Humanitarian response for development in Fiji: lessons from Tropical Cyclone Winston

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Linking humanitarian response and development is a key agenda driven by multiple factors across both humanitarian and development landscapes. It is also a topical issue in Fiji, a South Pacific Island nation which is exposed to natural hazards, particularly tropical cyclones. This research aims to learn from Fiji’s experience of Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016. The research offers lessons for sub-national and national governments of Fiji, governments and donors in the Pacific region, and also beyond, on how humanitarian response (response and early recovery) has contributed – and can be strengthened to further contribute – to development goals in urban contexts.
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# Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>ACPS</td>
<td>Annual corporate plans</td>
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<td>BBB</td>
<td>Build back better</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<td>DDMC</td>
<td>District disaster management council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>DISMAC</td>
<td>Disaster management committee</td>
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<td>DivDMC</td>
<td>Divisional disaster management council</td>
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<td>DivEOC</td>
<td>Divisional emergency operations centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FRCS</td>
<td>Fiji Revenue and Customs Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>NDMC</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Council</td>
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<td>NDMO</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Office</td>
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<td>NEOC</td>
<td>National Emergency Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFMF</td>
<td>Republic of Fiji Military Forces</td>
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<td>PHT</td>
<td>Pacific Humanitarian Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard operating procedures</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>Unicef</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Tropical cyclone</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Linking humanitarian response and development is a key agenda driven by multiple factors across both humanitarian and development landscapes at the global and also at the Pacific regional level.

This research aims to learn from Fiji’s Western Division’s experience of integrating development planning and disaster response following Tropical Cyclone (TC) Winston in 2016.

TC Winston was the most severe cyclone on record to affect Fiji, making landfall as a Category 5 storm – the highest intensity of tropical cyclones. It was one of the most powerful cyclones ever recorded in the southern hemisphere and is the highest-cost cyclone to affect the South Pacific.

Through primary research with stakeholders in the Western Division, the research explored the TC Winston humanitarian response within the context of urban communities in Fiji. Urban communities are inclusive of informal settlements which experience disruption of traditional cultural practices, which (in traditional Pacific settings) provide support structures following a disaster. Primary data was supplemented by a document review which focused on generating insight from the TC Winston response and revealing opportunities to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals.

Three key research questions guided the research:
1. How did the humanitarian response to TC Winston influence the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?
2. What were the implications of the TC Winston humanitarian response to longer-term development outcomes (including education, housing, health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), roads and food security)?
3. What are the opportunities in humanitarian response to strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?

Research question 1: findings
The research found that the humanitarian response to TC Winston had no substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. While the research did not reveal any evidence of influence, by asking the question, the research did reveal aspirations to employ governance and institutional arrangements practised within the humanitarian response, as part of the longer-term development agenda, and for there to be a stronger intersection of development planning and humanitarian response.

The research revealed a variety of reasons why the humanitarian response to TC Winston did not have substantive influence to the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. These findings offer insight into how future humanitarian response can be better linked to development goals as discussed further in response to research question 3.

- Humanitarian response and development planning in the Western Division are informed by different governance and institutional arrangements.
- In the Western Division, Fiji, there are different degrees of coordination experienced during humanitarian response compared with long-term development planning, as evidenced before, during and after TC Winston.
- Governance arrangements for recovery are also different to those for longer-term development and humanitarian response.
- Local-level planning agendas are not clearly known to major stakeholders which meant the TC Winston humanitarian response could not penetrate and feed into development priorities nor longer-term governance and institutional arrangements.
- There is a fragmented and separated governance structure for rural and urban development in Fiji.

Research question 2: findings
The research found that the TC Winston humanitarian response silenced the longer-term development agenda, with no strong connection or complement between the humanitarian response and longer-term development outcomes. The silencing of the development agenda within the response and recovery interventions was due in part, and as already noted above, to the disconnected governance arrangements for long term-development, response and recovery and lack of a widely known long-term development plan, especially at the divisional level at the time of TC Winston, which may have influenced or informed response and recovery efforts. The magnitude of the disaster and resulting damage has also prioritised response efforts.
Key implications of TC Winston response to longer-term development outcomes in the Western Division include:

- Longer-term government initiatives and development goals have been siloed and fragmented as a result of the TC Winston response.

- The humanitarian response has been mainly focused on infrastructure rehabilitation in response to the large-scale damage sustained as a result of TC Winston.

- The humanitarian response has prioritised housing, recognising the severe destruction resulting from TC Winston. However, the research revealed that local stakeholders had mixed views on the extent to which these efforts were contributing to longer-term development outcomes.

Research question 3: findings

The research found a wealth of opportunities for humanitarian response to strengthen the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development.

- Coordination between government with civil society organisations (CSOs), practised during times of humanitarian response and as evidenced during the TC Winston response, could be applied to support the longer-term development agenda.

- The cluster system could be strengthened, building on emerging practice in Fiji, to provide governance and institutional arrangements which link humanitarian response and the development agenda.

- Another opportunity for humanitarian response to strengthen the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development is to better integrate ‘recovery’ within both dimensions of the humanitarian-development nexus.

- Another opportunity for humanitarian response to strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development is to build on existing governance structures at both divisional and community level, where the same community leaders are responsible for both the development agenda and also humanitarian response.

- Key concepts central to humanitarian response and appreciated in the Western Division can strengthen governance and institutional arrangements for development.

- An important finding from this research is the circular nature of humanitarian response and development. While the research focus has been on humanitarian response and how this can influence and strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development, what we found was that these opportunities need to be enabled in the first instance through the development agenda.

The platform for blurring the divide between humanitarian response and development is present in Fiji, particularly in the Western Division. An appetite for stronger coordination that stretches across the divide, a recognition of the value of ‘integrating principles’ such as ‘risk integration’ and ‘build back better’ and drawing on shared experience of humanitarian response and its impact on development goals, provides a strong catalysis for the nexus and contribution of humanitarian response to development.
1 Introduction

1.1 Research background

Linking humanitarian response and development is a key agenda driven by multiple drivers across both humanitarian and development landscapes. Together, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015) have called for efforts to reduce risk, ensuring resilience is enhanced and exposure and vulnerability reduced for all people. In practice, this means meeting the needs of people during humanitarian crises while also concurrently reducing underlying risks and inequalities. It also means ensuring development practices and activities do not enhance vulnerability and exposure, and therefore disaster risk (Keating et al. 2017).

Conversations on the humanitarian-development nexus culminated at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey, where a shared Agenda for Humanity (UN 2016) was committed to. This included a ‘core responsibility’ to ‘deliver collective outcomes: transcend humanitarian-development divides’. This included the need to:

Commit to the following elements in order to move beyond traditional silos, and work across mandates, sectors and institutional boundaries, with a greater diversity of partners, towards ending need and reducing risk and vulnerability in support of national and local capacities and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda (UN 2016:58).

United Nations (UN) agencies and other development stakeholders at global, regional, national and sub-national levels have since progressed agreed actions from the World Humanitarian Summit. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)’s New way of working report (UNOCHA 2017) further develops the ideas from the Agenda for Humanity and describes the need to overcome the barriers that exist between humanitarian and development workers.

At the Pacific regional level, humanitarian and development actors have also been discussing the need to think of humanitarian response and development as a continuum, rather than as separate fields of work. The Pacific’s Framework for resilient development in the Pacific (PIFS et al. 2016) notes that ‘knowledge brokering, communication and access to meteorological, climate, geological and other relevant information and tools are essential to effectively address key risks across the humanitarian-development continuum’ (PIFS et al. 2016:29). The Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (a collaboration between the UN, Pacific Island country representatives, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), donors and private-sector actors) has also made efforts to overcome the traditional divide between humanitarian and development work. At the Pacific Humanitarian Team’s 2016 meeting, it was noted that transformative change in the traditional ways of working were needed, and this included changes to governance structures to support the humanitarian-development nexus (UNOCHA 2016).

In Fiji, at the sub-national level, progress is also being made to address the divide between humanitarian response and development. The commissioner of Fiji’s Western Division demonstrated his leadership on this issue, preparing a communiqué which provides guidance that all planning and sectoral programming in the Western Division integrates considerations of risk, in order to reduce and/or mitigate the impact of climate change and disaster (Western Division Government of Fiji 2015). This research flips the linkage of development and disaster response as set out in the communiqué, by exploring how humanitarian response might best serve the interests of long-term development. This research explores the interface between humanitarian response and long-term development in the context of Tropical Cyclone Winston, which struck Fiji in February 2016.

Within conversations on bridging humanitarian response and development, urban issues remain largely absent. Some authors have acknowledged this gap, highlighting that while humanitarian response has provided much-needed immediate post-disaster assistance, it has done so (and continues to do so) with no regard for local development needs (Tag-Eldeen 2017). This is particularly true in the Pacific, in part because urban planning challenges are a new and emerging issue. The complex dynamics present in any urban setting are acknowledged to be a challenge in humanitarian response (Dodman et al. 2013), and the Fiji example certainly highlights this to be the case. This research aims to bring some new
thinking to the topic of linking humanitarian response and development in urban contexts.

1.2 Research context

Fiji is a South Pacific Island nation with a population of 892,000 (World Bank 2015a), almost 54 per cent of which lives in urban areas (World Bank 2015b). Fiji’s sub-national government is divided into four divisions: Northern, Eastern, Western and Central, with divisional commissioners responsible for coordinating government services and development activities (Rahman and Singh 2011). This research is focused on Western Division (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Figure 1. Location of Fiji on world map

Source: www.free-world-maps.com

Figure 2. Divisional structure of Fiji highlighting Western Division

Source: Netmaps
Fiji is widely exposed to natural hazards, particularly tropical cyclones, and ranks 16th out of 171 on the World Risk Index (United Nations University 2014). The focus of this research is on Tropical Cyclone Winston which is the highest intensity storm to impact Fiji to date.

The Western Division experienced the greatest damage from TC Winston, with more loss of life and damage to homes and infrastructure than any other area. The Western Division has a total land mass of 6,377 km² which covers two-thirds of Viti Levu Island. The total population is 368,838 which is equivalent to 40 per cent of the national population. Western Division contributes to 70 per cent of Fiji’s GDP (Commissioner Western 2016).

1.3 Research objective

This research aims to learn from Fiji’s Western Division’s experience of integrating development planning and disaster response following TC Winston. The research offers lessons for sub-national and national governments of Fiji, governments and donors in the Pacific region, and also beyond, on how humanitarian response (response and early recovery) has contributed – and can be strengthened to further contribute – to development goals in urban contexts.

Through primary research with stakeholders in the Western Division the research explores the TC Winston humanitarian response within the context of urban communities in Fiji. Urban communities are inclusive of informal settlements, which experience disruption of traditional cultural practices, which (in traditional Pacific settings) provide support structures following a disaster.

1.4 Working paper structure

This working paper is structured as follows. The methodology used for the research is presented in Section 2 while Section 3 provides the findings in response to key research questions. Section 4 presents the policy implications from the research. A conclusion is presented in Section 5.

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^ Preliminary figures are from the Fiji Meteorological Service.
Methodology

2.1 Study design and key research questions

The research is informed by a case-study methodology, focusing on the experience of the TC Winston response in the Western Division, Fiji. The design of the research recognised the leadership of the Western Division sub-national government in relation to the nexus of humanitarian response and development planning. The research was carried out with support from the Western Division Commissioner’s Office and key staff supported the research through a range of activities:

- Joint development of a research plan, clearly articulating roles and responsibilities
- Joint preparation of stakeholder mapping
- Regular scheduled phone meetings for planning and preparation of field work
- Joint invitations to participate in the research by the Western Division Commissioner’s Office and research team
- Participation of key government staff in research workshop and validation of emerging research findings, and
- Review of draft report.

Research phases and activities are described in Box 3.

Three key research questions guided the research:

- How did the humanitarian response to TC Winston influence the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?
- What were the implications of the TC Winston humanitarian response to longer-term development outcomes (including education, housing, health, WASH, roads and food security)?
- What are the opportunities in humanitarian response to strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?

### BOX 3. RESEARCH PHASES AND KEY ACTIVITIES

#### Phase 1. Project scoping, methodology design and document review

- Reviewed Western Division reporting on TC Winston response, development planning and document review on humanitarian-development nexus.
- Prepared detailed analytical framework and initial findings in relation to research questions. Use of thematic analysis and qualitative software (NVivo) to ensure efficiencies in research and provide transparent and useable findings.

#### Phase 2. Primary data collection in Western Division, Fiji

- Conducted key informant interviews primarily with Western Division staff and then snowball sampling to identify specific organisations/actors who participated in TC Winston response (eg Red Cross, UN agencies, national government, other NGOs)
- Designed and led participatory workshop with Western Division staff and NGO humanitarian actors to explore benefits and risks of localisation in humanitarian response and nexus to development; validation of emerging research findings; and co-production of research findings and lessons for broader sector.

#### Phase 3. Detailed data analysis, write-up and preparation of outputs

- Conducted detailed analysis of qualitative data within the analytical framework to structure key findings and lessons. An important aspect of the research findings will be to reflect multiple stakeholder perspectives and lessons learnt for key audiences.
- Produced outputs in partnership with the Western Division office undertaken through remote communication.
2.2 Data collection

Two primary sources of data were used to inform this research. Primary data was collected from key informant interviews (using a semi-structured interview guide) at both national and sub-national levels (Western Division) and a multistakeholder participatory workshop held in the Western Division with representatives from Western Division government (sectors and Commissioner’s Office) and locally based NGOs.

Twenty-eight interviews were conducted (21 male, 7 female). The gender representation of interview participants is indicative of broader trends of women in senior government roles in Fiji. Appendix 1 details the representation of multiple organisations in the research in the Western Division. At the national level, key stakeholders relevant to the TC Winston response were also consulted during the research as also detailed in Appendix 1.

A multistakeholder workshop was held in Lautoka, Western Division with 34 participants (11 female, 23 male) representing government (sectors, Western Division) and NGOs. The workshop provided an opportunity to share and validate emerging findings and through active participation generate recommendations for how humanitarian response could strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development (research question 3).

Primary data was supplemented by a document review which focused on generating insight from the TC Winston response and revealing opportunities to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals.

BOX 4. KEY DEFINITIONS FOR THE RESEARCH

This research uses language and terminology common to both the humanitarian and development sectors, but it is important to clarify these terms in the context of TC Winston and this research.

**Humanitarian response:** A state of natural disaster was declared by the government of Fiji after Cyclone Winston between 20 February and 19 April 2016. The government led the immediate response to TC Winston with coordinated support from development partners.

**Recovery:** As defined in the Discovery Recovery Framework (Government of Fiji 2016c:3), recovery is defined for the period from mid-2016 to mid-2018. As stated in the document: ‘In recognition of the long-term nature of recovery and reconstruction, recovery efforts beyond two years will be integrated into Fiji’s National Development Plan’.

**Governance and institutional arrangements:**

A key focus of this research is on ‘governance and institutional arrangements’ in the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals. A broad perspective is offered for this research.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1997:9), in its policy paper defined governance as ‘the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences’.

We employ a state-centric definition of governance but also recognise the multistakeholder perspective.

As described by Pierre (2000:3), ‘Governance refers to sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives’. As evidenced during the TC Winston response, actors relevant to a humanitarian response not only include political actors and institutions, but also CSOs, NGOs, multilateral organisations and other national governments. It is important that understandings of governance encapsulate the rich interactions through a multistakeholder perspective.

Our definition of institutional arrangements is informed by literature which considers the inner workings of institutions. Scott (2014:56) notes that: ‘Institutions comprise regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive developments that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life’. Scott describes three elements which are the vital ingredients of institutions: regulative systems, normative systems and cultural-cognitive systems. Scott (2014) quotes Hoffman (1997:36) in describing a continuum: ‘From the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted’.

This broad dimension of institutional arrangements has enabled the research to reveal both formal and informal dynamics relevant to the Fiji context. Scott (2014:59) describes this as the ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing facets’ of institutional arrangements. This research will draw on these theoretical underpinnings to explore governance and institutional arrangements in the context of humanitarian response and the longer-term development agenda in the Western Division, Fiji.
2.3 Sampling

The research focused on the Western Division of Fiji, centring on Lautoka. With a population of 52,000, it is the second largest city of Fiji (after Suva, the capital with a population of 88,000). The research location was selected based on the urban focus of the research, the high degree to which TC Winston affected the Western Division, and the existing commitment for linking development and disaster preparedness as demonstrated through the communiqué on risk integration mentioned previously.

The sample of research participants was informed by a purposive approach. Western Division government partners provided guidance to the research team on relevant stakeholders to participate in key informant interviews and the participatory workshop. Sampling of key informants in Suva was also purposive in order to capture all relevant stakeholders involved in the TC Winston response.

Documents were purposively reviewed to explore the TC Winston response in the Western Division as well as reveal practice and opportunities to strengthen governance and institutional arrangements within the nexus of humanitarian response and development. Documents relevant to TC Winston in Western Division were accessed from the Fiji government as well UN agencies such as UNOCHA, United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and NGOs such as Save the Children and the Red Cross. Documents relevant to governance and planning for long-term development in the Western Division were also sought. While documents pertaining to sector planning were available, those specific to the Western Division Commissioner’s Office were not accessible at the time of the research.

2.4 Analysis

Data analysis of both primary and secondary data was conducted using the qualitative software, NVivo. Inductive thematic analysis was undertaken where areas of inquiry framed by the research questions formed the basis of the coding and analysis structure.

2.5 Research ethics

The research was carried out with ethics approval from the University of Technology Sydney and more particularly through the Institute for Sustainable Futures. Informed consent was obtained from all research participants and consideration was made to ensure privacy (anonymisation of all participants) and protocols for secure data storage were in place.

2.6 Limitations

Several limitations to this research should be acknowledged since they will influence the readers’ interpretation of findings.

First, while the research team planned to have a strong partnership approach with key Western Division government staff in planning and carrying out the research, in practice this was limited. Steps were taken to maximise the inputs from the Western Division. However, input mostly related to logistics (e.g., in the fieldwork planning, stakeholder mapping, developing interview schedules). Participation in the research was primarily as research participants. This was due to staff transfers and the inability of key staff to take time away from their daily work due to their already high workloads.

Second, while the research sought to focus on the urban dimension in relation to the TC Winston humanitarian response, interview responses and also relevant documentation tended to relate to rural dimensions. This is illustrative of policy lag in relation to urban issues in Fiji, lack of integration of key actors within the urban context and other government arrangements, and relatively more focus on disaster response in relation to rural areas. These issues are discussed further in the findings section. Research findings are presented in response to the three research questions as set out in Section 2.1.
Research findings: influence of the humanitarian response on development

Research question 1 asked, how did the humanitarian response to TC Winston influence the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?

This section draws on both primary research conducted in Fiji and the document review, to consider the influence of the TC Winston humanitarian response, particularly in the Western Division, to governance and institutional arrangements for longer term-development.

The research found that the humanitarian response to TC Winston had no substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. While the research did not reveal any evidence of influence, by asking the question, the research did reveal aspirations to employ governance and institutional arrangements practised within the humanitarian response, as part of the longer-term development agenda, and for there to be a stronger intersection of development planning and humanitarian response. This view was expressed by both representatives of government and NGOs alike.

The research revealed a variety of reasons why the humanitarian response to TC Winston did not have substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. These findings offer insight into how future humanitarian response can be better linked to development goals as discussed further in response to research question 3 (Section 3.3).

3.1 Differences in governance and institutional arrangements

This research found that humanitarian response and development planning in the Western Division are informed by different governance and institutional arrangements. Governance arrangements for both humanitarian response and long-term development planning are set out below, as a means to highlight the current absence of linkages.

3.1.1 Humanitarian response governance

Fiji has a clear policy, planning and operational framework for disaster preparedness and response. Humanitarian response is informed by the government of Fiji’s National Disaster Management Plan (1995), the National Disaster Management Act (1998) and the National Emergency Operation Centre’s standard operating procedures (2010). The National Disaster Management Act delegates authority to coordinate disaster response at divisional levels to the divisional commissioners. In the case of this research, the Commissioner Western Manasa Tagicakibau for the Western Division was vested with authority for the TC Winston disaster response:

*The National Disaster Controller will be in overall command when an emergency operation is initiated. He will be assisted by the Divisional Commissioners and the District Officers at divisional and district levels (Government of Fiji 1998).*
The research highlighted universal awareness of the delegated authority from the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) to Commissioner Western during times of disasters. The NDMO is the coordinating office of the Fiji government in times of national disasters. The NDMO operates under the National Disaster Management Act and coordinates the national management of disaster activities at the national level and delegates responsibility to divisions. Awareness of the governance arrangements and delegation to divisional levels was expressed by representatives from all stakeholder groups: government, NGOs and community leaders.

The NDMO representative at the divisional level is Commissioner Western, his office activates the response and all support agencies then coordinate through this office (government staff representative, Western Division).

Due to the severity of TC Winston, the Fiji military played a key role in the humanitarian response, though there is no mention of this role in the national disaster plan and act. The government of Fiji enacted emergency powers which provided the legal framework to deploy military assets to respond to the cyclone. The Australian and New Zealand militaries also provided transport and logistical support in response activities. A participant of the research workshop noted that ‘for the response – there are processes in place – but because of the severity of the cyclone most processes were not followed’. Research worldwide shows there is a need for flexibility, ingenuity and collaboration in post-disaster construction (Opdyke et al. 2015) and this was evidenced in response to TC Winston.

The established institutional arrangements for humanitarian response shifted in response to TC Winston. Using Scott’s (2014) understandings of three pillars of institutions, the dominant paradigm which informed the TC Winston response moved from dominance of a ‘regulative’ framework established in the policy, legal and planning framework for humanitarian response to dominance of a ‘normative’ perspective which was driven by expectations and social obligations to address the immediate needs of Fiji citizens.

Within Fiji there are no established links between military-led humanitarian response and other governance arrangements, though coordination was evident during the response to TC Winston. The Fiji military were able to navigate and align to local governance arrangements activated in response to the cyclone, informed by innate understandings of the local context. This was a different picture for Australia and New Zealand military forces which, as described by an international stakeholder, worked separately to local systems.

Australia and New Zealand had no idea how that works at the local level. At the government’s Lessons Learnt Workshop – it became clear that the Australia and New Zealand military hadn’t been briefed but no one realised. They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No one thought to ask. You need to find out what are the local systems before you go. Other NGOs did this too. Came in without understanding the local systems.

3.1.2 Long-term development governance

The longer-term development agenda in Fiji is informed by a range of different governance and institutional arrangements, at national, sub-national and community level comprising a mix of different features of decentralisation. As described in Box 5, it is important to distinguish different dimensions of decentralisation since they do influence the way in which long-term governance arrangements work and to highlight why there is currently an absence of links between governance for humanitarian response and long-term development planning. Box 5 gives a brief summary of sub-national governance arrangements for long-term development in the context of the Western Division.

Administrative sub-national governance

Fiji is geographically divided into four administrative divisions: Northern, Eastern, Central and Western, each with a commissioner ‘who coordinate(s) all governmental services and development activities’ (Rahman and Singh

**BOX 5. FEATURES OF DECENTRALISATION**

**Decentralisation**: The transfer of power from central (national) institutions to lower levels in a political-administrative structure, such as regions or communities. ‘Decentralisation’ is often used as a broad term to describe different levels of delegated authority.

**Deconcentration**: Administrative leadership and responsibility is retained in the central government. It involves ‘the transfer of functions within the central government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from central ministries to field offices, the creation of field agencies, or the shifting of responsibility to local administrative units that are part of central government structure’ (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986).

**Delegation**: A more extensive form of decentralisation. Through delegation, central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it.

**Devolution**: The strongest form of decentralisation and often described as a democratic or political form of decentralisation. Local authorities are given autonomy and independence, are usually elected and are perceived of as a separate level of government over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control.
Informal settlements are estimated to be 7 per cent of Fiji’s total population. The greater Suva area (capital city) has the highest number of settlements, with Lautoka the second highest. In Lautoka an estimated 20,000 people live in informal settlements on agricultural land, where the agricultural lease has expired, or peri-urban areas outside of Lautoka. Informal settlements can be well organised, such as the Navutu settlement, densely populated such as Tomuka settlement or vulnerable to flood such as Navutu, Wajavi and Lovu settlements.

Because the settlements lie beyond the city’s boundaries there is no mandated government responsibility to manage health and sanitation issues in these settlements. The settlements are serviced both directly and indirectly through municipal infrastructure, services and utilities even though the council have no responsibility to do so. The council is also unable to enforce development and environmental controls. The Lautoka city council is considering extending the city boundaries in order to incorporate these newly populated areas.

There are both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors driving urbanisation in Lautoka and the informal settlements. The rate of urbanisation in Lautoka is closely associated with factors such as employment, education, commerce and industry, all of which attract residents. Above all, migration into Lautoka is attributed to the educational facilities and housing options.

Another big factor increasing informal settlements is the release of iTaukei land by indigenous land owners for informal housing and to seek rental incomes. This topic was raised by numerous stakeholders interviewed for the research. For example, as noted by a Lautoka city council worker:

*The main challenge now is people wanting to develop but not getting the approval. They only get land owners’ approval.*

Divisional commissioners are government appointed and report directly to the Minister of Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management. Commissioner Western is the principal government-appointed point of authority in Western Division and is based in Lautoka City. The government administration of divisions, and within this provinces and districts, can be described as deconcentrated government administration (Rahman and Singh 2011).

**Urban-centre governance**

Governance structures in Fiji are different for rural and urban areas. Major urban centres are governed under the Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development and Public Utilities. This is different to rural areas where local community-level governance is connected to the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs at the national level.

Major urban cities such as Lautoka are defined as cities or towns under the Local Government Act. Two departments are relevant to urban centres. First, the Department of Local Government, which provides oversight of Fiji’s municipal local governments, such as Lautoka City Council. Second, the Department of Town and Country Planning controls and regulates the appropriate use of land in Fiji through the Town Planning Act and Subdivision of Land Act.

Urban informal settlements are growing in Fiji and a government response has been prioritised (see Box 6). The housing policy of Fiji was produced in 2011 with support from UN-Habitat: ‘The policy recommends to focus on settlement upgrading using integrated community-based approaches such as partnerships with community groups, cost-sharing and sweat equity’ (UN-Habitat 2012).

**Line ministry administration**

Sectors such as education, agriculture, health, housing and infrastructure are governed at the Western Division level according to their national line ministries. The development agenda at the sub-national level for each of these sectors is informed by national strategic plans such as the Ministry of Health’s National Strategic Plan (2016–2020). Each year, ministries prepare annual corporate plans (ACP’s) which set out objectives, key performance indicators, and budgets and plans. These include implementation of activities at divisional levels. At the sub-national level, heads of departments are responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the ACP’s. Heads of departments meet quarterly at division and district levels for information sharing about sector activities, those these are not coordinated together into divisional/district plans.

**Village-level governance within the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs**

Another part of sub-national governance concerns structures in relation to governance of iTaukei (indigenous Fijians) which are central to Fijian governance and institutional arrangements yet separate to governance for urban contexts. Under the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, a governance and leadership structure extends from the national to the village level through provinces and districts. Members of the provincial council hold similar powers as are vested in municipal councils, can make by laws, levy rates, and have control of building construction in the Fijian villages. Each province consists of tikinas – administrative sub-units at a district level. Out of several tikinas one member is elected to represent the province in a provincial council of Fiji. Each tikina consists of several koro [villages]. The koro is headed by a Turaga-ni-Koro elected by the villagers based on chiefly status (Rahman and Singh 2011 :677).
As illustrated through the descriptive analysis above, there is little opportunity for a humanitarian response such as TC Winston to influence longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. The regulative frameworks for humanitarian response and long-term development planning are so different, disconnected and the long-term governance and institutional arrangements so fragmented, meaning that the nexus between development and humanitarian response is not evidently clear.

3.1.3 Differing degrees of coordination

In the Western Division, Fiji, there are different degrees of coordination experienced during humanitarian response compared with long-term development planning, as evidenced before, during and after TC Winston.

In response to our research question, this meant that humanitarian response to TC Winston did not have any substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development.

As directed by the National Disaster Management Act, a divisional commissioner has authority to direct all divisional government staff during an emergency response which is different to long-term development governance. The act states that ‘All government resources in a division will be at the disposition of the Divisional Commissioner; all agencies and persons in a division shall be subordinate to the Division Commissioner’ (Government of Fiji 1998). Similarly, at a district level, the same provisions apply. As noted by a divisional staff member:

_The Ministry of Public Service Commission, they send out a memo to the departments, telling them to release the public servants for disaster operations._

During long-term development, the commissioner coordinates and consults with heads of departments, but these staff report to, and are accountable to, their line ministries at the national level. While there are a variety of meetings at the divisional level, such as the heads of department meetings which the commissioner chairs, these do not involve substantive coordination but rather are for sharing of information only.

In recognition of the different degrees of coordination, the research revealed a strong desire for strengthened coordination, not only during humanitarian response, but also to support longer-term development. This view was expressed by both government staff in the Western Division and CSO representatives. Illustrations of this view are noted below:

_In peace times we have our own sector plans. We have the heads of department meetings but we don’t have a combined plan. It would be good to have one (Western Division government)._  
We need to put something from the division – even if it comes down from our own ministry and then just slots into the divisional plan – not to have separate plans (Western Division government).

Coordination between government and the NGO sector is also different during humanitarian response and longer-term development. During the TC Winston response, CSOs were called into the meetings chaired by the commissioner in order to coordinate the humanitarian response. Some CSOs appreciated this practice but noted that this was not the same practice during ‘peace times’. As described by one NGO representative:

_We need to have more work together, to not only link at the same time of the disaster but also before and after disaster and to link together. Not just the meeting at time of disaster. It’s better to have us meet monthly and quarterly (CSO representative, Western Division)._  
Humanitarian response in urban centres falls under the remit of Commissioner Western’s office in line with directives through the NDMO, but no such coordination of urban areas operates at the sub-national level as part of the long-term development agenda. Western Division government staff, including the commissioner, sit within the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management. The commissioner has no responsibility or authority to engage with local councils since they sit under the Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development and Public Utilities.

The regulative framework which informs coordination within government and with NGOs is very different for humanitarian response compared to the long-term development agenda. This means that there is little opportunity for a humanitarian response such as for TC Winston to influence longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. Working practices and degrees of coordination of stakeholders shift back and forth depending on the different scenarios of long-term development/disaster.

3.1.4 Differences in recovery, response and development arrangements

Governance arrangements for recovery are also different to those for longer-term development and humanitarian response. This meant there was little potential for the humanitarian response to TC Winston to have substantive influence on the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development.

Different governance structures are in place for the periods of development, response and recovery. As noted above, governance for long-term development is informed by a mix of governance structures at the divisional level with sub-national coordination and devolution of authority to sub-national level from national line ministries. This arrangement shifts during a humanitarian response and authority for the whole of government at the sub-national level flows directly to the divisional level, vested in the Commissioner Western. Governance for recovery
following the TC Winston response has shifted again to another structure. The Ministry of Economy at the national level has overall responsibility for coordination. Recovery following TC Winston is set out within a national disaster recovery framework (Government of Fiji 2016c), which includes no mention of the role of divisional staff in implementation, coordination or monitoring of recovery activities.

While the framework for recovery is led at the national level, there is no equivalent recovery framework at divisional levels. During the research field work in the Western Division, there was no mention of the recovery framework by divisional staff or CSO representatives. Staff did express frustration that while they saw existing needs in communities, they had no means of addressing these since planning and budgets for recovery were centralised through the single ministry. As noted by one divisional staff ‘budget allocations to ministries is important – during and after disaster’ (Western Division government staff).

The recovery framework has no mention of the role of CSOs and this absence echoes views expressed by CSOs in the Western Division that the government has not considered the value and contribution of CSOs in longer-term recovery and preparedness efforts despite their interest and capability to assist.

*We can train volunteers to be on standby, to be prepared in communities. We can do this, but we need support to do these services. The government don’t fund us* (CSO representative, Western Division).

Since the governance structures for long-term development, response and recovery supersede each other, and they are so different, the research highlighted that there is no real potential for humanitarian response to influence the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development.

### 3.1.5 Disconnect with local-level planning agendas

Local-level planning agendas are not clearly known to major stakeholders which meant the TC Winston humanitarian response could not penetrate and feed into development priorities nor longer-term governance and institutional arrangements.

At the time of the research no sub-national development planning for the Western Division was accessible or available despite efforts to obtain it during the course of the research, and it was also not available to key stakeholders at the sub-national level. Though a Western Division Development Plan was mentioned by a few government staff at divisional level, nobody had accessed the document or previous versions which were also mentioned. A few staff in the divisional office noted that a draft was in place and being finalised, though this not widely known to other staff or CSOs. While some divisional staff were aware of a divisional plan, most were not aware that such a plan existed.

A desire for divisional planning was expressed by government staff as well as CSO representatives. As noted by a CSO representative:

*Through the divisional planning they need to know who is here and who has the expertise, so that they can come on board. The planning framework is not there* (CSO representative).

During the participatory workshop carried out during the research, one participant noted:

*There needs to be a divisional vision in place and clearly communicated. There needs to be regular meetings and communications.*

As explored further in response to research question 3 in Section 3.3, a humanitarian response may be able to best influence longer-term development if there were a clear development plan in place. This would enable a humanitarian response and recovery agenda to be informed by and complement the development agenda. As noted by a divisional government representative:

*It's unfortunate we try to fix the here and now and forget the long-term and the perspective of the future* (Western Division government staff).

Similar to the absence of divisional plans, the research also found an absence of readily available community-level planning which could have informed the TC Winston response and longer-term recovery and provide opportunity for the development-humanitarian response nexus. As noted above, the governance structure under the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs enshrines a planning process at village, district and provincial levels. However, documentation of plans is weak and there is little opportunity for there to be a continuum of influence from development humanitarian response back to the development agenda. From the two community leaders interviewed for the research, one village had a community plan, though this was not used to inform response-recovery efforts. Similarly, within the urban context, the Lautoka City Council plan was not accessed in order to inform the humanitarian response.

There is a disconnect between local-level development planning and humanitarian response since there is an absence of local development planning, which means that humanitarian response cannot feed into established local agendas set by communities themselves. This also has implications in terms of who sets the humanitarian-response agenda and the need for localised responses, recognising that local communities can be best placed to know vulnerabilities, to strengthen resilience and operationalise the development-humanitarian response nexus.

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2 The development of the community development plan had been supported through the Pacific Risk Resilience Programme funded by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and implemented by UNDP.
3.1.6 Fragmented urban and rural governance structures

There are fragmented and separated governance structures for rural and urban development in Fiji which means that the opportunity for the TC Winston response to influence longer-term governance and institutional arrangements, particularly for urban development, is limited.

The separation of governance for rural and urban contexts within the long-term development agenda is replicated during the humanitarian response, which is dominated by a rural-centric focus. While all government staff, including those responsible for Lautoka City, were directed to work under the authority of Commissioner Western during the time of TC Winston, the rural focus dominated based on the existing arrangements set under the development agenda. As noted above, the office of Commissioner Western sits within the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management and the primary focus of the divisional office staff is towards rural communities. There is a lack of integration between urban development and lead ministries at the divisional level. The disconnect flows to and is replicated in the humanitarian response with urban governance structures isolated from the main agenda of development and also humanitarian response.

During field work, interviews with research participants naturally gravitated towards responses relating to the rural context and there was little focus on urban development issues across the government sector, particularly at the divisional level. Urban issues are seen to be the responsibility of few government agencies which have no direct reporting lines to Commissioner Western’s office.

With an emphasis on a rural perspective by divisional staff, the humanitarian response to TC Winston was expressed on the most part in relation to rural settings, though a few stakeholders noted the changing dynamics of rural-urban development in Fiji and how this affects response to disasters. As illustrated by a government worker in the Western Division who expressed the need for a ‘village-style response’ to be a feature of humanitarian response:

“That really needs to fall under Ministry of Fijian (iTaukei) Affairs. We have to bring back what our forefathers used to do – communal living. Changing times means most households are depending on themselves whereas before, everyone looked after each other. We need to bring this back. I’ve spoken to the ministry about this. But the changing times and money has changed things. Before, if some houses were destroyed the whole community would get together and rebuild. But now everyone is left on their own (Western Division government staff).

The above quote highlights the changing nature of development and is an indication of a changing culture that will become more prominent in rural to urban migration.

Changing from communal to more individualistic lifestyles also requires a change in governance structures and a need for a more integrated and aligned approach to rural and urban development.

In summary and in response to research question 1, the TC Winston response had no substantive influence to the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development since the governance structures and institutional arrangements operate so separately, with different actors responsible for urban and rural contexts. The governance structures do not enable linkage between interventions focused on humanitarian response and a long-term development agenda. However, the research did reveal aspirations to employ governance and institutional arrangements practised within the humanitarian response, as part of the longer-term development agenda as discussed further in response to research question 3 in Section 3.3.

3.2 Implications of the humanitarian response for longer-term development

Research question 2 asked, what were the implications of the TC Winston humanitarian response to longer-term development outcomes (including education, housing, health, WASH, roads and food security)?

This section draws on both primary research conducted in Fiji and the document review to consider the implications of the TC Winston humanitarian response to longer-term development outcomes in the Western Division with a particular focus on housing and roads.

The research found that the TC Winston humanitarian response silenced the longer-term development agenda, with no strong connection or complement between the humanitarian response and longer-term development outcomes. Of course, the humanitarian response and ongoing recovery are essential to the development needs and priorities of Fiji, but the research found no evidence that established development priorities in Fiji, as set out prior to TC Winston, have been taken into account and incorporated within the response and recovery activities.

The silencing of the development agenda within the response and recovery interventions was due in part, and as already noted above, to the disconnected governance arrangements for long-term development, response and recovery and the absence of long-term development planning, especially at the divisional level at the time of TC Winston, which may have influenced or informed response and recovery efforts. The magnitude of the disaster and resulting damage has also prioritised efforts.

Key implications of TC Winston response to longer-term development outcomes in the Western Division are explored in the following sections.
3.2.1 Long-term development has been siloed

Longer-term government initiatives and development goals have been siloed and fragmented as a result of the TC Winston response. As described, government arrangements for response and recovery are different to longer-term development planning, meaning that efforts to support longer-term development are fragmented across different government agencies.

Recovery efforts are disjointed and distant to the longer-term development agenda at the divisional level. There is no mention of the divisional focus in the Disaster Recovery Framework (Government of Fiji 2016c). This disconnect was also described at the divisional level by government staff interviewed for the research. They expressed feeling disconnected to the recovery agenda, that they do not see plans and budgets. They know that recovery efforts are centralised and disconnected to their day-to-day efforts for longer-term development. As described by one workshop participant:

We should have one mandate and decentralisation of decision-making. It’s a top down approach at the moment, we need to have a decentralised budget (Western Division government staff).

The recovery governance arrangements are disconnected to both humanitarian response and also development. Recovery priorities are planned for, budgeted and coordinated through a central line ministry, the Ministry of Economy. There is little engagement of Western Division staff who are responsible for working with communities on longer-term development agendas.

What is interesting as well is that while operating under different governance arrangements in long-term development and humanitarian response, the same individuals were responsible. Yet the centralised nature of recovery means that local government agencies are not engaged.

3.2.2 Rehabilitation has focused on infrastructure – not community resilience

The humanitarian response has been mainly focused on infrastructure rehabilitation in response to the large-scale damage sustained as a result of TC Winston.

In the Western Division, key stakeholders described response and recovery primarily as infrastructure rehabilitation efforts. For example, government staff described how the Commissioner’s Office was able to prioritise infrastructure needs in relation to road and bridge repairs. These were then communicated to the national level for authorisation and funding through the Roads Authority. Directives were then provided from the central level to the divisional-level Roads Authority to carry out the work.

A disaster recovery framework in response to TC Winston has been produced by the Ministry of Economy in Fiji and sets out four priorities with a key focus on infrastructure (Government of Fiji 2016c). The four programmatic areas are:

- Rebuilding homes
- Restoring livelihoods
- Repairing and strengthening critical infrastructure
- Building resilience

Recovery is defined within the framework which similarly has a focus on infrastructure:

For the purposes of this Framework, ‘recovery’ does not mean returning Fiji to how it was just before 20 February 2016. Recovery includes both restoration and enhancement. There will be opportunities during recovery to ‘build back better’ when repairing and reconstructing buildings and infrastructure. These opportunities need to be considered where they lead to increased resilience and/or functionality or are cost-effective according to life-cycle analysis; provided that they do not come at the expense of the repair or replacement of essential infrastructure and services elsewhere (Government of Fiji 2016c:3).

The focus on infrastructure rehabilitation within the response and recovery initiatives has been accompanied by little emphasis on the broader agenda of resilience building in communities and strengthening governance structures at the divisional level which may support both humanitarian response, longer-term development governance and the nexus between them.

Efforts to strengthen community-based resiliency were described by CSO representatives in the Western District, though these were not connected to the government agenda and there was a call for government to play a stronger role.

3.2.3 Has the focus on housing contributed to longer-term development outcomes?

The humanitarian response has prioritised housing, recognising the severe destruction resulting from TC Winston. However, the research revealed that local stakeholders had mixed views on the extent to which these efforts were contributing to longer-term development outcomes.

Rebuilding homes is described as the number one recovery priority in the disaster recovery framework (Government of Fiji 2016c). The Help for Homes initiative is the major government initiative targeted towards families to rebuild damaged or destroyed homes. Households affected are eligible for one of three grants:

- US$1,500 for partially damaged homes
The concept of build back better (BBB) was well known by stakeholders consulted during the research both at divisional and national levels and by government staff and CSOs alike. It was understood primarily in relation to infrastructure rather than ‘soft’ measures such as community resilience or adaptive capacity building. The view of BBB expressed by research stakeholders is in line with that described by the government of Fiji, which notes it as a guiding principle for recovery efforts as stated within the Disaster Recovery Framework TC Winston:

Building Back Better (BBB) is the reconstruction approach designed to reduce vulnerability and improve living conditions, while promoting more effective reconstruction taking account of future risks from natural hazards (climate-related and geological). BBB underlines the policy commitment to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure. The BBB principle will mean, for example, that roads, bridges and public buildings will be rebuilt to a higher construction standard (Government of Fiji 2016c:5–6).

- US$3.00 for seriously damaged homes, or
- US$7,000 for destroyed homes (sufficient to build a one-room, 15m² dwelling to withstand Category 3 wind speeds).

The Ministry of Women, Children and Poverty Alleviation manages the funds and distributes grants via electronic vouchers which can be used by beneficiaries to purchase materials from approved hardware stores. The initiative is expected to cost a total of US$184 million up to 2018. The government of Fiji has currently committed US$70 million to kick-start the initiative (Government of Fiji 2016c:8–9). While the initiative is described as a means to ‘build back better’ (BBB), numerous stakeholders at both national and divisional level interviewed for this research raised concerns about the extent to which the Help for Homes initiative encompassed the BBB principle (see Box 7).

While highlighting that BBB was a big focus of the Fiji response to TC Winston, stakeholders identified this as a core component of rebuilding government infrastructure but was a weaker element of rebuilding within the housing market. As noted by one national level stakeholder:

BBB – it’s been a big focus. For schools, markets, health centres. Real focus from the government is to build to a standard. The gap is in the houses – they provided the money to people, but no technical assistance is provided. People have the materials but not the best practice (national-level stakeholder).

A similar view was also expressed by a divisional level stakeholder:

The Help for Homes initiative – I question whether this is sustainable. Will it survive the next disaster? I look at how people are building. The initiative is good, but the amount [of money] is not enough and it’s hard to find good carpenters, you see materials just lying around (stakeholder, Western Division).

Local stakeholders raised concerns about the Help for Homes initiative and its capacity to deliver on the BBB principle citing numerous contextual factors which pose challenges for it to effectively serve longer-term development outcomes, and to build resiliency for future disaster contexts. These factors are outlined in Table 1.

A key aspect of the Help for Homes initiative is the concept of equipping householders with skills to build back better. However, aspects of the initiative and contextual factors are considered to have undermined this potential, as described by stakeholders consulted for this research.

The amount provided to householders is considered too small – and means that incentives are provided to cut corners as described by a variety of government representatives in the Western Division:

Before, the government did everything and when they left everything was done. But this time, the government is giving everything and hoping they will build it. But whether they do, we don’t know.

We were thinking the previous arrangement was better than this one. Before, recipient pays a third of cost and government pays the rest. We keep on pushing to ensure they build on time. This is a new concept for us about building back houses from the community.

### Table 1. Challenges and outcomes: Help for Homes initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHALLENGES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Limited number of approved hardware stores in the Help for Homes initiative</td>
<td>Building supplies have been limited leading to delays in rebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak supply chain and logistics of basic goods at volume</td>
<td>Housing construction delayed since limited availability of materials in necessary sequence to construct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursed island archipelago and remote communities</td>
<td>High freight and transport costs are incurred by householders to transport housing materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of skilled labour within the community</td>
<td>Skilled labour is scarce in remote parts of the country</td>
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<td>Poor housing reconstruction</td>
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The Help for Homes initiative is expected to cost a total of US$184 million up to 2018.
We need to change the Help for Homes programme and go back to what we were doing before. Then we won’t need to repeat the process from before. How can you build a house with US$7,000, US$3,000 and US$1,500 dollars? By not following the building code? Evans was US$12,000 for materials and US$4,000 for labour (Western Division government staff).

Skilled labour to ensure quality in construction is limited and has compromised the quality of housing construction as described by stakeholders in Fiji at both national and divisional levels.

The extent to which principles of BBB have reached communities and they are taking up practices to achieve this was also questioned by the stakeholders (see Box 8). The Help for Homes initiative includes the provision of a booklet ‘which aims to provide simple Build Back Safer tips’. This is available only in English (instead of all three official languages, English, Fijian and Fij Hindu) but provides a great visual 31-page resource (Shelter Cluster Fiji 2016). But other than the production of the guide there has been limited training provided to communities. A pilot activity was carried out through the Shelter Cluster (and supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross), but that was in very few places. Challenges of having limited skilled labourers was also experienced by the pilot programme. As described by one national-level stakeholder:

The idea of the pilot was that you would train a collective of local community members who could then be a resource in their community to work with other households to repair their houses. However, the problem was in the first instance that there weren’t enough individuals available, and then following this the assumption that they would be available to support other households didn’t hold true.

Most stakeholders expressed concern about the Help for Homes initiative, with many describing that they ‘just didn’t know’: they did not know who was monitoring it, and if they were, what the results were. The initiative is disconnected from divisional-level responsibilities and government staff who work regularly at the community level. As described by a Western Development government representative:

We were not involved in the Help for Homes initiative. This was the BBB. We noticed about the monitoring, whether people were actually building their homes better. They provided too little money – you can’t build a house for US$7,000. We don’t have any feedback about whether they are checking. We ask them to inform the commissioner but they just do what they want to do.

The concern expressed about the quality of rebuilding houses following TC Winston is coupled and complemented with broader concerns about compliance of building code standards as already described above and as described in the UN-Habitat 2012 Lautoka City urban profile:

**BOX 8. RESILIENT AND ADAPTIVE COMMUNITIES: HAND OUT OR HAND UP?**

Stakeholders who participated in the research appreciated the challenges of empowering resilient and adaptive communities in the context of BBB. On the one hand Help for Homes was described as positive, equipped householders to know standards of housing and ensured they had the skills to build now and into the future.

However, the view was also expressed that the vouchers were not sufficiently means tested and support was made available to all. This was seen to raise expectations that the government will always be present to provide cash payments following a disaster. Case payments being championed in other government programming in the form of vouchers were described as undermining efforts to build self-reliance and empowerment. The BBB focus on infrastructure was not viewed as commensurate to an agenda of building resilience and strength in the community, as noted by a government representative at the Western Division:

*Discussions yesterday at the workshop were about while the government is focusing on creating infrastructure there should be an accelerated plan to empower communities that want to help themselves out rather than relying solely on government (Western Division government staff).*

LCC [Lautoka City Council] is strongly committed to controlling development. However, due to weak enforcement and ignorance by the public, planning standards have been relaxed and cases of non-compliance are increasing (UN-Habitat 2012).

One Western District government representative described an implication of the TC Winston response to longer-term development outcomes by suggesting that the initiative undermined the government agenda to strengthen empowerment:

*I’m not sure if it’s empowerment or what. It somehow helps people to recover quickly. Another way that I look at it – people are more reliant on government… Empowerment to me is people taking the initiative themselves, instead of waiting. Before this Help for Homes assistance was there. Before it was only emergency rations. Before they were more self-reliant on themselves. Now they are more reliant on the government.*

In summary and in response to research question 2, the research found that the TC Winston humanitarian response silenced the longer-term development agenda, with no strong connection or complement between the humanitarian response and longer-term development outcomes. A number of reasons for this were revealed.
Governance structures and institutional arrangements are so different for long-term development, humanitarian response and then recovery, that there was little potential for integration and alignment of agendas. The recovery phase is also coordinated at the national level, with little engagement of sub-national government officials who have day-to-day responsibility for longer-term development in communities.

The focus on infrastructure within the TC Winston humanitarian response also had implications for long-term development. Broader development initiatives were siloed and fragmented. Recovery initiatives such as the Help for Homes initiative were questioned by various stakeholders as undermining development agendas which promoted empowerment. While the research revealed little positive influence of humanitarian response to longer-term development outcomes, various opportunities to strengthen influence and alignment were offered by various research participants which are discussed below in response to research question 3 in Section 3.3.

### 3.3 Opportunities for strengthening longer-term development

Research question 3 asked, what are the opportunities in humanitarian response to strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development?

The research found a wealth of opportunities for humanitarian response to strengthen the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development. The primary focus of this research is at the sub-national level. However, these research findings also have implications for national and international agendas. Six key opportunities are set out below.

#### 3.3.1 Government and CSOs should work together

Coordination between government and CSOs, practised during times of humanitarian response and as evidenced during the TC Winston response, could be applied to support the longer-term development agenda.

The research found that governance and institutional arrangements during a humanitarian response are preferred by Western Division staff and also CSO representatives over those which are currently employed for long-term development. This is illustrated by a workshop participant:

> In ‘peace times’ we have our own sector plans. We have head of department meetings but we don’t have a combined plan. It would be good to have one (Western Division government staff).

A key aspect of strengthened coordination is a ‘divisional plan or overarching framework’ described as different to ‘separate plans’ coming from national-level line ministries.

The value of a plan to coalesce different parts of government was described by many of those interviewed for the research and as illustrated below:

> Most often we work in isolation – we ought to work together in collaboration and with unity and to have a more proactive approach. Development strategies need to be in place. The development plan is high there, up in the sky, but it needs to be close. Steps taken during ‘peace time’ and during disaster need to be connected, to have collaboration, to have plans that are integrated written, available and shared (Western Division government staff).

Stakeholders at the local level recognised the challenges of multiple governance frameworks, which do not seem to be integrated and do not support linkages between humanitarian response and development. As noted by a workshop participant:

> We hear about bottom-up approach – from village to settlement – from provincial and divisional plans – but also we have a top-down approach from the SDGs – we need to have combined bottom up and top down (Western Division government staff).

Coordination during humanitarian response was not just appreciated in terms of an overarching framework or planning document but also in relation to the practice of stronger working relationships within government. This was described by a Western Division government worker:

> Even if we have the plans – we need to have the coordination to bring them together. We don’t get together frequently enough. We need to meet more regularly. The Commissioner Western who cuts across the ministries needs to bring us together. A good example of this is, this workshop [for the research], which was directed from the Commissioner Western’s office.

CSOs also described the desire to have better coordination with government as part of longer-term development agendas as already noted previously.

Government staff interviewed for the research did acknowledge some level of coordination to support longer-term development activities:

> We have monthly heads of department meetings – it’s the only way to have coordination – sharing different aspects each ministry has.

But as noted above there was appreciation that this could be strengthened, informed by the practice of coordination within a humanitarian response.

Drawing on Scott’s (2014) perspective on institutional arrangements the research revealed the need to couple and complement informal working relationships which are especially dynamic and robust at the sub-national level with institutional and regulative systems in order to strengthen and enable a humanitarian-development nexus.
3.3.2 The cluster system should be strengthened

The cluster system could be strengthened, building on emerging practice in Fiji, to provide governance and institutional arrangements which link humanitarian response and the development agenda (see Box 9).

A decentralised cluster system could acknowledge sub-national development priorities as part of preparedness and disaster-mitigation activities during ‘peace time’ and ensure that these same priorities flow through into humanitarian response and recovery activities. Standard operating procedures which support the interface between humanitarian and development responses could be enabled through the leadership of sub-national government staff who are responsible for both development and humanitarian response.

The research found strong endorsement at the sub-national level for ‘peace time’ or ‘evergreen clusters’ (ie continually active between disaster events) at the sub-national level. This view was expressed by stakeholders interviewed at both sub-national and national levels. There is an opportunity for clusters to reach down to divisional level but also connect to the national level as well. Though there are challenges to establishing such linkages in Fiji, where divisions are separated across large distances, as noted by one stakeholder:

We can’t make it totally simple, but this needs addressing in the policy. There need to be clear lines of who reports to who. I haven’t heard much about the cluster system at the local level. Fiji is a small country but when it’s far away and access is an issue – we need coordination between the different levels (national-level government official).

Government leadership and inclusive membership of government, local and international NGOs is an important feature of the clusters described by stakeholders interviewed for this research. Experience of effective clusters in Fiji highlights the value of strong government leadership and also inclusive membership which can support the practice of ‘evergreen’ clusters, at both national and sub-nationals which are also linked.

The clusters system which operates at both sub-national and national levels, and links the two, offers an important strategy to build relationships and trust between stakeholders essential for effective humanitarian response. As noted by the Pacific Humanitarian Team’s After action report (PHT 2016:7):

It was acknowledged that, ultimately, much of the response depended on the relationship at ministerial political level that had been built before the disaster.

Fiji’s formal adoption of the cluster approach provides an opportunity to strengthen ongoing trust and relationships

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**BOX 9. THE CLUSTER APPROACH: GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL APPROACHES TO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE**

Reforms to the International Humanitarian Community saw the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) launch the cluster approach in 2005. The purpose of the reforms was to ensure improvements were made to global humanitarian response in terms of capacity, predictability, accountability, leadership and partnership (IASC 2006). The cluster approach sees humanitarian response organised by sector (eg shelter, health, protection). At the global level, these clusters are either led by UN agencies or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IASC 2006).

The Pacific has its own regional version of the cluster approach, implemented by the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT). The PHT was established in 2008 and coordinated by UNOCHA and is comprised of Red Cross agencies, UN agencies, international NGOs, donors and regional organisations (Gero et al. 2013). As per the global cluster system, each cluster is led by either a UN agency, IFRC or an international NGO. Since its initial establishment, the PHT has offered Pacific governments additional surge capacity in times of disaster.

At the national level, Fiji is also in the process of formally adopting a cluster approach to humanitarian response. The cluster approach for Fiji is outlined in the draft National Humanitarian Policy for Disaster Risk Management (Government of Fiji 2016a), with clusters led by Fijian government ministries. The draft policy notes that:

The Fiji Cluster system is envisaged as an ongoing government-led system for coordination of national and international humanitarian assistance for all aspects of disaster risk management and will be incorporated into national legislation. It will complement and enhance other government objectives and initiatives for disaster risk reduction, development and climate change (ibid:6).

Despite the National Humanitarian Policy still being in draft form, Fiji’s cluster approach has been informally adopted and was implemented to some degree for the TC Winston response.

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3 The IASC oversees the coordination of agencies involved in humanitarian assistance. The IASC is comprised of UN humanitarian agencies and key non-UN humanitarian actors such as IFRC and humanitarian NGOs (Tag-Eldeen 2017).
between government ministries (as cluster leads) and local and international agencies and collective action within the nexus of humanitarian response and development.

During TC Winston, there was mixed practice by the clusters informed by their ongoing practice prior to the disaster. Research participants observed that some clusters were more active and advanced in terms of coordination and preparedness than others. The health and WASH clusters, for example, had pre-existing contingency plans, were government-led, had pre-existing relationships and had undertaken activities together prior to TC Winston’s impacts. These actions enabled these clusters to better coordinate and provide assistance to those who needed it most at the time of TC Winston.

The importance of trust and relationships is critical in the context of Pacific Island countries such as Fiji, as evidenced through this research which also echoes earlier research findings carried out in the Pacific. An evergreen cluster approach offers an effective governance arrangement to strengthen relationships and trust. As noted by the earlier research:

An absence of existing relationships and trust between agents was reported to be problematic for coordinating disaster assessments and act to constrain adaptive capacity of the disaster response system, particularly in accessing vital assessment information (Gero et al. 2015:42).

The evergreen cluster approach also highlights the ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing facets’ of institutional arrangements as described by Scott (2014) and the need to support and strengthen all three elements (regulative systems, normative systems and cultural-cognitive systems) as a means to build the humanitarian-development nexus.

The Pacific Humanitarian Partnership meeting report (UNOCHA 2016) notes the need for flexibility in funding arrangements by development partners in order to support evergreen clusters and governance arrangements which enable smoother transitions between response and development. This research has also highlighted the need not only for flexibility but also active engagement of development partners in local development priorities in order to address underlying vulnerabilities and needs that exist prior to a disaster, and to ensure that response and recovery efforts align with these longer-term development agendas. An evergreen cluster approach could explicitly call on humanitarian responders to seek out and know development priorities and underlying vulnerabilities in disaster-affected locations to address these as a core contribution within humanitarian response and recovery activities.

An enabler of an evergreen cluster is that at the sub-national level, the same individuals are responsible for both humanitarian response and development. This applies within government (divisional, provincial and district levels, and municipal government), to community leadership in villages, and to CSOs. The national cluster system is to be formalised within the National Humanitarian Policy (currently in draft), but to be formalised through the Fijian parliament in late 2017. The policy, however, only provides overarching priorities and themes and does not provide guidance on sub-national arrangements. It is recommended that guidance for sub-national formation and maintenance of evergreen clusters is provided as well.

### 3.3.3 Integrate recovery into both humanitarian response and development

Another opportunity for humanitarian response to strengthen the longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development is to better integrate ‘recovery’ within both dimensions of the humanitarian-development nexus.

There are a number of dimensions to integrated recovery which would support the nexus as described by research participants and noted below.

**Decentralised recovery** could strengthen the nexus of humanitarian response and development and improve outcomes in terms of contribution to stronger and more resilient communities. As noted by one international stakeholder:

*Recovery [for TC Winston] could have been decentralised: they are the right people to know what needs to be done. They are the right people for accountability. Then they can report back to the national level – it would have happened quicker.*

Stronger coordination during the recovery process was also championed at the local level as described by one CSO representative in the Western Division:

*We need to work more together. To not only link at time of the disaster but also after disaster and link together. It’s better to have us meet monthly and quarterly.*

Decentralised recovery also involves decentralised budget allocation at sub-national level, with the budget managed by government staff responsible for the ongoing long-term development agenda. Research participants’ description of the need for decentralised budgets has already been described above. By owning and managing budgets for recovery and development, the humanitarian-development nexus can be strengthened.

Decentralised recovery supports links to risk mitigation and disaster preparedness activities. By situating divisional staff in the driving seat of recovery, these local government staff would be responsible for and manage the link between the development agenda and humanitarian response and back to the development agenda. They are more likely to see the connection and prioritise efforts for disaster risk reduction and mitigation strategies. Efforts are already underway from local...
divisional staff to support risk reduction, and this could be championed again as part of the response and recovery.

3.3.4 Build on existing governance structures at both divisional and community level

Another opportunity for humanitarian response to strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development is to build on existing governance structures at both divisional and community level, where the same community leaders are responsible for both the development agenda and also humanitarian response.

What was revealed through the research is that the humanitarian-development nexus is nascent in the dual roles that divisional staff play in both humanitarian response and development. It is also present in the continuum of ‘risk integration in development planning’ and ‘build back better’ in humanitarian response, which are strongly valued concepts described by local stakeholders.

The research highlighted that this nexus needs to be strengthened and made more explicit and then translated down to the community level, where local planning and local response is most critical to address local vulnerabilities and strengthen community resilience to disaster and climate change.

The village governance structure in Fiji means that community-based leaders are the key focal points for external actors, whether they are focused on long-term development or humanitarian response. Within current governance arrangements, and as described above, village leaders are responsible for establishing development plans, though in most cases these are not documented and are set as short-term initiatives.

The research revealed that some communities have disaster plans formalised but most do not. CSOs are primarily focused on strengthening resilience to climate change, but this practice is fragmented and separate to disaster response and development planning at the community level which is predominantly absent. The need to stretch the humanitarian-development nexus and appropriate government support to the community level was expressed by a CSO representative during the research workshop:

> From my perspective working in an NGO, there is so much to learn from here. We are implementing projects in 30 communities. What I’ve learnt from that project, people lack the knowledge. But from today, I’ve learnt, you are the strength here. You have the structure that supports resiliency – you are here, but it has not filtered down to the community.

3.3.5 Focus on key concepts

Key concepts central to humanitarian response and appreciated in the Western Division can strengthen governance and institutional arrangements for development.

As already noted above, ‘build back better’ was a concept commonly described in relation to the humanitarian response, though as noted above, most relevant to infrastructure. This concept naturally strengthens the nexus between humanitarian and development responses and could be utilised to further strengthen the nexus.

The notion of ‘build back better’ is also intrinsically linked to risk integration which is also valued in the Western Division and is evidence of an emerging nexus between realities of humanitarian response and development. Western Division staff expressed a strong appreciation of risk integration into development planning and described this as a key practice in infrastructure planning. The commissioner of Fiji’s Western Division demonstrated his leadership on this issue, preparing a communiqué on integrating climate change and disaster risk management activities into development processes (Western Division Government of Fiji 2015).

Government staff in the Western Division spoke with confidence and experience of risk integration into development planning. Research participants could describe numerous examples of how their everyday work incorporated disaster risk reduction, for example environmental impact assessments (EIAs), risk screening tools, agricultural practices incorporating risk management, and risk response training at the village level.

The evidence and appreciation of both concepts provides an excellent opportunity to strengthen governance and institutional arrangements in humanitarian response and longer-term development. The concepts of mitigating risks and strengthening resilience can provide an anchor to linked governance and institutional arrangements for the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.3.6 Development agendas can enable the humanitarian-development nexus

An important finding from this research is the circular nature of humanitarian response and development. While the research focus has been on humanitarian response and how this can influence and strengthen longer-term governance and institutional arrangements for development, what it found was that these opportunities need to be enabled in the first instance through the development agenda.

The longer-term development agenda can support and create the enabling environment for shorter-term humanitarian response and mid-term recovery, in order to then feed back into and support longer-term development. This nexus might practically involve development plans which are readily available to multiple sets of stakeholders, and which set out translation of development agendas to response and recovery contexts, such that any humanitarian response can take into consideration the development agenda and align where appropriate.
Conclusion

This research sought to explore ways in which the response to TC Winston contributed to the development goals in the Western Division and more particularly the urban context of Lautoka City and identify how humanitarian response could best contribute to longer-term development in the future.

The research found a range of key factors which inhibited the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals.

- A divide between rural and urban development planning is an inhibitor to linking humanitarian response and development. In Fiji, the main policy and planning agenda is dominated by a rural focus and there is a policy lag and lack of focus on the urban agenda.

- The fragmented governance structure in development planning means that opportunities to connect governance arrangements with humanitarian response is difficult, though there are also factors which create opportunity. Different sets of governance arrangements and ways of working are in place for development, humanitarian response and recovery. While the governance arrangements are different, the individuals (government and CSO staff) working across these multiple frameworks are the same, offering a unique opportunity and foundation for a nexus between humanitarian response and development. The value of a localised response which is situated at a divisional level, which was enacted during the TC Winston response, together with a coordinated agenda for longer-term development, again at a divisional level also provides future opportunity for the nexus.

- Development planning may be used as a means to connect humanitarian response and development planning. Stakeholders interviewed for the research recognised the value of a development plan as a means of coalescing humanitarian response and especially recovery towards contributing to development goals.

- The research found a strong appetite for governance structures and coordination practice present within humanitarian response to be similarly used for long-term development. Especially Western Division staff recognised the value of joint planning, coordination of government personnel, sharing resources, and working together in the community which was carried out as part of the TC Winston response and expressed a desire to carry out such practices during periods of long-term development.

- The research found emerging practice which can be built on and strengthened in order to link together development goals and humanitarian interventions. The cluster system in Fiji is inclusive of ‘evergreen’ clusters which operate during ‘peace time’. These support the development agenda, disaster preparedness and mitigation and are then operational to support humanitarian response. These evergreen clusters provide an important pathway to strengthening the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals.

- The platform for blurring the divide between humanitarian response and development is present in Fiji, particularly in the Western Division. An appetite for stronger coordination that stretches across the divide, a recognition of the value of integrating principles such as risk integration and ‘build back better’ and drawing on shared experience of humanitarian response and its impact on development goals, provides a strong catalyst for the nexus and contribution of humanitarian response to development.
Appendix 1. Multiple stakeholder participation in the research

Representatives from the following organisations were consulted as part of the research:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WESTERN DIVISION GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>NGOS</th>
<th>COMMUNITY</th>
<th>NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Western Division Office</td>
<td>• Red Cross</td>
<td>• Sabeto village</td>
<td>Fiji NDMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Department of Planning</td>
<td>• Viseisei Sai Health Centre</td>
<td>• Korobebe village</td>
<td>Humanitarian response agencies (based in Suva)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lautoka City Council</td>
<td>• Empower Pacific</td>
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<td>including:</td>
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<td>• Ministry of Women</td>
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<td>• DFAT</td>
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<td>• Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works</td>
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<td>• New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)</td>
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<td>• Housing Authority</td>
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<td>• UNOCHA</td>
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<td>• Department of Social Welfare</td>
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<td>• UNDP</td>
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<td>• Fiji Roads Authority</td>
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<td>• Unicef</td>
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Appendix 2. Fiji’s National Disaster Response Framework

Fiji has recognised national structures for disaster preparedness and emergency operations. Governing bodies for disaster response include:

- National Disaster Management Council (NDMC).
- National Disaster Management Office (NDMO).
- Disaster management committees (DISMACKs) at the divisional, provincial and district levels.

At the divisional level, the commissioners of each division assume authority and responsibility of the divisional disaster committees in times of disaster response, reporting up to the NDMC and the NDMO. At the national scale, Fiji’s disaster and humanitarian response legal and policy framework consists of the following instruments:

- National Disaster Management Act (Government of Fiji 1998).
- National Disaster Management Plan (currently being reviewed) (Government of Fiji 1995).
- Standard Operating Procedures – Fiji’s National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) (Government of Fiji 2010).
- National Humanitarian Policy for Disaster Risk Management (in draft) (Government of Fiji 2016a).

Details of the relevant legal instruments for disaster and humanitarian response are included below.

**National Disaster Management Act (1998)**

The National Disaster Management Act establishes the NDMA, which has overall responsibility for disaster risk management (including risk reduction, response, recovery and rehabilitation). The chairman of the council is the minister responsible for disaster management activities, which is the Minister of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management. The act also establishes:

- NDMO: responsible for the day-to-day operations of disaster management.
- NEOC: responsible for coordinating activities of all disaster monitoring, warning and immediate post-disaster response including disaster relief work.

Roles include:

- National disaster controller (who advises the minister on operational matters relating to disaster management and activities).
- National disaster coordinator (who coordinates, supervises and implements policies of the council and the duties and functions of the NDMO).
- Disaster service liaison officer.
- Divisional commissioners and district officers (as designated points of authority and command at sub-national levels during disasters).

**National Disaster Management Plan (1995)**

The 1995 National Disaster Management Plan is currently being reviewed. Its aims are to outline disaster
management roles and responsibilities of agencies and bodies in relation to different stages of disaster management. It also notes the following definitions of relevant bodies that are not included in the National Disaster Management Act:

- National DISMAC: Comprised of the NDMC, NDMO and the NEOC.
- Divisional DISMAC: Refers collectively to the divisional commissioner’s office, divisional emergency operations centre (DivEOC) and the divisional disaster management council (DivDMC).
- District DISMAC: District officer offices, district emergency operations centres (DEOC) and the district disaster management councils (DDMC).
- DivDMC: Divisional-level body comprising the heads of all agencies and NGOs in the division, chaired by the divisional commissioner and responsible for providing assistance to the commissioner in coping with disaster mitigation and emergency operations.
- DDMC: District-level body comprising the heads of all agencies and NGOs in the district, chaired by and providing assistance to the district officer in coping with disaster mitigation and emergency operations.

The National Disaster Management Plan illustrates the structures for disaster management in terms of permanent bodies (Figure 3) and during times of disaster (Figure 4).

### Standard operating procedures: NEOC (2010)

Fiji’s standard operating procedures (SoPs) for the National Emergency Operations Centre were developed to address the timing for agencies and organisations who have key responsibilities for disaster response. As per the National Disaster Management Act, in terms of sub-national responsibilities, the SoPs note:

- The divisional commissioner oversees the disaster management activities in their respective division.
- The district officer oversees the disaster management activities in his/her respective district.
The National Humanitarian Policy for Disaster Risk Management (in draft) notes how Fiji’s humanitarian response is coordinated through the Fiji cluster system. The Fijian government is in the process of formally integrating its approach to national humanitarian and disaster response to be modelled on the Global Cluster System. The Global Cluster System was established in 2006 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to provide a more predictable and accountable response to humanitarian crises, with clearly mandated lead agencies to ensure strong leadership in the main sectors of humanitarian response (IASC 2006). A regional approach to the cluster system exists through the Pacific Humanitarian Team, which is a collaboration between UN, Pacific Island country representatives, NGOs, donors and private-sector actors. See http://bit.ly/2Gc5qSg
## Appendix 3. Fiji’s cluster approach

<table>
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<th>CLUSTER</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT LEAD</th>
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<th>KEY PARTNERS</th>
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References


Linking humanitarian response and development is a key agenda driven by multiple factors across both humanitarian and development landscapes. It is also a topical issue in Fiji, a South Pacific Island nation which is exposed to natural hazards, particularly tropical cyclones. This research aims to learn from Fiji’s experience of Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016. The research offers lessons for sub-national and national governments of Fiji, governments and donors in the Pacific region, and also beyond, on how humanitarian response (response and early recovery) has contributed — and can be strengthened to further contribute — to development goals in urban contexts.