Urban planning following humanitarian crises

Supporting local government to take the lead in the Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan

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Purpose

This paper is part of a series of research pieces produced under the ‘Urban Crises Learning Fund’ managed by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Urban Crises Learning Fund aims to build an in-depth understanding of how the humanitarian sector can most effectively operate in urban contexts.

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In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of humanitarian agencies supporting and collaborating with local governments in order to restore city functions following humanitarian crisis.

This research aimed to identify, document and disseminate learning from UN–Habitat’s experience providing urban planning support to three Local Government Units (LGUs) in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban after super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. UN–Habitat staff worked under considerable pressure and were successful in providing support to the LGUs to deliver useful Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans (RRPs). However UN–Habitat were not able to secure adequate, long-term funding and as such were not able to provide the level of support and continuity that was required in order to secure longer-term positive impacts for the cities’ poorest residents.

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Introduction

1.1 Background

“Displacement, conflict and natural disasters are increasingly urban phenomena … generating a fundamental shift in the nature, scale and impact of humanitarian crises” (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016, p.1). This urbanisation of human risk presents a significant challenge for humanitarian agencies – both in the complexity of responding to urban disasters and in operating in an environment in which these agencies do not have significant experience and expertise (Parker and Maynard, 2015). In responding to urban crises, experts recommend that “humanitarian agencies work in support of and in collaboration with municipal authorities” (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016, p.1) and “concentrate on restoring or bolstering existing city systems” (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016, p.1) rather than creating parallel services of provision. However, while initiatives such as Making Cities Resilient1 and 100 Resilient Cities2 are working with municipal authorities in advance of humanitarian crises, there are few examples and little guidance on supporting local governments during response, recovery and reconstruction.

Urban planning is one of the key responsibilities of local government, particularly after humanitarian crises when there are both urgent needs and opportunities to reduce the risk of future disasters (Olshansky and Chang, 2009). Local government, however, typically “has the least resources, weakest governance and lowest capacity of all of the levels of government” (King et al., 2013, p.7). Crises are also infrequent, so “planners and decision makers are unlikely to be able to draw on personal experience and institutional memory” (Olshansky and Chang, 2009, p.206). While interest in urban planning after crises is increasing, the literature has generally focused on the role of planning in disaster mitigation rather than recovery (Olshansky and Chang, 2009). Thus, there is “little guidance for planners who suddenly find themselves with significant post-disaster responsibilities” (Olshansky and Chang, 2009, pp.201–202) or for humanitarian agencies trying to provide them with support (see Box 1).

1 http://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/.
2 www.100resilientcities.org.
1.2 Aims, objectives and research questions

This research aimed to identify, document and disseminate learning from UN–Habitat’s experience of providing urban planning support to three Local Government Units (LGUs) after super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. It was a collaborative research project rather than an evaluation, with the intention of documenting lessons from this experience that may be applicable in other contexts.

The objectives of this research were to:

1. Examine the process, outputs and effects of the collaboration between UN–Habitat and local government with regard to urban planning.
2. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this approach from the perspective of local actors and UN–Habitat.
3. Identify what worked well and what was not as effective.
4. Analyse the contextual factors that helped or hindered adoption and implementation.

It also investigated the following research questions:

• What ‘technical surge capacity’ was needed and how was it provided?
• How did short-term relief planning integrate with pre-crisis planning and longer-term planning?
• How were the views of affected communities and key stakeholder groups incorporated into the planning process?

Following this introduction, Section 2 describes the process, outputs and effects of the collaboration between UN–Habitat and local government with regard to urban planning (objective 1). Section 3 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of UN–Habitat’s approach, what worked well and what was not as effective, and the contextual factors that helped or hindered implementation (objectives 2, 3 and 4). The research questions are also answered within boxes in Section 3. Section 4 summarises the findings from this study, describes the implications for future policy and practice, and makes suggestions for further research.

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3 UN–Habitat is the United Nations programme working towards a ‘better urban future’. Its mission is to "promote socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all" (UN–Habitat, 2016), mandated by the UN General Assembly in 1978 to address the issues of urban growth, for nearly 40 years UN–Habitat has been working in villages, towns and cities on a wide range of policy and technical urban issues. In 2003, UN–Habitat launched good urban governance and secure tenure campaigns in the Philippines (UN–Habitat Philippines, 2016a). Following this, UN–Habitat established its country office in 2004 and runs multiple projects and programmes across the country (UN–Habitat Philippines, 2015). UN–Habitat was initially created for the accomplishment of development goals (UN–Habitat, 2013). However, recently UN–Habitat has worked more in the humanitarian sector, especially around risk reduction, relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (UN–Habitat, 2013).

4 These research questions were derived from the recommendations for supporting governments made during the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) series of expert consultations on humanitarian response to urban crises. For further details see DFID, 2014.
1.3 Methodology and limitations

The research followed an ‘embedded case study design’ (Yin, 2014), and provided greater depth of understanding of the urban planning process in Tacloban,Ormoc and Guiuan by investigating the similarities and differences in each of the three locations. Case study research “investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context” (Yin, 2014, p.16). This case study methodology included triangulation of findings using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a clear chain of evidence linking data, analysis and findings, and having the draft case study reviewed by key informants (Yin, 2014, p.47).

A three-person research team undertook data collection during a three-week period of fieldwork in July 2016. The fieldwork included 29 key informant interviews5 during a three-week period of fieldwork in July 2016. The fieldwork included 29 key informant interviews5 and direct observation. Key informants were identified through a combination of the authors’ professional and personal networks, and the research team sought to engage key informants from a wide range of stakeholder groups to capture different perspectives.6 Data collected through direct observation included a guided tour of each of the three cities. The researchers also attended open public meetings in Tacloban and Guiuan. Initial findings were reviewed in workshops in Manila with UN–Habitat and later combined with an extensive literature review in order to triangulate the data and refine the findings. Data were collected through digital recordings, comprehensive notes and photos.

This research applied the ten Department for International Development (DFID) Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation to the research approach (DFID, 2011). All informants were provided with an ‘information sheet’ prior to the interviews and requested to sign a ‘consent form’ to indicate their understanding of the research and giving their permission.

Schwab’s (2005) outline of the typical steps to prepare a plan for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction was used to structure the description of UN–Habitat’s activities in each of the three cities (see Box 2). The diverse perspectives of key informants on UN–Habitat’s work were analysed using logic models7 (Yin, 2014) alongside textual descriptions, tabulation, grouping and clustering, and conceptual mapping (Popay et al., 2006). Each interview was given equal weight. In order to verify personal accounts, interview data were triangulated with direct observation and secondary documentation. Finally, six of the key informants reviewed the draft case study to check the accuracy of the findings and to ensure that no key data were missing.

The research was undertaken two and a half years after super typhoon Haiyan and the researchers were unable to access internal UN–Habitat documentation describing the interventions. This resulted in a strong reliance on key informants’ recollections of events. Wherever possible, the statements of each interviewee were triangulated with those of other interviewees and available secondary data. However, it has been challenging to capture all the details, and some gaps remain. While the majority of interviews were undertaken in English, six were partially in Tagalog. These interviews took longer due to the need to translate and consequently less detail was noted.

The association with UN–Habitat also presented a potential bias because the researchers were largely dependent on UN–Habitat to provide introductions for interview and one of the researchers was previously employed by UN–Habitat (David Garcia). However, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages because it provided the researchers with access to a wide range of key stakeholders and detailed insight into UN–Habitat’s work. This risk of bias was mitigated during data collection by stating clearly during the interviews that the ex-UN–Habitat staff member was undertaking the interview as an independent researcher, and a researcher with no previous relationship with UN–Habitat undertook the analysis (Elizabeth Parker).

5 Later supplemented by three additional interviews via video-conferencing or telephone in the period August–September 2016. Therefore, in total there were 32 key informant interviews undertaken as part of this research.

6 This included representatives from local government (nine), the private sector (four), (I)NGOs and UN agencies (11), community and civil society representatives (six) and ‘other’, for example donor organisations or academics (two). Barangay officials, while technically government officials, were included in the ‘community and civil society representatives’ category due to their ongoing and direct contact with residents. To balance anonymity for the key informants and transparency for the research, each interview is referenced throughout this paper with a group code and a unique number: local government is ‘IG’, the private sector is ‘IP’, (I)NGOs and UN agencies are ‘IN’, community and civil society representatives are ‘IC’, and ‘other’ is ‘IO’. So, for example, the first government official we interviewed is ‘IG1’, the second is ‘IG2’ etc. See the end references for further details.

7 See Section 4, Figure 6 for the final version of the logic model developed as part of this research.
1.4 Context and intervention

The Philippines is one of the most dynamic economies in East Asia, with an annual average growth rate of more than five per cent in the past decade (World Bank, 2016a). With close to 100 million people and a population growth rate that is one of the highest in Asia, the country has seen rapid urban growth (United Nations, 2016). In 2015, just under half the population lived in urban areas (44.3 per cent) and the cities offer higher average standards of living compared with the rural areas (USAID, 2016; World Bank, 2016b). The poverty incidence in urban areas (12.8 per cent) is roughly half that in the country as a whole (26.5 per cent) (USAID, 2016), however significant pockets of urban poverty remain.

The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world (Alliance Development Works, 2012) with around 1,000 fatalities and economic losses amounting to 0.7 per cent of GDP each year (GFDRR, 2013). More than 60 per cent of the country is exposed to multiple hazards, including typhoons, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, droughts and landslides (World Bank, 2014), while 74 per cent of its population are considered vulnerable (GFDRR, 2009) and 26.5 per cent poor (GFDRR, 2013). Typhoons are the most frequent and the most damaging of all natural disasters in the Philippines (GFDRR, 2009). Despite the development of considerable national capacity for Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) (Barber, 2013), rapid urbanisation coupled with environmental degradation and climate change continue to exacerbate the country’s vulnerability to natural hazards (GFDRR, 2009).

The Philippines has a “well-developed and robust system of laws and regulations governing disaster risk reduction, disaster response, public housing and other issues … in addition to institutions with ongoing responsibility for disaster response and reconstruction” (Sherwood et al., 2015, p.16). These laws and regulations are intended to guarantee autonomy and responsibility for LGUs. For example, the 1987 Constitution states that “the state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments” and this paved the way for the Local Government Code of 1991 that mandates a decentralization of central functions and the delivery of basic services to LGUs. Equally, the 2010 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act establishes that LGUs “have the primary responsibility as first disaster responders” (Sherwood et al., 2015, p.17).

Each LGU in the Philippines in mandated to develop a Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) to guide their long-term development. The CLUP should be “a systematic and organized presentation of [the LGU’s] strategic vision, objectives and directions, which are then translated into a physical and spatial dimension*.

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*The starting point of the planning process must be an identification of the hazards facing the community and the risks they pose to life and property.

*This potential damage to life and property is what constitutes vulnerability, and the likelihood of that damage – quantifying the probabilities – is what constitutes risk. A flood in an unpopulated and unbuild area, for example, poses little or no risk. On the other hand, the risk posed by even a modest earthquake in urban areas can be quite high.

*The legal mandates and enabling policies that require the LGUs to develop CLUPs include the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), Executive Order No. 72, Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act), Climate Change Act of 2009 (RA 9729) and National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (RA 10121) (HLURB, 2013).
(HLURB, 2013, p.21). The CLUP is required to span a minimum of nine years and cover an area defined by the city’s or municipality’s political boundaries (HLURB, 2013). In order to implement the CLUP, the LGU is also mandated to develop a Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP). The CDP is "regarded as an action plan and an implementing instrument of the CLUP" (DILG and NEDA, n.d., p.3). As a multi-year planning document, the CDP may span different political terms, thus it serves as the basis for the development of an Executive and Legislative Agenda (ELA), which provides opportunity for new administrations to focus their priorities from within the CLUP (DILG and NEDA, n.d.).

However, while there is a clear and well-documented planning system and process for LGUs to follow when developing the CLUP and the CDP, the reality is not so straightforward. In 2013, out of a total of 1,635 cities and municipalities (towns) in the Philippines, only 503 had up-to-date CLUPs; 204 had no CLUP at all; and 928 had CLUPs that were either out of date or would be in 2013 (Apolonio, 2012). Particular challenges include:

- More than 20 specialised plans\(^{11}\) are required to feed into the CLUP but are seen as repetitive and not "beneficial" by the LGUs, and are impractical with limited local government resources (DILG and NEDA, n.d.; Gotis, 2008).

- A "lack or total absence of horizontal linkages among sectoral concerns" (Gotis 2008, p.3).

- "Weak plan-to-budget linkages" (Gotis, 2008, p.3).

- The majority of LGUs contract consultants to develop the CLUP, typically because they have limited experience and time to develop the plans themselves. Thus "it is the consultant who usually does everything and when the plan output is handed over to the LGU the latter is left not knowing what to do with it" (DILG, 2008, p.v).

On 8 November 2013, super typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) devastated the Visayas region of the Philippines. More than 6,000 deaths were recorded, while in excess of 14 million people were affected and approximately four million people were displaced (UNOCHA, 2014). Approximately ten per cent of the total damage to housing and settlements was in the cities of Tacloban andOrmoc in the province of Leyte and in the municipality of Guiuan in Eastern Samar. Hospitals, health and education facilities, government buildings and electricity, water and communications networks were damaged or destroyed (see Figure 1 and Box 3).

Figure 1: Path of typhoon Haiyan: Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban

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\(^{11}\) For example, the Local Shelter Plan, the Solid Waste Management Plan, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, Traffic Management Plan, Tourism Management Plan, Local Poverty Reduction Plan, Gender and Development Plan, Sustainable Development Plan etc. (DILG and NEDA, n.d.; Gotis, 2008).
UN–Habitat began providing urban planning support to the LGUs in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban in the first few weeks and months after the typhoon. Through activities such as design workshops with key stakeholders and secondment of urban planners to the LGUs, the organisation provided technical assistance in a range of areas including developing Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans (RRPs), establishing local recovery and sustainable development groups to help integrate humanitarian support into longer-term development planning, and developing or updating supporting planning documents such as Local Shelter Plans (LSPs).12

12 Please note: UN–Habitat also ran a series of other initiatives that sit outside the scope of this research as they are not directly ‘urban planning’ processes or outputs. Examples include: in Tacloban, UN–Habitat worked with the LGU to develop a localised building code, specifically addressing climate change (Maynard, 2015); in Guiuan, UN–Habitat worked directly with displaced households to run a programme aiming to improve women’s livelihood opportunities (W1, 2016; IN1, 2016). In addition, in all three locations, UN–Habitat worked with the LGUs to undertake informal settler families surveys in a number of barangays to provide additional data to feed into the development of the CLUP (W1, 2016; W2, 2016).
UN–Habitat’s work in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban

2.1 Guiuan

2.1.1 Context: what was Guiuan like before and immediately after typhoon Haiyan?

Guiuan is a second-class municipality (town) with a population of 47,037 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2010) and an annual income of 45–55 million pesos (US$ 905,000–1.1 million) (Bureau of Local Government Finance, 2008). Just 3.5 per cent of the municipality is classified as ‘built up’ (urban or peri-urban), with fishing and coconut farming being the major sources of livelihoods (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014).

The population of Guiuan is spread across the mainland peninsula and nearby islands, which makes it challenging to provide centralised services and infrastructure. For example, prior to typhoon Haiyan, only around 23 per cent of households had piped water to their homes, with the rest accessing communal piped water points or communal stand-alone water points such as shallow wells (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014). Guiuan also faced critical environmental challenges. These included “abuse of natural resources [including illegal fishing], waste management, particularly in island barangays, and implementation of policies concerning environmental management” (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014, p.13).

Guiuan was the location where typhoon Haiyan first made landfall and it sustained significant damage from both wind and storm surges. Around 70 per cent of homes (8,210) were ‘totally damaged’ while the remaining 30 per cent (3,315) were ‘partially damaged’ (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014). Damage to fishponds, aquaculture and coconut plantations severely affected the local economy. The town’s infrastructure and services were also severely affected: up to 90 per cent of the piped water network was damaged; only three of the town’s 32 designated evacuation centres remained ‘usable’;14 and the municipal hall where most of the administrative offices were located was totally damaged, as were the majority of public health facilities (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014).

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13 2,700 households out of a total of 11,571 households (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014).
14 Four were totally destroyed and 25 were heavily damaged (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014).
2.1.2 Intervention: what did UN–Habitat do in Guiuan?

In Guiuan, UN–Habitat worked closely with the local government, providing mentoring and technical support to develop and produce the Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (GRRP) and a draft Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (CCVA).15

**Decision to plan and form a task force:** UN–Habitat staff arrived in Guiuan within a week of typhoon Haiyan (W1, 2016; IG6, 2016). A meeting was secured with the mayor and while initial discussions centred around rehabilitation of settlements, this “shifted into how UN–Habitat could help with rehabilitation as a whole” (IG6, 2016). On 21 November 2013, the mayor signed an executive order (IG6, 2016), which identified the Guiuan Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (GRSDG) as the task force responsible for developing the GRRP.

**Put someone in charge of the process:** The GRSDG was structured in three parts (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014; W1, 2016):

- the steering committee was responsible for ‘decision making’; it was chaired by the mayor, co-chaired by UN–Habitat and included the municipal council (Sangguniang Bayan);
- the secretariat was led by the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO); and
- four technical working groups – social development, environment, economy and infrastructure – were each led by a local government department and included representatives from private sector organisations, civil society, (I)NGOs and UN agencies.

**Orientation meeting:** An ‘inception workshop’ was held on 13 December 2013. The first meeting to establish the GRSDG was attended by the local government department heads plus a few representatives from the UN (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)), in total approximately 15–20 people. The purpose of this meeting was to share the framework for the planning process and to request data (IN7, 2016).

**Identify hazards and risks and develop the plan:** In the first quarter of 2014, UN–Habitat supported the local government to run a series of consultations with the GRSDG to collect all available data and to assess needs, hazards and risks and draft the GRRP (IG5, 2016; IN7, 2016).

- The different technical working groups met approximately once a week to “share data and analyse, and develop interventions” (IG5, 2016). These meetings were often small, typically around three people (IN1, 2016).
- In addition, there were around three larger multi-sectoral workshops (or charettes), facilitated by the LGU with support from UN–Habitat. These were attended by all members of the GRSDG (sometimes as many as 75 people (UN–Habitat Philippines, 2014a)) in order to coordinate and integrate the data and interventions (IG5, 2016; IG6, 2016).
- The LGU, with support from UN–Habitat, also convened a two-day workshop with the barangay captains approximately halfway through the development of the GRRP, to validate the initial findings and the GRRP goals (IN7, 2016).

**Present the plan:** The ‘draft’ GRRP was presented at two meetings. The first, in October 2014, was with the GRSDG and other invited guests (for example (I)NGOs). The second was an open event in the public plaza in November 2014 to mark the one-year anniversary of typhoon Haiyan, with around 1,500 attendees (IO1, 2016; IG6, 2016; IG5 2016).

**Legislative body and chief executive adopt the plan:** The GRRP was submitted to the provincial government, which compiled a Provincial Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan that was then submitted to the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR)16 as input to the national Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (CRRP).

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15 The CCVA was reported as part of the GRRP and does not exist as a stand-alone document (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014; W2, 2016).

16 OPPAR was the national coordination mechanism of the government of the Philippines. It was tasked with unifying the efforts of government and other agencies involved in post-Yolanda rehabilitation and recovery. OPARR did not directly implement projects; this remained in the hands of the government agencies and departments and the LGUs. For further information, see http://oparr.gov.ph/who-we-are/.
Implement the plan: The LGU used the GRRP as the basis of some of their work: to inform decisions (IN2, 2016); to coordinate with humanitarian agencies and donors (W1 2016; IG5, 2016); and to continue to promote the city’s strategies. “Using it, we were able to maintain our network with national government agencies” (IG6, 2016).

Monitoring the plan: The MPDO were responsible for monitoring the implementation of the GRRP through regular meetings with each of the technical working groups. UN–Habitat provided support and training to the MPDO to set up this monitoring process, including the development of a matrix (IG6, 2016).

Review and amend the plan: The GRRP is identified as a ‘draft’ document (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014); as of July 2016, the GRRP had not been updated nor were there any plans to do so. However, in mid-2016 the municipality of Guiuan initiated the process to update the CLUP (IC5, 2016), with the intention that the GRRP would be integrated into the longer-term city plans (IN5, 2016).

Figure 2 presents an overview of the timeline and compares UN–Habitat’s work in Guiuan to experiences in Ormoc and Tacloban.

Figure 2: Timeline indicating key activities in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban, November 2013–2014
2.1.3 Outputs: what did the GRRP propose?

The GRRP identified 12 key goals across five strategic areas: shelter, social services, economy, infrastructure and environment. The document identifies its purpose, partially describes the planning process (provides a summary of who was involved and how) and sets out the principles for its development. The GRRP also describes the hazards and contains detailed hazard maps, including for climate change projections.

In terms of implementation, across the 12 key goals the GRRP lists more than 130 different projects; there is very limited detail on each and there are many gaps in information. For example, there is little budget data (although some areas have included more detail than others, for example infrastructure); it is not clear who is responsible for implementation; assumptions are not stated; there is no prioritisation or hierarchy for proposed initiatives; and target dates are given as years (for example 2014) but there is no timeline. Finally, the GRRP does not discuss or explore the dependencies or relationships between the different projects, programmes and activities; for example they are not mapped (with the exception of some high-level maps for the social sector).

2.1.4 Effects: what happened next?

The majority of the projects in the GRRP focused on replacing or upgrading damaged or destroyed infrastructure. Many of these projects were successful in identifying funding and had either been completed at the time of the fieldwork or were underway. For example, the rehabilitation of the public market was funded by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); multi-purpose evacuation centres were funded by IOM and the Italian Development Cooperation; and reconstruction of the municipal hall was funded by the Department of Interiors and Local Government (DILG) (Direct Observation, 2016).

The two most significant planning items that have changed the spatial and political landscape of the city are the No-Build Zone (NBZ – see Box 4) and the proposed integrated seaport, market and multi-modal transport terminal. Both of these initiatives required significant relocation of the town’s population away from the coastal areas to new sites inland (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014).

The GRRP proposed relocating more than 2,155 households living in the No-Dwelling Zone (NDZ – see Box 4) ‘high-risk areas’ (many of whom were ‘informal settler families’) to new permanent houses in ‘low-risk areas’. This was in addition to constructing permanent shelter for the 391 households already displaced by typhoon Haiyan: 281 who were living in bunkhouses and approximately 130 living in ‘tent-city’ (a camp in the grounds of a school). As part of the CRRP this translated into a commitment from the National Housing Authority (NHA) to build 871 permanent housing units across three sites in barangays Tagpuro and Sapao (NHA, 2015). On one of these sites, the NHA has partnered with ACTED to construct 329 housing units.

BOX 4: WHAT IS THE NO-BUILD ZONE OR NO-DWELLING ZONE?

In November 2013, the national government announced its intention to enforce a 40-metre No-Build Zone (NBZ) in coastal areas. Oxfam (2014) notes that the request was loosely based on existing legislation. The Water Code “provides for public easements of three metres in urban areas, 20 metres in agricultural areas and 40 metres in forestry areas, with the classification of the land based on local land use plans” (Oxfam, 2014, p.14). However, the Water Code is primarily for the management of water sources and does not directly relate to hazards or safety (Vincencio Blanco, 2015, pp.754–755; IN1, 2016; Oxfam, 2014).

Several months of confusion and inconsistent implementation followed, with local governments trying to enforce the policy through restricting recovery support to residents living in the NBZ and proposing wide-scale resettlement (Sherwood et al. 2015, p.26). The NBZ was renamed the No-Dwelling Zone (NDZ) in some locations, as uses other than housing were permitted. In March 2014, OPARR recommended that rather than applying a blanket 40-metre NBZ, areas should be distinguished as ‘safe zones’ or ‘unsafe zones’ based on geo-hazard mapping; later, these labels were advised as ‘safe’, ‘controlled’ or ‘high risk’ (Oxfam, 2014, p.14).

17 The NHA originally planned to construct 290 units in barangay Sapao site 2 (NHA, 2015) but the authors understand that this is no longer planned. Rather, these units will be provided as part of the development with ACTED (Direct Observation, 2016).
Urban planning following humanitarian crises

As of July 2016, construction on the three sites was underway but had not been completed and no houses were occupied. The approximately 130 families living in ‘tent-city’ had been relocated to an IOM-funded transitional settlement on a fourth site in barangay Cogon (IC3, 2016; IOM, 2014). Although residents at this site did not have secure land tenure (IC3, 2016; IN1, 2016), the LGU – with funding from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) – was in the process of replacing the transitional shelters there with more permanent, concrete houses (IC3, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016; IG6, 2016). The land had been personally donated by the mayor’s family (IC3, 2016) and is exposed to hazards such as flooding (greater than 1.5 metres height) (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014, p.31).

Meanwhile, the majority of residents living in the NDZs had rebuilt their homes in situ (Direct Observation, 2016).

The three sites identified for permanent housing are located inland and approximately three kilometres from the city centre. Families are concerned about moving to these locations because the sites are exposed to hazards and lack adequate infrastructure (water and electricity) or access to schools, health care, employment and markets. The new houses are also smaller, families are attached to their current homes and communities, and they face additional costs for monthly land rental and transportation (Sherwood et al., 2015; IC5, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016).

Figure 3: Map of Guiuan


For example, the GRRP identifies the risk of flooding at these locations (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014, p.31).
2.2 Ormoc

2.2.1 Context: what was Ormoc like before and immediately after typhoon Haiyan?

Ormoc is a first-class, independent component city\(^{19}\) with a population reported in the 2010 Census of 191,200 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2010) and an annual income of more than 400 million pesos (US$ 8 million) (Bureau of Local Government Finance, 2008). Six per cent of the municipality is classified as ‘built up’ with an additional five per cent used for ‘special uses’ such as the airport or industrial areas (City of Ormoc, 2014). Ormoc’s economy relies primarily on agriculture and commerce, and the latter is strongly connected to the presence of commercial and transport facilities – especially Ormoc Port (City of Ormoc, 2014).

In 1991, Ormoc experienced a severe flash flood caused by tropical storm Thelma (known locally as Uring). This resulted in wide-scale damage to the city’s infrastructure and housing, and approximately 4,920 people lost their lives and 3,000 were reported missing, presumed dead (Salarda, 2014). Following this tragedy, the LGU with the assistance of JICA implemented a series of flood mitigation projects, including reforestation of the watershed areas, construction of bridges and improvement of drainage (Olan, 2014).

During typhoon Haiyan, Ormoc sustained significant damage from strong winds. Around 40 per cent of homes (14,000–18,000)\(^{20}\) were ‘totally damaged’ while the remaining 60 per cent (approximately 26,000) were ‘partially damaged’ (City of Ormoc, 2014). Agriculture suffered from the death of livestock and damage to stored goods, while 25 per cent of businesses reported severe damage to their structures, goods and

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\(^{19}\) The Local Government Code (1991) classifies all cities in the Philippines into three legal categories: highly urbanized independent cities, which have a minimum population and a minimum income – there are fewer than 40 of these in the Philippines, one of which is Tacloban; component cities, which do not meet the population and income thresholds and are considered to be part of the province where they are located – the majority of cities in the Philippines fall into this category but none are included as part of this research; and independent component cities, which are considered independent from the province where they are located – there are only five of these in the Philippines, one of which is Ormoc.

\(^{20}\) Inconsistent accounts were noted in the ORRP (2014, p.11): “The city had 26,549 partially damaged and 14,132 totally damaged houses according to Shelter Cluster data, accounting for three per cent of the national total of damaged houses due to Haiyan. The figures from the Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Centre (DROMIC) data slightly vary as it indicates 25,371 totally damaged and 18,750 partially damaged houses.”
equipment. Ormoc Port, however, resumed operations within days. As in Guiuan, many public buildings were heavily damaged. This included the new and yet-to-operate Ormoc city hospital, six of the city’s ‘3-in-1 buildings’ (which host health, social welfare and the police), and 22 out of the 33 barangay health stations (City of Ormoc, 2014, p.20).

### 2.2.2 Intervention: what did UN–Habitat do in Ormoc?

In Ormoc, UN–Habitat worked with the local government to develop and produce the Ormoc Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (ORRP).

**Decision to plan and form a task force:** UN–Habitat was in touch with local government officials in Ormoc from early 2014. However, it was not until May 2014 that UN–Habitat staff were assigned to Ormoc and started the planning process (IN11, 2016; IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016). An Executive Order was signed by the mayor (IG1, 2016; IN11, 2016).

**Visioning workshop:** The ORRP was developed in just one week in July 2014. This week started with UN–Habitat supporting the local government to run a day-long recovery planning workshop attended by around ten participants representing different local government agencies (IN11, 2016; IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016). This meeting sought to identify “what is the driver [for the city’s recovery]?” (IG1, 2016) and participants reflected on the strengths of the city (such as commerce and agriculture) to create a vision for Ormoc on which to build the ORRP (IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016).

**Identify hazards and risks and develop the plan:** Workshops later the same week in July 2014 focused on data collection and validation, and approximately 25–30 people attended, primarily government agencies (IN11, 2016; IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016). The workshops also incorporated action planning exercises, including identifying what the city could do themselves and where additional funding could come from (IG1, 2016). Data collected by UN–Habitat from when they arrived in Ormoc in May 2014 to July 2014 were fed into these workshops (IN11, 2016).

**Legislative body and chief executive adopt the plan:** In August 2014, the ORRP was submitted to the city development council21 for approval (IN11, 2016; IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016). The city development council approved the ORRP and submitted it to the city council for confirmation of funding. This was straightforward because members of both the city development council and the city council agreed with how it had been formulated because they were either involved in the process or very aware of the document (IG1, 2016).

**Present the plan:** Upon completion, the ORRP was presented to the IASC humanitarian clusters (IN11, 2016). When asked, key informants interviewed did not identify any open meeting, public presentations of the ORRP.

**Review and amend the plan:** As of July 2016, the ORRP had not been updated, nor were there any plans to do so. However, in 2015 the City of Ormoc initiated the process to update the CLUP (IG1, 2016), with the intention that the ORRP would be integrated into the longer-term city plans (IN5 2016).

Following the completion of the ORRP, UN–Habitat continued to work with the city to develop a draft LSP. The LSP is a supporting document that was required by the local government as an input into the CLUP.

### 2.2.3 Outputs: what did the ORRP propose?

The ORRP identified nine goals across five strategic areas: shelter, social services, economy, infrastructure and environment. However, unlike the GRRP, the ORRP does not identify its purpose or describe the planning principles or process. The ORRP does describe hazards and contains detailed hazard maps but there are no climate change projections (City of Ormoc, 2014).

In terms of implementation, the ORRP lists more than 120 different projects in the five strategic areas but these are not directly linked to specific goals (except when the strategic area only has one goal). As in the GRRP, there is very limited detail on the individual projects, however approximate budget details have been included for ‘unfunded’ projects. There is also no clear timeline, with almost all of the projects being identified as ‘short term’ and a few noted as ‘short to long term’. Unlike the GRRP, the ORRP identifies ‘high-priority projects’ for each of the five strategic areas but not an overall priority list for the city. The ORRP also typically identifies the organisation responsible for facilitation, although this is almost exclusively noted as the ‘LGU–Ormoc’. Finally, the ORRP maps the different projects in each of the five strategic areas, but does not discuss or explore the dependencies or relationships between the different projects, programmes and activities (City of Ormoc, 2014).

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21 This includes the mayor, Congress, the chairman of the city council, all barangay captains and representative members of civil society.
As in Guiuan, one of the most significant planning items in the ORRP was the No-Build Zone (see Box 4). The ORRP (2014) identified 10,000 families that needed to be provided with permanent housing: 8,000 affected by the typhoon and 2,000 informally settled families or those internally displaced. However, unlike in Guiuan, this did not translate into a funding commitment in the CRRP and the NHA did not commit to providing any housing units in Ormoc in their ‘permanent housing programme’ documentation (NHA, 2015). Instead, permanent housing is being constructed by external agencies such as the UNDP and the Tzu Chi Foundation on sites identified by the LGU and personally donated by the mayor (Digo, 2015); these sites are 7–10 kilometres from the city centre.

As of July 2016, at the UNDP site in barangay Cagbuhangin approximately 90 per cent of houses were completed but not yet occupied (IG2, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016). The Tzu Chi Foundation had ‘handed over’ 677 out of the 2,000 houses planned for barangay Liloan (Digo, 2015), however, while more houses had been completed and the site was certainly occupied, residents lacked secure land tenure (IG2, 2016). There was also no access to water on site and the local government had delayed moving any more families until this issue had been resolved (IG2, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016). Meanwhile, in coastal communities within the NBZ, approximately five per cent of households had moved voluntarily while the majority had rebuilt their homes in situ (IC1, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016).

One source noted that Ormoc did go on to receive subsequent NHA funding, and that this was for 200 units in barangay Concepcion; however, it was not possible to verify this through documentation (IG2, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016).
2.3 Tacloban

2.3.1 Context: what was Tacloban like before and immediately after typhoon Haiyan?

Tacloban is a first-class, highly urbanized city with a population of 221,174 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2010) and an annual income of 827 million pesos (US$ 16.6 million) (City of Tacloban, 2011). Tacloban is the provincial capital of Leyte and the regional centre of Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), and its economy relies primarily on “trade and commerce” (City of Tacloban, 2014, p.6).

Prior to typhoon Haiyan, Tacloban had a “complex and growing housing problem [with a] housing backlog estimated at 17,859 households” (City of Tacloban, 2014, p.23). In addition, there were challenges with water supply as the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) served only 35 per cent of the city (City of Tacloban, 2014). The water distributed by LMWD comes from water sources located within neighbouring municipalities and there was ongoing conflict between the provincial and city governments prior to the typhoon about extending the water system to provide more connections in Tacloban (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015).

Tacloban was on the direct path of typhoon Haiyan and sustained significant wind, flood and storm surge-induced damage. In particular, 100 per cent of households were affected; around 28,734 of houses were categorised as ‘totally damaged’, while 17,643 were ‘partially damaged’ (City of Tacloban, 2014). The local economy was also affected and the majority of Tacloban’s businesses were ‘heavily or partially damaged’; in addition, disrupted power and water supplies impacted on business operations (City of Tacloban, 2014, p.9). Equally, many public buildings and their equipment were heavily damaged; this included all of the city’s hospitals (two government and five private hospitals) and 90 per cent of all educational facilities (pre-schools, elementary, high schools) (City of Tacloban, 2014).

2.3.2 Intervention: what did UN–Habitat do in Tacloban?

In Tacloban, UN–Habitat worked closely with the local government – providing mentoring and technical support – to develop and produce the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP).

Decision to plan and form a task force: UN–Habitat initiated discussions with the mayor and other government officials in November 2013 (W1, 2016; IG7, 2016). On 3 December 2014, a preparatory meeting resulted in the development of a framework for the TRRP and the formalization of the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TACDEV) to lead the planning process (Paragas et al., 2016). The mayor did not issue an Executive Order to establish TACDEV.

Put someone in charge of the process: The TACDEV was structured in three parts:

• the steering committee was chaired by the mayor, co-chaired by UN–Habitat and included the municipal council (Sangguniáng Bayan) and other officials;

• the secretariat was co-chaired by the City Planning and Development Office and the City Human Resource Management and Development Office; and

• five technical working groups (social development, environment, economy, infrastructure and shelter), each led by a government department and including representatives from private sector organisations, civil society and humanitarian agencies (City of Tacloban, 2014).

Identify hazards and risks and develop the plan: UN–Habitat supported the local government to run two major planning workshops in December 2013–January 2014 and 6–7 February 2014, each attended by around 50–100 people (IN7, 2016; IN3, 2016; UN–Habitat Philippines, 2014e). The purpose of the workshops was to gather stakeholder inputs, define initial agreement on priorities and actions, and discuss strategies for the overall spatial framework (Paragas et al., 2016). UN–Habitat introduced relevant frameworks and spatial strategies (IG7, 2016) and there was a focus on data collection (IP4, 2016).

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23 Sometimes also referred to as the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TRSDG), for example see City of Tacloban (2014).
24 There are contradictory accounts of when this first workshop took place. Paragas et al. (2016, p.25) report that “November 2013 to April 2014, TACDEV organised and facilitated two major charrettes”. However, TACDEV was not established until early December 2013 (Paragas et al., 2016, p.24). Participants interviewed as part of this research were unable to confirm precisely when the first workshop took place (IN3, 2016; IG7, 2016; IG8, 2016), although it is not possible for it to have taken place before December 2013 or after January 2014.
In addition, UN–Habitat supported the LGU to host a series of meetings on specific topics to inform the major planning workshops (Paragas et al., 2016). UN–Habitat also led a rapid CCVA, brought in members of ASSURE and engaged Arcadis in the preparation of plans for coastal zone protection, the provision of water supply and urban planning for the area (UN–Habitat Philippines, 2014b; UN–Habitat Philippines, 2014c).

**Present the plan:** At the end of March 2014, the mayor and UN–Habitat presented the first iteration of the TRRP at an open meeting in the city astrodome.25 Paragas et al. (2016, p.25) also note that “a couple of smaller consultations were also conducted in communities in highly affected coastal areas, focusing on shelter and relocation plans.”

**Update the plan:** Following the public meeting, in April 2014 UN–Habitat and the city government facilitated a series of ‘write-shops’ (intensive workshop sessions) in order to write and complete the TRRP (IP4, 2016; IN3, 2016).

**Legislative body and chief executive adopt the plan:** Tacloban, as a city administered independently from the provincial government, presented its recovery plan directly to the national government in May 2014 (Paragas et al., 2016). Paragas et al. (2016) note that the TRRP was subsequently approved at the end of July 2014, however no government-issued documentation has been identified to support this claim.

**Review and amend the plan:** As in Guiuan and Ormoc, as of July 2016 the TRRP had not been updated, nor were there any plans to do so. However, in 2015 the City of Tacloban initiated the process to update the CLUP (IG1, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016), with the intention being that the TRRP would be integrated into the longer-term city plans (IN5, 2016).

Following the completion of the TRRP, UN–Habitat continued to work with the LGU to develop inputs to the CLUP (Direct Observation 2016; IN8 2016). This included a draft LSP and facilitating the development of the Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP).

The plans for Tacloban North (proposed city extension) have also been developed further. According to the LGU, the population of Tacloban North will reach 90,000 by early 2018 – representing around 40 per cent of the city’s total population (City of Tacloban, 2016, p.6). This includes 75,000 relocated families from the NBZ plus the original inhabitants of the area and is reflected in the current draft of the CLUP (Direct Observation, 2016).

### 2.3.3 Outputs: what did the TRRP propose?

The TRRP identified five goals, one for each of the five strategic areas: shelter, social services, economy, infrastructure and environment. As in Guiuan, the document identifies its purpose, partially describes the planning process (provides a summary of who was involved and how) and sets out the principles for its development. However, unlike the GRRP and the ORRP, the TRRP does not contain hazard maps that clearly indicate different levels of exposure; rather, hazards are described in a brief narrative summary.

In terms of implementation, the TRRP lists more than 170 different projects under the five strategic areas. As in the GRRP and the ORRP, there is very limited detail on the individual projects. There is also no clear timeline, with projects in the shelter and economy strategic areas being identified as ‘short term’, ‘medium term’ and ‘long term’, and the projects in the social services, infrastructure and environment areas not related to any timescale. The TRRP maps the different projects in each of the five strategic areas but does not discuss or explore the dependencies or relationships between the different projects, programmes and activities in the strategic areas.

Finally, the TRRP also clearly sets out a proposed ‘spatial framework and development direction’, which identifies four different ‘development districts’ within the boundary of the city and details the proposed strategic plans for each of these areas. This is very clear and contains a good level of detail, however, it is not straightforward to directly link each of the projects listed to the ‘development district’ in which it is located, and thus how each individual project relates to the wider spatial strategy.

### 2.3.4 Effects: what happened next?

The two most significant planning items in the TRRP are the NBZ (see Box 4) and the proposed city extension (Tacloban North). Both of these required significant relocation of the town’s population away from the coastal areas to new sites inland. As in Ormoc and Guiuan, the relocation sites are located more than 11 kilometres from the city centre, primarily on land that had not previously been developed. Unlike in Guiuan and Ormoc, the planning approach with Tacloban North was to build an entirely new centre or hub rather than to integrate the new developments into the existing urban area.

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25 There are contradictory accounts of when the public meeting took place and the number of attendees. Paragas et al. (2016) note that it was held on 18 March 2014 with 5,000 attendees, whereas UN–Habitat Philippines (2014d) reports that it was on 21 March 2014, with 2,000 attendees.
The TRRP set a ‘long-term’ target of constructing more than 10,000 permanent houses on new sites. The primary relocation site was owned by the city prior to typhoon Haiyan and was located in the Tacloban North area (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 for further discussion of land availability, exploration of ‘options’ and existing relocation plans). The TRRP proposed the construction of 3,000 houses on this site, while the purchase of an additional 70 hectares of land was a ‘medium-term’ target for the additional 7,000+ houses (City of Tacloban, 2014, pp.20, 29). As part of the CRRP, this translated into a commitment from the NHA to build 14,433 permanent housing units across 21 sites (NHA, 2015). For many of these sites, the contractor awarded the contract by NHA was responsible for identifying and purchasing the land on which to build the properties (Kammerbauer et al., forthcoming; IG9, 2016).
As of July 2016, construction on these sites stood at varying degrees of completion. For example, Ridgeview Park 1 in barangay Cabalawan (1,000 units) had been occupied since 10 November 2015 (NEDA, 2015) and residents appeared to be investing in the area by building small extensions on the properties and establishing home-based convenience stores (sari-sari) (Direct Observation, 2016). Other sites appeared completed, with finished houses and roads, for example Villa Sofia in barangay Tagpuro (640 units) and Villa Diana in barangay New Kawayan (409 units), but in these locations there were very few occupied properties (Direct Observation, 2016). Finally, some sites are still under construction, for example in barangay Santo Niño (Guadalupe Heights 1, 2, 3; and Greendale Heights 1, 2, 3) (Direct Observation, 2016).

In addition to the permanent housing provided by the NHA, a number of (I)NGOs and UN agencies (including Habitat for Humanity, UNDP and Catholic Relief Services) were constructing permanent houses along the road leading to the Tacloban North area (Direct Observation, 2016). As of July 2016, construction on these sites was underway but no houses had been occupied. In July 2015, the Kapuso Foundation completed 403 houses in its development – Kapuso Village in Barangay New Kawayan (Manila Times, 2015). The LGU owned this land prior to typhoon Haiyan and this was the first occupied permanent relocation site (IG9, 2016).

By December 2015, 867 families from Tacloban’s coastal barangays had moved into permanent housing units in the Tacloban North area (City of Tacloban, 2016, p.11). Meanwhile, the majority of residents living in the NBZs had rebuilt their homes in situ (Direct Observation, 2016). Households that have moved or are anticipated to move to the relocation sites have voiced the following concerns:

- **Water**: There is no adequate water supply, which has resulted in poor sanitation practices and health issues (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015; Romero, 2015; Oxfam, 2015; Millare, 2015; Boase, 2015; IG7, 2016; IC4, 2016). Until December 2015, the LGU was providing each household with 20 litres per household per day26 as a short-term strategy to meet the basic needs of the residents (IN6, 2016; IC4 2016). The government has delayed moving households to the relocation sites until the issue of water availability is addressed.

- **Livelihoods**: There are limited livelihood opportunities in the relocation sites and it is expensive to travel back to the centre of Tacloban to continue previous income-generating activities (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015; Romero, 2015; Boase, 2015; IN6, 2016).

- **Additional transport costs to access livelihoods**: To travel from Tacloban North to the downtown area costs approximately 50 pesos (US$ 1)/day. This is a significant amount when taking into account that the daily income is approximately 200 pesos (US$ 4)/day (IN6, 2016; IC4, 2016; IG9, 2016).

- **Pollution**: Barangays New Kawayan, San Isidro and Santo Niño are exposed to health hazards because of the neighbouring Santo Niño dumpsite (Oxfam, 2015).

- **Access to schools**: There are not enough school places in Tacloban North, and some children are still enrolled in their previous schools, consequently there are significant additional transport costs (IC4, 2016; Romero, 2015).

- **Additional costs are incurred for monthly land payments**: The house is free but the land is paid for by the residents (IC6, 2016).

- **Hazards**: The resettlement sites are exposed to hazards. For example, Ridgeview Park 1 in barangay Cabalawan has problems with flooding (IG9, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016).

- **Social cohesion**: Residents from different barangays are being relocated to a range of different resettlement sites – families, friends and/or neighbours are not being relocated together. It is not clear who will represent the new resettlement areas – whether they will appoint new barangay captains or be represented by the existing barangay captains in the resettlement areas (IC6, 2016).

As a result of these concerns, some households that relocated have moved back to their previous homes (IC6, 2016; IC4, 2016).

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26 Please note: the Sphere standard states that water use for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene in any household is a minimum of 7.5–15 litres per person per day (The Sphere Project, 2011).
3

Analysis

3.1 Strategy: What were the advantages and disadvantages of UN–Habitat’s approach to providing urban planning support to the LGUs?

According to the stakeholders interviewed as part of this research, there were five main advantages to UN–Habitat’s approach:

- **Empowered the LGUs:** The RRPs provided a ‘road map’ that enabled the LGUs to set strategy, identify problems and necessary tools, form the basis of decisions and advocacy, and empower them to manage the situation (IO1, 2016; IG9, 2016; IG5, 2016; IN3, 2016). As one government official described it, “if we did not have the TRRP we would not have come this far, if we don’t have a map”, (IG9, 2016).

- **Increased capacity:** The ongoing mentoring and technical support from UN–Habitat increased the skills and knowledge base of LGU staff members, as well as introducing them to useful tools, technologies and frameworks (IG1, 2016; IG3, 2016; IG7, 2016; IO1, 2016).

- **Improved reputation:** In Guiuan, the support from UN–Habitat resulted in a higher-quality RRP, which raised the profile of the city, showcased the competencies and determination of the LGU and improved the city’s reputation (IG6, 2016; IN5, 2016).

- **Improved coordination:** Developing an RRP helped to organise all the different activities and actors and contributed to improved coordination (IN7, 2016). For example, in all three locations, (I)NGOs and other UN agencies sought to access the RRPs in order to align their plans with the city’s recovery strategy (W1, 2016; IG3, 2016; IG5, 2016; IN2, 2016). In Guiuan and Tacloban, external stakeholders started to express an interest in the cities’ plans as their initial relief programmes came to an end, around June/July 2014 (IN3, 2016; W1, 2016). UN–Habitat supported this coordination through formal and informal coordination with other UN agencies, (I)NGOs and civil society groups (IN1, 2016).

- **Improved LGU access to funds:** The RRPs provided a framework for the LGUs to identify areas of investment as well as provide clear entry points for national government agencies, investors and donors (IG9, 2016; IG6, 2016).

Despite this being a specific area of investigation, stakeholders interviewed as part of this research identified only one disadvantage of UN–Habitat’s approach:

- **Additional pressure on local government:** In some instances, the planning process placed extra time and resource pressures on the LGUs and key stakeholders at a difficult time, as they were required to undertake service delivery and planning simultaneously (see Section 3.3 for factors that were a hindrance); however, their need to develop a plan outweighed this extra burden (IG9, 2016; IO1, 2016).
3.2 Programme: What worked well and what was not as effective?

Stakeholders interviewed as part of this research noted that the following aspects of UN–Habitat’s intervention providing urban planning support to the LGUs worked well:

- **UN–Habitat staff had the necessary knowledge and experience.** UN–Habitat staff in each of the three cities were Filipino planners who, whilst not experienced in humanitarian response, were familiar and knowledgeable about the urban planning processes in the Philippines (W2, 2016). Equally important, the UN–Habitat staff were committed, personable and enthusiastic, and had around 5–10 years post-university experience and strong professional and personal networks that extended across the country, including good contacts in national government agencies and universities (see Box 5 for additional information). This combination of skills, aptitude and networks was effective because UN–Habitat staff were able to address the political and technical aspects of the urban planning process. For example, they were able to access hard-to-reach data (IN1, 2016; IG6, 2016), facilitate and support the relationship between the LGUs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) clusters27 (Shelter Cluster Philippines, 2013a; IN1, 2016) through “acting as an extension of the city” (W1, 2016) and draw diverse stakeholders together in the planning process (see Box 8).

- **UN–Habitat was based in the city government offices.** During the development of the RRP, UN–Habitat staff were provided with office space within the LGU offices, typically within the Planning Department. This was effective because the “culture in the Philippines [is] when you are here, you are respected ... people see you every day and they listen to you” (IN1, 2016; W2, 2016).

- **UN–Habitat had staff working at city and national level.** UN–Habitat has had an office in the Philippines since 2006 and has well-established relationships at national level with various government agencies (W2, 2016). UN–Habitat was also part of the national Shelter Cluster,28 which was effective because UN–Habitat had an established reputation and was respected in its field. This built trust when making introductions with the cities, as well as facilitating rapid communication (‘fast tracking’) national policy decisions that affected the cities (IG7, 2016).

Stakeholders interviewed as part of this research identified the following aspects of UN–Habitat’s work that were not as effective:

- **UN–Habitat received short-term funding from different sources.** UN–Habitat’s work in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban was not delivered as one unified ‘programme’. Rather, funding was received from different sources because donors did not express any interest in funding an urban planning programme (W2, 2016). Initially, costs incurred for November–December 2013 were covered internally by UN–Habitat. These included visits and assessments in each of the cities to establish relationships and develop an outline strategy for collaboration. From January to June 2014, UN–Habitat secured funding from UNDP to cover the development of the RRP, and then from July 2014 to April 2015 funding was awarded by UNICEF to pay for the development of the LSP (W1, 2016; IN1, 2016). Finally, the technical support provided to develop the LCCAP in Tacloban was part of UN–Habitat’s Cities and Climate Change Initiative (UN–Habitat Philippines, 2016b). This piecemeal funding restricted UN–Habitat’s ability to make a long-term commitment to the cities and resulted in UN–Habitat doing additional work to meet earlier promises with new funding streams. Also, additional time and energy was required to report to different donors (W1, 2016). From the LGUs’ perspectives it was necessary to receive support from other actors, resulting in duplication of planning processes. In Tacloban, the LGU accepted

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27 Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, for example shelter, water, health and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination during humanitarian crises. The aim of the cluster approach is to strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies and provide clear leadership and accountability in the main areas of humanitarian response. At country level, it aims to strengthen partnerships and the predictability and accountability of international humanitarian action, by improving prioritisation and clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian organizations.

28 The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) was the Shelter Cluster lead. For further information, see https://www.sheltercluster.org/hub/national-hub-manila.
support from, among others, JICA and Oxfam, who ran parallel, sequential and, in some instances, duplicative planning processes (IG7, 2016; IO2, 2016; IG8, 2016; IN7, 2016). This duplication hindered implementation because it placed increasing time pressures on key individuals – taking "precious time away from important service delivery work and community work" and increasing complexity as there were competing plans (IG9, 2016; IN1, 2016).

- The RRPs were ‘stand-alone’ documents and were not supported by further planning documents detailing the practicalities of implementation. Kammerbauer et al. (forthcoming, n.p.) noted that “critics consider the TRRP an aspirational plan and seriously question whether it can promote an inclusive disaster recovery process.” For example, the RRPs typically contain limited information on timescale, assumptions, budgets and risks. Just as in the mainstream development planning process, the CLUP is supported by the CDP (see Box 6); it may have been beneficial to develop a further document to support implementation after the development of the RRPs.

- There was limited analysis or subsequent management of the inter-dependencies between the different projects in the RRPs. All three of the RRPs listed projects that were structured around five strategic areas: shelter, social services, economy, infrastructure and environment. However, the RRPs contain very limited analysis of the relationships and inter-dependencies between the different projects. For example, there is limited spatial analysis and indeed not all of the projects in the GRRP were located spatially: “some were floating around” (IN1, 2016). There is also limited phasing analysis to understand what project needed to be completed first in order to support subsequent activities. This resulted in significant investment in the cities that did not effectively deliver positive outcomes. For example, houses in Tacloban and Ormoc were completed before the services and infrastructure required to make them habitable were, and in Guiuan three pumping stations have been constructed but do not have a connection to mains power, thus they can’t be used to supply the city’s water (IP3, 2016; IC4, 2016).

- There was limited exploration of ‘options’ with a range of stakeholders. In response to the 40-metre NBZ exclusion zone (see Box 4) all three LGUs constructed housing on resettlement sites that were far from the city centres. Throughout this research, key informants from humanitarian agencies and community representatives expressed frustration that relocation was seen as the default option and that they were unable to discuss other alternatives with the LGUs (IN10, 2016; IN6, 2016; Shelter Cluster Philippines, 2013b) (see Box 6 and Box 8). Alternative options included support for rental housing, increasing the density of existing urban areas through medium-rise developments (IN6, 2016; IC4, 2016) or allowing residents to stay in areas that were exposed to hazards, but ensuring there were good evacuation procedures (IC4, 2016; Sherwood et al., 2015). Interviewees suggested that the LGUs both lacked experience of alternatives to resettlement programmes and felt under pressure to accept assistance from national government (see Section 3.3).

29 For example, pre-feasibility/feasibility studies, project management plans, detailed engineering designs were badly needed but it was not possible to develop these due to a lack of time, limited access to detailed market information, lack of commitment from funding sources and limited availability of technical support people (project managers, architects, urban/environmental planners, civil/geodetic engineers, financial planners/accountants) (IP4, 2016).

30 Please note: UN–Habitat is a global advocate against forced evictions, noting that they are a violation of human rights and that “forced evictions commonly result in people being pushed into extreme poverty and as such pose a risk to the right to life itself” (UN–Habitat and UNHCR, 2014, p.1). However, they do not advocate against resettlement entirely, and have a number of publications that discuss obligations and alternatives to explore when an eviction is unavoidable, for example UN–HABITAT and UNHCR (2014) and UN–HABITAT and OHCHR (2015).
Box 6: How Did the RRP Planning Process Differ in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban?

The planning processes undertaken in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban closely followed the planning processes detailed in Schwab (2005) (see Box 2 for further details).

The exception to this being steps 7 and 8 in the table below – ‘Present your [initial hazard and risk] findings to the community and get feedback’ and ‘Build public consensus around the need to develop and implement a plan’ – which were not undertaken in Guiuan, Ormoc or Tacloban. It may have been useful to include these steps in order to generate greater public support, a discussion of ‘options’ and ‘participation’ (see also Box 8).

Conversely, UN–Habitat and the LGUs included additional activities that Schwab (2005) did not identify but that were useful in this context. These included steps 4 and 5 (‘Orientation meeting’ and ‘Visioning workshop’), step 10b (‘Update the plan’) and step 14 (‘Monitor the plan’).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>GUIUAN</th>
<th>ORMOC</th>
<th>TACLOBAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Make the decision to plan for post-disaster recovery</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Form a task force to develop the plan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Put someone (some agency) in charge of the process</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Orientation meeting (introduction to process)*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Visioning working shop (what are you trying to achieve?)*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Mayor directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Document the hazards and risks for your community</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Identify and map the community’s natural hazards</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Document and quantify what’s at risk</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Present your findings to the community and get feedback</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Develop clear, effective educational materials</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Hold public forums to discuss the problem</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Build public consensus around the need to develop and implement a plan</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Develop the plan – include additional plan elements as needed</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Present the plan for adoption</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Hold public hearings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Update the plan (including any feedback from public hearings)*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Get the legislative body and chief executive to adopt the plan (official approval of the plan)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Implement the plan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Review and amend plan as appropriate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Monitor the plan (what has been done, what needs to be done)*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration: details summarised from Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. ‘Activities’ based on Schwab (2005).

Key:
✓ = activity undertaken
✗ = activity not undertaken
*= not possible to triangulate data, not clear if activity undertaken or not.
Please note, activities indicated as * are additional to those identified by Schwab (2005).
3.3 Context: What factors helped or hindered UN–Habitat’s intervention providing urban planning support to the LGUs?

Stakeholders interviewed as part of this research identified the following factors that helped UN–Habitat’s intervention providing urban planning support to the LGUs:

- **The mayors in Guian, Ormoc and Tacloban supported UN–Habitat’s work.** In all three locations, the mayors promoted and prioritised the planning process (IN3, 2016; IG9, 2016; IG8, 2016). Key informants noted that “the support of the leaders is crucial” (IG6, 2016) and that “political will is key” (IN4, 2016). This resulted in the RRP processes being given priority by the LGUs, encouraging people to attend the meetings and share data, even though there were many demands on their time (IN3, 2016).

- **There was a mandate for the RPP from the national government.** After UN–Habitat had initiated their work in Tacloban and Guian, the national government requested that each LGU develop an RRP and submit it to OPARR in order to access national funding streams (see Box 7) (IG6, 2016; IG9, 2016; IN3, 2016). This national mandate created a strong catalyst to develop an RRP within a short time frame, helping to secure local government commitment and time.

- **Determination, commitment and self-reliance of local stakeholders.** Key informants noted the resilience and commitment of the government and other stakeholders involved in the planning process to help themselves and not just wait for outside assistance: “they have put forward their best efforts to recovery” (IN9, 2016; IG1, 2016; IP2, 2016; IG2, 2016; IP1, 2016; IG7, 2016). UN–Habitat and the LGUs were able to build on this determination and mobilise stakeholders to participate in the planning process, even though there were many demands on their time.

- **There were fewer casualties in Ormoc compared to the 1991 tropical storm Thelma.** In Ormoc, approximately 8,000 people were reported dead or missing following tropical storm Thelma (Salarda, 2014), compared to 45 following typhoon Haiyan (NDRRMC, 2013). Government agencies did not lose employees, resources were not required to take care of cadavers and the city did not enter the same period of mourning; effectively, because there were “less casualties, we can focus on recovery” (IG3, 2016). While this is noted as a factor that helped in Ormoc, the opposite was true in Tacloban, where 2,678 casualties were reported and 701 people were missing (NDRRMC, 2013). Government officials noted that at the time the planning process for the TRRP was starting, many relief activities were still ongoing: “we were still recovering bodies and there were problems left and right” (IG8, 2016; IG9, 2016).

According to the stakeholders interviewed as part of this research there were nine factors that hindered UN–Habitat’s intervention providing urban planning support to the LGUs:

- **Typhoon Haiyan had severely affected the functions of the cities and the lives of their residents.** It is key to recognise the challenges associated with running an urban planning process in a city that has been affected by a humanitarian crisis. Specific challenges identified in this case study included:
  - Key stakeholders – government officials, civil society, private sector – needing to meet their own basic needs in terms of housing, access to water and making sure their families were safe before becoming involved in a citywide planning process (IN3, 2016; IP4, 2016; IG9, 2016; IG8, 2016).
  - Concerns for personal safety, for example no street lights and looting (IP4, 2016; IG9, 2016).
  - Limited communication, including no or restricted internet access, similarly mobile phones and functioning computers (IG4, 2016; IN1, 2016).
  - No or limited electricity; this also made it difficult to charge mobile phones and use computers (IN3, 2016; IP4, 2016).
  - Securing suitable, functioning meeting spaces, especially for large groups. In Tacloban and Guian, the government was working in makeshift offices as theirs had been damaged or destroyed (IN3, 2016; IG9, 2016).

- **The LGUs and city stakeholders had limited experience of urban planning processes.** While the LGUs were responsible for urban planning processes (for example developing the CLUP), they did not have the financial, technical and human resources capacities and only limited experience (W2, 2016; IG8, 2016; IG9, 2016; IG5, 2016; IG7, 2016; IG6, 2016). Prior to typhoon Haiyan, in Guian and Ormoc it had been ten years or more since the cities had engaged in a multi-sector, citywide planning process as their previous CLUPs had spanned 2003–2012 and 1990–2015, respectively (IG2, 2016; IG6, 2016). Tacloban had just updated its CLUP in 2013 and was waiting for it to be approved. However, external consultants had delivered the process and document, which meant the LGU did not have that...
first-hand experience. Other city stakeholders were also unfamiliar with the planning processes, including the private sector and civil society (IP4, 2016) (see Box 8). This hindered the planning process because additional time and resources were required to support LGU staff.

- **It was difficult to access the data required to develop the RRPs.** In all three cities, UN–Habitat and the LGUs reported challenges in the availability and quality of data; this included inaccurate or outdated data for base maps, geo-hazards and social and economic data (IN1, 2016; IG4, 2016; IG3, 2016; IG8, 2016). This problem was compounded by the typhoon because data sets had been lost as electronic and hard copies had been water damaged. Also, internet connection was poor, which delayed access to information online (IP4, 2016; IG4, 2016; IG8, 2016) and this prevented access to accurate data – particularly that lodged in national government agencies – on which to base the planning process.

- **LGUs had limited influence over national government decisions.** There were very different priorities within different parts of government (IN3, 2016) and limited success in gaining the most out of coordination or communication in key areas such as housing (IG9, 2016) and settlement services (for example water and power). The LGUs did not feel confident rejecting offers of assistance from national government because there was such need and they were concerned about political and media pressures or being seen as obstructive (IG9, 2016; W2, 2016). This limited control or influence over national government decisions meant that the RRPs developed by the cities could not secure the necessary funds or adapt the national government projects to suit the city context (IN4, 2016; W2, 2016; IG8, 2016).

- **Guiuan and Tacloban had existing plans to relocate coastal communities.** In Guiuan and Tacloban, there had been plans prior to typhoon Haiyan to relocate informal settler families in the coastal areas. In Tacloban, residents in barangay 88 (San José) were previously planned to be relocated to Tacloban North to enable an extension of the airport; but after the typhoon, the same plans were promoted for implementation based on ‘public safety grounds’ (Boase, 2015; Shelter Cluster Philippines, 2016b; IG9, 2016; IN3, 2016; IG8, 2016; Sherwood et al., 2015). In Guiuan, there were also plans to resettle the residents of urban coastal communities near the market area to another coastal barangay (IG6, 2016; IC5, 2016). In both Guiuan and Tacloban, there does not seem to have been clear communication between the LGU/UN–Habitat and the residents stating: this is the previous plan; this is the new plan; and this is the reason why. This created mistrust and fostered rumours and confusion.

- **Lack of clarity from national government over the NBZ policy.** The LGUs in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban all tried to implement a 40-metre NBZ along the coastline in response to national government’s instructions (see Box 4). However, overall, the NBZ did not adequately take into consideration coastal hazards, which resulted in confusion and inconsistent adoption, with none of the RRPs setting out clear guidance (Oxfam, 2014; Sherwood et al., 2015). For example, in Tacloban the LGU initially promoted the 40-metre NBZ and did not allow (I)NGOs to offer shelter assistance to families living in this area (IN2, 2016; IN5, 2016). Consequently, (I)NGOs designed their programmes around this requirement, only for the LGU to amend this direction in August 2014 and agree that “shelter assistance can be provided in the now defunct ‘40m no build zone’ on a case by case basis” (Shelter Cluster Philippines, 2014, p.3).

- **There was limited availability of suitable land for resettlement.** In Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban, there were challenges in securing suitable land for resettlement at a price that the local government could afford (IN4, 2016; IG3, 2016; IN7, 2016). As a result, plans for relocation were developed around the land that was donated by the mayor’s family (Ormoc and Guiuan) or already owned by the LGU (for example the city expansion area in Tacloban), or that was purchased by the NHA contractors (Boase, 2015; IG9, 2016). Adequate site assessments for these relocation areas were not completed, resulting in the subsequent discovery of hazards. For example, St Genevieve in Guiuan is prone to liquefaction (University of the Philippines Centre for Integrative and Development Studies, 2016) and Ridgeview 1 in Tacloban is vulnerable to flooding (IG9, 2016).

- **There were troubled political and personal relationships between key decision makers.** The political and personal relationships in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban between key decision makers at city, provincial and national level played a role in the level of funding received from national government. For example, in Ormoc there were tensions between the congresswoman (the representative at national level) and the city mayor (IN1, 2016; IG2, 2016). Equally, in Tacloban, the national and city governments did not have a good relationship (IG9, 2016; IO1, 2016; IG7, 2016; IN9, 2016). The dynamics of these personal and political relationships hindered implementation in Ormoc and Tacloban because they limited the opportunity to access national funds or delayed
the approval of the plans (IG2, 2016; IN7, 2016). However, conversely, positive relationships can help and this is reported to have been the case in Guiuan (IN7, 2016).

- **Poor or inconsistent attendance of stakeholders at planning meetings.** In Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban, the LGUs and UN–Habitat reported that it was difficult to ensure all the necessary individuals attended the planning meetings. Poor attendance – for example, (I)NGOs who were not willing to engage or local stakeholders who had many demands on their time and were not able to attend – affected the accuracy of the data available and led to a lower appreciation of the resulting RRPs (W2, 2016; IG5, 2016; IN3, 2016; IG2, 2016). Inconsistent attendance (different individuals attending but representing the same organisation) made it difficult to move forward with the planning processes as it was necessary to repeat earlier stages (IO1, 2016; IN3, 2016; IG7, 2016; IG1, 2016).

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**Box 7: How Did Short-Term Relief Planning Integrate with Pre-Crisis Planning and Longer-Term Planning?**

UN–Habitat’s work in the Philippines was operating within a complex policy environment.

### PRE-HAIYAN PLANS: DEVELOPMENT

- **Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLU Ps)**
  - Guiuan: 2003–2012
  - Ormoc: 1990–2015
  - Tacloban: 2013–2022 (draft)

- **Comprehensive Development Plans (CDPs)**

### PRE-HAIYAN PLANS: RELIEF–RECOVERY

- **Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda – Build Back Better (RAY–BBB)**
  - 16 December 2013

- **Strategic Response Plan (SRP)**
  - 27 December 2013

- **Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLU Ps)**
  - Guiuan: 2003–2012
  - Ormoc: 1990–2015
  - Tacloban: 2013–2022 (draft)

### CURRENT PLANS: DEVELOPMENT

- **Our Ambition 2040**
  - In progress

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Source: Authors’ elaboration.
At national level, there is a clear strategic integration of relief/recovery plans and longer-term planning with pre-crisis plans. The key long-term national planning document was the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011–2016, which set out the country’s “strategic development policy framework” (NEDA, 2011, p.viii). The Public Investment Programme (PIP) document supports the PDP and "summarizes the yearly investment targets for programmes and projects by funding source, and indicates their spatial coverage, [and sets out] objectively verifiable indicators" (NEDA, 2012, p.xi).

Following super typhoon Haiyan, the national government published the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda–Build Back Better (RAY–BBB) on 16 December 2013. This was the “government’s strategic plan to guide the recovery and rebuilding of the economy, lives and livelihoods in the affected areas” (OPARR, 2014, p.8). The humanitarian community developed the Strategic Response Plan (SRP), which was designed to ‘complement’ the RAY–BBB and covered the period November 2013–November 2014.31

In September 2014, the national government issued a follow-up policy document, Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda–Implementation for Results (RAY–I4R), which “aligned the Yolanda recovery framework with the goals of the Philippine Development Plan for the typhoon-affected areas, thereby not only justifying the allocation of funds for recovery but also addressing the developmental deficits in the affected areas, which are some of the poorest in the country” (Asian Development Bank, 2015, p.2). The national government also requested that each LGU develop an RRP. The RRPs from the LGUs were compiled into provincial RRPs, with the exception of Tacloban because of its highly urbanised city status. The CRRP was based on the policy guidance that came from RAY and sets out projects, programmes and activities (OPARR, 2014). The president approved the CRRP in November 2014, on the one-year anniversary of super typhoon Haiyan.

Looking forward, with the appointment of the new president, Rodrigo Duterte, the government released its new 25-year plan to reduce poverty called ‘Ambisyon Natin 2040’ (‘Our Ambition 2040’) in October 2016 (President of the Philippines, 2016).

At LGU level, prior to super typhoon Haiyan the key planning document was the CLUP, which was supported by the CDP to provide further detail on implementation (DILG and NEDA, n.d.). Following typhoon Haiyan, during the immediate relief period the LGUs developed rapid response plans on an ad hoc basis. Each LGU then developed an RRP to guide their recovery and rehabilitation. Currently, Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban LGUs are updating their CLUPs.

Finally, the authors observe that at the national and international level, there are distinct policy/strategic documents and separate implementation documents for existing plans, relief/recovery plans and longer-term plans. However, at the city level the RRPs aim to cover both of these aspects and set out policy/strategy and detail projects, programmes and activities.

In all three cities, the RRP planning process was described by government officials and UN–Habitat as ‘participatory’ (IN5, 2016; IN3, 2016; IG8, 2016; IN7, 2016; IG6, 2016; IG1, 2016). The RRRPs also identify that from the outset a key principle was that the process was intended to be “collaborative, multi-sector, participatory – national and local ownership and engaging all stakeholders especially the communities” (Municipal Government of Guiuan, 2014, p.2).

However, while it is certain that many different stakeholders were involved in the planning process, with representatives including barangay leaders, civil society groups, private sector, national government agencies, (I)NGOs and UN organisations, different stakeholder groups reported that there were restrictions to their ‘participation’.

Limitations to participation included:

- Stakeholders were primarily engaged in data collection and had a limited role in decision making or analysis (IP4, 2016; IC5, 2016; IG2, 2016; IP1, 2016; IC1, 2016).
- Barangay captains were responsible for sharing information and collecting feedback from residents in their area but were not provided with the tools or documentation to do this effectively (IO1, 2016; IC5, 2016).
- Open public meetings followed a ‘presentation and question and answer’ format, which provided limited opportunities for discourse or discussion of options (IC5, 2016; University of the Philippines Centre for Integrative and Development Studies, 2016; Direct Observation, 2016).

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**Source:** Authors’ elaboration.

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**Box 8: How were the views of affected communities and key stakeholder groups incorporated into the planning process?**

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For example when asked how they had participated in the planning process, stakeholders typically described data collection activities, for example: “I consulted [the local residents] on the damages of their fisheries equipment” (IC5, 2016); “the city played a more central role, with the barangay taking a back seat. For example, barangay captains were not part of the visioning process for the ORRP” (IC1, 2016); and “the meetings I attended were largely data gathering. There were barangay captains [attending]” (IP1, 2016).
BOX 8: CONT.

- Meeting rooms were not large enough to accommodate the number of people wishing to attend (IP4, 2016).
- Attendance at meetings and workshops was on an invitation-only basis, and restrictions were reported on stakeholders with opposing views to those of the LGUs (IO1, 2016).

Key informants expressed frustration at the restriction to their ‘participation’; for example, a community representative noted “there was no discussion with communities about options, [they were] just told” (IC4, 2016), and requested that residents have a stronger voice in decisions that affected them (IC3, 2016). This is likely to be a disappointing finding for UN–Habitat and the LGUs, who worked hard in difficult conditions to engage a diverse range of stakeholders throughout the planning process. However, it also reflects the dangers of using ‘participatory’ as a blunt term, and not analysing the various levels of power sharing and decision making.33

Finally, none of the RRPs are accessible to the general public. The documents are not available on the internet nor were hard or soft copies circulated to the stakeholders who were involved in the development process (IP1, 2016; IC1, 2016; IN6, 2016; IC4, 2016; IC2, 2016; IP2, 2016; IC5, 2016; IP3, 2016). Some (I)NGOs and UN agencies reported having copies of the RRPs (IN10, 2016; IN2, 2016). Key informants also noted that when they had actively asked the LGU for a copy of the document it was not forthcoming (IO1, 2016; IC4, 2016; IC6, 2016). This lack of access to the RRPs is problematic for the residents of the city; it has made the process and resulting plan opaque; it makes it difficult to connect to the vision or assess the details that directly relate to their lives; there is no opportunity to appraise the data on which the strategy is developed; and it is not possible to hold the LGUs accountable (Kammerbauer et al., forthcoming; Schwab, 2005; University of the Philippines Centre for Integrative and Development Studies, 2016).

33 For example, see Arnstein (1969), Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Hickey and Mohan (2004) for a discussion of different ‘levels’ of participation, the risks for development and inequality and the limitations and strengths of ‘participatory’ processes.
Conclusions and recommendations

4.1 Conclusions from this study

Urban planning – before and after humanitarian crises – is one of the key responsibilities of local government. However, municipal planning departments are likely to have limited resources and capacity, and urban planners are unlikely to have previous experience of humanitarian response. Experts recommend that humanitarian agencies “work in support of and in collaboration with municipal authorities” (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016, p.1) when responding to urban humanitarian crises, but there are few examples and little guidance on how to put this into practice. This research aimed to identify and document learning from UN-Habitat’s experience of providing urban planning support to LGUs in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban after super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. Figure 6 summarises UN-Habitat’s intervention.

4.1.1 Intervention: what did UN–Habitat do?

UN–Habitat placed one or two members of staff in each of the three LGUs in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban and they were supported by senior UN–Habitat staff based in Manila. In all three locations, UN–Habitat staff worked closely with the LGUs – providing mentoring and technical support – to produce RRP’s during the first year after super typhoon Haiyan. The process of developing the RRP’s included supporting the LGUs to: form a task force; identify hazards and risks; host planning workshops and consultations; and present, update and submit the plan for approval by national government. UN–Habitat also provided support to develop additional planning documents that fed into the longer-term CLUPs. These planning documents included draft LSPs (in Guiuan and Ormoc), CCVAs (in Guiuan and Tacloban) and a Local Climate Change Action Plan (Tacloban).

4.1.2 Effect: what happened next?

In all three cities, the informal and formal recovery and rehabilitation planning processes have resulted in the same level or increased levels of vulnerability for the urban poor. Informally, the vast majority of households have rebuilt along exposed coastal areas. However, because of the NBZ government instructions, (I) NGOs were strongly discouraged from providing support to residents in these areas, so all rebuilding has been largely self-directed with limited opportunity to explore disaster risk reduction. Likewise, formal planning processes have resulted in the relocation of residents to sites far from the cities, with poor and unaffordable transport links, limited access to services, few employment opportunities, inadequate water and electricity supplies, and damage to social cohesion as residents from different barangays are moved to different resettlement sites.
Figure 6: UN–Habitat’s intervention providing urban planning support to LGUs

**INFLUENCING FACTORS (RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS)**

**Contextual factors:**
1. Support of chief executive (e.g. mayor)
2. Official mandate for an RRP
3. Determination and commitment of local stakeholders
4. Number of casualties
5. Impact of crisis on functioning of city
6. City government experience of planning processes
7. Availability of data
8. Influence of city government on decisions made at national level that affect them
9. Existing plans for relocation
10. Clarity and agreement on policies and legislation that affect land use (e.g. NBZ)
11. Availability of suitable land
12. Relationships between key decision makers
13. Consistent attendance at meetings

**Programmatic factors:**
1. Staff have the necessary knowledge and experience
2. Staff are based in the city
3. Organisation is working at a national and city level
4. Adequate level of funding over a suitable period of time
5. RRPs include adequate detail on implementation or are supported by further documentation
6. Adequate analysis and management of inter-dependencies between the different projects
7. Adequate participation of stakeholders and discussion of ‘options’

**INPUTS**
- Funding
- National staff (political and technical expertise)
- International staff (technical expertise)
- Tools, technologies and methodologies
- Data

**OUTPUTS**
- Various planning documents:
  - RRP
  - CCVA
  - LSP

**OUTCOMES**
- Empowered the LGU
- Increased capacity
- Improved reputation
- Improved coordination
- Improved LGU access to funds

**ACTIVITIES**
1. Make the decision to plan for post-disaster recovery
2. Form a task force to develop the plan
3. Put someone (some agency) in charge of the process
4. Orientation meeting*
5. Visioning workshop*
6. Document the hazards and risks for your community
   a) Identify and map the community’s natural hazards
   b) Document and quantify what’s at risk
7. Present your findings to the community and get feedback
   a) Develop clear, effective educational materials
   b) Hold public forums to discuss the problem
8. Build public consensus around the need to develop and implement a plan
9. Develop the plan.
10. Present the plan for adoption
   a) Hold public hearings
   b) Update the plan*
11. Get the legislative body and chief executive to adopt the plan
12. Implement the plan
13. Review and amend plan as appropriate
14. Monitor the plan*
   See Box 6 for further information

**IMPACT**
- Social, economic and environmental recovery and development of the cities

Source: Authors’ elaboration, building on Schwab (2005) for the ‘Activities’. Please note, activities indicated as * are additional to those identified by Schwab (2005).
4.1.3 Strategically, what were the advantages and disadvantages of UN–Habitat’s approach?

UN–Habitat’s urban planning support empowered the LGUs by providing them with a road map. This led to increased capacity, improved reputation, improved coordination and improved LGU access to funds. Only one disadvantage was identified, namely that the planning process placed an extra burden on the LGUs and key stakeholders at a difficult time. However, this disadvantage was outweighed by the usefulness of the plan.

4.1.4 Programmatically, what worked well and what was not as effective?

Stakeholders highlighted three aspects of UN–Habitat’s intervention that worked well. These were that: UN–Habitat staff had the necessary knowledge and experience; they were based in the offices of the LGUs; and that UN–Habitat had staff working at both city and national level. Conversely, several aspects of UN–Habitat’s intervention were felt to be less effective. These were that: UN–Habitat received short-term funding from different sources (which limited their ability to make long-term commitments and may result in duplication of planning processes); the RRP’s were ‘stand-alone’ documents not supported by further documents detailing the practicalities of implementation; there was limited analysis or subsequent management of the inter-dependencies between the different projects in the RRP’s; and there was limited ‘participation’ of key stakeholders and discussion of ‘options’ (particularly regarding resettlement).

4.1.5 Contextually, what factors helped or hindered UN–Habitat’s intervention?

Several contextual factors were identified by stakeholders interviewed as part of this research as helping UN–Habitat’s intervention. These were: that the mayors in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban supported UN–Habitat’s work; there was a requirement for the RRP’s from national government; and the determination, commitment and self-reliance of local stakeholders. In Ormoc, it was also noted that the limited number of casualties (in comparison to a previous crisis) meant that the LGU could focus on recovery.

Contextual factors that were identified as hindering UN–Habitat’s work included: the severe effect of super typhoon Haiyan on the functions of the cities and the lives of their residents; that the LGUs and city stakeholders had limited experience of urban planning processes; it was difficult to access the data required to develop the RRP’s; LGUs had limited influence over national government decisions; that Guiuan and Tacloban had existing plans to relocate coastal communities; the lack of clarity from national government over the NDZ policy; there was limited availability of suitable land for resettlement; there were troubled political and personal relationships between key decision makers; and there was poor or inconsistent attendance of stakeholders at planning meetings.

In conclusion, UN–Habitat staff worked under considerable pressure and were successful in providing support to the LGUs to deliver the RRP’s. However, due to the limitations discussed above, in particular the challenges UN–Habitat experienced when aiming to secure longer-term funding, it was not possible for them to provide the level of support and continuity that was required by the LGUs in order to secure longer-term positive impacts for the residents of the city.

4.2 Implications for policy and practice

The development of an RRP is a valuable tool to empower city governments to set strategies, identify priorities and manage their own recovery following humanitarian crises.

Local governments that do not have the knowledge, experience, time, tools or technology to develop RRP’s will need external support – mentoring and technical advice – to build their institutional capacity.

Organisations providing urban planning support to local governments following humanitarian crises should:

- Have prior experience working with, and contacts within, local and national government agencies.
- Contract national staff with urban planning knowledge and experience to lead the work at city level – preferably placing them within the planning department.
- Bring in national or international experts to provide specific expertise as required; this can be adapted for the local context by staff members working at the city level.
Together, organisations providing urban planning support and local governments should:

- Clearly identify the ‘outcomes’ and the intended ‘impact’ of the planning process from the outset in order to guide decisions, and ensure the poorest residents of the city or town are not disadvantaged.
- Define the degree of ‘participation’ for the various stakeholder groups at the outset, clearly indicating which individual or group has the power to make which decision.34
- Assess the capacity of key stakeholders to ‘participate’ from the outset (for example what is their experience? Level of education? Familiarity with the planning process?). Design institutional capacity building into the planning process, not just for the local government but also for other key stakeholders, especially vulnerable groups and civil society organisations that represent them. This will be required in order for various stakeholder groups to ‘participate’ meaningfully.
- Assess and manage potential risks to the urban planning process (the factors identified in Section 3.3 may be used as a basis). Depending on the context, these factors have the potential to make the work take longer, require additional funding or impact on the quality of the outputs, outcomes and impact.
- Structure their RRP following existing planning guidelines, including analysis of the spatial and phasing inter-dependencies of the proposed projects (for example project A has to happen before B and C etc.). As required, develop detailed supporting documents to the RRP that specifically address implementation – including timescales, assumptions, budgets and risks.
- Consider carefully any resettlement projects; explore a range of options with all affected stakeholders, including residents, service and infrastructure providers and current or potential employers. Do not default to resettlement planning as a simple ‘solution’; it is not.

- Document both the process and outputs of urban planning and make documents publicly available. This could be via the internet, given the rapid nature of decision making during humanitarian response.

Humanitarian donors should provide longer-term funding to support urban planning processes after humanitarian crises. Ideally, this would span from immediate action planning during the relief period until after the city has incorporated specialised plans developed in response to the crisis (such as RRP or area-based plans for specific neighbourhoods) into its mainstream planning documents (such as its official comprehensive plan); this is likely to take three or more years.

4.3 Suggestions for further research

Based on this research, the authors suggest that investigation of the following topics would be beneficial in developing the evidence base regarding urban planning processes after humanitarian crises:

- Comparison of the recovery and rehabilitation planning processes in urban municipalities affected by super typhoon Haiyan that did not receive urban planning support from UN–Habitat with those described in this paper.
- Comparison of recovery planning after previous humanitarian crises that affected urban areas in the Philippines (such typhoon Ketsana in 2009 and severe tropical storm Washi in 2011) with the response to super typhoon Haiyan.
- Documentation of other international case studies of urban planning after humanitarian crises – particularly those where an international organisation provided support for the local government to take the lead.

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34 For example, see Arnstein (1969), Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Hickey and Mohan (2004) for a discussion of different ‘levels’ of participation, the risks for development and inequality and the limitations and strengths of ‘participatory’ processes.
Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSURE</td>
<td>Alliance for Safe and Sustainable Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCVA</td>
<td>Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLUP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Land Use Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRRP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interiors and Local Government</td>
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<td>DROMIC</td>
<td>Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Centre</td>
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<td>DRRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELA</td>
<td>Executive and Legislative Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFDRR</td>
<td>Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRRP</td>
<td>Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRSDG</td>
<td>Guiuan Recovery and Sustainable Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLURB</td>
<td>Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCCAP</td>
<td>Local Climate Change Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMWD</td>
<td>Leyte Metropolitan Water District</td>
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<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Shelter Plan</td>
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<td>MPDO</td>
<td>Municipal Planning and Development Office</td>
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<td>MSB</td>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency</td>
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<td>NBZ</td>
<td>No-Build Zone</td>
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<td>NDZ</td>
<td>No-Dwelling Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEDA</td>
<td>National Economic and Development Authority</td>
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<td>NHA</td>
<td>National Housing Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPARR</td>
<td>Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery</td>
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<td>ORRP</td>
<td>Ormoc Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Philippine Development Plan</td>
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<td>Public Investment Programme</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
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<td>Strategic Response Plan</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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IC2, 2016. Unpublished Interview: Community or Civil Society Representative, Friday 15th July 2016 (11.00am).

IC3, 2016. Unpublished Group Interview: Community or Civil Society Representative, Saturday 16th July 2016 (9.00am).

IC4, 2016. Unpublished Interview: Community or Civil Society Representative, Thursday 21st July 2016 (1.00pm).

IC5, 2016. Unpublished Interview: Community or Civil Society Representative, Friday 22nd July 2016 (8.00pm).

IC6, 2016. Unpublished Interview: Community or Civil Society Representative, Saturday 23rd July 2016 (10.00am).


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This Working Paper is part of a wider research project. Please also see:


In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of humanitarian agencies supporting and collaborating with local governments in order to restore city functions following humanitarian crisis.

This research aimed to identify, document and disseminate learning from UN–Habitat’s experience providing urban planning support to three Local Government Units (LGUs) in Guiuan, Ormoc and Tacloban after super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

UN–Habitat staff worked under considerable pressure and were successful in providing support to the LGUs to deliver useful Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans (RRPs). However UN–Habitat were not able to secure adequate, long-term funding and as such were not able to provide the level of support and continuity that was required in order to secure longer-term positive impacts for the cities’ poorest residents. 

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