Learning from community planning following the 2010 Haiti earthquake

Darren Gill, Laura Smits and Maggie Stephenson
About the authors
Darren Gill, Laura Smits and Maggie Stephenson carried out this work as independent consultants.
Contact: lucy.earle@iied.org

Acknowledgements
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Produced by IIED’s Human Settlements Group
The Human Settlements Group works to reduce poverty and improve health and housing conditions in the urban centres of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It seeks to combine this with promoting good governance and more ecologically sustainable patterns of urban development and rural-urban linkages.
Humanitarian responses to urban crises are focusing increasingly on integrated programming and area-based approaches. This paper contributes to the emerging literature of urban area-based planning in humanitarian crises through a case study of community planning projects carried out in 28 neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince seven years after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. These initiatives involved over 50 humanitarian organisations and resulted in both practical improvements to living conditions and far-reaching institutional changes in planning policies and the status of informal settlements.

Experience from the seven years of urban recovery interventions in Haiti also raises questions about the scope of planning, the roles of planners and challenges around data and coordination.

Learning from community planning in Haiti requires access to the plans developed in Haiti. As such, we retrieved and consolidated extensive planning data from the 28 neighbourhoods and the broader response and made them available through a digital archive linked to this paper. Our intention is that this archive should be useful both in Haiti and for wider reference in future urban crises. We also hope it will promote learning from the reality of implementation for those involved in crisis-recovery and urban planning education and policy development.
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<tr>
<td>16/6</td>
<td>Seize Quartiers / Six Camps/Sixteen Neighbourhoods/Six Camps – an organisation supporting the return of displaced populations from six camps and the rehabilitation of sixteen neighbourhoods of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement/French Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfH</td>
<td>Architecture for Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIQIP</td>
<td>Programme d’aménagement intégré de quartiers informels de Port-au-Prince/ Programme for Integrated Planning, Management and Development of Informal Neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Agences Techniques Locales/Local Technical Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMPAD</td>
<td>Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement/ Office of Monetisation of Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARMEN</td>
<td>Centres d’Appui pour le Renforcement des Maisons Endommagées/Community Support Centres for House Repairs</td>
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<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination/Camp Management</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Cooperative Housing Foundation – latterly Global Communities (GC)</td>
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<td>CHRAD</td>
<td>Centre Haïtien de Recherche en Aménagement et en Développement/ Haitian Centre for Research in Planning, Management and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Comité Interministériel d’Aménagement du Territoire/Interministerial Committee for Territorial Management and Planning</td>
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<td>CNGRD</td>
<td>Comité National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres/National Risk and Disaster Management Committee</td>
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<td>CNIGS</td>
<td>Centre National de l’Information Géospatiale/National Centre of Geospatial Information</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
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<td>DINEPA</td>
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<td>DPZ</td>
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<td>FOKAL</td>
<td>Fondasyon Konesans Ak Libète/La Fondation Connaissance et Liberté/Foundation for Knowledge and Liberty</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>Global Communities</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GFDRR</td>
<td>Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery</td>
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<td>GoH</td>
<td>government of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNRSP</td>
<td>Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Programme/ Programme d’Appui à la Reconstruction du Logement et des Quartiers</td>
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<td>HRF</td>
<td>Haiti Reconstruction Forum</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IHRC</td>
<td>Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee</td>
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<td>IHSI</td>
<td>Institut Haitien de Statistique et d’Informatique</td>
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<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Integrated Neighbourhood Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>MICT</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales/Ministry of Interior and Local Governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPCE</td>
<td>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe/Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTPTC</td>
<td>Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications/Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAQ</td>
<td>Programme d’Appui à la Reconstruction et à l’Aménagement de Quartiers/Support Programme for Neighbourhood Reconstruction, Planning, Management and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDNA</td>
<td>post-disaster needs assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREKAD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODEPUR</td>
<td>Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain/Participatory Community Development in Urban Environments Project</td>
</tr>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SILQ</td>
<td>Système d’Information du Logement et des Quartiers/Housing and Neighbourhoods Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCRS</td>
<td>Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Residus Solides/Metropolitan Service for Solid Waste Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>Service Planification Urbaine/urban planning services – department in the MTPTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics/Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive summary

On 12 January 2010, Haiti was hit by a 7.3-magnitude earthquake, with the epicentre approximately 25km west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Over 300,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged and approximately three million people directly affected. The bidonvilles, or informal neighbourhoods, of Port-au-Prince experienced widespread devastation. As part of the post-earthquake response, more than 50 organisations and the government of Haiti engaged in an extraordinary collective effort of humanitarian community planning.

As humanitarian crises have become more urban and complex, humanitarian organisations have tried to develop appropriate skills and ways of working to support post-crisis recovery in urban areas. Among the changes are a shift from humanitarian assistance operating within sector silos or focusing on individual or household needs to taking an integrated and area-based approach to coordination and programming (Parker and Maynard 2015, GAUC 2016, Sanderson and Sitko 2017).

Community planning or participatory urban planning facilitates integrated and area-based programming usually at neighbourhood rather than city level. It seeks to support and catalyse local interests, and identify and address local priority needs through a process commonly facilitated by governmental or non-governmental planning professionals. The context, objectives and scope of community planning can vary from diagnosis to projects for specific investment opportunities. The approach differs significantly from the pace and process of formal urban and master planning. While community planning has been widely practised in development, it has been less common as part of humanitarian response after catastrophic damage where planning has generally not been considered eligible for funding as a life-saving activity.

This paper seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on urban area-based planning by documenting how stakeholders interpreted and realised community planning after the Haiti earthquake and drawing lessons about humanitarian community planning in general. We present a case study of community planning projects in 28 Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods — home to more than one million people, or 40% of the city’s population (IHSI 2015) — and planning beyond the neighbourhoods, in Port-au-Prince city centre and the expansion of the city.

The 28 neighbourhood planning initiatives guided the investment of more than US$400 million assistance funding in recovery activities. But the investment was unevenly distributed and the underlying development needs were great. Ambitions to plan and rebuild a resilient Port-au-Prince after the earthquake through integrated, multi-sectoral, participatory planning could not redress development deficits with the resources available or through neighbourhood-level interventions alone.

Nevertheless, the community planning initiatives brought practical improvements to living conditions, as well as far-reaching institutional change in the status of informal settlements and planning policies. This paper explores issues of standardisation, flexibility, shared principles and coordination to mitigate the risks of incoherence, projectisation and fragmentation. We consider the institutional and policy context that influenced why community planning and neighbourhood recovery projects were instigated, what they were trying to achieve and how they were executed.

Over the seven-year period, more than 500 community planning personnel produced over 3,500 pages of planning documents, including almost 1,000 maps. The research we document in this paper set out to retrieve and consolidate as much as possible of these vast data, making them available through a linked digital archive. Using data from this archive — videos, photographs, community plans, methodologies, working papers, reference documents, maps and local public discourse on planning issues — and the reflections of stakeholders involved, we seek to bridge the gap between existing literature on, and the practice of, community planning in Haiti. We hope that giving researchers, planners and technical assistance programmes direct access to these data will prove useful in future humanitarian crisis response and urban development practice and planning education.

Most post-disaster case studies seek to promote best practice lessons for replication in future disasters or to evaluate the impact of humanitarian policies and programmes. But in this paper, we do not seek to evaluate, measure or compare the impacts of the 28 neighbourhood projects or the wider urban planning initiatives and post-crisis recovery in the city centre and new-planned greenfield sites. Rather, we present...
synthesised reflections on the role of community planning and planners as experienced by those involved. These qualitative insights — gleaned from documentation, interviews and site visits — around the relationship between planning and implementation illustrate the unique combination of changing factors that influence recovery and increase our understanding of the challenges of recovery.

The achievements of community planning initiatives in Haiti deserve to be acknowledged. First, they helped put informal neighbourhoods and communities on the map and on the political agenda. Before the earthquake, these were undocumented areas outside of urban policies and planning. Community planning also helped channel humanitarian funding into community-prioritised rehabilitation and upgrading works and led to institutional developments nationally and in humanitarian urban policies and practices.

However, the experience in Haiti also highlights challenges in area-based approaches and community planning in urban crisis recovery. The fragmented response was less than the sum of its parts and there was a gap between ambition and reality, planning and implementation. By its nature, community planning targets a neighbourhood or community, but there also needs to be urban planning at supra-neighbourhood or city level, not least in terms of urban infrastructure. And because it tends to be fragmented, community planning can miss opportunities to act collectively and optimise impacts.

In highlighting the systemic shortcomings, we do not seek to diminish the considerable achievements of community planning initiatives after the earthquake in Haiti or the efforts and quality of work by committed individuals, organisations and authorities in very challenging circumstances. Our intention, rather, is to attribute greater importance to the work by making it more accessible, and to promote continued learning by revisiting the responses to develop our understanding, tools and systems as we engage in increasingly urban crises.

The design and implementation of planning initiatives in Haiti provide us with several lessons around the relevant, efficient and effective use of human and financial resources.

There were gaps between ambition and reality, and between planning and implementation. Adjusting to economic, political and physical reality — from what is desirable to what is possible — was a common and difficult experience for all organisations and communities in Haiti. We learnt that not everything can be dealt with at neighbourhood level, that residential neighbourhoods require housing strategies and that recovery initiatives should not be confined to the disaster site. Fragmentation of planning and neighbourhood recovery activities reduced their impact and the potential for lasting progress. There was greater emphasis on plans than on planning and stronger human resource strategies could have built capacity, avoided duplication and optimised scarce expertise. Finally, we cannot overstate the value of institutionalising, sharing and communicating data.

Drawing on the experiences of all involved and the lessons above, we close with some recommended factors for consideration when planning in future humanitarian urban crises around: coordination and collaboration, the implications of timing and duration of activities, strengthening continuity, pooling resources, sharing and exchanging data; strategic planning, being smart about data, and learning from the longer recovery story.
1 Introduction

1.1 Background

In general terms, community planning refers to communities shaping the production and management of their neighbourhoods, by themselves or in cooperation with local authorities and other stakeholders.

Community planning is not new. It is established in planning theory and widely practiced in urban development, including in neighbourhood upgrading programmes. However, it has not been common practice as part of humanitarian responses after catastrophic damage. The increasingly urban location of crises has highlighted the need to draw upon approaches and tools from urban development, such as community planning. However, crisis situations are very different from the normal urban planning context. Crises bring extra complexity, urgency and challenges; but they also bring opportunities and resources. Community planning in humanitarian crisis response involves adjustments to arrive at what may be best described as a new hybrid: humanitarian community planning.

Haiti was hit by a 7.3-magnitude earthquake on 12 January 2010. The epicentre was close to the town of Léogâne, approximately 25km west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Over 300,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged and approximately three million people directly affected. The bidonvilles – informal areas/neighbourhoods – of Port-au-Prince experienced widespread devastation.

As part of the post-earthquake response, more than 50 organisations and the government engaged in an extraordinary collective effort of humanitarian community planning, preparing plans for 28 neighbourhoods. During the subsequent seven years, they have operationalised and tested this hybrid of humanitarian community planning, identifying valuable lessons for those setting out to develop community plans in current crisis situations, governments managing cities in crises and stakeholders in planning education needing more than abstract principles or guidance. There is a need for more than abstract principles or guidance; it is vital to have concrete, detailed examples, not for copy-paste replication, but to build a more complete understanding of the issues and processes involved.

More than 500 personnel involved in community planning produced over 3,500 pages of planning documents, including almost 1,000 maps. In most cases, the data were in working documents on the laptops of those who prepared them. And many of the plans that were published have since vanished from the public domain. Most of the community planning data can be described as ‘perishable data’ (Davis and Alexander 2015).

Questions arise about the efficient use of resources, planning as a means or an end, and about the institutionalisation and sustainability of humanitarian activities. This research set out to retrieve and consolidate as much as possible of the vast community planning data and make them available — through a linked digital archive — for continued use. This is not an evaluation of the neighbourhood recovery projects or community plans. Rather, this paper presents synthesised reflections on the role of community planning and planners as experienced by those involved.

1 Humanitarian response has been strongly influenced by the architecture of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee humanitarian coordination system, which is based on thematic sectors or clusters. Urban and community planning represent a geographically based, multi-sector approach. Humanitarian funding is commonly based on life-saving criteria, which urban planning does not usually meet.
1.1.1 What is community planning?

Community planning, community action planning and participatory urban planning emerged in response to both the rapid growth of informal areas — particularly in cities of the global South — and the inability of top-down formal urban planning mechanisms to meet cities’ needs (Castillo 2001, Roy and Al Sayyad 2004). Participatory planning approaches range in scope from consultation to ensure plans incorporate citizens’ concerns to community development and management of public land or services. Community planning usually refers to a neighbourhood, rather than city, level.

Most informal neighbourhoods in developing cities are already largely shaped by the communities themselves. With or without the involvement of government or assistance agencies, communities build housing and organise services. But densely built urban neighbourhoods in precarious locations are likely to face challenges — such as inadequate infrastructure — that community resources alone cannot always address, particularly after a disaster.

Community planning or community action planning seeks to support and catalyse local interests, and identify and address local priority needs through a process commonly facilitated by governmental or non-governmental planning professionals. The context, objectives and scope of community planning can vary from diagnosis to projects for specific investment opportunities. The terms ‘action planning’ or ‘community action planning’ emphasise that the approach differs significantly from the pace and process of formal urban planning and master planning.

The 28 plans we refer to in this report were variously titled community plans, community action plans, diagnostic plans, [urban] development schemes/projects/outlines/plans, participative plans, and so on. For the sake of brevity, we refer to all under the umbrella term ‘community planning’.

1.1.2 Area-based approaches in urban crises

As crises become increasingly urban and complex in nature, there are many calls for humanitarian assistance to change from operating within sector silos or focusing on individual or household needs to taking an integrated and area-based approach to coordination and programming (GAUC 2016).

An area-based approach should ideally engage with and strengthen existing local systems — such as markets and infrastructure, authorities and communities — and operate at different scales, taking account of how a neighbourhood connects to the wider city. However, area-based programmes risk concentrating attention and resources into small islands of excellence while the needs of other areas are neglected (Earle 2016, GFDRR 2016).

Community planning can provide key tools to operationalise area-based approaches in humanitarian response, enabling local engagement, capacity and needs analysis and generating strategies for rehabilitation. Emerging literature on area-based approaches, along with settlement or integrated approaches, includes case study reviews (Parker and Maynard 2015, USWG 2018) and technical guidance (Sanderson and Sitko 2017). This research on community planning in Port-au-Prince from 2010 to 2016 seeks to contribute to urban area-based approach discussions.

1.1.3 The 2010 earthquake: more lessons to learn?

Aspects of the humanitarian response and recovery efforts in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake have been widely documented and scrutinised (ALNAP 2010, Clermont et al. 2010, UN OSE for Haiti 2011, Grünewald et al. 2011, Tulane University Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy and State University of Haiti 2012, Schuller and Morales 2012). International assistance was mobilised at a level not seen since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, with consequent attention paid to the recovery progress and challenges faced.

Learning from the tsunami response accelerated action to improve humanitarian coordination. The defining lesson cited from the Haiti earthquake is the need to improve humanitarian response in urban contexts. Lessons from Haiti have already motivated some organisational policy changes, but humanitarian actors still need to adapt further to respond effectively in urban crises. Helping cities recover is a collective responsibility. Urban planners and authorities are also re-evaluating their roles to engage more effectively in future crises.
One-and-a-half million displaced people in urban camps became an early symbol of the Haiti earthquake (Ferris and Ferro-Ribeiro 2012, UCLBP et al. 2013a). One of the enduring legacies of the Haiti response may well be the recovery of over 28 devastated city neighbourhoods, home to one million people. It was the residents themselves who carried out the major work of rebuilding homes and re-establishing livelihoods. But humanitarian organisations played a vital role – both in supporting communities to plan and implement priority rehabilitation and upgrading measures and secure a new political status for their neighbourhoods and in developing the city as a whole.

The first of many lessons learned after the Haiti earthquake – on emergency logistics arrangements, trauma care, security measures and other aspects of the response – were issued as early as January 2010. Many provide comprehensive accounts of the impact of the earthquake, policy decisions or reconstruction activities and were published in academic journals, books and online resources. In this digital archive, we have gathered key documents on Haiti, the earthquake and the response in the background folder, providing extensive background on institutional and policy issues related to land, tenure, urban development, finance, shelter and housing.

### 1.2 Aims, objectives and research questions

How, and to what degree, community planning aspirations were realised after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince may provide lessons for urban stakeholders advocating the adoption of area-based approaches, strategic opportunities for urban planning in disasters and the critical role of urban planners in recovery.

This research aims to:

- Consolidate fragmented data on 28 community planning and neighbourhood recovery programmes, to enable broader access and continued use
- Illustrate and analyse the processes involved in community planning and implementation in Haiti
- Contribute to discussions on area-based based approaches and/or community planning in humanitarian crises, and
- Contribute to discussions on the role of planners and planning in humanitarian crises.

It does not aim to:

- Analyse institutional development in Haiti related to informal neighbourhoods
- Provide an exhaustive account of all urban planning initiatives after the earthquake in Haiti, or
- Evaluate the community plans, implemented measures or organisations involved.

The paper is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction. Chapter 2 provides an overview of community planning projects in post-earthquake Port-au-Prince. Chapter 3 discusses the institutional and policy context and outlines shared guiding principles. Chapter 4 examines community planning processes: framing factors (funding, timing); setting up (area selection, scope, coordination, personnel); planning (diagnostic, plan development, validation, implementation); and follow-up (dissemination, institutionalisation). Chapter 5 examines aspects of implementation in infrastructure and housing. Chapter 6 provides an overview of other urban planning and development initiatives in Haiti related to recovery after the earthquake outside of the 28 community planning crisis contexts to understand what happened next (Levine 2015). This paper attempts to explore what happened during and after community planning and neighbourhood interventions. Seven years is a short time in post-disaster recovery or in a city’s development, and longer studies are needed to continue to examine the impacts of planning activities.
projects. Chapter 7 presents conclusions from the Haiti post-earthquake experience and recommendations for community planning in future humanitarian crisis situations.

1.3 Methodology

We use a case study approach to illustrate the unique combination of changing factors influencing recovery. This provides an accessible means to explore perspectives, dilemmas, trade-offs and consequences, capturing the complex and constrained conditions under which humanitarian response operates (Stake 2009, Thomas 2011, Taylor 2013). Urban analysts highlight the importance of building a database of city case studies using multiple methods to increase understanding of the challenges of recovery (Blanco et al. 2009, Olshansky and Chang 2010).

Most post-disaster case studies seek to promote best practice lessons for replication in future disasters or to evaluate the impact of humanitarian policies and programmes. This case study does not seek to evaluate, measure or compare the impacts of the 28 initiatives. Our aim is to explore shared experiences and the processes involved in the collective effort of community planning in a common context over a seven-year period. We seek to be descriptive and explanatory, using data from the digital archive for illustration and focusing on participant reflections on their experiences. The 2010–2016 timing represents the trajectory of most post-earthquake funding and activities in Port-au-Prince, the transition to development programming and an appropriate moment to take stock.

1.3.1 Data sources

The research was a collaborative process. We collected documentation from coordinating and funding bodies, implementing agencies and individuals and held semi-structured interviews with around 50 respondents from more than 20 organisations. These included government authorities, United Nations (UN) agencies, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), NGOs, private sector planning professionals, civil society stakeholders and community representatives. We conducted many of the interviews in Port-au-Prince during field research in June 2016, when we visited 14 neighbourhood community planning locations.

We sought to capture respondents’ reflections on their own roles and lessons learned. So, we use direct anonymised quotations, to allow their voices to be heard and assure confidentiality. As several NGO, INGO, UN and donor organisations were involved in the 28 plans and in complex arrangements over the timeframe, attribution throughout the document would be unwieldy. We refer generically to assistance actors as organisations. Details of organisations’ roles and responsibilities may be found in the project data in the folders (see the ‘more information’ table below).

1.3.2 Limitations

Two-thirds of the data in the digital archive were not publicly available. Some key data are yet to be retrieved. We hope the digital archive will expand to accommodate additional and new data. The departure of organisations or turnover of personnel meant that some individuals were not available for interview. Personnel involved at later stages often did not know the rationale behind decision making at earlier stages, and personnel involved only at earlier stages often did not know the outcomes of plans. The interviews rely on key informant recollection up to seven years after events, but most had extensive field notes from the time.

1.3.3 Researchers

The three authors worked in Haiti over different periods from 2005 to 2014. Our roles included developing and implementing community plans and neighbourhood programmes, monitoring reconstruction progress and providing policy assistance to government. Familiarity with the community planning process facilitated our access to data and key respondents. We may be considered participant observers, while acknowledging that we were not present for the full seven years or involved in all of the 28 projects.

1.4 Context

Many resources describe the urban development contexts in Haiti before and after the earthquake, including:

- UN-Habitat (2009) Situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince
- Rencoret et al. (July 2010) Haiti earthquake response: context analysis’ of July 2010, and
- GFDRR, supported by Habitat for Humanity, UN-Habitat and the IFRC (October 2016) What did we learn?
The Groupe URD Haiti Observatory website also has a wide range of urban context and recovery data. Contextual aspects relevant to post-earthquake community planning include:

- The city’s rapid informal growth
- The earthquake’s impact on the built environment
- Displacement and the humanitarian response
- The institutional context of urban planning and the built environment
- The economic situation, and
- The political situation and foreign assistance.

1.4.1 The city’s physical context and rapid informal growth, 1980–2010

Port-au-Prince is situated in a coastal plain bordered by steep slopes to the south that rise to over 2,000 metres. Haiti has a tropical humid climate and is exposed to frequent Caribbean tropical storms and hurricanes. Even moderate rainfall can cause inundation and flash flooding in the heavily populated marshlands and ravines and landslides on the slopes. As well as being exposed to weather hazards, Port-au-Prince is vulnerable to earthquakes and the increased risk of rising sea levels. The topography of the city is a challenge to urban planning, infrastructure provision and disaster risk management. Its many steep slopes and ravines or gullies mean that nearby areas are often not connected and make sewerage installations and solid waste collection difficult.

The city grew rapidly between 1980 and 2010. At the time of the earthquake, most of the population lived in informal neighbourhoods, developed largely outside of urban planning or controls. Areas of Port-au-Prince were the most densely populated in the Western Hemisphere; but they lacked basic infrastructure or services. Many neighbourhoods were located on marginal, low-lying sites that were prone to flooding or on precarious steep slopes. Growth in informal settlements was driven by demand for housing as the city’s population grew from 500,000 to 2.7 million between 1982 and 2007. In 2008, over 70% of people living in the city’s informal neighbourhoods were originally from the countryside (UN-Habitat 2009), which shows the dynamic and emergent nature of the settlements and communities (Corbet 2012). Figure 1 maps the growth of Port-au-Prince from 1950 to 2010, illustrating rapid expansion from 1980 onwards.

Figure 2 illustrates the typical density and pattern of urban development in Jalousie, an informal neighbourhood. The blue plastic sheeting shows where shelters are constructed on roofs, as well as a small camp on the flat land at the top of the hill (top right of the photograph). Jalousie suffered less damage than most other areas.

Source: MPCE, UN-Habitat and UNDP (2011). Used with permission of the government of Haiti.

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2 https://urd.org/en/research-page/?activite=observatories&zone_geo=haiti
1.4.2 The earthquake’s impact on the built environment

The Haiti post-disaster needs assessment estimated damages of approximately US$7.8 billion, exceeding the country’s 2009 national GDP (GoH 2010b). The Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications/Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) reported that 80,397 houses in Port-au-Prince were destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and 103,937 houses were damaged but deemed repairable (GFDRR 2016). Considering the proportion of residential buildings that housed multiple families, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee (IHRC) estimated that 105,468 housing units or homes were destroyed and 156,277 damaged (GFDRR 2016). Figures 3 and 4 map destroyed/damaged beyond repair (red), repairable (yellow) and habitable (green) buildings.

Figure 3. MTPTC rapid visual assessment of damage and habitability for Port-au-Prince, 2010

Most of the damage occurred in informal neighbourhoods in the south of the city. Challenges included access and circulation, rubble removal, demolition of unsafe buildings, space for shelter and basic utilities. Difficult conditions in the neighbourhoods contributed to large-scale displacement to formal and spontaneous camps. Neighbourhood recovery, including community planning, could not advance until emergency needs were met. Political instability, cholera and hurricanes in 2010 protracted the emergency phase (GFDRR 2016).

Figure 4. Visual assessment map of damage and habitability in Bristou-Bobin, in the Petionville suburb of Port-au-Prince

Source: UN-Habitat (2012). Used with permission.

Figure 5. Typical informal neighbourhood immediately after the earthquake

Credit: Alain Grimard/UN-Habitat
1.4.3 Displacement and the humanitarian response

The number of people displaced in camps reached 1.5 million in the summer of 2010 as many city residents returned after being initially displaced to rural areas. Tents and shelters occupied footpaths, streets and private and public spaces. Camps became a defining feature of the crisis in the city, a political priority for the incoming government in 2011 and a key measurement of the humanitarian response. The return of displaced households to their neighbourhoods was facilitated by removing debris, rehabilitating services, repairing damaged houses, providing temporary shelters on the sites of destroyed houses and subsidising rent (Fitzgerald 2012).

1.4.4 Institutional context for urban planning and the built environment

In Haiti, the central government is responsible for national urban policy and strategic planning. Municipalities have planning responsibilities in their area but must comply with national policies. Port-au-Prince comprises seven municipalities but has no mechanisms for metropolitan-level governance.

Before the earthquake, national agencies with responsibility for urban development included:

- Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe/Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE)

Figure 6. Camps with tents and tarpaulins (left) and with shelters made from salvage materials and tarpaulins (right), 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 7. Spontaneous camp (left) and a planned camp north of the city at Corail Cesselesse (right), 2010

Credit: Giovanni Cassani/IOM
• Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications/Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC)
• Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire/Interministerial Committee for Territorial Management and Planning (CIAT)
• Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales/Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MICT)
• Individual municipalities, and
• From mid-2011 (formally from July 2012) the new Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics/Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit (UCLBP), responsible for coordinating and implementing reconstruction policies and projects.

Before the earthquake, Haiti was characterised by weak and fragmented government. Extensive losses of premises, data and key personnel further weakened government capacity to lead or manage recovery, exacerbating policy vacuums and delays in decision making and limiting the institutionalisation of urban development and risk reduction measures.

1.4.5 Economic situation

Haiti ranked 149 out of 182 in the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP 2009). In 2008, GDP per capita was US$729 and inflation was at 15.5%. Remittance inflows constituted 18.7% of GDP in 2007 (ALNAP 2010). Almost three-quarters of the population was living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank 2009). Income distribution was highly unequal: in 2001, 20% of the poorest households had 2% of total income and 20% of the richest households had 68%. Inequality worsened after the earthquake, suggesting the poorest households continued to lose more after the disaster while the wealthier moved towards recovery.

"Households are not borrowing to recover; they are borrowing to survive" (Feinstein International Centre/INURED 2013).

The low economic capacity of most of the people living in the informal neighbourhoods affected by the earthquake was a key factor in housing and neighbourhood reconstruction.

1.4.6 Political situation and foreign assistance

The 2010 earthquake precipitated a massive international response in terms of institutional and public financial assistance, number and diversity of humanitarian organisations and intensity of media attention. The Haiti earthquake was a global story. Overwhelming international attention is not new to the country. The disaster exposed centuries of underdevelopment and mismanagement at times exacerbated by foreign policy and foreign aid interventions. Understanding the dynamics of the emergency response and recovery required appreciating the historical and political context, including key geopolitical interests and relationships – with the United States, Canada, France, other Caribbean and Latin American countries – and understanding the dominant size and role of the non-governmental sector in Haiti (Schuller and Morales 2012).

Elections were due in February, as 2010 was the last year of President Preval’s second five-year term. Following delays, the new President Martelly was confirmed in April 2011. Recovery from the earthquake was characterised by a transfer of power, a fledgling administration trying to gain traction in extraordinary circumstances and periods of unrest and tension due to political and/or economic difficulties.
Community planning in post-earthquake Port-au-Prince

2.1 Providing an overview of community and other urban planning projects

This document aims to provide an overview of the community and other urban planning projects — such as recovery and new sites — that were executed after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. We collected as much information on these projects as possible and organised it in three ways:

1. Tables showing the associated organisations, number of pages produced and main donor (Table 1) and neighbourhood name, area (in hectares) and population (Table 2)

2. Maps with the boundaries of all the discussed neighbourhoods. (Figures 8 and 9), and

3. An archive with a wide selection of information on the discussed neighbourhoods, the context and the background.

We discuss all three in more detail in this section.
### 2.1.1 Community plans\(^3\)

Table 1. Overview of the plans, organisations involved, length of main planning documents and main donors (the colours in the table correspond to the shaded areas in the maps in Figures 8 and 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOLDER</th>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>ASSOCIATED ORGANISATIONS</th>
<th>±# PAGES OF PLANNING DOC</th>
<th>MAIN DONOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ti Sous</td>
<td>Cordaid, Fondation Architectes de l’Urgence/Emergency Architects Foundation (FAU)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Martissant</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement/French Development Agency (AFD), Gret</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>AFD, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Grand Ravine</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Concern, Architecture for Humanity (AfH)</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fort-Mercredi / Cité 9</td>
<td>FAU, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>HRF Debris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Carrefour Feuilles</td>
<td>UN-Habitat, FAU</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>HRF Debris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>We/Spora, Société d’expertise et d’ingénierie LGL</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Baillergeau</td>
<td>AFD, Gret</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>AFD, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Campêche</td>
<td>American Red Cross (ARC), We/Spora, Global Communities (GC)</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>RC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Desprez</td>
<td>Gret, Oxfam GB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>TiSavan</td>
<td>FAU, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Haiti Reconstruction Forum (HRF), Debris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Haut Turgeau</td>
<td>GOAL, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>HRF 16/6, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Canape Vert</td>
<td>GOAL, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>HRF 16/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Villa Rosa / St. Marie</td>
<td>AfH, Cordaid, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>HRF 16/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Morne Lazare / Nerette / Morne Hercule</td>
<td>FAU/UN-Habitat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HRF 16/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bristou-Bobin</td>
<td>UN-Habitat, FAU, Solidarités</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>HRF Debris, Badische Anilin- &amp; Soda-Fabrik (BASF), United Methodist Committee on Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ravine Pintade</td>
<td>Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), which became GC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), HRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Christ Roi</td>
<td>Solidarités, FAU</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\)In several of the 28 neighbourhoods, more than one diagnostic or plan was developed between 2010 and 2016, by the same or different actors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOLDER</th>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>ASSOCIATED ORGANISATIONS</th>
<th>±# PAGES OF PLANNING DOC</th>
<th>MAIN DONOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nazon</td>
<td>CHF (GC)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>HRF, Projet de Reconstruction des Quartiers Défavorisés de Port-au-Prince/Port-au-Prince Disadvantaged Neighbourhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Delmas 30</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RC, HRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Delmas 32</td>
<td>SODADE, Jenkins Penn Haiti Relief Organisation</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>HRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Delmas 9 (7-13)</td>
<td>Croix Rouge Française</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>RC, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Delmas 19</td>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>RC, HRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Simon Pele</td>
<td>Habitat for Humanity, AfH</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>OFDA, HRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Gingerbread districts</td>
<td>World Monuments Fund, Fondasyon Konesans Ak Libète/La Fondation Connaissance et Liberté/ Foundation for Knowledge and Liberty (FOKAL)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Prince Claus Fund (PCF), Institut de Sauvegarde du Patrimoine National, International Council on Monuments and Sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Carradeux</td>
<td>CRS, Cordaid, Affordable Housing Institute</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nan Cocteau</td>
<td>CORDAID, FAU</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>De Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Solino</td>
<td>CRS, AFH</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Fort National</td>
<td>Groupe IBI-DAA Architecture and Planning Company (IBI-DAA), UN-Habitat</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>MPCE, HRF 16/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Jalousie</td>
<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>HRF 16/6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B Downtown Duany Plater-Zyberk (DPZ), The Prince's Foundation, IBI-DAA, Centre Haïtien de Recherche en Aménagement et en Développement/ Haitian Centre for Research in Planning, Management and Development (CHRAD), Trame 175 Government of Haiti (GoH), The Prince's Foundation

C Canaan MCPE, UCLBP, SODADE, IBI-DAA, UN-Habitat, ARC, GC 525 GoH, USAID, RC

D Planned sites USAID, GoH

|                  |                  |                  | 3,522 (total number of pages) |
Table 2. Overview of area and population, by neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOLDER</th>
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<th>± AREA (HA)</th>
<th>± POPULATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>31,492</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Martissant</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Grand Ravine</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fort-Mercredi /Cité 9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Carrefour Feuilles</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>111,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Baillergeau</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8,894</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Campêche</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Desprez</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>TiSavan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,102</td>
</tr>
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<td>Haut Turgeau</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Canape Vert</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5,945</td>
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<td>Villa Rosa / St. Marie</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12,600</td>
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<td>Morne Lazare / Nerette / Morne Hercule</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>16,097</td>
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<td>Bristou-Bobin</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22,325</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ravine Pintade</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,760</td>
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<td>Christ Roi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nazon</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<td>Delmas 30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,500</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Delmas 32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76,000</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Solino</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Fort National</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Jalousie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Downtown</td>
<td>47-240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Canaan</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Planned sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on authors’ own estimates and information from project documents
2.1.2 Maps

A city-scale map with all the project boundaries was not available, so we complied one based on individual project documents (Figures 8 and 9). These maps are also available online via Google Maps (see the 'more information' table at the end of this section), where they can also be downloaded for geographic information system purposes.

Figure 8. Metropolitan-scale map with associated planning neighbourhoods

Credit: Laura Smits

Figure 9. Map of Port-au-Prince with associated community planning neighbourhoods

Credit: Laura Smits
2.1.3 Digital archive

We collected as much data as possible on all the community planning projects. Our archive comprises published and unpublished, finished and working documents, drawings, maps, photographs and videos on community planning and neighbourhood recovery programme implementation and other urban planning efforts. Together, they give direct access to the original data produced through the community planning process.

The digital archive also contains selected resources on other post-earthquake urban planning initiatives for Port-au-Prince that were outside of community planning in informal neighbourhoods, as well as background documents on planning and urban development in Haiti. The ‘more information’ table below has links to the digital archive as well as links to other relevant material.

The archive is structured as follows:

- **Neighbourhood folders (community planning):** folders for each of the 28 informal neighbourhoods (A1–28), with information on:
  - Diagnostics and assessments
  - Plans and strategies
  - Implementation details
  - Reports and evaluations, and
  - Communication materials.

  The availability of documentation varies greatly per neighbourhood.

- **City folders (strategic planning):** contain information from planning projects for a larger scale that did not follow a community planning methodology. These include:
  - three plans for the downtown area (B1-3)
  - plans for a new settlement, Canaan (C1)
  - plans for new sites, and
  - institutional development: programmes that were meant to support the government in developing planning capacity.

- **Background:** contains documents with a wider scope, divided into academic work, emergency phase-related documents and recovery phase-related documents.

- **Media:** contains links to videos that was produced, music that were composed, maps and websites.

There are many cross-references in the archive — for example, information about certain neighbourhoods can also be found in an evaluation in the background folder, and some videos in the media folder are about a sub-set of neighbourhoods. Mostly, the information in the neighbourhood folders is specific to that neighbourhood only. Anything that pertains to more than one neighbourhood is in the background folder.

Figure 10. Diagram of the archive structure
MORE INFORMATION: digital archive folders and online maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folder</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti 2010 earthquake: community urban planning archive</td>
<td>The digital archive is made up of four folders: neighbourhood (community planning), city (strategic planning), background and media</td>
<td><a href="http://bit.ly/IIED-Haiti-archive">http://bit.ly/IIED-Haiti-archive</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google Map showing neighbourhoods, project boundaries and landmarks</td>
<td>Google Maps showing community plans by neighbourhood and project; plus landmarks in the city</td>
<td><a href="https://goo.gl/rzeHpi">https://goo.gl/rzeHpi</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Recovery programmes framing community planning

The 28 projects are in neighbourhoods affected by the earthquake. Key overarching programmes and tranches of institutional funding initiated or progressed groups of community planning projects at different stages in the recovery period. The timing, objectives and resources involved in these programmes were major factors in the direction of the community planning effort and in developing the associated plans. We have not categorised the projects by programme, however, as many started under one programme and continued under another. Table 3 summarises the programmes.

2.2.1 Programme overviews on video

The digital archive contains videos that introduce the context and provide an overview of each recovery programme. Watching these videos provides a good introduction to the city, the informal neighbourhoods, the aftermath of the earthquake and key stakeholders in community planning, which will help contextualise this research.

While most of the videos in the table introduce the broader scope of neighbourhood recovery programmes, the last entry is a video produced by the Debris 2 project that focuses on the specific activities involved in community planning in Haiti and the experience of stakeholders involved in the process.

This additional video focuses on the specific activities involved in community planning in Haiti and the experience of stakeholders involved in the process: https://youtu.be/MwazlYxzkvw

2.2.2 The Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Programme

The HNRSP aimed to reinforce institutional mechanisms at national and municipal levels to manage housing and neighbourhood reconstruction and future urbanisation. Developed in 2010 in collaboration with the government and the IHRC, the programme was funded by the HRF and executed as a joint UN programme. It sought to provide appropriate monitoring tools and increase the capacity and competencies of the Haitian state and national ownership of recovery initiatives. Unlike the other housing and neighbourhood recovery programmes in Table 3, where funding was channelled through NGOs for implementation, HNRSP funding was provided primarily to the government.

The programme attempted to move recovery support from a fragmented, project-based approach to a more programmatic one, by addressing the most urgent needs and capacity gaps in government agencies. Delays in funding approval, recruitment and decision making undermined the accomplishment of some HNRSP objectives. In addition, by the time implementation got under way, the fragmented approach to recovery had already taken hold to the point that it was very difficult to overcome. Establishing the UCLBP in 2011 provided a single institutional lead to coordinate and take forward HNRSP activities.4

The HNRSP established Agences Techniques Locales/Local Technical Agencies (ATLs) in all municipalities in Port-au-Prince under the MICT, strengthening local authority capacity to coordinate, communicate and assure quality control and monitoring of reconstruction programmes in their respective areas. Government ATL teams undertook local area diagnostics and planning using approaches similar to those used by NGOs in earthquake-affected informal neighbourhoods.

The HNRSP established the Système d’Information du Logement et des Quartiers/Housing and Neighbourhoods Information System (SILO) in the Centre National de l’Information Géo-Spatiale/National Centre for Geospatial Information (CNIGS). One of the SILO’s first activities was to map neighbourhoods supported by UN-Habitat in close collaboration with community representatives and organisations working in those areas, defining a common reference for all recovery projects including community planning.

As ‘neighbourhood’ is not an official administrative term, the CNIGS website explained the rationale for defining neighbourhoods and the data collected and advocated for a neighbourhood approach to urban recovery and development.

Table 3. Summary of overarching recovery and reconstruction programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Quartier</td>
<td>Pilot early</td>
<td>Debris 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>HNRS*</td>
<td>PREKAD/</td>
<td>PARAQ*</td>
<td>AIQIP*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upgrading</td>
<td></td>
<td>plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neighbourhood Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRODEPUR*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main institutional</td>
<td>Various, including</td>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU AFD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding</td>
<td>USAID and World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government lead</td>
<td>CIAT, BMPAD*</td>
<td>MTPTC</td>
<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>UCLBP</td>
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*AIQIP: Programme d’aménagement intégré de quartiers informels de Port-au-Prince/Programme for Integrated Planning, Management and Development of Informal Neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince

BMPAD: Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement/Office of Monetisation of Development Aid

HNRS: Programme d’Appui à la Reconstruction du Logement et des Quartiers/Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Programme

PARAQ: Programme d’Appui à la Reconstruction et à l’Aménagement de Quartiers/Support Programme for Neighbourhood Reconstruction, Planning, Management and Development

PRODEPUR: Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain/Project for Participatory Community Development in Urban Environments
LEARNING FROM COMMUNITY PLANNING FOLLOWING THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE

MORE INFORMATION: programme overview videos

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Figure 11. Map of neighbourhoods in the communes that comprise metropolitan Port-au-Prince, 2011

Credit: SILQ CNIGS supported by UN-Habitat. Used with permission.
The institutional and policy context influenced why community planning and neighbourhood recovery projects were instigated, what they were trying to achieve and how they were executed.

3.1 Institutional and policy factors

There were different visions for neighbourhood recovery and the future of the city

After the earthquake, there was broad consensus that the 2010 earthquake was a particularly urban crisis. However, there was less agreement on urban recovery strategies. Government officials, Haitian civil society and assistance agencies had diverging and often conflicting perspectives on the future of informal neighbourhoods. Among other views, they viewed recovery as an opportunity to:

• Clear illegal slums, which are a blight on the city
• Prevent people from rebuilding on highly vulnerable sites
• Encourage people to move (back) to secondary cities, decongesting the capital
• Develop new, well-planned cities and satellite suburbs
• Rebuild the neighbourhoods with adequate infrastructure and quality housing, and
• Accelerate legal reform and regularise the status of informal neighbourhoods.

Coordination with and between authorities was not systematic

Neighbourhood recovery programmes are multi-sectoral and may have local- and city-level implications. Organisations found themselves coordinating with a wide range of government agencies for guidance, approval or reporting, including: MTPTC, MPCE, CIAT, MICT, UCLBP, DINEPA,5 CNIGS, BMPAD, as well as local authorities and elected officials. Government lead or focal agency roles in relation to guiding neighbourhood projects varied according to institutional funding arrangements. Although the HNRSP aimed to strengthen and simplify coordination between the government and organisations operating in neighbourhoods, it could not encompass all authorities or establish consensus between authorities with diverging views on recovery.

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5 DINEPA is the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement/National Agency for Potable Water and Sanitation.
Informal neighbourhoods operated outside of urban regulatory systems

Before the earthquake, most residents did not participate in a formal land system with official titles or cadastre. Areas were developed without adherence to planning regulations. Properties were built without permits or adherence to construction standards. Their functioning outside of state regulations and mechanisms was arguably among the reasons informal neighbourhoods were so prevalent, rapidly built and effective in accommodating the population. But this deficit of state engagement also contributed to deficits in infrastructure and services for communities and tax revenues for government. After the earthquake, regulatory issues ranging from extra-legal status to appropriate planning and construction standards and enforcement affected reconstruction of those neighbourhoods.

Housing was a priority after the earthquake, but the housing sector was institutionally weak

The impact of the earthquake was, to a large extent, measured by the number of homes that were damaged or destroyed and the number of homeless families in camps. Emptying camps and rebuilding houses became key performance indicators for government and donors and in media reporting, helping make (re)housing the driver of neighbourhood recovery policies.

One-and-a-half million people displaced in urban camps highlighted underlying weaknesses in urban housing policies. No pre-earthquake government agency had the necessary experience in housing policy to assume responsibility for planning or coordination of housing recovery and Haiti’s government struggled to establish a consensus on the role of the state in housing. The UCLBP clarified housing reconstruction policies from 2012 onwards. But this was not in time to marshal all the housing stakeholders and resources; nor did the unit have the ability to do so.

Although coverage and a collective response guided emergency shelter activities, these were not determining factors in the recovery

Aiming to provide basic assistance to the maximum number of affected people and areas, the emergency shelter response achieved practically full coverage by coordinating the organisations involved and resources available. But assistance for reconstruction subsequently retreated into selected areas, with marked differences in levels of funding and activities between neighbourhoods. This left some areas without any support despite clear needs. Respondents and project reports and documentation cited several reasons for this shift, including:

- Reconstruction needs that were too vast for assistance to cover all affected areas
- Inadequate funds available for reconstruction — far lower than emergency phase funds
- No clear overview on available funding amounts or timing
- Possibility of filling gaps later when funds became available
- Pressure to deliver tangible results that resulted in organisations concentrating their efforts and resources
- Commitments made in some neighbourhoods during the emergency phase or in planning that required all available resources
- A lack of measurable and visible results — or results within a recovery timeframe — from investing in institutional support, training or other support activities, and
- Organisations being liable for the funds they provided, which meant they could not finance or contribute to works that did not meet standards — so they favoured smaller outputs at high standard over larger outputs at inadequate standard.

Unlike in the shelter response, there was no effective coordination mechanism to promote collective responsibility for coverage of assistance, optimising resources, prioritising neighbourhoods or determining agreed levels of assistance or appropriate support activities.

One response

The government struggled to establish or maintain an overview of funding commitments and allocations. The IHRC and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Humanitarian Cluster System carried out partial tracking, joined latterly by the MPCE. However, with such a wide range of institutional and non-institutional funding, it was difficult for authorities, implementing agencies, media or affected communities to access a comprehensive account of resources or to ensure transparency and accountability.

Planning the transition from emergency to reconstruction or development activities and funding was challenging. This was due both to Haiti-specific policy deficits and to structural gaps between the modus operandi of emergency and reconstruction systems that have different donors, funding terms and conditions, coordination mechanisms, organisations and personnel. The concept of ‘one response’ in Haiti emphasised coherence across sectors; there was less focus on coherence across phases.
3.1.1 Implications

Agencies decided their own policies and strategies

In the absence of early and agreed government policies for reconstruction of housing and informal neighbourhoods, the recovery effort fragmented. Although it recognised the importance of overall policies, the international community was unable to act collectively to support government policymaking and coordination or to arrive at common working strategies among itself. “Having no strategy both simplified and complicated agencies’ work. While there was no requirement to conform to government guidelines or priorities, each agency had to identify a place to work and define its own approach. The result was a proliferation of unique standards and approaches in individual housing-related projects and an inequitable distribution of the available resources” (GFDRR 2016).

Some organisations were paralysed by extra-legal status and risk aversion

Many organisations were unfamiliar with working in informal urban neighbourhoods and some were unable or slow to adapt their systems to operate in hazardous conditions that often could not be mitigated, without property titles or adequate space to meet standards and with few binding contracts. Organisations were concerned about financial risk due to the works’ extra-legal status and the liability and reputational risk associated with substandard works. Political instability and local security concerns exacerbated this aversion to risk.

Weakly defined housing policies contributed to piecemeal housing interventions

The government struggled to reconcile housing reconstruction expectations with the funding and capacity available. Likewise, the assistance community struggled to define a strategic role for their financial and technical resources. Without the mandate, mechanisms or ability to act collectively or towards long-term impact in the housing sector and under pressure to deliver, external support for housing focused on emptying camps and on initiatives that could be realised and within project timeframes. These included housing repairs, rent subsidies, developing new sites, designing and building small-scale pilot or model housing, institutional support to government agencies for developing building standards, housing finance and other components of the housing sector. However, it was the people who rebuilt most of the housing, without financial or technical assistance. And most rebuilt to the same standards as before the earthquake, reinstating the same vulnerabilities.

Collective responsibility and impact did not guide recovery

Uneven coverage resulted in concentrated resources in some neighbourhoods, with little or no resources invested in others. The absence of agreed recovery policies was mirrored by an absence of mechanisms to define agreed rationales for neighbourhood programmes, distribution of resources and prioritisation. Data on funding, staffing or other assistance resources were not pooled systematically for accountability or to facilitate collective planning. Organisations considered themselves individually responsible for the quality and impact of interventions in their project areas, rather than collectively responsible for gaps in assistance outside their project areas. The 28 projects had a cumulative impact, but greater solidarity might have generated greater momentum and institutional progress on common agendas.

Transitions were problematic

The earthquake occurred in a context of political uncertainty, frustrating early decision making for longer-term reconstruction. The IHRC and working groups under the Early Recovery Cluster such as the Logement Quartiers (housing and neighbourhoods) working group facilitated discussions on reconstruction, including issues of tenure and urban planning. But these were limited in duration, mandates and legitimacy and were unable to coordinate or to develop policies in the transition from emergency to recovery. Transition proved challenging, not only for coordination actors but also within implementing organisation teams, in projects, for donors and for government authorities.

Institutional development and institutionalisation yielded successes but required greater support

Although the government was involved from the earliest pilot community planning initiatives through the HRF-funded Debris projects, it took a major step forward with the launch of its flagship 16/6 programme in 2011. Government ownership continued, with increasing involvement of municipalities and national authorities, the launch of the government’s ‘Guide for urban planning in neighbourhood rehabilitation’ (CIAT 2013) and the adoption of participatory planning approaches in Canaan from 2013.

From 2010 to 2016, there was little investment in government personnel to lead, manage or participate in community planning or neighbourhood programmes compared to investment in non-governmental actors. Institutional development was not an explicit objective for most projects or funding. Large-scale investment in temporary, short-term or external actors, mechanisms and activities contributed to weak institutionalisation of data, skills and experience.
3.2 Guiding principles

Although official recovery vision and policy was weak and the humanitarian response was fragmented, there was a broad consensus on behalf of the assistance community around the following key guiding principles which informed decision making in relation to emergency and recovery initiatives in informal neighbourhoods.

1. Bidonvilles are part of the city

“The informal settlements and the slums of Port-au-Prince are permanent. The people and most of the houses are here to stay. The slum cities that have been created are permanent cities, and may change over time like any city, but they will not disappear. Therefore, the solution to the low living standards in the slums cannot be found in isolated slum upgrading projects, but requires the development of the whole metropolitan Port-au-Prince” (UN-Habitat 2009).

Most of the earthquake damage was in informal neighbourhoods. Support for recovery was obliged to engage with the complex issues of the city’s slums. For some agencies, the objective was simply to alleviate earthquake impacts on vulnerable communities. Others had more strategic objectives: to leverage opportunities to achieve political recognition of informal neighbourhoods and to generate appropriate planning tools and expertise through recovery to contribute to continuous urban development.

Community planning contributed to:

- Accounting for informal neighbourhoods through detailed mapping, enumeration of the population and adressage (the naming of streets and properties)
- Understanding informal neighbourhoods through diagnostics of social and economic profiles and dynamics, technical and experiential risk assessments and analysis of local priorities and perspectives for development, and
- Institutionalising informal neighbourhoods through:
  - Integrating newly generated maps and datasets of informal areas with those covering the formal city (CNIGS, IHSE)
  - Engaging municipalities and national authorities (MICT)
  - Direct government funding to informal neighbourhoods for rehabilitation and upgrading works (UCLBP, BMPAD), and
  - Government-produced guidelines for future community planning in informal neighbourhoods (CIAT).

2. Humanitarian response has a duty of care towards vulnerable populations

Humanitarian response aims to relieve the suffering of the most vulnerable. In disaster situations, it is often only those areas and populations affected by the crisis that are eligible for assistance. Meanwhile, other areas and populations in the city may be equally or more in need. In Haiti, post-earthquake humanitarian funding was predominantly tied to areas of damage and involved:

- Assisting people to rebuild in or further develop high-risk sites, raising questions around reducing, reinstating or even increasing vulnerability. Moving people out of harm’s way to sites like Camp Corail addressed safety but neglected other factors, including livelihoods.
- Humanitarian agencies delivering free water, medical and other services after the earthquake, which negatively affected the recovery and viability of local service providers (Earle 2016).
- Defining the most vulnerable for targeted assistance among large and very vulnerable populations, which consumed considerable time and resources in assessments and was contentious. Targeting was further complicated by the absence of baseline data and displacement.
- Providing temporary shelter and rehabilitation assistance. Property owners were more likely to receive this support, with rental households commonly receiving only camp or shelter support and rental subsidies to a lower value. This demonstrates that sector rationales did not necessarily adhere to criteria of greater assistance to those in greater need.
- Prioritising the emptying of camps in public squares in Petionville and supporting the return of those populations to their neighbourhoods of origin. This was driven by several factors, including the incoming government’s need for visible results (Équipe Michel Martelly 2011).

The impact of the earthquake and a series of subsequent crises – including cholera and hurricanes – exacerbated by underlying conditions meant the emergency phase in Haiti extended for over two years. Allocating funding to longer-term institutional development or activities such as community planning had to be justified over meeting urgent basic needs.
3. Crises are opportunities for positive change

Major disaster events often trigger calls to ‘build back better’, with social, political and financial pledges made to redress the underlying vulnerabilities that contributed to the high levels of damage. In Haiti, this included:

- Calls for change to address shortcomings in construction, planning, risk, livelihoods and government. The levels of financial and human resources mobilised for recovery inevitably fell short of what was needed to redress massive development deficits.

- External assistance catalysing strategic change — for example, in the status of informal neighbourhoods and in local area infrastructure works.

- Contention and a lack of resolution around defining the aim and level of change and the means to bring it about. Unresolved questions around acceptable risk to institutional reform included: Should people leave precarious neighbourhoods? Which ones? Where should they go to? What standards are appropriate for urban sanitation? Are they affordable?

- The earthquake damage resulted in large gaps in dense neighbourhoods and unprecedented funding and technical assistance. This afforded opportunities for rationalisation and planning and to retrofit badly needed infrastructure.

- Organisations underestimated the depth and breadth of development deficits and the timeframe and scale of measures required to achieve substantive and lasting changes.

Many Haitians did not expect to see wholesale changes. Some vested interests did not want or support change. Most poorer Haitians could not afford change.
Community planning processes and methods

Community planning in Haiti varied between neighbourhoods and organisations. Table 4 presents a generalised idea of the key stages common to most community plans.

In this chapter, we describe community planning, preliminary and follow-up steps and framing factors, including:

• Framing factors: funding, timing and duration
• Setting-up: area selection, project scope, coordination and collaboration, team and technology
• Community planning: community engagement, assessments and diagnostic, plan development, detail and calibration, quality assurance and consistency, validation and approval, implementation, and
• Follow-up: dissemination and institutionalisation.

Each sub-section includes factors that shaped the issue, observations on the implications, quotes from respondents and examples from the community plans.

This chapter does not seek to present step-by-step guidance on how to plan or implement community planning and neighbourhood recovery activities in a crisis. For readers seeking methodological data, details of planning and implementation processes developed and used in Haiti may be found in the 28 neighbourhood folders and in the background folders in the digital archive.
Table 4. Key stages common to most community planning projects in post-earthquake Port-au-Prince

<table>
<thead>
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<th>SETTING UP</th>
<th>COMMUNITY PLANNING</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION</th>
<th>FOLLOW-UP</th>
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<td>EARLY IMPLEMENTATION</td>
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<td>Select area</td>
<td>Neighbourhood enumeration</td>
<td>Conduct overall visioning sessions, focus groups and design charrettes on specific topics with community stakeholders</td>
<td>Execute or coordinate preparatory activities: emergency humanitarian activities, temporary or rehabilitation works, rubble clearance, etc</td>
<td>Develop detailed implementation plans for key projects: technical drawings, specifications, budgets</td>
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<td>Define scope</td>
<td>Participatory assessments</td>
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<td>Recruit and train project team</td>
<td>Consultation and community workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engage with community leadership</td>
<td>Mapping: roads, pathways, drainage, electricity, water, public spaces, amenities</td>
<td>Consolidate community input with technical analysis into a strategic plan</td>
<td>Execute ‘quick win’ activities identified in planning</td>
<td>Validate the plan with community stakeholders and relevant public authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engage with national and local government and local institutions</td>
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*www.iied.org*
4.1 Framing factors

4.1.1 Funding

Funding refers to humanitarian and development financial support for organisation activities.

There was considerable funding available for the emergency response and recovery in Haiti. More than US$500 million was disbursed in temporary shelter and US$400 million in neighbourhood recovery programmes, including housing rehabilitation and reconstruction. Although this level of funding is high considering the number of homes destroyed (100,000) and damaged (150,000), project costs were very high, funding was unevenly distributed and the underlying development needs were great. HRF channelled over US$200 million into neighbourhood recovery on behalf of several institutional donors. RC, AFD and the EU were the other major sources of institutional funding for neighbourhood recovery.

Strategic seed funding by USAID OFDA enabled early community planning and neighbourhood recovery activities that delivered tangible results, credibility and momentum. This early investment in planning aimed to leverage, guide and optimise anticipated reconstruction funding. Funds were invested to demonstrate the potential of urban transformation in informal neighbourhoods and/or to develop methodologies and train personnel in recovery planning and integrated recovery programmes.

Expectations of funding for reconstruction were extremely high in the first few months after the earthquake. But the funding available was far lower than expected and required all involved to recalibrate their plans. Uncertainty in terms of amounts, timing and conditions mitigated efforts to plan or prioritise the still significant funds available. Funding for neighbourhood programmes was usually predicated on housing recovery and included target numbers of households to assist for various housing-related measures. In general, funding for post-earthquake rehabilitation was tied to areas with high levels of physical earthquake damage. In some cases, donors also tied it to the locations they had already assisted in the emergency response.

Without clarity or coordination on funding or prospective funding throughout all stages, recovery policies, agreed scopes of work or of planning activities, and discussion on the levels of funding per area/population/activity or on rationales for prioritisation were limited.

The cost of community planning is difficult to disaggregate from the neighbourhood recovery programme. Respondents’ estimates average between US$100,000 and 500,000 per neighbourhood. Across 28 neighbourhoods, the total ranged between US$2.8 and 14 million. This estimate does not include the cost of all specialised technical inputs or intensive inputs on specific reconstruction works; nor does it account for series of plans prepared for the same neighbourhoods. The US$2.8–14 million invested in community planning can be analysed in relation to the US$400 million invested in neighbourhood recovery.

OBSERVATIONS

Advantages and disadvantages of piecemeal funding: delays in funding caused gaps in programming and missed opportunities, but also enabled incremental development over a longer period, at a pace and through a process that accommodated trial and error, capacity building and political traction. The fragmentation of – and lack of transparency on – funding mitigated collective and strategic decision making.

Operational costs and delays: high operational costs in Haiti meant that delays – in decision making by authorities or funding agencies, processing data, editing, feedback loops or validating plans – all had major cost implications without adding any tangible value for affected communities. Delays consumed funds in premises and vehicle rental and in salaries to retain staff, but authorities and donors often did not perceive such costs as project disbursement.

Consistency and equity: many organisations coordinated to establish consistency on the value of rental subsidies, the cost of housing repairs and unit costs for civil works. The level of funding per household or population in community planning and neighbourhood rehabilitation and upgrading works varied widely and was not explicit in project proposals or reports.

Funding for affected communities or locations to recover: many residents affected by the earthquake sought a future elsewhere in the city, but found themselves unable to access either technical or financial assistance, which was geographically tied to damaged neighbourhoods.

Investment in plans or planning: investment in plans involved project-by-project staffing and contracts. Investment in national or municipal institutional planning capacity was small-scale and short-term in comparison to investment in community planning (Boyer and Baunard 2013).
“The funding is always incremental. We merge various sources, different agendas and put together a collective programme.”

“Uncertainty about how to finance housing recovery began with the donor-led Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the government-led Action Plan for National Reconstruction and Development of Haiti (APNRDH)… The PDNA assumed repair and reconstruction in situ would be major cost items, whereas the APNRDH assumed the major costs would be for land acquisition and infrastructure for major relocation sites.”

“These projects are an anomaly. They probably won’t happen again. Unless [the organisation] gets half a billion dollars…”

4.1.2 Timing and duration

Timing and duration refer to the date that community planning started and the period of development and implementation.

The timing of community planning initiatives influenced their aim, scope and role and the type of funding available. Early pilot community planning in 2010 and 2011 provided methodologies and results which enabled large scaling-up from 2012 onwards and leveraged later development funding from 2014 onwards.

The average duration for community planning — in other words, for local engagement, diagnostic, planning, validation and detailing — was nine months. Respondents expressed opinions that six months would be a feasible timeframe and that twelve months would be preferable.

The duration of community planning activities did not vary widely by size of area or population, or by complexity of conditions. Rather, it varied according to methodologies chosen, the scope of planning activities, input from experts and revision/validation processes.

Respondents said that all organisations underestimated the time required for data collection to establish detailed baselines. The reasons for this included using comprehensive methodologies, complex working conditions and capacity levels of the personnel involved, many of whom had no previous experience.

The duration of community planning and neighbourhood rehabilitation and development activities varied:

- One to two years for some who engaged in early support in parallel with emergency response
- Five to seven years for others who either started late or managed a sequence of interventions, and
- Over ten years where organisations had previous activities already underway at the time of the earthquake or planned to continue in future.

Duration is a critical factor to consider in relation to any organisation’s aims for neighbourhood development.

OBSERVATIONS

Planning takes time: no respondents considered it feasible to compress the process under six months with increased manpower, citing the impossibility of short-circuiting the processing, feedback loop, discussion, local ownership and approval steps.

Understanding planning takes time: although prolonged engagement in planning would allow time to develop an understanding of planning processes, it also requires funding and time commitments from organisations and communities. Few organisations invested in structured capacity building of wider teams, communities or local officials in planning issues during this time.

Simultaneous activities: organisations usually carried out several activities simultaneously, completing post-earthquake support, responding to cholera, hurricanes or flooding, undertaking training, supporting livelihood recovery or development even while planning was underway for mainly physical works identified through the planning process. Community experience of implementing all activities at different stages influenced their relationships with and expectations of the organisations involved in community planning.
4.2 Setting up

4.2.1 Area selection

Area selection refers to how organisations identified and defined the planning project spatially. The level of earthquake damage was indicated by numbers/ratios of buildings destroyed in official data and by visual inspection. The level of recovery need was further indicated by living conditions and socioeconomic profiles. Organisations were influenced in their area selection by their pre-earthquake presence in those areas and pre-existing relationships with the community or post-earthquake emergency relief works and continuity into recovery. The government prioritised some areas, such as main areas of origin/return for residents in high-profile camps. Donor funding was generally tied to earthquake-damaged areas and/or pre-earthquake programme areas and/or areas assisted in the relief phase.

Organisations avoided some neighbourhoods or sub-areas within them due to high risk of landslides, flooding or environmental risks, or due to perceived operational risks such as insecurity or conflict. Informal status was institutional donors promoted links between relief, recovery and development in the same areas and with the same partner organisations. In other cases, areas perceived to have received ample investment in the emergency phase had the funding withdrawn in later phases. Areas that were not included or eligible in the emergency phase also found difficulties in securing funding or support in later stages.

Outside the boundary: some organisations developed a two-tier approach to area selection, carrying out intensive works inside the official project area and partial works in adjoining areas that were not receiving other assistance. The aim was to mitigate the shadow effect or inclusion/exclusion implications of project boundaries and associated frustration for communities outside the project area. Respondents reported that, while attempts to blur the boundaries provided much-needed investment, they also generated new problems, raising expectations, comparisons and questions that were not easy to answer.
not a disqualifying factor in area selection, as almost all damaged neighbourhoods were informal and over 80% of the population lived in such areas. For some organisations, supporting informal settlements towards recognition and development was as important as post-disaster reconstruction. However, most donors and organisations did not recognise that newly emerging informal post-disaster settlements had the same potential and challenges as pre-earthquake informal settlements and did not support new settlements during their rapid growth after the earthquake.

In many plans, neighbourhood sub-areas were classified according to levels of informality. The map and photographs in Figure 13 show levels of informality, with purple, green and blue representing different levels of development. But there was no consensus on how to classify or name the different levels of informality. Informal neighbourhoods included established settlements like Savane Pistache and emerging settlements on the foothills of Morne l’Hôpital (both in Figure 13).

QUOTES

“But I don’t know what to do with up there [Morne l’Hôpital foothills] MTPTC says it’s a red zone and no-one should be there; everything should be demolished. But that’s not going to happen. If I started to do something up there, would I just make it easier? Would more people arrive, and the problem get worse? I don’t have the money to go in and build retaining structures everywhere, and if I did, I’d have to relocate everyone.”

“Petionville was easy. I’m glad some of the neighbourhoods were done but we didn’t need to do all of them… We could have predicted that Petionville would boom.”
4.2.2 Project scope

Project scope refers to the facets of urban development addressed in community planning and neighbourhood recovery: the physical site and situation, risk, infrastructure, housing, services, governance, social cohesion and economic development. Although we can describe all 28 projects as multi-sectoral or integrated, they varied in their coverage of or emphasis on different topics.

Organisations involved in early community planning initiatives were uncertain about the prospects of funding for implementation. Later initiatives had greater clarity on resources and therefore potential implementation.

Many of the neighbourhood programmes were funded under housing recovery budgets, but most of the works in the plans and under implementation were not housing. Planning as a community consultative process focused less on the rehabilitation of private assets and more on collective issues and measures. Most project funding had fixed criteria, such as assisting the most vulnerable or reducing risk. Delivering visible results was a priority for government, donors, organisations and communities themselves.

Planning project documentation — both for implementation and reporting — emphasises physical works, reflecting the process of preparing maps, drawings and specifications, the visible outputs and the proportion of the budget involved. However, analysis of project team composition, time and daily activities indicates the significance of — and investment in — social and economic development to strengthen, among other things:

- Representation and participation
- Relationships between communities and authorities
- Mitigating local tensions and conflict
- Empowerment of women and girls
- Youth leadership and skills development
- Support for the earthquake injured and disabled
- Psychosocial support and promoting public health
- Promoting entrepreneurship and small business
- Cultural expression, and
- Communication and feedback mechanisms.

**QUOTES**

“The masterplan is really, really ambitious. But I guess that’s part of what a masterplan is — it’s the future, the future plan. We’re doing access up the ravine but it calls for a two-lane road, it’s just astronomically expensive. So the way I look at it is, maybe we’ve set the scene for the government to do it in the future.”

“The projects were prioritised but it comes down to a judgement call with our budget, and in some cases we do scaled-down versions.”

**Figure 13. Map and photographs of levels of informality**

Source: UN Habitat (2012) Diagnostic Urbain et Projets d’Aménagement Carrefour-Feuilles. Used with permission. Credit: Maggie Stephenson (photos)
OBSERVATIONS

How much upgrading do you do in rehabilitation? All neighbourhoods could be described as having severely inadequate infrastructure. Interpretations of rehabilitation varied from restoring infrastructure assets and services to replacing them with significantly improved ones. Resource constraints required limitations on the selection of works or reduced levels of works.

Timescales and scope: preparing community plans or community action plans sets out a long-term vision and direction for the area, to guide both available recovery funding and the actions and resources of local stakeholders and authorities. Not all recommendations in a plan need to be achievable in the short term or under earthquake-related funds. As an inclusive document with a broad scope, such plans were intended to have a life span and relevance beyond humanitarian timeframes and budgets. However, many audiences perceived these community plans, with raised expectations, as a list of commitments.

Works beyond the area or beyond available capacity: many of the identified infrastructure priorities – such as upgrading sanitation with piped sewerage – could not be addressed at the neighbourhood level, with the resources available or by the organisations involved.

MORE INFORMATION: Martissant, Carrefour Feuilles and Grand Ravine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folder</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martissant</td>
<td>The Martissant development plan outlines four zones, each with distinctive features and strategic orientations (see Table 5)</td>
<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/vbnkcdw">https://tinyurl.com/vbnkcdw</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrefour Feuilles</td>
<td>The Carrefour Feuilles development plan proposes a vision focusing on three priority domains of intervention (see Table 6)</td>
<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/w8nxoqt">https://tinyurl.com/w8nxoqt</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Ravine</td>
<td>The Grand Ravine development plan is structured around nine development themes: land use, community infrastructure, land tenure, access and drainage, basic services, settlement patterns, risks, economic activity and housing</td>
<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/uxy7pgv">https://tinyurl.com/uxy7pgv</a></td>
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Table 5. Zones and features of the Martissant development plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WATERFRONT</th>
<th>CORE NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>UPPER NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>HILLS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>Preservation and upgrade of existing urban fabric</td>
<td>Insertion of road network</td>
<td>Environmental preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed use and an economic corridor along the main artery</td>
<td>Creation of Parc de Martissant</td>
<td>Housing reconstruction</td>
<td>Leisure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture (primarily trees)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Priority domains of the Carrefour Feuilles development plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSING</th>
<th>INFRASTRUCTURES</th>
<th>SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microurbanisation in vacant lots</td>
<td>Roads and diverse networks</td>
<td>Educational, health, leisure and sports facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Densification of low-density urban areas</td>
<td>Redevelopment of all ravines</td>
<td>Construction of markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated development and urbanisation of the neighbourhood’s central axis</td>
<td>Development of public spaces</td>
<td>Economic activities: microcredit programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year housing improvement programme</td>
<td>Ecological protection zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of urban agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insertion of road network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water kiosks and public toilets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stairs and pathways with drainage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reforestation of Morne l’Hôpital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste management: compost and waste processing facility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.3 Coordination and collaboration

Coordination and collaboration refer to how organisations interacted with each other and public authorities both within and across projects.

Due to the vacuum of official policies and data, the weakness of authorities and the complexity of the brief for community planning and neighbourhood recovery, organisations mobilised a wide range of expertise to develop and implement their projects. We can describe most of the neighbourhood projects as being implemented by consortia. Organisations procured expertise through their own project staff, partners or consultant. Those who shared office space – particularly site offices – reported greater trust and coordination. Turnover in personnel affected continuity and consistency in programming and resulted in data and knowledge loss, erosion of trust and working relationships that had to be remade.

Coordination between projects was primarily based on grouping by donor, which also meant common timing and common government focal points. Personnel with shared backgrounds tended to coordinate across projects – for example, French speaking/English speaking, architects/urban planners. The HNRSP proposed establishing community resource centres in each neighbourhood to facilitate community discussions and provide both a focal location for assistance organisations and a space for liaison between communities, organisations and authorities. Although centres were established in approximately 20 neighbourhoods, their roles and identities varied depending on whether they operated primarily as organisation site offices or were perceived as local government site offices. While the map of neighbourhood projects shows a concentration of neighbourhood projects in the south of the city, with many even sharing boundaries, in reality many communities were physically separated by ravines and the linkages between them were poor. Communities and organisations were often not familiar with recovery projects in adjoining neighbourhoods.

Examples of coordination and collaboration

Logement Quartiers working group: this working group was established by UN-Habitat under the Early Recovery Cluster within the humanitarian coordination architecture. The working group provided an early and open forum to introduce and promote a neighbourhood approach and community planning, sharing information and progress on evolving methodologies, early experiences and results from pilot community planning initiatives on a biweekly basis with a large number of organisations. While the working group had no mandate to establish official policies, it was effective during 2010–2011 in building common and increased understanding of urban recovery challenges and opportunities, providing a platform for local authorities and expertise and experience in multiple sectors.

Government technical and area-based coordination: the MTPTC’s Service Planification Urbaine (SPU) (urban services planning) department convened weekly thematic workshop sessions for all organisations involved in community planning support with UN-Habitat to:

• Share methodologies and experience from pilot programmes
• Support the development of new initiatives
• Resolve and formalise policies and procedures
• Train personnel, and
• Strengthen relationships between government and non-governmental actors.

The mayors and municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Delmas convened regular meetings of all organisations working on neighbourhood planning and reconstruction in their respective communes to track coverage of and gaps in assistance, liaise on proposals for public infrastructure works and monitor progress in implementation.

Architecture for Humanity informal exchange: AfH established the Rebuilding Centre in Petionville, hosting open monthly presentations and social events for the architecture and urban planning community in Haiti and facilitating in-person exchanges between international and national, practising and student technical personnel, including architects, planners, engineers and others.

Groupe URD Haiti Observatory: from 2012, Groupe URD managed the Haiti Observatory and a variety of initiatives in Haiti to improve analysis, share lessons, provide training and disseminate knowledge of good practice in humanitarian and reconstruction aid in Haiti. The observatory operated a web platform ensuring access to a curated range of data from government, assistance organisations, academia and media and providing timely contributions to public debate and policy and programme development.

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6 See www.urd.org/Our-activities-in-Haiti
OBSERVATIONS

Visiting other projects: all of the respondents were aware that there were other community plans and neighbourhood projects, but most were not familiar with the detailed content, progress or lessons learned, and fewer than 25% of personnel involved in community planning visited other neighbourhood projects despite being in the same city.

Coordination by individuals: coordination was not institutionally systematic throughout all phases, although authorities and groups of organisations convened intermittently over the seven years. Exchange largely relied on proactive individuals being willing to share information and on personal networks. Coordination tended to be informal, without records and was eroded by frequent turnover of personnel.

Turnover and transfer of knowledge: knowledge transfer and network building occurred when organisations, personnel or consultants with experience in one area moved to a new area or organisation, representing a positive consequence of turnover and overlapping of staff, flexible consortia arrangements and the phasing of projects.

Sharing and duplication: without official guiding policies or institutional coordination, formalised or finalised standards, tools and specifications, many organisations developed their own detailed methodologies. As most projects involved similar activities in similar conditions with similar challenges, these individual efforts to address them contributed to a considerable duplication of effort, with implications for time and resources invested. Data sharing was often constrained by concerns around intellectual property rights or organisational liability, and raised questions about the efficiency of project-by-project technical assistance.

Coordination for operational rather than policy issues: coordination was more common on operational issues, such as resolving community disputes or conflict, sharing technical specifications or information on materials or service suppliers or costs. It was less common on policy issues, such as institutionalising project data or the status of informal neighbourhoods in future metropolitan plans.

Platforms: initiatives to specifically collect and share information included working groups and web-based platforms hosted in-country and remotely. While it is easier to share data electronically now than in the era of printed copies in theory, many challenges remain, including:

- Constraints on sharing unfinished and working documents, sensitive information on costs or critical or negative findings
- Government validation
- Organisation headquarters protocols
- Delays associated with validation or editing requirements
- Only summarised data being available, without associated detail
- Concerns around sharing technical data without clarity on users or uses
- Commercial value on work product
- Data overload
- Web-based platforms requiring investment in design, management and maintenance
- Short-term platforms becoming dormant
- Data-source addresses expiring
- Government-hosted sites that, while durable, may only accommodate government-authored or authorised data
- Changes in software or formats rendering data inaccessible in future, and
- Access to data being a component of coordination and institutionalisation as well as a technical challenge and opportunity.

QUOTES

“We went to see donors and our government partners went to see other authorities, but they weren’t interested in what others were doing. We offered them our plans, our info and they weren’t interested. Everyone was struggling and behind and burning cash with nothing to show for it. It’s always easier with people in the field – there’s less ego and politics – sharing [information] happened instead through technical working groups – like with bills of quantities.”
4.2.4 Team

Team refers to personnel and partners formally employed on the project as distinct from community volunteers and government officials. The range of expertise required for community planning included: social mobilisation/community engagement, urban planning, architecture, information management, geospatial analysis, engineering, disaster risk assessment, economic development, social research, communications, graphics, translation, project management, finance, human resources, logistics and administration.

The implementation stage involved additional expertise and numbers of personnel for: engineering, site supervision, training, construction work, horticulture, community development, education, health, monitoring and evaluation, reporting and increased operational support.

For community planning, some lead organisations expanded their teams and recruited in-house expertise. Others entered into partnerships or contracts to procure a range of expertise. Team sizes ranged from 3 to 15+ people. In some arrangements, human resources (such as planners or other staff) were duplicated for the same neighbourhood – in the funding agency, the lead agency, partners and consultants. Duplication ensured quality assurance and support for inexperienced personnel, but sometimes represented redundancy or a lack of trust.

Some planning topics required highly specialised expertise, including technical risk assessment or infrastructure design. Many of the international personnel working in community planning were young, with advanced education but limited relevant field experience. There was a significant turnover of personnel at the end of large-scale emergency activities and the start of recovery activities, when development profile staff replaced emergency profile staff. As community plans were prepared from 2010 onwards, personnel with emergency and development backgrounds were involved, bringing different perspectives and reporting different experiences.

OBSERVATIONS

Humanitarian community planning as an emergency or development activity: some of the emergency personnel lacked urban expertise and experience, while some of the urban development personnel lacked crisis rehabilitation expertise and experience. Community planning after catastrophic damage is not the same as community planning for long-term slum upgrading.

Organisations broadened their expertise and increased their total planning capacity: organisations that expanded their in-house staff for planning and urban recovery programmes reported that their organisational expertise and experience expanded more than those that engaged partners and consultants for planning. Community planning within mixed teams may have been a short-term role, but it provided valuable exposure and on-job training for organisation staff. Organisations that undertook community planning in-house increased the number and range of stakeholders and total capacity involved in the city, compared to organisations that repeatedly drew on a relatively small number of specialised personnel in technical agencies or firms as consultants.

Pooled resource personnel and technical support for technical staff: individual planners and other technical staff benefited from informal and formal coordination for professional exchange, advice and support. Young and inexperienced staff may not have had technical guidance within their own organisations and benefited from opportunities for mentoring, advice or exchange.

Economic profiles: many respondents cited the absence of or shortcomings in economic expertise and experience in their team profiles, leading to a lack of understanding of local markets, local financial capacities and ineffective livelihood and economic development strategies in neighbourhood programming.

Compatibility and understanding: assembling teams with various backgrounds required time to develop mutual understanding, trust and cohesion. Even within similar professions, there were frequently misunderstandings across cultures with different ideological backgrounds and professional practices, as well as language barriers.

QUOTES

“My preference would be to have fewer people for a longer period of time. And I need to stand over all of them as there’s a serious reputational risk.”

“The country is full of engineers but you have no economists, no lawyers or people with a clue of urban policy. It’s easier to build a house than to deal with land regularisation and donors need to show visible things. It’s the view of engineers.”

“Lots of donors and people from the emergency sector did not come from a background of dealing with institutions or through institutions. But the work we were doing was development and that requires institutions. Maybe 90% of the people I met did not have the professional habit to go through the institutions.”
4.2.5 Technology

Technology refers to the use of information and communication hardware and software in community planning.

Organisations widely used high-resolution satellite imagery printed in a large format as a tool to develop baseline maps for annotation of roads, services and property damage, enumeration and other spatial analysis. Some tools originated in data-rich environments and were not directly transferable to the Haitian context. Mobile phone access was widespread and social media was a major channel of communication.

While accessible tools and planning skills facilitate data processing, there are challenges to collecting and institutionalising primary data in contexts like Haiti, which affect the retrieval and use of that data.

The 28 planning reports exhibit a wide range of communication methods and means presenting the overarching community vision/development scheme/project/community action plans.

Figure 14. Planners and other stakeholders use large-format satellite photographs used with transparent overlay for annotation and in fieldwork

Credit: Sylvain Joachim/FAU
The planning and development concept for Ti Sous, on the one hand, (Figure 15) was very diagrammatic, while the community vision for Delmas 32 (Figure 16) was graphically represented as a series of icons and nodes on a rough outline of the neighbourhood.

Figure 15. Planning and development concept for Ti Sous: an accessible neighbourhood with enhanced potential

![Planning and development concept for Ti Sous](image1.png)

Source: CARE (2014)
Credit: Violaine Colonna d'Istria

Figure 16. Community vision for Delmas 32 neighbourhood

![Community vision for Delmas 32](image2.png)

Source: SODADE (2011). Used with permission
The development plan for Ravine Pintade (Figure 17), on the other hand, relied on an aerial photograph for context and attempted to draw individual buildings or clusters.

A much later project in Grand Ravine (Figure 18), based on a digitised survey, was mostly a land use zoning plan with interconnected nodes.

Figure 17. Urban development plan for Ravine Pintade

Figure 18. Community action plan for Grand Ravine
Small-scale proposals for interventions varied considerably in graphic sophistication and detail between plans and over time. This early example from Martissant (Figure 19) is entirely hand-drawn.

**QUOTES**

“When the planners were from social science disciplines, the plans were mainly text. When the planners were from built environment disciplines, there were more drawings. We use the tools and languages of our training.”

“The graphics became very sophisticated. It wasn’t enough to have hand-drawn maps or overlays on photos. But the publishable maps were time-consuming without always adding extra thinking value.”

Figure 19. Extract from the urban planning and development scheme for Martissant

Dans ce site, les zones de maisons à démolir et à reconstruire (en bleu) ne constituent pas de grands secteurs. Une partie est diffuse dans l’habitat qui est resté en bon état. L’aménagement par la constitution de grands îlots (îlots 1, 2, 3, etc.) desservis par une voie nouvelle et par des corridors en escalliers est recommandé. Mais l’aménagement intérieur de ces grands îlots comportera, à côté des parcelles de reconstruction, des secteurs de construction saine préexistants.

Source: MTPTC and ACT/Société d'expertise et d'ingénierie LGL (2012). Used with permission of the government of Haiti
OBSERVATIONS

Open street maps – adapting a tool to context: organisations used OpenStreetMap to collect the addresses of origin of persons displaced to camps. However, most did not have street addresses, which the tool requires. Others provided the names of major streets, several kilometres long, as their approximate addresses. Recording neighbourhood of origin was more appropriate and effective than street address.

Aerial imagery and photos: the use of aerial imagery relied on affordable access to large format printing, through humanitarian coordination and logistics support. It was possible to reuse imagery procured for damage assessment for enumeration and planning initiatives. Satellite imagery was not ideal for steep terrain, which required oblique angles. Balloons and drones provided excellent quality imagery, although their visible presence occasionally generated local concern about their purpose.

Wide use of aerial photos and Google Earth in a data-starved environment allowed planners to communicate information quickly where data may be lacking. The aerial shots of Ravine Pintade (Figure 20) before and after the earthquake give an immediate impression; this was complemented by ground-level photos to give a sense of the scale and severity of destruction.

Familiarity with maps: the participatory use of satellite images for detailed enumeration and addressage, along with cognitive maps and other tools for analysis and planning, cultivated a familiarity and fluency in the use of maps as tools for discussion and decision making among community representatives, local officials and team members.

Geographic information systems and map making: the level of map making involved in both diagnostics and planning was very high, with extensive expertise in geographic information systems and graphics and considerable investment in time and personnel. While team members with various backgrounds could participate in data collection, analysis, reporting and recommendations, only a few were familiar with geospatial software. The emphasis on maps increased the role of those with graphic, map-making and editing skills but may have excluded those without such skills.

Phones: mobile phone access was widespread and social media was a major channel of communication. Mobile phones were used for feedback/complaint lines in the emergency response phase, for cash subsidy transfer in the subsequent phase and for early warning and other preparedness activities in the later phases. Phones were not extensively used to disseminate information or local survey activities in community planning.

Data management: the absence of robust knowledge management systems resulted in the loss of both finalised and working documentation, limiting transfer between colleagues, institutionalisation within the organisation and long-term authorities, and reducing the availability of data for public communication.

Figure 20. Ravine Pintade: before and after the earthquake

Source: left: adapted from Google Earth (2010) Ravine Pintade (viewed in Google Earth on a desktop, 10 January 2020) right: adapted from Google Earth (2008) Ravine Pintade (viewed in Google Earth on a desktop, 10 January 2020)
4.2.6 Community engagement

Community engagement refers to community involvement in planning, from initiation through to implementation.

Organisations with pre-earthquake programmes in a neighbourhood were more familiar with community dynamics and had long-term local staff and existing community engagement mechanisms. But they also suffered loss of personnel, damage to premises and other shocks and depletion of capacity. New organisations arriving after the earthquake were not familiar with the normal functioning of neighbourhoods, recruited local staff and started community engagement in a highly dynamic situation where a high proportion of the community was displaced.

The ‘community platform’ model of community representation and participation was promoted by the government and the agencies involved in the pilot or early neighbourhood plans for Ravine Pintade, Bristou-Bobin and Simon Pele and 16/6 plans as a mechanism for community engagement. The aim was to identify and bring together all existing community organisations and to seek additional representation if required. The community platform aimed to harness and strengthen existing community structures rather than superimpose new structures. The role of this and similar mechanisms was to provide input for diagnostics and planning, validate plans, monitor progress, revise plans and facilitate implementation including through local negotiations.

Community planning and neighbourhood programmes emphasised measures to strengthen local governance through local community structures and through liaison with local government authorities. They involved, for example, training and organisation on topics ranging from operating and maintaining drainage, solid waste and amenity facilities to reinforcing or establishing disaster risk preparedness and response structures.

Engagement with community leadership and existing structures took many forms. Figure 21 gives some idea of efforts to integrate different neighbourhoods and issues (themes) within community structures. Community engagement was a recurring component of all projects. All the planning reports have images of community engagement events like the one shown in Figure 22.

Figure 21. Early diagram of a community committee and cells

Credit: Amelia Rule
“Through an intensive participatory planning process consisting of over 22 meetings, group sessions and guided walks, each community identified specific development priorities.”

“Trying to keep a lid on expectations was a real priority. You can’t just set up the community platform and assume they’re going to do all the work. You have to keep working and reaching out to people. It’s been a real challenge with our outreach team, as some of them are from the community and they come under pressure when they go home. And they’ll be here afterwards. So they come under these other pressures, so they’re not telling you things. It’s nice to have people who are problem solvers, they’re normally leaders already and they can resolve issues. But we also need people from outside the community [in the team].”

“Community planning is not just about having communities ‘participating’. Support organisations will go away quickly. If planning capacity has not been built, if information is not available with the community, if links have not been created between communities and local authorities, the only purpose of community planning will be to plan (if not justify) humanitarian/early recovery funding.”
OBSERVATIONS

Existing community structures and processes: as most informal neighbourhoods operated outside of state services, communities were usually highly organised before the earthquake to manage local development, service provision and local safety and security. These communities had their own organisational structures, complex rules and control mechanisms that needed to be understood as much as official and formal processes and regulations.

Community platform: rather than establish a new community structure, the community platform approach aimed to mobilise, convene and supplement a neighbourhood’s many existing community organisations. Although this mechanism facilitated the development of diagnostics and the preparation and validation of plans, it did not initially have formal status to approve any of these steps, monitor or report on the implementation of measures. The government’s formalisation of community plans also advanced the formalisation of the platform, but not as a body to manage funding as is the case with community mechanisms that are widely used in other countries.

Engagement beyond the neighbourhood: community stakeholders also included individuals, groups and networks beyond the neighbourhood boundary in the wider city, such as water kiosk owners, absentee landlords and school operators. They also included interest groups in adjoining neighbourhoods, where issues of links and interfaces needed to be addressed.

Community commitments: community engagement required participating representatives to invest a considerable amount of time and energy. The timing of planning initiatives had different implications for the availability and disposition of community participants. In 2010, many households were traumatised, displaced or without basic services whereas in 2014, conditions were more stable. The duration and timing of input needed to consider participant availability and trade-offs in terms of livelihoods and social commitments.

Organisation commitment and trust: in the accelerated context after the earthquake, there was a need for intensive engagement to rapidly establish working relationships and confidence and to ensure buy-in from communities. Building trust and mutual understanding was frustrated by uncertainty on policy issues, funding and the duration of organisations’ commitment to the community.

Sustainable community-government relationships: community respondents acknowledged the significance of authorities visiting a community and discussing local plans, bridging a communication gap from both sides. They also expressed concern that interest from authorities was contingent on the presence of funding and projects and the facilitating role of NGOs.

Sustainable community capacity in planning: community planning initiatives required strategies to strengthen the community’s own capacity to plan. They required skills to analyse and identify resources and opportunities, consider options and feasibility and take action to facilitate the development of their area in a rapidly changing urban context. Planning after the earthquake gave community members tools, experience of planning and learning from implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

MORE INFORMATION: community engagement in Morne Lazare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Video link</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morne Lazare</td>
<td>Local representatives introduce their neighbourhood and the role of the community platform</td>
<td><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6To-ZuXFUUU">www.youtube.com/watch?v=6To-ZuXFUUU</a></td>
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4.3 Community planning

4.3.1 Assessments and diagnostic

The diagnostic or assessment constituted a preliminary step to capture area knowledge and facilitate inclusive analysis on a neighbourhood’s current situation and potential.

Before the earthquake, informal neighbourhoods were not accounted for in city maps; they were annotated simply as undefined grey areas. After the earthquake, diagnostics (as part of community planning) facilitated the delineation of each neighbourhood or project area, based on both physical and social analysis. The absence of baseline data on population and services was a major constraint for planning and implementing all post-earthquake activities. Diagnostics aimed to redress the data vacuum and establish baselines to meet multiple objectives.

Damaged neighbourhoods were dense and organically built. Debris, damaged buildings and steep slopes increased the difficulty of creating maps, and global positioning system data were not sufficiently reliable. Most diagnostics focused on physical data, physical damage and proposed physical project activities. In some cases, specialised risk analysts carried out the diagnosis of natural hazard risks; in others, it was done through locally facilitated documentation of experience and perceptions of risk. Some combined the two approaches as complementary. Documenting services included limited analysis of socioeconomic data associated with physical infrastructure, such as ownership, costs, fees, maintenance, staffing or potential for growth.

The scope of social and economic diagnostics varied widely across the plans, according to team composition, time and funding available for writing and the objective of the analysis. Most diagnoses accounted for social organisations present as potential project stakeholders and identified vulnerable groups and issues to be addressed. The scope of the diagnostic for some areas started from the current situation; for others, it involved documenting the historical evolution of the neighbourhood to understand the pre-earthquake ‘normal’ situation and analyse longer-term development patterns. The extent to which diagnostics identified priorities or recommended interventions depended on whether the planning exercise was directly linked to implementation. Many respondents reported that the diagnostics and planning exercises raised local expectations, which had to be subsequently managed in the context of limited resources.

Organisations used a range of assessments and diagnostics in Haiti, including asset-based community development, guidelines, street names and numbering and mapping. We look at these in more detail here.

Asset-based community development

The process used in the Grand Ravine Community Action Plan “follows the ‘Asset-based Community Development’ (ABCD) methodology, which has three principles:

1. Asset-based: begins with what the community already has and can build on to improve quality of life, rather than focusing on the problems and seeking to find solutions.
2. Internally focused: emphasises the community’s role in carrying forward initiatives rather than creating an expectation that outside organisations will provide for them.
3. Relationship driven: recognises the value of social capital and encourages collaboration and dialogue between influential members of the community.”

Guidelines

UN-Habitat guidelines define the scope of the diagnostic to include:

- The history of the neighbourhood
- Physical analysis of the site, including natural hazards
- Population and tenure status of land and housing
- Access to basic services, and
- Economic activities.

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7 Source: AfH (2014). Authors’ translation
8 Source: UN-Habitat (2012c). Authors’ translation
Street names and numbering
Community-based enumeration was piloted in the Bristou-Bobin, Carrefour Feuilles and Simon Pele neighbourhoods to identify the pre-earthquake property type, condition, occupants, owners and tenure status, generating a basis for detailed maps of the area. Local communities subsequently defined street names and associated property numbers in a process called ‘adressage’ (Figure 23). This was perceived as a step of ascribing the urban attributes of the formal city to the informal settlements in practical and visible terms. Community members mobilised funding for new street name signage and property numbers (Figure 24).

Figure 23. An ‘adressage’ map for defining street names and property numbers in Bristou-Bobin

Source: UN Habitat (2012). Used with permission

Figure 24. Community-based preparation of signage for street names and property numbers

Credit: Sylvain Joachim/FAU
Mapping

Historic analysis of settlement patterns and sequences (see Figure 25) formed part of a social history and confirmed the history of the city’s informal settlements and substantiating claims around property status. Risk maps (see Figures 26 and 27) were based on topography and soil conditions. The government commissioned Ingénierie des mouvements du sol et des risques naturels (IMSRN – Engineering for Earth Movements and Natural Risks) to conduct a risk assessment and produce zoning guidelines, which were subsequently used in many community planning exercises. Multi-dimensional risk maps (such as Figure 27) attempted to include social risk and community perceptions of risk. Figure 28, an analysis of shops and commercial activity in Villa Rosa and Sainte Marie, considers business activity. However, this was done mostly from a spatial rather than economic perspective.

Figure 25. Map representing the growth of Bristou-Bobin from 1950–2010

Source: UN-Habitat (2012). Used with permission
Figure 26. Risk map for Christ-Roi, 2013

Source: Architectes de l'urgence (FAU) (2013). Used with permission

Figure 27. Multi-dimensional risk maps of Villa Rosa and Sainte Marie

Source: UN-Habitat (2013). Used with permission
Figure 28. Shops and commercial activity in Villa Rosa and Sainte Marie

Source: UN-Habitat (2013). Used with permission
**OBSERVATIONS**

**Facilitating a rights basis for reconstruction:** the diagnostic process enabled communities to account for the pre-earthquake situation in a neighbourhood through enumeration as a basis for recovery, including detailed data on property, tenure and population, securing rights for residents who perceived themselves at risk of exclusion from assistance or the right to rebuild.

**Developing consensus and a locally driven basis for reconstruction:** the diagnostic process enabled the development of common understandings on key issues, their causes, symptoms and implications; local capacities and challenges; and consensus on appropriate and priority actions. Participatory diagnosis ensured proposals were bottom-up and responsive rather than technically driven and imposed.

**Communities learning planning:** by involving large teams of local residents in enumeration, mapping, analysis and preparing proposals – including through the use of satellite imagery, cognitive maps and project maps – community stakeholders became more familiar with both the geospatial characteristics of their neighbourhoods and with using maps for communication and decision-making tools. This familiarity facilitated dialogue with officials from technical and local authorities as well as organisations working in the neighbourhood. Having a diagnostic document equipped local representatives with data to substantiate their positions in negotiations with authorities. For most organisations, building community capacity in the principles and processes of planning or bridging the gap between communities and authorities were not explicit objectives, so they did not monitor or evaluate those activities.

**Diagnostic documentation:** the diagnostic documents were often very detailed, in French or English. They ranged from 50 to 400 pages long; many had complex maps and used planning terminology. There was limited reflection on how the document would be used, who would read or retain copies of the full document (among the community and the authorities) and if or how people would use it as a resource.

**Consolidating diagnostics:** the diagnostics constituted an unprecedented bank of data that provided a baseline on conditions in informal neighbourhoods. While subsequent plans may have been project-specific, the diagnostics constituted durable data. However, data collection methodologies, mapping and representation were not always consistent, frustrating the aggregation of results. The narrative-heavy reports were not amenable to data retrieval or analysis.

**QUOTES**

“The lack of available demographic, cartographic, socioeconomic and tenure data necessitated the realisation of a fundamental diagnostic of all urban information through exhaustive site mapping exercises, community surveys and community engagement events. This data collection was performed in conjunction with the community platform and other community groups. In summary, two components comprised the diagnostic: the technical diagnostic and the participatory diagnostic.”

“A partial understanding is as good as it gets.”
4.3.2 Detail and calibration

Detail and calibration refer to the levels of data analysis involved in diagnostics and the levels of elaboration of proposals involved in community planning.

Early diagnostics and strategic plans were prepared without clarity on funding or partners for implementation. As a result, where included, proposals were just an outline, with limited technical or financial feasibility data. Detailed specifications would have required expertise and costs beyond the scope of planning. Some diagnostic and planning processes — such as enumeration — need to be detailed and so required considerable manpower and time for collecting and processing data. Some proposals were detailed for communication and advocacy purposes — for example, using 3D visualisations — to generate local momentum, political traction and donor support.

Later plans involved extensive design and specifications. Government authorities did not have standards or specifications for many of the infrastructure or construction works in informal areas, so organisations developed their own or contracted experts to do so. The level of detail in all aspects of the community planning documents reflects an orientation toward implementation. In particular, the fiches de projet (project sheets) exhibit a level of detail that takes community planning beyond the realm of urban planning or design and into engineering, architecture and construction.

Figure 29 compares the cost and priorities of three different strategies for Ti Sous, as presented in the community plan document. This kind of comparison is rare. In most cases, there was only one proposed scenario/vision. Community plans do not explicitly describe the process for selecting the components to be executed or detailed costs.

Figure 29. A comparison of costs of different strategies for Ti Sous

Source: Adapted from CARE (2014)
Visualising plans

Community plans often used visualisations (see Figures 30, 31 and 32) for communication and advocacy purposes, to give an impression of the proposed interventions. Figure 32 shows the level of detail that many community plans produced. But, while it is relatively detailed for an urban planning exercise, this sort of visualisation is not immediately useable for implementation, which was a source of frustration for both the producers and implementers of community plans.

Figure 30. Visualisation of a proposed ravine upgrading intervention

Source: UN-Habitat 2012(b). Used with permission

Figure 31. Photographs of existing spaces, with visualisations after proposed upgrading interventions

Source: UN-Habitat (2013). Used with permission
Figure 32. Extract from a project sheet

Source: AfH (2014)/available via Creative Commons (CC BY-NCSA 3.0)

Figure 33. Photograph of roadside sign with detail of visualisation of planned road upgrading in Campêche

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
OBSERVATIONS

Reflection on the time and cost of detailing: few respondents commented on the level of inputs in the diagnostics and plans in terms of time and cost of writing, editing, feedback, translation or formatting, or of implications for target audiences, including communities, authorities, partner agencies and donors. Nor did many reflect on the link between data, analysis and implementation or consider strategies to streamline processes in future crises.

Data for multiple purposes: the detailed enumeration process served multiple purposes, including the unprecedented comprehensive mapping of informal neighbourhoods. However, emergency or strategic community or neighbourhood planning post-crisis may not always afford or require the time or resources invested in this step.

Detailed information: organisations invested considerable time into detailed design and specifications for interventions such as stairs, incidental public spaces and amenities. Considering the topography, complexity of negotiating site boundaries and masons’ low capacity to read detailed drawings, it is possible that outline drawings, on-site decisions and supervision might have been more efficient for some works, including non-structural paving or landscaping works. Critical works involving structural or capacity calculations – such as high retaining walls or culverting of storm drainage – required experienced engineering detailing and assurance of implementation as per design and specification.

Refinement and duplication: detailed drawings and specifications in project sheets were progressively improved as organisations gained experience in executing works. Some organisations shared their specifications to enable others to save time and resources and for quality assurance purposes, particularly for repeat and common works (footpaths, drainage, stairs and lighting). But the majority of organisations continued to prepare specifications independently. Proposals to devise ‘a kit of parts’ with common and tested standard details for local adjustment to site conditions could have contributed to greater optimisation of technical resources, but were only partially successful.

Expectations that plans address all information needs: several organisations describe the project sheets as the most useful aspect of the planning reports, affirming the perception of planning as a means to justify and facilitate implementation. However, several agencies expressed frustration that the community planning reports did not include immediately executable projects, as additional design and costings were required before construction could start. This captures the challenge of expectations that were placed on community planning. Different stakeholders variously hoped that these reports would serve as demographic statistics, geospatial records, codes and standards, strategic plans, master plans, architectural designs, construction documents and community charters.

QUOTES

“[This community action plan] includes 8 diagrams, 38 maps and 68 drawings over 138 pages. It includes 20 project sheets with an estimated total cost of approximately US$3.6 million.”

“Pathways weren’t really designed. They were just called [decided] on site. But retaining walls depended on soil so we’d do investigations but there are houses everywhere so to do that we’d have to evacuate a site and start digging, then we’d find a septic tank and that would change everything. We had a team that dealt with retaining walls and that wouldn’t change on site. We had a matrix that you input information and its pops out a design, then it would be checked.”
4.3.3 Validation, quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation

Validation refers to the processes of confirmation and approval of plans at various stages. Quality assurance refers to implemented measures from those plans. Monitoring and evaluation refers to analysis of the outputs and outcomes.

The government did not establish the status of diagnostics and plans or the process for validation clearly at the outset. Instead, local municipalities’ and technical authorities’ roles in validating overall plan findings and recommendations and approving specific works evolved as work progressed. In general, government authorities did not approve detailed project budgets. Validation sessions usually involved community platform restitution, followed by broader community sessions. These, in turn, were followed by presentations to and discussions with concerned local and technical officials, often organised in the community with site visits to look at key concerns and proposal sites. Key infrastructure proposals were subject to technical approval by the concerned authorities.

Government authorities did not have standards or specifications for many of the works proposed in community planning, and organisations commonly reverted to international standards or the discretion of team engineers. Standards and costs therefore varied widely. Respondents reported workmanship to be as critical a factor as design and specifications. Repeat implementation by the same contractors across multiple projects helped to achieve quality assurance standards.

Only a few organisations conducted independent evaluations of their community plans. One example highlights the challenge of designing for and measuring outputs versus outcomes: “The evaluation team believes that, even though the results appear to be mixed, [the programme] still represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in [the programme location] and the significant constraints within which [the organisation] had to work. On the whole, the housing and infrastructure components achieved fairly good results, especially in public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for the lack of time and the high turnover in programme staff. Of all three components, governance was the most severely affected by the programme’s tight implementation deadlines. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable” (British Red Cross 2016: 10).

OBSERVATIONS

Standard specifications: appropriate standardised specifications issued or endorsed by respective authorities might have saved time and resources for both the authorities and the implementing organisations.

Standards: the wide variation in standards was a concern in cases of inadequate standards, but there was little debate around the consequences of very high-standard or high-specification works, including value for money and optimisation of resources.

Measuring outputs: project evaluation and indicators focused on physical works in terms of cost and quality, with limited analysis of economic dimensions such as labour costs as a proportion of those works, employment in person days generated through those works and the proportion of budget spent in the neighbourhood or country.

Measuring outcomes requires more time: the utility of plans and implemented measures and their impact on community recovery or longer-term development require monitoring on a continuous basis or after several years. The same is true for monitoring of change processes, such as community-government relationships, local planning knowledge and capacity to manage the neighbourhood.

QUOTES

“Specs are useful. Even finishing of stairs – if you don’t do it right, they’ll degrade or become slippery... But specs are only as good as the supervising engineer. Our documents would not show quality standards. They’re construction documents. Plastering has a very generic description but when we’re on site we explain the quality we really want. We have drastically improved the selection and execution.”

“We had to do everything [through] direct implementation, which is not our preferred approach. We did work initially with local contractors, but the results weren’t good and we spent so much time trying to assist them. And our donors were putting [on] pressure to implement so we had to implement ourselves. So, our lessons are mostly internal procurement processes on how to be a contractor.”

“Community contracting – it’s a personal opinion – it’s a supervision issue. When you’ve got a community doing it, it’s very difficult to tell them to redo it. If you don’t have your supervisors [around] constantly and fighting with the community constantly, the work is not okay.”
4.3.4 Implementation

Implementation refers to operationalising the measures identified in community plans.

Many perceived the community plan as an exhaustive wish list. So, the next step was determining how to operationalise the proposals. Some were long-term and aspirational; others were short-term and practical. They all required varying levels of funding, approval and executing actors. Stakeholders determined which works to implement by:

- Available or anticipated funding
- Technical competence of the organisations or their executing partners
- Mandates of the organisations and donors
- Conditions attached to funding
- Feasibility within project timeframes, and
- Complexity of ownership, validation or approval processes.

Early implementation of tangible activities was important to build trust, sustain community interest in planning, and relieve local conditions while planning activities continued over several months. Early implementation was usually contingent on funding availability and conditions. Any permanent works were precluded under humanitarian funding. Organisations used a range of procurement mechanisms for implementing works, depending on the type and value of the works and the organisation’s capacity to manage implementation.

Observations

Capacity: capacity was low across all implementation options – direct, partner, community contracts or commercial contracts – requiring investment in training and supervision beyond anticipated levels, with time and cost implications. Contractors were often replaced or substandard work redone.

Delivery: organisations calibrated their implementation according to feasibility, their own capacity, expertise and timeframes as much as possible and according to funding. With Haiti currently ranked 182 of 189 countries in which to do business, many organisations were concerned about getting something done, rather than fail in attempting complex works (World Bank 2019).

Recommendations: respondents cited the following recommendations for future operationalisation of community planning proposals:

- Feedback loops to enable revisions to budgets, changes of activities and the pursuit of new opportunities in a dynamic context
- Donor flexibility to accommodate revisions
- Balancing the pressure for visible and fast results with support for strategic and vital activities, however complex, and
- Assuming that low implementation capacity requires investment to increase and improve skills, manpower and systems and will limit the range of achievable measures.

Quotes

“The design build approach [where the design happens in parallel to implementation] has significant benefits in bolstering community support for the participatory process, particularly in an environment where ‘NGO fatigue’ is justifiably prevalent. It is recommended that in future a more realistic schedule gap between data collection, planning and construction be established.”

“The masterplan was good. If I’d been involved in the production, I would have understood it better, which I realised later and I would have pushed on certain aspects of it.”

“The level of detail produced in the plans did not anticipate the inevitable changes and modifications which emerge during implementation. This process may have been compounded by the prevalent role of architects and engineers in the community planning process. Debilitating arguments over a few feet of wall or a square metre of public space became a recurring theme which may have distracted from more strategic concerns like the maintenance of drainage.”

See Chapter 5 on the implementation of infrastructure and housing works.
4.4 Follow-up

4.4.1 Communication

Communication refers to how community planning was presented and perceived and the measures taken to facilitate dialogue and understanding.

Project names communicated the aim or scope in discussions with communities, authorities and media. Although many of the projects shared common principles and methodologies, they did not adopt a common identity. Instead, they were identified by the respective government lead agency, institutional donor and lead implementing agency. They did not use common terms in their names, which ranged from community planning, (urban) development plan, [urban] development scheme/project/outline and community action plan to integrated neighbourhood approach and participatory approach for safe shelter awareness, among others.

Most projects used public signage with project information to demarcate the area, promote the project and identify project sites and organisation offices. The HNRSP helped establish ten community resource centres to support neighbourhood recovery and additional centres in other neighbourhoods offered similar services under different names, including house of knowledge, Centres d’Appui pour le Renforcement des Maisons Endommagées/Community Support Centres for House Repairs (CARMEN) and organisation site offices.

At the close of the project or funding cycle, documentation focused on outputs, illustrating tangible results from investment, the quality of processes involved, government approval, impact on lives and contributions towards a more positive future. The main public communications materials for public relations and advocacy purposes were videos and short web-based reports; projects also prepared detailed reports (particularly financial ones) to meet institutional donor requirements.

Figure 34. Campêche neighbourhood project signage listing partners

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Engaging the public through music and culture

Haiti has strong musical, performance and visual cultures. Two of the initiatives (see Figure 35) built on these traditions to engage the public by getting them to discuss the plight of and potential in informal neighbourhoods after the earthquake with well-known figures.

**Katye P’am** – which means ‘my neighbourhood’ – was a music contest organised in 2010 and 2011 for young residents of earthquake-affected communities to compose and perform songs on their visions for the future of their neighbourhoods. Finalists received mentoring and production support from established musicians. The final performances were televised and a compilation was professionally recorded and released, receiving extensive radio play.

**Sinema Ba Zetwol**/Cinema Bas Etoiles – or ‘cinema under the stars’ – was a series of interactive events combining recorded and live interviews with local residents, organisations and authorities discussing their concerns, priorities and intentions, combined with music from local musicians, information, entertainment and other content, using a large stage and sound system attracting thousands of participants of all ages over several hours. Events were usually held on weekend nights and provided information and debate as well as generating momentum and optimism.

**Communicating neighbourhood recovery programmes**

Organisations have published reports, blogs and videos on Haiti community planning and neighbourhood recovery programmes and made these available on their websites. The data are often in summary form and/or have been superseded. See the more information table for links to samples.

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Figure 35. Katye P’am finalists (left) and a Sinema Ba Zetwol event in Carrefour Feuilles neighbourhood (right)

Credit: Jean Christophe Adrian/UN-Habitat
OBSERVATIONS

Common identity: a common identity for plans or neighbourhood projects might have promoted a perception of a coordinated and collective effort greater than the sum of the parts, notwithstanding the variations between areas and projects.

Government identity: a common identity could have strengthened the perception of government leadership and ownership of the neighbourhood programmes, whether by a single agency or a group of state agencies. Such collaboration was achieved for the Debris programmes in 2010–2011. Although many of the neighbourhood projects were funded under HRF and therefore through government funds, respondents perceived the assistance as being provided by the leading organisations in the neighbourhood or the UN, World Bank or EU. Projects under the UCLBP-led 16/6 programme were most strongly branded locally as an initiative under the new president and government, with associated media interest.

Media coverage: local media coverage of neighbourhood recovery mainly comprised:

- Press releases or sponsored posts on NGO, UN and other donor activities, focusing on visible outputs and budgets
- General criticism of delays and inefficiency in the response
- Government announcements, and
- Government contracts.

There was limited analysis of policy issues, coordination or coverage questions or longer-term implications of recovery activities. There were few initiatives to engage media actors in or increase public understanding of issues of urban development, including recovery, in informal neighbourhoods.

Local media coverage was rarely technical and was often political. Intensive international media coverage fell sharply after the emergency phase, apart from annual progress reviews. The focus was on people still in camps or new houses built and on the use of assistance funds (particularly funds from the country of origin). A few key journalists and publications sustained their coverage and followed the recovery progress from multiple perspectives with valuable contributions to the evolving record of events.

QUOTES

“There were opportunities to share and achieve economies of scale — even if the contexts are very different. We were able to bring community members from one place to another and explain what went on — it was very helpful.”

4.4.2 Institutionalisation and dissemination

Institutionalisation refers to the transfer to and continued use by long-term stakeholders of data, approaches and capacity generated through community planning.

All government authorities had low levels of staff and funding before the earthquake and suffered losses to personnel, premises and records, further depleting their capacity to engage in, lead and sustain community planning and neighbourhood development works. With a range of government lead agencies involved in neighbourhood projects and high staff turnover in local and national authorities, institutional anchorage, continuity and retention were challenging. CNIGS was designated as the agency to collect and manage data through the SILQ, including availability for long-term use by authorities and other stakeholders.

The exposure of authorities to informal neighbourhood issues and of informal communities to legislative processes increased mutual understanding among officials and communities. Government engagement in informal neighbourhoods was earthquake- and project-related. How and to what degree the relationship between authorities and informal neighbourhood communities has fundamentally changed will require longer-term analysis.

CIAT’s guide for neighbourhood rehabilitation, which made reference to a number of UN/NGO-led community planning and recovery initiatives, marked a significant institutionalisation of the collective effort (CIAT 2013). Detailed designs and specifications for construction and civil works could also be institutionalised, either through government validation or through shared use by implementing agencies and contractors. The vast quantity of data produced as baseline data, diagnostics, strategic plans and detailed proposals is not available in the public domain. Our digital archive represents 5% of the data produced on the Haiti earthquake. For technical and liability reasons, it does not have primary data (like the enumeration/census data), personal data (household names, business owner details), editable maps in GIS format or detailed assessments, calculations and specifications for physical works. However, summary data are available through CNIGS and summary reports — including lessons learned — are available through organisations’ websites.
OBSERVATIONS

Data management: delays in establishing the CNIGS SILQ system, along with inconsistencies in data collection by field organisations, mitigated the effectiveness of the CNIGS. However, CNIGS has captured extensive mapping of informal neighbourhoods, which now forms part of the detailed city mapping. As data manager rather than a lead reconstruction or urban management agency, CNIGS was not in a strong position to coordinate organisations or push for greater institutionalisation.

Future use: comprehensive data – including risk assessments and infrastructure, services and socioeconomic profiles – are available in the public domain for only a few neighbourhoods. This is not unusual for detailed assessments carried out for humanitarian and development projects. However, as the diagnostics addressed a major data vacuum in Haiti and were generally intended to inform development beyond the scope of short-term recovery interventions, the availability of baseline data, diagnostics, strategic plans and information on both realised and unrealised projects is important for future reference.

Institutional change: this is commonly measured by the existence of and compliance with policies or regulations. In contexts like Haiti, it may be useful to measure incremental or interim steps such as changes in officials and communities’ knowledge, attitudes and practices in relation to planning, producing and managing neighbourhoods.

Role of non-government actors: as well as government authorities, options for institutionalisation included planning and built environment professional bodies, planning education, media and cultural organisations, chambers of commerce and the Haitian diaspora. Investment in policy and institutional change through public awareness and discourse may be as critical as investment in policymakers and institutions, particularly in contexts of political flux.

Planning for dissemination: treating data as a valuable resource that represents donor, organisation, government and particularly community investment should warrant planning for their dissemination among various audiences and for long-term access to optimise their use and impact. Taking communication, dissemination and institutionalisation into consideration at the outset may guide the conceptualisation of activities, products and processes throughout the programme.

QUOTES

“[CIAT] look at Port-au-Prince and say that until you have a masterplan for the city, don’t waste my time with these projects, which makes sense. If I was in their position, I would do the same thing but if I was them, I’d activate the master plan. My role is to get things done. I have my role, which is get my hands dirty and whatever I’m finding will serve as discussion and the mistakes I’m making – let’s try to correct them and get the conversation going while I’m building things and trying to reach people in need.”

MORE INFORMATION: websites with more information

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4.4.3 Communicating about the city: the role of video after the earthquake

The advantages of video

Video communicates urban contexts, presenting built environments as a multi-dimensional, dynamic and lived experience. Drones allow us to go beyond street level, using aerial overviews to understand patterns in city fabric. 3D visualisations render planning and architectural proposals easier to understand. Video interviews personalise leaders and give voice to a range of other stakeholders, helping us to understand and empathise with their situations and perspectives.

It has advantages over text, maps, drawings, audio and meetings, allowing actors to communicate a wealth of information succinctly to potentially wide audiences. Production quality can range from mobile phone footage to scripted and professional recording; from short single takes to extended edited compositions with subtitles.

Videos can be made easily accessible through YouTube addresses rather than agency websites. Viewer numbers vary widely and there are not clear dissemination strategies, although they represent considerable investment. The durability of links and web addresses is an issue to be resolved for the longer term, as many good resources become irretrievable when links fail or expire.

Use of video in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake

Directly after the earthquake, videos communicated the extent of damage more effectively than single images, showing building after building destroyed, the impact on people and daily life and the efforts to remove debris, restore services and establish shelter in chaotic conditions. This early footage provides an important record of the point of departure in 2010, the scale and complexity of the challenges and the prevalence of confusion. Early videos were made by broadcast media or humanitarian organisations. The primary objective in both cases was to illustrate a catastrophic event and to mobilise resources.

Humanitarian organisations prepared many videos in the first months after the earthquake, showing emergency relief activities and demonstrating how they were spending assistance funding. They focus on interventions – distributions, life-saving healthcare and debris removal – and on intervenors rather than on how households, communities and the government were coping and organising themselves. Later videos by government and organisations describe the more complex processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation, including the importance of community engagement. These show recovery processes as well as visible outputs and capture the opinions of local people through interviews. Videos were usually prepared at late stages of projects as a reporting activity, although some programmes – including 16/6 – used video, TV, radio and media coverage throughout. This was a key government strategy to generate public support and political credibility for a newly elected administration, new authority and contentious policies.

Media videos made from 2012 onwards and longer films tend to focus on the pace of reconstruction as unsatisfactory and on continuing needs; but they generally fail to examine underlying economic and urban development challenges.

Increased use of mobile phones and access to drones in recent years and experience gained during the earthquake recovery has increased local video production and local description of – and discussion on – the city. The potential of video to raise public awareness and debate on urban development issues is open to more participants; but it requires an analytical lens and voice to ensure it is more than an end in itself and acts as a tool to inform, influence and enable the production and planning of the city.

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MORE INFORMATION: videos
4.5 Selected project summaries

4.5.1 Pilot community planning and neighbourhood recovery projects

The three early pilot projects — Ravine Pintade, Simon Pele and Bristou-Bobin — started at around the same time in 2010. They all went beyond emergency works to develop neighbourhood recovery programmes through mapping, participatory planning and physical works to facilitate long-term recovery and development. Although they shared similar rationales, their advocacy aims and recovery trajectories varied widely.

1. Ravine Pintade

Large numbers of temporary shelters — including innovative two-storey ones — were constructed to meet immediate needs in 2010 and 2011. The lead organisation carried out preparatory works for reconstruction and risk mitigation, including retaining walls, slope stabilisation and improved circulation. Major new infrastructure included opening a key link road and upgrading the area's drainage canal spine. Works were all completed within three years, providing an early model for other areas and organisations but without longer-term funding or subsequent development programming. Although the lead organisation procured technical inputs on elements of the programme (retaining walls, drainage and shelter), they did not prepare a comprehensive diagnostic or planning document, instead engaging in an action planning process that relied on high levels of community participation. Respondents cited investment in detailed mapping as less critical than negotiation and conflict resolution to achieve results in densely built conditions.

2. Simon Pele

Although this extremely low-income community was considered not only damaged but insecure, an organisation committed to work there from the outset of the emergency response through to long-term development. Investment in comprehensive baseline data through enumeration and mapping formed the basis of sustained engagement and a sequence of rehabilitation and upgrading works. Although housing was a priority for key donors, improving housing conditions from very low space and structural standards proved difficult. The organisation argued the case for reducing flooding, improving drainage, managing waste, water and other services to improve residential conditions and benefit the whole population. Ongoing funding from various sources enabled a range of livelihood development programmes beyond the scope of strictly post-disaster rehabilitation.

3. Bristou-Bobin

Bristou-Bobin was selected to build on pre-earthquake relationships with communities to develop and pilot methodologies for community planning. Staff and community leaders were able to transfer experience to other areas, replicating tools and using outputs to communicate the approach within a year of the earthquake. Early planning enabled the community to guide organisations involved in emergency activities and identified projects to reuse debris which would otherwise have been removed. Wider implementation paused for two years until another organisation with funding was able to step in to use the community plans to execute key infrastructure and other measures. The location of the neighbourhood close to booming Petionville may have contributed to faster private recovery than in other areas.
Table 7. Summary of activity in Ravine Pintade, Simon Pele and Bristou-Bobin, 2010–16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
<th>2010–2012</th>
<th>2013–2016</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
<th>ADVOCACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ravine Pintade</td>
<td>Lead organisation action planning</td>
<td>Large-scale temporary shelter</td>
<td>Site stabilisation, retaining walls</td>
<td>Frontloaded Early planning and implementation</td>
<td>Deliver tangible results as neighbourhood model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifying priority measures</td>
<td>Canal upgraded</td>
<td>New road opened</td>
<td>Rehabilitation, transition and risk reduction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultant mapping</td>
<td>Community development</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Consultant technical input</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Pele</td>
<td>Lead + partner organisation for planning</td>
<td>Housing repair Small-scale temporary shelter</td>
<td>Ongoing housing rehabilitation and upgrading Infrastructure upgrading Social/economic development support</td>
<td>Continuous Sustained planning and implementation Rehabilitation and sustainable development</td>
<td>Build capacity and institutionalise approach within organisation and government Address urban vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enumeration</td>
<td>Small-scale community contracts Training and livelihood activities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community diagnostic and planning</td>
<td>Sequence of proposals for interventions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sequence of proposals for interventions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bristou-Bobin</td>
<td>Lead + partner organisation for planning</td>
<td>Small-scale temporary shelter Debris reused for football pitch</td>
<td>Second lead organisation details and implements infrastructure works</td>
<td>Discontinuous Early planning, intermittent/partial implementation Rehabilitation and strategic development</td>
<td>Develop and test tools with demonstration results for replication by multiple organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enumeration</td>
<td>Training for housing reconstruction Community development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Addressage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community diagnostic and planning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Priority interventions</td>
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MORE INFORMATION: Ravine Pintade, Simon Pele and Bristou-Bobin

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<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Folders</td>
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<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/vc82l9r">https://tinyurl.com/vc82l9r</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simon Pele</td>
<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/v8zcww9">https://tinyurl.com/v8zcww9</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bristou-Bobin</td>
<td><a href="https://tinyurl.com/veqdgvb">https://tinyurl.com/veqdgvb</a></td>
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</table>
4.5.2 New agency involvement in community planning and neighbourhood recovery

Several neighbourhood projects grew out of emergency activities and/or in areas targeted as priority for the return of households who were in emergency camps. We look at three such areas here.

1. Haut Turgeau

Rapidly growing up the foothills, the area was identified for return for residents in priority camps to be cleared under 16/6. The lead organisation had carried out emergency activities, building a strong local team and moving into recovery through participatory planning under the aegis of government and with guidance from technical support agencies. Funding was intermittent and piecemeal but progressively secured through results and capacity. While the organisation was new to Haiti and not specifically urban or planning-oriented, it drew on decades of experience elsewhere to transition from emergency to development programming in both physical and social activities. Respondents cite the organisation’s internal efforts to document, evaluate and transfer new learning, notwithstanding high personnel turnover.

2. Delmas 32

An early strategic plan was prepared by local planners for this mixed neighbourhood of over 75,000 people. Two large organisations then divided the area for recovery programmes; one had decades of local experience, the other was established after the earthquake specifically to support Haiti. The new organisation had a large staff and corps of volunteers operating emergency activities before transitioning to establish long-term medical services and undertake school rehabilitation and housing reconstruction projects. They mobilised high levels of institutional and private funding, but the size of the area meant they had to concentrate resources on key projects, with associated consultants and partners for each. The disadvantages of starting a new organisation were offset by their ability to engage experienced staff, focus on a single country and access independent funding, as well as their commitment to engage long term with the Delmas community. The programme represents a multi-sectoral approach within a defined area, but was not an area plan per se.

3. Morne Hercule

Morne Hercule, Nerette and Morne Lazare are all hillside neighbourhoods on precarious but central sites between Petionville and Delmas. They suffered heavy earthquake damage and were key areas of return under 16/6. Under a lead technical organisation, partner organisations developed community planning for each neighbourhood, linked to subsequent implementation of works including roads, stairs, drainage, lighting, housing repairs and new construction by 16/6 partner agencies. Planning was specifically linked to 16/6 funding. None of the partners was involved in subsequent development activities after the 16/6 activities. These neighbourhoods include government flagship interventions and represent unprecedented direct government engagement in informal area planning, rehabilitation and development.

Table 8. Summary of activity in Haut Turgeau, Delmas 32 and Morne Hercule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
<th>MAIN WORKS</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
<th>ADVOCACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haut Turgeau</td>
<td>Sequence of planning and interventions</td>
<td>Lead organisation undertook comprehensive community planning in-house and implementation</td>
<td>Stairs, site mitigation, drainage</td>
<td>Community planning and implementation in three phases</td>
<td>Guidance for development in precarious and rapidly growing neighbourhood may be more critical than in established areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>(rapidly growing neighbourhood on steep foothills)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Housing repairs</td>
<td>Rehabilitation, risk reduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delmas 32</td>
<td>An early strategic plan was prepared by local planners for this mixed neighbourhood of over 75,000 people. Two large organisations then divided the area for recovery programmes; one had decades of local experience, the other was established after the earthquake specifically to support Haiti. The new organisation had a large staff and corps of volunteers operating emergency activities before transitioning to establish long-term medical services and undertake school rehabilitation and housing reconstruction projects. They mobilised high levels of institutional and private funding, but the size of the area meant they had to concentrate resources on key projects, with associated consultants and partners for each. The disadvantages of starting a new organisation were offset by their ability to engage experienced staff, focus on a single country and access independent funding, as well as their commitment to engage long term with the Delmas community. The programme represents a multi-sectoral approach within a defined area, but was not an area plan per se.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation of schools and community services</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morne Hercule</td>
<td>Morne Hercule, Nerette and Morne Lazare are all hillside neighbourhoods on precarious but central sites between Petionville and Delmas. They suffered heavy earthquake damage and were key areas of return under 16/6. Under a lead technical organisation, partner organisations developed community planning for each neighbourhood, linked to subsequent implementation of works including roads, stairs, drainage, lighting, housing repairs and new construction by 16/6 partner agencies. Planning was specifically linked to 16/6 funding. None of the partners was involved in subsequent development activities after the 16/6 activities. These neighbourhoods include government flagship interventions and represent unprecedented direct government engagement in informal area planning, rehabilitation and development.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood support</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NEIGHBOURHOOD</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>MAIN WORKS</td>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delmas 32 (large established</td>
<td>Collection of projects</td>
<td>Early masterplan not followed</td>
<td>Medical service provision</td>
<td>Project-based planning</td>
<td>In very large areas, interventions will be targeted, diagnostic and planning may also need to be targeted rather than comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbourhood)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lead organisation planned and implemented discrete works within the</td>
<td>School rehabilitation</td>
<td>Continuous programme</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>neighbourhood</td>
<td>Road upgrading</td>
<td>Rehabilitation, improved services and socioeconomic development</td>
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<td>Housing repair and medium-scale new construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morne Hercule (small established</td>
<td>Concentrated planning and</td>
<td>Comprehensive community planning</td>
<td>Major road upgrading</td>
<td>Community planning and implementation</td>
<td>Front-loaded input can deliver infrastructure works but is less effective for socioeconomic and disaster risk management objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbourhood on precarious land)</td>
<td>implementation</td>
<td>Separate implementation by other agencies</td>
<td>Stairs</td>
<td>Single phase Rehabilitation area upgrading</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration between the planning and implementation agencies</td>
<td>Housing repairs and small-scale new construction</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>from outset to completion</td>
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**MORE INFORMATION:** Haut Turgeau, Delmas 32 and Morne Hercule

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<td>Morne Hercule</td>
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4.5.3 Other approaches to neighbourhood recovery

There were other approaches to neighbourhood recovery. In this section, we look at how plans improved and regenerated the residential environment in three neighbourhoods — Jalousie, Petionville and the historic Gingerbread district.

1. Jalousie: changing the image and narrative of informal neighbourhoods

Many informal neighbourhoods are invisible, situated in ravines, but Jalousie rises, highly visible, above the centre of Petionville. Although not extensively damaged by the earthquake, Jalousie was affected by increased densification and pressure on severely inadequate services.

The government decided to invest in measures to upgrade Jalousie as part of earthquake recovery, including improving stairs and drainage on the steep terrain and investing in plastering and painting large areas of the neighbourhood. The painting initiative — Beauté contre la pauvreté: Jalousie en couleurs/Beauty versus poverty: Jalousie in colour — was influenced by similar projects in Latin American cities and was funded through the HRF by the government of Venezuela. The painting was designed by a local artist.

Critics claim the project is cosmetic, does not address practical problems and benefits the wealthy residents below by improving their view. However, research carried out by the authors in 2013 and 2016 found widespread approval including among very low-income residents from other parts of the city on the basis that it shows a different image of Haiti to the world than damage and camps, and that it changes local perceptions of informal neighbourhoods as pleasant residential environments.

2. Place Boyer and Place St Pierre: regenerating public space and amenity in recovery

Petionville is a planned grid city, laid out with public buildings and two main public squares, Place Boyer and Place Saint Pierre. Contiguous with Port-au-Prince, it is surrounded by densely populated steep informal neighbourhoods, many of which suffered heavy earthquake damage. Both squares were occupied as camps for hundreds of displaced households for over two years and are two of the six camps in the 16/6 programme.

Figure 36. Before and after: view of Jalousie from Petionville before (2011) and after (2013) partial painting

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 37. Before and after: Place Boyer as a camp in April 2011 and regenerated as a public park in June 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
While organisations concentrated on opportunities to improve access to public space within the informal neighbourhoods of return, the 16/6 programme also invested in rehabilitating and upgrading these two squares to optimise their amenity value and recreational use. Like painting Jalousie, the works may be considered cosmetic and of benefit to the upper-class residents of Petionville; they have also been criticised for contracting issues. However, the regenerated squares provide high-quality space and facilities for residents of a wide catchment area with different users at various times of the day, week or year, the majority from informal neighbourhoods. Analysing the relationship between the neighbourhood and the wider city, the regular movement patterns of residents and other dynamics may lead to more flexible approaches to types and locations of urban planning interventions.

3. Gingerbread district: building and neighbourhood conservation in crisis and recovery

Port-au-Prince has many 19th and early 20th century residential buildings of architectural and historical importance. Concentrated mainly in the south of the city, these were constructed in mixed timber and masonry in a style known locally as ‘gingerbread’, with many situated on large garden plots. Following the earthquake in 2010, national authorities and international conservation interests assessed and documented the buildings as part of planning for the conservation of individual structures, appropriate upgrading and potential regeneration of the historic district.

Property owners and local authorities liaised with technical, legal and cultural experts to prepare diagnosis, identify potential and challenges and prepare recommendations (WMF 2010).

At a time of massive displacement and urgent humanitarian needs, conservation was neither a political nor an institutional priority. The challenges for conservation were complex; respondents cited many joint owners, high land values and redevelopment potential, scarce materials and conservation skills and weak urban tourism as among the many constraints. Organisations successfully carried out conservation and retrofitting work on a few individual buildings but others were either inappropriately modified or their degradation accelerated (one in six gingerbread houses collapsed or were demolished following the earthquake). New buildings in the historic neighbourhood were not subject to any area-specific planning guidance before or after the earthquake.

Academic researchers undertook broader analysis of an expanded area, of the roles the gingerbread houses play within their context and the challenges and opportunities associated with the houses on the basis that they would only survive into the future if they remained integral elements within the built and social fabric of the city (Columbia University 2016). Unlike community planning driven by funding imperatives and by operational actors, academic analysis and planning are both unconstrained by and unsupported by the imperatives and prospects of implementation.

Figure 38. Two historic houses in the Gingerbread district: without protection measures (left) and restored by FOKAL (right)

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

| MORE INFORMATION: Jalousie and Gingerbread district |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Type       | Name                        | Link                     |
| Folders    | Jalousie                    | https://tinyurl.com/skv8zar|
|            | Gingerbread district        | https://tinyurl.com/vyj22qt|
Aspects of implementation

While community plans usually translated into implemented projects, in many cases the scope of implementation was considerably less than initially intended. This paper does not seek to quantify or evaluate implemented measures. Instead, some qualitative insights from documentation, interviews and site visits are presented concerning implementation of infrastructure and housing works and the relationship between planning and implementation.

5.1 Infrastructure

5.1.1 Context

Port-au-Prince had, and continues to have, a considerable infrastructure deficit. Years of underinvestment, significant population growth and a chronic lack of maintenance have all contributed to this reality. In mid-2010, the US Army Corps of Engineers concluded that the earthquake had had very little impact on Port-au-Prince’s infrastructure, which was mostly already in disrepair before the earthquake. Even the more formalised or affluent parts of the metropolitan area (downtown and Petionville) relied extensively on off-grid solutions, due to the lack of functional municipal infrastructure systems. Many practitioners saw that Miami firm DPZ’s plan for downtown — which conceived each urban block as a ‘ship’ that dealt with its own energy, water and waste on site in a decentralised manner — as an indication that municipal systems would not be forthcoming and community plans should promote off-grid or informal solutions.

This context and operational factors influenced the implementation of infrastructure in several ways. For example:

• Without the legal authority needed to implement infrastructure at municipal level, many organisations only considered immediate, neighbourhood-level infrastructure needs
• The physical land requirements for infrastructure frequently require compulsory purchase or appropriation of land; many organisations and local authorities were not able to negotiate these transactions, which restricted their ability to implement larger pieces of infrastructure
• The cost of physical infrastructure was beyond the means of many organisations, and
• The technical requirements of infrastructure were not codified, so organisations used a wide range of standards in recovery.

Implementing infrastructure associated with community planning projects generally involved:

• Access: pathways, stairs, roads and so on
• Site remediation works: retaining walls and drainage
• Services: water supply, waste management and so on, and
• Amenities: public spaces and sports facilities.

Several projects proposed significant interventions with ravines that combined access, remediation, services and amenities. These areas tended to be steep and/or unstable slopes and used as dumps for solid
waste. Although the scale of intervention required was generally beyond most implementing organisations’ budgets, planning reports frequently identified the need to address ravines.

5.1.2 Access

The absence of open space in densely built neighbourhoods and the difficulty of circulation (both into and within neighbourhoods) are recurring themes within the community planning reports. Projects made numerous efforts to implement roads, pathways and staircases to address the situation.

In collaboration with MTPTC, organisations built new roads and extended others in several neighbourhoods, including Ravine Pintade, Morne Hercule and Campêche. The key link road in Ravine Pintade was a new route and in Campêche, they extended a dead-end road to link access on the other side of a new public space. Organisations, private companies and the MTPTC produced the designs, which were approved by MTPTC engineers. Using concrete, which was considered more durable and easier to maintain than tarmac, the roads were generally contractor-built with MTPTC oversight due to the scale and technical complexity of the work.

For most organisations, building complete new roads was beyond their budget and capacity. But pathways and staircases were widely implemented – for example, in Haut Turgeau, Villa Rosa, Sainte Marie and Grand Ravine. These were generally concrete routes with integrated surface water drainage. Given the steep topography of many neighbourhoods, staircases were frequently integrated into the pathways. The location and design of these pathways tended to follow pre-existing settlement patterns and routes.

Despite the similarities in technical requirements across locations, there is limited evidence of organisations sharing drawings, specifications or standards. The level of design information varies between organisations, from detailed technical documentation to indicative volume estimates. The level of design information evolved over time as organisations calibrated what was required and was relevant for the authorities and on-site contractors. Small-scale works and site-specific conditions rendered exact design and quantification an inefficient use of time and unnecessary prior to construction.

Much of the implementation of small infrastructure works was carried out via community contracting, whereby the organisation provides cash grants to community representatives to execute the works. Contracts ranged from hundreds to tens of thousands of US dollars. Urban upgrading projects carried out before the earthquake also included similar works, which helped bolster communities’ technical capacity to build small-scale pathways. This approach was considered cost-effective (approximately US$150/m²) and promoted retention of funding within a neighbourhood. But despite the potential benefits of labour-intensive construction to local economies, the process and impacts were not robustly analysed through project monitoring and evaluation.
Figure 40. Before and after: roads in Ravine Pintade

Source: Global Communities (2011). Used with permission

Figure 41. Road extension in Campêche

Credit: Darren Gill

Figure 42. New pathways and staircase in Haut Turgeau (left) and Villa Rosa (right)

Credit: Darren Gill (left) and Maggie Stephenson (right)
5.1.3 Site remediation works

The topography and physical risk profile of many neighbourhoods necessitated site remediation works — on retaining walls, terracing, large drainage and so on — to prepare sites for reconstruction. The scale of these works varied considerably. In some cases, remediation was at individual household level; in others, it involved working on a ravine. As remediation works were often technically complex, they tended to be designed in more detail and implemented via contractors with more oversight than small access work.

Figure 43. Before and after: terracing and retaining walls to support shelters at Ravine Pintade

![Before and after: terracing and retaining walls to support shelters at Ravine Pintade](Image)

Source: UN-Habitat (2012). Used with permissions

Figure 44. Terracing and site remediation works using gabions and stone facing at Bristou-Bobin

![Terracing and site remediation works using gabions and stone facing at Bristou-Bobin](Image)

Source: UN-Habitat (2012). Used with permissions

Figure 45. Remediation work and reinforced concrete retaining walls in a ravine in Campêche

![Remediation work and reinforced concrete retaining walls in a ravine in Campêche](Image)

Credit: Darren Gill
5.1.4 Services

The implementation of new or rehabilitated basic services – water supply, waste management, sanitation and so on – was restricted by several factors. These included the absence of infrastructure before the earthquake, the challenge of integrating with broader municipal networks or systems beyond project sites and the long-term operation and maintenance implications associated with these systems.

In some locations, the water authority DINEPA had existing networks or systems that were reinstated or improved. These were usually community water points rather than individual household connections. Neighbourhood water committees played key roles in managing and maintaining these services. Water kiosks and pipes were fixed and/or built with organisational support in many neighbourhoods, such as Delmas 19. But these interventions still relied on the overall supply network, which suffered frequent shortages. This was beyond the control of neighbourhood-level organisations and projects.

There were also constraints to implementing solid waste management. These were related to links with municipal systems, as they relied on integrating with existing services provided by the Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Residus Solides/Metropolitan Service for Solid Waste Collection (SMCRS). Several community plans included waste collection sites where SMCRS trucks could pick up waste and transport it to municipal facilities. The neighbourhood sites required road access and in some cases – such as Villa Rosa – were implemented as part of road construction works. But waste management was complicated by infrequent collection, the absence of recycling and waste sorting options, and the overarching question of how waste management is paid for. Thus, implementation was limited.

The implementation of sanitation measures was even more limited. Perhaps more than any other infrastructural system, there was no consensus on what technical approach to take with sanitation. Despite the high profile accorded to sanitation due to the cholera outbreak in 2010 after the earthquake, improving sanitation was not prioritised as a topic for policy or technical development, or for major funding in recovery.

Challenges included the high density of building in most neighbourhoods and high water tables in low-lying areas. Houses were commonly constructed with septic tanks directly underneath them on sloping sites. Waste disposal practices such as collecting waste in plastic bags and disposing of it in nearby ravines continue today.

Emergency and temporary sanitation facilities provided in association with temporary shelters and camps in the humanitarian phase had to be decommissioned in the later stages, which was complicated because there were no good solutions and because the cost and technical needs for decommissioning were not factored in to the original planning and installation. Recovery projects implemented a variety of household and community-level sanitation approaches, including household pit latrines as part of owner-driven reconstruction in Villa Rosa and septic tanks in group housing schemes as well as community-level systems, such as biodigesters and composting, alongside schools and community centres in Simon Pele. However, these tended to be small in number, isolated and decentralised.

Figure 46. Shared composting toilets in Simon Pele

In contrast to other basic services, public lighting was widely implemented with the support of many organisations. Hundreds of solar streetlights were installed across Port-au-Prince. These manufactured items were relatively cheap, easy to install and, critically, independent of any electrical network or grid. However, specifications varied across organisations and there is already evidence of non-functioning lights in some neighbourhoods. One organisation described service contracts or warranties between the manufacturers and community representatives, but installation, maintenance and functionality records are not systematically maintained.
5.1.5 Amenities

In many neighbourhoods, organisations built new or upgraded public spaces. The community plans describe a wide range and scale of public spaces, with unique designs and specifications, often implemented by government authorities. These include:

- Large city-scale parks — for example, in Martissant
- Commune-level public squares, such as Place Boyer
- Neighbourhood-scale spaces in Campêche and Carrefour Feuilles
- Micro public spaces
- Upgrading existing or creating new spaces
- Prescribed-use spaces such as football pitches, and
- Multi-purpose spaces such as tiered seating.

Several neighbourhoods — such as Grand Ravine, Morne Lazare and Villa Rosa — made considerable effort to carve out micro public spaces. However, during the field work for this research, we noted that surrounding households have appropriated several of these and that others had been entirely privatised or replaced with more housing. The condition, maintenance and use of all new or upgraded public spaces by the community require analysis over the longer term.

Investment in community or public facilities included schools, health facilities and markets. Early rehabilitation of markets in 2011 enabled traders to restart their businesses as a key step for neighbourhoods to return to normal. Support for schools usually involved retrofitting or rebuilding existing facilities. The design, specification, cost and quality of construction varied widely.

Figure 47. Neighbourhood-scale public space in Campêche

Credit: Darren Gill

Figure 48. Micro public spaces in Morne Lazare (left) and Villa Rosa (with basketball court, right)

Credit: Laura Smits
“Somehow getting infrastructure in place so people can move on with their lives is better. Forget the houses, let’s build retaining walls so people can build their shack safely and it’s not going to flood down the hill.”

“Implementing road infrastructure has been complicated. The number of houses that we need to cut in half or demolish completely. The government can’t pay people without land title, so that’s somewhere where we’ve been able to step in.”

“A road is a road. That’s the ground up. It’s the first investment you need. Once you do that, you see a whole transformation in the neighbourhood. A nice clean road with no dust, you see an immediate impact.”

“We’ve designed for minimum maintenance and easy access. It’s about using technology that everyone knows. So, we make roads out of concrete. Or the pathways are also drainage. We provide info to the community leaders, but usually it’s the people who live on the pathway that are going to clean it.”
5.1.6 Implications and overall issues with infrastructure

Infrastructure implementation delivered significant improvements to neighbourhoods and laid a foundation upon which future work could be carried out. The benefits of infrastructure improvements are more widely experienced than household-level works. In Haiti, they addressed issues that communities themselves may not have had the capacity to deal with – particularly after the earthquake – and which the state may not have been able to address for several years. Despite this, it was hard to measure and attribute the benefits of infrastructure and services. And because much of this work was invisible, it was harder to ’sell’. The shortfall in financial resources and lack of agreed standards and criteria for selection and prioritisation also meant it was difficult to initiate and complete infrastructure works.

Because of the complex, networked and long-term nature of infrastructure, the volume and effectiveness of what organisations could do was limited. Issues around links with municipal systems and future maintenance require integrated plans which generally did not exist and long-term engagement with public authorities, which organisations were not always well placed to do. Systems like sanitation remain unresolved, despite time and money invested in them during the planning phase. Organisations proposed numerous technical solutions, which still require analysis and testing; socioeconomic considerations also need to be considered.

Design and implementation presented a steep learning curve for many organisations in terms of technical complexity and procurement systems. Better sharing of information between organisations could have short-circuited this learning curve by allowing organisations to learn collectively rather than individually. But executing infrastructure works also raises questions about long-term liability for organisations. Community contracting exhibited mixed results. Although works tended to be very small in scale or simple in scope, they still required significant investment in training and oversight. The ability to achieve the desired quality of results was a challenge for many organisations. The level of design detail and drawings carried out may not have been necessary, particularly as so much was modified on site. It may have been more effective to invest more in specification and supervision and less in drawing. Negotiating property lines with communities was also extremely complicated and time consuming; many items were never implemented for this reason.

5.2 Housing

5.2.1 Context

In 2010, almost 80% of the population lived on 20% of the habitable land in Port-au-Prince, in some of the Western Hemisphere’s most densely built neighbourhoods. Half of the homes in the city were rented, mainly from small-scale landlords who often lived in the same building. Before the earthquake, the average dwelling size for many households in Port-au-Prince was 10m² (UN-Habitat 2009). Most urban housing was in low-quality concrete block with reinforced cement concrete slab or corrugated galvanised iron (CGI) roofs, with poor access to sanitation or other residential services.

Informal settlements had grown rapidly at critical times over the previous three decades, enabling people to access land and address their housing needs incrementally with the resources available. But serious deficits remained in terms of housing quantity and quality. Increasing and improving urban housing was already a major need and challenge before the earthquake. In 2013, Haiti’s housing deficit was estimated at 500,000 new units required over the subsequent decade (UCLBP 2013). Responsibility for aspects of housing policy, regulation or provision lay between several government authorities, but private housing production in informal neighbourhoods generally operated outside of the state mechanisms (UN-Habitat 2009, Levine et al. 2012).

Approximately 100,000 homes were destroyed and a further 150,000 were damaged by the earthquake, mainly in informal areas (GFDRR 2016) and 1.5 million people were displaced into formal and spontaneous camps (UCLBP 2013). Shelter and housing became a priority determinant in emergency and in recovery programming. Funding expectations for both temporary and permanent housing support were initially very high, but from 2012 onwards had to adjust to reality. Major new site development would be the exception rather than the norm; most households would rebuild at origin; and supporting household’s accelerated and improved reconstruction would pose significant challenges for the government and assistance organisations.

Emergency shelter support, formal and informal camps, temporary shelter provision, housing demolition and debris management, housing repair and retrofitting, rental subsidies, construction training, new housing, emergency, temporary and rehabilitated water and sanitation activities all took place in affected neighbourhoods. In some cases, these works ran in parallel with, or were components of, community planning. In all cases, emergency, temporary and permanent housing works consumed a large proportion of the allotted budget for the neighbourhood rehabilitation.
5.2.2 Housing damage

There was extensive damage to housing in many neighbourhoods, on flat streets and steep hillsides (see Figure 51). Figure 52 shows a typically dense informal neighbourhood, where a high proportion of buildings were destroyed. Debris management – and mapping or planning for reconstruction – was a huge challenge.

Figure 51. Damage was extensive on flat and steep sites, 2010

Credit: Jean Christophe Adrian/UN-Habitat (left), Neil Brighton/CARE (right)

Figure 52. A high proportion of buildings were destroyed in this area of Delmas, 2010

Credit: Mary Faherty/GOAL
5.2.3 Housing displacement, shelters and camps

Figure 53. People built shelters where they could: on the roof of damaged buildings (left) and on the street, close to their damaged homes (right), 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 54. A shadeless camp on open low ground at risk of flooding, 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 55. Small and large camps occupied all available open ground, May 2010

Credit: Giovanni Cassani/IOM
Figure 56. Peak displacement in the city, July 2010

Credit: Alain Grimard/UN-Habitat

Figure 57. Camp latrine and housing conditions almost five years on, October 2014

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Table 9. Range of housing intervention options carried out in Haiti

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<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION TYPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency shelter</td>
<td>Provision of tarpaulins, tents, non-food items, weatherproofing buildings or makeshift shelters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camps</td>
<td>Formal or spontaneous occupation of public and private open spaces, usually close to origin. Rudimentary shelter and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary shelter</td>
<td>Framed structure with tarp, board or sheeted walling and CGI roof average 15 m², usually on site of destroyed house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debris management</td>
<td>Manual or machine demolition of destroyed or severely damaged houses, material salvage, debris reuse or removal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing repair</td>
<td>Minor or major repairs or retrofitting to higher safety levels of houses categorised as repairable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rental subsidy</td>
<td>Conditional cash subsidy to enable households to leave camps and secure one year’s rental accommodation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing technical support</td>
<td>Training for construction actors, material improvement, public information and awareness, demonstration buildings, design service, resource centres or on-site advice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing subsidy</td>
<td>Conditional cash or material subsidy to support households to reconstruct their house and adhere to standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing construction</td>
<td>Organisation of direct construction of single or groups of new houses</td>
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MORE INFORMATION: emergency response

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5.2.4 Housing repair, retrofitting and upgrading

Through their projects, organisations promoted housing repairs to facilitate households’ safe return from camps and optimise the remaining housing stock. For organisations concerned about challenges involved in new construction, investing in existing buildings avoided critical issues such as relocation and ownership. Housing repair work started in parallel with temporary shelter construction and the majority was completed by the end of 2012. Retrofitting the very large stock of undamaged but substandard housing remains a development challenge, where hazard resistance is only one factor. Space standards, durability and sanitation are also upgrading priorities. Respondents and project reports noted the following challenges:

- The MTPTC teams who assessed damage did not provide analysis or guidance to property owners at the time of inspection, but the teams constituted a new corps of knowledge on building performance and shortcomings and MTPTC personnel worked in organisations afterwards on repair activities
- Many organisations assumed liability for the safety of repaired houses, although most buildings were likely to be altered and extended afterwards
- Varying building sizes and conditions made it difficult to manage safety requirements within standardised levels of subsidy
- Bespoke technical assessment, design and specification were expensive vis-a-vis the value of the building or the cost of repairs
- Masons were usually unable to read engineering drawings or specifications
- Unknown factors, such as site conditions, material quality and workmanship, undermined the accuracy of engineering analysis
- Funding of repairs by organisations was a disincentive for owners to fund the works themselves, and
- Some organisations carried out repairs on condition the owner rented a room to a displaced person/household, thereby increasing the number of households housed in the neighbourhood.

Figure 58. Rehabilitating and retrofitting damaged houses in Simon Pele (left) and a 16/6 neighbourhood (right)

Credits: Maggie Stephenson (left) and Claude-André Nadon/UNOPS and 16/6 (right)

MORE INFORMATION: recovery

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5.2.5 Owner-driven housing reconstruction

Although the UCLBP 2012 Housing Policy advocated an owner-driven approach to reconstruction, no large-scale government-led or organisation-coordinated programme emerged similar to those implemented after disasters in other countries over the previous decade. Initial efforts to promote such a programme included recommending a US$3,500 subsidy level, developing construction standards and technical assistance activities. Some organisations adopted owner-driven reconstruction strategies within their neighbourhoods at project level.

Constraints to owner-driven reconstruction included:

- Land ownership and formal status as a precondition for subsidy eligibility
- Reconstruction policies that were not tailored to facilitate rental reconstruction
- Humanitarian organisations mandated to assist the most vulnerable helping property owners, who were usually less vulnerable than tenants
- Sites for reconstruction that were deemed hazardous
- Organisations aiming to provide full housing and guarantee quality, rather than a partial subsidy without control over quality
- Inadequate size of site, services, poor materials and workmanship posing a reputational risk for organisations
- Technical assistance that varied from basic awareness to site supervision (respondents estimated the cost of technical support in owner-driven housing repairs and new builds was 20% of the technical support cost in organisation-driven ones)
- The focus on consistent subsidy levels not including analysis of and not aiming for consistency in project support costs
- The time required for incremental construction being beyond organisations’ project timeframe and donor requirements for finished house outputs
- A lack of redress mechanisms in the event of housing subsidies being used for other purposes, and
- The difficulty of complying with building approval processes in informal neighbourhood conditions.

5.2.6 New housing

Organisations only directly repaired or built new housing in small numbers. There were two main strategies; minimal houses for extremely vulnerable households and individual or groups of houses to demonstrate improved typologies and technologies. Direct housing construction was expensive and represented a major investment per household, with implications for project budgets and equity in the community.

Housing damage, displacement, return and reconstruction were priority criteria for institutional donors. Neighbourhood recovery programmes were often funded as housing recovery programmes and many organisations had target numbers of houses to (re)construct directly.

Figure 59. New construction of incremental housing in Nerette with reinforcement bars for a future additional storey

Figure 60. New multi-family housing in Delmas 32, with shared open space that accommodates the septic tanks and provides circulation

Credit: Claude-André Nadon/UNOPS and 16/6

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
The size and cost of new house (re)construction by organisations in informal neighbourhoods on complex sites varied widely. They ranged from US$5,000–35,000 per unit or US$250–750 per m², with an average cost of US$20,000 or US$500/m². This cost did not include organisation planning or management costs. Site mitigation and preparation costs were high, involving technical assessments and engineered retaining walls, for example. Design and build supervision costs were also high, as there were several technical and quality assurance issues to resolve. Programme delays further increased the costs.

It proved difficult to combine better planning, urban design and housing by consolidating plots and developing grouped housing using owners’ resources; but a small number of fully organisation-funded schemes managed to do this. Organisations also undertook intensive social support activities associated with housing schemes, to resolve site rationalisation, design requirements, future maintenance, shared areas and services and other implications of collective living.

New typologies and practices introduced through demonstration and pilot housing schemes were not widely replicated by other residents in the area, usually due to prohibitive costs, high skill levels involved and the normally individualised and incremental processes of housing construction. But investment in pilot housing schemes contributed to housing sector knowledge, diagnosing and demonstrating options for issues including tenure, site works, housing finance, sustainable services, environmentally appropriate design, culturally expression, hazard resistance, security and privacy.

The group schemes had similar impacts to the painting of houses in Jalousie, significantly changing the image and perception of informal neighbourhoods for the authorities and wider public and contributed to local discourse on housing. While new link roads and stairs made a practical difference to thousands of residents’ daily lives, they were not necessarily visible or apparent to the rest of the city. Highly visible housing schemes, on the other hand, acted as billboards, demonstrating government action on housing and commitment to the neighbourhoods. But while the government appreciated the importance of visual impact to decision makers and public opinion, the assistance community often underestimated it.
Figure 62. Grouped housing under construction in Morne Hercule. With limited access for machinery, site levelling and engineered retaining walls become more complex

Credit: Adriana Navarro-Sertich/UNOPS and 16/6

Figure 63. New grouped housing is the new face of the Morne Lazare neighbourhood, acting as a billboard for housing reconstruction and government assistance to neighbourhood recovery

Credit: UCLBP and 16/6 Drone Image. Used with permission
5.2.7 Technical support for housing

Technical support for housing, or technical assistance, includes a broad range of inputs to inform, guide and add value to housing recovery undertaken by households, communities and governments, either with their own resources or with financial or material assistance.

Technical support for housing activities aims to improve recovery outcomes through the establishment, rehabilitation or development of systems, capacities, policies and programmes. It acknowledges that the affected population has a primary role in housing recovery. Technical support for housing recovery ideally comprises a range of measures including for example: (re)establishing regulatory systems and institutional arrangements, the development of housing policies and programmes, standards and guidance on construction materials and financing, capacity development, public awareness, community mobilisation and engagement, quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation of recovery progress, and institutionalisation of recovery lessons learnt.

Figure 64. Public information on concrete mix painted on the wall along a busy pedestrian route in Villa Rosa

Figure 65. An MTPTC official provides on-site advice during weekend information sessions at a demonstration house in Delmas 32
5.2.8 Overall issues in housing

Housing is unavoidable: when there is major damage to housing in a crisis, community planning and neighbourhood recovery will have to engage with housing rehabilitation and reconstruction issues as housing represents the majority of the neighbourhood building stock, the greatest demand on local resources and a priority concern for residents.

Piecemeal shelter and housing support is suboptimal: affected populations need better coordination and greater control over funding and activities in shelter and housing recovery. Disjointed, uncertain or supply-driven housing support undermines household optimisation of resources and collective planning efforts.

Housing has changed little: the location, mechanisms and standards of housing production in informal neighbourhoods have changed little since the earthquake. The same shortcomings continue despite extensive diagnosis and efforts to achieve improvements.

Informal reconstruction: building in informal neighbourhoods has continued, with residents filling in open spaces and adding new storeys to existing buildings (Figure 66). Substandard construction practices have also continued since the earthquake (Figure 67).

Figure 66. Densification of existing neighbourhoods: Jalousie November 2011 (left) and June 2016 (right)

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 67. Inadequate sizes, spacing and tying in steelwork (left) and inadequate vertical and horizontal reinforcement of blockwork (right)

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Supporting housing: most housing resources (finance, materials and labour) are mobilised by people themselves. Neither government nor organisations understand this sufficiently; instead, they remain preoccupied with their own funds and actions. Harnessing and adding value to local and private housing resources requires different approaches and activities based on sustained analysis of local capacities, priorities and needs.

Addressing tenure: among the constraints to advancing housing policies and housing programmes was the critical issue of informal land and property status. Tenure issues were complicated further by making security of tenure a precondition to reconstruction and development, on ideological or regulatory grounds. Measures to help resolve tenure issues needed to be derived from analysis of local reality, needs and priorities.

Housing policies cannot be determined through individual neighbourhood projects: housing standards, housing infrastructure and land, property and construction regulations are determined through political and institutional mechanisms that operate above the neighbourhood level at municipal and national levels. Housing finance, levels of subsidy or market mechanisms also operate above the neighbourhood or project level. Housing reconstruction policies could not be determined through participatory community planning; rather, they required sectoral mechanisms to facilitate greater equity and efficiency in the use of housing-related funding, and greater coherence and consistency in approaches to housing between neighbourhood recovery projects.

Quotes

“People were waiting for us. We had to put out a big message to say we’re not building houses anymore. Because people were waiting.”

“It’s all about houses. Everyone wants their house built. But what else is on the list? The health clinic, the public space, the football pitch, the corridors. If I don’t do this corridor, then I can do this many houses.”

“How did you select 500 houses? It’s really just a technical assessment, nothing to do with vulnerability. If it’s a 30-degree slope or more, can’t do it. If you’re too close to the ravine, can’t do it. If we do a geotechnical survey so this is a red zone, can’t do it. If you have a T-Shelter, can’t do it. If it’s too expensive, can’t do it.”

“In the collective site, the units are better maintained and the community is organised. The idea was to show that it is feasible to do something that’s nice, that’s decent, that people like. You can’t really do that with individual units.”

“An enormous sum has been spent on temporary housing (easily US$500 million when all is completed), which has gone largely to existing landowners in non-urban settings. A conservative estimate is that reconstruction could cost US$1.6 billion. Less than US$400 million is now available, and it is committed to a disproportionately small number of beneficiaries. More funding is needed, but it should be allocated more equitably and spent more efficiently.”

More information: housing issues

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Fort National

Figure 68. Before and after: Fort National residential area close to the city centre, before and after debris removal

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 69. Government plans for total redevelopment of Fort National area as middle class apartments for new residents, April 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 70. Pre-earthquake residents return to new 16/6 funded houses (yellow) and rehabilitated previous houses in Fort National, June 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

MORE INFORMATION: Fort National/Champs de Mars

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Ravine Pintade

Figure 71. Ravine Pintade neighbourhood, damaged and uninhabitable in February 2010

Credit: Jean Christophe Adrian/UN-Habitat

Figure 72. Land terraced with ramps, stairs, new retaining walls and building foundations: temporary shelter under construction in Ravine Pintade, July 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 73. Foundation for permanent housing built as part of the 2011 rehabilitation works, with no further construction progress five years on, June 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 74. Temporary latrines still in operation. Most residents indicated that sanitation was a priority, June 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 75. Upgraded canal maintained clear of rubbish, 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 76. One- and two-storey coloured shelters in good condition and continued use, with few replaced by concrete block construction, 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Planning beyond the neighbourhoods

The previous chapters explored community planning in informal residential neighbourhoods damaged by the earthquake. Post-crisis recovery also involved urban planning initiatives at city level and in key locations not damaged by the earthquake, addressing different issues and using different approaches from those used in the damaged informal neighbourhoods. This chapter describes planning in three of these areas: the city centre, new planned sites and Canaan. It also looks at initiatives in planning education.

6.1 The city centre: downtown Anbas Lavil

The historic centre of Port-au-Prince was developed as the planned capital in the mid-18th century as a series of gridded blocks with commerce, housing, government, schools and other public institutions and recreational space (Figure 77). Rapid urbanisation from the 1980s onwards saw the emergence of Delmas, Petionville and Croix des Bouquet as competing nodes of social and economic activity. Political instability and insecurity over the same period accelerated the decline of the city centre. By the time of the earthquake, infrastructure was in poor condition and many buildings were poorly maintained and had been closed, demolished or occupied by low-value activities and low-income tenants. The location continued to host markets for all types of goods arriving into the country and produce from rural areas for redistribution to the rest of the city. City centre landmarks — including the cathedral, the National Palace, the Iron Market and the Champs de Mars — symbolised the city and national identity and remained central to the lives of most citizens.

The earthquake destroyed historic monuments and ordinary buildings in the city centre (Figure 78). The government was crippled by the collapse of over 20 ministries and municipal buildings. The thoroughfare of Champs de Mars became one of the largest camps, accommodating residents mainly from the informal neighbourhood of Fort National. Shortly after the earthquake, a moratorium on (re)construction was issued for the city centre subject to the development and approval of a plan for the area.

The future of the city centre after the earthquake was a question for the whole city and for all Haitians. Various answers emerged. In this section, we explore a range of initiatives and processes and some of the associated planning discourse.

Figure 77. Port-au-Prince city centre, 1950s

Source: Peloux (2011). Used with permission
Figure 78. City centre earthquake debris not yet removed, May 2011

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 79. City centre grid

Credit: Laura Smits

Figure 79 shows a map of the blocks and streets in the historic centre of downtown Port-au-Prince. Figure 80 compares these blocks to urban blocks in Cerda’s Barcelona10. Most of the urban blocks in Port-au-Prince are $115m \times 115m$, closely resembling the $113m \times 113m$ urban blocks in Cerda’s Barcelona. The three blocks in Figure 80 compares a typical Barcelona block with large peripheral buildings and an open core (top); a typical Port-au-Prince block before the earthquake (centre) and the same typical Port-au-Prince block after the earthquake, with many buildings destroyed (bottom). The typical Barcelona block has less than 20 individual building plots while in Port-au-Prince, the typical plot is densely built with over 50 narrow building plots. The percentage of open space increased from 19% before to 42% after the earthquake.

Figure 80. Block characteristics: Barcelona v Port-au-Prince, 2009 and 2011

Credit: Laura Smits

10 Ildefons Cerda was an urban planner who designed the 19th-century ‘extension’ of Barcelona called the Eixample.
6.1.1 Projects

1. Restoring the Iron Market: coinciding with the first anniversary of the earthquake, this project was a privately funded commitment to the emblematic value of national heritage, the old commercial centre and local traders. Media coverage was extensive for the first anniversary, due to the building’s high profile, the actors involved and the scarcity of good news stories. Associated plans to (re) develop a wider area were not realised due to difficulties, which included site acquisition.

2 The new cathedral: in March 2012, the Archdiocese of Port-au-Prince launched an international design competition inviting the architects of the world to submit ideas to inform the reconstruction of the cathedral within a decade. “The ideal design must engage the future and celebrate life. Still it must be mindful of the past and memorialise the thousands who died and were injured in the earthquake of 12 January 2010” (Monsignor Guire Poulard, Archbishop of Port-au-Prince).

Figure 81. Cathedral design competition entries from the YCF group (left) and TABB Architecture (right)

Credit: YCF Group (left) and TABB Architecture (right)

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6.1.2 Urban planning

A range of local and external interest groups developed plans for the city centre in the first two years after the earthquake. These illustrate different interpretations of the physical, social, political, economic and cultural context, options for the future and the role of planners and planning in helping to bring about change.

MORE INFORMATION: rebuilding Port-au-Prince

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1. Port-au-Prince master plan, the Prince’s Foundation and DPZ (January 2011): the Haitian government engaged the London-based Prince’s Foundation for the Built Environment and Miami firm Duany Plater-Zyberk (DPZ) to develop a reconstruction plan for Port-au-Prince. Their vision for downtown emphasised the existing grid and amenity in the public domain with a fine grain of mixed-use buildings anticipating middle- and higher-income occupants with block-level cooperative management. Proposals for the waterfront were based on natural resource management and risk reduction.

MORE INFORMATION: Port-au-Prince master plan

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Figure 82. Vision for downtown Port-au-Prince

'Urban village' with corner park

Credit: DPZ
2. Port-au-Prince redevelopment plan, Groupe Trame and CHRAD (August 2011): over 40 Haitian experts, engineers, architects and planners, led by Groupe Trame and CHRAD in cooperation with the municipality of Port-au-Prince, proposed an entirely new modern, higher-rise city centre. The core administrative and financial buildings were to be serviced by a metro system and supplemented with tourism, culture and leisure facilities. Proposals for the waterfront were based on recreation. The plan was estimated at US$3.3 billion over five years.

Figure 83. Visualisation of city centre redevelopment

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3. Vil Nou Vle A (The city we want), MPCE, UN-Habitat and UNDP (November 2011): unlike the two physical and design-driven planning initiatives outlines above, Vil Nou Vle A was a process-based consultative effort organised by the MPCE with support from UN-Habitat and UNDP, engaging more than 600 people over 12 months in stakeholder groups to analyse the city and suggest priorities and strategies for recovery and for the future, at neighbourhood, municipal and metropolitan level. Participating groups included municipalities, the private sector, academia and community leaders. The city centre was a major focus area and issue. The Vil Nou Vle A forum in November 2011 included presentations and discussions by the respective groups on their findings and proposals, which were also documented in a brochure. A key recommendation proposed in the forum – which the government immediately endorsed – was lifting the moratorium on (re)construction in the city centre.

4. Cité Administrative urban development plan (August 2012): the Cité Administrative plan, led by the UCLBP and supported by the MPCE with technical input by IBI-DAA planning consultants, addressed a key sub-area of the city centre that accommodates most state institutions and administrative buildings and priority public spaces. The proposed development was guided by three strategic objectives:

1. Promoting exchange and coordination between central planning entities and state administration
2. Creating a critical mass that can start the rebuilding of the devastated city centre, and
3. Clearly affirming the government will to rebuild the administrative capital within the historical city centre.

The plan facilitated the development of major individual building projects, which advanced at various speeds. Brand new government ministry buildings present highly visible signs of recovery. The concentration of government buildings along two axes allowed a rationalised upgrading of infrastructure. Although the style of the buildings and streetscape may not constitute a consistent or recognisably Haitian architectural and urban identity, they reflect a collection of influences. Investment in the public domain is concentrated in high quality key spaces including Champs de Mars.

Figure 84a. Cité Administrative location in city centre and planning rationale
Figure 84b. Cité Administrative location in city centre and planning rationale

Source: MPCE, UCLBP, IBI, DAA (2012). Used with permission of the government of Haiti

Figure 84c. Cité Administrative: developed plan showing locations of government buildings along the east-west and north-south axes and the park at Champs de Mars

Source: MPCE, UCLBP, IBI, DAA (2012). Used with permission of the government of Haiti
Figure 86. Cité Administrative: three-dimensional view of the developed plan, showing the central street of government buildings running from the Champs de Mars park to the waterfront

Source: MPCE, UCLBP, IBI, DAA (2012). Used with permission of the government of Haiti

Figure 87. Cité Administrative visualisations: the newly widened central street of government buildings and part of the renovated park at Champs de Mars

Source: MPCE, UCLBP, IBI, DAA (2012). Used with permission of the government of Haiti

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6.1.3 The city centre now

The challenges facing the regeneration of the rest of the historic city centre remain. Macro-economic, legal and political factors outweigh planning efforts to encourage private investment and development in the centre. Strain on infrastructure and municipal services is illustrated by waste management problems that seem far removed from the streetscape images in the 2011 plans. Severely hazardous buildings remain standing and have not been secured. Relocated and new commercial development and higher-income groups have become more established elsewhere in the city, and other locations such as Canaan and Morne l’Hôpital have proven more expedient for the very large number of small investors who continue to build homes and livelihods in the city.

City centre regeneration planning required economic analysis and strategies, including for investment in infrastructure. But planning engagement in the future of the city centre fell sharply after 2012, despite dangerous buildings remaining standing and living and working conditions being far below those in many informal neighbourhoods. Later and continuing initiatives include CIAT analysis of city centre block morphology, tenure and use and other studies and plans by government, local academic and business interests (CIAT 2015).

Urban development actors – international organisations, professional bodies, planning practitioners and the media – did not maintain interest in the plight of the city centre as a priority issue and did not sufficiently analyse options to regenerate the city centre’s residential capacity at critical periods during the recovery. The area suffered from a lack of funding and urban professional expertise, and was not considered in relation to overall urban policies and investments in informal area recovery and peripheral growth. These actors did not view the city centre as fundamental to the future of the city and its citizens or as a challenge to which they could usefully and collectively contribute.

MORE INFORMATION: the city centre now

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Figure 88. City centre streetscape and waste management, 2013

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 89. Sunday market traders set up in front of still damaged city centre damaged buildings, 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
6.2 New planned sites

Sites for greenfield housing development were mainly identified north of the city, in zones long earmarked for satellite urban development, with good road access, low agricultural value and usually with challenges for water supply.

**Morne a Cabrit:** also known as Lumane Casimir, this government housing project of 1,000 homes (450 apartments and 550 houses) was constructed at a cost of over US$48 million on a greenfield site north of the city. It was part of a larger strategy to house 3,000 families affected by the earthquake in a newly established neighbourhood.

**Haut Damier:** north of the city near Cabaret, this smaller greenfield housing development, planned and implemented by an institutional donor and NGO partners with the government, cost US$8.3 million and houses 156 earthquake-affected families.

Both schemes used a monolithic reinforced concrete technology approach designed for mass replication. The sites were developed with piped water supply, sanitation and extensive high-quality landscaping works. Buildings were plastered, painted and the images used extensively in housing recovery media reports. The unit size and specification in the Haut Damier scheme is of a much higher standard. Both schemes involved voluntary relocation, with household and community development support.

Both initiatives were driven by the aim to produce new, technically safe and adequate housing units. But many issues — around eligibility and selection of residents, rent levels, affordability, maintenance of services, ownership or rent-to-buy mechanisms — were only addressed when the projects were at an advanced stage, with planning driven by the construction process. Road space is generous but few residents own cars as yet. Efforts have been made to mitigate the harsh environment with planting. As the settlements mature, residents are expected to appropriate spaces between buildings and develop the construction sites into real rather than nominal villages. But tenure and management issues — including the continued operation and maintenance of infrastructure — may prove more challenging.

Figure 90. Mechanised construction method in Haut Damier (2013, left) and Morne a Cabrit (right)

Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 91. Double-storey apartment units and single-storey housing in Morne a Cabrit, 2016

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
6.3 Canaan

In 2010, the foothills north of the city were largely vacant land. By 2017, the area was home to over 200,000 people and Canaan was the third largest urban settlement in the country. Canaan (encompassing Canaan, Jerusalem, Onaville and Saint Christophe) was established and developed rapidly over the first three years after the earthquake, almost entirely without official financial or technical assistance for construction, infrastructure or for urban planning.

After the earthquake, the government identified the area north of the city to potentially relocate displaced urban households. The land had been the subject of various earlier proposals — including as a tourist site (1971) and an industrial and residential area (circa 2000) — but it remained undeveloped. In March 2010, the government issued a Declaration of Public Utility over 7,450 acres but it did not progress plans for the overall area.

In April 2010, a portion of the land called Corail Cesselesse was developed as a formally planned camp with 2,100 temporary shelters and associated services by a range of humanitarian organisations for displaced families relocated from congested camps in the city. The adjoining lands of Canaan were spontaneously and informally appropriated and developed rapidly, soon dwarfing Corail (see Figures 94 and 95). Corail Cesselesse has changed little since its establishment; Canaan, on the other hand, has transformed rapidly through stages of urbanisation.

Canaan developed in a pattern similar to the establishment of other informal neighbourhoods in the city, settled by some residents in tents and makeshift shelters but also by middle- and higher-income residents and investors directly constructing permanent buildings. In 2011, there was mainly lightweight timber framed housing, and many stone and concrete foundations were under construction. By 2014, both concrete block and lightweight construction were prevalent. All seized an unprecedented opportunity to access land to house those who lost homes in the earthquake, for tenants to become property owners, and to respond to massive market demand.

Figure 92. Image analysis of development of Canaan, 2009, 2011 and 2013
Figure 93. Canaan summary analysis of growth, 2013 and update 2019

Credit: Laura Smits

Figure 94. Canaan before and after: tents, shelters and plots demarcated, May 2010, and with Camp Corail Cesselesse in the centre of the image, November 2016

Credit: Giovanni Cassani/IOM (left) Ben Noble/Internews (right)

Figure 95. Canaan with Camp Corail Cesselesse in the background in 2011 (left) and 2014 (right)

Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Early commentators viewed the growth of Canaan as chaotic or a new slum for only poor residents, but analysis from 2011 illustrated the highly organised process of allocating and demarcating plots (see Figure 96) and organising circulation. There was already a range of house sizes, reflecting a broad mix of income groups (see, for example, Figure 97). Perceived safety in numbers, low risk of eviction and expectations of future growth underpinned the confidence of the new population. Informal status and the absence of formal infrastructure were familiar conditions for the stakeholders, who proceeded to incrementally develop community and commercial services and facilities – roads, street signs, street lighting, water kiosks, churches, schools, markets and parks – themselves and to take steps individually and collectively towards environmental management. Surveys in early 2012 found the population had risen to over 150,000 with an estimated US$100 million of private funds invested in the area, countering the narrative of Haiti as dependent and waiting for external assistance.

Figure 96. Plot demarcation at the edges of Canaan, 2013
Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Figure 97. Typical construction size and quality on premium sites, 2013
Credit: Maggie Stephenson

Canaan rapidly became the site of recovery for many earthquake-affected families, including tenants, vulnerable and low income households, creating the same pattern of informal urbanisation that would present challenges in upgrading programmes. But international and national assistance and technical communities did not engage in guiding its development. Apart from some small-scale philanthropy, research and advocacy, there was little or no assistance in promoting or supporting sustainable land use, services and urban management, hazard-resistant construction awareness or skills, social or economic development. Institutional donors and large organisations did not get involved, citing constraints due to the area’s non-earthquake affected status, the residents’ illegal status and funding and capacity deficits, having committed resources to existing neighbourhoods.

As well as not initially engaging directly in Canaan, few from the urban development or assistance communities visited the area while the new city was built. Canaan was visible from the main national road; it was the largest construction site in the country and a headline in local and international media. Yet few Port-au-Prince-based planning professionals visited the area to learn how it was developing, what issues were arising or how they were being addressed.

6.3.1 Canaan planning initiatives

In January 2012, the government engaged with Canaan anew and tried to advance policy decisions and associated regulatory measures and infrastructure investment, despite the politically complex challenges involved – such as the risk of accelerating growth and raising expectations and having scarce resources for public investment. The government commissioned a series of strategic plans, aiming to delimit the zone, rationalise already developed areas, upgrade pilot areas and address water supply and flooding risks.

From late 2013 onwards, under national government leadership and in coordination with local authorities, a coalition of donors, humanitarian and civil society organisations explored the potential of investing in programmes to support sustainable urbanisation in Canaan. Preparatory activities – including participatory area analysis and planning – started in 2014, with priority activities and measures starting the following year. Government authorities and partner organisations built on experience, tools and lessons learned from post-earthquake community planning and neighbourhood recovery programmes elsewhere in the city, including the UCLBP-led 16/6 programme.

In Canaan, community planning approaches were adapted to a new scale, complexity, flux and a highly politicised context with a large number and wide range of stakeholders of various origins, incomes, needs and priorities. Canaan faces similar challenges and opportunities to the earthquake-damaged established neighbourhoods. But there are differences, too, such as the stage of development, the scale and speed of
expansion and the relationship to the city. Per capita funding and staffing for planning and interventions was also significantly lower than the 28 neighbourhood projects. The approach was more strategic, action-planning focused, iterative and linked to official policies than the more comprehensive — but often autonomous — processes applied in the other neighbourhood rehabilitation projects.

The political importance of Canaan and its links to the 2010 earthquake may have been instrumental in the adoption of community planning approaches to support urbanisation. Whether and to what degree these approaches will inform ongoing development in existing neighbourhoods or the development of new neighbourhoods remains to be seen and will involve questions around the institutionalisation of policies, methodologies and data, public awareness and expectations of planning, the roles of and relationships between the state, development partners and communities, the employment or deployment of experienced personnel and the financing of planning and implementation.

Figure 98. Large infrastructure works are part of the government’s urban plan for Canaan, supported by ARC, 2017

Credit: Anna Konotchick/American Red Cross

Figure 99. Priorities in Canaan included upgrading the main road and building drainage works, 2017

Credit: Chris Ward/USAID

MORE INFORMATION: Canaan

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6.4 Planning education

Many stakeholders in urban planning, urban disaster management education and related topics sought to learn from the impact of the disaster and recovery process in Port-au-Prince. In some cases, they also sought to contribute to knowledge, capacity or activities in recovery.

Engagement ranged from individuals working independently to partnerships between international and local institutions and groups embedded with organisations that were involved in post-earthquake humanitarian response or recovery. Some education stakeholders had prior knowledge of the city and prior relationships with communities or institutions; others undertook short or extended post-disaster missions.

The availability of planning education outputs varies. Journal articles are available but some are only accessible to a limited audience. Student project data, primarily for learning purposes, are not shared widely.

Planning and urban development education initiatives after the earthquake fall into three main categories: academic research, projects and courses.

1. Academic research

**Topics**: sociology, anthropology, politics, geography, disaster risk management, geology and engineering.

**Objectives**: learning for the author and contribution to knowledge, evaluating policies or projects; generating evidence for advocacy.

**Outputs**: unpublished and published dissertations, academic journal articles, books, book chapters, videos and blogs.

2. Projects

**Topics**: architecture, urban planning, engineering, environmental management, social and economic development, disaster risk management, information and communications technology.

**Objectives**: learning for participants and contribution to knowledge; practical experience in real-life post-disaster situations; assisting local communities/agencies to develop proposals; implementing projects or elements thereof; testing and evaluating results.

**Outputs**:
- Diagnostics: maps, photographs, surveys and documentation.
- Proposals: drawings, specifications, costs, rationales and documentation.
- Executed projects: emergency shelter and services, rehabilitation of damaged or provision of new infrastructure, site works and social development activities.

3. Courses

**Objectives**: developing urban planning education for informal neighbourhoods and post-disaster recovery; increasing access to urban planning education; developing North/South partnerships between education providers; exposure and experience for participants from the North; expanding local planning expertise.

**Outputs**: course modules, learning by visiting and local graduates, projects and dissertations.

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**MORE INFORMATION: planning education**

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Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Achievements

Community planning after the Haiti earthquake firmly placed informal neighbourhoods on the map and on the government agenda. It also ensured that resources were used in a way that would deliver improved living conditions for people across the city and helped local, national and international actors develop their planning approaches and capacity. In this section, we look in more detail at the achievements in these sectors.

1. Putting informal neighbourhoods on the map and on the agenda
   • Community planning produced extensive quality data and analysis of previously undocumented informal neighbourhoods despite difficult operating conditions.
   • The perception and status of informal neighbourhoods in the city changed significantly through recognition in government policies and programmes, institutionalisation and integration with the city through community planning initiatives.

2. Channelling resources through planning to deliver improved living conditions
   • Broad-based participatory processes facilitated local prioritisation of resources invested in area rehabilitation and provided guidance for future area development.
   • Improvements were achieved in access and circulation, drainage and risk mitigation, community services and amenities, reducing vulnerabilities and upgrading the residential environment for one million people across a range of communities and contexts.
   • Investments in the neighbourhoods contributed to economic recovery by generating local employment and re-establishing businesses. Neighbourhood programmes contributed to political stability by calming tensions, alleviating conditions and demonstrating government commitment to frustrated communities.

3. Developing humanitarian urban planning approaches and capacities
   • Early pilot community planning and neighbourhood upgrading projects enabled stakeholders to develop tools, created examples and credibility and provided a basis for progressive expansion and refinement over seven years. Combining approaches from slum upgrading and other (traditional) urban development activities with emergency response and reconstruction developed a hybrid emergency urban planning.
   • Government officials, technical personnel and community members all increased their knowledge of urban planning approaches for informal neighbourhoods, expanding local planning capacity. Formalising methodologies for continued use, in existing and new areas, could also contribute to the mitigation of risks and the promotion of more sustainable urbanisation processes in the future.
   • Over 50 humanitarian organisations gained understanding and experience of a major urban disaster and the dynamics of low-income informal neighbourhood recovery in Haiti, informing changes in thinking and practice to respond more appropriately to urban crises in future.
7.2 What could we learn and improve?

The experiences of all the stakeholders involved in community planning have highlighted areas for improvement and provided lessons for the future.

1. A fragmented response was less than the sum of its parts

The emergency shelter response was based on maximum coverage of coordinated, agreed, basic support to all affected households. But the subsequent community planning and neighbourhood recovery activities were based on discrete projects with uneven funding that produced major gaps and diverging aims, activities and priorities. Fragmentation diluted the impact, made outputs difficult to aggregate and mitigated the building of political momentum or lasting progress on common agendas.

2. There was a gap between ambition and reality, between planning and implementation

Crisis recovery in Haiti was not only or primarily about earthquake damage. Community planning had to engage with the scale and depth of underlying urban development deficits, which recovery support could not redress. Community planning generated ambitious visions for neighbourhoods, amplified by high early expectations of funding and a resilient future for Haiti, but all programmes involved at best modest or selective execution of those visions. Adjusting to economic, political and physical reality — from what is desirable, to what is possible — was a common and difficult experience for all organisations and communities.

Haiti already faced many logistical constraints due to location, terrain and infrastructure. It is expensive, slow and difficult to get things done in the country. After the earthquake, logistics were even more challenging. Almost all conditions for safe construction were absent – locations were unsafe, plots were small and both materials and construction skills were low quality. This made it difficult to meet the standards that authorities and organisations deemed necessary. Concern for tangible results within short timeframes and for reputational risk shrank planning ambition to what could be delivered or controlled.

3. Multi-sector planning requires human resource strategies

Planning requires people. Developing comprehensive, integrated, multi-sector diagnoses and plans involved the costly mobilisation of multiple experts in large teams, consultancies, consortia or partnerships working on often very small areas, with the associated complexity of management and reporting. Limited transfer of tools or experience between projects contributed to extensive duplication, with implications for time, cost, quality and consistency. Programmes often did not have human resource strategies for supervision or backstopping for technical personnel, continued training and advice for young staff, skills transfer and exchange between disciplines, international and national staff or project personnel and communities. The backgrounds of lead personnel strongly informed planning approaches and outputs, illustrating differences between technical and social disciplines. Some skillsets – such as architecture, geospatial analysis and mapmaking – were strongly represented. Many respondents said that other skills, such as economic analysis, were deficient. Monitoring and evaluation focused on project outputs, with only rudimentary analysis of human resource costs, time and activities, despite the high proportion of the project budget involved and the influence on the process.

4. Uncertainty has advantages and disadvantages

All organisations cite uncertainty as the prevailing environment, from the immediate response to date. This spans all levels, from national politics to local contract delays. All respondents complained of data and policy vacuums that needed to be addressed to establish a necessary degree of certainty for projects. Organisations filled the data vacuum by investing in extensive data collection; they filled the policy vacuum by taking autonomous decisions.

Uncertainty and autonomy provided opportunities to test and learn from pilot activities. These enabled an iterative response to evolving situations and incremental definition of priorities. They also gave stakeholders time to build capacity and establish trust and confidence. Uncertainty in funding, however, contributed to redundant and disjointed planning and activities.

Respondents cited the absence of policies and coordination as symptomatic of the government’s – rather than the humanitarian and technical communities’ – weakness. But the assistance community could have anticipated government uncertainty in Haiti, particularly after catastrophic losses, as a key characteristic of the recovery environment.
5. Residential neighbourhood planning and recovery require housing strategies

The 2010 earthquake destroyed and damaged 250,000 homes and rendered 1.5 million people from Port-au-Prince's informal neighbourhoods homeless. Shelter and housing were urgent priorities for affected populations. Funding for neighbourhood recovery programmes and associated community planning was usually predicated on improving shelter and housing conditions. Community planning focused on the public domain — on collective infrastructure and community facilities — rather than housing. Organisations struggled to define relevant approaches or adapt their mechanisms to support housing recovery in a context where housing was largely illegal, insecure and substandard, so engaging in housing activities would require compromises. Housing interventions tended to focus on emergency or temporary measures, short-term technical assistance or small-scale new construction. Most housing was rebuilt, without financial or technical assistance, and with little improvement in terms of safety, quality or condition. This means that more than 80% of buildings in the neighbourhoods have not significantly improved.

6. There is less accountability for the outcomes of socioeconomic — rather than physical — interventions

Many urban planning initiatives emphasised spatial or physical analysis and propositions. Associated socioeconomic analysis was often less developed and undermined the validity or utility of the overall planning. Most plans included interventions that aimed to contribute to social cohesion and promote social and economic development, but there is limited analysis of the outcomes and effectiveness of those efforts to inform future planning in the context of crisis conditions.

7. Not everything can be dealt with at neighbourhood level

Housing reconstruction strategies involve issues of property status, policies and technical standards. Strategies to finance housing involve eligibility criteria, coverage and optimisation of resources. Such issues cannot be determined organisation by organisation, project by project or area by area — particularly in adjoining areas of a city — without risking serious inequities. Sectoral consistency underpinned emergency and temporary shelter activities; permanent housing strategies have even greater need for sectoral coherence and rationales.

It was feasible for interventions such as solar lighting, amenity space and staircases/stairs to be planned and implemented at neighbourhood level. But measures such as access roads, and ravine and watershed management required coordination between adjoining neighbourhoods. Other issues — such as improvements to sanitation — were identified as priorities but required planning, investment, authority and capacity beyond the level of the neighbourhood or organisations that were entrusted with most of the reconstruction funding. The earthquake damage created opportunities for physical rationalisation and developing critical infrastructure. But without timely decisions and investment, such opportunities passed. Capacity to implement strategic-level infrastructure was low, but neighbourhood-level planning and implementation capacity was also low at the outset of recovery in 2010. Neighbourhood planning capacity was expanded significantly, but strategic planning capacity was not.

8. The disaster site is not the only site of recovery

Assistance funding was tied to areas damaged by the earthquake, mitigating the potential to invest in other urban development options in the city for earthquake-affected households. The city centre regeneration represented a major recovery opportunity to optimise key accessible land, restore the city's identity and accommodate a large population close to transport and employment. But doing so required political, institutional, technical and economic actors with different mandates and capacities to the corps of humanitarian organisations involved in community planning and neighbourhood rehabilitation. The foothills south of the city continued to grow after the earthquake and a new city of more than 200,000 people grew to the north in Canaan, both accommodating many earthquake-affected families. But as these newly settled areas were not earthquake-damaged, they lay outside of earthquake-related community planning assistance, despite their potential to benefit from planning. Over 500 planning personnel were involved in planning in the 28 pre-earthquake informal neighbourhoods, but only a small fraction of that number were involved in supporting planning in the city centre, Morne l'Hôpital or Canaan.
9. Investing in plans or investing in planning?
Most planning stakeholders understood community planning as a means to mobilise or allocate organisational funding to implement visible, achievable projects. To a lesser extent, they considered planning to also provide practical or aspirational guidance for longer-term urban development. Since plans were mainly funding-related, the funding aims and conditions framed the planning scope and process. The focus of plans for project implementation meant that the long-term availability or use of data beyond project completion were not major considerations.

Planning was task-oriented. Building staff or community planning capacity was not a specific objective, a structured activity or a measured outcome in the projects. Project-based planning personnel stayed within their areas; most did not engage in planning or recovery issues in the wider city, or in the development of planning education, practice or discourse in Haiti. Institutional investment in long-term national and municipal urban development and planning authorities was minimal compared to the investment in short-term non-governmental planning actors.

Project-based planning inputs were not conducive to coordinated advocacy or contributions to longer-term urban development agendas. After the earthquake, there was significant public and media interest in discussing the city and its future. Planners in the city or wider urban development community did not optimise communication and public discussion opportunities.

10. Timing in strategic planning, research and evaluations
Most discussions and inputs on strategic urban planning and the future of the city centre took place in the first year or two after the earthquake, when both national and municipal authorities were preoccupied with managing humanitarian issues such as displacement camps, debris removal and cholera. But strategic planning and planning authorities needed support over a longer period – particularly from 2012–2017 – when areas of the city were changing rapidly and with long-term consequences.

Most community planning activities and evaluations of those activities took place in the first three years after the earthquake, when interest and resources were high. The longer process of recovery received less attention in terms of research or evaluation, including evaluating the impact of assistance programmes. Longitudinal research and/or sustained engagement are critical to learning on topics such as community planning and neighbourhood recovery, which continue over five to ten years or longer. Evaluations tended to be project-based and accounted for outputs directly on completion of works. This mitigated understanding of dynamic recovery or urban development processes and of any links between macro and local factors and short-term actions and longer-term impacts.

11. The cost and value of data
Data collection and processing required massive resources in terms of time and personnel to produce over 3,000 pages of core documents, as well as detailed implementation documents. All organisations were preoccupied by the perceived data vacuum in 2010. In contexts like Haiti, in conditions of urgency, dilemmas arise around data collection, processing and analysis. Do we need or want all the data we are collecting? What question do they answer? Whose question do they answer? Do we base our decisions on experience and expertise as much as on data? Are we operating according to methods borrowed from data-rich contexts? What are the costs of data? Could those resources be spent more directly on tangible outcomes? Are the data only for project decisions or are they more strategic and durable?

Few respondents mentioned analysing the cost of collecting and processing data, but they did analyse the cost of other activities and outputs. This does not show that the costs of data were insignificant; rather, that they considered data to be necessary and non-negotiable, so they tended not reflect on their value and cost.

Are government or organisations obliged to – or is there a plan to – make data available? If so, to whom? How? When? What for? Five years on, most of the valuable data produced through community planning in Haiti were not available – in the organisations that produced it, in the public domain or in the communities concerned.

The amount of data produced and the subsequent loss of most of those data may seem unique to community planning in Haiti, where extensive and expensive data were produced to address a vacuum, secure funding and support implementation. But this pattern reflects common experience in humanitarian and development programming, where assessments, project data, reports and evaluations are routinely generated and lost or discarded.

Most academic research data on the crisis are not in the public domain or are available in subscription-only journals and therefore not easily accessible to – or used by – those involved in recovery in Haiti.

Solutions to both project and research data availability require greater focus on institutionalisation along with options for supplementary mechanisms such as country or crisis-specific platforms to enable aggregation, exchange and continued access.
7.3 Recommendations for future humanitarian community planning

Drawing on the experiences of all involved and the lessons learned outlined in Section 7.2, we close with these recommendations for future humanitarian community planning.

1. Coordination is not optional
Coordination is vital for recovery support to address coverage, coherence and consensus on the use of resources. In particular:

- National and local governments should be supported to lead coordination; they may need additional staff, advice, skills or resources to do so
- Regardless of whether the government can coordinate, all recovery actors have a responsibility to coordinate and collaborate to be collectively accountable to the affected population, and
- Coordination is not a designated role, it is a necessary attitude for all stakeholders in all activities, from emergency through to post-recovery.

2. Timing matters
Planning is possible at all stages of the disaster cycle. Timing and duration will have implications for the status and scope of planning activities. In particular, we recommend

- Having agreements and resources in place before a disaster happens
- Where this is not the case, starting community assessments early to inform emergency response funding and activities and empower communities to make more informed decisions for recovery
- Ensuring planning is iterative, informed by and informing policies and implementation
- Timely review and feedback loops to optimise the iterative process, and
- Adjusting to the urgency and accelerated timing of post-crisis recovery when transferring planning approaches from a development to a crisis context.

3. Build continuity
Crises are times of flux with high turnover of staff and projects, loss of knowledge and fractured programming and operations. As such it is a good idea to:

- Anticipate staff turnover, ensuring more personnel and long-term local personnel are involved in all stages of activities to increase understanding and retention of knowledge
- Strengthen the transfer and continuity of skills and knowledge, through training and mentoring, and
- Engage local officials and local contributors or commentators from the outset and regularly throughout the process.

4. Pool resources to optimise resources
Specialised skills are valuable and scarce, so project-wise investment may be suboptimal. Optimising resources could include:

- Avoiding unnecessary duplication when developing methodologies, curriculums, specifications and other transferable tools and resources
- Carrying out joint activities and form joint teams where feasible — for example, in training, assessments and evaluation — to optimise resources, exchange information and build capacity, and
- Pooling resources to procure higher-level and sustained expertise and backstopping support for project personnel.

5. Share and exchange to develop capacity
Building a common understanding of urban development issues, challenges and potential post disaster requires proactive engagement by:

- Encouraging and facilitating exchange of data, problems, opinions and experience at all levels of project personnel, particularly through site visits and discussions
- Not waiting until completion to share information — including draft, interim and final documentation — throughout the process for timely feedback, revisions and wider use, and
- Learning from previous crises and other cities and capturing knowledge to inform future crisis response.
6. Plan strategically

Crises present unprecedented opportunities for change in cities and investment in planning, but many plans are unrealistic and unrealised. As such, it is good to:

• Be selective and be feasible; identify minimal input and maximum outcome activities and/or concentrate inputs for key outcomes

• Be flexible in planning to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances; action or iterative planning will be more effective than a rigid linear planning approach, and

• Ensure that planning is not just a collection of projects; with collective effort, planning can be more than the sum of its parts, generating momentum and greater lasting impacts.

7. Be smart about data

Planning can be a data-hungry activity. Collecting, analysing and communicating data takes a lot of manpower, resources and time. With this in mind, we recommend:

• Clearly defining questions and the data needed to answer them

• Distinguishing between necessary and desirable data

• Considering the trade-offs between investing in data and in other measures, and

• Planning for retaining, sharing and institutionalising data to optimise the investment.

8. Learn from what happened next

Because planning is often an early activity, many planners do not see what happens later. To learn from the longer recovery story, it is a good idea to analyse the contribution of planning inputs by investigating:

• How data were institutionalised or lost, capacities transferred and redeployed

• Which planning recommendations were implemented or not, and why

• What was involved

• How the area and community recovered outside of the project activities

• What resources people mobilised, and

• What activities they prioritised.
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Humanitarian responses to urban crises are focusing increasingly on integrated programming and area-based approaches. This paper contributes to the emerging literature of urban area-based planning in humanitarian crises through a case study of community planning projects carried out in 28 neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince seven years after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. These initiatives involved over 50 humanitarian organisations and resulted in both practical improvements to living conditions and far-reaching institutional changes in planning policies and the status of informal settlements.

Experience from the seven years of urban recovery interventions in Haiti also raises questions about the scope of planning, the roles of planners and challenges around data and coordination.

Learning from community planning in Haiti requires access to the plans developed in Haiti. As such, we retrieved and consolidated extensive planning data from the 28 neighbourhoods and the broader response and made them available through a digital archive linked to this paper. Our intention is that this archive should be useful both in Haiti and for wider reference in future urban crises. We also hope it will promote learning from the reality of implementation for those involved in crisis-recovery and urban planning education and policy development.

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International Institute for Environment and Development
80-86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399
Fax: +44 (0)20 3514 9055
www.iied.org

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