept pace with the town's modest growth.

The section describing Owerri's development is followed by one describing attempts in Nigeria by both the colonial and the independent government to develop urban plans and implement them. It notes the lack of success in town planning, most especially in implementation. Two recent initiatives have tried to improve this – the 1978 Land Use Decree and the urban policy contained within the 1975–80 Third National Development Plan. But it is too early to assess their relevance and their effectiveness to a place like Owerri.

In conclusion, the paper questions whether Owerri will develop as rapidly as the master plan suggests, given its past performance and its difficulty in developing a strong economic base. Owerri faces continued competition from more buoyant commercial and industrial towns in the State (like Aba and Umuahia). And it is a pity that the master plan does not seem to be related to any broad regional programme linking it with rural areas and other

urban centres. Furthermore, the paper criticises the master plan's concentration on land use and physical development rather than 'on the people and the process of filling in and utilising the planned space . . . Such plans often reflect the values, needs and lifestyles of the privileged few, but do not sufficiently address themselves to the needs of the less privileged majority who are much more concerned about low cost housing, rent subsidy, job opportunities and better pay, the ability to acquire secure titles to property, and credit facilities to develop them, easier access to medical and related facilities . . .' (p. 240). It notes that on the practical side of implementation 'the history of town planning in Nigeria reveals crippling problems of coordination, funding and administration' (p. 241). Town planning has to compete with other pressing needs in the State and since it is not in itself financially profitable, governments and private enterprise are not very enthusiastic about it. Loans are difficult to get. The paper notes the recent observation that 'the only operational plans are the annual recurrent and capital budgets and the work plans of the agencies that perform urban functions<sup>4</sup>, and these invariably differ from those in conventional masterplans.

1. Galantay, Ervin Y., *The Development of Owerri*, a short paper published in *Third World Planning Review*, Vol II, No II, Autumn 1980, pp 243-244, is a response to this paper since Galantay worked on the master plan for the consultants, C. Fingerhuth and Partners.

2. Editor's note: in this year the number of Nigerian states was increased from 12 to 19.

3. Galantay suggests that Owerri's current population is close to 90,000.

4. Editor's note: this comment is given within quotation marks but no source is given.

ONYEMELUKWE, J.O.C.

## SOME FACTORS IN THE GROWTH OF WEST AFRICAN MARKET TOWNS: THE EXAMPLE OF PRE-CIVIL WAR ONITSHA, NIGERIA

*Urban Studies*, Vol II, No 1, February 1974, pp 47-59.

The paper's main objective is to identify and examine the main factors contributing to Onitsha's growth, and to the development of its market. It also seeks to draw attention to the marketing aspect of centre-periphery relations in a sub-national context. The paper's thesis is that urban growth centres in developing countries are not necessarily based on industry, although industry can develop later, after primary and tertiary activities have developed. The agricultural landscape around Onitsha (a river port on the left bank of the Niger River) is characterised by increasingly fragmented and uneconomic farm holdings where the fallow period has been drastically reduced. Although traditionally an agricultural area, this part of the country is a food deficit area and depends on inter-regional trade. Lack of land and poor agricultural returns act as push factors. Maps show population density for Nigeria based on the 1963 census, the geology of south-eastern Nigeria and the

weekly flows of staple foodstuffs from Onitsha to sub-distribution centres (1965-66). There are major trading links to the south-west and south-east coast and to distant northern areas. Tables give information on inter-regional migration in Nigeria in the 1950s, retail prices for manufactured goods in various urban markets in Nigeria for 1963, the price of fruit at the village (source) markets and in Onitsha markets during the peak of supply 1965-66 and frequency of food shipments to Onitsha wholesale traders for 1966.

Onitsha is some 320 kilometres from the Atlantic shore line, near the core area of the high population density Ibo heartland. It developed into a large centre of over 160,000 inhabitants before the Civil War (1967-70). It was a 17th Century village created by a group of migrants on a well-drained riverain site by relatively high, firm, dry ground. A British trade voyage in 1857 chose Onitsha as a base, both because of the healthy site compared to low-lying malarial areas nearby and because of its close proximity to the oil palm-rich Iboland east of the Niger. Trade in palm produce (for which there was rising demand in Europe) was an attractive replacement for the slave trade. Onitsha became the centre for oil palm export out of Iboland and the centre through which imported goods were brought in exchange. By 1900, over 90 per cent of Nigeria's export trade was palm produce. The town also became the ecclesiastical and educational centre of Iboland and the point for the first (and at least up to the 1970s only) trunk road with a bridge across the lower Niger. It became the headquarters of Onitsha Province and in 1917 was designated by the British as a Second Class Township<sup>1</sup>. By this date, what had previously been a periodic market in a four day cycle had developed into a daily market. In 1917, Onitsha had 18,014 inhabitants.

New motor roads and the occasional steamer call from Europe helped increase the market's sphere of influence and even the largest periodic markets nearby were quickly dwarfed and their areal influence engulfed. The town's population growth was increased by the large-scale movement of people from the food deficit Ibo heartland into Onitsha. The 1953 census showed that nearly 70 per cent of its adult population were trading and about 73 per cent of total population were non-Onitsha Ibos. Among the factors attracting farmers to the town's market were the prospect of bulk sales for cash and the far wider range of goods on sale there. 'The prospects of quick sales in bulk and for cash, and of cheap purchases from wide ranges and assortments of goods, all of which more than made up for the problems both of transport costs and of low margins per unit sale' (p. 53).

The paper examines in some detail the flow of goods between Onitsha and distant centres such as Kano, Jos, Port Harcourt, Warri and Lagos, and the way in which the commercial transactions and transport were organised. Traders would usually have a representative in distant sub-distribution centres and often use truck transporters to undertake the shipments both of goods and proceeds. This 'way-bill' system is described in some detail. The paper notes the fact that most of those involved in trade and transport were Ibos and that there was a high degree of trust between those involved to allow the system to work. In the market trade, capital in both money and stock was often borrowed interest-free with no formal documentation.

This appeared to highlight the factor of ethnic particularism in the trade business. The traders who interacted between Onitsha market and most of the

northern centres and Lagos were almost invariably of the same ethnic (Ibo) origin. So were the drivers operating between them and serving as their transporters as well as their unofficial trustees in frequent money transfers' (p. 55). One of the paper's findings is the strong correlation between the volume of trade from Onitsha to market centres outside Ibo country and the number of Ibo in those centres. There was also a significant (but less strong) correlation between trade flows and freight rates.

Thus, 'the rise of Onitsha as a growth centre and the development of the areal influence of Onitsha market can be seen as a result of a combination of physical, economic and socio-cultural factors. The initial advantages of nodality, relative nearness and accessibility to the densely peopled, oil palm-rich Ibo heartland amounted to considerable competitive advantages. Indeed, the fact that Onitsha was a late starter in the regional development race which it later won, as it were, from its rival river ports – Aboh, Asaba and Lokoja – underscores this factor of comparative advantage. The latter provided the initial mainspring for economic growth and the basis for scale economies often concomitant with growth. The cumulative effects of scale economies (which have been well illustrated with the phenomenon of low commodity prices in Onitsha market) stimulated further growth until the Civil War, and widened the gap between Onitsha and its rivals which were relegated to the economic hinterland of Onitsha market.... The importance of Ibo entrepreneurship as a significant factor in the scale and areal scope of Onitsha market's distribution function has been seen to derive from interesting economic and socio-cultural factors. One of the main causes of large-scale Ibo migration to distant urban markets of Nigeria was the economic implications of high man:land ratios in the Ibo heartland' (p. 55).

The Civil War's effect on Onitsha was the devastation of the city and the withdrawal of the market's main growth factor: the Ibo merchants from other parts of the country. Onitsha's ability to regain its pre-war place in the country's internal exchange system will depend on the speed and the scale of redistribution of the Ibos in the market's pre-war service area.

1. Editor's note: Lagos was the only town given First Class status.

SMITH, GAVIN A.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AMONG RURAL-BASED PETTY PRODUCERS IN CENTRAL PERU 1880-1970

*The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol 6/3, April 1979, pp 286-310.

The paper looks at the development of socio-economic differentiation in the village of Huasicancha between 1880 and 1970. Its main focus is on changing production relations between villagers, and between villagers and the outside in three periods: 1886-1920; 1920-1945; and 1945-1970.

Huasicancha is a peasant community in the high pasture region of Peru's central Andes. The area is well-suited to livestock grazing, although the control of much of this pasture by haciendas (large ranches) has forced villagers into arable farming on the steep hillsides of river valleys. The people who refer to themselves as 'of the community of Huasicancha' number some 3,500 of whom roughly half are village residents living off farming, crafts and trading and half work in urban centres such as Huancayo (the departmental capital) or Lima.

Up to the 1940s, the major outside influence on the village was the neighbouring hacienda which, at its height, controlled over 28,000 hectares of land in contrast to the villagers who at that time had uncontested access to less than 120 hectares of pasture. Between 1886 and 1920, the hacienda followed its traditional pattern of producing animal and arable farm products for domestic consumption and for sale. It did not become heavily involved in the expanding wool production which in many haciendas elsewhere was pushing peasants off the land. Village residents relied on a mix of livestock and arable farming (the latter on both communal and individual plots) and trade (mostly barter). In the dry season, sheeps and llamas were moved to high zone pastures and access to the best pastures was of great importance. There were complex and important inter-household ties. For instance, several households usually shared a highland 'estancia' (shepherd's dwelling and corral) or through an arrangement known as 'huacchilla', households lacking young men for highland shepherding recruited people from households deficient in livestock who were paid with a share of the lambs and llama caives. Alternatively, a flock-owner looked after another household's flock in return for (say) labour on the flock-owner's arable land.

While livestock were the village's economic backbone, households became increasingly involved in arable farming in the 1886-1920 period for two reasons: first, the hacienda expanded the area under its control, reducing villagers' access to pasture; secondly, farmers in the nearby lower valley who had previously bartered crops for villagers' livestock products increasingly produced crops for sale in the national market. Thus, most households reduced herding in favour of arable farming. This in turn reduced the importance of communal farming and communal control of arable land use and meant that households sought to cling onto individual plots and to

hand them on to offspring when the household head died rather than return them to the village authorities. Households also gradually encroached onto fields farmed by the community. And annual bartering with households in the high jungle for corn and coca leaf, which traditionally coincided with harvest time, came to be done by a small group of young men on behalf of a number of households, so more labour was available for the harvest. Thus a group of traders emerged.

Between 1920 and 1948 the hacienda developed as a commercial unit and came to dominate the selling of livestock on the commercial market where previously both hacienda and larger village herders had sold livestock. The town of Huancayo began developing an industrial base and a railway made it possible for highland cattle ranchers to supply Lima with dairy produce. The hacienda next to the village was too remote for this but developed its wool production and during the 1920s and 1930s, extended its boundaries, driving some village herders even higher in search of pasture and forcing others to make trespassing on hacienda land a way of life. Meanwhile, the hacienda employed shepherds from the village by exchanging households' rights to graze animals on hacienda land for care of hacienda animals. A major conflict came from the hacienda claiming that too many villagers' animals were kept on hacienda land. The decline in pasture availability for villagers meant some herders migrated to become foremen in more distant haciendas, although they usually maintained a small plot and a house in the village. These foremen were the first to send sons to Huancayo for education or apprenticeships.

Poorer village households seem to have been hardest hit as traditional inter-household arrangements broke down. Some made a living specialising in crafts like weaving and pottery (which formerly all households undertook) while others took the place of shepherds who had left. Seasonal migration became common with most households sending members to work on cotton plantations between 1920 and 1939. During the 1930s, national government investment in public works created jobs and many seasonal migrant workers also worked in road construction. From the 1930s onwards, households who had earlier sent members to Huancayo began to move their residence there although they often maintained arable farming in the village through members returning during important periods and through huacchilla arrangements for livestock. When the cotton market collapsed in 1938 and local road building diminished, a number of villagers went to Lima. By the end of this period, a small colony of villagers were in an inner city slum there. The increasing importance of non-farm occupations did not reduce the importance of subsistence farming. Women increasingly took over the estancias. Inter-household economic ties within the village were reduced while individual households came to depend more on non-farming occupations.

Between 1948 and 1970, one saw the transition from aggressive capitalist penetration of agriculture in the Andean hinterland to capital increasingly concentrated in urban centres, especially Lima. The hacienda tried to rationalise labour relations along wage lines which meant that their shepherds would no longer have access to hacienda pasture for their animals as payment. Villagers responded by occupying some of the hacienda's land. Throughout the 1950s, the hacienda fought these invasions and tried to reduce the villagers' use of hacienda land. It also employed fewer shepherds.

By the 1950s, migration was a way of life for villagers. By the mid-1950s, Huancayo had around half of all village migrants, most of them young men or women from poorer households working in the market-place or in casual labour or petty commerce and keeping strong ties with the village. However, an important core now resided permanently in Huancayo. Through the 1960s, this core grew while Lima became the focus of migration for the young. By 1970, there were colonies of village migrants in two inner city lots and in three shanty towns in Lima. Better-off migrants in both Lima and Huancayo began to re-establish economic interests in the village but usually with village households and through no direct payments. These inter-household arrangements were, for instance, villagers working migrants' land and livestock while migrants lodged villagers' children, kept village partners informed about job prospects in the city and in some instances provided loans or arranged villagers' petitions to government agencies or attended to villagers' legal affairs. These are termed household confederations by the article. Thus, complex production relations among households which thrived in the first period and had been reduced in the second now re-emerged in a new form.

The development of a rich mine close to the village during the 1950s provided regular or casual work for some villagers. Mine-workers could also manage their own village affairs since the mine was close. When the mine began to lay off workers in the mid-1960s, some former mine-workers had the capital to invest in farming and began to employ labourers on a contractual basis, referring to the labourers in the old hacienda term 'peon' (serf). By 1972, four of the six wealthiest farmers in the village were those who had spent six to ten years working at the mine.

While livestock numbers had reduced between 1920 and 1949, numbers increased in this third period, although much of this increase was concentrated in the hands of a few capitalist farmers and a larger number of household confederations. Even when the village managed to acquire the hacienda's land in 1972, the poorer migrants and village residents were not able to re-establish herding activities as a significant part of their livelihood. The long-term development of capitalism in the village will depend on two factors – firstly, the resilience of household confederations in resisting the larger farmers' expansion onto more and more community pasture (just as the hacienda had done previously) and secondly, the room left by the dominant large-scale capitalist economy for the development of petty capitalist livestock.

SOIFFER, STEPHEN M., and  
HOWE, GARY N.

**PATRONS, CLIENTS AND THE  
ARTICULATION OF MODES OF  
PRODUCTION: AN EXAMINATION OF  
THE PENETRATION OF CAPITALISM  
INTO PERIPHERAL AGRICULTURE IN  
NORTH-EASTERN BRAZIL<sup>1</sup>**

*The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol 9/2, January  
1982, pp 176–206.

The paper describes the changes over 80 years in the relations between elite and rural masses in a small farming town in northeastern Brazil, Barro, which had some 2,000 inhabitants in 1974. It divides the period 1897–1975 into eight distinct stages based on differences in patron-client relations which gradually show the erosion of a single land-owner's political and economic power at the expense of the state, and the change from pre-capitalist to transitional to capitalist mode of production in agriculture.

The first part of the paper discusses the concept of 'mode of production' and states that it is a concept elaborated by relatively recent Marxist writers since Marx himself used the expression 'rarely and loosely in *Capital*' (p. 177). Theoretically, the article is close to the position of Rey who suggested three sequential steps in the articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production: peasant agriculture and handicrafts production existing side by side with commercial farming and manufacture; the development of large-scale industry which destroys most handicraft production and restructures the peasantry as full time commodity producers; and the massive entry of capital as capital into agriculture with peasant agriculture destroyed, leaving a rural proletariat without land and the full incorporation of agricultural labour into the capitalist mode of production.

The rest of the paper is largely devoted to explaining the changes in patron-client relations over time. In the first period, 1897–1905, modern habitation begins with the most powerful figure in Milagres, the town immediately to the South, buying the land and selling it at a nominal sum to his favourite nephew. This nephew becomes the all powerful local patron who settles on an estate and allows peasants to establish subsistence plots around him in return for working his lands, most especially at harvest and planting time. At this point, there is no town of Barro but various rural clusters with a population of perhaps 150, some of which preceded the establishment of the estate. The landowner supplies the peasants with land, implements and credit. Relations between patron and clients probably came close to feudal rights in person. What little production of goods for sale there is – the production of sun-dried beef – is mostly confined to the land-owner's estate.

In the second period, 1905–1915, crop production for sale becomes common – with the introduction of cotton, and some new landowners emerge, whose interests in some cases conflict with those of the major landowner – for instance over his monopoly of marketing the cotton and near-monopoly over the surplus labour of the rural masses. But he remains the major power and orders the

murder of a state revenue agent who has been despatched to the community at the urging of other landowners in 1907. In this period, there is also the first appearance of share-cropping arrangements, showing landowners' desire to bind peasants to the land through formal agreements and thus to counteract the shortage of labour and to break the patron's monopoly over surplus labour. The patron himself has only a few resident share-croppers on his land. Wage labour and ground rent are not apparent. And as one Barro octogenarian resident puts it, the patron is the government, the bank and the market place all in one.

The third period, 1915–1922, sees the patron's role change to that of the representative of the local elite in the frequently antagonistic dealings with both the state and the agents of the marketing and banking system. Although most of the production for all but a few producers remains subsistence, most of the local elite's land is now producing crops for sale. The patron maintains his control over marketing and credit and through reciprocal relations with 'social bandits' and armed retainers, quashes resistance to his domination. However, this comes to a head in the fourth period, the year 1922, when the state government sends troops against Barro, using the patron's involvement with bandits as an excuse. The patron is arrested but flees to the interior, after bribing the jailor on the night of his arrest. The development of the capitalist mode of production had made the patron's position untenable and neither the state nor merchant capitalists could tolerate an individual who stood in the way of the expansion of commodity production, the re-organisation of rural labour and the juridical and administrative rationalisation which is part of this.

The fifth period, 1922 to the early 1930s, sees the rising importance of crop production for sale and the rise in agrarian labour based on direct payment or on a certain portion of the production. The local land-owning elite are the patrons and in this period become, with their clients, more dependent on the whole capitalist mode of production and more vulnerable to variations in commodity prices.

In the sixth period between the mid-1930s and mid-1950s, patrons become direct representatives of the state. It is the state which assumes primary responsibility for anti-drought measures, for road construction, for schools and for health programmes. A group of the local elites begin to move to towns or even to large regional cities. Ground rent appears and rapidly replaces share-cropping as the form most readily available to landless labourers. On plantations, owners increasingly pay for labour. Thus, the peasant is no longer able to count on minimal support from patrons (as before) in times of difficulty or disaster. However, the political role of the patron becomes more important in his ability to deliver the rural masses' votes. And the man who emerges as the principal patron in Barro does so through his control of state funds – for instance anti-drought funds provided by a national agency. Previous sources of patrons' power such as credit, basic social welfare and protection now come from the state, the banks and the police.

In the seventh period, beginning in the mid-1950s, the patrons' role is further reduced as his role as agent of the state is increasingly performed by state bureaucrats and a systematic state administration. It is within this period that the regional development agency SUDENE<sup>2</sup> became important in facilitating the entry of capital into both agriculture and industry in the northeast. The patron has



some role as broker between the masses and the state (for instance in helping a client see a doctor at the state-run infirmary or helping ensure the client obtains good seed and fertiliser from state agencies). At this time, there are a growing number of 'minifundistas', producers largely dependent for their subsistence on the smallest units of land. The economy of Barro has become more fully integrated into the national market. By 1960, local handicraft production in the town has been completely destroyed. Commodities replacing them and replacing formerly locally grown domestic foodstuffs are sold at a weekly market. Share-croppers are increasingly replaced by wage labour which means a reduction in the number of people residing on plantation land. Barro's population grew from 500 in 1960 to an estimated 2,000 in 1974. Absentee land-ownership expanded in this period.

The final stage, the year 1975, is a natural extension of the previous one with the patron being deprived of his role as a broker between the masses and the state and reduced to a supplicant for state favour. Many of the masses see the state more as a patron. At this point, the traditional patron has no real choice but to ally himself with capital in a subservient way, accepting the severe restrictions on his role as patron and presenting the benefits of state patronage as if they were his own generosity. He has to compete with the state for the ideological support and control of labour among the rural masses. He could fight the increasing encroachment of the state in all his traditional roles but the paper suggests that such a strategy is doomed as it cannot survive against the capitalist re-orientation of rural relations of production.

1. Editor's note: it is impossible in a short summary to do justice to the complex theoretical discussions included in this long paper. In addition, we have tried to keep to a minimum the use of specialised marxist terminology.

2. Editor's note: SUDENE is the Superintendency for the Development of the North-East.

THAXTON, RALPH.

## THE PEASANTS OF YAOCUN: MEMORIES OF EXPLOITATION, INJUSTICE, AND LIBERATION IN A CHINESE VILLAGE<sup>1</sup>

*Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol 9/1, October  
1981, pp 3-46.

The paper looks at the problems of livelihood faced by peasants in a large village in North China between 1911 and 1943. The paper looks at the mechanisms by which peasants were increasingly impoverished during this period, the popular movements they took part in against landlord exploitation, the effect of the Japanese invasion and finally, the substantial changes brought about by Communist Party leadership after 1943. Information is drawn largely from interviews with people inhabiting Yaocun in 1980.

Yaocun had 2,465 inhabitants when the paper was written (1980) and its population had long surpassed the ability of the agricultural land base to supply subsistence

needs. It had only 0.04 hectares of land per inhabitant. The village has a long history and although relatively isolated from the mainstream of Chinese civilisation, it is on the main road running north from the county capital which has 20,000 inhabitants.

In 1923, Yaocun had 324 families and an agricultural land base of 120 hectares, a substantial amount of land by most village standards in this part of North China. 61 per cent of this was in the hands of 11 landlords and 15 rich peasants with a further 19 per cent being held by some 35 middle peasant households whose average holding was about 0.6 of a hectare. The remaining 263 peasant families who made up 81 per cent of all households had the remaining 20 per cent of land and their family landholdings averaged little more than 0.07 to 0.13 hectares.

Life was particularly hard on these 'micro-peasants' since even in the best years, using high quality agricultural land, a family of five would need the produce of one quarter to one third of a hectare to meet subsistence needs. By the 1920s, this poor majority of households who owned insufficient land to meet their subsistence needs increasingly rented land from the village landlords. Land was either rented on a share-cropping basis with the landlord taking 60 per cent or more of the total crop or on a fixed rent basis. Fixed rents were paid in grain and were generally for between half and two thirds of what the total yield would be in a good year. While the fixed rent system allowed renters to make a good profit in exceptional years, it also demanded full payment in poor years. And in drought years, this could mean a higher payment in grain than all the rented land produced. Landlords and rich peasants not only had the best land but they enjoyed a fairly tight monopoly on water needed to develop wheat production. First, landlords had the capital to drill costly deep wells in village fields and deterred peasants from doing so. Secondly, landlords owned most of the donkeys and these could out-compete peasants when water had to be taken from river beds or high mountain streams.

Poor small-holders who had to rent land to survive resorted to various ways of coping with the problem of fixed rent. One was a renewed emphasis on side occupations - mostly the raising of rabbits, ducks and pigs or making coal balls for sale. Another was the migration of men out of the village to work as carpenters, blacksmiths or stone-cutters while women tilled the fixed rent fields. By the late 1920s, women made up the majority of Yaocun's poor rental peasant workforce. Finally, according to the author, peasants rented less land in years of drought, although it is not clear to the author how peasants managed to anticipate when a drought was coming.

The fixed rent system aided land ownership concentration. Poor peasants lost their tiny family landholdings or had to sell part of them to pay the fixed rent when a poor harvest meant it could not be paid in grain. Or landlords took land when peasants could not meet debt obligations. By 1933, some 63 of the 263 poor peasant households had become landless. In the drought-ridden 1920s and 1930s, some households migrated permanently. 101 families migrated or turned to begging to survive although 49 of these returned after 1943. Many of those who did not return are known to have died of hunger.

The paper then describes the Tianmen Hue (Heavenly Gate) Society movement (in which poor rental peasants became involved) against Republic warlord rule,

oppressive taxation and bandit pillage. Dissent swelled into pressure on landlords to reduce rents and to stop charging interest on peasant debts but it did not attempt to do away with landlords. However, between the late 1920s and the early 1930s, this movement was destroyed by a new regime which was allied to the landlords. Under this new regime, warlordism and banditry reappeared, as did press-gangs. Many interviewees believe there were liaisons between bandits and the new county government. County authorities enlisted district level leadership from people who had enough money and land to purchase a district post so landlords became district officials and collected taxes for the county government. Landlords' right to charge fixed rents was no longer questioned. The years following the defeat of the Tianmen Hue movement were characterised by peasant flight from landlord rent collectors (who were also district tax collectors) with out-migration and begging becoming endemic.

Thus, in the years from 1911 to the late 1930s, Yaocun, traditionally a village with a predominance of smallholders, was transformed into a village characterised by share-cropping and part tenancy/part smallholdership. The new regime which came to power in the late 1920s and early 1930s reinforced this transformation and worsened its social consequences. The majority of the village's peasants managed to survive in part because it had more stable water resources than other areas, in part because it was a big market village and the trade which came to it from neighbouring villages helped many peasants to last out this period of landlord domination.

The paper terms 1938–1945 the years of rent reduction, migrant revolt and communist power. It describes how migrants into the village and village migrants who returned played a major role in the struggle leading up to the village's liberation in 1943 and the effect of the Japanese army on the village. Between 1938 and 1943, the Chinese Communist Party gained in power and influence and won support through its opposition to taxes and its support for peasants during the drought in 1942. By July 1943, landlords in the village were no longer able to call either on the Japanese or the former ruling regime to defend their interests. In the winter of 1943, the peasants of Yaocun took part in a mass movement to reduce rent and interest, promoted by the Peasant Association. First, sharecroppers' share of produce on rented land changed from 30 per cent to 70 per cent. Then 25 per cent reductions in fixed rent were demanded which were in some instances back-dated so landlords had to repay their tenants.

Landlords still had the right to buy and sell land and to till it themselves, although many now hired farm hands to do so rather than rent out land. Prior to the 1943 rent reduction campaign, some 180 families had been involved in fixed rent relations. By the end of 1943, fixed rent had been virtually eliminated. Landlords had returned the land to the 180 families they had dispossessed through usury. Many landlords fled in the next few years while those who stayed lost their status. One even lost his ears as these were cut off by the villagers.

1. Editor's note: this summary concentrates on information presented about landlord-peasant relations, crop production and other factors of relevance to the settlement's economic and social base. It does not try to summarise the information the article contains about the very complex political changes the village, the region and the whole nation underwent.

## VERDUZCO, GUSTAVO

### URBAN GROWTH AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF ZAMORA, MICHOACAN

(Crecimiento urbano y desarrollo regional: el caso de Zamora, Michoacan)  
*Revista Interamericana de Planificación*, Vol XVIII, No 71, September 1984, pp 67–80.

The paper examines, from a historical perspective, the growth of Zamora, a city with 150,000 inhabitants in 1980<sup>1</sup>, located in the State of Michoacan, eastern Mexico. The focus of attention is the relationship between this small city and its surrounding region, the so-called 'Bajío Zamorano'. The usefulness of this analysis lies in the fact that 'it reveals the main features of the type of structural relationship which inhibits or promotes certain changes in the rural and urban activities of a region in the country' (p. 68).

The author stresses Roberts' argument that urbanization in Latin America must be seen as an essential outcome of capitalist expansion throughout the world. The causes for urban primacy must not be sought directly in the lack of growth of industrial activities, but in the dependent and peripheral role played by the Mexican economy vis-a-vis the more industrialised core countries. Mexico's regional economic policies must therefore be seen in the light of the changes in this role.

Zamora is located in a valley bearing its name and is surrounded by some 16,000 hectares of irrigated land. The traditional crops in the region are corn, wheat and chickpeas, although in the last 35 years new crops have appeared, such as potato, onion, strawberries and other vegetables.

The paper describes in some detail the most important developments in the history of the region. Irrigation works and the arrival of the railway were the two main contributing factors to an increase in grain production, in the last decade of the 19th Century. Under the 'Porfiriato'<sup>2</sup>, Zamora's landowners thrived and the city, which by 1910 had a population of 15,000, consolidated its intermediary role between the region and the national market. The local small industries and the artisan workshops enjoyed a steady growth in this period, given no national scale industries to compete with. The growth in agricultural production also increased the demand for technicians and skilled labour force, most of whom started concentrating in Zamora.

The available data leads the author to hypothesize that at the time of the implementation of Mexico's agrarian reform (1925–1940), which took place in the 1930s in the study region, production in the haciendas<sup>3</sup> was more a social status symbol rather than a source of wealth. Some of the reasons for this probably lie in the insecurity resulting from the civil war and the frequent interruptions suffered by the communication systems. By 1940, almost four-fifths of the land in the valley of Zamora had been distributed.

In the 1940s local financiers thrived, as more credits were required to bring the land back into production, and they soon became the more influential social group in the region. Although by then most peasants owned the land

they tilled, a process of social differentiation also took place among them, as some had better political connections and less economic problems than others.

The consolidation of agricultural activities after the distribution of land was followed by a higher population growth: growth rate in the valley rose from two per cent per annum between 1930 and 1940 to 2.9 per cent in 1950. Zamora's population, on the other hand, grew at an average four per cent between 1940 and 1950, when it reached 23,397. In the background of this rapid growth lay not only a higher agricultural production but also an increase in commercial activities, where most of the products traded were produced by industries at the national level. The role of financiers was further consolidated after the creation of a local bank.

Improvements in the systems of irrigation increased the amount of land under cultivation from 13,000 hectares in 1953 to 40,000 hectares in 1957, and three production cycles throughout the year were now possible. Production was substantially increased and diversified. As a result of the new cycle of prosperity, the population in the region continued to grow as fast as in the 1940s. With the construction of a paved road connecting Zamora with the rest of the country, the city's role as a service and commercial centre was enhanced.

Strawberry cultivation, started in the 1960s, introduced new changes to the region. This new product, whose main market was the United States, requires water in plenty and its cultivation is labour-intensive. Packing plants were soon set up and the total value of the product exceeded that of all the other products in the region. By 1976-77, 16 per cent of all the irrigated lands were producing strawberry and that year's crop represented 62 per cent of the other crops' total value.

Other labour-intensive crops were also introduced, with clear effects upon population growth rates. The municipalities of Zamora and Jacona grew on average 4.5 per cent and 6.4 per cent per year between 1960 and 1970, respectively. The population of the region, not including Zamora and Jacona, on the other hand, grew at the much lower rate of 1.3 per cent. This is explained by the fact that the labour market outside these two settlements was soon saturated, and at the same time many of the smaller farmers who could not afford the switch to the new products had to leave their plots.

The paper goes into some detail about the type of urban activities now taking place in Zamora, the region's migratory movements and the transformations experienced by the labour force. According to data from the early 1980s, the city's economic base is of a commercial type, largely small-scale family-run food stores, but also larger wholesale businesses catering for the agriculturalists.

Over half the city's labour force is comprised of migrants almost half of whom lived in villages located in neighbouring municipalities prior to their arrival in the city. However the city not only receives new population, it also creates out-migrants. Half the city's native families have one member living outside the region, chiefly in California (USA), Mexico City and Guadalajara.

Most of the migrants to Zamora originally came from families whose livelihood depended on the land. The author points out the sudden changes that took place from one generation to the next one, as these migrants abandoned their parents' occupation (agriculture) to move into commerce and services. Most migrants, though, had already worked in these sectors before

migrating to Zamora. This is a reflection of the changes in the structure of agricultural production in the region, and also of the increasing concentration of the region's services and commercial activities in Zamora, a process which had generated some unemployment in smaller townships.

As Zamora's case is by no means atypical in Mexico, the paper concludes by pointing out that Mexico's development policies have promoted imbalances at various levels. They have encouraged rural out-migration and unemployment in smaller urban centres. Given this situation, the author endorses Garza's suggestion that in present-day Mexico only a policy of 'concentrated deconcentration' can be realistically promoted, i.e. a policy of promoting de-concentration in only a few cities throughout the country.

1. Editor's note: this is the author's estimate and it includes the neighbouring town of Jacona, which has been engulfed by Zamora's expansion.

2. Editor's note: the 'Porfiriato' is the name given to the autocratic government of Porfirio Díaz, who ruled almost uninterrupted from 1877 to 1911.

3. Large-scale farms.

## 1h PLANNING

BLUNT, Ismailia Sites and Services and Upgrading Projects – a Preliminary Evaluation

DAVIDSON, Ismailia: from Master Plan to Implementation

STEWART, The Development of the City of Suez

WELBANK and EDWARDS, Port Said: Planning for Reconstruction and Development

BLUNT, ALISTAIR

### ISMAILIA SITES-AND-SERVICES AND UPGRADING PROJECTS – A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

*Habitat International*, Vol 6, No 5/6, 1982, pp 587–597.

The paper describes the administration, organization and implementation of the Hai el Salam project in Ismailia, Egypt, up to 1981. A paper by Davidson<sup>1</sup> described the background to the project and how it fitted into Ismailia's masterplan and longer term development. Blunt's paper complements this with its concentration on the organizational aspects (and how these changed over time) and on a preliminary evaluation.

The Hai el Salam project was the first upgrading and serviced site scheme to be implemented in Egypt. It encompassed some 130 hectares of existing housing and a further 90 hectares adjacent to it for sites and services. It sought to demonstrate a more effective, more cost effective and more easily replicable approach to improving housing conditions than the 'traditional' Egyptian public provision of subsidized rented accommodation. The paper notes that similar kinds of schemes are now being implemented in Alexandria, Cairo, Asyut, Port Said and Suez, although this approach is 'not enshrined wholly within the Government's present Housing Plan' (p. 587).

The paper's main concentration is on how the project's administration and organization were set up and then changed as the project developed. It notes how the original project stated the need for a special agency to implement it 'free of the restrictions of the local bureaucracy' (p. 588). It describes the responsibilities of this agency and its board of directors (which included representatives from the governorate and from the city council) and how these responsibilities changed over time. The problems the agency had to contend with are described, including the initial reluctance of senior management staff (who held positions within the governorate) to give sufficient attention to the project. It also notes the problems of inter-agency coordination. In Ismailia, water is provided by the Suez Canal Authority while electricity is supplied by an autonomous public sector company. But the agency eventually had to pay for most of the costs of the street lighting and water. The city council is responsible for sewerage and drainage, together with the National Authority for Potable Water and Sewerage. But the local revenue base for such

investments is weak. Under the Local Government Act of 1979, governorates have total responsibility for meeting housing needs and greater autonomy in financial and planning matters but their role is limited by their own weak fiscal base and their reliance on central government for funds.

In evaluating the project, the paper examines whether initial objectives – such as relevance to low income groups, minimal unit subsidy, implementation without continued outside support and expertise – and replicability were met. The plot allocation system is described both for the squatter area and for serviced sites. Priority was given to households already within the project area, with second priority to residents in Ismailia prior to the 1967 evacuation. The lack of easily collectable and reliable income data meant that no income criteria were considered. Plot prices varied according to size and to location with regard to such elements as main roads or commercial areas.

At the end of the second year, about 25 per cent of the existing area plots had been given a formal title and about 80 per cent of the plots in the new area had been allocated. 90 per cent of the plots awarded were being developed after 18 months. A substantial proportion of the infrastructure and physical and community services had been completed or were under construction, although delays in utilities, road provision and in assistance for house-building, such as provision of plans and availability of government subsidized building materials, have delayed development. The project has demonstrated the viability of new approaches to improving housing conditions which are implementable by local governments without having to draw heavily on their own funds or those of central government. The project is viewed as a success by the Governor and his Party. A second project has been started and further areas in Ismailia have been identified for upgrading, including the worst housing area. The project also stimulated the governorate to set up the Ismailia Planning and Land Development Agency. But the text notes that certain factors may make replicability harder to achieve. These include the fact that Hai el Salam was chosen because it had no physical or tenure problems to hinder the planning process<sup>2</sup> and the fact that the project obtained small amounts of inception capital and technical assistance which new projects may not receive.

1. Davidson, Forbes, Ismailia: From Masterplan to Implementation, annotated p.65 of this bibliography.

2. Prior to the project, Hai el Salam (previously called El Hekr) had long been a place where people could build their own houses on condition that they paid a small annual charge (el hekri) to the city which gave no security but legalized their squatting.

## DAVIDSON, FORBES

### ISMAILIA: FROM MASTERPLAN TO IMPLEMENTATION

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 3, No 2, May 1981, pp 161-178.

The paper describes how the Masterplan for Ismailia was prepared and then describes in some detail the design and implementation of a demonstration upgrading and new housing development project.

Ismailia city had some 175,000 inhabitants in 1975. It had been established about 100 years earlier as the headquarters of the Suez Canal Authority and had been laid out with a 'European quarter' (tree-lined boulevards and parks) and an 'Arab quarter' with a narrow grid lay-out. The Suez Canal Authority remains the largest employer while small-scale shipbuilding, light manufacturing and service industries also provide employment. The city has never had a stable employment base due to variations related to major construction works or politics. It was evacuated during the War between 1967 and 1974 but was not seriously damaged by the hostilities. It enjoys a beautiful site on the north shores of Lake Timsah, good communications with Cairo and a good water supply - from the 'sweetwater canal' which runs from the Nile and also serves Port Said and Suez.

The Masterplan was prepared during 1975 and early 1976. The government's original target population of 1 million by the year 2000 was considered too high. To reach 600,000 by then would require the development of small industries, the construction of serviced industrial areas, the development of the Canal University, the transfer of some central government jobs and some tourism development. The paper outlines Masterplan proposals for employment, housing, physical planning, tourism and agriculture.

For housing, one of the Masterplan's major recommendations was a change away from the direct provision of subsidised housing using central government funds to one where government provides the basic infrastructure and sub-divided plots with the construction undertaken by the private sector and the owners themselves. A concentration of public support on heavily subsidised social housing simply ensures that the scarce resources available for housing only benefit a small proportion of the population and give little or no help to those most in need. The paper then describes the demonstration project implemented in the El Hekr area of the city (recently renamed 'Hai el Salaam' or 'District of Peace' by the local council). This was an unplanned extension of the city onto desert land which housed some 40,000 people in 1977. The project includes upgrading for existing residential areas and developing a new adjacent area with the aim of bringing total population up to around 90,000 by the end of the century. The text describes the project's objectives, the consultants' approach, the research undertaken to establish the existing population's housing needs, the plans and proposals, and implementation. Among the objectives were: relevance to low income groups, minimum subsidy, relevance to social, economic and physical needs, easy implementation using existing skills and resources, and replicability. The

final section points to lessons learnt from the project.

One thread running through the whole paper is that the master planning process must be very closely tied to implementation. It notes that all too often 'the production of a series of maps and volumes is seen as an end in itself, rather than a first step in a continuous process' (p. 161). Plans have to be rooted in what exists. They also have to have achievable targets and obtain local support. One reason for the demonstration project's relative success was that the plans were tied closely to the realities of implementation, including a City Council with limited funds and technical capacity.

## STEWART, ROY

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITY OF SUEZ

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 3, No 2, May 1981, pp 179-200.

The paper describes how the Masterplan for Suez aims to provide the framework for reconstruction (to make good war damage) and for the city's rapid development up to the year 2000. The paper's main focus is on how government housing policies must change if they are to reach the low income majority with improved housing and on progress in this between 1975 and 1980.

In the mid-1960s, Suez was Egypt's third largest, and fastest growing urban area. Unlike the two other Canal Zone cities, Port Said and Ismailia which were established with the commencement of the canal's construction, Suez's history as a settlement pre-dates Roman occupation as a caravan watering point. Later it was a Roman settlement and then Egypt's Red Sea port closest to Cairo (some 136 kilometres away). The construction and opening of the Canal stimulated its growth and development. By 1966 it had 250,000 inhabitants and a population growth rate of 4.2 per cent per annum. Immigration was an important element of this, especially unskilled or partially skilled workers from Gena and Sohag<sup>1</sup>. Suez's economic base was more diversified than the other two Canal Zone cities with port activities (Canal Authority facilities, ship repair and provisioning), tourism, a substantial industrial base (including two oil refineries, a large fertilizer plant and a paper-making factory) and fishing and agriculture.

The city's population was evacuated in 1967 and people did not begin to return until early 1974. The city had suffered considerable war damage. Over half the housing stock was damaged beyond repair and the sewage treatment plant and power station had been destroyed. The water supply and sewerage systems were in a very poor state. And port installations and many industrial plants had been seriously damaged.

One section of the paper is devoted to the Suez Masterplan while other sections look at Suez in 1980, at future housing demand and at plans to try to meet this. The Masterplan prepared in 1975-6 was to provide the framework for the city's growth up to a population of 1 million by the year 2000. And it noted that the Egyptian Government's approach to urban housing problems (the

construction of five storey walk-up blocks) could not tackle Suez's housing problems unless it received 'an apparently unacceptable share of total national investment' (p. 183). Unit costs for such blocks were far too high.

By 1980, population had grown to some 260,000. The city's economic base had recovered rapidly. But there was a great problem in infrastructure shortages and this in turn had inhibited housing construction. Some 5,000 plots were not served by the city sewage system with an equivalent number not served by the water supply system. Approximately 8,000 privately developed plots had been occupied illegally. Sample surveys of private housing indicated that up to 7,000 buildings were structurally unsafe and that a further 4,000 had two families sharing space that was barely sufficient for one.

The rest of the paper concentrates on how present and future housing needs can be met. It begins with a detailed breakdown of housing demand for 1980-85 by income group and finds that despite ambitious public housing construction programmes, there will be a major shortfall in units constructed. It also points to the scarcity of large sites for rapid residential development due to problems of access to water, sewage and road systems and problems of suitable ground conditions and protection from flooding. Finally, it notes the enormous funding needed if conventional five storey walk-ups are to be built to meet needs.

The consultant team who had been involved in the Masterplan's preparation was asked to help the governorate develop new concepts of low cost housing and serviced site schemes to meet lower income households' needs with minimum capital investment. As a demonstration project, detailed planning for a new community to house 40,000 people some 7 kilometres from the existing city was undertaken but the major part of the plan was postponed indefinitely in 1978 due to lack of funds in the governorate to construct essential infrastructure. The consultants then proposed a pilot scheme on a much smaller scale in Suez and this was designed as core housing units which would be acceptable to low income households but with full cost recovery. The text describes the costs, layout and standards, and the funding plus cost recovery. It also describes how the plan was rejected by the local council in 1979, apparently because of the fear that such a project would create new slums. In redesigning the project to meet local objections, standards had to be increased with the net result that only the richest 25 per cent of households could afford an unsubsidized unit. Unit costs, however, were still well below those of conventional public housing units.

In a conclusions section, the author notes that weak local government remains a major problem. Governorate levels of government have increasingly inherited power which has been devolved from central government but have remained with limited revenue raising capacity and thus are dependent on central government for capital and for approval for their investment plans. Local government is heavily constrained by limited money and manpower, given the enormous tasks for which they are responsible. Misplaced optimism by the local council as to the availability of central government funds for public housing was perhaps a major factor in their rejection of the low cost housing scheme. '... the wholehearted local acceptance of appropriate forms of low cost housing on a large scale may take time to achieve in urbanized governorates. In

Suez that point in time is near and the experiences so far of the consultants and involved officers in attempting to bring it about have been valuable for the future. . . . At the present time perhaps the biggest obstacle to overcome in the short term (in addition to shortage of investment capital) is the financial resource to bring about the institutional developments in the governorate which officers and consultants have combined to specify' (p. 199-200).

1. Editor's note : These are governorates to the north of Aswan Governorate which is Egypt's southern-most governorate.

**WELBANK, MICHAEL, and  
EDWARDS, ANTHONY**

## **PORT SAID: PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT**

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 3, No 2, May 1981, pp 143-160.

The paper outlines Port Said's growth and development and looks at plans and programmes to guide its expansion and tackle its housing problems. Its population according to the 1976 census was 262,500.

Port Said was founded in 1860 as the port and Mediterranean supply base for the Suez Canal's construction. For nearly a century, its development was bound to the Canal since it was physically, economically and culturally isolated from the rest of Egypt, with the European community there dominant. By 1914, it had grown to a city of almost 100,000 people and during the 1920s and 1930s, it increasingly became a thriving Mediterranean city with traders, merchants and shipping agents. It expanded beyond its original sandbar site. Then, during the 1940s and 1950s, it developed into a more broadly-based trading community and a more Egyptian city as British control of the Canal Zone ceased in 1956. After this, there was a public sector development programme with new housing, schools and health facilities. At the outbreak of the 1967 war, it was a thriving city of 280,000 people. Its economic base was still rooted in the Canal; the port, shipyard and a multiplicity of trades servicing both ships and their passengers and crews being the major economic activities. In 1966, 71 per cent of the labour force was employed in the tertiary sector. A large public sector textile factory was the only major evidence of the new centralized economic planning. Normal civilian life ceased two years after the outbreak of war and the city was evacuated. Its lifelines had been cut, the Canal closed and its links into Egypt and its water and power supplies all but destroyed.

The paper then describes the Masterplan 1975-2000 which seeks to tackle the immediate problems of war damage (although the city's isolation saved it from the worst ravages of land fighting), to begin a reconstruction programme and to prepare a planning framework for the city's growth to house 750,000 people by the year 2000. Central to this is its promotion as an industrial free zone (especially for manufacturing industries producing for

export), development of the port's facilities and developing the agricultural and fisheries potential of its hinterland. Commenting on progress up to 1980, the paper notes that the conferral of free city status in January 1976 and in particular internal free zones for warehousing and industrial development has stimulated economic activities. Shipping and commercial activities grew rapidly although there are signs that investments in manufacturing industries has in a way further isolated the city from the rest of Egypt in that, to enter it, one has to pass customs and passport posts.

Four sections in the paper describe demonstration projects and a technical assistance programme, housing, new housing concepts, and future prospects. Demonstration projects were to prepare detailed plans for the development of new communities within the urban area for some 35,000 people and for the development of a free zone industrial estate, and to formulate proposals to upgrade part of the old city. Housing conditions and various public sector initiatives to try and improve these are described. So too are new housing concepts. Set against the developing economic base are various problems. First, there are major deficiencies in city infrastructure, especially in water supply and sewerage. Secondly, there is a lack of large dry-land development sites. Lack of building land has inhibited house construction. While an estimated 46,000 people live in shanties and temporary dwellings, one reason why their growth has been inhibited (along with the growth of legal private sector housing developments) is the lack of suitable land. Perhaps the large public housing programme initiated in 1974 along with the lack of a self-building tradition among city inhabitants and the high expectations among them for a 'delivered house' has also inhibited house construction. A land reclamation scheme initiated in 1979 will help ease land shortages in the short term but a rolling programme is needed. Thirdly, there is an acute shortage of housing, especially for the poorest and most deprived groups and a large and rapidly deteriorating pool of public housing with few or no resources devoted to their upgrading.

## 11 OTHER

BARROW, Urbanisation and Growth: Growth and Environmental Degradation in Penang (Georgetown)

GIHRING, Accessibility Choices and Opportunities in Zaria, Nigeria

ULACK, The Impact of Industrialisation upon the Population Characteristics of a Medium-Sized City in the Developing World

BARROW, C.J.

### URBANIZATION AND GROWTH: GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN PENANG (GEORGETOWN)

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 3, No 4,  
November 1981, pp 407-418.

The paper looks at the growth of Penang which is the second smallest of Peninsular Malaysia's eleven states. It has a long history of intensive occupation and land use which means relatively greater pressures on land and the environment. Penang State, and especially Georgetown, the largest city with 270,000 inhabitants on Penang Island have increasingly had to face environmental impacts which accompany the growth and concentration of a sophisticated urban population in a humid tropical habitat. Furthermore, space for expansion is restricted by topography. Communications are improving and new industrial activity is developing rapidly. The indications are that pressures on Penang's environment will not relax during the 1980s.

Penang Island (and Georgetown) grew in importance after the island was purchased by the British East India Company in 1786. Georgetown was an important port for colonial Malaya. Penang State's population in 1980 was an estimated 1,049,000 and was growing at around 2.7 per cent a year. It is the most densely populated state in Malaysia with some 743 persons per square kilometre compared to 67 persons per square kilometre for Malaysia as a whole. 56 per cent of the State's population is urban according to the 1970 census and only 7.7 per cent of the population is over 55 years old. Urban population is expected to expand during the 1980s.

There are various implications for an expanding urban population within a limited physical area. Population increase during the 1980s will outgrow the capacity of existing domestic water supply and sewage disposal facilities. More and more residential areas are encroaching on hillsides. On Georgetown's fringes, vegetable farmers have already been forced by building activities to cultivate sloping land up to 400 metres or more in altitude. Georgetown's increasingly decrepit town centre has led to the formulation of plans for urban renewal and for the establishment of new urban centres. These new centres have created considerable congestion on the existing roads into Georgetown.

The level of provision for sewage facilities in Georgetown is inadequate. Only 47.7 per cent of all living quarters have flush toilets which discharge water into a common sewer system. About 40 per cent still use the

bucket system while the rest have septic tanks. The combined effects of waste water and sewage discharges into the sea has been a growing pollution problem in coastal waters.

Barrow makes an analysis of urban development, industrialisation and tourism. Regarding urban development, he considers Georgetown a historic city and a tourist attraction. It is also increasingly becoming a centre for industrial growth. Plans must be made to revitalise the centre area of Georgetown without the excessive destruction of picturesque buildings and to allow the removal of larger industrial units from the city.

The paper also analyses industrial development from 1968 to 1977 and its impact on the environment. It mentions the discharges of untreated industrial wastes into natural water courses and into the sea, thus increasing water pollution. Tourism's impact probably represents the greatest threat to the environment after industrial development. Some of the tourist areas are the coastal zones where, despite efforts to restrict there are plans to develop these areas by creating tourist tracks linking several hills and merging the historic Botanical Gardens and a Youth Park for recreational use.

Barrow suggests that a master plan should be prepared and implemented as soon as possible. It should pay special attention to industrial expansion, improved communication, the impact of tourism and the need to house growing numbers of people within a limited area.

GIHRING, THOMAS

### ACCESSIBILITY CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ZARIA, NIGERIA

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 4, No 4,  
November 1982, pp 387-399.

The paper reports on the findings of a study on whether the people of Zaria would be better served by increasing accessibility and social contact opportunities or by increasing individual mobility and encouraging the physical separation of land uses. Zaria is a city in north Nigeria which had around 200,000 inhabitants when the study was done.

In studies of urban growth and change, social progress is often considered to be associated with the free flow of people, goods and information. If this implies emphasising 'movement' as a desired objective, urban planners may concentrate on transportation improvements and neglect land use planning. But if the purpose is to improve accessibility, this can be done by better transport systems (to overcome spatial separation



mechanically) or by land use planning to reduce spatial separation. In the West, especially in the United States, the preference has tended to be maximising accessibility through provision for privately owned automobiles. The result has been urban sprawl and heavy investments in improving urban road systems plus a widening gap between the rich and the poor. The paper also notes that urban sprawl combined with the effects of social heterogeneity has diminished 'social animation', the opportunity to engage in a variety of spontaneous human contacts in public places.

Zaria evolved as one of the original Hausa settlements, linked to the Arab World by an ancient trans-Saharan trade route. Under British rule, urban growth took the form of separate areas for 'natives' and for colonial staff offices and residences. Post-colonial town planning policies have tended to perpetuate this physical separation in the siting of new institutions.

Today, Zaria takes its shape from four distinct quarters: the original walled settlement largely inhabited by indigenous Muslim Hausa peoples; the original 'strangers quarter' largely inhabited by Hausa-speaking northern Nigerians; the 'new town' with the provincial government offices, the large commercial firms, the largest of the four urban markets and the largest concentration of households; and developments around Samaru, once a village, which has expanded rapidly with Ahmadu Bello University being located nearby.

Unlike its northern sister towns of Kaduna and Kano, Zaria has a weak industrial base. Its main economic activities centre around the university and various training colleges located in scattered compounds. These are self-contained enclaves, functionally and physically separate from the more densely settled areas.

Sub-sections in the paper describe the study approach, the methods used, the dimensions of travel (trip participation rate, mean distance travelled by trip purpose and choice of mode), the propensity for motorised transport, evaluations of trip-making and secondary contact behaviour. It then discusses the implications for policies and plans. The data comes from a sample of 1,753 individuals, aged 18 or over, who were asked to give details of their normal weekly travels. To briefly summarise the findings, 'high income individuals are typically car owners, participate often in social-recreation trips and larger shopping trips, and consume less time en route per increment of distance travelled. Low income individuals are typically pedestrian dependent, engage in more frequent shopping trips, participate less in social-recreation trips, and consume more time per kilometre travelled' (p. 394). It was notable that 36 per cent of adults were entirely dependent on pedestrian travel to carry out their routine activities. Improvements to the existing public transport system would benefit most low income wage-earners who are separated by relatively large distances from their homes. A policy to provide markets and provision for religious centres, recreation and entertainment in dispersed centres would help reduce travel distances. Non-motorised transport should be made more attractive - for instance through pedestrian precincts. 'In conclusion, it is important that spatial mobility be distinguished conceptually from accessibility as a socially desirable goal. By concentrating entirely on facilitating mechanised movement, a planner ought to enquire as to whether very much is gained from newly generated traffic, increased dispersal and withdrawal from socially active life spaces' (p. 398).

## ULACK, RICHARD

### THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALISATION UPON THE POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF A MEDIUM-SIZED CITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, January 1975, pp 203-219.

The paper looks at the impact of industrialization on age and sex structure, educational levels, age at marriage, fertility and cultural composition in Iligan City in the Philippines. Its data base is largely from 735 questionnaires completed during household interviews in Iligan City during 1970-71.

In an introductory section, the author notes that studies concerned with the consequences of growing industrialization have stated that this (and associated rates of in-migration and urbanization) can be related to various subsequent changes in the population's demographic and migration characteristics. It is argued that 'an urban area in a developing nation undergoing large-scale industrialization is generally characterized by (1) high rates of in-migration, (2) an age pyramid with an unusually broad base, (3) a high sex ratio, (4) relatively high educational levels, (5) somewhat lower and declining fertility levels when compared with national levels or levels in other less-developed regions, (6) a population with a higher social and economic status, and (7) a more heterogeneous cultural composition' (pp. 202-203). The research on which the paper is based tests these in a city which has undergone rapid population growth and rapid industrialization since 1948.

Iligan City is in the north of Mindanao island<sup>1</sup> and capital of Lanao del Norte Province. Its population grew from 25,000 in 1948 to around 104,000 in 1970, this rapid growth being associated with the city's rapid industrialization. Industrial development has been associated with developing the hydro-electric potential of the nearby Agus river. In late 1971, there were nine major industries operating in the immediate area and a tenth nearing completion: an integrated steel mill, three cement plants, a flour mill, a pulp and paper mill, a fertilizer plant, two electro-chemical plants and the hydro-electric power complex. In 1971, around one quarter of the heads of households in the city were directly dependent on the 10 industries.

There has been rapid net in-migration to the city from all corners of the Philippines. Between 1948 and 1970, only two cities in the Philippines had a higher rate of growth: metropolitan Manila and the city of Butuan, a lumber-processing centre also in northern Mindanao whose population grew from more than 31,000 to around 140,000 in this same period. Several other cities in Mindanao were among the more rapidly growing cities in the Philippines during this period including Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao and Marawi. Of the total of 1,431 adults residing in interviewed households, 77.4 per cent were born outside Iligan City. Most migrants arrived in the city in their early years of adulthood.

A section entitled 'Primary Data Source' gives details of

how the interviewed households were selected and how the interviews were undertaken. Separate sections on 'Age and Sex Structure', 'Educational Levels', 'Age at Marriage and Fertility Levels' and 'Cultural Composition' present the major findings from the questionnaires. Then a short conclusions section summarizes these.

Industrialization and the rapid in-migration which accompanied it were found to have had an impact on the city's population, as is shown by the demographic and socio-economic difference between the industrial occupational group and other occupational groups. 'First, because of the initial heavy in-migration response to the perceived employment opportunities, the labour supply has exceeded the demand' (p. 218). But there is some data to suggest that now there is some out-migration of young males because few jobs are available in secondary and tertiary activities. Industrialisation has helped raise overall levels of skills and educational levels. The industrial population has the highest educational level of any group in the city except for professionals and those in the highest administrative posts. Industrialization has not resulted in an early decline in fertility as is shown by the higher fertility rates, larger household sizes and higher young dependency burdens of the industrial population. But the paper notes that industrialization has only been underway for some 20 years, and discusses factors which may account for the high fertility levels. However, for all age groups, fewer children were born to mothers with seven or more years' schooling compared to those with up to six years. Finally, the city's industrial population is among the least homogeneous in terms of cultural composition (as reflected by place of birth of male household heads). Many of the male heads of household were born in the Central Visayas, a region of high population density which has long been an area of high out-migration due to poor agricultural conditions. People leaving this region have gone to all corners of the Philippines, and have usually re-established themselves in agricultural occupations. Male heads of household born in the Central Visayas figured more prominently in primary and tertiary occupations than they did in secondary occupations in Iligan City.

1. Editor's note: Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippines archipelago and the second most populous - after Luzon, the largest and most populous within which metropolitan Manila is located.

## PART II



# SPATIAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

## 2a MIGRATION

### i. Theoretical and General

BUTTERWORTH, Rural Urban Migration in Latin America: the State of our Knowledge

HERRICK, Urbanisation and Urban Migration in Latin America: an Economist's View

NELSON, Sojourners versus New Urbanites: Causes and Consequences of Temporary versus Permanent Cityward Migration in Developing Countries

### ii. Case Studies

EKANEM and ADEPOJU, Directing Migration to Medium Size Cities

FACHURROZIE and MACANDREWS, Buying Time: Forty Years of Transmigration in Belitang

FLINN, Rural and Intra-Urban Migration in Colombia: Two Case studies in Bogota

FULLER, Migrant Evaluations of the Quality of Urban Life in Northeast Thailand

KOENTJARANINGRAT, Population Mobility in Villages around Jakarta

KHOO and VOON, Rural-Urban Migration in Peninsular Malaysia: a case Study of Sungei Ruan New Village, Pahang

PARK, Temporary Migration as an Index of Urban Underdevelopment in Morocco

REBORATTI, Seasonal Migration in the Argentine North-West and Its Effect on the Agrarian Structure

SAINT and GOLDSMITH, Cropping Systems, Structural Change and Rural-Urban Migration in Brazil

SELVARATNAM and DISSANAYAKE, Migration, Regional Development and Employment in Peninsular Malaysia - the Case of Negri Sembilan Timur

SPEARE, Urbanisation and Migration in Taiwan

WILKIE and WILKIE, Migration and an Argentine Community in Transition

YOUNG, Peasant Economy, Household Unit and Migration

## BUTTERWORTH, DOUGLAS

### RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE STATE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

*America Indigena*, Vol XXXI, No 1, January 1971, pp 85-105.

The aim of this article is to review and evaluate some of the findings from sociologists and anthropologists working on problems of rural-urban migration in Latin America, to help future investigations in this field.

Among the subjects connected with migration, the author sums up the principal studies which deal with push and pull factors, selectivity processes, and the adaptation of rural migrants to their new urban settlement.

With respect to push and pull factors, Butterworth summarises the position of different authors, mentioning poverty, poor and insufficient land, inefficient exploitation systems, political factors and insecurity as the main factors which encourage migration. On the other hand, job and employment opportunities are among the main reasons for migration (to cities.) However, the weight of each factor cannot be measured.

In relation to selectivity for migration, it seems that the only universal factor operating is age. Others, such as sex, education, origin, and land ownership, are variable.

There is considerable disagreement over the nature and degree of migrants' adaptation to city life. This should not be surprising since migrants are very different. Lewis does not view it as an oppressive situation, while Germani considers that urban life may either unite or disorganise families. Rotondo (Peru), Recaseus Siches, and Ortiz (Colombia) understand that city life causes disorganisation, disorientation and even mental problems and delinquency. While Ortiz finds that the family name is no longer important to group families in the city (only money serves this purpose), Whiteford shows that in Popayan (Colombia), the family name is very important.

Mangin found a high incidence of poor adaptability among Indian migrants to the coastal cities in Peru. Lewis, on the other hand, believes that family life improves in the city, that primary social relations are still important, and that family members come closer to face difficulties. Matos Mar arrived at the same conclusions for Peruvian migrants.

## HERRICK, BRUCE

### URBANISATION AND URBAN MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW

*Latin American Urban Research, Vol II, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1971, pp 71-81.*

'Migration can be pictured as a process involving investment in human capital'. The migrant incurs costs in order to reap future benefits. His decision to migrate is said, hypothetically, to depend on the rate of return from doing so. The act of migration then becomes a function of differential costs and length of time over which the returns are received. Using some of the classic texts describing migrants, and on migration in Latin America written during the 1960s, Herrick concludes that:

- a. socio-economic data is consistent with the rate of return hypothesis;
- b. migrants display economic rationality; and
- c. the rate of return hypothesis assumes equality of individual and social costs and benefits.

## NELSON, JOAN M.

### SOJOURNERS VERSUS NEW URBANITIES: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT CITYWARD MIGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

*Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol 24, No 4, July 1976, pp 721-757.*

The article looks at the variations in the length of time migrants to cities stay there. It also suggests causes for the variation between permanent migration and different types of temporary migration in different continents, nations and cities and discusses the different consequences that temporary and permanent migration have both for the cities where the migrants go and for their original home-places. Data is drawn from many migration studies.

Those coming to larger cities from small towns or rural areas cover a wide spectrum with regard to their length of stay — from the short term visitor to the permanent in-migrant committed to a new life in the city. Among migrants not committed to staying permanently, one can distinguish between seasonal migrants (who frequently come during the off peak agricultural period); 'target' migrants who come for a limited period to accomplish a specific purpose (such as completing education or accumulating money to accomplish some task); to migrants who come to the city more than once but whose main economic and social ties remain in the home-place;

to migrants who work most or all of their working life in the city but plan to retire to the countryside. Among permanent migrants, one includes those choosing to migrate permanently, and those forced to move for economic, political or personal reasons.

Many examples are quoted to illustrate these different kinds of migration flows, and census data for a number of Latin American, African and Asian cities is used to suggest the relative importance of temporary or permanent migration, this being crudely measured by the ratio of males to females in major cities. This census data, largely drawn from the 1960s, suggests cityward migration in sub-Saharan Africa is heavily temporary due to high male:female ratios in cities such as Nairobi and Kinshasa. Data for India and Pakistan suggest the importance of temporary migration there as well and the male to female ratio is particularly high for Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Karachi. By way of contrast, the male:female ratio is much closer to 1:1 for Bangkok (Thailand), Seoul (South Korea) and major Latin American cities.

Specific city studies supported this conclusion. A study of migrants in Bombay found that between the 1951 and 1961 censuses, 1.2 million persons born outside Bombay entered the city and 478,000 non-natives left. Most of this out-migration seemed to be mill workers and other unskilled labourers returning to cultivate ancestral land after 10-15 years in the city, retired workers going home or wives and children of low income workers who decided to bring up their children in villages. A study of male migrants in Monterrey (Mexico) found that two thirds regarded their move as permanent while a survey of adult migrants in six Brazilian cities found that only six per cent of those from rural areas or small interior townships 'expressed the wish or intention to return to their place of origin'. However, despite the evidence suggesting predominantly permanent migration to Bogota (Colombia) and Bangkok, two surveys showed important temporary migration movements, even if the prevailing pattern was permanent. Migrants to Bangkok from the northeast were likely to be temporary, according to a 1965 study, while a study in the early 50s of Bangkok pedicab drivers from the northeast found that men came to the city for some months or years, sent home much of their earnings and then returned home to rejoin their families and cultivate their farms. Many repeated this cycle a number of times. Then in the Colombian departments of Cundinamarca and Boyaca (which surround Bogota and account for a high proportion of migrants into Bogota), a 1968 survey in 11 towns and villages found that 20-30 per cent of the married male population of between 15 and 54 years of age and 'customarily resident' had spent some time in a large city, generally Bogota. Roughly 15 per cent of the men interviewed in Cedral, a small Mexican village 380 kilometres from Monterrey were returnees from that city while young men who migrated from a small and isolated Argentinian town Chilecito to Buenos Aires were found 'often' to return home to find a bride and 'sometimes' buy land and settle back to Chilecito.

Evidence from Egypt, Turkey, Nairobi and Bombay suggest that temporary migration patterns over time will give way to more permanent migration. For instance, in Turkey, changing conditions (population growth, declining soil fertility, earthquakes and restrictions on wood cuttings among them) forced increasing numbers of rural men into migrating in search of work but they would return periodically to their families before leaving again. Starting in the early 50s, accelerated economic growth brought

more stable urban employment and more and more migrants brought their families to join them in the cities and settled permanently. The rapid drop in Nairobi's male:female ratio for adults between 1948 and 1962 from roughly 5:1 to 2.5:1 also suggests a reduction in temporary migration against permanent migration.

The causes in the variations in temporary and permanent migration can be divided into those acting in the home-place and those acting in the destination. The stability of demand for urban labour in destination cities partly determines the mix and the differences in the level of industrialization and pace of economic growth must account for much of the contrast in migration patterns between South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand and Latin America, Taiwan and South Korea on the other. Rural migrants' desire to and ability to return to their home-place after a stay in the city is also an important factor and this is strongly affected by access to land or other sources of rural livelihood in the home-place, by rural kinship structures, the importance of age graded social roles, cultural and religious significance of land and customs or events which make outcasts of certain groups. Rural social structure may require the maintenance of strong ties but at the same time encourage migrants' return due to prestige conferred on returnees. The examples quoted suggest this is particularly important in Africa. Heavy return migration is often associated with more or less guaranteed access to land which is common to much of Africa and South Asia but rare in Latin America. Rural social structure also interacts with economic factors. In rural societies where extended family or clan or lineage systems are strong, a man may migrate with or without his immediate family confident that his claim to a share of communal land will be respected on his return. Or a migrant may leave his family in the homeplace precisely to ensure that he can return to cultivate his plot. Urban conditions and demand for labour are probably the main determinants of the gross contrasts among predominantly permanent patterns in Latin America and several Asian nations as compared to most of Africa and South Asia. But rural factors are probably more helpful in understanding the more detailed characteristics of migration streams in particular nations. For instance, single shot target migration implies enough land at least to provide subsistence to the migrant and his family after he returns or alternative ways of making a living in the countryside. A study of returnees to small towns in Bogota's hinterlands found that these were drawn disproportionately from the better educated and higher status families. It seems that many of the returnees had gone to the capital to complete their schooling and perhaps work for a while before returning to help with (or take over) the family farm or business. Return migration to farms implies a rural economic base, although not necessarily one adequate to meet subsistence needs.

Rural conditions are probably the most important explanation not only for particular types of temporary migration but also for atypical streams — temporary migrants in predominantly permanent areas and vice versa. A study in Madhya Pradesh in north-central India suggests that some permanent migrants in a setting where most migration is temporary may be due to worse than average rural prospects. A sample of 949 low income families in eight towns who had left their village homes after 1939 in search of employment and had been drifting from town to town up to the time of the study in 1953-4 found that 64 per cent had been landless and 19 per cent

had been tenant farmers. Of these 19 per cent, more than two thirds had been unable to meet their rent payments. 78 per cent of the families in the survey were untouchables, complicating their prospects of finding land or work. They were termed 'floating migrants' because they floated from place to place and there is no reason to assume that they stayed in cities because they were doing well there. Many were low paid and had insecure construction jobs.

Temporary and permanent migration flows imply very different demographic, social and economic consequences for destination and home-place areas — as indeed do the different kinds of temporary migration.

For the area of out-migration, large-scale temporary migration will change the demographic structure but returnees will bring skills and education back. Remittances from temporary migrants will probably be larger than from permanent migrants while their consumption spending will be smaller. Temporary migrants are also more likely to invest in productive activities and houses in their home-place. Short term temporary migrants are likely to invest both in productive activities and in housing in their home-place while migrants who only return when they retire may spend considerable amounts of money investing in their retirement house prior to their return but are less likely to invest in productive activities. The closer the migration is to being permanent, the less the incentive to send remittances or invest in houses or productive activities.

For the city, temporary migrants are likely to take the worst jobs. They often seek cheap rented accommodation and are less likely than permanent migrants to invest labour and money in a city house or engage in political activity (for instance through neighbourhood improvement associations) demanding better services and legalization of squatters' tenure. Short term migrants are also less likely to be involved in organizations like unions which demand political action on employment, wages and prices, even though these are important issues for them. Temporary migrants' major political involvement may well be through hometown associations which often act as a pressure group on national government on behalf of their hometown. A study in the 1960s found that virtually every town of over 1,000 inhabitants in Peru (and many with less) seemed to have a club in Lima.

## EKANEM, ITA I. and ADEPOJU, ADERANTI

### DIRECTING MIGRATION TO MIDDLE SIZE CITIES

*Ekistics*, 263, October 1977, pp 231-215.

This article is an abridged version of the authors' final report on a study of migration in selected state capitals of Nigeria. Here, they look at some of the aspects of migration in two towns, Ilorin and Calabar and some policy implications for their findings.

Authors comment on lack of migration data in Nigeria.

Existing knowledge of internal migration derives from ad hoc sample surveys carried out both in rural areas and the major cities. Note that more migrants attracted to larger cities than medium-sized towns. State that migration studies should concentrate more on smaller towns as government policy (1975-80) is the development of integrated urban and rural programmes, so more information should be available.

Study focuses on two state capitals, Ilorin and Calabar. Both are from parts of the country which so far have not been properly looked at in terms of migration. Calabar has a population of 200,000, Ilorin had more than 150,000 in 1963 and more than 550,000 at time of writing. Both cities have universities; Calabar's largest industry is cement, Ilorin's tobacco. There were more migrants in Calabar (80 per cent) than Ilorin (63 per cent). Household surveys undertaken, samples being mainly male (head of household). Some characteristics of two towns' similarities and differences given.

Bulk of migrants to both towns were first-time movers. Some reasons given for moving were: expected higher income relative to birthplace; better employment opportunities and social considerations and availability of relatives who can serve as temporary 'insurance'. At least 70 per cent of migrants had some sort of job within 12 months of arrival.

Most migrants sent some money home. Though most of them said they liked the towns, they said they would probably migrate elsewhere in the future, even return to their birthplace. Only those who owned some property said they would probably stay. Data on current births for migrant women confirmed that urban growth is primarily a sequel to a higher fertility of immigrants relative to natives. Migrant population accounts for 80 per cent of current births in both towns. Native-migrant fertility differences among 'currently-mated' Calabar women (by age) virtually disappear while higher migrant than native fertility in Ilorin is perpetuated.

Authors looked at some policy implications as a result of their findings:

- study shows that these two towns can serve as alternative growth poles to larger capital cities, because of their large absorptive employment capacity potential;
- a more heterogeneous ethnic mix in towns might be better, decreasing inter-regional differences and building a stronger allegiance to the nation;
- different illiteracy rates observed between the two towns should encourage a more widespread equalization of education throughout the country;
- as most migration is rural-urban or urban-urban, there is a case for rural development to stem rural-urban movement. Some suggestions: bring urban facilities to rural areas; pay economic subsidies to farmers in rural areas; formulate a national and progressive tenure system; create viable employment opportunities in urban centres.

Migration has some benefits by siphoning off excess population into areas of greater opportunity, as well as personal benefits. Authors thus think government should define and implement official migration policy; authors suggest the establishment of agencies in the two towns to handle payments of unemployment benefits and a settlement bonus to some new arrivals till they are settled; this to minimize the present drain and dependency burden on relatives of these people and allow them to send bigger remittances home.

Because home-ownership seems to reduce repeated

migration, authors feel state and federal government housing schemes should be extended to medium-sized towns as well as state capitals.

Authors note that knowledge on migration is important because migration affects both areas of out-migration and areas of in-migration. Therefore more knowledge, more comprehensive studies, a more accurate picture all need to be developed in Nigeria, so that more can be known about who migrates where, why, benefits, disadvantages etc. Information could also be used as projections for future rural/urban changes in population etc.

Authors admit that such studies would be expensive, and gives recommendations as to who should do it and the role of government.

**FACHURROZIE, S.A. and  
MACANDREWS, COLIN**

### **BUYING TIME: FORTY YEARS OF TRANSMIGRATION IN BELITANG**

*Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol  
XIV, November 1978, pp 94-103.*

This paper focuses on transmigration in the Belitang area in South Sumatra, Indonesia. This area has been one of the few generally successful areas of Indonesian transmigration. When it was first opened by the Dutch Government in 1937 it was very sparsely populated, consisting of forests, with only one small access road. By 1977, the area had radically changed, due to the almost continuous inflow of transmigrants which totalled at least 130,000 official transmigrants, and a considerable number of spontaneous migrants.

The Belitang area has three characteristics which make it particularly interesting for the study of the Indonesian Transmigration Programme. First, it is an excellent natural site for transmigration. Secondly, it was fortunate in having well-planned inputs in the early years of settlements. Thirdly, the area has seen a continuous flow of both government-sponsored and spontaneous transmigrants over 40 years.

The authors have used three methods for collecting data for the study. The first was a 10 per cent sample survey of five villages established at different periods, to look at changing conditions between 1937 and 1974. These were Sidomulyo (established in 1937), Sukanegara (1953), and Margacinta (1954), three villages with irrigation; and two non-irrigated villages, Karangmenjangan (1965) and Harjomulyo (1974). They included first, second and third generations of government-sponsored transmigrants, and also spontaneous transmigrants. The second method was an in-depth observation of four of the villages by a team of three anthropologists living in the villages for two months and writing extensive village reports and life histories of selected transmigrants. The third was a wide range of interviews with both government sponsored and spontaneous transmigrants, government officials and local people.

Their analysis first sought to establish the prosperity of the five villages. This was done by examining the income

levels of respondents, as well as other economic indicators such as housing standards and eating patterns. Then, the pattern of landholdings was examined to see whether there had been either excessive fragmentation or concentration of land in a few hands.

The family incomes of the respondents from the five villages were generally good. The authors found that there is a very marked contrast between the three villages with irrigation and the two non-irrigated ones. Clearly, well-planned irrigation is very important to the economic development of transmigration areas. They also found that there are widely differing levels of off-farm income and that the higher level is in the oldest village.

In looking at land fragmentation and concentration, the authors examined the size distribution of landholdings in the five villages, by each generation of government transmigrants, and also for the spontaneous transmigrants. Landholdings in the first generation in each village were still relatively large (from 1.14 hectares in Sidomulyo to 1.55 hectares in Harjomulyo), reflecting approximately the land allocations of the opening dates. In the second generation, the average holdings were smaller in the three older villages (0.64 hectares in Sidomulyo, 0.92 hectares in Sukanegra and 0.51 hectares in Margacinta), and it showed a gradual land fragmentation. This was particularly significant in Sidomulyo, which had third generation respondents whose average holding was much smaller (0.28 hectares) than those of the other two generations.

The Belitang study also threw light on two other phenomena often seen in Indonesian transmigration areas, namely land conflicts and the role of spontaneous transmigrants.

## FLINN, WILLIAM

### RURAL AND INTRA-URBAN MIGRATION IN COLOMBIA: TWO CASE STUDIES IN BOGOTA

*Latin American Urban Research*, Vol 1, Sage  
Publication, Beverly Hills, Rabinovitz,  
Francine F. and Trueblood, Felicity M. (Editors)  
1971, pp 33-93.

Based on samples from El Carmen and from El Gavilan, two barrios (neighbourhoods) in Bogota, Colombia's capital city, the author concludes that 66 per cent and 70 per cent of migrants respectively arrived there with no intermediate stops. 12 per cent and 15 per cent made one stop, eight per cent and eight per cent made two stops, six and five per cent made three and six and two per cent made four or more. This is thus not fully consistent with the theory of step-migration. Several migrants of peasant origin who have made one or more stops during their migration apparently did not go first to another important centre before going to Bogota. They moved from a minor rural district (*vereda*) to a more important one (*cabecera*) although the *cabecera* did not always have a larger population than the *vereda*.

Flinn states that other Colombian studies suggest the small cities near Bogota have experienced large in-

migration. In 1963, 60 per cent of the population in Chia, 48 per cent in Facatativa, 42 per cent in Zipaquira and 30 per cent in Chiquinquirá were migrants who, according to the information presented, came from neighbouring areas. These municipalities' rate of population growth is approximately the same as the national rate, suggesting that out-migration also existed there too.

Most of the rural migrants who arrive in Bogota settle in slums and tenement houses in the central districts. 69 per cent of the sample in El Carmen and 87 per cent in El Gavilan had residences in other areas of Bogota before moving there.

## FULLER, THEODORE D.

### MIGRANT EVALUATIONS OF THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 16, No 1,  
October 1981, pp 87-104.

The paper reports on the results of a survey on recent migrant households in six relatively small towns in Northeast Thailand to gauge their satisfaction with various aspects of town life.

Studies of migrants in Third World urban centres have generally found that the majority regard themselves as better off than in their original home-place or the place from where they have migrated. This is not to deny that many in-migrants and other urban dwellers live in makeshift housing which lacks the most basic levels of infrastructure and services. 'The point is not that all migrants have achieved an acceptable standard of living, but merely that for many the move to the city is perceived as contributing to improvement in their quality of life.' (p.87)

Studies of migrants' evaluations of quality of urban life have typically focused on migrants to major metropolitan areas or primate cities. But given the increasing interest among Third World governments in reducing the flow of migrants from rural areas and small urban centres to large metropolitan centres, similar evaluations should be made in smaller urban centres. The paper notes that the Thai Government has recently adopted a decentralized urban strategy focused on upgrading several urban centres into medium-size 'regional urban growth centres' to become cities with between 100,000 and 300,000 inhabitants. This strategy follows on from earlier government policies which identified regional growth poles. But with the Fourth Development Plan 1977-81, the commitment to decentralized urbanization has become more explicit and more integrated into national planning. This plan notes that 'the Bangkok Metropolis is more than 46 times larger than Chiangmai, the second largest urban centre . . . The concentration of population, economic activities and the administrative systems in the Bangkok metropolitan area have impeded the distribution of growth to regions outside Bangkok.' According to the 1970 census, no city in Thailand outside Bangkok Metropolitan Area had 100,000 or more inhabitants. The Fourth Plan designates nine



provincial capitals as regional urban growth centres, four of which are in the northeast.

The paper then presents the findings from a survey of 554 migrant households in three provincial capitals and 3 district towns<sup>1</sup> in Northeast Thailand, the poorest and least urbanized region in the nation. The survey included only migrants who had moved to the town from a rural area within the previous five years and who had not lived in any other town for a period of more than six months. The largest and most important of the study towns was Khon Kaen, a regional government centre and an important transportation and commercial centre. In 1974, its population was more than 50,000. The other study towns were two smaller provincial capitals and three district towns with a range of populations down to 5,000 inhabitants. Although the number and variety of services in the six towns vary according to their size and position in the urban hierarchy, each provides urban services such as sale of agricultural inputs, collection and processing of agricultural products, lumber yards, automobile and truck repair shops, government offices, tailors, restaurants and pedicabs.

In assessing migrant satisfaction, the survey covered economic aspects (income and housing satisfaction), employment (job security, schedule and suitability), infrastructure (education and medical services), acquaintances (satisfaction with neighbours and co-workers) and general satisfaction with life.<sup>2</sup> There was strong agreement among migrants that town income was higher than village income, that life was generally better, and that health and education services were better. Enthusiasm for town jobs was less strong although about 60 per cent perceived an improvement in working conditions as a result of moving to town. For housing, satisfaction is less strong and about as many feel they have suffered a decline in housing quality as feel they have found improvements.

The paper then examines the pattern of inter-relationships between satisfaction measures in the various categories listed above. Among the inter-relationships examined were differences in satisfaction between first year and fifth year migrants who prefer the town, income satisfaction of cityward migrants by occupational change, and housing satisfaction in different forms of tenure. The first year migrants showed nearly the same satisfaction as the fifth year migrants except in job security, housing and evaluation of neighbours. Although as noted previously, most migrants found their incomes better in the towns, the satisfaction was stronger among those who had been labourers in the villages, especially among labourers who became skilled workers, merchants or white collar workers in the towns. Those who had been farmers were less unanimous in finding the town better, especially those who became merchants and those who remained farmers but based in the towns. However, even in these instances, the majority still found the town better. Housing satisfaction related to tenure in that migrants who rented their homes were least satisfied while those who owned their homes were more satisfied. Migrants with housing provided rent free by a relative or employer expressed intermediate levels of housing satisfaction.

In conclusion, the paper notes that there are a number of potential advantages in encouraging a pattern of decentralized urbanisation in Thailand or other less developed countries. The survey found no sub-group of migrants reporting extensive dissatisfaction with urban life. A programme to promote the growth of smaller urban

centres would need to ensure not only employment and infrastructure provision but also that migrants could be attracted to the centres and retained there. But it also notes the criticisms of Ginsburg and of Sternstein on such an approach,<sup>3</sup> and suggests that the degree of controversy surrounding the issues and the importance of the issues to Thailand and other countries 'caution against a premature decision and urge a thorough examination of all aspects of the question'. (p.102)

1. According to Hafner (1980), these district towns which are known as 'sanitary districts', are 'incipient municipal areas which may have attained the necessary population size (at least 10,000 inhabitants) and density criteria (average population density of 3,000 per square kilometre) but which lack provincial administrative functions, adequate tax revenue and identification by the Ministry of Interior as municipal places'. Fuller quotes Goldstein and Goldstein who suggest that 'the sanitary districts generally resemble the smaller urban places more than they do the rural areas under which they are usually subsumed'.

2. Three concepts which are common in Thai speech were used to measure this: 'sabei' which refers to the quality of being comfortable or often to healthfulness; 'saduak' which refers to convenience; and 'sanuk' which refers to that which is enjoyable.

3. Brief summaries of their criticisms are given in the summary of Hafner (1980) which looks at urban resettlement and migration in northeast Thailand.

## KOENTJARANINGRAT

### POPULATION MOBILITY IN VILLAGES AROUND JAKARTA

*Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol XI, No 2, July 1975, pp 108-119.*

This paper focuses on mobility between villages and on two types of migration: temporary non-seasonal migration and permanent migration. The study shows that there is a high frequency of temporary migration in the rural ring around Jakarta, and that the second type of migration is less frequent, perhaps due to the proximity of the villages to Jakarta, which makes permanent migration to the city unnecessary. The study was undertaken between January and March 1972 in two villages in Kecamatan Pasar Rabo (which lies on both sides of the road connecting Jakarta to Bandung). The first village is Ciracas, a rather compact, densely populated village on the highway, with a population of 6,198 in December 1971. The second is Cilangkap, a more isolated 'interior' village about 12 km off the highway, with a more dispersed settlement pattern. In December 1971, the population was 2,906. Statistical data show that almost twice as many people are coming into the area than leaving it. The number of temporary, non-seasonal migrants proved to be limited. Less than 18 per cent of the respondent household heads had relatives who had left the village for part of the year in 1971. Although there is insufficient information, findings confirm the theory that rural migrants more often come from the middle level of the village community, rather than from its lowest and most impoverished level.

The number of people who move permanently is small. The annual village report on Ciracas dated December 1970 reported that 216, or 3.5 per cent, had left the village permanently, while the figure for Cilangkap was only 33, or

1.2 per cent. In 1971, even less people left the village permanently: 198 or 3.2 per cent in Ciracas, but there is no information for Cilangkap. Most of the permanent migrants had been away from home for more than five years. Unlike the temporary migrants, a large proportion of the permanent migrants belonged to the younger generation, and consist more of women than men.

Villagers do not particularly choose to migrate to Jakarta. Although they favour the city, not many would like to live there because housing is hard to find and the cost of living is too high. Moreover, the proximity of the village to the city, to the highway, to roads, and to available means of transport greatly facilitates daily commuting, making a permanent move unnecessary, even for those who find white-collar occupations in Jakarta. People from Ciracas and Cilangkap do not migrate solely for reasons of lack of employment opportunities in their villages, but rather try to obtain additional sources of income during the favourable seasons.

**KHOO, S.H. and VOON, P.K.**

### RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA: A CASE STUDY OF SUNGEI RUAN NEW VILLAGE, PAHANG

*Ekistics*, 235, June 1975, pp 405-408.

The paper looks at out-migration from Sungei Ruan New Village, in Malaysia, one of the 400 or more new villages established between 1950 and the end of the Emergency<sup>1</sup> in 1960. Data is drawn from interviews with 81 households.

The village is 15 kilometres from the nearest township of any size, in this case the district capital of Raub in Pahang State. The inhabitants are largely Chinese and the agricultural new village is only one type of rural settlement and is very different in ethnic composition and in social and economic structure from, for instance, the kampungs inhabited by rural Malays and the estate settlements.

60 per cent of the heads of households had been born in China while 23 per cent were born in Raub district or other parts of Pahang and the rest were born elsewhere in Peninsular Malaysia. However, 44 per cent had been in Raub District prior to the move to Sungei Ruan while a further 30 per cent had been in other parts of Pahang.

More than half the sample households depended on rubber production while another tenth combined rubber tapping with odd jobs or services for their main income. 10 households were engaged in small scale retailing while the rest were in services (for instance taking in laundry), living off remittances sent by family members living and working outside the village or relying on odd jobs and agricultural activities. Physical over-crowding was becoming a problem. At the time of resettlement, the new village was meant to accommodate as many families as possible in a given area. Rapid population growth has increased pressure for space but the built up village area can only be extended at the expense of agricultural land.

Out of the 81 households interviewed, 49 had one or more members living outside the settlement, the total number of migrants from these households being 88. Most

were under the age of 30.

For the 47 male migrants, 29 were reported to have left for employment reasons while five had left for education. Close to 80 per cent of the male migrants had moved out of Pahang State, and several had moved to Indonesia, Hong Kong or Singapore. It seems that much of this male migration is regarded as permanent although migrants make periodic visits to the village and in times of high rubber prices may even return temporarily to help in the holdings. For the 41 female migrants, seven had left for employment, one for education and 18 for marriage. Most had not moved far from the village. Logging and service occupations were the most common jobs for male out-migrants while rubber tapping and 'housewives' were the occupations of nearly three-quarters of the female out-migrants. Only six of the 88 out-migrants were reported to be factory workers, with another six also doing 'further studies'.

The authors note that since the mid 1960s, there has been an increasing number of teenagers and young adults at a time when there was a depression in rubber prices and 'creeping inflation' in the price of basic necessities. Out-migrants provide much needed supplements to family incomes.

1. The New Village was originally a group of buildings occupying a defensive site enclosed by barbed wire and a road. They were established during the 'Emergency' when the Chinese-led Malayan Communist Party rose in armed revolt against the British colonial government.

**PARK, THOMAS**

### TEMPORARY MIGRATION AS AN INDEX OF URBAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT, IN MOROCCO

*Small Urban Centres In Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editors), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 158-174.

By means of a statistical model using data from small urban centres in northern Morocco the paper assesses the role played by some urban services (particularly those related to trade) and sales turnover in the temporary out-migration of workers to Europe.

Underlying this exercise is the notion that although it might solve most urgent problems of development, the creation of rewarding and suitable employment for migrants to Third World cities does not appear as a feasible possibility in the near future. An alternative approach to the current emphasis on investment in major urban areas (which results in higher migration to the cities) such as decentralization, stops short of being a vague prescription. Another plausible option for many countries is to develop a way of indicating priorities for investment so that governments can set up local incentives which will have a maximum effect on employment and migration at a minimum cost.

The author concedes that any full analysis of the phenomenon of migration would require an historical explanation for the heterogeneity of the urban impact on

the movements of population. Industrialization as a national phenomenon and the world economy as a whole also have a bearing upon the process. Nevertheless, the author deliberately chooses to narrow down the focus of his study with the aim of indicating

'a) that the local urban economy has a significant and sizeable impact on the rate of out-migration and b) that the degree to which the urban economy affects out-migration differs from county (*cercle*) to county' (p.159)

One of the features of the urban economy in Morocco is the distinction between the periodic market (*souq*) system and the permanent business community, both of which are integral, and distinct, parts of the local economy. By taking both aspects into account, the study seeks to find quantitative differences between towns that reflect perceivable changes in employment opportunities which are important to local potential migrants' (p.159). The paper details relevant characteristics of urban centres in the study region. The north is the most highly urbanized area in the country, with 53 small urban centres (population between 1,000 and 50,000 and having at least 100 shops) as well as a number of larger cities. The economies of these are interdependent to a large extent, and inter-urban linkages can more clearly be seen in the almost completely distinct *souq* networks which fill the area's commercial space. Each one of these is dominated by a centre market which is the residence of the great majority of that network's merchants. An assessment of the proportions of resident wholesalers and retailers provides a good measure of urban interdependence. According to the author, the need to look at interdependence stems from the indirect influence it exerts, at the local level, upon migration; it must be noted, however, that the paper fails to establish how this influence operates.

The paper is illustrated with a set of maps showing the area of influence of wholesalers and of *souqs* based in different cities, the total value of products and services dispensed in urban *souqs* and the number of vendors in urban *souqs* and urban shops in the region. An important point is made in the paper when it is noted that, for the study region, the location on a moderately frequented traffic route at a relative distance from larger urban concentrations and the presence of a core clientele of salaried customers as well as a permanent administrative unit have been essential to the growth of a prosperous urban community during the 20th century.

The model proposed by the author involves the combined testing of two hypotheses by means of a statistical correlation. The hypotheses are:

1. 'an increase in the average *souq* merchant's earnings will cause a decrease in the rate of temporary out-migration', and
2. 'the lower the ratio of businessmen to wholesalers, the higher will be the average business earnings, the more local investment there will be, and the lower the rate of temporary out-migration will be'.

The results of the correlation point to a confirmation of both hypotheses in the study region. The paper notes that 'the most obvious policy implication of this result is that by decentralizing wholesaling, perhaps by tax incentives for local investment in areas of high out-migration, a significant decrease in the rural flow to major urban centres might be possible'. It is also noted that a policy of decentralized investment at the national level cannot be based on the study of temporary out-migration but on that of permanent out-migration, both of which may have different spatial distributions.

## REBORATTI, CARLOS

### SEASONAL MIGRATION IN THE ARGENTINE NORTH-WEST AND ITS EFFECT ON THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

*Demografía y Economía*, Vol X, No 2, 1976, pp 235-253.

In this paper, the author uses a case study to analyse relations between marginal areas and the rest of the country arising from seasonal migrations. The case study took place in Santa Victoria (Salta, Argentina), with fieldwork carried out in 1972.

The author describes three types of seasonal migrants: natives (or Indians), people from the Bolivian Highlands, and Argentine peasants, and analyses the third type in detail. Since 1920, a specific link has been established between plantation and latifundia by which, through coercive action, peasants were forced to migrate to the plantation in the harvest season. In spite of modernisation, seasonal migration continues. Physical coercion no longer exists and migrants leave with their families. But plantations secure their labour by other means such as land tenure, for which peasants need money. Another change was the end of the land tenancy system. Migrants have to choose between returning to subsistence activities or permanent migration. The latter alternative is usually chosen, and migrants go to the southern valley, or settle in the Valley of San Francisco, or increase marginal populations in large cities.

The peasants who were forced to migrate to the plantations came from the highlands, from marginal, depressed areas. They rent small plots. The plantation replaces the latifundia owner as employer. The latifundia expels the worker population which is employed by plantation owners during the sugar cane harvest season. In the plantation they earn cash, while in the latifundia all exchanges are in the form of barter.

By the end of the last century, sugar cane plantations were established in the region under study because of the cane's high potential yield compared to that in Tucuman (Argentina). Plantations need a seasonal labour force and latifundia possess a large rural population, under subsistence conditions. In order to hire the workers it needs, the plantation rents a whole latifundia and becomes the owner of the peasant's life and work. These peasants are compelled to rent their plots, but payment has to be made in cash. Most of them migrate for the harvest. Thus, large landholdings were replaced by the plantation system, and workers migrated, hiring themselves out in the different plantations in the region, for the harvest season.

SAINT, WILLIAM S. and GOLDSMITH, WILLIAM D.

## CROPPING SYSTEMS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN BRAZIL

*World Development*, Vol 8, pp 259–272, 1980 (English version) and CEBRAP, No 25, pp 137–163 (Spanish Version).

This paper studies how different mixes of crop production on small farms in a municipality in Brazil's northeast influence rural out-migration. It looks at the labour needed by farms where tobacco, cassava or citrus is the predominant crop and examines the implications of national government's encouragement of increased citrus production on rural out-migration. The study took place in Cruz das Almas municipality which is in the Reconcavo region, some 150 kilometres inland from Salvador, the state capital in Bahia.

Reconcavo's agricultural activity has traditionally been sugar cane, cattle raising, tobacco and cassava, although citrus production has gained in economic importance in recent years, largely as a result of government encouragement. During the last 15 years, Bahia and in particular Reconcavo has had declining rural population, growing urban centres and heavy internal rural-urban migration and out-migration. The two principal migratory streams in Bahia have been from the countryside to Salvador, and from the countryside to the south, especially to Sao Paulo.

Most farmers in Cruz das Almas cultivate cassava (the principle means of subsistence), citrus (a cash crop for urban consumption) and tobacco (a poor man's international export) as well as small amounts of food crops. But the predominant crop on each farm can be easily identified. Pressure on land is intense. Tobacco is intensively cultivated on small plots and needs high labour input; citrus is cultivated extensively and capital is the major requirement. Cassava occupies a middle position with regard to labour and capital needs.

Tobacco growers' needs for labour during peak periods are met through labour exchanges and cooperative work arrangements with relatives and neighbours. Citrus growers' greater dependence on capital for production demands relationships with financing agents. Cassava producers require neither labour nor capital in great amounts so production is less dependent on social relations outside the family. Cassava has no set harvest period and is easily marketed. Citrus has a definite market period and farmers usually have to hire a third party to transport the fruits to market. The tobacco producer has to sell his crop to the tobacco exporting firms. These take maximum advantage of their power and producers' weakness. Tobacco is gathered in rural markets, processed in a few strategic locations (including Cruz das Almas) and moved to a port city for export. In terms of economic resources, political power and living standards, tobacco producers are generally poorest followed by cassava producers and then citrus producers.

The paper then outlines how farmers' concentration on the different crops produces different migration patterns. Cassava systems had 3.2 out-migrants per family while

tobacco had 20 and citrus 1.8. Among citrus farm families, true migration was somewhat lower, for a small proportion of out-migrants were students in Salvador. Men tended to migrate more than women, and women showed a greater tendency to go to Sao Paulo.

Migration patterns were not seasonal responses to agriculture's varying labour demands. Migrants usually returned once or twice a year but only 10 per cent assisted with farm work on their visit. Rural cash transfers were received by almost half of the cassava families, one third of the tobacco families and one fifth of citrus families. Cash amounts were generally low, although many migrants brought consumer goods as presents during their visits. Cassava and tobacco farm residents transferred little in the way of money or goods to migrants although 10 per cent of citrus migrants were attending school in the cities and were supported by farm incomes.

The form out-migration takes and the changes in mix of crops produced on individual farms seem to respond both to what the paper terms stagnation pressure (where families grow too large for the land to support so individuals migrate) and enclosure pressure (where whole families are pushed off the land as changes occur in land ownership, farm technology and major crop pattern). Out-migration of females of between 20 and 29 years is particularly high from tobacco farms, reflecting the fact that the role of women in tobacco production is less essential than that of men and many of the women's tasks can be performed by children. Women as reproducers are also less desirable than men. Farm households with severe restrictions on land tend to turn to tobacco in spite of the exploitative marketing system and low returns in terms of labour input because this increases gross family income. As population pressures on the farm ease through migration of family members, cassava production becomes more important since this gives a higher return per unit of labour input. It seems that switches in the predominant crop from cassava to tobacco and back again reflect different stages in the family life-cycle and out-migration from both are adaptive responses and arise from what the authors earlier defined as stagnation pressure.

Growing citrus production can be seen as representing enclosure pressure. It requires extensive land and minimal labour in an area characterized by small holdings and intensively worked farms. As citrus cultivation expands, small farms are absorbed, labour demand declines and small farm families have difficulty getting adequate land. Families may move into citrus production but they do not move out of it. Supported by favourable market prices, the citrus sector is expanding at the expense of tobacco/ cassava. Out-migration which has long existed as an adaptive response to stagnation pressure has increased sharply as a consequence. Its nature has also changed as families rather than individuals within families migrate. The number of farm families has declined since 1970. Stagnation pressure, as noted earlier, tends to encourage out-migration of family members, not families. Changes in agricultural land use in Cruz das Almas also shows a near tripling in area under permanent crops, with that under temporary crops nearly halving and that under pasture increasing, between 1960 and 1975. There was also a rapid drop in the number of tenants and sharecroppers which suggests that these are being forced out as part of land concentration. Clearly, this means major changes in labour requirements since citrus requires barely a third of the labour input per hectare of

cassava and tobacco while cattle raising requires even less.

To get an idea of the 'pull' for out-migration, results from a 1974 census of a lower class neighbourhood of Salvador were quoted. Out of 9396 families in the community, 272 included one or more adults from Cruz das Almas and average monthly incomes proved to be no higher than rural incomes. Most were not recent migrants and only 3.3 per cent reported that they were unemployed.

The article concludes with four points. First, cropping systems and out-migration adjust to families' economic circumstances. As family labour supply increases, more labour intensive crops predominate which emphasize total rather than per capita output. When demographic pressure on the farm exceeds the capacity of the most labour intensive system, then out-migration occurs and the cropping mix again shifts to reflect this new balance. Secondly, the growth of capital intensity in agriculture, stimulated by national policies, has led to increasing land concentration and declining labour demand. Thirdly, the way in which particular productive operations are organized closely relates to migration patterns - both for stagnation pressure and for enclosure pressure. Finally, the studies suggest that individual rational-decision explanations of migration are inseparable from structural social explanations.

**SELVARATNAM, V. and DISSANAYAKE, B.W.**

### **MIGRATION, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA - THE CASE OF NEGRI SEMBILAN TIMUR,**

*The Developing Economies*, Vol XIV, No 2, June 1976.

The paper reports on the findings and conclusions of a survey on employment, income and attitudes towards migration among youths in Negri Sembilan state in southwestern Peninsular Malaysia and examines the relevance of the findings to the government's regional development strategy.

In Peninsular Malaysia, unemployment, under-employment, poverty, low income and under-development continue to be chronic problems in rural areas. Rural-urban income and development disparities were widened first by colonial rule since peasant agriculture was consistently ignored in favour of European agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises. Then after Independence, the government's concentration on exports and industrialization brought few benefits to rural areas while widespread education encouraged rural youths to migrate in search of urban jobs. Malaysia's manufacturing sector grew rapidly in terms of output between 1961 and 1973 but by 1973 it still employed only 11 per cent of the labour force. Rapid natural increase has also aggravated un- and under-employment.

The government has recently launched a regional

development programme based on growth centres or poles, the goal being to reduce rural-urban disparities, create employment regionally, eradicate rural poverty and contain rural to urban migration. Four districts of Negri Sembilan covering 77 per cent of the state and with nearly half its population are to have a development strategy. It is an area of net-outmigration and economic stagnation.

The survey on employment, income and attitudes towards migration contained a sample of 909 households in four sectors - kampongs (villages), 'small sized towns' (with less than 1,500 inhabitants), 'medium sized towns' (1,500-2,500 inhabitants) and estates. Respondents were drawn from 15-24 and 25-34 age groups.

The open unemployment rate for the whole sample was 13 per cent while a further 10-14 per cent reported being partly employed. Many of the unemployed had been unemployed for more than a year. Many respondents had low cash incomes. The Kampong inhabitants had the highest proportion of low income respondents although households here are likely to have the highest non-cash incomes from, for instance, crops grown for household consumption and this was not taken into account in the survey.

Only 12.4 per cent of respondents held any land, including only some 19 per cent in the kampong section - although these low percentages also reflect the fact that people generally come to hold land only much later in life. In addition, the kampong sample was heavily weighted to the 17-24 age group and to males although customary land is generally inherited through females and landownership is by inheritance. There is widespread landownership among respondents' households although over 62.8 per cent of households had less than three acres and under current land use patterns, this can be considered too small to generate a reasonable income.

In response to questions about migration, 72.8 per cent said they had considered moving to a different place (the proportion was particularly high - 83.6 per cent - in 'small sized towns') and 55.8 per cent stated that it was not difficult to move to a new place. On the estates, only 41 per cent said they had considered moving to a different place and over half thought it would be difficult or very difficult to do so. This may reflect lack of opportunity to migrate rather than lack of willingness.

Many estate households are tied to the plantations. They generally have a low level of education and minimal contact with urban centres. In addition, when the survey was done, there was a boom in rubber and oil palm exports.

Kuala Lumpur, Seremban (the state capital) and the nearest town in that order, were the preferred destination for respondents. One should note that Kuala Lumpur is relatively close and easy to get to. However, a high proportion of respondents intending to move were not sure where they would go. From discussions with several people in the project area, Kuala Lumpur and its suburb seemed to be the final destination of most migrants from the project area, with Seremban acting as an intermediary step.

43.1 per cent said that more jobs available was the major reason for moving, followed by 19.5 per cent stating higher salaries, 16.9 per cent having friends and relatives there, and 16.1 per cent stating better life conditions. Most respondents did not know how long they would stay if they migrated; only 23 per cent reckoned they would stay permanently.

The paper makes various recommendations about the

development strategy needed in the proposed Negri Sembilan Timur development project area including the need for a comprehensive agricultural development policy to diversify and intensify existing land use patterns and support for agro-based industries, social and economic infrastructure and grassroots planning. Agricultural development should be supported by helping the shift from land tenancy to ownership, by improving the availability of credit and by better agricultural extension services.

**SPEARE, ALDEN, JR.**

## **URBANIZATION AND MIGRATION IN TAIWAN**

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 22, No 2, January 1974.

The paper looks at urban growth in Taiwan between 1920 and 1970, at migration flows, and at migrant characteristics. The author relies mostly on official data from published records, and notes that a detailed study of the urbanisation process and of migrant flows is made possible by the relatively accurate and complete household registration system.

Taiwan's population grew from 3.7 million to 14.7 million between 1920 and 1970, mostly from natural increase. In this same period, cultivated land area increased very little – from 749,000 to 905,000 hectares. The population of the five major cities grew rapidly throughout this 50 year period; the annual average growth rate was 3.7 per cent for the 1920s and 1930s, 5.8 per cent for the 1940s, 5.1 per cent for the 1950s and 4.3 per cent for the 1960s. Although the rapid rate of growth since World War II was augmented by the influx of migrants from mainland China, its effect was small compared to the natural increase of cities' population and the migration of Taiwanese into the cities.

Migration flows have been strongest to the larger urban centres. Between 1961 and 1966, the average net migration rate was 15.9 per 1,000 population for the five largest cities, 12.5 for the five cities with over 100,000 inhabitants and 4.9 for urban townships<sup>1</sup> with between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Smaller urban townships and rural townships lost population, on average. Most of the net migration can be explained as a shift from agricultural to non-agricultural areas. However, this does not necessarily imply that rural-urban migration was primarily due to rural 'push'. Land reform in the early 1950s and growing agricultural yields seem to have kept many potential migrants back. So too has the fact that some of the industrial growth took place outside the larger cities. One should recall that between 1953 and 1970, Taiwan's economy grew by an average of around seven per cent a year and industrial production increased eightfold.

Migration streams between cities, urban townships plus small cities, and rural townships were examined for 1967 and 1968. The major flow was from urban townships plus small cities and from rural townships to cities. Data for 1968 permitted a more precise disaggregation with large cities (over 250,000 inhabitants), large urban townships plus small cities (50,000–250,000), small urban

townships, large rural townships, and small rural townships. The major net flow is again up the settlement hierarchy with large cities having the largest gain, large urban townships plus small cities also gaining and the three other categories losing. Gross migration proved to be much larger than net migration. In 1968, for every four migrants who entered the major cities, three left these cities, most of them probably returning to their original places of residence.

The author suggests that rural-urban migration in Taiwan can be viewed as a rational response to changing economic conditions.

Migrants are drawn disproportionately from young adults, from the better educated, from those working most recently in non-agricultural employment and from larger farms. Thus it is generally those best qualified for urban employment that migrate to the cities. Those with less education or from smaller farms have tended to seek other employment nearby either through seasonal employment as an agricultural labourer or in local non-agricultural employment or by commuting daily to non-agricultural employment in a smaller urban settlement.

1. The division between 'urban' and 'rural' settlements is not clear in Taiwan. Both urban and rural townships are minor administrative units which typically consist of an urban settlement surrounded by a rural area. Townships designated 'urban' tend to be larger and more urban than those designated 'rural', although there is no clear dividing line. 'Cities' are a separate administrative category.

**WILKIE, RICHARD, W. and WILKIE, JANE, R.**

## **MIGRATION AND AN ARGENTINE COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION**

*International Area Studies Programs, Program in Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper Series No 12, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1980.*

Aldea San Francisco is a small agricultural village, settled in 1878 by a Volga-Deutsch village population which migrated from Germany to Czarist Russia in the 1760s, and then to Argentina. At least five Volga-Deutsch farmers left for the New World in the years 1875, 1889, 1902 and 1925 and, beginning in 1871, 15 to 20 Volga-Deutsch villages were established in the western part of the province of Entre Rios. Aldea San Francisco is 500 km from Buenos Aires, and 380 km from Rosario; Parana, the provincial capital, and Santa Fe are within a 65 km radius. In 1965–66, Richard Wilkie studied the village which, in many respects, resembled the village one might have seen in the 1880s, shortly after it was founded. He conducted interviews with all the families in the village, who numbered 315 inhabitants, and who still made extensive use of a 17th Century German dialect maintained for 110 years in Russia. In 1973–74, the community was restudied and 264 out-migrants from the village were traced and interviewed in their new environment. In 1977, Richard Wilkie again visited the village to record demographic and household changes by

which time the population had declined to 205 inhabitants.

The study records the impact of 'modernisation' at its initial stages on a relatively homogeneous village. During the short span of time between the first and third visits, the road into town had been paved, motorised vehicles, television and electricity introduced, and 36 per cent of the adult population were in a family which owned a tractor. Machinery replaced labour intensive farm methods, helping to raise substantially the standard of living for many families. The isolation of the village was significantly reduced. By 1974, 75 per cent of the families had a diversified economic base relying on such activities as milk production, commercial crops and livestock, while only 10 per cent depended primarily on non-agricultural sources of income.

Such changes did not stop the flow of out-migrants which had already started in the 1920s although, at the beginning, the population size was maintained by a high rate of natural increase. Out-migration declined during the economic depression of the 1930s but resumed with the recovery during World War II. And, despite cyclical changes during periods of improved economic and social conditions in the rural areas, it has not stopped. Some migrants, particularly young women, left the village to lessen the financial strain on large families. Out-migration has depleted the village of young and middle age adults, but a decreasing population and the stimulus from farm mechanisation have resulted in the expansion of the average size of family landholdings. Another result is that the once nucleated village is now primarily a dispersed village. By 1977, only 15 households remained in the core village, while 31 households lived dispersed on their farms.

Out-migrants have influenced the values and attitudes of the villagers, although they only pay occasional visits to their families who remain in the village. More important was the role of return migrants as a source of technical and cultural change. The current leader of the village is one example, because he was not only able to increase productivity and enlarge his landholding, but also exercises a strong leadership in village affairs. Other return migrants, dissatisfied with the opportunity and the environment found in urban centres, provide an important source of labour for the larger farms and the few non-agricultural activities which have developed in the village in recent years. Most of the return migrants are males. The role of women in the village is still secondary, at best. Female in-migrants have been brides of village sons and come mostly from neighbouring villages also of Volga-Deutsch origin.

YOUNG, KATE

## PEASANT ECONOMY, HOUSEHOLD UNIT AND MIGRATION,

*America Indigena*, Vol XXXVIII, No 2, April-June 1978, pp 279-302.

The author seeks to show that migration can only be understood as a response to social forces acting within societies and that any analysis of migration must be historically defined. She also seeks to show that present migration processes in the Third World occur as part of the consolidation of the capitalist world system.

Two rural communities in Mexico's Zapoteca highlands were studied. The author looked at migration trends and changes between 1930 and 1970 in terms of sex, age, education, and occupation of migrants. Young concludes that in this period, the area changed from subsistence to integration with the local economy. Labour was freed up in the process and there were no employment opportunities in the area. However, migrants were not absorbed into the formal industrial sector but into the informal urban sector. Within the rural areas, there were deepening social differences between landowners and landless labourers. The State adopted a series of measures to try and keep people from migrating, including agrarian reform, cooperatives, subsidies, training programmes, credit systems and investment in infrastructure. Women in these communities assumed responsibilities and therefore also tended to migrate.

Most migrants went to Mexico City. Of all migrants from the highland region, 60 per cent lived in Mexico City in 1972. The 1960s was a decade of very high out-migration compared with the 1950s. The percentage of migrants who left the highlands in the 1960s was 29.2 per cent according to the author.

Concerning measures adopted by the State, they often had the effect of worsening social differences, facilitating capital penetration, increasing each household's monetary requirements and limiting the chances of obtaining local profits.

As for women in these communities, they tended to look for economic independence. Many tasks undertaken by women (sewing, preparation of products for the market, etc.) were done in factories. Girls were encouraged to leave because they earned very little and had to be supported by the rest of the family.

## 2b SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS

### i. General

- ADALEMO, *Small Urban Centres in Nigeria's Development Strategy: the Role of Rural Market Centres*  
 ANSARI, *A Study of Settlement Patterns in Kerala*  
 COLLIN DELAUAUD, *Uruguay: Medium and Small Cities*  
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- GRIESHABER, *Hacienda-Indian Community Relations and Indian Acculturation: a Histographical Essay*  
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## ADALEMO, ISAAC AYINDE

### SMALL URBAN CENTRES IN NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: THE ROLE OF RURAL MARKET CENTRES

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 127-130.

The aim of this short paper is to examine the role that existing market centres dispersed throughout Nigeria's rural areas can play in a rural-oriented national development strategy.

The author supports Bromley's assertion that the market place is one of the fundamental points of economic life. The traditional market system in Nigeria represents an articulation of spatial linkages which has been neglected

in post-Independence developments such as the building of transport routes. The centres of agricultural production are by-passed by the trunk roads so that often produce is left to rot. But despite the lack of recognition given to them, market centres 'perform integrative functions by providing the link between the production and consumption centres of the economies within which they are located'. Not all of them can be regarded as urban centres, but they all act as centres for the diffusion of information to the surrounding areas. The existing network of market places ought to provide development planners with a footing, for it represents the outcome of a selection process carried out by the rural inhabitants whereby they express their spatial preferences.

The paper stresses that the growth pole idea as conceived in the developed world is unsuited to the developing countries because it superimposes a largely alien set of urban places onto the indigenous socio-economy. The system of market centres is better suited for developmental purposes because of its articulation and intricate ties with it.

The author advocates provision of facilities in rural areas such as health, credit and postal services operating on a mobile and periodic basis, like rural markets. The



argument underlying this is that the subsidy involved in setting up such a system 'is likely to be lower than those being used to combat the problems consequent on over concentration of facilities within the large urban centres'.

ANSARI, J.H.

## A STUDY OF SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN KERALA

*Ekistics*, 180, November 1970, pp 427-435.

The paper looks at the settlement pattern developing in Kerala State (in South-West India). It notes that it is important to understand this before formulating regional development plans and adopting a planning approach to help co-ordinate urban and economic growth.

Kerala's coastline which is 350 miles long has many major and minor port towns plus a flourishing fishing industry which provides employment for a large population in the coastal area. Kerala is one of India's leading fish producing states, although the present catch is only a small proportion of possible stocks. Lack of landing, curing and storage facilities limit the exploitation of fish resources. Fishing has been a significant factor in shaping the settlement pattern in terms of harbours and villages.

Kerala State has a very high population density. The land is used intensively; during 1961/62 48 per cent of the land was sown (compared to the total figure for India of 39 per cent) with a further 27 per cent under forest (compared to the total figure for India of 17 per cent). Kerala's major agricultural production can be divided into field crops like rice, ginger, pulses, sugarcane, etc., and plantation crops like coconut, tea, rubber and coffee. The state's population growth rate for 1951-61 was 2.24 per cent against the figure for all India which was 1.98 per cent.

A well-developed transport network links the state's settlements. Prior to roads and railways, canals were dug to link existing water bodies like lakes, rivers and backwaters. 65 per cent of commodity transactions still use the waterways. The railway line runs parallel to the major road along the coast.

Despite its well developed transport system, high yielding agricultural sector and potential for hydro-power development industrial development is low compared to the average for the whole of India. Most industries are agro-based and many still function without power. Half the workers employed in registered industrial units work without power.

15.1 per cent of the population lived in urban areas in 1961. Cities and towns sprawl over large areas and five 'town groups' exist where a group of towns has developed sufficiently close to each other for them to merge into a single urban area. The Cochin-Ernakulam-Alwaye town group had seven towns. Most of these clusters have formed since 1951. But it seems that this clustering is not a reflection of the functional linkages joining these towns within a cluster but the effect of a low density sprawl of development. A large proportion of the towns in cluster groups are predominantly service towns.

The paper distinguishes between towns according to their predominant function - serving as a centre of trade and commerce or industry or transportation or service. The extent of any activity is reflected in the proportion of land-use under that activity and eventually in the share of employment any activity offers for the whole workforce. In Kerala in 1961, there were 37 manufacturing towns, two transport and communications towns, one trade and commerce town and 52 service towns. Three out of four Class I towns (with over 100,000 inhabitants) were service towns and one a manufacturing town. All but 10 of the state's 92 towns in 1961 were Class III, IV and V, i.e. with between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants. 60 per cent of the state's urban population lived in service towns with 35 per cent in manufacturing towns.

There are distinct settlement patterns in the lowlands, midlands and highlands. The lowlands have 26 per cent of the population on 10 per cent of the land area and contain 52 of the 92 towns in the state. These tend to be the fastest growing towns too. Favourable topography, long coastline, alluvial soil and good transport network are among the reasons, and many of the towns have grown in the coastal area along the main transport routes. This is particularly evident along the national highway running parallel to the coast. Along the highway, one can identify a hierarchy of homesteads, local market centres, 'rural-urban knots' (settlements on transport nodes which develop certain urban characteristics), small urban centres and major urban centres. There is a striking relationship between hierarchy of settlements and hierarchy of roads. To the coastal side of the main highway, there are fishermen's settlements while on the inland side, there are settlements located along backwaters and specializing in the manufacture of coir.

The settlement pattern in the midlands is characterised by a lower density development; rural and urban settlements do not form a regular corridor as in the lowlands and villages in the peripheral areas of urban centres do not tend towards urban densities as they do in the lowlands. Settlements in the highlands are characterised by a semi-nucleated pattern of growth where the economy is strengthened by forest products and cash crops.

Social and religious forces have shaped settlement structure. Concentrations of people by caste or religious group in a village separated by cultivated fields gives settlements in Kerala a distinctive structure. Thus, a village is an administrative unit but not a well-knit social or physical entity and does not have a well-defined built up area. There is a tendency for people of the same caste to form a definite sector. This kind of caste or class separation is not so apparent in coastal areas where higher pressure on land and higher densities have meant that dwellings are built on any available land. Only recently have richer people from lower castes been able to acquire property in traditionally high prestige areas.

Increasing pressure on land from population, changing socio-economic traditions and rising literacy rates all affect settlement trends. Compounds are being subdivided and some semi-clustered settlements are forming within what was formerly a scattered pattern. This is more apparent in lower caste or class areas although high caste people also tend to form semi-clustered settlements around their ancestral residences and temples. The joint family system is also breaking up which means an increasing number of dwellings being built. The surplus population is turning to other occupations like petty trade.

small-scale industries and so on because slow industrial development does not generate the jobs to absorb them. Such people often settle along the roadside which is one reason for the development of dwellings along roads. In coastal areas, demand for land is so high that large compounds are far less evident, as are caste zones. In the midlands, the caste zones are gradually giving way to class zones with a greater tendency to form semi-clustered settlements, although most houses still stand within their own compound. The extension and improvement of roads have made house sites along roads more valuable and the stigma attached to roadside dwellings is disappearing.

Thus, Kerala is urbanising faster than the rest of India. But it is not accompanied by a proportionate growth in industry and the state's economic base remains weak. There is limited scope for expanding the already intensive use of agricultural land. But abundant marine resources remain under-utilised. Expanding and modernising the fishing industry can expand employment and encourage the development of fish-based industries. Fishermen's settlements should be recognised as potential growth centres. Lack of industry has restricted the growth of large urban centres while small urban centres have grown in large numbers with household manufacturing and collection and marketing of agricultural produce as the main economic activities. Densities in urban settlements are low and towns and cities sprawl over large areas. Town groups and town clusters are common and in some places continuous rural-urban corridors have grown along highways. Many rural-urban knots have grown in a linear fashion along major highways and they need immediate planning attention since they grow into major traffic bottlenecks. But these knots also provide an important link between rural and urban areas. The major clustering of towns around Calicut, Ernakulam and Trivandrum and the dynamism of their hinterlands needs to be recognised and understood before any co-ordinated approach for integrated development of these city regions is attempted.

**COLLIN DELAUAUD, ANNE**

### **URUGUAY, MEDIUM AND SMALL CITIES**

*Institut des Hautes Etudes de l'Amérique Latine, Laboratoire Associé du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1976, 139 pages.*

Uruguay is one of the most urbanised countries in Latin America. Around 80 per cent of the national population lives in urban areas. From the middle of the 19th Century, the main characteristic of its settlement network has been the high primacy of Montevideo, the capital, which has 1.4 million inhabitants, or over 50 per cent of the national population, against a background of small and intermediate centres and a rural landscape of large landholdings dedicated to cattle-raising. Based on the national census of 1963, and on fieldwork done in 1968 and in 1970, the author presents one of the very few (if not the only) documents written with a special concentration

on the small and intermediate centres of a Latin American country, seen both from a demographic and a functional point of view. The study is divided into five chapters. Each includes a section with conclusions. There is also a final section on general conclusions, and a detailed bibliography. In Chapter I (The Urban Situation), the author includes a typology of settlements in an attempt to match census categories, and provides a brief explanation of the spatial distribution of the urban population (and the demographic trends of the departmental capitals and major centres). Chapter II (The Process of Urbanisation) is essentially historical in its context. In Chapter III (The Urban Space) Collin Delavaud presents the changes in the spatial organisation of a selected number of small and intermediate centres. Chapter IV (The Urban Functions) introduces the economy of small and intermediate settlements through a number of case studies. Chapter V (Inter-Urban Relationships) deals with the flow of communications between the larger centres.

Descriptive in its approach and in the selection of the data used, this study provides a useful insight into the nature of Uruguay's small and intermediate centres which are faced with the high centralisation of all business, administrative, and industrial matters in Montevideo. The large cattle ranches, for instance, do without the intermediary role of intermediate centres and deal directly with banks, export houses, industrial enterprises and transportation enterprises based in Montevideo. This is not so with the smaller enterprises which make a fuller use of services offered by these centres. A departmental capital or a district town is nothing more than a link in an administrative chain where all orders originate in the national capital, leaving the departmental mayor with very limited possibilities for independent action. Although most of the 18 administrative departments which form Uruguay are highly urbanised (with at least 60 to 70 per cent of the departmental population in urban areas), the emptiness of the fields does not encourage other functions, other than the most simple ones of animation of their rural hinterland.

**RONDINELLI, DENNIS, A.**

### **INTERMEDIATE CITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEIR DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS**

*Third World Planning Review, Vol 4, No 4, November 1982, pp 357-386.*

The paper begins with a broad overview of the growth in the number and population of 'intermediate cities' in the Third World and examines common characteristics among them in demography. It then discusses the economic and social characteristics which many intermediate cities share. Finally, it concludes that they play a relatively weak role in national development and that the heavy concentration of national government's development budget in the largest city/cities is a major reason for this.

The paper discusses the problem of defining an 'intermediate' or 'middle size' or 'secondary' city. Since information on the social, economic, demographic and physical characteristics of intermediate cities is so sparse, population size is usually used. The author notes the inadequacy of using this alone in defining what constitutes an intermediate city and the fact that for countries with different size national populations and different levels of urban and industrial development, the population of cities larger than small market towns but smaller than national capitals and major cities/metropolises will vary enormously. But owing to lack of data, the paper chooses to focus on cities defined by having at least 100,000 inhabitants up to (but not including) the largest city.

Three general conclusions are presented as to intermediate cities' demographic characteristics. First, they have grown rapidly both in number and in population since 1950. Their number more than doubled between 1950 and 1981 from 301 to 644 and more than tripled in number in Africa, the Middle East and South America. The increase in number was particularly notable in Nigeria, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Iran, Mexico and Colombia, among others. The population in intermediate cities increased even more dramatically. The second conclusion is that intermediate cities have been growing more slowly than cities in larger and smaller size categories. Only in those nations in Latin America and Asia where the largest cities have already reached enormous sizes have the populations of middle cities grown faster than the largest metropolis. Finally, intermediate cities have played a relatively weak role in absorbing population increases in most nations and in creating a more balanced spatial distribution of population. In Thailand, rates of immigration and growth vary positively and out-migration inversely with city size. 60 per cent of Jakarta's growth in the 1960s could be attributed to in-migration. Some 63 per cent of Seoul's growth from 1955-1965 can be attributed to in-migration.

Four broad conclusions are drawn on intermediate cities' economic and social characteristics. First, they tend to have a combination of urban and rural social, economic and physical characteristics and generally perform functions found in both cities and the countryside. Like major metropolitan centres, their economies are dominated by commercial and service activities and they may have a large manufacturing sector. Yet they have a small share of the nation's manufacturing establishments and employment. They are not usually competitive with larger metropolitan centres for large industries and even their commercial and industrial establishments are usually small. In many, rural activities continue side by side with modern urban activities. The paper quotes Hazelhurst's description of India's 'middle range' cities with some areas of their bazaars heavily populated with hawkers, and behind these the shops of resident businessmen with, for instance, bicycle shops and mechanics, small-scale metal workers who manufacture trunks and agricultural implements, medical practitioners and medicine dispensers, cloth shops and brass shops, tailors and dry cleaners, radio repair shops, gold merchants, grain merchants, etc. 'Both traditional consumer goods and luxury goods of more recent origin can be found in the bazaar of the middle range city'. Periodic markets still play an important role in the city of Ranchi, India with more than half a million inhabitants. These markets draw buyers from urban and rural areas and sellers from far flung villages

and towns. The paper notes that many intermediate cities are often growing in population and size with their economies diversifying. But they lack the resources to cope with these changes and to influence their direction of change.

The second conclusion is that intermediate cities' economies are usually dominated by commercial and service activities. Manufacturing employment is usually concentrated in small-scale plants. Studies in some Asian countries suggest four size classifications for occupational structure. Cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants usually have high proportions of employment in agriculture and related marketing and commercial activities, in small scale cottage and artisan manufacturing and lower order services that have a relatively low growth rate in total urban employment. Cities with between 100,000 and 250,000 inhabitants usually have employment in small scale manufacturing and consumer-oriented commercial and service activities and relatively high rates of growth in total urban employment. Cities with between 250,000 and 500,000 inhabitants are characterised by 'an increasing rate of growth in the producer-oriented commercial sector' and tend to have substantial manufacturing and tertiary activities. Finally, cities with a million or more inhabitants have a relatively high proportion of employment in manufacturing although their occupational structure is dominated by producer oriented commerce and service sectors. Smaller cities lack the population to support large-scale commercial and manufacturing activities but have a large enough market for lower order small-scale consumer and service functions and agricultural marketing and service activities. As city populations increase, they begin to offer economies of scale that allow larger production volumes which generate demand for producer oriented commercial goods and services. Lo and Salih suggest that in Asia, manufacturing efficiency increases with city size up to around a million inhabitants and then begins to decline while for producer-oriented tertiary activities, efficiency continues to increase with population size after cities have more than a million inhabitants.

Although evidence on this is fragmentary, that which does exist seems to support this. Data for South Korea for 1974 showed a declining percentage of employment in manufacturing in cities going from the largest city to other cities with 500,000 or more inhabitants to cities with 250,000-499,999 to cities with 100,000-249,999 to cities with 60,000-99,999 inhabitants. However, South Korean intermediate cities are notable for the high proportion of employment in manufacturing and for the rapid growth in this proportion between 1960 and 1980. In this period, with heavy government investment in export production, light and heavy industry and infrastructure, and with rapid economic growth, the number of intermediate cities nearly quadrupled in these 20 years. The proportion of employment in agriculture declined rapidly while the proportion in manufacturing grew rapidly. But Seoul remains the dominant manufacturing centre and contained 35.1 per cent of all manufacturing employment in 1974.

In many nations which have not experienced South Korea's rapid industrial development, the characteristics of intermediate cities remain similar to those in South Korea in the 1950s and 1960s with relatively low proportions of their labour force in manufacturing.

The economic base of Filipino intermediate cities is dominated by very small commercial activities in which

most participants barely manage to eke out a living. Hackenbarg's surveys of Davao City in the mid 1970s found that 'the portion of the labour force participants directly involved in formally organised manufacturing was not of sufficient size (only 11.3 per cent of those employed) to play a major role in shaping the contours of urban society'. The manufacturing sector had just 48 firms with 10 or more workers and 759 employing nine or less. The 12 industries with 100 or more workers employed two fifths of the labour force engaged in manufacturing. The paper notes that 'the manufacturing and commercial sectors in intermediate cities tend to be composed of large numbers of small firms that are owned and operated by family members and that employ few workers. Some (intermediate) cities<sup>1</sup> in developing countries have little or no large-scale industries.'

A third conclusion is that intermediate cities tend to have a far smaller share of manufacturing activities and employment and contribute less to national output when their population is compared to that in the large cities. The dominance of Seoul in South Korea's manufacturing employment has already been noted. In Kenya, Nairobi contained nearly 57 per cent of manufacturing employment in 1975. Half of Egypt's industrial enterprises are within the boundaries of Cairo and Alexandria, the two largest cities or else in their immediate hinterland.

A final conclusion about intermediate cities' social and economic characteristics is that they have a greater diversity and a higher quality of social services and facilities than smaller settlements but a smaller share and poorer quality from the largest cities. Examples of these are given from Indonesia, Colombia and Thailand.

The paper then discusses the concentration of national development investment in the largest cities and suggests that this is a major reason why intermediate cities have remained a relatively weak component of urban settlement systems. In Colombia, Bogota had a clear advantage over other cities in the distribution of tax revenues, import licences and 'administrative determinations that can generate economic growth'. Average per capita expenditure for municipal services, education, public health and economic development assistance was five times higher in Colombia's three largest cities compared to other cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants and per capita expenditure generally decreased with city size. Unikel is quoted on how the Mexican government's infrastructure investment has favoured Mexico City metropolitan area. Ironically, this metropolitan area benefited most from incentives designed to foster industrial decentralisation since establishments located there captured between 51 and 68 per cent of the credits granted by the Guarantee and Development Fund for Small and Medium Industry between 1953 and 1970. In the Philippines, nearly 57 per cent of government's investment in the fiscal years 1959-61 in infrastructure went to the metro Manila region. A study by Javier is quoted, showing the continued concentration of government funds for infrastructure, schools and hospitals in the two regions encompassing and surrounding Manila's metropolitan area. A report by Cohen on the Sahel is quoted, saying that the pattern of public investment is often an obstacle to the growth of smaller towns. 'When compared to the distribution of urban population, despite the importance of capital cities, it is clear that secondary cities do not receive an equitable share on a per capita basis'. This investment bias is not only in housing and infrastructure but also in industry and

services.

The paper suggests that the enormous and pervasive influence of government investment in creating large metropolises suggests that governments can also influence the growth of intermediate cities through 'decentralised concentration' of investment. This implies that if governments in developing countries want to bring about a more balanced distribution of urban population and productive economic activities by building the capacities and numbers of intermediate cities, changes must be made in the distribution of strategic investments. Such changes, however, must be based on a better understanding of the reasons why (intermediate) cities have emerged and of their potential advantages, the dynamics of their growth and the critical functions they can perform in the national economy, if they are to have the desired impact.'

1. The text uses the terms 'intermediate' 'medium size' and 'secondary' cities interchangeably - in this instance the original text talked of secondary cities. We have used only 'intermediate' in this summary.

TRAGER, LILLIAN

## MARKET CENTRES AS SMALL URBAN PLACES IN WESTERN NIGERIA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 138-157.

The paper looks at the settlement hierarchy in Ifeshaland, an area in eastern Yorubaland, Nigeria which extends for a radius of 24-32 km around Ilesha, a town which had 165,000 inhabitants according to the 1963 census. It discusses how best to determine a regional settlement hierarchy. It describes how settlements in this region can be grouped into a five rank hierarchy based on a centrality index related to the number of commodities and the number of establishments (sellers) in markets. It then looks in detail at the six settlements which fall into the second rank under Ilesha and discussed the economic services, and are served by roads and transport services. It concludes with a discussion on their potential development in the urban centres.

In the introduction, the paper notes that with the increasing emphasis given to rural development in recent years, there is a growing interest in identifying settlements to provide a focus for agricultural and rural development. Western Nigeria provides an excellent locale in which to examine such issues since, unlike many parts of Africa, it has long had a well developed hierarchy of settlements ranging from small farm hamlets up to large cities. Yet there has been relatively little discussion of the actual and potential role of lower level centres in development policy, even though these centres provide the links between the rural populations and higher level administrative and economic centres.

Ifeshaland's economy is predominantly agricultural, based both on food crops and export crops like cocoa and kolanuts. A table shows the labour force by

occupational groups in Ilesha Division for 1963. While farming was the largest occupational group, 'salesworkers' accounted for 25.8 per cent of defined occupational groups (almost all were street vendors) and this category was dominated by women. Apart from agriculture and sales workers, 'craftsmen production-process workers and labourers' was the only other major occupational group; it included 14.3 per cent of the labour force.

The paper discusses the various ways in which small urban centres can be identified both in terms of delineating a regional hierarchy and in terms of showing which centres have links with their rural hinterlands. It discusses the usefulness of relying on traditional Yoruba concepts which group settlements in terms of political importance. Using such concepts, one arrives at a hierarchy of hamlets and villages, subordinate towns and capital towns. But it is difficult to use these in a contemporary setting in that the political status of a settlement in the traditional system can bear little relation to its current size or importance. However, Ilesha, much the largest urban centre in the region in 1963, was traditionally the most important town since it was the capital of a traditional kingdom and the seat of the ruler (oba) and his council of chiefs.

The validity of constructing a central place hierarchy based on the extent to which centres have, for instance, banks, wholesale stores, judicial and administrative functions and medical, educational and entertainment facilities is discussed. The author points to the difficulties in weighing the relative importance of such difficulties. She also criticises the claim that periodic markets are not a valid function of 'urban centres' since they are characteristic of rural settlements. She suggests that market place activity is a useful measure of centrality.

The 28 markets in Ijeshaland are examined with a table giving the population of the 28 settlements and the number of sellers of food and non-food commodities in each. These can be grouped in a five part rank hierarchy. Ilesha, the only centre in the first rank has by far the largest population (165,000 in 1963 against the next largest of 20,983) and the only daily market. The other 27 have periodic markets based on cycles of two, four or eight days. Ilesha has much of the region's non-agricultural employment. The paper then examines the six centres which fall into the second rank in more detail. There is some correlation between population size in the 1963 census and the centres' score in the centrality index. Three of the four centres with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1963 (besides Ilesha) are in the second rank.<sup>1</sup>

But there are also two centres which had less than 5,000 inhabitants in 1963 in this second rank with several more populous settlements in 1963 being in lower ranks.

The six centres in the second rank are all, not surprisingly, on roads and all but one on tarred roads. It is the author's contention that the centres in the second rank are either actual or potential small urban centres in the Ijeshaland context, and can be referred to as 'market centres' with Ilesha as a 'regional centre' and lower level centres with market places as 'rural market places'.

Each of the six centres plays an important role linking small centres and rural areas with larger urban centres, and linking small centres with their rural hinterlands. Traders use the markets for selling manufactured goods and places where farm produce can be purchased and bulked for transport and sale elsewhere. The centres also play an important role for local farmers who may sell some

of their produce there but needed consumer goods. Tables show the urban centres from where traders obtain their commodities sold in the markets and the source of goods and the residence of those selling farm produce on two of the six centres. Farmers in the region were found to be heavily involved in the market system both for selling produce and for purchasing goods and services. Many journey to the market on foot.

A study of three of the six centres found other functions characteristic of lower level central places. Lorries and taxis served each town. Each had a post office, some permanent shops and two stores houses, churches and a primary and secondary school. Basic service provision was generally poor. None had a hospital and only one had a dispensary. Only one had electricity in 1974. If rural development is a concern of government, clearly basic social service provision and provision, for instance, crop storage and agricultural extension services, could be initiated or improved.

In conclusion, the paper raises two points. The first is that individuals and corporations are unlikely to have much interest in investing in such small centres. After all, Ilesha with its much larger population and much more comprehensive provision of services and availability of goods and services is generally viewed as less attractive than Lagos or Ibadan. The second is the question of who would benefit from government policies to foster the development of small urban centres. The paper notes that perhaps 'the location of market places primarily benefits traders and business people from larger urban centres such as Ilesha . . . A simple prescriptive approach to the development of small urban centres is not sufficient. We cannot simply identify 'small urban places' and state that, if they are the focus of rural development, all will be well for all members of the population. However, such an approach can be used as the basis for raising a number of major issues. We can examine specific places, such as the six market centres in Ijeshaland and enquire into their relationships with the larger centres and with rural hinterlands. We can also ask questions about political processes of development in such places. We can consider the way in which different groups within the population – farmers and traders, men and women, and so on – utilise these centres, and make suggestions about the possible impact of development policies on these groups'.

1. Editor's note: The text does not discuss the correlation between centrality index and population. It is relevant to note that the three centres in the second rank according to centrality indices with the smallest 1963 population figures are the three which are closest to major urban centres each with more than 100,000 inhabitants which are not included in the discussion. Perhaps the size of and complexity of their markets, despite relatively small populations, owes something to this fact.

UNIKEL, LUIS and NECOCHEA,  
ANDRES

## HIERARCHY AND SYSTEM OF CITIES IN MEXICO

*Demografia y Economia*, Vol 1, 1976, pp  
27-39.

In this paper, the authors describe the methodological aspects of a study referring to the hierarchy and system of the 38 cities in Mexico which had 50,000 or more inhabitants in 1960. The paper is divided into three parts: characteristics of the urban centres as 'central places'; quality of life; and the position each city occupies within the economic space of the urban system.

The results are very briefly described:

1. The bigger the city, the greater its functional specialisation.
2. Population size and quality of life are positively, although weakly, correlated. No definite conclusions can be drawn.
3. There is strong centralism in Mexico; and
4. Weak migration.

WEINARD, HERBERT, C.

## SOME SPATIAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA<sup>1</sup>

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 7, No 2,  
January 1973, pp 247-263.

The paper tests various hypotheses relating to 'spread' and 'backwash' effects, using data from Nigeria based on its provincial boundaries in use in the early Sixties.

The paper notes that growth poles<sup>2</sup> emerge as a result of agglomeration economies and because of internal and external scale economies, especially in manufacturing industries. Differences in economic growth characterise different parts of any country. Drawing on the work of Friedmann, Myrdal and Hirschman, the paper talks of 'spread' or 'trickling down' effects which tend to disperse some of the benefits of economic growth from growth poles to peripheral areas and of 'backwash' or 'polarisation' effects which are unfavourable to the peripheral areas. A section on 'backwash effects' notes the migration of capital and people from peripheral areas to growth poles, the people migrating tending to be the more enterprising, energetic and skilled. A section on 'spread effects' notes that growth poles can benefit peripheral areas by relieving them of some of their excess population, by these spread effects.

Myrdal and Hirschman see the spread effects as being weakest and least responsive in the initial stages of development so that public investment in, for instance, schools, roads and hospitals must tackle the problem of

regional inequalities and defuse political unrest in the poorer regions.

The paper then outlines various hypotheses which it seeks to test. On the intensity of backwash effects with distance, 'if the friction of distance is high, and the information field is limited to an underdeveloped country, backwash effects should be felt most strongly in areas near to the centres of growth'. On the intensity of spread effects with distances, 'spread effects should be distributed more uniformly than those of backwash, yet through the neighbourhood effect and because of the overflow of wealth from the growth poles they will be more intense in the vicinity of growth poles'. These are then tested using a set of socio-economic indicators, some of which are strongly associated with spread effects, others with backwash effects. 'If a principal components analysis is performed on a correlation matrix of development variables, two factors should emerge, one interpretable as spread and the other as backwash. The spread factor should be composed primarily of government-provided services while the backwash factor should consist mainly of entrepreneurial services and activities'.

Then, having extracted the principal components, 'the association of each areal unit with the components can be assessed by computing their scores. The mapping of factor component scores will then form the basic evidence supporting or rejecting the first and second hypotheses'.

The factor scores were then used as dependent variables in multiple regression models to test other hypotheses, including the relationship between distribution of growth poles and manufacturing industry.

A section on 'data and measures' describes the variables selected while the longest section in the paper describes the principal components analysis and includes maps of Nigeria showing the spread of entrepreneurial activity, urban utilities and infrastructure. Then a short section presents the findings of the regression analysis.

In a concluding section, the paper states that the empirical analysis 'strongly supports the concepts presented by Myrdal and Hirschman'. Four basic areal types were identified; the growth pole with most of the entrepreneurial activity and high level services; a hinterland surrounding it, relatively well provided with roads, schools and health facilities but looking to the growth pole for its basic economic services; the economic frontier some distance from the growth pole with some economic activity and infrastructure, suggesting a distributive role complementing the growth pole's role but possibly a future competitor to it; and the undeveloped periphery in the areas most distant from growth poles which typically lack economic activity and infrastructure. In addition, a high correlation between manufacturing and entrepreneurial activities was found, supporting the concept that manufacturing is a major driving force within the economy.

1. Weinard's paper of the same title in *Ekistics* 214, September 1973, is not annotated in the bibliography since it is a condensed version of this paper.

2. Although the text gives no definition of what it means by 'growth pole', it is used in the text to describe an area where economic development is concentrated.

WOLFE, MARSHALL

## RURAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA

*Latin American Research Review*, Vol 1, No 2, Spring 1966, pp 5-50.

'This paper's starting point is the well-known present situation of rapid population growth combined with apparent incapacity of the rural areas to absorb more than a fraction of the very wide gap between their levels of living and those of the cities, to respond adequately to rising urban demands for their products or to participate effectively in national decision-making.'

The author's aim is to describe settlement patterns and relationships which are important in Latin America. The study focuses on rural settlements on the eve of changes which both influence and are influenced by settlement patterns and community organisation; changes such as land tenure reforms, the appearance of rural mass organisations, new forms of leadership and allegiance to national political movements and the disintegration of localities through migration. Settlements were classified as follows:

1. Towns and villages: largest population nuclei with which study is concerned. Over 2,500 and 1,000 inhabitants respectively. Both are administrative centres. They have urbanised settlement patterns, with central plazas and some of the houses arranged along regular streets. These settlements may have a piped water system and electricity. Both have at least three distinguishable strata: a local upper stratum of officials, merchants and medium landowners; a middle stratum of shopkeepers, artisans and small landowners; and a lower stratum of landless workers and minifundio holders. Both towns and villages depend on agriculture. The most important distinction between town and village as ideal types is the way in which they are related to the land. The 'pueblo' (town) is primarily a marketing, transport, administrative and servicing centre for a rural hinterland, and a place of residence for proprietors who do not work their own land. The 'aldea' (village) is primarily a compact living area of cultivators who travel daily to and from the fields, but still closely knit enough to support a certain range of specialised institutions. It functions as the specialised centre of a large community.

2. Large hamlet (villorio): smaller than the village, specialised institutions relatively less important, and more rudimentary class stratification where the population is almost entirely made up of small cultivators or agricultural wage workers. There are no regular streets or centre. Community relationships are more limited and informal than a village. There is a lack of services.

3. Hamlet (caserio): loosely nucleated cluster of not more than 200 people.

4. Dispersed settlement: not clearly distinguished from hamlet but with no links to a larger 'pueblo centred' community.

5. Estate (hacienda): community confined in a paternalistic mould, with its own social hierarchy, its own provision for internal supply of goods and services and, to a large extent, its own administrative system. In size and

pattern, these may resemble any of the other settlements except the town.

6. Plantations and pastoral enterprises: the first are tightly organised central settlements, entirely built, with trade union organisation to replace neighbourhood. The second are pastoral ranches with low densities and the smallest proportion of workers living on the state in family units.

7. Rural groups that are the result of deliberate national policies eg. 'ejidos' in Mexico, organised groups of families that have received grants of land.

8. Communities: in the Andean countries, an important part of the Indian population belongs to 'comunidades' which manage their internal affairs and the tenure of their land.

The author discusses the influence of history, geography and land tenure upon settlement patterns and local organisation. State and Church policy called for the grouping of rural population into sizeable compact settlements with their own landholdings and their own institutions of self-government. However, they were still under the close paternalistic control of the authorities. A system of 'indirect rule' simplified the giving of religious instruction, the collection of taxes, the recruitment of labour and public works. Influential individuals sought ownership of the land and with it control over the population working on the land. These interests also favoured compact settlements, but under the absolute dominion of the landowner and his appointees.

Highway systems have also induced regroupings. Overcrowding of older areas, changes in hacienda land use and labour demands have fostered new categories which lack local ties such as squatters and pioneer cultivators. Administrative and political structures are also described in terms of their lack of power in relation to higher levels.

Examples include the lack of power a municipality and its authorities have with respect to the provincial authorities and the domination exerted by the 'cabecera' (chief city in the department) expressed in the superiority felt by its residents.

The author suggests that the bleak picture of present rural settlement conditions cannot be solved by uniform national recipes or plans drawn up at a distance, and that the organisation of rural people deserves primary consideration. Rural people must be helped to acquire institutions to cope with change and high rates of natural increase. The promotion of clustered settlements, service nuclei, self-government, and the strengthening of towns and municipalities are also important.

YOUNG, M. CRAWFORD

## THE STATE AND THE SMALL URBAN CENTRE IN AFRICA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 313-333.

The article describes a series of political events in Ghana, Uganda and Zaire since the last years of colonial rule, particularly focusing on the State and its evolution over that period. In the final section some hypotheses are enunciated regarding the role of small urban centres in the national economy and how it may be affected by changes in the structure of the State. The assumption that the role of such centres also evolves lies on the evidence provided in a study by Schatzberg that 'a large fraction of small centres owe their existence essentially to the role of administrative outpost' (quoted by the author, p. 313). The justification for a study of small urban centres lies on the assumption (not proven in the article) that 'they are key points of articulation of incentives for greater productivity with the complex socio-political interests of the rural poor'.

The choice of countries is not made on any presumption of representativeness within Africa but because of the author's previous research experience. However, at the time of writing, all three states were undergoing a profound crisis, 'with far-reaching and long-run implications' which 'invites a search for comparative explanation beyond the configurative peculiarities of a given polity'.

The lengthy and detailed description of political events in the three countries serves to bring to the fore the obvious differences in culture and economic base which separate the three countries. But the common economic and political decline experienced by all the countries particularly in the 1970s helps to stress what the author calls 'the perversion of the State'. In Ghana and Uganda the military regimes of Acheampong and Amin brought about the gradual erosion of many of the achievements made by previous governments after Independence, particularly in the area of service provision to the population, but also in the export sector. In Zaire, on the other hand, although there was never any real progress in the supply of services after Independence, mounting corruption and a deterioration of incomes became a feature of the 1970s.

The author concedes that the decline in the three countries may be explained in part by the arguments of the dependency school<sup>2</sup> particularly in a mineral-based economy such as Zaire's, where external capital holdings are quite sizeable. Although clear links can be seen between those in power in the three countries and representatives of international capital, they do not suffice to explain the 'state-perversion process' suffered by them. The author believes that 'perversity is situated predominantly in the pathology of given regimes; their impact is then catastrophic because of the sheer scale of the state in relation to society'. (p. 327)

Due to the recency of the crisis which was patent in the three countries at the time of writing, the author believes that 'there is no solid empirical base on which to construct

a secure set of hypotheses' (p. 328). The line of reasoning, nonetheless, is that a perverted State yields a disarticulated nation where 'the presumably beneficial linkages between the State and its periphery are partially ruptured, as the mass withdraws in sullen apathy, and the rural sector seeks to evade the state circuits through such devices as smuggling its production out of the country . . . ' (p. 328). Although no more amenities are provided to the rural areas ('the periphery'), the State continues to draw most of its resources from them, and the State eventually becomes parasitical.

In this process the small urban centre lies at the point of disjuncture, it becomes a focal point for extraction. In the face of an impoverished countryside, finally, State-based small centres may continue to expand rapidly in population.

1. Editor's note: In this context 'polity' means nation.

2. Editor's note: Several and quite distinct positions can be found among some political analysts concerned with development in the Third World, and erroneously grouped together as 'the dependency school'. Their main common feature lies in the importance they give to foreign interests in shaping a development path for these countries which maintains a situation of underdevelopment.

CHALOULT, YVES

## SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND PEASANT ORGANISATION IN NORTH EASTERN BRAZIL

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 4, 1980, pp 536-548.

The article describes and compares two rural development schemes developed by the Brazilian Government during the 1970s in the country's poorest region, the northeast. Over half the 35 million inhabitants of this vast region live in rural areas. Severe droughts and an increasingly inequitable land tenure structure are but some of the problems that the large rural majority faces: 'the basic characteristic of the small northeastern rural producers is the limiting of their potential as productive agents. This limitation is the consequence of the combined influence of various systems of social relations, particularly those concerned with the ownership of the land, the financing of productive activities and the marketing of production at diverse levels' (p 537).

The two schemes are administered by Polonordeste, an agency set up by the Federal Government, and financed partly with funds from the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank. At the end of its third year, in 1977, a total of \$315 million had been invested. The two schemes were aimed at benefiting some 2.1 million people by the end of 1979. The author of the article worked as a coordinator in the Programme.

The Rural Settlements Project, the more expensive of the two schemes, is really a continuation of a series of colonisation projects promoted for years by the government and the private sector in regions with a low population density, particularly in Rondonia, near the



Bolivian border, and in Amazonia, where peasants from the northeast have been encouraged to settle since the early 1970s. Polonordeste set up and financed four such colonisation schemes, the largest of which was Serra do Ramalho, described briefly in the article. This was aimed mainly at resettling 4,000 families who had been displaced by the construction of a dam some 850 km south of Serra do Ramalho; by the end of 1978, a projected 3,300 families were to be living in the project, half of which were from the original 4,000 families who had been offered to resettle. By 1981 the project, designed as a hierarchy of settlements (ranging from agricultural villages to agricultural cities) of different population sizes each with a given set of services, was to have an estimated cost of \$16,000 per family.

Integrated Rural Development Projects (PDRIs), the second scheme set up and financed by Polonordeste, are aimed at helping small landholders in already densely populated rural areas. Under these projects, small-scale producers are grouped together and are given government support to buy land (in the case of landless peasants), are given access to credit, are helped to market their products, while the isolation in which they normally live is reduced by being encouraged to work together in groups. By 1978 there were 31 PDRIs in operation in the northeast, with an estimated cost of \$365 per person.

The article assesses the pros and cons of both schemes and concludes that cost, among other factors, renders the first scheme unviable as a solution to the problems of the millions of rural poor who eke a living in the northeast. The two schemes should complement each other. However, the author recognises that they alone cannot change living conditions and long-term development prospects for the rural poor. They ought to be accompanied by other forms of government intervention such as for example, 'effective agrarian reform and a policy of prices and jobs which benefits the agricultural sector' (p.546).

DILLMAN, C. DANIEL

## URBAN GROWTH ALONG MEXICO'S NORTHERN BORDER AND THE MEXICAN NATIONAL BORDER PROGRAM

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, July 1970, pp  
487-508.

The paper looks at economic development and urban growth in Mexico's border zone adjacent to the USA and at the economic links and labour movements across the border. It also looks at the conditions under which Mexicans can work in the US, at the regulatory policies affecting the entry of US goods into the Mexican border zone and at the objectives and problems of the Mexican National Border Programme.

The boundary between Mexico and the United States divides nations with large differences in living standards and levels of economic development. Mexican

municipalities close to the border are at a considerable distance from Mexico's main producing areas and have become more closely linked to the economies of neighbouring US border communities and their agricultural areas.

A section on 'the attraction of the Mexico-United States border zone' describes the rapid growth in population of the nine major municipalities in the 35 municipalities which stretch along the Mexican side of the border. Figures on their population growth are given for the 1950s and for 1960-1968. The northern tier of Mexican states is more urbanised and has urbanised more rapidly than the average for Mexico as a whole. Over one fifth of the inhabitants of the six border states reside in the nine major municipalities. In 1960, annual per capita income in these nine was 135 per cent greater than the national average and border municipalities' economies are generally structured to serve foreign tourists. Thus shops, gasoline stations, restaurants, night clubs and car-watching are major employers of unskilled labour. But it is through higher wages earned by Mexican residents who work in the United States that much of the income is earned. In six of the nine major municipalities, income earned in the United States is the leading category in the salaried sector. And the wages earned in the United States push up average per capita income figures and masks the much lower incomes the majority of workers receive.

A section called 'the commuter workers controversy' gives details of trans-border labour movements. This movement benefits US-based enterprises since it provides cheap labour and the Mexicans involved are important purchasers of goods and services there. Of course it provides Mexicans involved in this with, on average, higher incomes and these incomes have important multiplier effects in Mexico. For Tijuana, the third most populous of the border municipalities in 1968 and the richest in per capita income in 1960, the local chamber of commerce stated that in 1968 the average green card worker<sup>1</sup> directly or indirectly provided support for around 12 Tijuane. On the US side, department stores and parking lots seem disproportionately large for local populations. In Mexico the abundance of night clubs, restaurants, liquor stores, bordellos, perfume and jewellery shops and handicraft dealers shows the importance of tourist trade. But US organised labour has tried to restrict this labour movement since it lowers wage rates in US border communities and the movement has been largely unsuccessful at unionising Mexican labour. In addition, the US authorities are concerned about the scale of illegal labour movements.

Table 1 gives details of commuter workers and their occupations based on a 1967 survey and shows that an average of 40,176 Mexicans with green cards crossed the border daily, accompanied by an average of 18,259 US citizens. These are thought to be underestimates since many Mexicans stayed away from their jobs when the counts were made. There is no exact knowledge of the size of the migrant group entering illegally or using visitor visas or 72 hour shopping passes with the undeclared intention of working in the US.

Cities on both sides of the border benefit from economic exchanges but 'much the greater advantage is with the United States.' The fact that the Mexican border communities are a long way from Mexico's major producing centres means that there is a large volume of imports into the border municipalities. Money earned by their residents through tourism or through working in the

United States are necessary compensatory activities. But studies conducted in border municipalities show that tourist earnings in Mexico return immediately to the United States for the purchase of merchandise and services. The paper notes that the unfavourable balance in economic linkages with the US twin cities stultifies full commercial growth on the Mexican border centres.

The National Border Program to tackle this problem is then described. This has three components. The first is to 'beautify' the facilities in the port-of-entry towns; improving tourist accommodation and facilities and promoting Mexican products and culture. The second is to diversify and improve agriculture. And the third is to attract US-financed industries to border cities to develop and diversify the economic base and provide alternative employment to incomes earned from commuting into the United States since this commuting was in danger of being controlled. The text describes the incentives offered to US businesses and progress up to 1967. Of course, US manufacturing industries which can import materials and machinery free of duty and which export their products back to the United States continue to funnel much of the foreign exchange out of Mexico. The text also describes efforts to encourage Mexican enterprises to sell more of their commodities in the border municipalities and the incentives offered to encourage this.

In conclusion, the paper notes that the extent to which Mexican municipalities can replace US goods and services with those of local origin depends ultimately on the extent to which the area becomes integrated with Mexico's national economy and on the diversification of commercial and industrial functions in keeping with local requirements. It also notes that sub-standard housing and inadequate infrastructure and services should be added to the problems of inadequate local goods production and lack of employment opportunities. Municipalities' inability to plan and guide their rapid growth and to install needed infrastructure and services reflects their lowly position in the Mexican government's administrative hierarchy. Most of the major local taxes, including land assessments, go to state government, so local officials have to cope with deficient budgets. Municipalities usually do not directly control their budgets. In most states, they have to be approved in the state capital. State governments too are of slight importance both politically and constitutionally. Important decisions are usually made at national level and implemented by federal agencies. If states administer programmes, they do so as agents of centralised authorities.

When the paper was written, the programme to attract US industries to border municipalities was too recent for an evaluation.

Thus, the Mexico-United States boundary is unique because it is the longest land border shared by a country of high income and one of low income. Twin cities in the region are not individual entities; they are in reality divided cities. In order to maximise economic potential the communities on both sides of the border should be viewed inseparably. Hence, appropriate corrective measures and plans relevant to local circumstances cannot be dissociated from national policy. Only close co-operation between Mexico and the United States will ensure the viability of border centres which face problems of rapid urbanisation and which mirror the fusion of both cultures.

1. Green cards are immigration visas permitting Mexicans to enter the United States for business or pleasure or to immigrate and become bona fide residents. Most green card holders reside in the US.

HERRERA, LIGIA

## AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND THE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN MEXICO

*Demografía y Economía*, Vol XII, No 2, 1978, pp 203-225.

The author's hypothesis is that population distribution is conditioned by regional economic development and that existing agrarian structures tie in closely with the level of development achieved at the regional level. She also assumes that there is a close relationship between agrarian structures and settlement patterns. The natural environment and climate also influence population distribution.

Five regions were defined and the characteristics of population distribution were compared in two very different areas within a typology of agrarian structures. No information is provided on this typology. Two of the five regions were chosen: one region where commercial agricultural enterprises prevail and one in which a peasant economy prevails. In region I, products are sold in the market while in region II, small plots are exploited by the family within the framework of a subsistence economy.

Region I is clearly urban, while region II may be described as rural. In region I, small settlements prevail because there are large desert areas. The areas with most rain have the highest proportion of the population in centres with 100 to 500 inhabitants. The economic structure prevailing in each region gives rise to migration movements. Region II is a region of out-migration. Basic services are much better in region I.

The author succeeds in verifying her hypotheses, for she shows the different influences exerted by different structures on the population distribution, living conditions and migration trends. The development model in force has broadened the gap between the urban and rural areas in the region where capitalist enterprises dominate and also in the peasant economy area.

Differences are less acute where the population is more or less evenly distributed among small (1,000-2,500 inhabitants), medium (2,500-20,000 inhabitants) and large towns (over 20,000 inhabitants).

There is a close relationship between population distribution and land tenure system. Better living conditions are found where population is concentrated, while low levels are linked to rural dispersion.

MONNIER, F.

## THE CITY HIERARCHY, THE CASE OF CITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

*Revue de L'Institut de Sociologie*, 1974, No 2, pp 275-297

The estimated annual growth rate for the population in towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants in Africa is one of the highest in the world. Between 1950 and 1960 it reached 3.1 per cent while the average for Third World nations was 2.8 per cent.

Most African cities have grown very rapidly since Independence, in part because migration to cities was no longer controlled and in part because of increasingly deteriorating conditions in rural areas. The annual growth rate of 50 settlements in Zaire was 11.2 per cent between 1948 and 1958 and 9.9 per cent between 1958 and 1970. The annual growth rate of 8.15 per cent was estimated for 79 urban centres.

Christaller's, Beckmann's, Duncan's and Berry's and Rank Size Rules are described briefly. Monnier points out that the concepts and theories used for developed countries may not be freely used for Africa. Can the cities of Zaire be called an urban system or are they merely a collection of cities? Can a mining settlement in Africa be called a development pole?

The lack of an urban system in Africa is a result of under-development and its effects. The urbanisation process was induced from the outside. No integrated national markets were formed. Markets only answer external demands. The existing communications means do not link the centres but only individual centres with the exporting centre. Another characteristic which prevents the formation of an urban network is the gigantic size of many Third World capital cities. And the tertiary activities which normally support an urban network are concentrated in the capital city.

The paper quotes Lacoste, who considers that the concept of a region cannot be applied. We can speak of regions when there are functional links between the inhabitants and activities, when the region is organised around an urban centre with a certain economic activity and when there is integration with the global economy. Monnier applies the rank size rule for Zaire's cities in 1958 and 1970. He explains that the rule only applies for the cities in 1958, perhaps because of the bureaucratic and rational organisation and the constraints of the colonial system. In 1970, the rank size rule is no longer valid. The paper suggests that the freedom which characterised the first decade after Independence suppressed the effects of colonial constraints. The rank size rule is valid for a bureaucratic structure and not for a less determined social system.

PRESTON, DAVID

## EXPLOITATION OR SYMBIOSIS, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TOWNS AND COUNTRYSIDE IN LATIN AMERICA

*Cahiers des Ameriques Latines*, No 17, 1978, pp 120-131

The paper seeks to examine the thesis of internal domination in terms of the relationship between towns and countryside, to show its use and its limitations. The case study chosen is Bolivia, and the author looks at the changes undergone in town-countryside relationships after the revolution and agrarian reform of 1952-53.

The author states that the decrease in tension between urban centres and rural people allows peasants to improve their access to urban services and migrate to nearby towns and not to the national metropolis.

Preston describes two elements which influence the links between town and countryside, or between town and city. The first is social or cultural differentiation. The second, which explains the development of internal domination, is access to land.

After describing the situation in Bolivia before the 1953 Reform as the classic situation of internal domination, Preston describes four changes in rural areas after that date which have affected links between town and countryside. These are the formation of peasant trade unions, the elimination of large landholders as the dominant class, the emergence of new towns where open markets were established, and the emergence of new towns in the countryside.

After the 1953 Agrarian Reform, agricultural production, which had been in the hands of large landholders, was undertaken by peasants. Before the revolution, weekly markets were held, where peasants and local merchants exchanged their goods by barter. Afterwards, cities suffered from a lack of agricultural products and wholesalers went in search of goods for urban consumption. Gradually, new towns emerged as new markets along the main roads. With the money earned in these market places, peasants bought different goods in the cities, and thus were integrated into the national economy. The importance of these changes in the relationship between town and countryside is the geographic reorientation for peasants. They now had a surplus for sale and were able to sell it wherever they wished and not only in the local market place.

Another important change was the formation of new urban settlements in the countryside. Many of these new settlements developed in the same places as the new market places. They were formed by peasants from several communities so that anyone who wished could have a house in the town. There were few foreigners living there, and as peasants keep their houses in the country, the new towns seemed empty during the week, except for the school and a few shops. The great advantage for the people from the communities who formed their own town was that a family may have a house 'downtown' (a question of social prestige) with commercial opportunities due to the central location. Furthermore, the market place

could attract more people, because there were more lodgings to offer and the town and its community could improve its status in the administrative hierarchy of the province. Perhaps it would be given a police station, a telegraph station, a better school, a secondary school or a training centre for rural teachers. Thus, people living in nearby communities would go to the new town to solve their problems instead of going to the old town as before.

These towns constitute a new level in the urban hierarchy, usually inhabited by peasants. They offered a favourable social environment for the rural population, and may be a good alternative for those who decide to migrate to a big city. (No data is given on the size and number of new towns.)

**REVEL MOUROZ, JEAN and VANEPIH,  
ALAIN**

### **OIL AND FRONTIER ENCLAVES IN THE NORTH-EAST OF MEXICO: REYNOSA**

*Cahiers des Ameriques Latines*, No 20, 1979, pp  
95-109

Reynosa is a city of 200,000 inhabitants on the border between Mexico and the United States. The rural economic structure in the border zone and urban spatial organisation are underpinned by petroleum and by the role of border enclaves. New settlements on the border give impulse to Mexicanisation through commercial activities. But, the expansion of assembly plants there strengthens the dependence on the United States. Local economic growth has created a new balance between oil sector activities, which now prevail, and others. The authors are concerned with the problem of the existence, co-existence, and mutual relations between the two enclaves in the same city.

The importance of the oil company is reflected in the city's appearance. There is a separation between the 'oil exploitation city' and the 'border city', since they are physically separated by the Anzalduas Canal. The 'oil city' is similar to other industrial towns with reservoirs and refineries on one side and the workers' village with a hospital, school, green spaces and trade union building on the other. To the physical impact of pollution must be added the risks of fire and explosion. PEMEX (the oil company) is the city's main employer. The city is an enclave, a closed corporation, with its own traditions and environment. The PEMEX population has its own mentality and own organised trade unions, and is nomadic (for it goes from one oil extracting area to another). Conflicts usually arise when they meet with the more traditional population, the landowners from rural areas. But these conflicts declined thanks to Reynosa's 'border city' function. For the local bourgeoisie prefers the PEMEX population to the illegal workers who go to the US and gather in the peripheral neighbourhoods. Thanks to these two populations, Reynosa does not resemble other oil towns, but is a real city.

Border cities offer many advantages for people from both countries. Tourists from the US come to Reynosa to

buy crafts and curios, and to purchase goods and services at lower prices than they would find in their own country (meat, petrol, hairdressers, etc.). Mexican citizens buy foodstuffs and clothing in US cities.

President Echeverria's Government (1970-76) launched a programme to promote commercial and industrial activities in border areas. To keep Mexican clients in Reynosa, shops were authorised to import products tax-free. These products included whisky clothing and TV or radio sets. At the same time the peso was devalued, which meant a sharp decline in visits 'to the other side'. But there were other results. Local shops could not react immediately to the devaluation. They could not offer enough coffee, preserves, chicken, etc., so shopkeepers increased their prices. People did not know which side of the border to buy. However, devaluation measures favoured the setting-up of new Mexican shops along the border, which tried to capture clients who previously used to buy goods in the US. New shopping centres were set up by local or regional entrepreneurs. Reynosa's sales increased by 34 per cent in 1976, 17 per cent in 1977, and 20 per cent in 1978. People no longer buy on the other side, except those with high purchasing powers.

Today, Reynosa is an urban space structured around a central nucleus - the border commercial enclave, around the PEMEX enclave and around a third enclave, that of the assembler exporting plants ('maquiladoras'). These are free industrial zones for they import their machinery, raw materials, etc., without tax, and re-export their final products.

The author draws a few conclusions. First, it confirms a principle of urban geography, shown through 'contact towns', where a city is a place of exchange, where the variety of economic and human variables and the combination of functions play a more important role than the action of a single variable. Also, the border location, which opens up the foreign sector, strengthens activities which are exclusively linked to the foreign market: the 'maquiladoras'. Reynosa seems to be dynamic but it is as weak as any pioneer economy, condemned to keep dependence ties with the outside.

**SCHATZBERG, MICHAEL G.**

### **BLOCKAGE POINTS IN ZAIRE: THE FLOW OF BUDGETS, BUREAUCRATS AND BEER**

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in  
Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies  
Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison,  
1979, pp 297-309.

The article's main aim is to show that resources in Zaire do not filter down into the rural areas. To illustrate this, the availability of Government budgets, bureaucrats and sales of beer are compared throughout various parts of the urban hierarchy. Most of the illustrations for this argument come from the equator region, and particularly from Lisala, a small urban centre and Mbandaka, the

regional capital.

Some of the assumptions underlying many theories about the development process in Africa include first, that leaders and government officials have a genuine desire to develop the agricultural areas; second, that the presence of small urban centres in the hinterland contributes to this process; and third, that therefore it makes sense to build up these small towns because through them resources will filter down to the countryside and alleviate the plight of the farmers. In this article, the author wishes to show that, in the Zairean context at least, this is not necessarily true.

Central government money destined to pay for salaries, maintenance and investments usually takes a long time to reach the most remote parts of the country. Sometimes it never does, to the point that the problem is a national one, of serious proportions. A conclusion drawn in the article is that 'in general, the closer a bureaucrat stands to the source of the funds, the better his chance of getting paid' (p.301).

Regarding the distribution of bureaucrats throughout the country, the article notes that it 'parallels the flow of financial resources, for bureaucratic assignments in the hinterland and the flow of salaries are obviously related' (p.301). Available data reveal a tendency toward relative over-representation of high-ranking bureaucrats in the capital and low-ranking ones in the regions. Among the negative consequences of this imbalance is the fact that new development policies are less likely to bubble up from the bottom than be imposed from the top. And also, that the economy of administratively-based small urban centres may suffer given the fact that it depends to a large extent on the salaries of local bureaucrats.

Although the spatial distribution of beer sales<sup>1</sup> to a large extent follows the pattern of the administrative hierarchy in some sub-regions, in others it does not. After an examination of possible explanations, the author concludes that 'where road and river transportation are available and link far-flung centers with the regional capital, commercial distribution of resources is not dependent on, and does not seem to follow, the administrative hierarchy'. On the other hand, the article notes, 'where transportation facilities are lacking . . . the commercial patterns closely reproduce the administrative ones because merchants desire to locate in towns where there is a bureaucratic clientele' (p.305).

The article then shows examples of misappropriation of public funds by bureaucrats and politicians at different levels of the government (and spatial) hierarchy, to note that 'the regime's toleration, and indeed encouragement, of (such misappropriation) has had a direct and dramatic impact on the frequency with which resources reach the remote areas of the countryside'. When resources do arrive in the small, up-country towns, often they will be appropriated by members of what the author calls the local politico-commercial bourgeoisie, and used to their own ends. The author adds that 'as long as resources are directed through these urban-based administrative structures, there is little hope that they will reach their rural destinations' (p.309), to conclude that Zairean administration should be divorced from participation in further developmental initiatives.

1. In the article beer is seen as a 'commercial resource'.

GRIESHABER, ERWIN

## HACIENDA-INDIAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND INDIAN ACCULTURATION: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

*Latin American Research Review*, Vol XIV, No 3, 1979, pp 107-128.

The paper seeks to divert attention from the haciendas as the sole acculturative<sup>1</sup> instrument outside the city and to explore instead differences in the development of Indian-white relations by studying Indian core areas, in contrast to the periphery. Because of varied demographic and ecological conditions, a distinct type of society developed in each zone. In the Indian core areas, Spanish exploitative institutions such as the 'encomienda', 'repartimientos' and 'mita'<sup>2</sup> depended on preserving an Indian social unit (village/community) that supplied cheap labour. For the hacienda, obtaining labour was accomplished in many ways. Monopolising the land was the most basic. Over time, the surviving Indian social units changed. Indian communities were shorn of their leaders and their connections with supra-national empires. They became more open to Catholic beliefs, although the beliefs were imperfectly assimilated. The greatest pressure on Indian communities came during the late 19th Century when 'haciendados' began producing for the world market. Indians' response centred on revitalising the closed corporate nature of their villages. Changes in the 1930s forced Indians to leave their enclosed world and participate in the modern one. Increasing contact with whites provoked the emergence of aggressive mestizo attitudes. The decline in Indians' cultural distinctiveness led to increasing atomisation or dispersal.

In peripheral areas, the absence of sedentary Indians or rapid depopulation led to the disappearance of Indian social units and the predominance of the hacienda. During the 20th Century, as Latin America's population becomes culturally homogenous, racial attitudes based on somatic or other easily observed distinctions become more important in determining social and economic mobility. Population growth and competition for limited numbers of jobs encourages workers to think of the ethnic characteristics of their competitors in terms of disparaging stereotypes. This is a natural consequence of any multi-racial society tending towards a cultural homogeneity. The consequences will be to restrict the ability of the poor to form cohesive organisations in both rural and urban areas which might influence the power of the state and its alliance with national economic elites.

1. In this context acculturative means having a destructive impact on Indian culture.

2. 'Encomienda' - system by which Spanish governors entrusted large groups of Indians to men who had taken part in the Conquest, the Indians having to pay tribute to the trustee in goods and labour. 'Repartimientos' - labour allocations used mainly for city construction, flood control and agricultural work in nearby haciendas. A group of Indians would work for a week and then return to their village and not be called on again for three months. Private hacienda labour - as the Indian population declined, Spaniards acquired abandoned parcels of land and forced the remaining Indians to sell their labour to the haciendas in order to survive. 'Mita' - rotational labour draft systems modelled after an Indian prototype which regularly returned Indians to their villages after a certain period of service.

RAMOS, SERGIO

## THE ECOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC URBANIZATION PROCESS IN MEXICO 1900-1960

*Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, VolXXXII, No 5, 1970 pp 1251-1269.

The paper seeks to clarify the ecological and demographic channels by which the concentration of urban population operates as a specific trend in general population growth and to take them as a starting point to discover the essential points of the process.

The author stresses throughout the paper that the fundamental aspect of the urbanisation process in dependent countries is the inequality between city and countryside and stresses the importance of studying urbanisation in historical terms.

Ramos studies all the localities and dispersed populations which appear in the Mexican general census between 1900 and 1960. He states that population growth is a process of expansion together with a process of reduction in the number of localities. He studies this relationship for different periods and also finds that medium (2,500 to 50,000 inhabitants) and large (over 50,000 inhabitants) localities also expand. Dispersed population also expanded.

The growth of Mexico's urban population has been concentrated between 1900 and 1960 not only in Mexico City, but in other cities as well. There were six towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 1900 and 44 towns in 1960. This increase in the number of towns must have altered the ecological and demographic structure of rural-urban relations.

The fact that medium-sized towns show a sharp increase suggests that migrants go from the smaller towns to the larger ones. This process in which smaller towns (less than 2,500 inhabitants) suffer out-migration, must have altered the ecological and demographical structure in the following ways:

1. It reduced the number of smaller towns;
2. It increased the number of medium (2,500 to 50,000 inhabitants) and large (over 50,000 inhabitants) towns;
3. It decreased the amount of dispersed population in smaller towns;
4. It increased the dispersed population in medium and large towns.

These hypotheses have been proved true, except for the one on the decrease of dispersed population in smaller towns, perhaps due to the persistence of high birth rates.

The facts which explain the declining trend in the number of towns should be found within the framework of a dependent society with a critical rural economy and a weak urban economy. Thus, the alteration in the ecological and demographic relationship is linked to alterations in urban-rural economic relations.

The relative growth and development of different sized settlements may have different causes. One example is the sub-division of large landholdings into small plots from 1921 until 1930 and the emergence of innumerable small towns dedicated to small-scale agriculture. In addition, general mortality and out-migration caused a sharp

decline in population between 1900 and 1921 which also affected the number of small and medium sized towns.

At the same time, general instability, migration and rural-urban exodus since 1910 altered the ecological and demographic structure of the larger towns. Indeed, the growth of the present urban population is in part explained by the fact that the population concentrated in large towns grew at 12.5 per cent p.a. between 1921 and 1930. The data for 1960-1969 show a slight growth in smaller towns, while there is a slight slowing down in the growth of medium and large towns. This suggests that the general ecological and demographic process is slowing down as a result of a strengthened urban structure which covers medium sized towns, and the emergence of new smaller centres.

Thus, the author concludes that ecological and demographic urbanisation is a process of growing rural-urban inequality. Another characteristic of this process is that together with the expansion of large towns, there are also contraction processes in them.

The general trend is an increase in population together with a decrease in number of towns.

SUAREZ, MARIA MATILDE

## CHANGES IN THE AGRARIAN ECONOMY IN RURAL POPULATIONS IN THE VENEZUELAN ANDES

*Actas del XLII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas* Vol XI, Paris 1977, pp 435-456.

During the colonial period, Venezuela's Andean region was characterised by an agrarian economy producing wheat and green peas for the internal market. This allows neither a sufficient accumulation of capital nor the establishment of cocoa production and the slave system which was characteristic of the plantations that developed in the north coastal region during the 17th and 18th Centuries. At the beginning of the second half of the 19th Century, coffee plantations were introduced. Their peak coincided with the high market price. Coffee was the principal export and a source of foreign exchange in Venezuela up to the 1920s when it was replaced by oil.

The cultivation, harvesting and preparation of coffee beans requires a great deal of labour. Initially, conflicts that arose in Barinas State during the Federation War (1858-1863) attracted migrants to the Andean states. But migration there continued up to the end of the century, owing to the demand for labour.

Coffee cultivation was organised in small and medium size plantations which developed on unoccupied lands. Coffee cultivation also influenced the organisation of work in the family farms. Sons participated under the father's strict control within a cooperative system with mutual exchanges with other members of the extended family or neighbouring farms. Day workers were often employed in the coffee plantations and, to a lesser extent, in farms dedicated to nuclear self-sufficiency and the production of small surpluses which were sold in local markets. Sons were also seasonally employed in the coffee plantations

and their earnings were invested in the family farm.

One consequence of these changes was that an increased proportion of the nation's population lived in the Andes region: 11 per cent in 1847; 13 per cent in 1873; 14 per cent in 1881; 17 per cent by the end of the 19th Century; and 21 per cent by 1936. The coffee economy's decline due to technological and ecological limitations or to large variations in prices (which were controlled by foreign companies, especially German companies) began in the 20th Century. Its decline is reflected in the declining proportion of the nation's population living in the Andes region: 15 per cent by 1961 and 14 per cent by 1971. Since the 1940s, the Andean region has had rapid out-migration – and migratory waves from this region and from other regions contributed to the rapid urbanisation process and population concentration in the northern central region which began in Venezuela in the 1930s with the growth in oil production.

This weakened life on the family farms and the nuclear family disintegrated. Sons migrated, decreasing the region's population growth to below that of the national average. The Andes is still a region of small and intermediate towns, hardly industrialised at all, and of small isolated villages.

## 2c PRODUCTIVE ORGANISATION

### i. General

BOISIER, Localisation, Urban Size and Industrial Productivity: a Case Study in Brazil

HOSELITZ, Industrial Growth Through Regional Centres in Developing Countries

### ii. Case Studies

CHILD and KANEDA, A Study of Small-Scale, Agriculturally-Related Industry in the Pakistan Punjab

CUNNINGHAM, Industrial Estates as a Planning Tool: Recent Experience in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais States, Brazil

HO, Decentralised Industrialisation and Rural Development: Evidence from Taiwan

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### BOISIER, SERGIO

#### LOCALIZATION, URBAN SIZE AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY: A CASE STUDY IN BRAZIL

*Trimestre Economico*, Volume XLII (1), No 165, January – March 1975, pp 59–91.

Given the inadequacy of most national development plans designed to improve regional conditions, Boisier seeks to analyse in quantitative terms the trends in industrial productivity and industrial salaries in different areas. The study, which is descriptive as well as analytical, was done for Brazil covering the years 1967–1969. Most of the statistical data was obtained from annual surveys of the industrial sector. The research is divided into two parts: the first quantifies the relative importance of localisation as the variable which explains differences in productivity and salaries; and the second examines the empirical nature of the functional association between urban size and productivity.

The author draws the following conclusions: total heterogeneity in industrial productivity declined between 1967 and 1969. Differences in productivity between sectors declined both in absolute and relative terms, while differences in productivity between size of firms increased and differences in productivity between states increased in both absolute and relative terms too. Differences in productivity between states were less important than differences in productivity between sectors in explaining total differences in industrial productivity. Thus, there were no 'more productive' regions but regions with different industrial compositions. Differences in salaries increased between 1967 and 1969, when analysing different sectors, states and size of plants. The data shows that differences in productivity were more important when comparing sectors than when comparing states. In the case of Brazil, a policy of regional development should aim at deconcentration by concentrating in medium-sized cities. Medium-sized centres (San Luis, Joao Pessoa, Juiz de

Fora, Maceio, Natal, Manaus, Campinas, Santos and Goiania) present better conditions for demographic and industrial growth than larger-sized settlements. These cities are quite dispersed, which again supports a policy of 'deconcentrated concentration'. (Productivity per person rises with urban population up to a certain size and then declines as cities become larger).

### HOSELITZ, BERT

#### INDUSTRIAL GROWTH THROUGH REGIONAL CENTRES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

*Community Development*, No 21–22, December 1969, pp 143–150.

The author outlines an alternative model to solve the unemployment problems of developing countries, especially in rural areas where the bulk of the labour force usually lives. The initial situation is described by Hoselitz as one of a rapidly growing labour force and a scarcity of capital and foreign exchange. Also, there is generally a lack of entrepreneurial talent in rural areas and unavailability of power. Furthermore, the author suggests that the most suitable places for small plants are bigger cities since it is here that they can be serviced best by suppliers of raw materials and fuels, repair facilities for machinery, spare parts and wholesalers. A large steel mill or chemical plant which has a large contingent of engineers and other technical personnel can be located more easily in a rural place.

In view of these conditions, Hoselitz proposes a new approach; the planned development of industries in small population centres with more than 20,000 but fewer than 50,000 or 100,000 inhabitants. Combined factories rather than single plants should be established. Each production centre would consist of several departments, each



producing a commodity, or a group of commodities, specialising preferably in the production of those which are based on locally available raw materials and which are in demand among the rural population in the surrounding area.

In addition, the establishment of specialised research institutes of technology which would concentrate on the development of machines adapted to the relative factor scarcities prevailing in various underdeveloped countries should be considered.

**CHILD, FRANK C. and KANEDA,  
HIROMITSU**

### **A STUDY OF SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURALLY-RELATED INDUSTRY IN THE PAKISTAN PUNJAB**

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*,  
Vol 23, No 2, January 1975, pp 249–275.

The paper looks at the growth and development of small scale agricultural industries in Pakistan's Punjab in the 1950s and 1960s. It concentrates on the 1960s since this was a period when the growth in agricultural output was particularly rapid, due largely to the use of new fertiliser-responsive dwarf varieties of grain. There was also rapid growth in small-scale engineering industries supplying tube-wells (diesel engines, pumps, etc.) and farm implements.

Most of the data comes from interviews with a sample of 173 small-scale agriculturally related industries in the Punjab. This data suggests that these grew and developed successfully stimulated by growth in agricultural production but largely financed by indigenous savings, indigenously run and with no subsidies, tax concessions or technical assistance from government.

Lahore<sup>1</sup>, the largest city in the Pakistan Punjab was where the larger more diversified firms producing tube-well equipment were located, although an equally large number of somewhat smaller firms were located in the small town of Daska<sup>2</sup> which had acquired a region-wide reputation as a centre of excellence in the production of tube-well equipment. Two other cities, Multan and Gujranwala, also contained a number of tube-well firms. Lyallpur, the region's second largest city, lacked tube-well firms but had most of the non tube-well firms in the sample (making for instance fodder choppers and cane crushers).

Virtually all the industries in the sample were family businesses, set up with personal/family savings and virtually all had derived their expansion capital from re-invested earnings. The small scale diesel engine producers seemed to suffer from little or no dis-economies of scale compared to larger production units.

The authors suggest that there are many other forms of capital equipment needed on farms which small-scale indigenous enterprises could make and which most farmers could afford and benefit from – for instance inexpensive threshers, reapers or storage equipment. These would strengthen backward linkages, thus

promoting both agricultural and industrial growth and development.

But the paper lists the many ways in which government policies discriminate against small-scale industry and in fact promote the import of tractors and combine harvesters which by and large only the richer farmers can afford, which use up scarce foreign exchange in their import, which displace labour without necessarily increasing output per acre and essentially commit Pakistani society to techniques of production inappropriate to the country's factor endowments. Large-scale mechanised farming will push out the small farmer and erode or even erase the market for small-scale domestic industries which supply capital goods to the agricultural sector.

Various recommendations are made including a halt to policies which subsidise the import of capital goods (such as tractors and combine harvesters) and a re-examination of industrial policies which have unintentionally inhibited the growth and development of small-scale enterprises. Especially important in this are the discriminatory licensing of raw material imports (difficulties in obtaining needed imported inputs into production process was the major complaint among interviewed enterprises) and a careful assessment of the benefits that small-scale industries provide and could provide given appropriate government policies.

1. In the Pakistan Statistical yearbook 1980, statistics for 1972 listed Lahore as Pakistan's second largest and the Punjab's largest city with 2.17 million inhabitants. Lyallpur (renamed Faisalabad) was Pakistan's third largest with 823,343 inhabitants. On this same date, Multan had 538,949 and Gujranwala, 360,478.

2. Daska does not enter the list of towns for the Punjab, for 1972, which included towns with 50,000 or more inhabitants.

**CUNNINGHAM, SUSAN A.**

### **INDUSTRIAL ESTATES AS A PLANNING TOOL: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO AND MINAS GERAIS STATES, BRAZIL**

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 4, No 1,  
February 1982, pp 44–60.

The paper looks at the development of industrial estates in Brazil and at their spatial distribution, focussing especially on the efforts of two state governments. It describes the differences in the state governments' policy objectives and describes the lack of a national spatial policy to guide and encourage state government industrial estate or industrial location efforts.

In an introductory section, the paper notes the widespread adoption of 'industrial estates' by Third World nations as an increasingly important component of planned development. By Third World standards, Brazil has had a long period of industrialisation. Industry replaced agriculture as the leading sector of economic growth during the 1930s and since then, and especially since 1945, the thrust of Brazilian development has been directed towards rapid industrial growth.

Until very recently, industrial location has been implicit rather than explicit in government policies. While the large-scale industrial expansion of the last 30–40 years has involved a good deal of planning directed by government agencies, this has not taken place within a national spatial policy. While initiatives to influence the spatial distribution of economic and industrial development have been made in this period, 'even by 1981, no nationwide, consistent policy existed with reference to industrial location planning.'

However, several key elements can be seen in recent official approaches to the question of location. The first relates to the need to control industrial pollution and congestion in major urban centres and to reorganise land-use patterns to strengthen the established industrial base and improve environmental conditions. The thrust here is essentially at relocation within major urban centres. The second relates to generating new economic (and especially industrial) activities both within and beyond the nation's industrial core of the south east 'triangle' with Sao Paulo metropolitan area at its heart. It can be argued that the importance of industrial estates as a planning tool has been reinforced by certain Federal Government policy directives since 1975 aimed at reducing the spatial concentration of industry and 'equalising' industrial growth throughout Brazil (the so-called 'desconcentracao industrial' strategy). But the paper notes that most industrial estates are developed by state governments.

While Minas Gerais State Government set up Latin America's first industrial estate in 1941 – in a suburb of its capital city Belo Horizonte – most industrial estates in Brazil date from after 1960. Table 1 lists 143 industrial estates for 1976–79 and gives a breakdown by state. It also lists the number in state capitals and distinguishes between those 'implanted', those in construction and those at the pre-construction stage. Twenty-two were in construction while 69 were still at the pre-construction stage.

The table also shows that industrial estates were most numerous in three of the four states which border Sao Paulo State (Brazil's industrial hub) together with the two southern states in the north east region. While some two thirds of the planned estates are not within state capitals, the analysis of estates in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais States show that those within the state capitals were the most developed and had the largest employment base. The paper notes that Sao Paulo State had itself made little use of industrial estates although there was some action by certain local authorities within the state but outside the capital city to attract industry and the beginning of an industrial estate policy within the state in 1978–79.

The main body of the paper is devoted to looking at industrial estates in the states of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, adjoining Sao Paulo State, and which have part of their territory within Brazil's main industrial triangle.

For Rio de Janeiro State<sup>1</sup> the paper describes the work of state government agencies in industrial estate development and in Table 3 gives details of 11 such estates in 1979. The most developed of these in terms of employment were those within the metropolitan area of the state capital, while the most developed of these seven were within Rio de Janeiro municipality. Of the four outside this metropolitan area, one was still in the early stages of preparation and two were still at project stage. In this state, industrial estates have been seen more as a tool for urban land-use planning and are mainly being used to relocate some industry from the crowded north-eastern zone of Rio

municipality to its less developed western portion.

In Minas Gerais State the paper describes the somewhat wider aims of the industrial estate policy. This state has experienced rapid industrial growth in recent years after its locational disadvantages were offset by improvements in transport (particularly roads) and electricity supplies over the last 25 years.

Between 1970 and 1977, three state agencies involved in industrial development secured some 70 foreign industrial projects to a value of over US\$1 billion. Most went to industrial estates.

The development of the industrial estates is described with a map giving their location and Table 4 giving details of 24 of them (number of firms planned and installed in 1980, project employment and sectoral breakdown of industries). Of the 15 estates in place, the two under construction and the 21 'pre-construction', nine were in Belo Horizonte, the state capital. Table 4 shows that the two largest estates in terms of employment (projected) were both in the state capital's metropolitan area. However, five of the six estates outside the metropolitan area which had been initiated in 1972 and began operations in 1974–75 were also among the more successful. The text notes that in Belo Horizonte metropolitan area, a higher proportion of the planned projects had been implemented and that the industrial mix within metropolitan area estates was much more towards the 'modern' or 'dynamic' industries such as machinery, electrical equipment, transport and chemical sectors.

Thus Minas Gerais' state government has used industrial estates both to attract new (especially foreign-owned) industries and to stimulate intra-state regional developments. But while the use of industrial estates has in part been encouraged by official strategies endorsed by the federal government, 'neither an industrial location policy (backed by firm controls) nor an industrial estate policy has been brought into operation at the national level. In practice, state governments and their industrial development agencies have set up and run the estates.'

1. Editor's note. It is somewhat confusing for the reader that there are three distinct spatial entities called 'Rio de Janeiro' – the State, the metropolitan area, and the municipality which is where the city originally developed and is within the metropolitan area.

HO, SAMUEL P.S.

## DECENTRALISED INDUSTRIALISATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*,  
Vol 28, No 1, October 1979, pp 77–96.

The paper looks at Taiwan's spatial distribution of industrial employment between rural and urban areas and its change over the last few decades. It also looks at the kinds of industry which developed outside major cities and the extent to which farm households have come to rely on off-farm work for a significant share of their incomes. The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the factors

which have favoured decentralised industrial development and the lessons that the Taiwanese experience offers to other countries.

Between 1956 and 1966, which is when Taiwan's rapid industrialisation really began, total employment increased by between 5.3 and 5.6 per cent per year in greater Taipei, other metropolitan areas and minor cities and by 3.8 per cent a year in rural areas.<sup>1</sup> However, in this same period, manufacturing employment in rural areas increased annually at 7.2 per cent. By 1966, agriculture employed only five per cent of the rural labour force with 10 per cent in manufacturing, five per cent in commerce and 19 per cent in services. Of the 275,000 additional workers hired by the manufacturing sector between 1956 and 1966, greater Taipei took 23 per cent, other metropolitan areas took 22 per cent, minor cities took nine per cent and rural areas took 46 per cent. Furthermore, around half of the new employment in commerce, transport and communications, and services were in the minor cities and rural areas. Although comparable data does not exist for a later date, 1971 data suggests that around half of Taiwan's manufacturing employment and manufacturing value added is produced by enterprises outside the five provincial and 11 other cities.

Although rural industrial establishments are not necessarily small, on average they are smaller and more labour intensive than urban-based industries. The food and the textiles/apparel industries were the major large rural industries. Rural industries are almost always less capital intensive than those in urban areas, though large sugar refineries and pulp and paper mills are exceptions. Knitting, tailoring, wood and bamboo products, pottery, handtools, agricultural implements, repair establishments and food canning plants are among the more common rural industries. Figures for 1971 suggest that there is little difference in the ratio of net value added to fixed assets when comparing rural and urban non-agricultural establishments.<sup>2</sup>

The availability of non-farm income sources for the rural population has helped ease the pressure of population on the land and the pressure on the rural population to migrate to urban centres. Average farm size has more than halved in the last 30 years and, in 1970, 44 per cent of all farms had less than half a hectare of cultivated land. By this same date, 29 per cent of farm households earned more income from sideline activities than from farming. A large share of those employed in full time off-farm jobs in rural areas were women. In the 1960s some of the fastest growing industries (textiles/apparel, electronics) employed a very high share of women workers and it seems that some of these industries located their plants in or near rural areas so as to tap the large rural reserve of female labour.

Various factors favoured the development of decentralised industrialisation. One major factor was a highly commercialised and productive agricultural sector. The real income of the average farm household more than doubled between 1952 and 1972, although the increasing proportion of average farm household income earned from off-farm sources (13 per cent in 1952, 34 per cent in 1972) was a major cause of this. Taiwan's agriculture grew vigorously in the post-war period after the 1949-53 land reform which was supported by improvements in rural infrastructure and the introduction and increased supply of new inputs and techniques compatible with small and intensively worked farms. Some of these new techniques - power tillers and herbicides among them - also

substituted for labour inputs, thus allowing members of farm households to participate more easily in non-farm activities.

A second factor is Taiwan's long history of commercial agriculture and rural industrialisation. The Japanese colonists developed the country as a source of sugar and large sugar refineries were part of rural Taiwan in the first decade of the 20th Century. After World War II export crops were strongly promoted to replace the protected Japanese market with new food processing industries developing to support this. Primary education in rural areas also goes back to the colonial periods but this was expanded and improved after 1945. The transportation system was also developed in the colonial period to support agricultural commercialisation but this too has been much improved since 1945. Thus, the country's compact size, the early development of rural education, commercial agriculture and transport and the vigorous growth and development of agriculture since 1945 backed by expanded and extended rural education and transportation systems have all helped contribute to the relatively decentralised pattern of industrialisation. And the rapid development of non-agricultural employment within reach of rural households has helped boost rural incomes (most particularly for farmers with small plots of land).

1. The criteria used to define what constitutes an urban and a rural area are somewhat confusing. For the figures quoted here, urban is taken to include greater Taipei, other metropolitan areas (centred on Taichung, Tainan and Keelung) and eight 'minor' cities. Thus, within the 'rural' areas will be included some quite large settlements which by most other nations' urban criteria would be counted as 'urban'.

2. For these figures, urban establishments are those based in the five major cities while rural establishments are those located in nine counties excluding the provincial cities of Taichung, Tainan and Keelung.

## LIEDHOLM, CARL, and CHUTA, ENYINNA

### THE ROLE OF RURAL AND URBAN SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SIERRA LEONE

*Rural Africana*, No 6, Winter 1979-1980, pp 1-13

The paper looks at the economic performance and employment generation characteristics of small-scale industries (ie those with less than 50 employees) in Sierra Leone. Since there was no existing data base on small-scale industries, the paper based its findings on a census of the small-scale industry sector and on more detailed economic data collected over a year for 366 industrial establishments.

In 1974 there were 50,135 small-scale industrial establishments as compared to 28 large-scale establishments and these small-scale establishments employed 95.6 per cent of the industrial labour force. 78.8 per cent of the industrial employment was in settlements with less than 2,000 inhabitants with an estimated 6.7 per cent in settlements with between 2,000 and 20,000

inhabitants, 4.7 per cent in settlements with 20,000–100,000 and 5.4 per cent in Freetown, the one settlement with more than 100,000 inhabitants. A total of 92,677 people were employed in the nation's industrial sector.

Tailoring was the most important industrial activity in this sector followed by blacksmithing, carpentry, baking and gara dyeing. The more traditional activities such as blacksmithing, weaving and mat-making were relatively more important in rural areas<sup>1</sup> while the more modern activities such as tailoring, vehicle repair and metal repair were more important in urban areas.

Primary demand for small-scale industry products came from rural and urban consumers. The empirical data suggested that the income elasticity of demand for these was not only positive but rather high. Estimates suggest that if domestic incomes increased by 10 per cent, demand for small-scale industry products would increase by nine per cent. This contradicts Hyner and Resnick (1969) who argue that the products of small-scale industries in rural areas are 'inferior' goods for which demand will decline as rural incomes rise.

Demand also comes from backward and forward production linkages with the agricultural sector. The backward linkages from agricultural processing were found to be quite extensive while the forward linkages to the agricultural sector were also found to be of some importance especially in the blacksmithing industry where one dollar of domestic blacksmithing output (primarily in the form of matchets, hoes, knives and axes) was demanded for every \$100 of agricultural output.

The final source of demand was for the export market, a source often neglected or ignored in estimates for small-scale industries' potential for expansion. The study found that 18 per cent of the gara industry's production was exported.

Looking at supply, small-scale industries were found to generate more employment and output per unit of capital than large-scale industries. And most activities seemed to generate relatively high rates of profit. Mean annual returns to the proprietor were higher than the return to small-scale farm proprietors but lower than the average annual wage for a worker in the large-scale industrial private sector.

The paper suggests various measures to support the small-scale industrial sector including upgrading and expanding the apprentice system (42 per cent of workers in small-scale industries were apprentices and 90 per cent of the proprietors had previously served as apprentices). There was an evident need to improve proprietors' managerial skills – only 17 per cent of them kept even a rudimentary set of books and there was a strong positive correlation between firms that kept books and profit rates. Perhaps some improvements were needed in the provision of credit for small-scale industries although subsidised credit might simply encourage the use of more modern capital intensive processes which in the survey were not found to be more successful at generating profits. But there was a need to change various fiscal policies and import duties so these did not discriminate against the small-scale industrial sector. For instance, the tariff rate on sewing machine parts or cloth dyes was 36.5 per cent while there were zero tariffs on imported inputs for most large-scale firms through the Development Ordinance. Large firms also received a high degree of protection from competitive imports while small firms received very little.

1. The paper uses the criterion of 20,000 inhabitants or more to distinguish between urban and rural areas which is somewhat high given most national criteria and given the lack of large urban settlements in small-population West African nations. The paper states that the more traditional activities like blacksmithing, areas but no indication is given whether these are largely in settlements of under 2,000 inhabitants or what could be termed small towns of between 2,000 and 20,000 inhabitants.

PEIL, MARGARET

## WEST AFRICAN URBAN CRAFTSMEN

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, No 14,  
October 1979, pp 3–22.

The paper looks at the role urban craftsmen play in West African towns in producing goods, providing employment and training skilled workers. It examines the proportion of skilled labour in the urban labour force, its distribution between self-employed craftsmen and wage labour and the relative advantages of these two categories, the major trades for the self-employed craftsmen and the process by which they are trained. Its data is drawn from three sources: a study of factory workers in Accra, Tema, Kumasi and Sekondi/Takoradi in Ghana in 1966–67; censuses of residents in about 100 houses/compounds in Tema and its main suburb Ashaiman (Ghana), Banjul (capital of what was then The Gambia) and a suburb Serekunda, Aba and Abeokuta, administrative and marketing towns in southern Nigeria, Ajegunle, a large Lagos suburb and Kakuri, a suburb of Kaduna (a major town in northern Nigeria) taken between 1968 and 1976; and studies of apprenticeships in six trades in Accra in 1968 and 13 trades in Lagos in 1971.<sup>1</sup>

Small-scale artisanal production appears to be considerably more important in West African towns than those in East Africa or South America in terms of providing employment for large numbers of men and a high proportion of the trade training available in the country. This no doubt relates to the long history of craftsmanship in West Africa and the acceptance of new crafts where these provide additional opportunities for wage employment or independent entrepreneurship.

Skilled trades are defined as those manual occupations requiring broad competence in a certain field, usually obtained through a formal apprenticeship of one to five years or equivalent training in a technical school. The trades can be divided into three categories: the building trades (carpentry, electrical work, masonry/bricklaying, painting and plumbing); those producing a product (such as carpentry, leatherwork, shoe-making, tailors, printing, etc) and those which repair manufactured goods (road vehicles, radios, watches, etc.). Self-employment is distinguished from wage labour since the former involves making one's own business decisions and being responsible for one's own income while the latter is working for an employer. While men in the building trades are usually employees (although some are independent), most artisans producing a product, apart from carpenters and printers, are self-employed, as are most repairmen with the exception of fitters. People often combine wage employment with self-employed skilled work, trading or farming.

The relative importance of artisans in the different towns' economies and the variety of trades represented varied considerably. In the eight towns studied, between 11 and 29 per cent of the men and between one and eight per cent of the women were trained craftsmen. The number of smaller towns tend to have a somewhat higher density than large ones. The range of trades is wider in large towns.

The discussion on craftsmen concentrates on male craftsmen. Women artisans are mainly seamstresses who work at a smaller scale than tailors do and only in Tema and Aba did the proportion of skilled females in relation to female adult population exceed three per cent.

Some concentrations of craftsmen can be explained by the town's location or the basis of its economy. For instance, the proportion of men working as self-employed craftsmen was highest in Ashaiman (suburb of Tema) and Serekunda (suburb of Banjul): 29 and 21 per cent respectively. It is often convenient for craftsmen to move out to an area where rents are low, where there is space for a workshop and where a rapidly growing population needs builders and producers of household goods. Carpenters were the most common craftsmen in Ashaiman, no doubt attracted by the building of Tema. Photographers, electricians and electronic specialists flourished in Ajegunle, a suburb of Lagos, because more people in Lagos metropolitan area could afford their services. The fact that Aba and Abeokuta are service centres for motor vehicles and bicycles in their hinterlands is reflected in the high proportion of skilled bicycle and motor repairers. They also had a larger proportion of craftsmen in the older trades such as goldsmithing and shoemaking compared to more industrialised towns. In the Gambian and Nigerian towns, tailors were much the most common craftsmen.

The paper then discusses the problems and the prospects for various craft activities. For instance, shoemakers have probably faced more competition than other craftsmen from manufactured goods. Then a section is devoted to the career of a craftsman – the kind of person who becomes an apprentice, how they choose their trade and master, the cost of apprenticeship, where the apprentices come from and the extent to which skilled craftsmen work for part of their life in other activities. Two further sections look at the age, origin and education of self-employed craftsmen and wage-employed craftsmen and at income in these two categories for different trades.

The conclusions section notes that craftsmen are an important but relatively unstudied part of the labour force. Around one seventh of the male labour force in many West African towns can be classed as skilled and half of these are self-employed. Craftsmen-entrepreneurs make important contributions to development by training the next generation of skilled workers, creating jobs and producing import-substitution goods for local consumption. While some trades like shoemaking have been hit by competition from cheap manufactured goods, in others, the self-employed are competing very successfully.

There is relatively open recruitment for apprentices, especially for the more modern trades (only in certain traditional crafts is learning still largely within the family). Fees are remarkably low and there does not seem to be any attempt to limit the numbers trained. There is no lack of applicants for most trades and young men who do not have enough education for a 'good job' (ie at least completing secondary school) often see an

apprenticeship leading to a socially and economically rewarding occupation.

Further research is needed on the large numbers of men who do not practice their trade to see if this is due to lack of capital, business acumen or demand for their products.

'The size of the town and the structure of its labour force are important factors in attracting craftsmen of different types. Large towns have a wider range of craftsmen than smaller ones, even if the latter are based on industry, but oversupply of certain trades seems to be present in towns of all sizes . . . the distance between towns offering roughly similar opportunities affect the interchangeability of labour forces and mobility of workers. Craftsmen may see little difference between the various towns of southern Ghana or south-western Nigeria and try more than one before settling down to build a business. Gambian craftsmen, on the other hand, find the Banjul area a beacon of opportunity which cannot be matched; they therefore migrate directly to Banjul and stay there.'

'Wage employment is preferred by many because of its relative security (except in the building industry) and the benefits of minimum wage legislation, but the popularity of self-employment in West Africa is maintained by the cultural value of independence and the high incomes of the most successful. Although the average earnings of the self-employed tend to be somewhat lower than those of the wage-employed, the small differences in age, education and migratory background between the two groups suggest that chance and entrepreneurial inclination are the main factors drawing certain men into one or the other type of employment. The proportion of craftsmen who are in wage employment will probably increase as these countries industrialise, partly because of increased opportunity and partly because the formal education system seems to promote an ideology of achievement within bureaucratic organisations rather than through independent entrepreneurship. However, self-employed craftsmen are likely to have an important economic role in West Africa for a long time to come.'

1. Tema which is part of Accra Capital District, Banjul and its suburb and Lagos and its suburb are part of their nations' largest urban agglomeration. Kaduna, Aba and Abeokuta are important regional urban centres in Nigeria.

## 2d GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

### i. General

- ALAO, The Potential Role of Small Urban Centres in Rural Development
- BOISIER, Industrialisation, Urbanisation, Polarisation: towards a Unified Approach
- BRUTZKUS, Centralised versus Decentralised Pattern of Urbanisation in Developing Countries: an Attempt to Elucidate a Guideline Principle
- CONROY, Rejection of Growth Centre Strategy in Latin American Regional Development Planning
- DE MATTOS, Polarised Regional Development Strategies in National Planning In Latin America
- DESMOND, The Impact of National Development Policies on Urbanization in South and Southeast Asia.
- GUGLER and FLANAGAN, On the Political Economy of Urbanisation in the Third World: the Case of West Africa
- HARRIS, Urban Decentralisation
- KNESL, Town and Country in Development from Below: the Emerging Paradigm for the Decade
- MABOGUNJE, The Case for Big Cities
- MEISSNER, Growth Without Migration: towards a Model for Integrated Regional/Rural Development Planning
- POETH, Needed: Philippine Urban Growth Centres
- RONDINELLI, Balanced Urbanisation, Regional Integration and Development Planning In Asia
- RONDINELLI and RUDDLE, Integrating Spatial Development
- RONDINELLI, LOMBARDO and YEH, Dispersed Urbanisation and Population Planning in Asia
- UNCHS, The Role of Small and Intermediate Urban Centres

### ii. National Strategies

- ABOU-ZEID, New Towns and Rural Development in Egypt
- ACOSTA and HARDOY, Urban Reform in Revolutionary Cuba
- ALIF, The Rural-Urban Balance in Sri Lanka
- BREBNER, Algeria: the Transformation of a Settlement System
- BREBNER and BRIGGS, Rural Settlement Planning in Algeria and Tanzania: a Comparative Study
- CARRION, Intermediate Cities in the Context of Ecuador's Urbanisation: an Essay in Interpretation
- COMAY and KIRSCHENBAUM, The Israeli New Town: an Experiment at Population Distribution
- ECKSTEIN, Cities in Socialist Cuba
- FARINA, Urbanisation, De-Urbanisation and Class Struggle in China 1949-79
- FRIEDMAN, The Territorial Approach to Rural Development in the People's Republic of Mozambique: Six Discussion Papers
- GUGLER, A Minimum of Urbanism and a Maximum of Ruralism: the Cuban Experience
- JAIN, Evolution of an Urban Growth Policy for India
- KABWEGYERE, Small Urban Centres and the Growth of Underdevelopment in Rural Africa
- KULABA, Rural Settlement Policies in Tanzania
- KWOK, The Role of Small Cities in Chinese Urban Development
- LAQUIAN, Planned Population Redistribution: Lessons from Indonesia and Malaysia
- MARO and MLAY, Decentralisation and the Organisation of Space in Tanzania
- MEISSNER, Development Towns in Israel
- ONYEMELUKWE, Settlement Structures In Rural Nigeria
- RICHARDSON, An Urban Development Strategy for Kenya
- SHAH, Growth Centres as a Strategy for Rural Development: India Experience
- SLATER, State Territory in Post Revolutionary Cuba: Some Critical Reflections on the Development of Spatial Policy
- SOEN and KIPNIS, The Functioning of a Cluster of Towns in Israel: an Analysis of Real and Expected Zones of Influence
- SUTTON, The Socialist Villages of Algeria
- VAN TAP, On The Transformation and New Distribution of Population Centres in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
- YOU, Alternative Strategies in Urban Development: Some Chinese Experiments in a Quest for Agrapolitan Space

## iii. Regional/City Strategies

BARKIN, The Demographic Impact of Regional Economic Development: a study on Migration

DICKENSON, Innovation for Regional Development in North East Brazil; a Century of Failures

HAFNER, Urban Resettlement and Migration in Northeast Thailand: the Sceptre of Urban Involution

JENSSEN, KUNZMANN and SAAD-EL DIN, Taming the Growth of Cairo: towards a Deconcentration of the Metropolitan Region of Cairo

MATHUR, The Problem of Regional Disparities, an Analysis of Indian Policies and Programmes

MAX-NEEF, The Tiradentes Project: Revitalization of Small Cities for Self-Reliance

OKPALA, A Critique of the Application of New Town Concepts in Nigeria: the Case of Ajoda New Town

TRABELSI, The Problem of Drinking Water in Small Agglomerations and its Implications for Regional Development in Silliana Tunisia

## ALAO, J. ADEBANJI

### THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF SMALL URBAN CENTRES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, in Southall Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 118-127.

The paper briefly reviews some of the approaches to rural development and summarily discusses the potential role of small urban centres in rural development, in the light of a few research and development projects in Nigeria.

Carefully thought out policy and principles, upon which action programmes aimed at the equitable distribution of goods and services could be based, is a need in every nation. This is more so in previously colonized countries where due to the needs of foreign powers development was concentrated in a few ports and trade centres, whilst towns and villages further inland were left undeveloped. 'After independence, these poor countries are faced with evolving a social policy which either favours the maintenance of the status quo of growth without development, a situation where there is abundant wealth for the few urban based new elites or of evolving an egalitarian society where there is guaranteed good satisfying life for everyone' (p.120).

Some of the rural development approaches tried out at different times in recent decades in many Third World countries are briefly summarized: the community-development approach, implemented in Africa and India, in most cases before Independence was granted; integrated rural development, tried out in the 1970s; regional development, also used at the same time; and central place theory, which the author chooses to document more extensively. The results and recommendations of some studies are also reported, particularly those pointing to the notion that small urban centres play an important role in spreading the available resources for rural transformation. Based on the results of some rural development projects, particularly an integrated development project carried out by the University of Ife in an area within a 15-mile radius of the

campus, the author identifies a set of requirements which must be borne in mind by researchers and policy-makers. These are:

a. To identify those factors that naturally group certain communities together and consequently to draw social and geographical boundaries around these to constitute them into functional units.

b. To identify the centres of such units and to relate them in a hierarchical way.

c. To determine the appropriate level of central services which each of these units can competently and most efficiently incorporate.

d. To determine the population of each unit as a means of determining the adequacy of each of the incorporated services.

e. To determine the optimum distance which consumers are willing to travel to use the services in a central location.

f. To identify existing and potential linkages between various central places and how to effectively strengthen these.

g. To identify the processes involved in the differentiation or increasing complexity of hierarchical organisation.

h. To design new functions which the central places might serve for the benefit of their contributing communities'.

The paper ends with an endorsement by the author of the three preconditions given by Uma Lele for facilitating rural development: appropriate national policies (eg on land tenure, wage systems, etc.); effective administrative systems; and overall institutional development, including distribution of developmental responsibilities among government, mixed and private institutions.

## BOISIER, SERGIO

INDUSTRIALISATION, URBANISATION,  
POLARISATION: TOWARDS A UNIFIED  
APPROACH

*El Trimestre Económico*, Vol XL, No 157,  
January–March 1973, pp 19–61.

The author proposes an alternative to the traditional 'growth pole' approach. He also reviews the different authors' opinions on the subject and explains why he considers them as partial approaches.

The author disagrees with growth pole strategies. In the poles themselves there is a clear industrial and functional growth. But contradictions between centre and periphery increase in the pole's area. Boisier adds that a regional planning strategy only succeeds under certain political and economic conditions both at national and regional level and thus a regional development strategy must coincide with, and be supported by, the broader objectives of national development.

Boisier proposes a strategy called INDUPOL – industrialisation, urbanisation, polarisation – as three aspects of a comprehensive, planned, and large-scale process of regional development. He stresses the need to study the inter-relationships of these three phenomena. He considers INDUPOL as a series of actions which initiate a process of industrialisation and urbanisation so that the positive effects are kept within the chosen area, since this strategy is characterised by its growth dynamics and its ability to diffuse the effects of income, employment and increases in reinvestment. Besides, this strategy causes social modernisation by introducing urban ways of life (even in rural areas), by creating new job opportunities in the secondary and tertiary sectors and through a greater social mobility resulting from an increase in income.

The suggested strategy includes nine stages:

1. The identification of industrial activities (the best for each specific case).
2. The identification of urban systems (which are the most capable of receiving the effects of industrialisation).
3. The identification of processes which could be relocated i.e. those which should be relocated to increase efficiency.
4. The evaluation of comparative advantages. The evaluation of first stages.
5. The assignment of industrial processes to urban centres to which they are best suited.
6. The selection of measures which strengthen the conditions under which urban centres work systematically, eg. urban transport, communications.
7. The introduction of 'internalising' actions, i.e. those which 'close' the system such as measures to limit imports and foreign currency loss.
8. The introduction of physical and financial programming – the evaluation of funds and resource allocation.
9. Control and evaluation – the evaluation of results in order to correct errors or unwanted effects.

## BRUTZKUS, ELIEZER

CENTRALISED VERSUS  
DECENTRALISED PATTERN OF  
URBANISATION IN DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES: AN ATTEMPT TO  
ELUCIDATE A GUIDELINE PRINCIPLE<sup>1</sup>

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*,  
Vol 23, No 4, July 1975, pp 633–652.

The paper asks the question – does the urbanisation process which Third World nations will inevitably continue to experience have to be mainly concentrated in a few primate cities or can a more dispersed pattern of urban centres emerge. Polarised urban development in a few primate cities is the dominant one in most Third World nations, and has been largely accepted as an indispensable stage of economic take-off, largely because of the allegedly better performance of the primate city and the fact that the scarcity of capital, technical skills and educated manpower means these cannot be spread among many centres.

The paper points to the fact that primate cities' locations were somewhat arbitrary historical decisions which once made, gave them a distinct advantage over other nuclei. And over time, this advantage proved to be cumulative. In conditions of rapid and unplanned urbanisation, enormous momentum was given to this original numerical or strategic advantage.

Brutzkus suggests that this trend is not natural, inevitable or desirable. It may be so if the major priority remains rapid economic and industrial growth. But today, there are other problems such as the urgent problem of under-nourishment in large proportions of the population and the need to increase food production for local consumption (the paper notes that many essentially agricultural countries are fed largely by imports). But agricultural development needs a higher priority not only because it produces food for internal consumption and reduces food imports. It also helps generate a capital surplus for investment and helps create a larger internal market. And the hoped for 'spread' effects from highly concentrated urban and industrial developments have not materialised.

The paper outlines a strategy for encouraging decentralised urban development, with a strong emphasis on the commercialisation of subsistence agriculture and the development of natural resources. It points to the social and economic costs of concentrated urban development – the economic costs including rising per capita costs for infrastructure and services above a certain population, the social costs including the gap between what adequate legal houses cost and what the poor can afford and the difficulties posed to families when one member has to work either temporarily or permanently or seasonally in the urban centre separated from the rest of the family.

For nations where most of the people are still in rural areas, Brutzkus suggests that a long-range physical plan is needed to guide urban growth and development in a hierarchical pattern of towns and rural centres closely related to Central Place Theory. Governments'



concentration should be on encouraging processing industries and technical services linked to agriculture and heavy industries based on raw materials to locate outside major cities. They should also improve administration, social and educational services in smaller urban centres. Then as some interior growth poles gain momentum and achieve agglomeration economies so might labour intensive manufacturing industries be attracted there by lower wage costs. Governments should also promote small artisan based industries in smaller urban centres. Basic technical, social and marketing functions should be concentrated in rural service centres and improved transport networks should link the different settlements in the hierarchy and help encourage the modernisation and commercialisation of agriculture.

1. Brutzkus also wrote an article for *Ekistics* 214, September 1973, on 'Centralised versus Decentralised Patterns of Urbanisation' which has not been summarised here since it seemed an earlier and less complete version of the paper summarised here.

## CONROY, MICHAEL

### REJECTION OF GROWTH CENTRE STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

*Land Economics* Vol XLIX, No 4, November 1973, pp 371-380.

The paper begins with a description of attempts in Chile, Bolivia and Colombia to implement a growth centre strategy and the rejection of this strategy in all three. The author's aim is to undertake a critical review of the reasons for such a strategy in these nations, and to compare the strategies which each country now proposes as an alternative way of organising its regional development.

Conroy suggests that criticisms of growth centre strategies can be divided into four groups: 1) theoretical considerations, such as the transferability of a theory originating in developed countries to less developed areas, and the special characteristics of entrepreneurial activity in Latin America; 2) political considerations, which criticise the implications of defining, declaring and implementing a strategy of polarised development; 3) practical considerations, such as the problem of identifying appropriate 'growth centres' to be developed; and 4) ideological considerations which disagree with the value bases implicit in the theory.

The paper looks at the alternative strategies suggested by the three countries. In Bolivia, there is little evidence of an alternative strategy. In Chile, the planning process 'incorporates potential regional contributions to the global objectives at the outset, followed by detailed region by region plans.' In Colombia, the national strategy is based on continued processes of urbanisation but adjusted to maintain an equilibrium in the population, and centred upon the use of the urban housing construction sector as the main point of the thrust for growth.

In Chile, the planning process has been altered to incorporate potential regional contributions to the global

objectives at the outset, followed by detailed region plans based upon the implications of the global strategy. The development strategy being developed in Chile is a total strategy in which the regions are explicitly included, not one in which regionalisation is undertaken on a compensation basis after the fact. However, this appears to mean reduced attention to harmonious or balanced regional development, for it is also suggested that this will be promoted only to the extent that such action will not affect the immediate objectives of the global strategy. At no point are the previous concepts of polarisation incorporated.

In Colombia, the national strategy for development of the Pastrana Borrero government is centred on a continued process of urbanisation in patterns which have now been judged to maintain a certain national and regional equilibrium in the population and more specifically centred upon the use of the urban housing construction sector as the *primum mobile* of the thrust for self-sustaining growth. This strategy has been given regional dimensions only to the extent that these contribute to national objectives. The system of metropolises and centres is considered primarily when the national policies require a geographic or regional framework within which to be executed. The present plan has a definite sectoral orientation which is only subsequently regionalised.

Conroy concludes: 'What is more likely is that this form of reaction to the dissatisfaction with polarised planning is an accurate measure of the ideological fear, the theoretical uncertainty and the practical and political problems which accompanied spatially polarised planning efforts.'

## DE MATTOS, CARLOS

### POLARIZED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN NATIONAL PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA

*El Trimestre Económico* Vol XLII (4), October - December 1975, pp 1057-1074.

The paper begins with a brief review of different planning attempts in Latin America. During the previous two decades, most Latin American nations created planning offices in the belief that development plans could solve underdevelopment. These plans covered national and sectoral levels, but did not consider regional perspectives. Thus, they did not seek to make substantial changes in the existing spatial structure. By the late 1960s, the persisting spatial concentration led planners to consider the regional level, but results were not good. Attempts were made to disaggregate already finished plans according to regions, but it was difficult to assign the different resources which had been distributed according to national objectives. 'Regionalisation policies' were not followed by economic policies aimed at strengthening the suggested actions. Thus, these attempts were not able to change the spatial concentration trends.

The author lists the consequences of spatial concentration:

1. The creation of favourable conditions for industrialisation because different productive units benefit from the agglomeration of external economies and therefore increase their production, productivity and efficiency.

2. The decline in living conditions for people living in the periphery, who do not benefit from the geographical distribution of economic growth.

3. Overgrown metropolitan areas and the increase in urban marginality because cities are not ready to provide adequate conditions for their growing number of inhabitants.

4. The need to invest increasing amounts of scarce resources in urban concentrations to keep metropolises functioning.

5. Maintenance of part of the national resources, mainly natural resources, out of the productive process (in peripheral areas).

6. The worsening of pollution problems.

De Mattos states that the analysis of these consequences drove planners to introduce spatial aspects in their plans. But, once again, these strategies were not followed by a programme of economic policies for national, sectoral and regional levels. According to the author, polarised regional development strategies are the best way of introducing spatial aspects into planning. It is the most useful basis on which to formulate spatial strategies for both capitalist or socialist economies in which the industrial sector plays a major role. Such a condition implies the spatial concentration of industrial activities and of the tertiary sector. Thus, the proposed strategy should achieve an adequate hierarchy of urban centres aiming at increasing productivity and social benefits. Under these conditions, poles and polarised regions should be created. Results would be:

1. An increase in yields from scarce resources in an underdeveloped economy through their concentration in selected centres.

2. An improvement in living conditions for people living on the periphery and an increase in their participation in regional and national activities.

3. Controlling the growth of metropolitan areas, since part of the in-migrating population would be absorbed in new poles.

4. The incorporation of unexploited resources in the periphery.

5. The achievement of a rational use of space, reducing pollution problems.

6. A use of resources dedicated to the absorption of external economies in large concentrations, in the development of peripheral regions.

A polarised region is formed by a development pole (spatially concentrated industrial activities), a rural area, a system of centres and a transport and communications network.

The author describes the conditions necessary for the execution of a polarised regional development strategy: considerable financial resources to invest in infrastructure; the transfer of resources and activities from other regions to new poles; no relocation but the creation of new industries at poles; the development of activities in rural areas and urban centres of each polarised region; and the establishment of socio-cultural infrastructure and the broadening of the regional labour market.

Criteria to choose regions could be the improvement of

living conditions in places with a high demographic concentration and poor living conditions and the incorporation of unexploited resources into national production.

DESMOND, G.M.

## THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ON URBANISATION IN SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

*Ekistics*, 238, September 1975, pp 167-173.

The article starts with the observation that, when taken together, South and Southeast Asia form the most densely populated region in the world outside of Western Europe. Despite its low levels of urbanisation, UN projections estimate that by the year 1990 the region will have more people living in urban agglomerations than any of the other twenty-one major regions in the world. The paper's main argument is that given the absolute size of the region's population and if one were to assume that the region's demographic trends are going to follow the patterns of the presently industrialised nations, the only means of avoiding spatial imbalances and conflicts would be to introduce spatial considerations as an integral part of national planning strategies.

Although United Nations population projections estimate that the region will have a comparatively low level of urbanisation (27 per cent as compared to 50 per cent in Latin America and 72 per cent in Europe), past experiences in other regions suggest that 'a degree of stabilisation begins to assert itself after about two-thirds of the population are living in urban places'. The author notes that the largest cities in the region today are those urban centres initially established or substantially developed by colonial powers. This phenomenon has been viewed as having a negative and distorting effect on the region's further development.

Some authors have argued that the countries in the region suffer from an economically unhealthy 'pseudo-urbanisation', meaning that at similar levels of urbanisation, the proportion of the labour force involved in manufacturing on the one hand, and the per capita agricultural output on the other, are lower than in those European and North American countries which underwent a migration to larger cities, the most likely outcome in the process is an increasing level of urban unemployment and the deterioration of the cities' social and physical fabric which, may in turn, lead to 'catastrophic breakdowns'. However, the author also remarks that migration has played a smaller role in the region's urban growth than is often assumed.

The recent experience of many countries in Latin America and Asia points to a strong correlation between economic growth and urbanisation. Nonetheless, the author hastens to note that only general observations can be made in this respect, for 'at this point it is not possible to assess accurately the causal relationships between these two parallel dynamics'. (p.170) One further

observation which applies to the region under study is a positive correlation between levels of urbanisation and income, which may be explained by the higher productivity and higher income levels which are characteristic of urban activities, whilst a less evident but related fact is that of higher incomes and productivity levels which also go hand in hand with higher urbanisation levels. In addition, urbanisation tends to be self-reinforcing, insofar as urban inhabitants have a greater propensity to save and entrust their savings to financial intermediaries who use the capital to generate new and expanded productive activities.

One final point made in the paper is that if the assumption that people respond primarily to opportunities to maximise income is correct, then 'it is clear that development decisions which most directly influence employment and other income opportunities will have the greatest effect on migration.' Therefore, the author continues, 'it can be postulated that a policy designed to influence or control the location and rate of urbanisation must be conceived and implemented within a framework of income-affecting decisions'. (p.171)

The paper concludes with a few remarks on the state of spatial planning in South and Southeast Asia whose influence on national development plans has so far been minimal. Investment decisions both by governments and private entrepreneurs are still guided more by the maximization of income rather than by the pursuit of a spatially balanced settlement pattern. In most developing countries, where the priorities are still concentrated on basic economic objectives, the implementation of an effective spatial planning apparatus still has a long way to go. In the meanwhile, Desmond argues, spatial planners can achieve some immediate results by adapting existing administrative tools to better serve their objectives (a good example of which may be the super-imposition of spatial biases on the sectoral composition of the State's budget, one of the most important elements of policy implementation).

**GUGLER, JOSEF and FLANAGAN,  
WILLIAM G.**

### **ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANISATION IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF WEST AFRICA**

*International Journal of Urban and Regional  
Research*, No 1, 1977, pp 272-292.

West Africa contains some of the world's poorest nations and most impoverished people. It is also one of the least urbanised and most rapidly urbanising regions in the world. The paper points to the fact that, while the extent of urbanisation and the form it takes can be seen as an indication of the level of production reached and the concentration of economic opportunities in the capital city, it is not clear whether the resources that support rapid urbanisation (most especially in the capital city) were created in urban areas. And there is no reason to assume that present resource allocations in sectoral and spatial

terms which help produce present urban trends are necessarily optimal for economic growth.

The paper describes West Africa's urbanisation process since around 1900 and how the present urban pattern was essentially initiated by the era of coastal trade and the colonial period. Long established urban centres in the interior lost importance. Port cities grew disproportionately as seats of colonial administration and centres of commercial exchange and of what little industry there was. With Independence, the rapidly swelling political and administrative apparatus was usually based on these same towns. This drew economic activities to these towns (usually national capitals) since private investors needed access to the decision-makers and infrastructure that only these centres possessed. This process was further reinforced by national governments usually concentrating public works and public investments there.

The paper quotes various sources in giving statistics for the concentration of industry, medical services and political representation in cities such as Abidjan, Lagos, Accra and Dakar. And it asks whether the rapid growth of cities, especially national capitals, and rapid rural-urban migration there is advantageous to economic growth. There may be sound economic reasons for locating industries in the largest cities. But it is not easy to distinguish these from reasons relating to the concentration of political and administrative power and public works and services there. Much of the wealth of many West African nations is derived from agricultural and mineral resources yet it seems that relatively few large cities remain the focus of public investment. The paper notes that any attempt to determine an optimal city size is suspect. As Richardson pointed out, those who offer judgements on this base their observations on value judgements, implicit but untestable weighting systems and arbitrary selection of a limited set of criteria. Also, Spengler pointed to the difficulty of identifying, measuring and appropriately aggregating all the costs and benefits of cities, both private and public, and correlating changes in these with changes in size. But above a certain population size, such costs as service provisions, congestion, air and water pollution, administration and management do rise while public costs such as transport and housing in poor countries are also likely to grow. Then in smaller towns, more of the workforce can live in peri-urban areas where land costs are cheaper and part time farming is also possible. Finally, one should note that the pool of potential urban migrants is large, since close to 80 per cent of the population is still in rural areas and total population is growing rapidly. Given the poor (if little documented) housing conditions the poor majority endure in major cities and the lack of success in public housing schemes, 'projections of present trends in urbanisation . . . have to be read as a warning that policy changes are urgently needed to forestall the kind of future these projections predict . . .' Patterns of urban growth, primacy and poverty are not the necessary outcome of impersonal and ineluctable forces 'but are shaped by political decisions and non-decisions.'

HARRIS, NIGEL

## URBAN DECENTRALISATION

*Habitat International*, Vol 3, No 1/2, 1978.

The paper reviews the central issues with regard to the public and private costs and benefits of urban concentration and of industrial relocation in backward areas. At the beginning, it points to the lack of a coherent theory and, arising from this, a lack of guidelines checked against experience on the social and economic advantages and disadvantages of different urban and industrial locational patterns. Without this, location policy becomes 'rhetoric that conceals the working out of different interests' or as Alonso put it 'an abundance of opinion but a paucity of facts'.

The available evidence neither supports the inference that urban concentration is generally more advantageous than decentralisation nor the fact that redistribution of economic activity and population will maximise output, employment or welfare. Much of the literature stresses the increase in urban costs as population increases. But it is impossible to quantify all the costs involved, let alone try and relate them to population size. If one takes only public service costs to city government, then there are problems of short run cost variations from year to year (for instance in 'lumpy' investments). And costs per head of urban population vary widely according to a city's function and composition. For instance, costs per capita for a city trading with other international metropolitan centres is unlikely to be similar to a city of the same population servicing a small country or a city with a high proportion of retired or dependent people. In the United States, variations in per capita municipal expenditures seem to relate more closely to per capita income than population size. And per capita income and productivity appear to increase with population size four times faster than those examples where per capita local government expenditure increases with size. Similar conclusions have been reached elsewhere. In India, some research suggests that the marginal productivity of labour increases with the size of settlement.

The quantification of benefits and their relation to population size is even more difficult. The general idea of 'agglomeration economies' is stronger in conception than in measurable terms and one of the important elements in the argument over concentration is precisely the relative immeasurability of many of the advantages. But despite the clear increases in productivity and income per head as city size increases, the author suggests that in the end, the judgement has to have a negative inference and quotes Wingo in stating that 'the only way to explain the continued growth of large cities is that the return to private agencies of labour and capital are sufficient to continue to attract capital.'

The advocates of decentralisation argue that even if there are agglomeration economies, these accrue only to private firms while additional costs are borne by public authorities. But if this is the case, then it is the tax system which should be reformed to make private firms pay their full cost and not an argument for urban decentralisation policies.

Thus it is difficult to see how a general attempt to reverse the clustering processes can be economically

beneficial, although specific industries or companies' employment, activities and output might be enhanced by relocation in a backward area. The little evidence that exists does not support the argument that backward areas hold under-utilised resources and that gross returns can be raised by a redistribution of investment between backward and advanced areas. The advantages backward areas have – usually raw materials to hand and cheap unskilled labour – are factors of declining importance in most modern industries. Increasing inter-dependent linkages between manufacturing units, changing balance between use of imported and indigenous raw materials and technical change are among factors weakening the old locational determination relating to first stage inputs. High growth has resulted from the industrial mix in particular areas, not proximity to raw materials. The increasing scale of operations requires a concentrated supply of key inputs which are generally only available in already developed areas. Thus, the city's relationship to raw materials is weakened as indeed are its economic links with its hinterland as economic links with other cities become more important. This inevitably weakens what used to be seen as the stimulating effects of urban centres on surrounding countryside.

Decentralising for reasons of equity is another argument used to favour urban decentralisation. But there is no clear idea of the opportunity costs of such a policy in terms of foregone jobs, output and income. If by increasing equity one means more equal income distribution, then spatial and social equity should not be confused. Decreasing regional income differentials can go hand in hand with increasing inequality in per capita income distribution, just as increasing urban concentration can go hand in hand with decreasing income differentials.

Thus, it becomes difficult to assign any clear operational meaning to the concept of 'optimum size' for a city. It is not possible to use population size – which is itself measured within arbitrary administrative boundaries – as a surrogate for the complex and unstable urban cost function. If one is seeking to optimise employment and output, there is no clear limit provided by population size.

In conclusion, the paper states that as far as economic development is concerned, it is the movement of the population in relation to production and services which is of primary importance. The economic forces encouraging concentration appear to operate with unprecedented strength, and the more backward the area, a priori, the stronger the force of concentration. Indeed, it has never been more true that to industrialise is to concentrate resources, both in an economic and geographical sense.

KNESL, JOHN

## TOWN AND COUNTRY IN DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW: THE EMERGING PARADIGM FOR THE DECADE

*Ekistics*, 292, January – February 1982, pp 14–22.

The paper presents a model for economic development for settlement planning and for changing the whole spatial distribution of population and of settlements in what it terms 'development from below'.

The first section notes how Third World nations' economic and spatial development did not conform to Western precedents. It briefly describes some of the explanations put forward to explain this. These include: reasons for the concentration of industry and urban growth in primate cities and core regions; agglomeration and location economies, concentration of demand there for goods, especially imported goods; availability there of higher order goods and services and of skilled and unskilled labour. It claims that there are signs of polarisation reversal and some regional convergence in some peripheral regions in South Korea, Japan and Brazil. This section also outlines the explanation put forward by dependency theorists. Powerful international and national corporate interests have established outposts in Third World nations in the form of corresponding economic, political, cultural and spatial structures (which can be seen in the infrastructure, plants and settlement distribution). And these serve to extract surplus from the dependant economies, to expand the world market and to ensure the continuance of political systems which remain supportive of this. And it is largely through the principal cities that these operate, resulting in a high concentration of economic and industrial development in and around them and increasing regional imbalances with little development in the periphery.

The second section notes the 'ameliorative approaches' which have tried 'from above' to reduce primacy and the concentration of population and economic development in core regions. One group sought to promote the decentralisation of industries and population through satellite towns within the core regions (considered a relatively safe strategy since such towns could borrow some of the agglomeration economies of nearby primate cities), through countermagnets at some distance from the primate city and through development corridors connecting large centres with countermagnets. The growth centre, despite poor results, was re-evaluated and considered a viable option if it could be made to contribute more to the regional economy within which it was located. A second group concentrated on how to boost rural and agricultural development. These built on Johnson's advocacy of a balanced system of market towns and regional centres following the model of central place theory. The integrated rural-urban development strategy aimed at a balanced central place distribution ranging from rural service centres to regional metropolises with development impulses flowing through the settlement hierarchy.

The rest of the paper outlines the author's suggested

approach under the title 'Development From Below'. The principles 'derive from the objective of the decentralisation of power in its economic, socio-political and cultural dimensions. . . . On the global level, it pursues the objective of relative national self-reliance . . . but as a basis for genuine, non-dominative socio-economic interdependence rather than dependence on global market forces and interests. . . . On the national scale, the emphasis would not so much be on aggregate national growth propagated through selected functional growth sectors (and through core regions) but rather on the maximisation of aggregate national growth as a result of the economic exchanges between fairly self-sustained regional economies. Such regional self-sustainable economies would be based on the particular regional resources and constraints, turning these into relative advantages where possible. The building of such regional economies would begin with the satisfaction of basic needs . . . and would ensure the local reinvestment of surplus generated; then the objective would become to diversify the regional economy and use the surplus for broadly distributed increases in living levels.' 'The national economy would be based not on centrally located growth sector impulses that tend to develop the regional economies in an urban core biased way but rather on the full equitable development of the territorially co-existent resources beginning with the smallest viable spatial unit, probably something of the order of the "rural district" as proposed for agropolitan development and then moving up the scale'.

The text notes that 'development from below' has a strong spatial territorial emphasis. Small towns and intermediate size cities would 'acquire a new significance not so much as conduits for faster withdrawals to the core regions and for unequal exchanges with the latter but as genuine 'service centres' that offer their location, their linkages and agglomeration economies to support economic, social and cultural activities at the scale of the village or the urban neighbourhood. . . . Towns would not be able to appropriate more surplus than considered just in the overall regional interest. . . .' Thus, the 'basic impulse and much of the sustained momentum for such development should come from the communities and move upwards onto the national level of institutions and organisations, retaining its rootedness in the local communities.'

In terms of planning, this would involve a gradual shift towards a more regionalised spatial structure. Industrialisation would be primarily based on regional demand. Within this, small towns would support increased agricultural and decentralised industrial smaller-scale activity in the surrounding rural districts. Towns would help to accumulate capital regionally to the economic and social advantage of local needs. 'A structurally new urban system would be built from below, including also the intermediate size cities which, having suffered population loss recently, would regain importance for the regional economies. . . . Cities in the peripheral regions would become growth centres of a new kind, providing for regional basic needs first, then for a dynamic diversifying regional economy growing on the basis of comparative regional advantages in resources and skills, on the basis of appropriate, largely self-reproducible technologies, credit under reasonable conditions, all based on broad and effective local participation.'

Meanwhile, for core regions, 'well timed and appropriate scaled population deconcentration and

industrial decentralisation policies, particularly within or close to the core regions' would tackle diseconomies of over-concentration. The paper outlines the advantages of 'relatively diversified polynuclear regional systems' and the transport, energy, planning and basic service provision policies which would best support these.

The final section in the paper is about "helping the small sector to become a self-sustaining sector of the economy on the basis of 'soft energies' and the ecosystem approach." It advocates support for increasing the capacities of the informal or small scale sector to provide basic needs and to help generate employment. It also advocates mixed land uses, the strong promotion of urban agriculture and the use of recycling and energy systems which minimise the cost to municipal authorities and maximise the use of locally available resources.

**MABOGUNJE, AKIN L.**

## THE CASE FOR BIG CITIES

*Habitat International*, Vol 7, No 5/6, 1983, pp 21-31.

As the title suggests, this paper seeks to advance various points in support of big cities in the Third World. In addition, the paper presents statistics on the growth in the number of big cities and in the number of people concentrated in them, as well as the most common arguments raised against them.

The paper defines big cities as urban areas with at least 100,000 inhabitants, 'although a more rigorous definition would probably restrict the term to cities with more than 1 million inhabitants'. According to the UN's demographic data, in 1950 out of an urban population of 272.2 million in the Third World, the big cities contained 51 per cent. Twenty years later, while the urban population had increased by nearly 2.5 times, the population in big cities had gone up 2.7 times to nearly 380 million. The most remarkable transfer of population, however, took place in the 'very big cities' (those with a population of over one million), both in the developed countries and the Third World. By 1970, this category of cities contained 29.4 per cent of the Third World's urban population.

The prospect of the agglomeration of such a large number of people in big cities of the less developed countries cannot but be a cause of apprehension, not only for scholars of urbanisation but particularly for governments.' (p.24) Questions such as 'how are such agglomerations to be efficiently governed?' Or 'is it an inevitable and potentially beneficial trend whose challenges should be grasped and whose potentialities should be fully exploited' have no unambiguous answer. So much depends on the quality of governance and the characteristics of the populace of individual countries.

The initial reaction to the relatively sudden and overwhelming emergence of big cities in a number of Third World countries was almost one of despair. Lack of facilities and widespread unemployment were two major reasons why big cities were regarded as serious problems in these countries. However, the author notes, there was not an actual lack of facilities, but it was rather the sheer

pressure of numbers that created the strong impression of a visual lack. Similarly, unemployment was the result not so much of a failure to create new opportunities but of the insufficiency of these opportunities to meet the demands of an ever increasing number of hopeful migrants into the big cities.

Other negative reactions against the upsurge of big cities include a concern with the high degree of environmental degradation they cause. Inability to deal with solid waste pollution and the problems arising from loading water bodies within and around cities with untreated sewage and with allowing various industries to dump their effluents into neighbouring streams and rivers easily gets translated into health hazards of epidemic dimensions in many of the Third World's big cities. Increasing *anomie* and a sense of alienation are also said to be a product of big cities. Marxian analysis does not fall behind in the stream of opposition to big cities, which it sees as the point of concentration of the social surplus of Third World countries to facilitate their extraction and expropriation by multinational corporations of the advanced industrial countries.

None of these reactions can be dismissed as of no consequence, because the maladjustments of processes and structures which these cities reflect are real enough: 'they underscore in very glaring terms the fragile nature of the development process in most of the less developed countries' (p.25). Yet it is possible to see some streams of advantages deriving from the existence of these cities, which for analytical purposes Mabogunje has divided into three categories: economic, technological and social.

The *economic* case for big cities can be made from both a demand and a supply side. On the side of the former there is the fact that big cities represent big markets for consumption goods. Even with relatively low average income levels, big cities facilitate the rapid turnover in the sales of specific goods, notably food commodities. On the supply side, big cities' market encourages a tremendous diversification in their industrial structure (a diversification that is not only in terms of product-mix but also of process-mix). Big cities have enough room to house both formal and informal production activities. The author cites a study which asserts that the informal sector provides services and goods for the poorer class and to low capitalised activities, 'neither of which can have regular access to identical services or goods produced in the formal sector'. Moreover, the importance of the informal sector increased directly with cities' size, both in absolute terms and in relation to specialisation and diversification. In sum, all these economic advantages can be reduced to the single factor of higher income levels. In fact, there is a tendency for urban income levels to increase with city size, due to phenomena such as higher wage rates in the industrial sector, and a higher incidence of families with multiple income earners. Nonetheless, 'higher income levels . . . should not hide the fact of greater interpersonal income differentials' (p.27). But even here, the argument can be advanced that 'the presence of a sizeable wealthy class helps to extend the range of effective consumer choice available to the lower income groups and to that extent to enhance the value of their limited monetary income'.

Big cities also represent an important element in the dissemination of *technological innovation*, due to the presence there of a considerable amount of fixed capital, of a wide range of complementary skills and expertise which facilitates the production of new and innovative

products and processes and of a large market potential which also guarantees quick success and high profitability for innovations which have immediate value for household or industrial use.

The social case for big cities, according to the paper, stems from their capacity to attract and melt together thousands of people into an intensive social intercourse. Many new nation states, especially those in Africa, are characterised by excessive ethnic, cultural and linguistic fragmentation, a factor which has made the stability of political regimes in many of these countries rather fragile. Big cities have played a role not only in 'blunting the edges of ethnic and linguistic diversities and inducing a high degree of social tolerance' but also in raising the level of communication effectiveness in the society. For the author, 'it is this that facilitates the overall social development of the people and their collective subscription to common norms and value systems.' (p.29)

The author stresses two points in his analysis. One is that the beneficial effects of big cities in Third World nations are somewhat intangible and more subtle than the very real and vivid deleterious consequences of their growth. The second point is that the issue of effective management has been treated as almost a neutral factor in the case made by the paper. This is so because the question of efficiency is not regarded as a function of size, but rather as an outcome of the political ethos of the individual countries. 'A country where social differentiation and class discrimination are a strong feature of political behaviour can show a well-managed city in which a high proportion of the population are kept poor, underprivileged and disadvantaged. By contrast, where no such definitive political posture exists, the problems generated by the rapid agglomeration of people can be tackled and considerably ameliorated by systematic planning and determined management.' (p.30)

The issue then becomes one of 'the style and mode of planning the the big city' in which case Mabogunje argues for an allocative and trend-modifying mode of planning which entails gentle modification of situations by regulatory procedures to enhance existing values. This type of planning holds out greater promise of realisation in Third World countries, not only for pragmatic considerations with regard to resources and a growing sense of social equity, but also, and more importantly, because it tends to induce and to reinforce a sense of hope and confidence especially among the weakest and least advantaged urban residents.

## MEISSNER, FRANK

### GROWTH WITHOUT MIGRATION: TOWARDS A MODEL FOR INTEGRATED REGIONAL/RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

*Ekistics*, 291, November – December 1981, pp 442–446.

The paper questions whether rapid migration from rural areas to large cities is an inevitable accompaniment to socio-economic development. It outlines the problems such migration causes – both in large cities and the 'even more dangerous' social problems for those involved. It then describes the 'Rehovot Approach' in Israel and suggests that this has important lessons for Third World nations and that urbanisation should be concentrated in small regional towns.

The paper opens with the statement that 'the trajectory of development of affluent Western industrialised countries clearly shows that the key to their economic success was a rapidly growing agricultural sector. By increasing production and productivity in agriculture, labour was released to work in industry and services.' And it notes the many links that developing agriculture created with other sectors of the economy. 'The negative trade-off of the release of labour from agriculture to industry and services involved mass migrations from villages to towns and cities, resulting in increasingly urbanised societies, and growth of huge cities.'

Conventional wisdom suggests that migration from rural to urban areas is inevitable as part of agricultural development and that urbanisation is essential to social and economic development.

But such conventional wisdom tends to lead to false conclusions when applied indiscriminately and tends to divert attention from the real issues: 'stagnation of rural areas, and ensuing exodus which swamps metropolitan centres, resulting in urban blight with its overcrowding, slums, squatter settlements, insufficient and unsafe water supplies, lack of facilities for waste removal and disposal, inadequate siting on flood plains or slopes, social disorganisation. . . .'

'The development profession tends to take it for granted that the rural exodus and burgeoning cities go hand-in-hand with the socio-economic development process.' The paper claims that the social problems accompanying rural to urban migration are even more dangerous than urban blight caused by it. 'A person who must leave his place of birth to improve the quality of life breaks personal ties with his home community, replacing it by an amorphous urban society, which tends to weaken the nuclear family itself, the very foundations of human society. In short, occupational and geographic mobility lies at the root of much that is undesirable and dysfunctional in human society today in that it has: brought about the social and economic duality in the Third World; prevented growth of agriculture and thus slowed down overall growth; widened the income gaps within poor nations; and fostered permissiveness in rich nations, disrupting nuclear families and endangering their very existence.'

The paper then asks whether growth is possible without

migration. 'If migration causes that many evils, are there ways to achieve balanced development and growth without migration?' It suggests that Third World nations need not blindly copy the precedent of the now industrialised nations and outlines 'The Revohot Approach' based on experience in Israel. It states that Dr Weitz, Director of the Settlement Study Centre in Revohot, Israel 'simply refuses to believe that mass urbanisation is a process that must inevitably go hand in hand with socio-economic development' and that 'he has plenty of evidence to prove his contention.' The paper then outlines the approach of the Settlement Study Centre in helping to reduce rural exodus. It also describes how industries were brought to kibbutzim to absorb surplus labour. And it describes Lakhish's integrated regional development programme and how the main town's growing economic base allowed it to absorb surplus labour, including some from outside the region.

The paper's final section asks whether kibbutz industrialisation and the Lakhish model can be generalised. It suggests that many of the elements have wide applicability and that 'urbanisation should concentrate small regional towns, various important functions for surrounding rural communities so that those who leave farming can find alternative employment in the vicinity without having to migrate to large cities. And though such recommendations are easier made than acted upon, 'the Israeli experience provides at least some initial clues about the types of layout and organisation of neighbourhoods required, so as to enable preservation of traditional social and cultural patterns.'

**POETH, RICHARD P.**

## **NEEDED: PHILIPPINE URBAN GROWTH CENTRES**

*Ekistics*, 180, November 1970, pp 384-386.

The paper briefly outlines Manila's historical development - its growth first as a centre of Spanish colonisation and then as the port and commercial centre for external trade. This role as middleman for the raw materials coming from the hinterland and for the manufactured goods arriving from overseas has made it a city with a more cosmopolitan outlook, a higher living standard and a centre of education and culture as well as the major economic centre. In some sense, this makes it substantially different from the provinces.

The higher living standard has attracted the more mobile members of the provincial population, and a study of 92 Filipino businessmen found that two thirds were raised in or close to Manila or within five kilometres of the Manila railroad and that industrial plants as far away as Iligan and Davao were established by entrepreneurs from Manila.

However, one result is that urban growth in the Manila area has occurred faster than urban facilities have been provided and has meant the rapid growth of squatter settlements. National planning for metropolitan and regional development has become necessary to co-ordinate regional, provincial and municipal activities.

The paper then discusses how urban regions with natural growth potential can be developed to help draw off some of the migration flow towards Manila. The main criterion recommended for choosing where an urban growth centre should go is an area with high out-migration. And such centres should be developed not only to diminish Manila's growth but also to create alternative points of attraction for human and capital resources to provide a more balanced development.

The paper then recommends the development of three urban growth centres: Cebu City in the Visayas region (which is the nation's second largest city after Manila) and Davao city and Iligan-Cagayan de Oro in the Mindanao region.<sup>1</sup> Although the island of Cebu does not have a high agricultural potential, Cebu City with 290,427 inhabitants in 1960, already has the second most varied industrial base in the nation and an international airport.

Cebu city is also important as the largest settlement in a region where Cebuano, the largest Filipino language group, is spoken (Tagalog is the national language). Development centres on Cebu City will also help to keep potential migrants there. Migration figures for 1960 showed that Manila and the adjacent province of Rizal drew 261,036 persons born in the Visayas while Cebu City attracted only 40,202 persons born in other Visayan provinces. Cebu city administration has already begun a programme to develop the city. Cebu Development Corporation is reclaiming land from the sea for commercial and industrial expansion. But such local effort needs national government support - for instance in fiscal policy and infrastructure investment. In Mindanao, to the North, the Iligan Bay area contains Iligan City with a growing industrial base and a 1960 population of 58,433 and 60 kilometres away, Cagayan de Oro, a city with 68,274 inhabitants in 1960 and Xavier University plus several good high schools. The new Mindanao State University has also been established in Marawi City, the centre of Muslim population 30 kilometres south of Iligan city. These two cities could be developed together, within a regional context. The government should consider training programmes for technical and machine trade skills for Iligan City while Cagayan de Oro could be further developed as a centre for higher education. Both cities will benefit from the new hydro-electric power station developed nearby. The Iligan Bay area is also close to the Visayas so that an enlarged regional plan linking its development with Cebu City could provide a countergrowth pole to metropolitan Manila. Then to the south of Mindanao, Davao City with a population of 225,712 in 1960, could be further developed. Davao city is in a rich agricultural area and the province of Davao drew more migrants from the Visayan provinces than metropolitan Manila, according to 1960 figures.

1. The country can be divided into three traditional regions - the Luzon region (in which Manila is located), the Visayas region (with six major islands) and Mindanao.



RONDINELLI, DENNIS A.

## BALANCED URBANISATION, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ASIA

*Ekistics*, 284, September – October 1980, pp  
331–339.

The article presents the case for a decentralised urbanisation policy in Asia and lists out the main features that such a strategy should include.

Most Asian nations have experienced rapid urbanisation in the past decades. The number of Asians living in urban areas more than doubled between 1950 and 1975 and it is expected to reach half of the total population by the end of this century. But, at the same time as cities are growing and prospering, Asian societies remain overwhelmingly rural and poor. Nearly two-thirds of Asia's total population survives on subsistence incomes. The economic development of East and Southeast Asia has been characterised by a dualism expressed in disparities such as those between rapidly industrialising economies and economies where agriculture predominates; between wealthy elites and the poor rural and urban masses; and between those people with access to productive resources and employment opportunities and those with little hope of gaining access to them.

The problems of dual economies are reflected in and perpetuated by the spatial pattern of development. The author stresses that it is the pattern of urbanisation rather than urbanisation per se which is a problem. 'Disparities have occurred to a large degree because investments have been concentrated in one or a few metropolitan centers that contain the overwhelming majority of the nation's industries, educated and skilled manpower, commercial services, educational facilities, capital assets, productive resources, and modern infrastructure' (p. 332). At the same time, the spatial systems of Asia's developing nations have relatively few intermediate-sized cities and small market towns that could 'provide services and facilities for the rural poor, serve as exchange points for agricultural and commercial goods, or absorb significant numbers of people in non-agricultural jobs' (*ibid.*).

Governments and ruling elites throughout Asia have recognised the need to foster more widespread participation in economic activities and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of growth, as prerequisites for modernization and for socially just and politically stable societies. The main argument of the article is that an essential element in the achievement of such goals is the creation of more articulated and integrated spatial systems. This requires 'an understanding of current patterns of spatial development and of how they can be changed most effectively to meet emerging development needs' (*ibid.*).

The article briefly examines what it argues are the three main causes behind the failure of development to accelerate and to spread to underdeveloped areas: preferential and concentrated investment (i.e. in most countries, deliberate location decisions and public and private investment patterns have favoured only a single

city or a few metropolitan areas), the failure of 'trickle-down' processes (i.e. experience has demonstrated that overconcentration of investments in a few growth centres has not trickled down to laggard areas) and difficulties in overcoming the early effects of concentrated investment and polarized spatial development (i.e. the historically high concentration of investment in a single location endows it with relative advantages over alternative locations, in terms of, for example transportation costs and availability of labour, capital and entrepreneurial talent).

Two main policy responses have often been attempted to counteract the problems of dualism, rapid urbanisation and growth of the primate city: these are, on the one hand, deconcentrating economic activities out of the primate city and preventing its further growth. And, on the other slowing rural outmigration by dispersing investments widely among rural villages. However, neither of them alone has really been effective, because both large cities and small towns play crucial roles in the development process. Rural and urban development are not incompatible and must be pursued simultaneously. The author argues that a strategy of 'decentralised concentration' leading to integrated spatial development is a more appropriate alternative.

The paper ends with a brief description of the seven main features in such a strategy. These are: maintenance and improvement of critical services and facilities in metropolitan centres (as these will continue to play a dominant role in economic and social development, as well as to house vast numbers of the urban poor whose needs must be met); controlling growth in the primate city (this must be done through a combination of regulation and the strategic location of public investment); stimulating the growth of regional metropolitan centres and intermediate cities as 'countermagnets' to the capital; strengthening existing and incipient market towns and small cities as rural service centres (as these can play a strategic role in linking larger urban centres with rural hinterlands); creating strategic villages as agricultural service centres (as these can provide isolated farms, hamlets and smaller rural villages with basic health and educational facilities); tying decentralised urbanisation policy to integrated rural development programmes (this is essential for increasing the access of the rural poor to resources needed for agricultural development); and strengthening linkages among settlements in regional and national spatial systems (as closer interaction among the settlements in the urban hierarchy makes it less expensive and more convenient to integrate technology at each level of the hierarchy and to distribute services more widely to peripheral and rural areas).

**RONDINELLI, DENNIS A. and RUDDLE, KENNETH**

## **INTEGRATING SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT**

*Ekistics*, 257, April 1977, pp 185–194.

Rondinelli and Ruddle argue that poorly articulated settlement systems in Third World nations are a major constraint on national development and that only through a well-articulated network of development centres, a hierarchy of towns and cities functionally linked with agricultural production areas can large segments of the population have increased access to 'economic, social and political opportunities as well as urban services and facilities'. They claim that 'spatial integration transforms societies and accelerates modernisation'.

They draw heavily on E.A.J. Johnson's work which stressed the historical importance of conveniently located central places in industrial societies in the commercialisation of agriculture and facilitating the exchange of goods and services.

Various examples of Third World nations' lack of such central places or of poorly articulated spatial systems are given. The paper notes the lack of towns with between 10,000 and 30,000 inhabitants in Malaysia in 1970. The emerging spatial system is characterised by an expanding number of service centres with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and a concentration of most industrial and commercial activity in the 18 towns and cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. An example from an International Labour Office report on the Philippines is quoted which found a surprising absence of cheap consumer-goods production in Mindanao. Despite the distance from Manila, textiles were still shipped from Manila to Mindanao's smallest towns. The lack of small towns was noted from a study in Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh, India, where 10 million people live in 11,239 villages, 24 urban centres and one central city. The paper quotes Johnson who suggested that this illustrates 'the flagrant inadequacy of the urban structure to provide markets, supplies or incentives for the millions of farmers in the Kanpur region'.

The paper outlines various kinds of spatial linkages – physical, economic, population movement, technological, social, service delivery, and political, administrative and organisational. Two fundamental observations which 'seem valid for all developing countries' are made. The first is that an increase in the number and diversity of linkages and the growth or transformation of development centres (from villages to market towns to small and intermediate size cities) are inextricably related. The second is that the variety of linkage which integrate urban and rural areas into an articulated spatial system are themselves inextricably linked. The authors claim that once a new set of linkages is introduced to a rural market system, it can trigger a set of 'circular and cumulative changes' towards further growth and development.

Under physical linkages, they note that in many parts of East Africa, farm to market roads have promoted new markets, increased interaction between villages, linked agricultural production areas to crop collection and distribution centres and made new crops economically viable. Under economic linkages, they note the example

of Chonburi town in Thailand, an intermediate city serving as a central place linking rural areas in its region both with each other and with the larger national market. Areas lacking market towns and transport connections remain relatively isolated from trade and access to services whereas those with transport and market networks linked to Chonburi have access to its services and access to markets in Bangkok, as well as to other regions and to the international market. Thus the town serves its region both as a channel for commodity flow and as a collection point for locally produced commodities to be shipped to Bangkok.

Under population movement linkages, the paper describes how the growth and development of towns in rural Pakistan during rapid commercialisation of agriculture in the 1960s helped stem the flow of migrants to the primate city and redirected many migrants towards smaller central places. It suggests that the small landowner whose land value had increased during the Green Revolution could sell his land (since he could not compete with larger landowners) and move to small towns and invest his capital. As town migration increased, it set off a set of multiplier effects, increasing goods and services demand, generating new investment and economic diversification, and providing greater job opportunities in the towns, thereby increasing migration in from rural areas, especially of landless labourers. The initial impetus for more stable town growth in the regions of rising agricultural productivity was the expansion of small-scale engineering industries which provided the technical inputs for the new high yielding crop varieties.<sup>1</sup>

Under political, administrative and organisational linkages, the example of the South Korean 'intermediate city' Taegu is discussed. As the city grew and became more industrialised, so its government took on more functions and generally changed from a passive maintenance organisation to one which actively intervened in guiding the pace and direction of the city's growth. City government's budget expanded 15 fold in 10 years. As it grew, so were new and more extensive links developed with central government and other local and regional entities. The paper stresses the importance of political and administrative linkages in the building of a system of development centres integrated into the national space economy.

The paper then outlines a strategy to build 'an articulated network of development centres' with lists of the facilities and services that three levels of centres should contain – the village service centre, the market town and small city, and the intermediate size city. Then in a final section, it talks of a spatial integration strategy needing the concerted efforts of governments and international agencies and within nations of a wide variety of public and private organisations to 'build the comparative advantages and entrepreneurial capacity of economically lagging and spatially unarticulated regions'. But the authors note that the concentration must be on increasing 'incrementally the productivity of indigenous institutions and practices, reinforcing and building on those appropriate to local conditions and needs and adaptive to changing circumstances, gradually displacing those that are not'.

1. Editor's note. Child and Kaneda's 'Study of Small Scale Agriculturally Related Industry in the Pakistan Punjab' which is summarised on page 102 note that the rapid growth of small scale agriculturally related industries in the Punjab in the Sixties was almost all in seven cities. Of the five that concentrated most of these industries, four were large cities with populations in excess of 350,000 inhabitants in 1972.

**RONDINELLI, DENNIS A. and  
LOMBARDO, JOSEPH F. and YEH,  
GAR-ON ANTHONY**

## **DISPERSED URBANISATION AND POPULATION PLANNING IN ASIA**

*Ekistics* 277, July–August 1979, pp 206–209.

The paper advocates the need for a 'dispersed urbanisation strategy' to promote economic growth with social equity, to reverse gross imbalances in spatial development, to reduce overall population growth and to change the patterns of rural-urban migration. The first section discusses the role urbanisation plays in development, the second outlines the 'dispersed urbanisation strategy' and the third outlines the need for and the impact of such a strategy.

The authors note that rapid and concentrated urbanisation in Asia over the last 25 years has led some analysts to talk of 'over-urbanisation', or of primate cities being examples of 'pseudo-urbanisation' because of their reliance on tertiary activities. Such analyses often confuse primate city growth with urbanisation and point to the financial and social costs associated with primate city growth as evidence for discouraging urbanisation. The paper outlines the important roles that cities play as centres of production, of demand for rural produce, of services and of innovation through which modern ideas, methods and technologies are disseminated. Furthermore, urban agglomerations provide economies of scale for production, concentrated markets for goods and services and ready supplies of skilled and unskilled labour. The strong positive correlation between extent of urbanisation and per capita income level among the world's nations should also be noted.

Despite legitimate criticisms of primate cities, the paper argues that many of the problems facing Third World nations stem from the fact that urbanisation has been too slow and too constrained. 'A larger number of urban places, better distributed geographically throughout a country and by size class to form a well-articulated hierarchy, can create new markets for agricultural goods, provide locations for efficient operation of industrial and agricultural processing establishments, provide employment opportunities and income for non-agricultural workers, absorb migrants from rural areas who currently have nowhere else to go but to the primate city or major metropolitan centres and link urban and rural areas into an integrated spatial economy.' The text notes that rural out-migration 'is a necessary condition of both rural and urban development and can be an indicator of healthy economic change . . . But the adversities of rapid migration combined with high rates of natural increase in both rural and urban areas, and the skewed pattern of urbanisation that emerged over the past quarter century have led developing nations to search for alternative spatial development strategies. The most promising alternative seems to be a decentralised urbanisation policy aimed at lowering overall population growth rates, changing patterns of migration and increasing the productive capacity of rural areas by encouraging the growth of market towns, small cities and regional urban centres, within an articulated national

spatial hierarchy.

Although metropolitan centres will remain the prime location for major investments by nations concerned with rapid economic growth, both governments and international agencies are beginning to realise that economic growth cannot alone reach the whole population with economic development. If social equity is to be promoted, this requires deconcentrating investment and strengthening both the private and public sector in urban centres outside primate cities. 'Spatial and structural imbalances are primary obstacles to achieving growth with equity, and the 'polarised dualism' that now characterises spatial systems in developing societies must be radically reduced'.

The paper draws on the work of E.A.J. Johnson to support this. Johnson argued that historically, the key to internal economic development, where it occurred (Japan, China, Europe, North America), was the relationship between urban centres and the countryside, and in the emergence of market towns and small and intermediate size cities that stimulated agricultural commercialisation and facilitated the efficient production and exchange of goods. As exchange developed and agriculture became more commercialised, the number of central places grew. Their economic bases also grew and broadened, as did their role as centres for social services and administration. Their increasing interdependence stimulated demand for more efficient transport and communications networks which further tied them into a national economy. 'Such centres, which evolved slowly and spontaneously over decades or centuries in the more developed world, must be deliberately planned and promoted in developing countries.'

The paper then describes the three types of urban places which should be created or strengthened: village service centres; market towns and small cities; and intermediate cities and regional centres.

In the final section on the need for and the impact of such a dispersed urbanisation strategy, it notes that such a strategy could slow migration to major cities, if smaller centres could offer better employment opportunities and better services and facilities. It also notes that there is some evidence that family sizes are generally smaller in cities compared to rural areas and that 'if urbanisation could be decentralised it could have substantial effects on reducing overall population growth'.

## **UNCHS**

### **THE ROLE OF SMALL AND INTERMEDIATE SETTLEMENTS IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

*United Nations Centre for Human Settlements,  
Nairobi, 1985, 97 pages.*

This document is based on a report requested by the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Settlements to the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) as a guide for governments to formulate policies for small and intermediate settlements.<sup>1</sup> It seeks to identify the potential and limitations of such settlements in national

development and to suggest the steps needed to establish realistic goals and programmes.

Three main themes are the focus of discussion of this report: the concept and definition of small and intermediate settlements in a national and, an international context, their role in regional and national development, and the direct and indirect effects of Government policies upon their development. The different ideas presented are illustrated with examples from around the Third World, drawn mostly from published sources.

The report stresses at the outset that there is no international consensus among governments and researchers about a definition for small and intermediate settlements. Such a definition must be country-specific. Although population size is often used to classify human agglomerations, this is an unreliable indicator of the scale and nature of a settlement's economic role. No generalisations can be made about the economic functions performed by, or the development potential embodied in, a small or an intermediate settlement simply on the basis of their population size within a given country, let alone internationally. However, in most Third World nations the only data available about urban centres other than the largest ones is normally restricted to demographic information, usually collected through population censuses. For the purposes of this work, an arbitrary classification was chosen to facilitate a discussion across national boundaries: small settlements are those with a population of between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, while intermediate settlements are those with populations of between 20,000 and 100,000.

Around four-fifths of the population in developing countries live outside urban centres of over 100,000 inhabitants. A study of small and intermediate settlements is amply justified, if only by the fact that most people in developing countries either live in them or depend on them for goods, services and markets. From a review of the empirical literature on the subject, the study concludes that some of the main features that small settlements share are that a substantial proportion of their labour force is engaged in non-agricultural activities, they have a relatively small administrative role and usually some concentration of low-order public services, a relatively small role in subnational and national production, but an important role regionally. These are the scale of urban centres with which most rural and agricultural inhabitants interact. They are, in summary, settlements 'whose roles as centres of production and service provision have not developed beyond those of local scope' (p. 9).

Intermediate settlements, on the other hand, have a lower proportion of their labour force in agriculture than small settlements, although higher administrative rank and concentration of public services and facilities, some mix of urban services and facilities not so evident in small settlements in the same area, and are often located on subnational and national transportation and communication routes. In short, these are settlements 'which have not developed large and diversified economic bases of importance to national production and which have not developed as locations for substantial and diverse sets of producer, consumer and public services for populations and enterprises . . . The fact that they have not developed beyond such a level may relate either to the lack of economic development and diversification within the entire national economy or to the fact that the location

and characteristics of these settlements did not serve new or expanding economic activities within the country' (ibid.).

The spatial pattern of distribution of settlements in a country 'corresponds to the pattern of economic activities other than primary production' (p. 11). Therefore, the development possibilities of a given small or intermediate settlement can only be understood in the light of its links with its hinterland and with other urban centres. A discussion of the various ways in which the economic base of small and intermediate urban centres can be strengthened is illustrated with examples from different parts of the Third World. A combination of growing primary production and increasing real incomes for a substantial proportion of those working nearby (and spending most of their income in the settlement rather than outside the area) provides the most common sustained stimulus to development for many small settlements which have grown and developed to become intermediate settlements. However, some factors can lead to local surplus being spent outside the area and therefore bypass small settlements, such as an inequitable land-owning structure, vertically integrated, centrally-controlled marketing operations and poor prices for local products (which limit the spending power of producers).

It is noted that the lack of detailed empirical studies about the main features and the evolution of intermediate settlements, combined with the diversity of functions they perform render generalisations difficult. However, some of the main factors which have underpinned the development of such settlements throughout the Third World include, for example, the fact that they provide a seat for a regional government, or for the headquarters for large-scale public works, or for the location of a booming industry whose main market may lie outside the region or even outside the country.

The report then examines explicit government policies in the urban development field which have had or can have an impact upon the development of small and intermediate settlements. Three main sets of policies implemented in different forms around the world are discussed and illustrated. The first is the control to the growth of primate and large cities. This has been attempted by means of different mechanisms, such as incentives for industry to leave such cities and locate elsewhere. There are, the paper notes, several problems associated with this type of policy: for instance, generalisations about the relative costs and benefits for different settlement sizes (which seem to underlie any discussion about the relative advantages of a particular location) have little or no validity for these are settlement-specific. One further problem noted is that many specialised businesses, industries and even government operations often need the economies of scale provided by large cities, and these can rarely be replicated in smaller settlements. Within this set of policies, another strategy unsuccessfully attempted by some governments is the control of migration to large cities. However, the paper notes, because 'migration patterns are the effect of changing spatial distribution of economic opportunities . . . they are best changed by addressing their causes' (p. 42).

A second set includes policies aimed at promoting development in economically backward areas. The paper gives several examples to show how such a goal is difficult to achieve and mentions some of the negative consequences. For example, industries may be attracted

to backward areas through government incentives or in search of cheaper land and labour. But net benefits for the local population may be limited if such industries are capital-intensive and/or industries whose links are with a market outside the needy region. The paper stresses that in many such policies social and spatial equity are often confused so that a particular government action may have a positive effect in reducing inter-regional imbalances (as measured through, for example, average per capita income) but little or no effect in decreasing inter-personal differences.

A final set of policies for promoting spatial decentralisation relate to the promotion of development of small and intermediate settlement within 'city regions', i.e. regions within the area of influence of large urban centres. Many studies in the larger and more developed industrial economies, including some in the Third World such as Brazil and South Korea, have shown how, as a large city grows and develops some form of spontaneous decentralisation of population and industrial production often takes place towards small and intermediate settlements within such regions. In such situations, there is a need for careful analysis of whether such a process is happening spontaneously and of 'the extent to which strategic investments in infrastructure and services, changes in the spatial biases of current policies, and programmes to inform enterprises in the city core can support (this process) at a cost which is justifiable' (pp. 49-50). Also, in such circumstances, 'the expansion and improvement of transportation systems over time will relax constraints on productive investment on locations other than the large cities' (p. 50).

Often government policies and actions can have unintended biases affecting the development of small and intermediate settlements. A section of the report is devoted to an examination of three such factors: the structure of government, the provision and pricing of public services, and government macro-economic policies and sectoral plans. Regarding the first factor, the paper notes that a centralised distribution of power and resources can contribute to the domination of a national settlements system by one or a few cities; on the other hand, strong and effective local governments are known to be a factor in influencing a settlement system not dominated by a primate city. A second set of unintended spatial biases which negatively affect the development of small and intermediate settlements is the provision of public services. The paper mentions several examples of government expenditures on social services and infrastructure which have been heavily concentrated in the country's primate city or a few large urban centres and compares the results of several studies on the differential costs of provision of services across a spectrum of urban settlement sizes. It concludes that 'it does not seem too optimistic to say that, if governments at the level of small and intermediate settlements are given increased power, resources and personnel, a wide provision of social and physical services can be achieved outside the large urban settlements without large cost penalties. Some *per capita* costs may even be lower than in large settlements and, in some instances, largely recoverable from user-charges, if the technology of each particular service is chosen to match the needs and resources of the particular locality' (p. 60).

The third factor, the spatial bias of government macro-economic policies and sectoral plans, has not been explored much in the literature. Such bias is implicit in, for

example, support for the development of particular industries through protectionist measures, which has the effect of subsidizing productive investments in the locations which best serve the new or expanding protected activities. In practice, this often implies a bias against small and intermediate settlements as it is the large cities which have been favoured locations for such activities. Another example is that of high exchange rates of the national currency against the currencies of the country's main trading partners, which will tend to cheapen imports and reduce returns for exporters; in addition, an over-valued currency can have the effect of subsidizing goods for those living in or close to large cities, since a high proportion of the households that can afford to buy imported goods live there. Similarly, poor prices paid for agricultural products or high taxation on crops can also have a negative effect upon the development of some small and intermediate settlements, as they limit farmers' earnings and, therefore, the disposable income they can spend locally.

The shape that spatial development takes is also influenced by the form and the location of all government spending. This, as the few existing analyses on the subject suggest, tends to have a strong bias favouring a concentration of productive investment in large cities or in infrastructure to support such investments. Furthermore, as the report also notes, it is not uncommon to find that government sectoral plans totally contradict explicit spatial development aims. General incentives to encourage industrial investment in loosely defined 'backward' areas are less likely to benefit local populations (especially the low-income majority) and small settlements than incentives and public investments designed to make use of the resource mix particular to each area.

Some recommendations for governments and international organizations are presented in the concluding section, where some of the key ideas advocated in the report are also highlighted. It is stressed that spatial policies are not ends in themselves, but tools for promoting and implementing economic and social development. The settlement system - which includes small and intermediate settlements - provides the spatial 'backbone' on which all development projects depend. Thus, the identification of specific development roles for selected small and intermediate settlements, in the context of economic and social development plans, should be the first step in formulating a special policy for such centres. Such settlements can be instrumental in increasing the proportion of national populations reached with services - such as health, education and recreation - and the infrastructure associated with them, without necessarily incurring in higher *per capita* costs than in larger urban centres. Appropriate decentralisation of decision-making coupled with a strengthening of local government can also have a beneficial effect not only in maximising the development potential of many such centres, but also in attaining social and economic development objectives. Sectoral policies and structural changes are often the most effective form of public intervention to maximise employment and income-generation potential in small and intermediate settlements.

Finally, the report mentions some of the areas where international development agencies can help governments in attaining their development aims. For instance, assistance can be provided for governments to

assess the spatial biases inherent in their macro-economic policies, sectoral investment plans and tax and pricing systems. And in finding the best range of technologies and organizational systems which can reduce unit costs and facilitate cost recovery in the provision of public services, utilities and infrastructure, as well as in strengthening the revenue base at the local government level. And, lastly, international agencies can assist in training planners and managers of subnational planning systems, including those of small and intermediate settlements.

1. The term 'settlement' is taken to imply 'urban centre'.

## ABOU-ZEID, AHMED M.

### NEW TOWNS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 286–295.

The article describes the recent development of two new towns in Egypt and discusses the rationale for such projects in the light of the modernising effects they may bring to the areas around them.

Egypt is a poor and densely populated country, where most people are engaged in agricultural activities and where the amount of cultivable land is limited. Under such circumstances, development priority has usually been accorded to agricultural projects aimed at reclaiming semi-fertile lands and building settlements near the newly opened areas. The construction of new settlements is seen as an effective means of 'relieving the overcrowded provinces of their excess population as well as developing neglected regions' (p. 286). But despite such efforts, not enough land has yet been reclaimed to accommodate all, or even the majority of poor landless peasants. Rural areas still suffer from acute 'masked' unemployment. As a result of this, large numbers of peasants migrate to large cities, particularly Cairo and Alexandria in search of work. The author imputes the roots of many of the problems of large cities such as slums, lower living standards and the insufficiency of social services to the uncontrolled influx of migrants who lack 'the minimum requirements of urban life' and who, 'instead of being assimilated into city life . . . succeed in imposing their own way of life on large sectors of the city and city-dwellers'.

Abou-Zeid believes that the new towns programme will offer these peasants and poor city inhabitants more varied job opportunities and a better way of life than those prevailing in traditional communities or in the slums of large cities. These towns are envisaged as self-contained communities in which people live and work, and are seen by the government 'as the only effective way of accommodating the ever growing population in Egypt' (p. 287). By the late 1970s, three new towns had already been built in the desert areas to accommodate new industries, while others<sup>1</sup> had been developed as satellite towns close to metropolitan areas. The article examines

briefly the development of Mersa Matrouh, located in a region traditionally inhabited by nomad Bedouins some 250 km west of Alexandria. It was originally a coast-guard port with some 1,000 inhabitants in the 1920s which grew at a very fast pace in the 1960s and 1970s to reach some 30,000 in the late 1970s after having been chosen as a provincial capital. The second case study is Kima, an 8,000-inhabitant industrial new town in Aswan Province whose economic life revolves around a plant producing chemical fertilizers.

The criteria for selecting these particular cases is not made explicit, although for the author they both illustrate the beneficial effects that towns where essentially 'modern' activities take place (such as government administration and modern manufacturing) can have upon a largely rural population. An example of this is the change in attitude of Bedouins in Mersa Matrouh, who are now less reluctant than they used to be to give their children formal education which, in the words of the author, 'seemed to be the only way that led to highly paid and respectable jobs' (p. 289). Another example is that of the skilled workers in Kima, most of whom come from regions more developed than Aswan Province and who often undertake some extra economic activity outside working hours in the nearby city of Aswan. This, the author stresses, not only complements the income they earn in the factory, but more importantly, it allows them to mix with the locals and introduce to them new and more advanced techniques than those already known in the city; 'for there is no doubt that the workers in Kima factory are better trained, more exact, and more efficient than the ordinary workers of Aswan' (p. 292).

The author regrets that the people are not given a say in the way new towns are planned. Planners usually segregate people from different social and cultural backgrounds, in such a way that interaction among them is limited and so the modernising influence that the more advanced groups can have upon more backward ones.

1. No further details are given about the new towns programme regarding, for example, date of commencement, number and location of new towns built and planned, budget allocation, etc.

## ACOSTA, MARUJA and HARDOY, JORGE E.

### URBAN REFORM IN REVOLUTIONARY CUBA

*Antilles Research Program*, Yale University, New Haven, 1973.

On the eve of the revolution, the spatial distribution of the population in Cuba had the following features: an enormous concentration of the total population (19.6 per cent), productive investments and services in Greater Havana; a great dispersion of urban population which lived in small localities (1,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) and which accounted in 1953 for 18.1 per cent of the national population; a lack of cities in the population range between the capital and Santiago, the second most important urban centre, whose population in 1953 was

eight times smaller than Havana's; a predominance of dispersed rural population and the absence of rural communities; and a communications network, formed to serve the export economy.

Revolutionary ideology and economic policy were biased towards rural areas and dedicated to eliminating the existing dichotomy between the city and the countryside which had developed during the evolution of Cuba as a capitalist country. During the early years of the revolution, a re-ordering of national goals and a number of policies reflected the interest of the government in introducing regional balance. The two agrarian reform laws eliminated the main causes of urban-rural migration. A new communications network linked most centres to the main trunk lines, reducing isolation. A number of intermediate centres were selected for concentrated investment in industries and housing, such as Cienfuegos, Santa Clara, Camaguey, Manzanillo, Holguin, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio and Cardenas. Their growth rates in the middle 1960s were more or less twice the national average. The development of some new rural cities and of hundreds of small rural centres was also consistent with the Revolutionary Government's interest in giving the rural population a higher standard of living, in promoting participation and in solving the grave problem posed by regional imbalances between the supply and demand of labour. Although the focus of this short volume, based on interviews in Cuba during 1970 and a thorough analysis of secondary sources, is the study of urban reform, it provides useful data and documentation on urbanisation policies in Cuba during the first decade of the revolution. 'Perhaps,' say the authors in the preface, 'the most important lesson to be derived from it is the recognition that the basis for the solution of urban problems is not of a technical nature but essentially political and socio-economic. That solution cannot be found by concentrating efforts solely in urban areas, but only by means of a territorial plan of national goals that spatially and socially reflects the orientations of the economy.'

ALIF, M.S.

## THE RURAL-URBAN BALANCE IN SRI LANKA

*Habitat International*, Volume 3, No 3/4, 1978, pp 325-330.

The article is an assessment of the settlement policies which had been pursued consistently in Sri Lanka over the two decades up to 1978. In the light of available statistics the author seeks to enquire the extent to which successive governments have achieved the stated aim of accelerating rural development and regulating urban population growth.

The official definition of what constitutes an 'urban area' is not adequate for a rigorous statistical analysis, largely because it is based merely on the country's administrative hierarchy, where Municipal Council, Urban Council and Town Council areas are considered to be urban, and Village Councils rural, with no further criteria being

involved in the definition. The inadequacy of the administrative classification lies in that it may be contradicted if one uses other criteria such as population and density. Moreover, its use means that there are no definite guidelines for administrative action in the upgrading of rural areas to urban status, and as a consequence, available census figures show sudden increases in the population which are attributable merely to the inclusion of rural areas within urban boundaries.

A detailed table is presented showing the share of the urban population for the different censuses between 1871 and 1971 and according to various definitions for what is urban, based on population size (i.e. towns over 2,000, 10,000 and 20,000). In the case of the 1971 census, for instance, the proportion of urban dwellers was 22.4 per cent according to the official definition for urban, and 15.9 per cent if one takes as urban those settlements that have more than 20,000 inhabitants.

But the author points out that regardless of the number base used, 'the rate of urbanization does not appear to have reached any significant proportion', especially when compared to other developing countries in the ESCAP region. There, the average annual urban growth rate was 5.8 per cent between 1960 and 1970, while Sri Lanka's was 3.6 per cent.

The impact of these government policies which have been instrumental in maintaining a relatively low level of urbanisation and have avoided 'upsetting the rural-urban balance' is then briefly discussed in the article. The author lists a series of elements which have played a role in the process, among which: a slow industrialisation process, mainly sited in less urbanised areas; government colonisation schemes in low-density areas; provision of basic social facilities and credit to rural areas; guaranteed agricultural prices and government purchasing schemes; a substantially diffused land-ownership structure; no substantial expansion of commercial and administrative activities in existing urban areas; low transport costs and adequate facilities and a direct dialling communications system which is being introduced.<sup>1</sup>

Also mentioned are some government measures which should in the future maintain the existing trends, such as the narrowing of social and economic disparities, greater emphasis on agricultural development and agro-based industries, irrigation of the sparsely populated and dry North-Central region, the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural land ownership and a more intensive decentralisation of the administration. By way of conclusion, the author emphasises that the key to the process of urbanisation lies in the higher or lower support given to the agricultural sector and to rural welfare: 'to the extent that Sri Lanka plans to develop its agricultural resources, the rate of urbanisation will be lower'.

1. In this respect the author notes that both this new system and 'reasonable (transport) fares and . . . concessions in season tickets for government employees have also prevented migration to towns'. However, the mechanisms through which this has taken place are not described.

BREBNER, PHILIP

## ALGERIA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 3, No 1, February 1981, pp 43–56.

This article is about the effect of French colonial policies and then of the independent Algerian government's policies on the pattern of settlements. Under French rule, towns developed as intermediaries between surrounding rural areas and capitalist markets with the main interaction being between inland urban centres and large coastal centres. Many settlements also functioned as the base for the management of and rent collection from, agricultural land controlled by French urban bourgeoisie. The French also initiated a series of new settlements and also some garrison stations in the interior which developed into small towns. Under the French, a linked pattern of settlements emerged with clear economic linkages and a distinctly hierarchical and centralised form. During the War of Independence, over a quarter of the rural population (perhaps more) were forced to move to 'regroupement' centres with over 8,000 villages and hamlets destroyed. This led to the breakdown of traditional rural society and certainly hastened the migration to the cities since so many formerly rural inhabitants had nothing to lose by moving.

On Independence, a massive exodus of French was replaced by Muslims taking their place. Various reforms meant the agricultural population was less exploited by urban based landowners. Industrialisation encouraged the development of urban based activities although little support was given to constructing the infrastructure and services and expanding housing provision or controlling urban growth. The administration was decentralised with 31 regions and 158 districts. It is interesting to note that many regional capitals seem to have grown faster than larger cities. For instance, Constantine was once the major settlement in a system linking it to Skidka, Annaba and Batna but now these three cities have grown rapidly and provide Constantine with strong competition for industrial investment.

Little support has been given to agriculture. Rural settlement policy has promoted the consolidation of rural populations into socialist villages since 1971 through which basic services could be provided. Shortage of funds has held this initiative back – and many regarded these socialist villages as 'regroupement' under another guise.

Finally, the article notes that there are close to 900,000 Algerian migrants in France and that the French government is increasingly discouraging them from staying in France. This could mean a steady stream of Algerians returning home and with most of them experienced only in urban and industrial work.

BREBNER, PHILIP and BRIGGS, JOHN

## RURAL SETTLEMENT PLANNING IN ALGERIA AND TANZANIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

*Habitat International*, Vol 6, No 5/6, 1982, pp 621–628.

The paper compares and contrasts experiences in Tanzania and Algeria in seeking to transform rural societies by resettling population in nucleated villages where basic services could be provided and by encouraging communal production.

The Tanzanian government's emphasis on rural development pre-dates the Arusha Declaration of 1967 which committed the country to a socialist path to development and outlined the policy for the establishment of 'ujamaa' villages. The three main features of 'ujamaa' were the relocation of population in nucleated villages, communal production there, and individual choice on the part of the rural population as to whether they wanted to take part. After a slow start, implementation speeded up after 1970 under more direct involvement by the Party in selected regions. In 1973, the priority became villagisation, ie. relocation of rural population in nucleated villages without meeting 'ujamaa' criteria on, for instance, communal production. By the end of 1976 most of the rural population, some 13 million people, were in villages. In some instances, relocation in the new villages was achieved by force. A combination of drought, rural disruption due to villagisation and economic problems have led to a holding policy rather than a dynamic policy on 'ujamaa' village encouragement.

In Algeria, after Boumediene's coup in 1965, rural development was of secondary importance to rapid industrialisation based on Algeria's oil and natural gas. In 1971, 'La Charte de la Revolution Agraire' sought to radically reform agricultural production and re-organise land holding systems. In 1972, the 1,000 Socialist Villages Programme was inaugurated. As in 'ujamaa' villages, communal organisation of labour and production was an essential part of this. And, as in Tanzania's early policy for 'ujamaa', peasants were to be encouraged (but not forced) into the villages. Implementation has been slow. Of the 1,000 socialist villages planned for completion by 1980 to house 1.12 million people, only 120 had been completed by July 1979 for some 150,000 people.

The paper points to the important differences between the two policies, apart from the obvious contrast in scale. In Algeria, 'socialist villages' have urban characteristics in that they have an urban style of layout, urban-type services, and houses built of stone, fired brick and concrete, usually constructed by the government. They are planned in a hierarchy of primary, secondary and tertiary settlements; tertiary settlements being the largest with between 2,800 and 4,900 inhabitants and having the most comprehensive set of social, cultural, administrative and technical services. The high cost to the government in constructing a socialist village, the degree of bureaucracy necessary for its realisation and shortages of building materials have inhibited the whole programme.

In both nations, the concentration of rural population in villages has allowed the government to reach more rural



people with schools, health facilities and clean water. Tanzania could not have achieved universal primary education without the villagisation programme. But the programme has brought significant costs too. Villagisation between 1974 and 1976 in Tanzania had a major negative effect on agricultural production. The disruption caused by this and by drought can be seen in the shortfall in internal food production. Tanzania's food imports rose dramatically in 1974 and 1975. In Algeria, the villages were very expensive to construct. In 1979, a village was costing 15–20 million dinars to build.<sup>1</sup> The paper also describes the difficulties brought by the promotion of communal agricultural production. It gives examples from Tanzanian villages and regions, of difficulties in organising communal production, and notes that less emphasis has been given to encouraging communal production in recent years. In addition, even in 'ujamaa' villages, small private plots for household's food requirements are allowed. In Algeria, inhabitants of socialist villages, do not possess individual plots. They are paid a minimum monthly wage and, unlike in 'ujamaa' villages, income is not conditioned by the level of productivity. Figures from a survey by Benachenhou (1979) are cited showing 83.1 per cent of villagers desired a stable and/or a private plot. Prior to the agrarian revolution in Algeria, peasants working for landowners were allowed their own cattle and plot of land.

The paper also notes that village programmes in both nations can be seen as ways by which central governments extend political and economic control over the rural population. 'Clearly, in both Algeria and Tanzania the degree of government and Party control and involvement is a dominant factor in the overall understanding of their respective rural policies.'

In conclusion, the authors note the ability of communal villages to provide rural populations with basic services and, in theory, to achieve economies of scale in agricultural production. But the use of force, directly or indirectly, and lack of peasant participation in planning and implementation can alienate those people who are meant to benefit from such a policy.

However, given the failure of other development strategies in Africa in alleviating rural poverty, 'perhaps if the types of problems encountered in Algeria and Tanzania can be resolved, then this may be the way forward.'

1. In February 1980: sterling 1.00 = 8 dinars

## CARRION, FERNANDO

### INTERMEDIATE CITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ECUADOR'S URBANISATION: AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION

(Las ciudades intermedias en el contexto de la urbanización ecuatoriana: un intento de interpretación)

*Revista Interamericana de Planificación*, Vol XVIII, No 71, September 1984, pp 129–147.

This essay seeks to locate Ecuador's process of urbanisation in the more general framework of the country's urban history. The more specific focus of the paper on the development of intermediate cities<sup>1</sup> is an attempt to identify some valid alternatives to the increasing concentration of the country's urban population in the two largest urban centres, Quito and Guayaquil.

In a brief theoretical section, the author rejects both empiricist and dependency approaches to an analysis of urbanisation on the grounds that they both view the process as the product of a regionally undifferentiated socio-economic reality. A more plausible approach is one which takes into account the country's profound regional disparities and the fact that each region has its own distinct geographical, political, economic and social features. In the course of the analysis, because inter-urban relations are the main axes of internal (capital) accumulation, urban centres are perceived as providing the links between regions.

Ecuadorian urbanisation can be divided into two main stages: the process of urban configuration, spanning the period between the Spanish conquest and the mid-nineteenth century; and the process of urbanisation, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. In the early decades of the first period, cities were founded as centres of control and use of the indigenous labour force to exploit the local resources demanded by the colonial power, Spain. A distinct regional profile starts to emerge around areas of specialisation and organised around the axis Quito-Cuenca, then the two main administrative centres in the Sierra.<sup>2</sup> In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Spanish colonisers forced the territory of present-day Ecuador to specialise in textile production and agriculture to serve the demands of neighbouring territories (what today are roughly Colombia, Peru and Bolivia). This gave rise to a hacienda<sup>3</sup> system in the Sierra whereby regions gradually become more self-sufficient and less dependent on the traditional centre of administration, Quito.

The main driving force behind the process of urbanising was Ecuador's agro-export economy – production of cocoa in the last years of the nineteenth century and early decades of this century, and bananas in the 1950s and early 1960s. With the waning of the traditional hacienda system in the Sierra and the development of large plantations along the Coast, the port of Guayaquil emerged as the largest and most dynamic urban centre soon overtaking Quito in demographic terms, while the latter is relegated to performing mainly

administrative tasks. In the two main growth periods of the agro-export economy, the development of some intermediate cities on the Coast was given a boost by investments in infrastructure, particularly inter-regional roads and railways. In the periods of decline, however, migration and investments to these centres practically ceased, and only the two largest urban centres experienced any growth.

In the 1960s, the agro-export economy gives way to a process of import-substitution industrialisation and modernisation of agricultural production, partly financed with revenues from a rapidly-growing State-controlled oil industry. In this period, urban growth is marked by the rapid industrial and demographic expansion of both Quito and Guayaquil, but also of some small and intermediate cities located along major routes and in areas of government-sponsored colonisation. However, as the author concludes, the oil boom failed to create the necessary conditions for sustained socio-economic growth and for a more dispersed pattern of urbanisation. Urbanisation in Ecuador still remains a bi-polar process.

1. In the Ecuadorian context, an intermediate city is understood as being the central locus of regional production milieus and as having an intermediary function between its region and the country's two primate cities, Quito and Guayaquil.
2. Editors' note: there are three main geographical regions in Ecuador: the Sierra (as the Andes mountain range is known in Ecuador), the Coast (on the Pacific ocean) and the Amazonia region in the East (sparsely populated tropical forest).
3. Editors' note: large landed estate.

## COMAY, YOCHANAN and KIRSCHENBAUM, ALAN

### THE ISRAELI NEW TOWN: AN EXPERIMENT AT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*,  
Vol 22, No 1, October 1973, pp 124–134.

In Israel, explicit population dispersal policies have been part of national policy since 1941, the aim being to increase population away from the coast, disperse settlements for development and defence purposes and provide for the integration of new immigrants. Israel's New Towns Programme, a massive effort at population dispersal, evolved in response to these needs.

The programme called for the establishment of 20–28 medium size (15,000–60,000 inhabitants) urban centres within a comprehensive regional structure. These were to serve as alternatives to larger urban centres with regional administration, marketing facilities, commercial outlets, health and educational facilities and employment. The government gave considerable resources to housing construction and physical infrastructure and heavily subsidised industrial development. There were lower personal and business taxes on income in these areas.

As these towns developed, it was found that they had a relatively high share of post-1948 immigrants and linked to this, a relatively high share of Asian-Africans. This implies

a lower educational background, larger families and many other differences in social, economic and political variables.

It seems the population dispersal aims have been achieved. From 1948–66, the share of the new towns in total urban population rose from 1.9 per cent to 20.6 per cent. The coastal plain's population while increasing in absolute terms fell from 80 per cent to less than 70 per cent of total population with part of the reason for this being the development of the new towns. Up to the mid 1960s, much of the growth in the new towns was due to new immigrants; nearly 30 per cent of all immigrants in the 1962–66 period went to new towns. But with fewer immigrants and the tendency for immigrants to come more from Western Europe or America rather than Asia/Africa, this trend has ceased. The new towns' growth in population will have to come primarily from natural increase and internal migration, unlike the past. Their success will now depend on their ability to attract internal migrants. But between 1965 and 1968, they were net exporters of population. Among 23 towns investigated, only three had positive net migration rates. During a slackening of economic activity, outward migration usually falls – and this was so in the new towns during the severe recession from 1966 to mid-1967. But outward migration persisted during the recession and intensified as soon as the labour market tightened in 1968. Much of the migration from the new towns is to larger established urban centres so the new towns are exporting people precisely to those areas from which they were supposed to draw population. Why are the towns failing to attract in-migrants?

It is hypothesised that in-migration rates to the new towns will be negatively associated with the unemployment rate, the number of inhabitants on welfare, the pupil/classroom ratio and the distance to the nearest major urban centre and positively associated with housing availability and number of doctors per capita. The study looked both at 1966 (during a recession) and 1968 (a relative boom).

25 towns have been formally designated new towns or 'development towns' but, of these, only 18 could be included in the final sample due to the unavailability of comparable data for all towns. Simple correlation coefficients and regression analysis were used.

Most of the hypotheses were confirmed by the data and the explanatory power of the independent variables as a group was quite high. Unemployment was the most potent explanatory variable which tends to justify government efforts to encourage employment generating activities in the new towns. But the sectoral nature of employment in these towns (employment is heavily concentrated in industry with a low proportion in services) makes them highly sensitive to the cyclic behaviour of the national economy. Housing construction rate appears to influence in-migration positively although its coefficient was statistically significant only for 1968, while distance from major urban centres exerted a retarding influence. Improvements in educational quality tend to raise in-migration rates if directed towards elementary schools. One surprising finding was the lack of a significant difference between sets of regression coefficients for the year of acute recession and the year of relative boom.

The study was seen only as a first step and recommends the analysis of out-migration and constructing the more difficult model for net migration. An analysis of the towns which have succeeded (more or less) than the expectations in the model would also be

useful. Still another step would be applying a similar analysis to subgroups within the migrant population whether subdivided by age, educational level or ethnic background. This might yield insights into those elements of the towns' composition which influence its economic and social viability.

ECKSTEIN, SUSAN

## CITIES IN SOCIALIST CUBA

*Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol XL,  
No 1, 1978, pp 155–180.

Eckstein describes the transformations undergone by Cuban cities after the revolution, in terms of their structure, functions and characteristics. She analyses the policies adopted by Castro's government to change the class structure, and make incomes and access to material and cultural goods more equitable. Thus, the author describes demographic and investment decentralisation policies, housing policies, and changes in employment and the use of free time.

The author concludes that the first decade of Castro's government tended to favour rural areas and secondary cities, with Havana receiving less attention. After that, the government turned its attention to the capital city, since it was no longer a focus of counter-revolutionary activity. Between 1959–63 Havana was strongly favoured.

Cuban cities continue to suffer the impact of their capitalist inheritance. Havana is still the largest city and the most important city culturally, administratively, demographically and, in many instances, economically. Its inhabitants still seem to enjoy better living conditions than those living in the provinces. But in spite of these capitalist vestiges, cities lost their bourgeois characteristics after the revolution. This paper describes these transformations. Its aim is to show the attributes of modern cities and that the consequences of urbanisation and economic development in the Third World are related to the capitalist economy and not necessarily to socialism. Eckstein's conclusion is that for the moment Castro's Cuba has not overcome all the social and economic inequalities inherited from its capitalist past. Demographic concentration in Havana, the dependence on sugar for foreign trade, and industrial underdevelopment are examples of this. However, cities in Castro's Cuba are not very similar to capitalist cities. There are more similarities with respect to demographic aspects than in economic and cultural aspects. Cuban cities have in many ways lost their bourgeois characteristics since material goods and housing are accessible to all, merit and need are the basis for distribution of consumption goods, cultural activities have been proletarianised, and the labour force has lost its bourgeois elements.

FARINA, MARINA BASSO

## URBANIZATION, DEURBANIZATION AND CLASS STRUGGLE IN CHINA 1949–79

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 4, 1980, pp 485–502.

The paper examines the Chinese government's urban and regional policies after the 1949 revolution. The main aim of these policies has been to reduce the regional disequilibrium inherited from the past and reduce population growth, especially in the urban areas. The article traces the changes undergone by the policies throughout the first Five Year Plan (1953–57), the Great Leap Forward (1958–60), the period of readjustment (1961–65), the Cultural Revolution (late 1960s) and the 1970s.

Imperialist policies in the 18th and 19th centuries concentrated industries in a few coastal cities. In 1949, the country's half a billion population was concentrated in one third of the country. Policy makers were faced with the challenge of fostering a rapid industrialization whilst at the same time overcoming the entrenched backwardness of the countryside. Finding a solution to the contradiction between city and countryside became of capital importance to China's general economic development.

Among the main targets of the first Five Year Plan (1953–57) were the overcoming of regional inequalities between industrialized and non-industrialized provinces and the dispersal of industry. Large investments were made in setting up industries in the interior; this helped decrease the concentration of industry in coastal areas but did not speed production growth. At the same time, funds for light industry and agriculture were curtailed, so that 'the disequilibria between highly industrialized areas and backward areas, and between city and countryside became more serious'.

In the period covered by this plan, urban population grew at 6.4 per cent per year, more rapidly than the national population, due not only to an unprecedented rural to urban migration, which accounted for more than one third of urban growth, but also to higher rates of natural increase. Better employment opportunities in urban industrial activities, higher living standards for waged workers and little state investment in agriculture stand among the main causes for internal migration, rather than the by then incipient collectivization policies.

Rising unemployment and overcrowding in urban centres led to policies aimed at checking rural to urban migration, such as registration procedures for urban workers, police controls, etc. These were implemented in 1955 and had some degree of success in the first year of implementation. Their subsequent failure, however, demonstrated the need for long-term urban and demographic policies. In 1954 the government launched a family planning campaign which was slow in gaining momentum partly due to opposition against contraceptive methods among peasants; for them, in the absence of a social security system children represented an asset in old age. In fact, the birth rate increased rather than fell in subsequent years, partly due to improved medical and sanitary conditions and to the relative economic security which encouraged people to have more children.

Family planning campaigns were complemented by a policy of resettling educated and unemployed people in the countryside, with the explicit aims of reducing tension in the cities, rationally distributing population and intellectuals, and raising technological and cultural standards in the countryside. Unfortunately, data on the population shifts resulting from this policy is scanty and not very useful.

When Chinese leaders felt that the socialist transformation of industry, agriculture and commerce had been completed, they thought the time right for China to compete with larger economies. They launched the development strategy known as the Great Leap Forward, which spanned the years 1958-60. It was through this policy that the people's communes were created: they were a combination of agriculture and rural industry run by local organizations using rural labour and whose production served agricultural demands. Local self-sufficiency, the corollary of industrial decentralization, aimed to free the people's communes from economic and administrative dependence on the state and to reduce the heavy financial burden of the latter. Despite the initial opposition it had to face among many party leaders and the mistakes made during its implementation, in the opinion of Basso Farina the fundamental policy was to prove effective in later years in relation to economic construction whilst implicitly it also tackled the problems of rapid urbanization and regional disequilibrium.

However, during this early period, collectivization did play a role in promoting migration to the cities, mainly because of fears of total communization of private possessions and the likelihood of becoming state labourers which worried better-off peasants. In addition, many peasants were now attracted by urban street industries, an innovation brought about by the new strategy. Despite its proportions<sup>1</sup> rural migration was neglected in official newspapers and speeches.

The short-lived popularity of grandiose ideas in town plans and the construction of new cities in the mid 1950s was replaced by a policy whereby planning departments were urged to show more realism, and support the role of small and medium towns. Mao supported the new trend when he wrote that 'we should disperse urban inhabitants in the countryside and build up many small towns'.

The four years after 1961 are known as the period of readjustment, which the paper considers as 'the hardest years of all for China'. The failure to meet some economic targets, mainly in agriculture, and the destruction of two annual harvests by natural disasters encouraged many to move to the cities in search of better living conditions. In the cities food supply became difficult and the continuous increase in population made the housing situation very tense. As part of a strict silence about the progress of the economy, publication of official statistics after this period was precluded, so that an assessment of any subsequent growth in urban population becomes impossible.

The paper describes briefly the experience of the pioneering development of Daqing, an oilfield in the northeastern steppe, which at the time became an economic and urban model for the country. There, the principles of self-reliance, hard struggle and plain life advocated by the government were fully carried into practice, but they concealed a trend towards reducing state investments in public utilities and shifting burdens on to the collectivity. The consequences of this were visible at the time of writing the paper, when after years of production increases, the settlement was still 'in part a sort

of shanty town, in part a sort of rural village with wood and mud huts'.

President Mao's Cultural Revolution, spanning from 1966 to 1969, and the complexities of the political scenario relegated economic and demographic problems to a second place, so that statistics for this period are very scarce. Production in rural areas was somewhat increased and rural communes were consolidated, but migration to the cities did not come to a halt. Controls on population movement slackened because of political instability and administrative paralysis, while some peasants joined their families in the cities or moved to join them for protection from the criticism and refutation campaign which started in this period. Some 'old bourgeois elements' profited from the turmoil, attempting to organize a black market for labour by promising a guaranteed job in the cities.

Most of the migrants were, according to the Chinese press, the urban unemployed, students and intellectuals who had been re-settled in the countryside in the 1950s and were in fact returning to live illegally in the cities. By the end of the Cultural Revolution they were reluctant to go back to the countryside and their forced return often gave rise to riots and demonstrations in the big cities. Nevertheless, between 1966 and 1977, 17 million people left for the countryside. In the author's view they were mostly young people who, unlike their predecessors, did not oppose the movement mainly for fear of endangering their future and their career, as well as for eagerness and curiosity to know the world.

During the 1970s, improved living conditions in rural communes and the dispersal of industry to the countryside worked as a restraint on internal migration. Even if it had still not been eliminated, it was no longer a source of concern for the government. At the time of writing, unemployment had been checked largely through the development of small and medium industries which gradually absorbed rural and urban labour.

The paper concludes by briefly sketching the policies of the new leadership which took power after Mao's death. There is no agreed upon figure for the country's total population, nor about its growth rate. Nonetheless renewed emphasis was given to family planning in 1978, when the target growth rate of ten per thousand for 1978 was proposed and new measures of discouragement were introduced, which the paper reckons will harm the poorer and larger families and the peasants.

The author criticizes the government's lack of attention to the problems of settling educated youth, intellectuals and specialized labour in the countryside as well as to the issues of a rational distribution of population over the country. 'As a consequence, concentration of economic activities in urban areas and regional inequalities will probably remain'.

During the early 1970s, the policy of developing small and medium industry was dominant. In the countryside communes set up cement, fertilizer and machine tool plants employing a total of 17 million people. Nevertheless, since 1976 the role of urban and rural small factories has been gradually downgraded. By the end of the 1970s, Chinese leaders were stressing the need to foster industrial development in rural areas in order to absorb excess labour generated by the mechanization of agriculture, and thereby avoid an excessive concentration of population in the cities. The resulting trend seemed to be towards rural industries serving the urban areas, contrary to President Mao's proposal of a rural industry

serving agriculture's needs.

Finally, the paper presents aggregated data on the number of towns and cities falling in different size ranges for 1952, 1957 and 1974, as well as more detailed population figures for 1974. Between 1952 and 1974, the construction of new big cities stopped, the number of urban centres of under 100,000 inhabitants increased considerably, and the coastal regions remained the most urbanized in the country. 'The aim of restraining the growth of big cities has only been partially successful because, in spite of the construction of new towns, the traditional Chinese big cities increased their population'. In the field of redressing regional disequilibria, the paper recognizes that there has been some success, although it concludes that there is still much to do in terms of finding a solution for the difficult problem of inequalities between coastal and interior regions.

1. The author estimates that assuming a net rate of population growth similar to that of 1953-57, rural to urban migration was about 30 million in 1957-60.

## FRIEDMANN, JOHN

### THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE: SIX DISCUSSION PAPERS

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 4, 1980, pp 97-115.

The article is a collection of six papers which provides the basis for a discussion on rural development policies in the People's Republic of Mozambique at a series of seminars held in Maputo in 1978. The topics covered by the papers are, respectively: urbanization and the development of productive forces, attempts at quantifying present and future demographic and economic trends in Mozambique, development as an increase in overall access to the bases for accumulating social power and a more equal access for the population as a whole, the territorial approach to rural development, organizing for rural development, and rural development and urbanization policy.

The author sets out by defining two possible meanings for 'urbanization': the first one (ecological urbanization) refers to an increase in the proportion of a country's total population living in cities; the second one (social urbanization) conveys the notion of an increased proportion of the population following distinctly 'urban' ways of living ('they become more educated, healthier, increasingly tied into a money economy; they are more organized and more informed; have a wider range of social contacts; achieve class consciousness; have new and wider social aspirations; and so forth'. p. 98). Whereas ecological urbanization usually leads to social urbanization, though often with a considerable lag of time, social urbanization can be achieved without resettlement in cities.

In peripheral capitalist countries, enclave industrialization and the progressive invasion of the countryside by capitalist forms of production have led to the rapid expansion of urban areas, particularly the capital city and/or major port cities. This has often been accompanied by the formation of an urban informal sector with a low productivity and low standards of living, an impoverished peasantry, police repression and the systematic destruction of natural resources. These outcomes 'put into question the claim that a process of capitalist development amounts to the same as national development'. Under socialism, on the contrary, 'the possibility exists of establishing a closer balance between social and ecological forms of urbanization and so of reducing and ultimately eliminating the major contradictions between city and countryside' (p. 99). Without opposing the idea of urban-based urbanization, the author believes that Mozambique's immediate priorities lie on the development of its rural areas, a strategy which will create the material conditions for collective production and industrialization. In the remaining five papers, Friedmann sets out to describe how, in the particular case of Mozambique, this strategy can be implemented.

The path towards a self-reliant form of development such as that proposed by Mozambique's ruling party FRELIMO, is one which increases overall access to the bases for accumulating social power, whilst access for the whole of the population is made more equal. By 'social power' what is meant is 'the ability to set purposes in the world and to achieve them'; the bases for its accumulation are knowledge and skills, political and social organization, productive assets, information, social networks and financial resources. Since Independence, FRELIMO's efforts have increased the access of the country's population as a whole to organization and networks, to a less extent to knowledge and information, and to an even lesser degree to assets and financial resources. Even the government's rural development programme of *aldeas comunais* has achieved only a minimal impact due to lack of state resources.

The main problem associated with the *aldeas comunais* programme is not the idea but its timing: 'quite simply, the material conditions for a massive relocation of the farming population of the country and its integration into cooperative work do not exist as yet, and may not exist for some time' (p. 106). An alternative territorial approach to rural development is proposed by the author. This approach is not inconsistent with that of *aldeas comunais*, and should in fact be combined with it; it is based on a recognition of the state's present limitations in creating the bases for a self-reliant development in rural areas, and on the belief that there is a substantial margin for raising agricultural productivity within the constraints of the existing pattern of dispersed settlements. This approach entails the use of the existing administrative district as the basic unit of development and gradually installing a package of services (listed in the article) in each district capital, some of which will have a higher priority than others. In addition, each village or group of villages should have access to a 'silent centre', a clustering of basic services in use during the day but which becomes silent at night when the bulk of the users return to their villages.

Regional and productivity differences should be taken into account and priority in the extension of basic services should be made accordingly. FRELIMO officials, assembly delegates and district cadres must be closely

involved in the process. The fifth paper in the set describes in more detail how the territorial approach is to be organized at the national, regional and local levels. Against possible criticism to the complexities of the organizational scheme suggested, the author emphasizes that the construction of socialism in Mozambique requires giving absolute priority to rural development, so that the 80 per cent of the population presently living in rural areas may be reached.

The article ends by pointing out what the author sees as the fundamental argument of this set of papers: that the territorial approach also constitutes an appropriate urbanization policy for Mozambique. By progressively extending social urbanization to the whole of the country's rural population, the rate at which ecological urbanization is likely to occur may be moderated. This moderation will, it is hoped, 'help to solve the existing problems in urban areas at the same time that access to the bases for accumulating social power, especially as between urban and rural areas, is gradually made more equal' (p. 112).

The territorial approach gives emphasis to the role of the lower-order centres, specifically to district capitals, on the principle that their economic and demographic growth will come about not by top-down stimulation but as a result of increased rural production and productivity in surrounding areas, particularly in the family and cooperative farm sectors. This strategy, finally, needs to be complemented with location impact assessments of major urban investments, and by giving Maputo, the capital city and main industrial centre, a special treatment within the context of national territorial planning.

## GUGLER, JOSEF

### A MINIMUM OF URBANISM AND A MAXIMUM OF RURALISM: THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 4, 1980, pp 516-535.

Cuba presents social scientists with relatively good information on urbanization policies and their implementation in one developing country committed to socialism. This article analyzes the impact of post-revolutionary policies, whose aim was to eliminate the rural-urban contradiction and to redefine a role for the capital, Havana. The analysis covers the period from the revolutionary takeover in 1959 until the late 1970s, yet taking into account pre-revolutionary trends in urbanization.

In a brief presentation of demographic data the paper summarises the most relevant statistics that form the background to the analysis. Mortality has declined substantially in Cuba since the beginning of the century to the present. Unlike many Third World countries, Cuba's fertility has also declined simultaneously with mortality, and in some periods even more rapidly. The revolution brought about a 'baby boom', in which the crude birth rate shot up from 28 per thousand in 1959 to 35 in 1963 and 1964. The boom compensated for the heavy out-migration

that followed the establishment of the revolutionary regime, a total net international migration loss of 574,000 from 1960 to 1972.<sup>1</sup>

A drop in the crude birth rate in the mid 1970s, however, is expected to decrease population growth rate from a reported 1.3 per cent in 1975-80; it may fall to 1 per cent in 1995-2000. But any guess as to the future trends in population growth must inevitably take into account government policies which may either encourage or discourage any existing trend.

Urban population growth in Cuba has been less dramatic than in many Third World countries in recent decades: it dropped from 4.1 per cent in 1943-53 to 3.0 per cent per year in 1953-70. For Gugler, 'government policies thus had a measure of success in stemming the tide of rural-urban migration' (p. 518). These policies included the improvement in living standards of the rural population as well as involving urban dwellers in agricultural activities. Rural conditions were fundamentally ameliorated by the establishment of full employment policies to replace the old system of seasonal employment and through a substantial reduction of wage differentials between urban and rural areas. This differential was finally erased in 1968. The rationing system set up in 1962 and the dramatic expansion in free social services in the rural areas also contributed significantly in reducing urban-rural inequalities. The goal of urbanizing the countryside found expression in a programme for the construction of new small towns that could more easily be provided with services. By 1975, 335 such new towns had been set up which housed 135,594 inhabitants.

There was also an attempt to 'ruralize' urban inhabitants by involving them in agricultural activities: for instance, in 1968 a million inhabitants of Havana were mobilized, at the rate of 125,000 a week, to work in the city's Green Belt (32,000 hectares developed in less than two years to supply vegetables and other foodstuffs for the urban population) or in other rural areas, especially the sugar cane plantations at harvesting time. Since 1970, much less has been heard of such mobilization campaigns, although a policy is being implemented whereby students in grades 7-10 learn and work in rural boarding schools.

Between 1958 and 1963, Havana's annual growth rate has been estimated at 3.4 per cent, which means that migration into the city more than compensated for the out-migration of Cubans who went into exile after the revolutionary takeover. After 1965, however, the rate decreased to one per cent. In 1970 the population of Greater Havana reached 1,750,000, according to the census, which gave an average annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent between 1953 and 1970. Despite a government programme to concentrate industrial projects in Havana (as well as in two other heavily populated and urbanized provinces, Las Villas and Oriente) and a rise in international tourism in the early 1970s, the city's growth rate did not increase significantly, reaching around 1.8 per cent per year between 1970 and 1976. Havana has been the country's primate city throughout this century, although its dominant position was considerably reduced between 1953 and 1970: the proportion of the population living in agglomerations over 20,000 inhabitants that lived in Havana fell from 55 per cent to 48 per cent. The establishment of elected local government in 1976 'has brought a measure of decentralization and may prove to be part of a continuing process of curtailing the dominant role of Havana in the island's political, economic and

cultural affairs' (p. 521)

To the revolutionary leadership Havana represents the evils of the old society, so that the policy has been one of deliberate neglect leading to a deterioration of its infrastructure. By 1970 only 13 per cent of Havana Province's<sup>2</sup> urban housing had been built after 1959, whereas in other provinces this proportion ranged from 22 per cent to 37 per cent. Close to half the urban housing deficit was estimated to be in Havana Province in 1970, even though a larger proportion of its urban population enjoyed more facilities and amenities (such as piped water, electricity, an indoor toilet, a bath or shower, kerosene or gas cooking, a refrigerator or a freezer, and a radio set) than in any other province. However, the early 1970s brought about a change in policies, whereby Havana Province received 30 per cent of the new housing built in 1971-75.

Regional growth strategies were also implemented to help counteract the dominant role of the capital city. The region that benefitted most from these policies was what was then Oriente Province, whose population increased at the rate of 2.7 per cent per year in 1953-70, considerably faster than any other province. Out of all the urban areas with a population over 20,000 (excluding Havana), the four that had grown most rapidly between 1953 and 1970 were all located in Oriente. This province had been chosen for integrated urban-rural development, which was to be based on the exploitation of local natural resources. Moreover, being the farthest from Havana, it was a particularly suitable location to create counterweight to the concentration of activities and population in and around the capital. However, a comparison of growth rates for the 1943-53 and 1953-70 periods shows that for many cities the high growth rates of the latter are a continuation of an established trend.

The paper presents what it calls 'elements for an assessment' of the Cuban experience. Whereas the heavy influx of migrants of the early 1960s can be taken as an indication of better conditions prevailing in the capital, it is difficult to determine whether the subsequently very low level of immigration was a function of improved conditions elsewhere in the country or whether the system of residence permits, ration cards and workers' identity cards introduced in 1962 was used to this effect.

In any case, 'disparities in earned income in Cuba have been sharply curtailed, unearned income has nearly disappeared, house rent represents a low fixed proportion of income, education and health care are free, and rationing introduces a further equalizing effect. The various equalizing policies might be expected to have increased the well-being of the population at large' (p. 529). However, infant mortality, 'a particularly appropriate indicator for assessing the success of policies aimed at providing basic necessities for an entire population' fails to reflect the increased equality that is a goal of the revolution. In the 12 years after the revolutionary takeover, infant mortality was invariably higher than 1958, due to the high pressure exerted by the baby boom, the reduction in medical personnel (a substantial proportion of which went into exile), and the trade embargo imposed by some countries which affected the importation of drugs and elements for local drug production. However, these factors fail to account for a continuing high mortality rate in the late 1960s which remains unexplained. In addition, there appears to be no indication that the difference in mortality rates between Havana and the rest of the country was reduced, although the former was considerably more

affected during the sharp increases in infant mortality in the early and late 1960s.

It is not easy to assess the efficiency in the allocation of labour between the rural and the urban sectors, within the urban sector, and among economic sectors, although it is clear that 'substantial unemployment is a thing of the past'. There have been successful efforts to transfer labour out of activities that could be characterised as misemployment, such as domestic service, prostitution and begging. The urban service sector has been reduced in proportional terms, in the case of Havana from 41.9 per cent of the economically active population in 1953 to 27.2 per cent in 1968. This labour has been transferred largely to agricultural activities, either temporarily or permanently.

In the area of housing construction, Cuba may be seen as a model of efficiency in contrast to the squatter settlements that characterise Third World cities. Housing is built on centrally allocated urban land through mass production of pre-fabricated elements and large-scale buildings. In addition, labour in housing projects has a low opportunity cost due to the organization of the workers in 'microbrigades', which are made up of workers temporarily released from their production centre on the understanding that the centre will maintain its level of output and that the new dwelling units will be allocated to workers at the centre.

The paper ends with the comment that despite the paucity of data, it would seem that policies to reduce the dominance of Havana, slow down urban growth and urbanize the countryside have been relatively successful, although these achievements were as yet quite limited by 1970. Fidel Castro's reflection appears more truthful than ever: '... the learning process of revolutionaries in the field of economic reconstruction is much more difficult than we had imagined; the problems are more complex than we had imagined; and the learning process much longer and harder than we had imagined' (from a speech delivered in July 1970).

1. Cuba's population was 5.83 million in 1953 and 8.57 million in 1970, the last two census years.

2. Three quarters of the province's population were living in the city in the early 1960s.

JAIN, ASHOK KUMAR

## EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN GROWTH POLICY FOR INDIA

*Ekistics*, 249, August 1976, pp 103-105.

The paper briefly reviews the slow evolution of a spatial (or settlement) element in India's national development plans and comments on planners' commitment to 'regional balance', the Industrial Estates Programme and the Growth Centre policy.

India's first two five-year plans (1951-60) gave little attention to spatial aspects of development. The Third Plan showed some interest in spatial aspects of development, and, among other things, called for new industries to be established away from major cities, for rural and urban components to be combined in

community development projects and for a more diversified economic structure to be promoted in rural areas. The Fourth Plan (1969–74) had a similar approach and called for development of towns other than Metro Bombay and Calcutta and stressed the need for development of state capitals and for an urban land policy.

The Fifth Plan (1974–9) further developed this interest in spatial aspects of development and included objectives like promoting the development of smaller towns and new urban centres, enlarging industrial townships, tackling the problems of metropolitan cities on a regional basis and overhauling the organisational and financial set-up of local authorities for implementing urban development schemes.

The author notes that this approach has several shortcomings. First, urban development programmes have been thought of as social welfare schemes, outside the mainstream of national development. Second, physical plans lack economic, social and political content. Such ideas as masterplan preparation to promote development in small and medium towns seems random, lacking in economic analysis and development orientation. The Planning Commission's recommendations such as developing small towns and locating industries away from large cities were not successfully realised. One reason was locational policies' lack of understanding of the complex forces and factors in industrial and other development programmes.

There is no clear cut methodology or mechanism for coordinating planning at national, regional and local levels. Nor are physical plans integrated with other development plans. 'Myopic plans, inefficient and uneconomic land-use patterns, unrealistic planning norms and standards adopted in urban planning resulted in under-utilisation or wastage of scarce national resources'. In planning various industrial centres such as Rourekela, Bhilai and Durgapur, areas of influence were not worked out.

India is committed to the objective of 'balanced regional growth'. But it is not clear how to measure regional balance. Nor is it clear what considerations make it an optimal policy objective. While investment in capital intensive industries (such as steel) has concentrated on economic growth, investment in labour-intensive industries has sought to fulfil broader objectives like employment creation and wider income distribution. Locational decisions for capital intensive industries were based on resource efficiency while regional balance objectives have been used to guide the development of labour intensive industries. The distribution of public sector heavy industries located on the basis of economic efficiency has created viable new centres – for instance the three steel plants built in the Second Plan in rural areas because of proximity to natural resources. Complex medium size agglomerations have been built around them with remarkable speed and these medium size towns could turn out to be focal points for new metropolitan industrial growth. By contrast, efforts to improve regional balance with subsidies and investments in basic infrastructure have failed. Infrastructure provision is not sufficient to induce industrial growth. 'The growth centre policy based on regional distribution results in wastage of scarce capital and organisational resources. . . . An industrial urbanisation strategy concentrating development on a few metropolises rather than dispersing investments to many town centres can more positively affect the growth of aggregate national income,

employment and consumption'.

The paper then briefly outlines India's Industrial Estates Programme and the Growth Centre Policy. The Industrial Estates Programme sought to promote the development of small-scale industries and the dispersal of economic activities. It promoted the estates by building factory sheds supported with basic services, raw materials provision at controlled prices, tax subsidies, technical training facilities and so on. This began in the First Plan and received increasing support in the Second and Third. Small enterprises on the estates manufacture a variety of products such as electrical equipment, chemicals, vehicle parts, agricultural, industrial and scientific instruments, furniture, plastic and rubber goods, machinery and so on. Estates have been located in industrially backward regions and, during the Third Plan, increasingly in semi-urban or rural areas. The Small Scale Industries Board sponsor the Programme goods production. But entrepreneurs on the estates prefer to cater to the needs of larger industries rather than produce for the consumer market, unless there are major consumer markets like metropolitan centres close by.

The author notes that while it is more efficient to concentrate industrial investment in efficient locations, efforts should be made to ensure benefits and growth do reach poorer regions.

Under the Growth Centre Policy, emphasis is placed on providing basic services to all. To do so and to promote economic development in rural areas, schemes for integrated area development identify growth centres which provide markets, banks, education facilities, transport services and so on to their rural hinterlands. Each centre serves around 25,000 cultivators or 40–45 villages within a 10–12 mile radius. The author notes that this growth centre strategy is a combination of 'central place' and 'growth point' theories. He also notes that there is a need to integrate the different development activities together both in this programme and in industrial and urban development. Physical planning has to take into account social and economic factors. And there must be a definite framework for plan coordination at local, regional, state or national levels and inter-sectoral coordination.

**KABWEGYERE, T.B.**

## **SMALL URBAN CENTRES AND THE GROWTH OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL AFRICA**

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Programme, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 36–44.

The paper criticises the idea of small urban centres as promoters (or potential promoters) of rural development and supports this with data from certain small Kenyan towns and from trends in Kenya's colonial and more recent past.

Kenya's 1970–74 Development Plan designated four



levels of centres to stimulate rural development: urban centres as the main commercial centres at district level; rural centres to serve populations of at least 40,000; market centres to serve populations of around 15,000 and local centres to serve populations of at least 5,000. 36 urban, 140 rural, 231 market and 600 local centres were identified.<sup>1</sup>

The paper notes the common assumption that small urban centres are the vital interface between developing rural and urban systems. And yet it poses the question – who actually benefits from small towns' development? There is no doubt that providing basic services and infrastructure and setting up credit facilities and other institutions are essential for development. But if development is understood to mean growth (for instance in basic service provision), participation (so the people are fully and continuously involved) and distribution (so benefits from the growth reach many people), then many initiatives to stimulate the development of small towns have not involved real development. The paper quotes Doherty (1975) who states that 'the development of central places and growth centres as part of national development strategy can in the present context of dependency be seen as merely aiding and abetting the perpetuation and intensification of the Third World exploitation and underdevelopment rather than contributing to a sustained and independent development effort'.

Kenya's urban system was essentially initiated and developed to serve the colonial power's interests in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The large towns developed as centres of control and administration and often of commerce. They developed as part of the internal trade system where the 'daughter cities' in Kenya collected and exported raw materials and in return acted as the distribution points for the sale of manufactured goods coming from the imperial countries. As tastes and appetites for imported goods developed, so did farming expand beyond the White Highlands and the Rift Valley to seek untapped resources. 'This is the logic of a system which was founded and entrenched on the basis of exploitation, a system in which underdevelopment was born and continues to be nourished. If the large urban centres have not served the causes of development, how are the small ones going to do it especially when they are an extension and elaboration of the system which produced Nairobi?' While the urban system may have been largely implanted and first developed under colonial rule, the small urban centres today remain the agents of penetration of an ever expanding periphery capitalist system sucking up the meagre surplus generated under pre-capitalist social relations. And just as small urban centres are the settlements through which the rural areas are exploited, it is through Kenya's urban system that the international capitalist system's interests are served.

The paper describes the evolution of small urban centres in Kenya. It notes that their growth as trading centres other than those formally established as administrative or commercial centres is a result of rural population trying to adapt to the increasing opening of their villages to powerful forces of socio-economic transformation. Some people moved to cities. Others opted for some form of trade in the small urban centres.

The urban centres below the level of district towns hardly produce anything themselves. They sell goods obtained from larger urban centres. In most centres one will find goods from Britain, West Germany, the United

States and Japan. Many of the businessmen who buy and sell these goods have no idea of their origin. 20 per cent have no formal education and 90 per cent of the rest have not gone beyond primary school. Few of the manufactured goods they sell are made in Kenya. The price of such goods may have tripled by the time they reach remote rural Kenya with government tax, transport costs, various middlemen and the importer all making money along the way. By contrast, the goods sold at these centres, essentially agricultural produce, are very cheap. A chicken may sell at one fifth of the price it will fetch in a larger city. Banks have often come to these small centres. Savings are encouraged. Two thirds of the businessmen in these small centres have savings accounts but only some 19 per cent have had a loan from banks or another loan-giving agency. Most do not qualify for a loan. So the capital generated in and around these small centres gets transferred to larger centres to serve as capital for re-lending. The bank acts as a net capital drain in such centres.

The paper then quotes from various sources (World Bank, International Labour Office, Seers) to show how Kenya's 'development' has not meant declining inequality, increasing employment opportunities for the poor and increased participation. It notes that rural transformation can be achieved by a few progressive farmers, and businessmen and small urban centres. But this should not be confused with development, for these simply extend the capitalist system and its inequality. Development cannot be achieved when political power and economic power are in the hands of small elites. Colonial rule set up an economy organised to support very different lifestyles for a small elite and the majority. Since independence, economic growth has largely continued along the lines set by the colonial structure.

Thus, 'the stress laid on small urban centres ... exaggerates their role in development in rural areas. Neither does the assumption that they are the "most strategic key to problems of rural development" (Southall 1977) seem justified. If the experience of Kenya is any indication, the growth of small urban centres is in many ways an intensification of dependence relationships and underdevelopment – this time extended to incorporate the rural areas – and in no way concerned with development. The rural areas are adjuncts and the small urban centres mere nodes in the process of the further impoverishment of the country.'

1. Editors' note. Kenya's 1974-8 and 1979-83 Development Plans further elaborated on this 'National Service Centre Hierarchy' and further developed a growth centre strategy whereby 18 urban centres' growth and development were to get special priority.

KULABA, S.M.

## RURAL SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN TANZANIA

*Habitat International* Vol 6, No 1/2, 1982, pp 15–29.

The article describes Tanzania's Villagisation Programme with the wider human settlement policies which underpin it and outlines its successes and problems. Through this Programme, the majority of Tanzania's rural population was settled (or resettled) in relatively large villages, bringing together what were previously mostly scattered homesteads. Estimates for 1980 suggest that 82.3 per cent of Tanzania's population of 18.7 million live in 'Ujamaa Villages and Development Villages' with about 14 per cent living in urban areas.

The villagisation programme is part of a wider policy to promote a more equitable distribution of development spatially, provide rural population with services, reduce rural to urban migration (especially slowing Dar es Salaam's growth) and promote the development of nine regional towns. The article describes the Tanzanian Government's wider aims within which the villagisation programme is located and the planning structure for the national human settlements policy.

Attempts to resettle rural population in larger settlements date back to the 1920s. The Colonial government met with little success between 1922 and 1956 in promoting village settlement policies. With independence in 1961, the new government recognised that only through nucleated village settlements could the rural population be reached with services and educational programmes. Various pilot village settlement schemes were begun by 1963 which sought to bring radical changes to agriculture with new and modern farming methods. They were found to be very expensive and in 1966 the Prime Minister announced that no more such schemes would be established. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 re-emphasised the need for development based on people's own resources and efforts. Out of this came the villagisation programme which sought to modernise traditional agriculture and villages using a minimum of inputs from outside and heavily relying on the inhabitants' own resources and initiatives.

Some 8,269 villages were established as a result of the 1974–76 programme and most of these have between 1,250 and 7,500 inhabitants. The state's role is to supplement villagers' own development efforts and to provide basic infrastructure and services. The aim is to provide all rural dwellers with clean and accessible water supplies by 1991 with intermediate solutions being devised before then. By 1980, 38 per cent of villages had running water. Village health posts, dispensaries, clinics or rural health centres are to provide health care to the rural population and by 1980, 35 per cent of villages had dispensaries. Primary education has been much expanded since independence and 92 per cent of villages had primary schools by 1980. Rural feeder roads are being constructed through self help programmes. Rural industrialisation and electrification are planned to boost small centres' development. Ward centres which are to act as nuclei for rural development serving 5–8 villages are to act as market and production centres for rural

produce and as centres for small scale or craft industries. The government aims to establish small scale industries in villages and rural centres to make them self sufficient in locally needed tools and implements. The government's Small Industries Development Organisation seeks to promote small scale industries' development in rural areas and carpentry workshops and brickmaking works have been started in many centres. Low interest loans are given to individuals or groups in villages to buy building materials or build a house and by the end of 1979, 11,540 rural dwelling units had been financed through the Tanzania Housing Bank. A 'Better Housing Campaign', campaigns and programmes to encourage sanitary waste disposal and technical assistance plus housing demonstration projects in rural areas have also sought to improve housing and living conditions in the villages. A Model Village Plan Handbook was produced in 1976 to help in the physical planning of villages and a training programme for village managers and leaders teaches them to guide their villages' development.

While the provision of basic services to the rural population represents a considerable achievement, especially given Tanzania's level of development and lack of resources, a number of problems arose in policy implementation. Some villages were sited on lands susceptible to seasonal floods or lands far from dependable water supplies or where soil fertility was not sufficient to assure an adequate agricultural base for the village population. In some areas, the Model Village Plan Handbook has been taken dogmatically and layouts have been incompatible with the physical configuration of the village site and indeed unnecessarily rigid for village communities. Some villages have found it difficult and costly to maintain and service water pumps. And apart from tackling such problems, a major task facing Tanzanian policy makers and planners is how to consolidate and sustain this large number of villages.

KWOK, R., YIN-WANG

## THE ROLE OF SMALL CITIES IN CHINESE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

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The paper looks at the development of small cities in China<sup>1</sup> since 1949 and at how changing priorities in the last 32 years in terms of industrialisation, administration and agricultural development and diversification have affected their growth and development. It also looks at small cities' role in China's future development.

Traditionally, small cities played major economic and administrative roles. They were usually on lowland river banks as most regional transport depended on waterways and functioned as marketing centres for agricultural production in their hinterlands and retail centres for industrial goods produced in major cities. They also served as seats of government and administration and were defended by walls and garrisons because of their strategic location on transport routes and their administrative and commercial importance. Wealthy

village gentry often had residences there. Prior to 1949, Chinese cities could be divided into two types: the few modern cities which originated as treaty ports which were the primate and large cities; and the majority of cities which were small cities. Most cities were not connected to the railway, and industrial development was practically non-existent. Although situated quite close to each other, transport difficulties and a strong 'vertical' administrative system meant tighter administrative and economic ties up the urban hierarchy rather than between cities of the same rank. Politically, government authority filtered down from the centre through the small cities which played a crucial role in controlling the countryside and as linchpins of the traditional society and its power base. Their vast numbers and proximity to the countryside meant they consumed rural produce and absorbed its surplus through taxation, rent and social and cultural services. Politically, the 'master and servant' relationship exemplified the tight control exercised by small cities over the countryside. Ideologically, after 1949, this type of inequity between small cities and surrounding countryside was seen as one which had to be eliminated, especially since the vast majority of China's population lived in the countryside.

The paper notes that urban development after 1949 has responded more positively and directly to specific national strategies for industrial or agricultural development, administrative reform and technological adaptation than to broad principles promoted by the government such as eliminating rural-urban differences, developing interior regions and decentralising administration. It then describes how changes in national strategies on economic priorities and administration affected the growth and development of small cities.

Between 1949 and 1957, the concentration was on developing large scale capital intensive industries clustered in major cities and what are termed key point cities (essentially growth poles) in undeveloped interior regions. Urban development was concentrated in the major industrial cities, key point cities and new expanding cities in the interior. In rural areas, there was major institutional change but no economic diversification or direct investment. With administrative centralisation and the dominance of Soviet-style planning in addition, small cities changed little and maintained their traditional role.

During the 'Great Leap Forward', 1958-61, 'walking on two legs' with the simultaneous development of advanced and indigenous small and large scale industries in both rural and urban areas was the main strategy in a crash industrialisation programme. Small scale industries initiated in small cities and rural areas gave a new impetus for small city growth and implicitly, the role of small cities was to develop indigenous small scale industries. Communes were established in the rural sector with the dual aims of diversifying economic, social and political functions and increasing economy of scale for the urbanisation of rural areas. Power and authority was decentralised which provided further conditions for small city development. But three years of failure in industrial and agricultural sectors quickly terminated its policies and while these policies were conducive to small city growth, they were too short lived to produce any significant result.

Between 1961 and 1965, there was a period of readjustment and consolidation. Agricultural development became the main development priority and since the Great Leap Forward had shown the severe weakness of local management, centralised planning was

re-adopted. Policies in this period generally slowed down urbanisation, and the suspension of small-scale industry development removed the needed generator for small city growth, although significant progress was made in these years in providing electric power to rural areas.

During the period 1966-76, known as the 'Cultural Revolution', small cities' functions began to take a new direction as attempts were made to diversify and urbanise the rural economy. Communes were the key to rural transformation and although it was not recognised at first, small cities began to emerge as their urban counterparts. The principle of local self-reliance reintroduced the idea of small-scale rural industry producing for local production and consumption needs, with small scale industries also developing in small and medium cities. Industrial development was more geared to supporting agricultural development. Rural electrification was further developed. This was also a period when urban graduates were sent out to the country to aid production diversification and help provide social and cultural services. Administration was again decentralised with local authorities allowed a much greater share in planning and management of production and distribution of services and income.

The period after 1976, 'The Four Modernisations', saw development taking a more orthodox direction, stressing the priority of consumers' demands and needs. Market forces became more important in determining investment priorities. While for the period 1976-78 the stress seemed to be on basic industries, agricultural mechanisation, centralised planning and close state supervision of local administration - which would have supported major cities' growth - this stress changed in late 1978. Light industries received more support and since much of the countryside was electrified and some basic transportation network existed, small cities and communes could play a role in this. Agricultural mechanisation received less support to allow a moderate structural transfer of labour from agriculture to industry and social services. Administrative authority was delegated downwards again with communes and small cities receiving more autonomy in finance, administration and investment.

In the post 1978 period, major changes in economic orientation had major implications for urbanisation. The focus became the exploitation of locational advantages and the development of inter-district and inter-regional trade. Joint enterprises with foreign firms were promoted to absorb foreign investment and advanced technology and to increase productivity and diversify the economy. Virtually all were large scale operations and because of their specific requirements could only be in major cities. Urban collective enterprises were promoted to provide goods and services for local demand. Small scale private enterprises were allowed, although these were small in scale and number. Finally, integrated enterprises were promoted to develop linkages between key industries in major cities and firms in the surrounding countryside or in other regions. For small cities, collective enterprises connected them more closely to rural communities through service provision and retailing and the flow of goods and services from other regions - as a result of increased integration - flowed through them to their surrounding area.

In the rural sector, commune enterprises were encouraged both in industry (usually labour intensive and small scale) and in diversification (for instance livestock, fisheries and forestry). As these helped increase rural incomes, so did rural purchasing power enlarge the

demand for urban goods and services. This process quickened the urbanisation of the countryside with urbanisation of communes happening in many provinces and with communes and small cities being put in the forefront of urban development. By the end of 1980, a definite urban policy began to emerge which was essentially 'control large cities, rationally develop medium cities, rigorously develop small cities'. Major cities had been expanding over what was very often high yield agricultural land. Demand for food in major cities could not at times be met by surrounding communes. And social overhead capital investment in transportation and housing were perceived to be at the point of diminishing returns. Furthermore, owing to a lack of advanced building parts like elevators, high rise construction was constrained which meant that major cities could not intensify their existing land usage.

For urban industrial development, government investment was still usually assigned to modern and large scale enterprises in the large cities. Even provincial investment usually went to larger or medium cities. But the two other sources of investment – collective and private – were open to all cities and these became important sources for industrial development. In addition, the integrated enterprise system through which major enterprises in large cities utilised linkages with enterprises elsewhere also helped the industrial expansion of small cities and communes.

Population movement between cities and between urban and rural areas were controlled and the policy of sending urban high school graduates to the countryside was stopped. Since major cities' industrial growth was capital intensive, small cities' and communes' diversification and development was seen as the major source of new jobs for surplus rural population. Improving road links between cities, small cities and rural areas became a high priority to facilitate production, trade and commerce, and strengthen links in the urban system, breaking down small cities' separation.

Looking at the future development of small cities, their economic and administrative functions have not been fundamentally affected but real changes have occurred in their productive and social functions. In production they have been brought into the national industrial network. Socially, they extend services to rural areas. They are taking on the principal role in transforming the countryside by providing conditions for a different employment structure.

The natural resource and locational advantages of a small city or commune are the determinants of its production and exchange activities. Specialisation which offers exports and increased income will be based on these special conditions. The degree of specialisation and its compatibility to market demands will determine its growth potential. Capital comes mainly from collective savings and collective enterprise depends on local entrepreneurship. The capacity to save and the ability to invest are the decisive factors in the success or failure of collective enterprises and since they are the mechanism for economic growth in small cities, their development will increasingly depend on private savings and collective entrepreneurship. Because of the importance of private savings, incentives instigated by the state have to encourage personal savings so that capital can be accumulated for investment. As ownership and utilisation of capital can be politically sensitive issues, the state has to structure a uniform policy for capital accumulation and

guidelines on collective investment.

Thus, 'small cities and communes have definite tasks in Chinese development and the post 1978 policies are largely favourable to their development and growth. However there are still some uncertainties relating to the conditions required for small city growth. There are three basic conditions which are unclear or for which there is no definite policy. Human capital and capital accumulation are two pre-requisites for Chinese small city development. Both will need strong national policy backing, particularly human capital development. Substantial efforts will have to be mobilised in order to generate labour and management skills. Capital accumulation from personal savings mainly rely on individuals' expenditure patterns. Nevertheless, incentives and encouragement by the state can initiate and promote this favourable social behaviour. There is no evidence that a concerted effort is being made to provide these two conditions. When collective enterprises in small cities begin to flourish, inter-regional flows of commodity and money will be indispensable for further growth. The transportation and commercial networks which are being installed will have to be co-ordinated at both the micro and macro levels. So far, planning in these areas has not directly addressed itself to the needs of small cities. If favourable conditions can be provided, small cities will play a dominant role in Chinese development'.

1. The latest definition of a small city in China is one with less than 100,000 inhabitants.

LAQUIAN, A.A.

## PLANNED POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION: LESSONS FROM INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

*Habitat International*, Vol 6, No 1/2, 1982, pp  
39–52.

The paper analyses two programmes aimed at redistributing population: the transmigration programme in Indonesia and the FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) scheme in Malaysia.

The Indonesian transmigration programme represents the subsistence approach. The programme relies on the efforts of the settlers themselves to clear forests, build houses, construct roads, produce crops and provide themselves with services. The main attraction for the settler is land.

The FELDA approach represents the production-oriented approach, involving heavy investments in capital, technical expertise, labour and land. The production of cash crops is the main activity.

The author points out that when considering population redistribution programmes, the trade-off between costs and assuring people that they can stay where they have moved is important. In some Indonesian projects (subsistence), as many as 16 per cent of the families abandoned the site within the first three years of relocation. Abandonment by FELDA settlers has proved almost negligible. Although the motivation for moving both

in Indonesia and Malaysia is largely economic, one can generalise that the factors at play in the Indonesian situation are largely "push" factors, while those in Malaysia are 'pull' factors.

In Indonesia, assistance to transmigration settlers is primarily designed to enable them to eke out a subsistence living. These include two hectares of land, tools, equipment, seeds, fertilisers and, in some cases, credit. Although in FELDA schemes, investment costs have more than doubled per settler compared to transmigration, they do provide all the support needed. This difference in support is shown in productive records. While almost all transmigration schemes are barely producing enough for the subsistence needs of settlers, FELDA in 1976 produced some 244,000 tons of oil from palms and 58,000 tons of rubber. Considering the importance of productive employment in the decision to stay or migrate, it can be easily deduced that FELDA schemes are a more effective means of redistributing and then retaining population.

In both programmes, social assistance is an important component. The main factor limiting the provision of social services in the transmigration programmes is the small size of many settlements. Thus, the settlements in two transmigration sites, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, had from 200 to 300 families. The settlements were also far from each other and poor road conditions made communication between them extremely difficult. Some social services require an optimal scale to justify costs. The small size of transmigration settlements means that only the most rudimentary services may be provided. It is precisely because FELDA schemes are organised on a much larger scale that the Government can justify putting in more social services. A typical FELDA scheme could include as many as 600 families. FELDA settlers are thus more satisfied and willing to stay where they are.

One indicator of the success of a planned population redistribution programme is how well the resettled people are able to integrate with people at the new site. The Indonesian Department of Labour Force and Transmigration follows the rule established by the first Dutch colonisers i.e. to attempt the relocation of whole villages. But this makes integration much more difficult because of the formation of enclaves. Difficulties are also extended to problems among migrants because of inter-ethnic differences. While transmigration relies on traditional community structures to achieve cultural and ethnic integration, the Malaysian approach is to induce social change by planned community development programmes. The basic task is the creation of cohesive social groups of people from diverse backgrounds. Cultural integration in FELDA schemes is helped by the homogeneity of participants. A 1974 survey showed that 96 per cent of settlers were Malays, with 2.7 per cent Chinese and 1.3 per cent Indians.

With the productive nature of the schemes and the considerable social assistance given by the government to FELDA settlers, there is a feeling that they have become a privileged group and this has made integration more difficult. FELDA has recognised this problem and hopes that the nascent urban institutions that exist in the various FELDA settlements can develop into growth centres which would pave the way for the accelerated development of the countryside.

The small scale of most transmigration communities, coupled with their subsistence production base, makes regional integration very difficult to achieve in Indonesia.

Transmigration is not likely to influence the decongestion of Java. Recognising this, officials have encouraged spontaneous migration by reimbursing some of the costs incurred in the move. Spontaneous migrants settled close to the official transmigration project in South Kalimantan bought the land, cleared it, planted their own crops, built their own houses and managed without government assistance. Although at the time of their arrival in the area their backgrounds did not differ markedly from the official transmigrants, at the time of the survey (seven years after) the spontaneous migrants tended to have a higher standard of living than the official transmigrants.

The paper then draws the following conclusions:

The differences in results between transmigration and FELDA schemes may be related to the fact that the former is a subsistence-type programme while the latter is production-oriented.

Although people's motivation to be located is an important factor, it is the actual physical, educational, ethnic, marital, and other characteristics which spell the differences between success and failure. The Indonesian and Malaysian programmes revealed that young, strong couples with large families are needed for the rigours of resettlement.

Providing services which will enhance the productivity of redistributed population is most essential in attracting people and retaining them in the schemes.

Social services deserve as much attention as productive services. For population redistribution programmes to succeed, they must be integrated with developments in destination areas.

Spontaneous migrants may provide additional labour, capital and motivation.

Well-planned resettlement sites may act as catalysts, paving the way for larger schemes initiated by self-reliant migrants. Spontaneous migrants may also improve schemes' regional integration although they may be set up initially as isolated settlements.

MARO, S. and MLAY, WILFRED F.I.

## DECENTRALISATION AND THE ORGANISATION OF SPACE IN TANZANIA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor) African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 274-285.

The paper describes the organisation and changes brought about in Tanzania by the 1972 decentralisation reform. It concentrates on the implications of this reform for rural development and for the restructuring of the settlements system across Tanzania. It then reports on the development of primary education, health care and water supply between 1970 and 1976, based on a study of 12 districts. By way of introduction, the paper describes the kind of urban/settlement system which developed under

colonial rule and how the government has sought to change this since Independence in 1961.

In its introduction, the paper notes that most independent African nations believe that the state is an 'indispensable agency' for creating the necessary conditions for rapid socio-economic transformation to bring a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development. But few countries are in agreement as to the needed institutional and organisational structures. It notes the 'growth without development' which has been achieved in various capitalist African nations with urban centres (especially primate cities) receiving a large part of national investments and the increasing exploitation and impoverishment of rural areas, and claims that the alternative model of state planned development through decentralised institutions has already proved successful in countries such as China and Yugoslavia. 'The decentralisation model provides opportunities for creating hierarchical points of concentration of human activities (villages and small urban centres) through which spatial interaction and equitable development can be pursued from the lowest level. It also provides for grass-roots participation in planning and local resources utilisation.' (p. 274)

Decentralisation was introduced in Tanzania in 1972 as a logical step in implementing the policy of socialism and self-reliance outlined in the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Under colonial rule, the organisation of human activity was centred around plantations and small peasant cash-crop, food crop and livestock farming areas and was controlled from eight provincial urban headquarters and 20 urban and proto-urban district headquarters. Most of these were in the northern half of the country, and most of the transport network was constructed to serve them. Export producing areas with transport facilities developed rapidly with areas around them specialising in food production. Areas further away supplied migrant labour or stagnated in isolation. Up to 1967, there were three types of service centres below the district level: small administrative centres and minor settlements with populations between 1,000 and 9,000; mining centres; and roadside townships (the most numerous). Until 1967, these exerted little influence on the development of their surrounding areas. Decision making and financial control were centralised in Dar es Salaam (then the capital) and Tanzania's largest city. Only in areas of export crop production did these centres thrive. There were only 30 of them in 1935 rising to 93 in 1949, 160 in 1967 and over 500 in 1976.

The text describes the organisation changes brought about by the 1972 decentralisation reforms. The settlement hierarchy was made up of village (sub-ward), the ward, and district headquarters below regional headquarters and the capital city. Greater powers in plan formulation and implementation were vested in sub-district, district and regional centres. Allied with the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act and the establishment of technical and managerial posts in wards and villages in 1977, the centre of planning activity moved down to the village. The text explains this change in organisational structure and includes diagrams of pre- and post-1972 decision making procedures.

The final section of the paper looks at the development of villages as service centres. By 1976, two out of three Tanzanians lived in villages. A table charts the growth in the number of villages between 1970 and 1976 in each of the 20 mainland regions from a national total of 1,959 in 1970 to 7,144 in 1976. The regions with sparse populations

and uninhabited land had more people moving into new villages. The more densely populated regions had relatively fewer new villages formed. In terms of increases in service provision in this period in 12 districts where research was undertaken, the provision of primary schools changed most dramatically while there was also a 30 per cent increase in the proportion of dispensaries per 1,000 people in eight of the eleven districts. It was not possible to obtain comparable data on water services although, in 1976, two thirds of the surveyed villages had a permanent water supply within five kilometres.

In a short conclusion section, the paper notes that by 1969 there were 16 regions and 62 districts. Four years after decentralisation (1976) the increase in the number of administrative units led to a corresponding increase in the number of towns and services centres. Existing sub-centres were elevated to township and new centres were created where none had existed. 'Between 1967 and 1976, the number of service centres in the country increased threefold, while most of the rural population (over 13 million) moved into planned villages. This structure is inter-connected by an expanding network of roads and telecommunications and through a hierarchical planned process. This is the framework within which socio-economic transformation is taking place in Tanzania'.

## MEISSNER, FRANK

### DEVELOPMENT TOWNS IN ISRAEL

*Ekistics*, 277, July/August 1979, pp 220-223.

The paper outlines the growth and development of Israel's 'development towns', discusses their successes and problems and draws some conclusions on the wider relevance of Israel's experience.

Between 1948 and 1951, Israel absorbed more than 645,000 immigrants and more than doubled the number of Jews. Immigrants were coming in at a rate of 20,000 per month. They could not all go to the three larger cities - Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Rural settlements were considered inadequate for the nation's population needs and the kibbutz and moshav type of communal living did not appeal to most new immigrants.

Developing towns became the main way of accommodating much of the growth in population while at the same time strengthening the settlement network, taking the pressure off larger cities and generating interactions between small rural settlements and the urban population.

Today there are more than 30 development towns with over half a million inhabitants, some 18 per cent of Israel's population. Only five are based on settlements which existed prior to 1948. It was originally thought that agriculture would provide most of the employment for development towns' population with the towns also acting as service centres. But agriculture's labour needs did not provide sufficient jobs. There were few other jobs for the largely unskilled labour-force. Many people came and left. The town of Beth Shemesh has 16,000 inhabitants today but some 60,000 have passed through it.

However, some development towns have succeeded. The paper lists four factors which seem to make for success: planning, size and location, leadership and ethnic composition. While many of the earlier towns were conglomerations of 'concrete cubes' and were poorly planned, the more successful ones were well planned with attractive environments. Size seems important since below a certain population there is not sufficient demand to support many services. Ten thousand residents is usually considered a minimum number and nine towns failed to reach that number. Many of the development towns had enormous social problems. The paper suggests that a major reason for this was the gap between the cultures of the Afro-Asian immigrants and that of Israel's existing population. Most of the immigrants arrived with little or no education, few occupational skills and no economic resources. 'They became unemployed and soon learned to be passive and depend on welfare'. The towns also have an unusually high proportion of aged residents and young children.

The author sees development towns and associated 'urbanisation' as 'a tool that seems capable to counteract the rural exodus to the big cities, with its side effects of extreme environmental pollution, congestion, crime and anomie, which characterise unplanned human migrations to cities in most parts of the world'. He also suggests that professionals outside Israel 'cannot afford to ignore an innovative and exciting social engineering scheme, which might hide some nuggets of obvious wisdom that could be adapted to apparently completely different situations'.

## ONYEMELUKWE, J.O.C.

### SETTLEMENT STRUCTURES IN RURAL NIGERIA

*Habitat International*/Vol 6, No 1/2, 1982, pp 53-57.

Nigeria's rural sector accounts for 98 per cent of the country's land area. Less than 50 per cent has, as yet, been brought under cultivation. The rural sector's potential is still immense. But this rural sector does not produce enough to feed its inhabitants. Nor does it provide for the manufacturing sector's low demands.

One reason is the declining quality of the rural environment due to inadequate infrastructure. The rural areas are unattractive, thus promoting out-migration.

Official programmes express the need for solutions but little has been done, and much of what has been done has been concentrated in the former Western State. Marginal support was given to the self-help struggles of rural communities, and this was often used to manipulate political loyalty in party politics.

Spatial equity is involved in the concept of social justice and should emphasise the criterion of need in the spatial distribution of social services. And rural areas have more claims than their urban counterparts. They deserve more services than they can afford to pay for. To leave them without basic amenities raises a moral question. One of the reasons cited why basic amenities could not always be provided is the smallness of the population to be

served by facilities characterised by a high capital/output ratio. Also, although the merging of communities through resettlement in more compact geographical space is a possible answer to the question of population thresholds, a population can hardly be persuaded to abandon their own land to merge with other communities. However, small village communities could be persuaded to change locations within their territorial boundaries, so that the highest possible number of groups could be brought closer to one another and be linked by roads along their common borders. Thus, mobile clinics, schools, water-tanker services and postal services can be provided to improve the rural environment and infuse a greater sense of belonging to the wider national economy.

## RICHARDSON, HARRY W.

### AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR KENYA

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol 15, No. 1, October 1980, pp 97-118.

The paper describes Kenya's urban hierarchy (including its growth and development), examines the government's urban decentralisation plans (and other spatial objectives), makes recommendations as to how these should be changed and describes the kind of policies which must underpin its recommendations.

The paper notes the Kenyan Government's commitment to rural development but suggests that it would be wrong for policy makers to neglect urban areas. Trends in towns and countryside are closely inter-linked. Without rural-urban migration, rural incomes would be lower (in Kenya, remittances from urban migrants represent around nine per cent of rural incomes) and out-migration from rural areas involves substantial population loss with very little fall in output. The urban settlement pattern, especially at lower levels, influences what services rural population receive and may play a major role in holding people in rural areas. In addition, there are large sectors of poor people in towns, especially in Nairobi and Mombasa, and policies are needed to aid these. Furthermore, an urban development strategy is needed to aid other major policy goals like national spatial integration (since this is largely structured through the settlement hierarchy). Agricultural development relies on the urban hierarchy for marketing its products. Many industries need to be in urban centres because of agglomeration economies and market demand.

Kenya's urban settlement pattern is primarily a legacy of the colonial era with Nairobi and Mombasa emerging as the sole major urban centres because of their strategic location on trading and transport routes. The function of other small towns was to form a network of administrative centres and their location can usually be explained by access to the railway, access to cash-crop producing areas or topography and climate. Medium size towns were primarily service centres for the White Highlands rather than central places for densely populated African areas.

The settlement pattern has remained almost unchanged since Independence, although removing

legal and institutional constraints on African mobility has meant that many landless labourers migrated to Nairobi whose population almost doubled in the last decade alone. Nairobi's population is larger than that of the next 20 towns combined and was around 950,000 inhabitants in 1978. In 1975, it had 56.6 per cent of all manufacturing employment and 67.3 per cent of all industrial plants in 1974. Mombasa, the major port, had 17.4 per cent of all manufacturing employment and 17.2 per cent of all industrial plants in these same years. Between 1967 and 1975, the share of Nairobi and its satellite Thika in industrial wage employment increased from 56.3 to 61.4 per cent. There are no signs of any other towns joining the big league by the year 2000. Kisumu may reach 500,000, no other city is likely to reach 250,000 and only four are projected to pass 100,000. However, the number of towns in the 2,000–10,000 inhabitant range is likely to increase from 37 in 1969 to around 200 by the year 2000. By then, Nairobi's population may be in excess of four million.

The government began outlining a national urban development strategy in the Second Development Plan (1970–74) with this further elaborated in the 1974–8 and 1979–83 Plans. Spatial goals are dominated by slowing Nairobi's growth and minimising out-migration from rural regions and these have to be seen within national development goals which stress rural development, poverty alleviation, basic service provision for all and the creation of income-earning opportunities. Seven towns were selected as growth centres in the 1970–74 Plan and these were to receive priority in infrastructure allocation with four of them designated as industrial centres. Two more centres were added in the 1974–78 Plan and their expansion was explicitly linked to discouraging Nairobi's and Mombasa's growth.<sup>1</sup> Other developmental goals the growth centres were aimed at included the importance of strengthening regional urban hierarchies to improve service delivery, providing appropriate locations for large scale agricultural and resource based industries, reducing migration losses from regions, and acting as incubators for small scale industries.

In addition, a hierarchy of 'service centres' with 86 'urban', 150 'rural', 420 'market' and 1015 'local' centres were identified. These were to be locations for providing rural population with services. The middle tier of the urban hierarchy has been neglected, partly because of the colonial legacy, partly because of the strong links between Nairobi and rural areas. Measures to strengthen these centres might include decentralising some government functions, highway improvement linking these centres with each other and with other larger towns, dispersing consumer goods industry and promoting marketing facilities. If combined with an effective growth centre strategy, this might increase the ability of smaller towns to hold rural migrants.

Policies to help the smaller 'market centres' are more difficult to design. Such centres' main role is to supply goods and services, both local and urban produced, to the rural population and to serve as markets for smallholder surplus produce. They are not manufacturing locations. Nor are they major residential areas. The best strategy at national level may be to concentrate infrastructure investment in the more vigorous centres, improving transportation access and serving isolated populations with a system of mobile markets. However, the concentration of the rest of the paper is on urban strategy for urban centres larger than these.

There is the general belief in government and among

the public that Nairobi is becoming too big. But it remains a relatively small primate city by world standards and has less than six per cent of the national population. It has major agglomeration economies making it attractive to both industry and people while diseconomies such as pollution, congestion and crime are less serious than in most other world cities. 'Unfortunately, since many of the agglomeration benefits and costs cannot be quantified, and since assigning weights as a basis for aggregation is arbitrary, this question cannot be resolved.' But Nairobi does offer major advantages for industries – the largest market, among the best transport and communications facilities, large labour pool, proximity to government and so on. For households, public service and infrastructure quality are far superior to those elsewhere, incomes are higher (for those with jobs) and there is access to the social and cultural advantages of a national capital. Nairobi, in fact, is not growing as fast as relatively small towns like Eldoret, Nyeri, Meru, Embu and Kakamega. And given effective planning and sound urban management, even a city with more than four million inhabitants by the year 2000 could be quite livable. Although it is very difficult to quantify and interpret migration flows, partly because of lack of recent data<sup>2</sup> and partly because of boundary changes between the 1962 and 1969 censuses, polarisation of migration to Nairobi can be exaggerated. Three fifths of all migrants to major cities went to Nairobi between 1962 and 1969. But only around one third of migrants move to major towns and urban in-migration absorbs only one out of every four new entrants to the rural labour force. Inter-district migration within provinces is quantitatively more important than inter-provincial flows and rural-rural migration is substantial, especially into the fertile areas of the Rift Valley. One should also note that Kenya is relatively un-urbanised (at present 15 per cent of the population) and projections for the year 2000 suggests it will be between 25 and 30 per cent urban. In seeking to keep a better balance between resources and population, the paper notes the importance of reducing Kenya's very rapid rate of population growth and the lack of success in government programmes to date of doing so.

Rather than concentrating on the need to slow Nairobi's growth, supposedly because of net agglomeration diseconomies, the paper argues that a much stronger comparative advantage economically in agriculture and resource based industries and its policy objectives emphasising rural development. This implies that a well conceived growth centre approach is complementary to and not in conflict with rural development.

If this becomes the focus, then given the shortage of fiscal resources, nine growth centres are probably too much. Several of the growth centres are too far away from Nairobi to benefit from its agglomeration economies but perhaps too close to escape its competitive influence. One, Thika, is so close to Nairobi that it would develop spontaneously. The soundest prospects for growth centres are the sizeable towns beyond Nairobi's competitive range in Western Kenya and since these are less than 160 kilometres apart, a serious attempt to promote one of them might generate spillovers that benefit the others.

Several factors support growth centre development in western Kenya – the fact that the region holds 40 per cent of the national population, has good agricultural potential and high population densities, good links with Nairobi and Mombasa and lags as a region in health and education



services and in infrastructure. Kisumu, on Lake Victoria, is recommended as the major growth centre. It is already Kenya's third largest city, has potential for industrial diversification (fish-based industries), unlimited water, a hinterland with substantial agricultural potential, abundant power supplies and is well placed for existing road and railway networks. The paper also discusses the choice of a secondary growth centre in this region.<sup>3</sup>

Such an urban policy nationally would imply the further development of the linear axis running through the country from Kisumu and Lake Victoria to the coast and Mombasa via Nairobi. Other towns could be linked to this axis.

Such a policy would imply changes in the allocation of infrastructure investment among major towns with Nairobi and Mombasa's share reduced, Kisumu's considerably increased and the rest more concentrated in four of the other 'growth centres'.

When the paper examines Kenya's industrial sector and its spatial distribution, again the need to concentrate on the development of fewer industrial centres outside Nairobi and Mombasa is noted. The optimal strategy would be to create agglomeration economies in one or two selected centres. The paper notes the importance of small scale industry to Kenya's spatial development and the importance of creating non-agricultural employment in small towns. Small-scale industries can provide low cost consumer goods, make wider use of local materials and are generally more labour intensive. In Kenya, three types of small scale industry are evident: a modern sector heavily concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa and difficult to relocate because they are dependent on urban agglomeration economies; agro-processing industries, often in towns close to prosperous agricultural areas; and 'craft' industries (such as woodworking and metalworking) which are widely dispersed. Many 'rural industries' are in fact large scale (for instance pineapple canning, sugar refining and pulp and paper mills) and are usually in or close to small towns. The paper describes Kenya's industrial estates programme and its Rural Industries Development programme; the former being heavily urban oriented and supporting larger smaller firms; the latter seeking to promote small scale industry through Rural Industrial Development Centres in towns to provide extension services to rural areas.

A section on implicit spatial policies discusses the strong spatial impacts of nonspatial policies – for instance an import substitution policy almost always benefits the primate city as the dominant manufacturing centre. It notes that the priority given in Kenya to the agricultural sector and rural development and to export promotion are generally compatible with spatial dispersion goals since rising rural incomes support small towns' development and agro-industries and resource based industries can operate efficiently outside the major cities.

The paper notes the importance of policies which complement spatial objectives. It notes that the main thrust of any attack on inequities should be redistribution of income and wealth (i.e. by implication addressing social and not spatial inequalities) although income distribution goals have a spatial dimension and some spatial measures may help promote equity. The final section outlines other needed policies such as a tax-subsidy approach to encourage potentially mobile firms to locate in growth centres. This could be financed by a modest tax on existing enterprises in Mombasa and Nairobi and is preferable to direct controls. The paper also stresses the importance of municipal fiscal reform. Major

towns, to offer viable alternative locations for enterprises, will need a strong fiscal base with which to finance infrastructure and service improvement. At present, local municipal governments have little control over investment decisions, little ability to raise funds for investment and a relatively low share in central government grants (Nairobi receives a disproportionate share). Two major local revenue sources, the graduated personal tax and school fees, were abolished by 1974/5 and replaced by inadequate and declining compensation grants. Municipal governments will also have to acquire more control over their land markets. And perhaps recapturing the increment in land values arising from urban development or public investment in infrastructure and services could be recaptured to help boost local revenues and as part of a more effective public intervention into the urban land market. Finally, site and service and 'illegal' housing area upgrading can help improve housing conditions in growing urban centres, although the paper notes the inadequacy and ill-directed approach of central government's housing policies between 1974 and 1978.

The paper ends with the comment that 'in countries with currently low urbanisation levels such as Kenya, planned urbanisation policies offer opportunities for moulding the national urban hierarchy towards patterns that are more consistent with accepted economic and social ends. Experience throughout the developing world suggests that leaving the pattern of urbanisation to the outcome of spontaneous market forces will very probably lead to a less desirable urban size distribution, especially from the point of view of the distribution of income and welfare over space and among persons.'

1. Editors' note: The 1979-83 Plan specified nine more growth centres in addition to the nine already designated.

2. Data from the 1979 census was not available when the paper was written.

3. The author notes that inter-tribal rivalry may inhibit a predominantly Kikuyu national administration from building up the capital of the Luo tribe. The Kikuyu and the Luo tribes are the most populous in Kenya.

SHAH S. M.

## GROWTH CENTRES AS A STRATEGY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: INDIA EXPERIENCE

*Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 22, January 1974, pp 215-228.

During India's fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74), more emphasis was put on rural development and on the provision of 'minimum needs' in rural communities.

The paper describes a pilot research project which seeks to identify a hierarchy of viable rural growth centres and their related communities. The aim is to develop, test and apply a methodology for an optimum provision of economic and social activities for all people within a given spatial area. The pilot project looked at 20 community blocks<sup>1</sup>, spatial units with a variety of settlements within them, to suggest how the development of a hierarchy of growth centres could efficiently provide goods and

services, to identify functional gaps in physical and institutional infrastructure in these centres and related settlements and to recognise the different resource endowments and settlement trends of each region. The study seeks to collect socio-economic data on the human and material resources in given areas and then define the social, economic and political service areas of different sectors of human activity by gathering both inflow and outflow data to determine how all settlements relate to each other. From this, one can deduce how these systems and the social institutions which they include can best be structured and spatially located to give the most efficient pattern of infrastructure investments traffic and transport costs. Primary data was also collected at village, household, shop and firm level to find out information on location-specific activities. Village questionnaires were completed for some 250 households in each of the 20 development blocks. Industry, cottage industry and shopkeeper questionnaires were also undertaken.

On the basis of this research, an attempt was made to look at the 20 growth centres' potential. A series of tables give information about the population, urbanisation level, sectoral breakdown of district income, economic characteristics and extent to which villages and towns have various kinds of economic and social enterprises and facilities. Blocks with high rates of urbanisation, high rates of population growth, high per capita income and a high proportion of income coming from manufacturing are mentioned as promising growth centres.

In looking at the functions settlements contain, almost every village was found to have a primary school, retail shop and credit cooperative. Bus stop, middle school, bank, health centre, repair shops, libraries etc. are available only in a few places – market centres and possibly large-size villages. A three tier hierarchy is evident – village, large size village and market town. Of the 37 functions examined, towns obviously had the highest score, exceeding 15 of these. Many towns had 28–30 of these functions. We may say that in India, it is necessary to develop the intermediary centres, the market centres of the large-size villages. The market centres which number between four and 14 in various blocks would have a village population of some 15,000 in its hinterland which would make it viable from the standpoint of services provision. Furthermore, in view of the slow and inadequate mode of transport facilities available, these market centres should be made more easily accessible to their dependent villages by the construction of link roads. Market centres or large size villages as central places should have all the necessary infrastructure. Sophisticated exercises are underway to indicate the distance-size relationship, the minimum distance path, and the appropriate and scientific locations of various economic activities and service facilities.

1. Note should be made that the concept of 'growth centre' in this article refers to certain community development blocks in India which are spatial units with populations of around 60,000–80,000 and approximately 80–100 villages. There are 5,265 such blocks in India.

SLATER, DAVID

## STATE AND TERRITORY IN POST REVOLUTIONARY CUBA: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPATIAL POLICY

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 6, No 1, 1982, pp 1–33.

Within a wider discussion of State and society, the article examines critically the nature of spatial policy in post-revolutionary Cuba. The paper explicitly attempts to overcome two main disadvantages often found in the literature about urban and regional policies of the so-called socialist societies: firstly, most studies tend to assume that the urban and regional research field exists in isolation from the social, political and economic processes and structures which 'give them their essential meaning' (p. 2). This is not confined to radical studies, but is also an assumption of a wide range of studies in this field. Secondly, in practically all the radical literature, 'the so-called 'postcapitalist societies' are assumed to be either already 'socialist' or at least in 'transition to socialism', so that a characterisation of postcapitalist societies is not of primary concern.

After characterising post-revolutionary Cuba as a 'state collectivist' rather than a 'socialist' society, and based on a set of criteria first proposed by Lenin and then developed by Carchedi, the author concludes that 'social classes exist in post-revolutionary Cuba' (p. 7). Direct producers do not exert social control over the means of production since the State, as a collectivity, owns the predominant share of the objects and instruments of labour and purchases the labour power of the worker in return for a wage. The disposition of social wealth lies within the control of a class of enterprise managers, administrators and technicians 'whose location and role in the social organisation of labour is qualitatively different from that of the direct producers' (p.7). However, the paper also notes that, despite the introduction in the 1970s of incentives in the form of higher wages and luxury goods (such as cars) to exceptionally productive workers and to persons holding key economic and political posts, Cuba has a much more egalitarian structure than other Latin American and Third World capitalist societies. This is reflected in a more equal distribution of income, while poorest workers receive free health care, education and social security.

The article examines the most important political changes that took place during the 1970s, which have generally been referred to as forming the basis of a new process of revolutionary 'institutionalisation'. These include a new party constitution which established an elected form of government at both national and local levels. The introduction of elective bodies at the local and provincial levels of government – the *organos del poder popular* or organs of people's power – has improved possibilities for popular participation 'within certain centrally directed limits'. But, as the author notes, these have probably not been enough to counter what remains a highly centralised form of political power. Before turning

its attention to spatial policy, the paper argues briefly that the Cuban economy has not simply exchanged one form of dependence (from the US) for another (the Soviet Union). After the revolution, planning came to possess a genuinely national character which, with Soviet technical and economic assistance, allowed the State to tackle the structural problems of poverty and socioeconomic backwardness.

Four different but closely related forms of spatial policy in post-revolutionary Cuba are then examined. Several socio-economic indicators, such as the number of primary schools, infant mortality rate and industrial employment seem to suggest that a considerable degree of success was achieved by the first of these which has sought to reduce territorial disparities. However, a few other indicators seem to point towards a maintenance of inequalities between urban and rural areas (such as the standards and infrastructure of both primary and secondary education) and between provinces (Havana province was particularly favoured by the construction of new health and social welfare establishments and from improvements in sanitation, water and electricity facilities than the other more rural provinces).

A second type of spatial policy, which has attempted to enhance regional interdependence and integration, has also had some measure of success, particularly in promoting the development and integration to other parts of the country of Oriente province, an area with previously unexploited mineral and agricultural resources. If one is to judge government policy of seeking to integrate regions through, for instance, a measurement of the reduction of migratory flows to the traditional centres of economic and demographic concentration, it can be concluded that this met with some success: the overall net inflow of migrants to the province of Havana, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the rest of the country declined after 1959, although not substantially. However, as other kinds of evidence are generally lacking, the author warns us that 'it is difficult to formulate any firm conclusions about the actual degree of success of some, if not all, forms of spatial policy' (p. 18).

The third type of spatial policy advocated by the post-revolutionary government has sought to break down the separation between town and country. Fidel Castro claimed in the 1960s that what was needed was 'a minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism'. At the time of the revolutionary takeover Havana, the country's capital city, accounted for the predominant share of the nation's income and industrial production. This concentration was gradually reduced after 1959, as shown by the fact that Havana's primacy index and rate of population growth fell between 1953 and 1970. The notion of 'a minimum of urbanism' was reinforced through a costly and unsuccessful greenbelt programme aimed at improving the supply of foodstuffs in urban areas and mobilising urban populations for the tasks of increasing agricultural production.

For the author, the idea of 'a maximum of ruralism' is perhaps more suitably examined in the context of the urbanization of the countryside, a process largely based on the reform and restructuring of agriculture effected mainly through two Agrarian Reform laws passed in 1959 and 1963. These gave the State control of the predominant share of agricultural land. Unlike other Latin American countries Cuba's agrarian reform was not an isolated measure but was accompanied by 'a concentration of productive investment in the agricultural sector, the

improvement of irrigation systems, the introduction of fertilizers and pesticides, the extension of new roads . . . and by a greater emphasis on the importance of agriculture within the educational system' (p. 20). A key element in this policy was the establishment of new rural settlements as a support for specific areas of production (such as sugar cane or livestock development) and as the places where a range of services are provided<sup>2</sup>. Slater also notes that even though the policy of urbanising the countryside appears to have met with not inconsiderable success, data from the 1970s on migration, construction investments and income taken together 'provide important caveats' for such a judgement. In the face of this evidence, it is difficult to conclude that the policy of a 'minimum of urbanism' has radically altered Havana's centrality in the territorial distribution of economic development.

The article briefly describes the fourth and final type of spatial policy, administrative decentralisation, an important element of which were the organs of people's power mentioned earlier. An additional element of such a policy was the restructuring of the country into new territorial divisions, 'a considerable advance on the earlier and far more arbitrary arrangement of the administrative divisions' (p. 23).

Three major contradictions identified by the author in the development of Cuban spatial policy are also discussed. The first one is a certain ideological displacement often found in the arguments of some authors and also implicit in the views of Cuba's leadership, reflected in the commonly-held idea that one region can conceivably exploit another region. Such an image, the author argues, dissimulates and reconstitutes class exploitation as areal or spatial exploitation, and attempts 'to conceal and camouflage the reality of bureaucratic power and the existence of social contradictions' (p. 24). The second contradiction lies in the fact that while initiatives such as the organs of people's power have created more possibilities for popular discussions on the local implementation of government policies 'there has been no equivalent devolution of political power' (p. 25), as this has become more centralised. The third contradiction can be found in the fact that Cuban spatial planning objectives are rooted in a theoretical perspective which combines models and concepts produced in either the bourgeois ('capitalist') or Soviet ('socialist') literature.

The article ends with a discussion about why the author believes Cuba to be historically specific. Cuba is a historically progressive state collectivist society where the potential for a socialist transformation lies in the possible forms of opposition to the social contradictions and new forms of exploitation that undoubtedly exist. 'Whether such a transformation will take place is something which will depend not only on the unfolding of events in Cuba, but also and fundamentally on the international balance of class forces' (p. 28).

1. Cf. Gugler's article bearing this title annotated on page 131 of this volume.

2. In addition, each rural settlement elects its own council and contains the usual branches of the mass organisations.

SOEN, DAN and KIPNIS, BARUCH

## THE FUNCTIONING OF A CLUSTER OF TOWNS IN ISRAEL: AN ANALYSIS OF REAL AND EXPECTED ZONES OF INFLUENCE

*Ekistics*, 205, December 1972, pp 400-407.

The paper studies the extent to which three new towns developed to serve as central places and suggests why two failed to do so. It concludes that the establishment of just one of these towns, rather than the three, would have allowed it to develop a stronger commercial base serving a much wider and larger area and counteract the influence of a major city nearby.

The establishment of more than thirty new towns in Israel since 1948 was part of a long range national plan to disperse population away from the heavily populated Tel Aviv and Haifa regions and help absorb new immigrants. Some of the newly created small and medium sized towns were built around an existing urban core, others were built on virgin land and a few were extensions of temporary camps for new immigrants. Most new towns were assigned the role of regional centres, the key planning principles on which this was based being drawn from central place theory.

The paper reports on research undertaken in three new towns and located inland in north Israel where the potential zones of influence for these towns (calculated by Reilly's law of retail gravitation) was compared to the actual zones of influence derived from a comprehensive field study. The first new town to be built, Afula, was built in 1948 as an extension of the 1920 veteran Afula while Upper Nazareth founded in 1952 and Migda Ha'Emeq, founded 1957, were on virgin land. Upper Nazareth is close to the Arab town of Nazareth.<sup>1</sup>

In terms of these three new towns' interaction with each other, Migdal Ha'Emeq was found to depend on Afula for medical specialists, dispensaries, hospitals, a courthouse and various government offices and to depend on Nazareth concerning matters of land registration and the regional health bureau and the Ministry of Health. A family survey also found that Nazareth and Afula also serve as shopping centres for many of Migda Ha'Emeq's inhabitants. Afula was least dependent on the others. Business functions were found in all three new towns and in Arab Nazareth, so the fact that people buy certain items outside their own town is not attributable to their unavailability there. Finally, the reliance of the four urban settlements on Haifa, a major city 30-40 kilometres away, was found to be greater than their mutual interdependence. For instance, Haifa was a focal point for entertainment for the youth of Migda Ha'Emeq and a substantial proportion of the clothing and furniture expenditure made by Migdal Ha'Emeq inhabitants was in Haifa. Also, in 1967, 79 per cent of the residents of Arab Nazareth who worked outside the town were employed in Haifa.

When looking at the rural sector, the two major centres for Jewish rural settlements were Afula and Haifa while for the Arab rural settlements, Arab Nazareth was the dominant centre with Afula playing some role too. Arab Nazareth has an incontestable priority among rural Arabs

for everything concerning health services, secondary education, entertainment, purchasing, marketing and services while their dependence on Haifa's services were very small (in contrast to Jewish rural settlements). Neither Upper Nazareth nor Migdal H'Emeq have a major function for Jewish rural settlements and fulfill no function for Arab rural settlements.

Of course, Israel's unique and peculiar social and economic structure partly explains the failures of two of the new towns to develop central place functions as anticipated. Because of differences in taste, language and consumption patterns, Jews prefer to use the commercial services of Jewish towns while Arabs tend to choose Arab settlements. Only if an Arab town does not exist nearby will a Jewish town serve as a central place for a rural Arab population. Then the kibbutz, by its nature, tends to have established firm ties, through its parent organisation, with big cities (notably Tel Aviv) even prior to 1948. The kibbutzim are large collective farms where production and consumption are regulated for the benefit of all branches of the family and its members. Kibbutzim in the area generally by-pass the towns and even ignore the relatively 'strong' town of Afula to make their organised purchases in Haifa and/or Tel Aviv. In the case of Moshavim (farms managed by private individuals with most productive functions carried out on a fully cooperative basis) those established prior to 1948 also tend to depend more on Haifa and Tel Aviv. Thus, the zone of influence of the urban sector is not simply a function of the size of this urban sector but of the geographical distribution of agricultural settlements, of the type of settlement and of the age of the settlement.

1. In 1969, Arab Nazareth had 32,900 inhabitants while Afula had 16,700, Upper Nazareth 13,200 and Migdal Ha'Emeq 8,500. Haifa metropole had over 300,000.

SUTTON, KEITH

## THE SOCIALIST VILLAGES OF ALGERIA

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 4, No 3, August 1982, pp 247-264.

The paper describes the evolution and development of Algeria's socialist village programme, its links with the agrarian reforms of the 1970s and its achievements and problems to date.

In the mid-70s, Algeria's rural settlement system was assessed as fragmented and poorly organised and lacked the kind of varied hierarchy of central places that Johnson (among others) regarded as essential for commercialising agriculture and facilitating the wide spatial diffusion of processing, light industry and services. Despite some nucleation, most rural settlement had remained dispersed in hamlets or loose clusters or isolated households. French rule added several hundred colonial villages, mostly in fertile plains and foothill regions primarily serving the modern colonial part of agriculture. To these were added more than 2,300 'centres de regroupement' during the War of Independence where

many rural Algerians were resettled in these nucleations which were not true villages in the agricultural sense. With independence in 1962, a crash programme to build rural housing in war devastated areas produced an uneven scatter of 'reconstruction villages' although many were never completed or proved unpopular with intended beneficiaries. Wartime refugee flows swelled some village populations severalfold between 1958 and 1966 but many of the new inhabitants were not involved in village activities and lacked local agricultural land.

The Socialist villages were seen as the settlement component of the agrarian reform which began in 1971. Land from large and absentee landowners was to be nationalised and redistributed, mainly in production cooperatives to landless peasants. Then these would be linked to neighbouring cooperatives, self-managed estates ('autogestions') and private holdings with service cooperatives providing inputs and marketing outputs. A '1000 village' programme was part of this agrarian reform, the new village providing the technical base for agricultural production and improved housing and services for their inhabitants, and services for surrounding areas. They were also seen as a way of improving rural housing conditions, of reducing the excessive distance between the homes and the agricultural land of agrarian reform beneficiaries and of keeping back rural to urban migration. Land abandonment by agrarian reform recipients was common in many areas, often with the recipients heading for urban areas, and the socialist villages were seen as a way of keeping recipients in agriculture and in rural areas.

The first 100 villages were added to the 1970-73 development plan with a further 300 in the 1974-7 plan. Initially, three village sizes were planned: primary with 700-1400 people; secondary with 1750-2450; and tertiary with 2800-4900. The larger the village, the more services and facilities planned. More recently, a more flexible approach responding to local needs has been advocated. Houses are designed and built with little or no participation on behalf of the user and urban style and standard units within relatively high density settlements are the norm.

From the outset, the programme fell behind its ambitious targets. By July 1979, 120 villages had been completed with 70 or more under construction. 15,871 dwellings had been completed from a total of 57,742 planned by December 1978. Shortages of building materials, skilled builders and planners and rapidly rising costs were major reasons for delays. The cost per dwelling rose from 20,000 dinars in 1973 to 70-80,000 in 1979 while the cost of an average size village was put at 15-20 million dinars for 1979.<sup>1</sup>

Despite shortcomings and doubts concerning the wider programme, the completed and functioning villages appear impressive. One of the early socialist villages inaugurated in 1974 had about 150 houses and 1000 inhabitants by 1979. Upwards of 140 heads of household, recipients of reform land, were grouped in production cooperatives. Housing standards were high with each dwelling having three rooms, a kitchen and bathroom and standing within walled gardens. In 1977, it was recorded as having a school, mosque, cultural centre, clinic, administrative office, Turkish bath and a group of shops. It also had a service cooperative with machinery, agricultural inputs and a bank and a training centre offering courses in masonry, accounting and typing. The article describes three other villages where housing and

living conditions appear impressive. In one, high land abandonment by reform recipients meant that families of 'autogestion' workers and agriculturalists from outside were brought in. Completed socialist villages now form a distinct group of rural settlements distinguished by their modern somewhat uniform buildings built to high standards in high density settlements serviced to high standards.

Socialist villages benefit a wider group of people than just their inhabitants. Their health services and schools, for instance, serve a wider area. In some steppe regions, socialist villages have given formerly semi-nomadic pastoralists their first proper rural centre. But as noted earlier, they are very expensive and as of December 1978 only 15,871 dwellings had been completed compared to 127,000 beneficiaries from the agrarian reform. If only 16,000 families (some 100,000 people) had benefited by then, this represents a tiny proportion of rural population. If all 1000 villages originally envisaged were completed, perhaps 15 per cent of the rural population would be housed by them. Then little thought was given to assessing the needs and priorities of the users of new housing or to involving them in house construction. While the Algerian government is keen to preserve traditional culture, village housing has ignored vernacular styles and settlement plans reflect urban or suburban design. Attempts to assess the degree of satisfaction among villagers have given mixed results. The desire to have a stable and a kitchen garden has not usually been satisfied and the high density settlements give little room for households to enlarge their houses. In one village, poorer peasants who previously worked as agricultural labourers saw the new village as an improvement while other groups such as small landowners were less unanimous in their appreciation. Then there is the problem of many production cooperatives not producing adequate incomes for their members and thus the discrepancy in socialist villages between high housing standards and relatively poor incomes. One critic questioned whether the socialist village with its expense and slowness in construction was always the best solution to the settlement and production problems, especially in intensive agricultural regions where many settlement nucleations already exist. The article claims that the villages have realised their role in reducing rural-urban migration, but no details are given.

1. Editor's note. The average exchange rate for the dinar against the US dollar in 1979 was 3.853 dinars to the dollar. Thus in 1979, the cost per dwelling was more than \$18,000 while the average size village cost between \$3.9 million and \$5.2 million.

VAN TAP, DAO<sup>1</sup>

## ON THE TRANSFORMATION AND NEW DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION CENTRES IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

*International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 4, 1980, pp 503–515.

This article describes the urban policies of Vietnam's socialist government. The three simultaneous processes which are being fostered by the revolutionary government, namely deurbanization, the creation of new villages and urbanization, are an integral part of the country's economic and social development strategy. Industrialization is the basis of the strategy, whose overall objective is 'to eliminate the underdevelopment inherited from the past, to build a society equipped with a modern industry and agriculture, endowed with a progressive culture, advanced science and technology, and with strong defence capacities, yet enjoying a peaceful, civilized and happy way of life' (p. 503).

The pursuit of *deurbanization* (which the author emphatically distinguishes from the 'inhuman' town clean-up practised by the neighbouring Kampuchean government) implies the transformation and reconstruction of those towns in the south of the country which grew to hypertrophic proportions largely through the flow of peasants fleeing the terror raids and roundups carried out by US troops in many villages during the war. Rapid growth was accompanied by a concentration of the population in non-productive (tertiary sector) activities, thereby increasing unemployment levels and fostering a growing gap between the rich and the poor. The most important feature in this process was a tendency for the population to develop along the lines of a 'consumer society', underpinned largely by US aid, foreign monopoly capital and Vietnam's comprador bourgeoisie.

One of the first actions taken by the new government was to reduce congestion in the 'overpopulated' cities in formerly US-held territory. This has proved a complex and herculean task which included providing means of transport and subsistence to those wishing to return to their villages and assistance in finding employment to those wanting to establish themselves elsewhere. Specific policies had to be designed for each stratum of the urban population. For instance, non-hostile former civil servants were given citizen's rights and duties, while at the same time the government set up grant schemes for the war victims, and rehabilitation centres for prostitutes and drug addicts to enable their re-incorporation into society. Similarly, at another scale, private capital concerns and most of the petty traders have been integrated into mixed economy enterprises, while commercial distribution systems have been set up to assist the remaining small-scale traders.

The policy has resulted in the relocation (either in their former villages or in newly cleared territory) of some 700,000 inhabitants of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) out of a total population of four million in 1975, and tens of thousands from other towns, whilst several hundred thousand have been employed locally. Since the revolutionary takeover, unemployment has fallen by two

thirds, and social and economic conditions have substantially improved.

The policy of creating new villages bases itself firstly, on the pursuit of 'a more rational distribution of population' than the existing one, which is characterised by sparsely populated inland areas with abundance of land and natural resources and high population densities in the delta and the coast. This involves the encouragement of a more intensive and diversified farming, the creation of non-agricultural concerns and occupations (such as industrial subsidiaries, cottage industries, transport, etc) so as to absorb part of the agricultural workforce, and the resettlement of part of the population in low-density regions (a resettlement which in the period of the 1976–80 five-year plan is supposed to involve 1,800,000 workers and their families).

And secondly, on the need to incorporate into fully productive activities the nomadic ethnic minorities living in the mountains (nearly 2,000,000 people) where their present way of life represents a threat to the country's ecological balance. This means persuading these people to gradually adopt a sedentary way of life and farming methods. For these tribes, as for the other resettled groups, the emphasis will be laid upon collective farms of production and increasing mechanization. Another feature of the scheme is the adequate provision of infrastructure and facilities in the newly created villages so that the resettled workers and their families can enjoy appropriate living conditions.

Lastly, the process of urbanization rests on two policies: the transformation and rebuilding of existing towns, which was already partially described earlier; and the creation of evenly-distributed new towns across the country. As mentioned earlier, the basic direction taken in the rebuilding of towns is to increase their productive activities, while gradually eliminating their 'consumer town' aspect.

The new towns will be created as part of a programme of regional development whereby primary and secondary sector activities will be coordinated at the level of the region. Thus, for instance, towns in the agricultural areas of the delta region will be equipped with food processing plants, plants for the manufacture and repairs of agricultural equipment, and so forth. This would include both factories using modern technology and craft or semi-mechanized workshops. Although the author recognizes that industrial production, by its very nature, tends towards even greater concentration, one of the aims of the Vietnamese government is to determine precisely the limits and functions of both regional and centralized industry, so as to gauge the potentialities of each one of them. The administrative reforms necessary to implement an agro-industrial strategy in the various regions are given a brief description at the end.

1. Editor's note: At the time of publication the author was Vice-President of the Committee for the Social Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

YOU, NICHOLAS

## ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT: SOME CHINESE EXPERIMENTS IN A QUEST FOR AGRAPOLITAN SPACE

*Third World Planning Review* Vol 3, No 1, February 1981, pp 77-93.

This looks briefly at attempts in China to alter the existing structure of cities and to redistribute urban population and urban-based activities to more remote, less developed and less urbanised areas, since 1949. Among attempts to encourage urban development away from major cities must be counted a) the New Towns and 'key-point' Cities policy which sought to develop small towns well placed in relation to existing transport networks and form new urban centres in under-populated areas, b) *Hui-hsiang* and *Hsia-fang* programmes which sought to involve students and administrators in rural production and in the case of the former sent 20 million urban youth and unemployed to the countryside, c) the development of satellite communities around major cities, often with intensive water or energy consuming industries, d) the development of 'model' communities such as Taching, originally built to house workers on newly developed oil-fields but which became a model for self-help housing, the development of agricultural production to support itself and industrial diversification. These were part of a general trend running through Chinese government policies to reduce the gap between rural and urban settlements in terms of income, social services and cultural facilities.

BARKIN, DAVID

## THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY ON MIGRATION

*Demografia y Economía* Vol 1, 1971, pp 40-55.

The author studies a regional development programme in Mexico to quantify the impact of public investments on the reduction of migration from the region.

The programme chosen, one with significant success in terms of returns from funds invested in the area, is that undertaken by the Tepaltepec Commission to utilise the productive capacity of hydro resources in the region.

There are only two large urban centres in the area. Apatzingan (44,849 inhabitants) and Uruapan (82,672 inhabitants) have grown considerably, repeating the same pattern as in the rest of Mexico, where intermediate cities' population grew faster than that of the metropolis. The demographic impact of the Commission's public investment was calculated by means of two variables: real

in-migration to the region and potential out-migration<sup>1</sup> (estimated by calculating the out-migration in a similar area where there was no public investment), to estimate what could have happened without the Commission's action.

In spite of substantial in-migration between 1960 and 1970, the region continued to expel population. The attractive forces could not counterbalance the push forces from other parts of the region. When measuring the second variable, the results also show a high potential migration. Living conditions improved in the area. It was not only cheaper but a better standard of living was achieved because the region did not suffer from competitive consumption and environmental pollution.

Various conclusions are given:

The programme described was only part of the total investment programme. Another important programme with considerable impact was the agrarian reform. The benefits were concentrated in a few hands. And, in spite of the programme's relative success, social growth was reduced because the benefits of investments were still concentrated in a few hands and out-migration, although reduced, could not check in-migration.

1. Potential migration is the number of people who would have probably left even without the construction of dams. High potential migration means a region has a high probability of expelling population.

DICKENSON, JOHN

## INNOVATION FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHEAST BRAZIL; A CENTURY OF FAILURES

*Third World Planning Review*, Vol 2, No 1, Spring 1980, pp 57-4.

This paper looks at the different initiatives tried by Brazil's Federal Government to reduce poverty and stimulate development in its northeast. This was the early colonial period's economic centre but became an area of frequent drought, poverty and exhausted land. In 1970, the region contained 28 million inhabitants, roughly a third of the national population. The interior 'Sertao' is the northeast's heartland and in the same year contained 55 per cent of the region's population and most of the poorest rural population. It is generally the area most affected by drought.

The 1877-79 drought triggered national interest in the northeast's problems with an Imperial Commission of Enquiry recommending the construction of dams and irrigation schemes as a solution. Prior to this, the construction of railways in the region, largely as a result of foreign capital's interests, had helped perpetuate the established economic system of sugar monoculture for export and had not brought a 'Rostovian' boost to the whole economy. And the drought of 1877-79 had been made all the more serious since before this, a 30-year period of no drought had encouraged a more intensive cultivation of the Sertao. The development of the railway system over time essentially benefited the more developed, prosperous coastal zone and most especially

the cities of Recife and Salvador. After the great drought, lots of dams were built but only a tiny proportion of potentially irrigable land was irrigated. The newly stored water resources were not used to improve or modify agriculture in the Sertao, largely because of the opposition of landowners there whose wealth was based on extensive cattle raising. Proposals for land reform in 1920, 1940, 1949, 1950, 1951 and especially 1959 were resisted. Thus, dams served essentially as public works against the droughts, sustaining the population and animals during dry seasons but doing little to transform and modify the agrarian pattern. The large landowners were the major beneficiaries both directly since they utilised the stored water and indirectly since the burden of supporting labour during drought years was taken over by public agencies in emergency job programmes.

Attempts after 1945 were made to use multi-purpose river basin development programmes based on the Tennessee Valley Authority model. While this successfully developed hydropower, it did little in irrigation development. Then in the early 1950s, the idea of special development banks became fashionable and a Banco do Nordeste do Brasil was created in 1952, modelled on the Italia Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Its role was then reinforced after the 1958 drought with a special development agency for the northeast, the Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste in 1959. This agency's task was to encourage agricultural and industrial development and improve infrastructure. Up to the early 1970s, the industrial incentives it offered (most especially the 34/18 legislation which allowed Brazilian entities to write off half their tax dues as investment capital in the northeast) helped to stimulate both industrial growth and industrial diversification. Several hundred new factories were built or existing factories modernized and the manufacturing base came to have strong metallurgical, chemical, electrical, engineering and vehicle industries, rather than a dominance of consumer goods industries. But this did not mean a large creation of jobs since the new plants were relatively capital intensive. What job creation there was went to the richer states and within these to the larger and most developed cities. Over half the projects approved by 1970 went to Recife, Salvador and Fortaleza, the major coastal cities. Two large relatively poor states, with most of their territory in the interior, Maranhao and Piaui, received less than three per cent of the approved investments. In determining the level of 34/18 assistance to a firm, surprisingly little weight was attached to location in a poor state or to labour absorptive qualities. 34/18 assistance was also available for agriculture, yet by 1969 only an estimated 10,000 additional jobs had been created and the vast majority of projects supported were concerned with pastoralism (especially beef raising) which is not labour intensive and almost certainly benefited the larger landowners most.

The immediate response to the 1970 drought was the traditional work programme which at its peak employed 400,000 people. 86 per cent of these were from rural areas, only 14 per cent owned land, 75 per cent were illiterate, half had been unemployed for more than three months and virtually all had very low annual incomes. Then two other responses were started, one to develop irrigation schemes in the northeast, the other to encourage migration from the region to highway construction and land colonisation projects in Amazonia. But the emphasis in these colonisation projects turned to ranching. Thus, a

century after the Great Drought, emigration and irrigation are the cornerstones of Federal policy. During this century with different Federal Government programmes to develop the region, the most deprived sections of the population (for instance, the landless labourers) and the poorest regions (such as the Sertao) have benefited least. Structural reforms like agrarian reform has been sidestepped. And the main beneficiaries of Federal Government aid have been groups from outside the region or small groups who are not poor within the region. In 1970, there were 5.1 million Nordestinos living outside the state in which they were born. And as the paper reports, there seems to be some accuracy in Singer's comment on Federal programmes in the northeast, made in the early 1960s, 'C'est magnifique mais ce n'est pas le développement'.

HAFNER, JAMES A.

## URBAN RESETTLEMENT AND MIGRATION IN NORTHEAST THAILAND: THE SCEPTRE OF URBAN INVOLUTION

*The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 14, No 4,  
July 1980, pp 483-500.

The paper looks at the extent to which urban centres in Thailand's Northeast can be expected to offer adequate employment prospects to those displaced by multipurpose dam projects and to those migrating to urban centres, and government's present and potential role in influencing this.

The paper begins by noting the work of McGee and of Geertz on what they termed 'urban involution', the process by which the tertiary sector in Third World cities absorbs increasing amounts of labour at low wages and with marginal levels of productivity in the absence of new jobs in the modern manufacturing sector. As developments in agriculture and infrastructure in rural areas tend to force labour from rural to urban areas, so is this process of 'involution' accelerated. And this happens not only in large primate cities but also in smaller regional urban centres which often support high levels of tertiary sector employment through their roles as service centres for rural agrarian hinterlands. Where occupational choices remain limited in these centres, and as their growth continues to depend on increased rural prosperity, they are not likely to hold migrants.

The paper looks at the impact of migration movements and of resettlement schemes brought about by multipurpose dam projects on the economic and employment structures of urban centres in northeast Thailand.

Northeast Thailand's largest urban centre is Nakhon Ratchasima (Korat) which had 83,671 inhabitants in 1970 and was the nation's third largest urban centre. Udonthani was the second largest centre in the region with 56,218 inhabitants and Ubonratchathani the third with 40,650. Below these were 14 'municipal areas' with between 10,000 and 30,000 inhabitants in 'sanitary districts' —



which may, like municipal areas, have 10,000 or more inhabitants and an average population density of 3,000 per square kilometre but which lack provincial administrative functions and official designation as municipal places; district centres; and local clusters of villages. Although each of these is characterised by a certain size and certain functional features, only in the municipal areas and in some sanitary districts is there the potential economic diversity to support the absorbing of migrant and resettled populations. Data is presented on the growth of municipal areas between 1960 and 1970. The two largest grew most rapidly in this period, the largest by an average of 9.8 per cent a year; the second largest by 8.7 per cent a year. Most of the others grew by an average of between two and three per cent annually.

While the northeast has remained an area of net annual out-migration, some provinces were areas of net in-migration, and this was associated with the clearance of arable land. But as arable land is cleared and settled and population densities in rural areas rise, so is increased migration to urban centres likely. Projections suggest that net rural-urban migration rates will rise from an average of 2.3 per cent a year between 1974 and 1985 to an average of 3.3 per cent a year between 1986 and 1995. With declining fertility expected in urban centres, this will make net in-migration the main component of urban growth from the mid-1980s, rather than natural increase. Thus, municipal areas in the upper northeast sub-region which are the most likely targets for urban resettlement already have rapidly growing populations and this rapid growth is likely to continue with in-migration playing the largest role. New or proposed urban resettlement schemes will inevitably add further increments of labour and population to these already rapidly growing centres. The implications of this must be examined.

The paper then looks at past experience in Thailand's resettlement schemes, since the impact of the Pa Mong dam project in the northeast with its need to resettle between 205,000 and 400,000 (or more) people is one of its major concerns. Although Thailand does not have the extensive experience of sponsored resettlement that West Malaysia or Indonesia has, it does include resettlement for multipurpose dam projects. For such resettlement projects, it seems that where public agencies provided rural settlement possibilities close to the original area, the rural population appear to have preferred these rural alternatives. Where rural programmes were not encouraged, those displaced seem to have preferred urban centres.

The urban employment base and the opportunities this might offer for those dislocated by dam developments are then examined. The manufacturing base of northeast Thailand's urban centres is weak. In 1974 only 18 per cent of urban employment was in the more capital intensive manufacturing sector and much of this was in 'small shop' industries dominated by agricultural product processing. Food processing industries dominate the manufacturing sector and they have grown slowly. Rice milling is the major industrial activity and rice covers some 80 per cent of the cultivated area. The rice is grown mainly for local consumption. There is little prospect of expanding food processing activities and already only one third of the locally produced raw materials are processed within the region. The region's urban centres have failed to attract private capital investment for manufacturing. Between 1960 and 1973, only 17 firms were granted promotional certificates by the Board of Investment for the northeast,

less than four per cent of the national total.

The paper presents data on the employment that migrants and resettled populations obtain in the upper half of the northeast region. Relatively few get jobs in the more modern manufacturing sector. Both migrants and resettles are usually absorbed in the service sector. Migrants seem to find better urban employment than resettles. Unemployment among both groups is higher than the regional average and it is highest for resettles. Where the resettled population has found jobs, it is primarily in various 'informal bazaar sector jobs which require few skills'. Thus, 'rather than providing an expanded labour force for a growing capital intensive sector, urban resettlement and migration may deepen the existing problems of underemployment, unemployment and significant regional imbalances in levels of development and economic growth'. And if manufacturing-related employment cannot be expanded, new increments in the urban labour force will find occupational choices limited to the low wage service sector, often in marginally productive activities. Thus, regional centres will provide few incentives to hold migrants and resettled populations, and migration to the primate city is unlikely to slow appreciably.

The paper then reviews the Thai government's attempts to stimulate regional development during the 1960s. A regional development plan was developed for the northeast for 1962-66, based on the concept of area development centres as mechanisms through which the development of external economies conducive to regional economic growth could be achieved. The 1966-71 national development plan had a similar emphasis. But 'the results of these efforts have been generally poor...'. The paper notes Ginsburg's suggestion that instead of trying to improve the potential of middle-sized cities which he regards as anachronisms in Asia, the greater integration of smaller rural places and larger urban centres should be sought through improved spatial linkages. It also notes Sternstein's view that the development of only one growth centre in the northeast is beyond the capacity of the government, particularly with the lack of growth in basic industries. Investments in education and medical services without the existence of basic growth industries may well intensify the problems that a growth centre strategy is intended to resolve. Thus, Sternstein suggests the development of a belt of industrial new towns around Bangkok's metropolitan area to help alleviate the employment and social problems of the primate city. Of course, this does nothing about the problems of the peripheral provinces.

The paper notes that the most promising solution to regional imbalances in development and to the problems posed by increasing urban involution in the northeast appear to be the government's newly adopted northeast Secondary Cities Urban Development Policy. This will emphasise the development of secondary cities to accelerate production, provide the basis for a national regional policy and disperse industrial activity which at present is concentrated in the central region. The three largest northeastern cities and Khon Kaen (which became the fourth largest in 1970 with 29,431 inhabitants) have been designated growth centres and will receive infrastructural investments, expanded urban services, and fiscal and monetary incentives to attract industrial investment. The paper notes that these initiatives must be accompanied by a transformation of the rural agrarian sector. Rural productivity must rise; the production of

primary and secondary crops must be expanded; and marketing, credit, capital and transport systems must be improved. 'If raw material outputs falter and regional per capita incomes do not grow, the regional markets essential to an expanding manufacturing sector will not provide the economic environment necessary for protracted industrial investment, and anticipated urban employment will not materialise to help absorb and distribute the growing urban labour force. The success of these programmes depends as much on rural investment as it does on urban investment'. Finally, the paper notes that the fundamental risks of these programmes may be more political than economic, for they imply sustained investment in the periphery and thus some diversion of investment from the core.

**JENSSEN BERND, KUNZMANN KLAUS  
and SAAD EL DIN, SHERIF**

### **TAMING THE GROWTH OF CAIRO: TOWARDS A DECONCENTRATION OF THE METROPOLITAN REGION OF CAIRO**

*Third World Planning Review* Vol 3, No 2, May 1981, pp 201–233.

The main focus of this paper is a critique of the Egyptian government's present commitment to decentralise growth and development away from Cairo into three or more large 'satellite cities' which are being built from scratch and a theory that deconcentration efforts should focus on the development of 'relief-poles' around Cairo, based on existing urban centres.

The paper first outlines Egypt's spatial problems – with the fact that most of the national population has to live in the Nile Valley and Delta due to arid or semi-arid conditions everywhere else which causes some of the world's highest population densities on this, only four per cent of the national territory. It then notes the increasing agglomeration diseconomies in Cairo as this city region has increased its primacy over the last three decades and as most of the nation's most important industries have become concentrated in Cairo (and in Alexandria) together with most of the important institutions and services.

The spatial dimensions of the 1973–77 Plan with regard to Cairo are discussed – and these focus on the reconstruction and development of the Canal Zone (where a third metropolitan area is to be developed), the development of the Alexandria Coast region and the construction of three or more large satellite cities between 30 and 100 kilometres away from Cairo on desert land. The fact that few private enterprises are likely to move to these satellite cities, their lack of linkage to any agricultural hinterland, their enormous expense and the lack of benefit they will give for lower income groups are described. An alternative, the development of relief poles based on existing towns or small cities close to (but outside commuting distance of) Cairo is then outlined – although the concept of such relief poles is held to be of relevance

to other major Third World cities. Among the preconditions for such a strategy are the creation of an economic base plus the development of technical and social infrastructure to support this and the upgrading of institutional structure within these relief poles so these have the skills and resources to implement realistic development plans. The selection of sites for Egypt is also discussed, based on land use, settlement structure, technical infrastructure and socio-economic conditions and several potential sites are put forward as candidates for a more careful consideration.

**MATHUR, OM PRAKASH**

### **THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES, AN ANALYSIS OF INDIAN POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES**

*Habitat International*, Vol 2, No 5/6, 1977,  
pp 427–454.

This paper analyses how regional policy in India is moving away from 'assistance-subsidy' types of intervention to a new regional approach. It describes the nature of the regional problem and recapitulates on the basic policy and planning framework. It also explores the changing view of regional development, and analyses the issue of growth centres.

The nature of India's regional problems are different from those in most developed and developing countries. The primate city does not dominate this country. It cannot be explained through the availability of natural resources or in terms of income and employment. The roots of India's regional problem lie in: diverse resources and complex geography; a highly imbalanced spatial pattern inherited from its colonial past; and locational policies which reinforce regional disparities. The urban structure is highly imbalanced. Only 27 per cent of the total urban population lives in medium-sized cities (20,000–100,000 inhabitants) and 55.8 per cent in cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more. The latter group has also registered a much higher growth rate.

With successive Five-Year Plans, there has been an increasing policy commitment to balanced regional development. Prior to the Third Plan, attention to the problem of regional disparities was only ad hoc and an adjunct to the Industrial Policy Resolution. It is possible to see a wider policy emerging, from the Third Plan onwards. During the Fourth Plan, regional disparities were seen as a problem of reducing inter-regional differences in income, developing the resource frontier regions and local planning. The Fifth Plan (1974–79) follows this framework and further adds the provision of social services on a norm-oriented and location-specific basis. As a part of industrial location policies, incentives and subsidies are provided to industrially backward areas, public sector industrial undertakings have been set up as growth poles, and decentralisation is promoted. Up to 1974, 62.1 per cent of the total investment subsidy went to the high income states and 34.6 per cent to the low income states. The main beneficiaries (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu,

Karnataka) accounted for over 50 per cent of the total subsidy but only 25.9 per cent of the country's population. In September 1973, 43 per cent of all industrial estates in the country were located in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 37.6 per cent in cities of 20,000–100,000 inhabitants. But what is important to note is that between 1963 and 1973, it appears that a decision was taken to reverse the location policy of industrial estates in favour of larger cities. This would suggest that medium-sized towns are not wholly viable for industrial growth.

Interest in growth centres for regional development emerged in the mid-1950s as part of India's decentralisation policy. A Pilot Research Project in Growth Centres was launched during the fourth Five Year Plan (1969–74). The project concentrated on the identification of a hierarchy of viable rural growth centres so as to provide them with basic services and facilities. The pilot project, which provided a good methodology, was discontinued at the beginning of the Fifth Plan. One of the first efforts to compare the cost structure of cities of different sizes was made in India in 1967–68. The study concluded that beyond a city size of 130,000 unit cost differences for the projected volume and types of industrial infrastructure were insignificant. The research study viewed cities with 130,000–300,000 inhabitants as the least-cost options for industrial growth in the Indian context. Policy implications were in favour of the development of medium-sized cities as growth centres.

At present rural settlements are too small to economically sustain very many of the productive and social services. There is the continuing problem of rural-urban migration. Even though the relative unit costs of providing incremental infrastructure may not be perceptibly higher in larger cities and metropolitan centres, the absolute costs are staggering. And smaller towns do not have the pre-requisites of development. This suggests that medium-sized towns should be strengthened to enable them to serve as intermediate centres in the urban hierarchy. A hierarchical system has a higher probability of survival than an isolated pole.

**MAX-NEEF, MANFRED A.**

### **THE TIRADENTES PROJECT: REVITALISATION OF SMALL CITIES FOR SELF-RELIANCE**

*Development Dialogue No 1, 1981, pp 115–137.*

Tiradentes is a small town in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. During the 18th Century, gold and precious and semi-precious stones supported a flourishing trade in Minas Gerais and an artistic movement which left some of the best examples of baroque architecture, sculpture and music in Latin America and of the art of goldsmiths and silversmiths. Several cities were stimulated by mining and trade, notably Ouro Preto, Congonhas, do Campo, Mariana, Diamantina, Sao Joao do Rey, Sabara and Tiradentes. In 1978, the Tiradentes project was launched, largely financed by SENAC, the Brazilian Vocational Training Service for the tertiary sector, and stimulated by

CINTERFOR (the Latin American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Centre) a specialised agency of the International Labour Organisation. It was to be a demonstration model with the aim of promoting the revitalisation of small urban centres as an alternative to the increasing dysfunction of the great metropolitan areas, and allowing for an improvement in the quality of life and in the productivity of the informal economic sector in smaller urban centres. It was an unorthodox project in the sense that it had neither a formal international subsidy nor a spectacular nature. The fact that big problems require a number of small solutions was the guiding principle of the project in establishing local confidence and renewed dynamism in the people of Tiradentes.

The actions undertaken were:

a. to secure the participation of the children in the revitalisation process (four creative ateliers for children were organised);

b. to rescue craftsmen from anonymity;

c. to organise vocational training in four areas – health and sanitation, hygiene and body care, tourism and hospitality (the response was overwhelmingly positive, contributing to a better integration of the population and understanding of the problems);

d. to organise a guild of artisans (some of the most distinguished local craftsmen were involved as part-time instructors for young people);

e. to awaken the interest of the population in the past as a way of uniting the whole community (an exhibition of One Century of Photography in Tiradentes was inaugurated in 1981 and was also shown in other cities); and

f. to incorporate the people of Tiradentes in the evaluation of the project.

**OKPALA, DON C. I.**

### **A CRITIQUE OF THE APPLICATION OF NEW TOWN CONCEPTS IN NIGERIA: THE CASE OF AJODA NEW TOWN**

*Third World Planning Review, Vol 1, No 1, Spring 1979, pp 57–70.*

The article is about how the building of satellite new towns close to Lagos and, more recently, Ibadan, as an attempt to deal with mounting housing, traffic congestion, infrastructure and service problems in such major cities is an inappropriate, expensive and probably ineffective response. What would far more effectively tackle such problems would be the well-planned physical expansion of existing cities and a concentration on developing the economic base and infrastructure/service provision in existing large, medium and small towns.

The article reviews the origins of the 'new town' movement in England and then the construction of new towns in Britain and the United States. It also notes the formation of 'new towns' in Nigeria as early as the 1900s (nearly half a century before Britain's New Towns Act), virtually all of them built to serve the extraction and export of mineral or agricultural resources or as garrison towns. Their growth and development was consolidated as they

became centres of administration, trade and employment.

Ajoda New Town, some 16 kilometres east of Ibadan City, was conceived in 1976 as a new town to eventually accommodate 250,000 people and help regulate Ibadan City's growth, to improve the living environment in the Ibadan region, and to be a model town. Four other satellite towns, like Ajoda, located on major roads linking Ibadan to other towns or cities, were also proposed to 'check the terrible and unsightly urban sprawl in Ibadan'. But the cost of providing basic services and infrastructure to such satellite cities is very high; far higher than upgrading infrastructure and services in or close to the existing city. Satellite communities will not stop urban sprawl; indeed they will probably encourage it on the roads linking them to the city. They will greatly increase traffic congestion – for they seem to develop as essentially dormitory towns for middle and upper income groups (who can afford cars) so that the population of these satellite cities still travel to the city centre for employment, shopping and social and cultural activities. 'Festac' and other satellite new towns around Lagos still depend on central Lagos for employment, schools and shopping – and simply compound Lagos' enormous traffic congestion. Infrastructure and service problems are already very acute in virtually all Nigerian cities and the creation of satellite towns increases, very considerably, the costs of servicing the urban population.

The best alternative is to develop effective expansion plans for existing cities with carefully thought out relationships between land uses and higher density developments to minimise infrastructure and service costs. Ibadan needs a carefully planned and controlled consolidated expansion programme. Meanwhile, the growth and development of medium and small towns should be encouraged. Many of these have stagnated – and may even be losing population. Among the major reasons for this is the concentration of employment opportunities in the few major cities and public investments should be decentralised to many more towns and regions.

## TRABELSI, MOHSEN

### THE PROBLEM OF DRINKING WATER IN SMALL AGGLOMERATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SILIANA, TUNISIA

*Small Urban Centres in Rural Development in Africa*, Southall, Aidan (Editor), African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, pp 268–273.

The paper describes current arrangements<sup>1</sup> for water supply in eleven localities in Siliana, a governorate in northwest Tunisia and living conditions in the region. It also briefly outlines plans to increase the proportion of these 11 localities' population served by a water distribution network.

The paper begins with a couple of paragraphs on the importance of integrating rural development and urban

planning. Neither should be undertaken in isolation and both should be within a regional development framework which is itself part of national development planning. 'The modern conception is of a region evolving in an organised space around at least a second order town as a pole of development.'

The paper notes that in Tunisia 'the rural population is not very far advanced in its restructuring around secondary urban centres as development poles at the micro-regional level'. Siliana is one of the least favoured regions in Tunisia. Per capita incomes are low. And there is rapid out-migration with many of the migrants heading for Tunis.

Siliana town became the centre of a governorate in 1974. It had 8,230 inhabitants.<sup>2</sup> The second largest town in the governorate, Bou Arada, had 5,487 inhabitants while three other settlements had more than 2,000 inhabitants. The governorate had 17 per cent of its population living in urban areas.<sup>3</sup>

The paper describes drinking water supply in eleven localities, including Siliana town and the other urban settlements in the governorate. Two thirds of the population in these localities did not have running water and the daily burden of carrying water fell most heavily on the children. While the proportion of children in school in these localities is high, the literacy rate is only 36 per cent and in 1975 only 13 per cent of children succeeded in the first year of high school.

The health problems arising from existing water sources are briefly described. So too are the maintenance problems. Findings from a 1975 survey of 4,800 dwellings and their internal facilities are presented. The importance of improving water supply is stressed and a planned project to increase water supply per capita, to bring more households into the water distribution system and to increase the number of communities with water distribution systems is described.

1. For many statistics, no date is given in the text.
2. No data is given to the table listing settlements' population and the proportion connected to drinking water supply. Presumably these come from the 1975 census.
3. The text also gives a figure of 23.3 per cent for Siliana governorate's 'active urban population'.

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## IIED'S HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME

Since 1977, IIED has organised a collaborative programme of Human Settlement research, evaluation, publications and seminars with the **Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CEUR)** in Buenos Aires (Argentina); the **Sudanese Group for Assessment of Human Settlements (SGAHS)**, Khartoum University (the Sudan); the **Human Settlements Unit**, University of Lagos (Nigeria) and the **International Institute for Development Research (IIDR)**, Allahabad (India).

Directed from IIED's Latin American Office in Buenos Aires, the work focuses on:

- The links between the health problems of people living in squatter settlements or inner city tenements and housing conditions – and the multi-sectoral programmes needed to address them
- The social and economic factors which underlie the development of squatter settlements, tenement districts and other housing sub-markets used by lower income groups – and priorities for action on the part of governments and international aid agencies. Teams in each collaborating Third World institution also give technical and legal advice to community groups formed by residents in low income areas
- The present and potential role of small and intermediate urban centres in stimulating or supporting regional, rural and agricultural development and in increasing the proportion of people reached with basic services. This includes the identification of priorities for action by governments and the support they need from international aid and technical assistance agencies
- The extent to which aid from the main multilateral and bilateral agencies is directed to meeting basic needs such as the improvement of housing and living conditions and the provision of services such as water supply, sanitation, primary health care and community facilities
- **Rethinking the Latin American City** – drawing on IIED's work to date and its network of contacts with other researchers, professionals and centres in Latin America this project seeks to develop policy proposals on how poverty and environmental degradation can be tackled more effectively by governments and international agencies.

The Programme also evaluated the effectiveness of Third World governments' housing, land and settlement policies while the office in Latin America has begun exploratory research on the needs and perceptions of children in cities and on the impact of floods and droughts. The Latin American office also joins with groups throughout the region to help build a coalition committed to research and action on environment and development issues. This includes an annual programme of seminars backed up with books and working papers and a quarterly journal *Medio Ambiente y Urbanizacion* published with the Commission on Urban and Regional Development of the Latin American Social Science Council.

The work of the programme and IIED's Latin American Office is funded by the International NGO Division of the Canadian International Development Agency, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) with additional support in recent years from the United Nations Development Programme, the World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxfam and the World Health Organisation.

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