LDCs, negotiations and the climate crisis

Will the poorest countries benefit from the COP24 climate package?

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The Katowice Climate Conference has come and gone, and a busy 2019 calendar headlined by the UN Secretary-General’s September climate summit is already in full swing. It’s important to not only look back at the developments of 2018 with a focus on the package of outcomes from COP24 but also look forward to the key moments of 2019.

This issue paper puts the climate crisis, the prevailing political context and the LDC perspective into frame; it looks at the Katowice package of outcomes and delves into the implementation guidelines adopted at COP24; and it looks at 2019 and beyond regarding opportunities and some reflections. Important context and history of the negotiations and the process are provided where relevant.

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The Katowice Climate Conference (Twenty-fourth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, COP24) seems like a distant memory and the 2019 calendar is already in full swing with meetings and big events. Looking back on 2018 in earnest, it was a frantic year of political and technical meetings and events at every level, including an extra UNFCCC negotiation session in August, a second installment of the One Planet Summit and the first Global Climate Action Summit for non-State actors.

Now that the dust has settled and we’re on the verge of the next negotiating session in June, we can step back and reflect a little more on the key outcomes of COP24 and some of 2018’s important developments. And just as every year turns out to be a record-breaking one for global temperatures, every year inevitably becomes a more crucial one for the climate agenda. Looking forward, 2019 doesn’t seem to be an exception.

This issue paper focuses on the COP24 package of outcomes and in particular on the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement (sometimes referred to as the “rulebook”), and zooms in on issues that are particularly important to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The first section of this paper puts the climate crisis, the prevailing political context and the LDC perspective into frame. It lays out the case for urgent action by reflecting on the stark findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its most recent special report and the increasing severity of observed impacts from year-to-year. It also looks at COP24 as more than an ordinary COP because of its critical timing and expectations leading into the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and gives a brief overview of political events and trends that could present some opportunities or challenges to addressing the climate crisis going forward. The middle section looks at key outcomes in the Katowice climate package and delves into the Paris Agreement implementation guidelines in a little more detail, giving some context and history of the process and issues where relevant. It covers the majority of negotiation issues and considers where Parties did or did not make important progress and the how specific outcomes relate to the priorities of LDCs. The final section looks forward to 2019 and beyond and recommends some next steps and considerations for the climate community going forward.

This paper is not a catalogue of every decision taken in Katowice or a play-by-play account of how the negotiations unfolded around every issue; rather, it voluntarily covers some areas in more detail than others in order to give an analysis that’s more representative of LDC priorities and perspectives.
Context and expectations
1.1 Climate change impacts and the IPCC 1.5 Report

By all accounts, 2018 was a big year in terms of climate change impacts and efforts to address the climate crisis. Global emissions and the overall concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere continued to rise. Global average temperatures continued to hover around or exceed 1°C above pre-industrial levels and are likely to continue rising for the foreseeable future. At the current level of warming (of only about 1°C), the impacts on ecosystems, people, communities and entire nations were widespread and devastating. Heat waves, droughts, flooding, sea level rise, glaciers melting at unprecedented rates and more extreme weather caused or worsened by climate change hit every corner of the planet. These impacts are projected to get more extreme and more frequent with every little bit of additional warming.

The IPCC highlighted many of these points in October 2018 when it published its Special Report on the impacts of 1.5°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels (IPCC 1.5 Report). It also made a strong scientific case that limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would result in fewer impacts, less irreversible loss and damage due to climate change, and fewer economic – as well as social and environmental – long-term costs overall when compared to 2°C of warming. The IPCC clearly showed that the difference in impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C of warming, for example on water and food security or biodiversity loss, can be exponential and not just incremental. And if we don’t collectively act soon enough and fast enough, limiting warming to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C, could quickly become unachievable. The scientific case is made clear that climate change is already wreaking havoc and is bound to cause irreparable harm if we don’t get our act together. Unfortunately, domestic politics relating to the fossil fuels industry and ideological differences about nature of human-induced climate change kept the substance of the report from being fully recognised and considered under the UNFCCC process in Katowice. This is discussed in a little more detail later in this paper.

But it isn’t all doom and gloom. According to the IPCC, if we act decisively within the next few years, we have a shot at limiting warming to 1.5°C, so it isn’t too late… yet. And although doing that will require a global transition and effort of unprecedented scale and speed, we can still do it without extreme measures, like solar radiation management geoengineering, which come with potentially massive risks and uncertainties.

1.2 The importance of COP24

With respect to the UN negotiations, COP24 was arguably the most important COP since the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 for a few reasons:

- **Rules** – The implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement were expected to be adopted by the end of COP24, although at times it seemed like Parties would run out of time to complete them or simply prefer to postpone adopting them. These guidelines are the figurative nuts and bolts of the Paris Agreement and needed to be coherent and comprehensive. They needed to give countries clarity on how they can deliver on their commitments and meet their obligations under the Paris Agreement, and on how the whole system would work to collectively generate the most ambition.

- **Ambition** – The Talanoa Dialogue, which evolved into a year-long process, was reaching its political pinnacle for catalysing ambition and bold action – the mandate from Paris was to hold a facilitative dialogue to assess how well collective ambition stacked up against the urgency of action needed to address the root cause of climate change. Inspired by the Pacific island story-telling tradition of “talanoa”, the facilitative dialogue (typically organised as an unimaginative workshop or event) was transformed by Fiji (who held the presidency of COP23) into a participatory process that was more inclusive, more empathetic and more solution-oriented. Building on months of stakeholder input and preparation, the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue was set to take place during COP24.

- **Urgency** – Leading up to the COP, there was queasy anticipation around the findings of the IPCC on the impacts of 1.5°C of global warming. Approved at the IPCC’s session in October, the science was in and it was sobering about the scale and urgency of the climate crisis. The findings shouldn’t have surprised anyone but it’s never easy to get a prognosis that so plainly confirms what just about everyone knew all along, and even less so when it might be worse than originally thought. How this report and its findings would impact the negotiations going forward was a big question mark, and everyone wondered whether the report would be the wake-up call that brought countries together to commit to actions that could meet the urgency of addressing climate change.

- **Action** – The real-world impacts across the world were undeniable, ambition and momentum had been building for years, and – with only a couple of years before the Paris Agreement was going to move to implementation mode – now was the time to double down and commit to braver and bolder action and stronger rules for the UNFCCC regime. Throughout 2018, some prioritised adopting a stronger rulebook, while others favoured securing more ambitious commitments. The LDCs had been calling for both rules and ambition because one without the other is unlikely to get us closer to addressing the climate crisis.
1.3 The political and social context

Outside the UN negotiations, the landscape was just as crowded with important moments, key events and in some cases political uncertainty.

Whereas the United States’ intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement hadn’t changed, Brazil had elected a president who had stated a similar intention. More generally, a number of governments started to swing a little more to the right in their politics, a little more towards isolationism in their perspectives and a little more towards protectionism in their international relations. These trends were dampening expectations for ambitious climate action and strong outcomes at COP24.

But 2018 also had some positive highlights. Some governments picked up some of the slack by announcing more ambitious targets and committing to provide additional climate finance to developing countries. China, in particular, was also more visibly taking a leadership role globally to address the climate crisis. Sub-national actors became more engaged. For example, Governor Jerry Brown of California convened a Global Climate Action Summit in September to bring together non-state actors (businesses, civil society, cities, regions and others) to showcase their efforts to address climate change. On a more grassroots level, the ‘Extinction Rebellion’ movement grabbed headlines in the build-up to COP24 and well into 2019 through protests, acts of civil disobedience and mass mobilisation to change a system that organisers said isn’t working and isn’t able to address the climate crisis. The most recent example was pressure on governments to declare a climate emergency. Teenager Greta Thunberg, who started a school strike for climate outside the Swedish parliament, and British broadcaster Sir David Attenborough were invited to address the COP about what’s at stake for future generations, the environment and our planet if we don’t act now and act decisively. While these kinds of celebrity appearances are probably more geared to engaging the masses outside the UNFCCC than the seasoned government negotiators inside, it never hurts to be reminded that the negotiations are more than rules and ambition, and that they need to be as much about real action and results.

1.4 The LDCs’ perspective

It’s that same real action and results that the LDCs, classified by the UN as the 47 poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world, have been calling for for years. Looking to the IPCC 1.5 Report, nearly every statement in the report that relates to the impacts of increased warming on the poorest and most vulnerable is made with the highest levels of certainty and likelihood, making it hard to ignore these countries’ consistent calls for more ambition and action. For example, the incidence of heat-related deaths, vector-borne diseases, water stress and poverty are expected to be significantly higher at 2°C when compared to 1.5°C of warming with LDCs among those at disproportionately higher risk. It’s for this reason that LDCs have been demanding that efforts at addressing the climate crisis be aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Of course, LDCs aren’t the only countries that are vulnerable to climate change impacts; many small island developing states (SIDS) face existential challenges, and some islands are trying to do everything in their power to avoid being swallowed up by rising seas altogether. It’s these groups of very vulnerable countries, LDCs and SIDS, which have contributed little if at all from the climate crisis, yet suffer the worst from it and have the least means to deal with it.

In terms of their own contribution to addressing the climate crisis, LDCs will need a lot of financial, technical and capacity-building support to be able to achieve their low-carbon development and build long-term resilience. If that support doesn’t come or comes too late, LDCs could be left behind in the global low-carbon transition and would doubly be less able to deal with the disproportionate climate impacts they already face. Many SIDS are in the same boat. In both cases, it’s easy to imagine how climate-induced migration will become more prevalent as more people look for safer, cooler and higher places to build communities and live.
The COP24 Climate Package
The Katowice Climate Package includes a number of political and technical outcomes. Going into the COP, the completion and adoption of the Paris Agreement implementation guidelines, the convening of the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue and the consideration of the recently published IPCC 1.5 Report were the top items on the agenda for many countries. A stocktake on pre-2020 ambition and implementation (another will be held at COP25), the biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance, and a Leader’s Summit organised by the COP President rounded out the other notable items on the COP24 agenda.

In hindsight, the COP24 outcome as a whole is predominantly focused on rules and less so on ambition. The guidelines that were adopted provide a good basis for Parties to start implementing the Paris Agreement in a couple of years. In some areas the rules could’ve been stronger, in others they were less complete and in others still they were deferred for further work (for example, on the use of cooperative mechanisms under Article 6 – informally known as ‘markets for carbon or emissions trading’ – and on the issue of common time frames for Nationally Determined Contributions – NDCs).

The ambition component of the overall package was far less substantial. There were a handful of safe calls to action and little clarity around how and how much Parties are expected to raise their ambition going forward. On the range of climate finance issues, the focus was again on rules and mostly related to transparency without concrete commitments or expectations around increasing climate finance.

2.1 Implementation guidelines and relevant technical outcomes

When the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, Parties outlined further work needed to elaborate the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the various mechanisms, processes and institutions established under the Paris Agreement. This body of work was the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP). The aggregate of that work was a set of implementation guidelines (or ‘rulebook’) for the Paris Agreement, which were detailed and, in some cases, complex provisions with many linkages between the different strands. They were also going to be considered as a package within the broader COP24 package of technical and political outcomes, which meant that there would need to be an internal balance and trade-offs among the various strands of the implementation guidelines even though they were developed mostly separately for more than two years. This made bringing the package together at the end technically more challenging. It also allowed for more than the usual bartering and bargaining within and between negotiation strands.

The implementation guidelines are captured in a collection of decisions generally covering the topics of NDCs and mitigation, adaptation and adaptation communications, the enhanced transparency framework (reporting and review), the global stocktake (GST) process, the implementation and compliance mechanism, finance and support, the use of cooperative mechanisms under Article 6, and a number of complementary decisions.

NDCs and mitigation

The negotiations on NDCs and mitigation covered three main topics: the up-front information Parties need to provide so their NDCs are easier to understand (in UNFCCC jargon “information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding”, or ICTU), the features of NDCs themselves, and how Parties would account for their NDCs. NDCs represent a core element of the Paris Agreement and essentially capture the things that each Party plans to do to address climate change under the Paris Agreement. Every Party has to submit an NDC every 5 years and they’ll all be kept in a public registry. And since every Party has full discretion to decide what kinds of efforts to include in its NDC, clear up-front information becomes even more important.

These negotiations seemed to be the most politically charged with little to no progress being made at some sessions leading into COP24. With such an important issue lagging, the overall balance in the package of guidelines began to come into question for some Parties.

At the heart of the tension were two issues: the scope of NDCs and whether they covered only mitigation efforts (and, for a few Parties, whether even mitigation efforts were optional) and whether the same guidelines would apply to all Parties. The latter issue was a clear manifestation of differences in how differentiation should be reflected in the guidance. From an LDC perspective, although every Party must include a mitigation component in their NDC, NDCs didn’t need to be exclusively about mitigation efforts. This was particularly important to LDCs because they believe that all countries should take important mitigation efforts. Keeping the scope of NDCs open would allow Parties to include their adaptation efforts as one of its components if they preferred not to submit a separate adaptation communication, for example. It also ensured that the high profile of NDCs in the whole Paris Agreement architecture wouldn’t tend to give increased visibility and prominence to mitigation efforts over adaptation and other issues, as has normally been the case pre-Paris.
Ultimately, Parties agreed that NDCs must include mitigation components, could include components other than mitigation, and that the guidance would generally apply to all Parties. The deadlock on differentiation swung towards a framing of self-differentiation – in other words, there isn’t explicit differentiation in the guidance since Parties could self-differentiate through their broad discretion over the content and structure of their NDCs. The only other nuance is that the NDC guidance is mandatory for all Parties going forward but is subject to it being applicable to the individual NDC. If a provision in the guidance applies, it has to be included but this is less about differentiation and more about accommodating the varied types of NDCs that Parties might choose to communicate.

Regarding up-front information, Parties had already agreed (in 2015) an indicative list of the kinds of information they could provide. As the negotiations carried on, the questions that arose were whether and how to expand on that list, and what if any of it would be mandatory and for whom. Parties ended up where they started and kept the original list with some elaboration but no new headings. Parties agreed to make the entire list mandatory, as applicable to an NDC, from the second round of NDCs. However, Parties were strongly encouraged to provide all of that information for the first (current) NDCs as well.

In terms of what to actually include in the NDC, Parties had been debating what to consider as features of NDCs for several sessions. Parties eventually noted that features of NDCs were already outlined in relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, agreed to consider further guidance on features in 2024 and left it at that.

Similarly, on accounting, Parties agreed to account for their NDCs in their biennial transparency reports (BTRs) under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), but they will only have to apply the guidance from their second NDCs. And again, the guidance on accounting simply elaborated on the previously agreed general headings (i.e. being consistent with methodologies and common metrics assessed by the IPCC and adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), ensuring methodological consistency, striving to cover all categories of emissions or removals while continuing to include categories from one NDC cycle to the next, and to explain why any category is excluded) without adding any new headings.

The NDC guidance for up-front information and accounting will be reviewed by the CMA in 2027 with a view to taking a decision on the matter the following year.

There were some noteworthy elaborations in the NDC guidance from an LDC perspective. Importantly, the Paris Agreement gives LDCs and SIDS flexibility to communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission development in their NDCs in order to reflect their special circumstances. The NDC guidance gives them further flexibility to not have to give quantifiable information in relation to these strategies, plans and actions if it isn’t applicable, for example with respect to reference or base years. Another point which LDCs fought for is on capacity-building – the negotiations on this were widely seen as a bridge-building exercise and reaffirmed that support will be provided to developing countries to continue to increase their capacity in preparing, submitting and accounting for NDCs.

In terms of encouraging higher ambition, Parties now have to give information on how the outcomes of the relevant GST informed their NDC, which is important to get NDCs to reflect the urgency and scale of action needed relative to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. On a similar note, Parties need to mention their intention to use the cooperative mechanisms under Article 6 (relating to carbon market/emission trading provisions) in the up-front information, although there’s no requirement to elaborate on how or how much a Party will use the mechanisms. This provides a little bit of transparency around the use of markets and emissions trading systems which have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement if left unchecked and without enough scrutiny, for example by not being strict enough on avoiding double counting of emission reductions or by creating loopholes that contribute to so-called ‘carbon leakage’. And crucially, Parties need to give information on how their NDC contributes to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in general and more specifically in relation to the temperature limit in the Agreement – this is a form of self-accountability, based on the experience that Parties are more likely to fulfill voluntary commitments that they make publicly and that they will generally avoid the reputational cost of not fulfilling them. However, the LDCs were left wanting more in some areas, for example in having clearer accounting guidance for areas not addressed in IPCC guidelines (such as estimating business-as-usual (BAU) or other baselines, ensuring methodological consistency with a Party’s ICTU for different NDC types and quantifying the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation action). These are things that can be discussed further when the guidance is up for review in 2027.

The related issue of common time frames has important implications on NDCs. As part of the PAWP, Parties were tasked with considering common time frames for NDCs. At the heart of this issue is whether Parties could harmonise their period of NDC implementation with the 5-year pattern of submitting NDCs, taking stock of progress and even the regular updates from the scientific community (through the IPCC). This would make it easier to gauge collective ambition over each NDC cycle. More importantly, it could result in higher overall ambition if the
common time frame is synchronised with the 5-year cycle of the GST, so that the GST can have a more immediate impact on collective ambition and action. This was the view of the LDCs and a number of other Parties and negotiating groups.

Ultimately, Parties could only agree that they’ll have to apply common time frames starting from 2031. Unfortunately, this doesn’t clarify any of the issues that were being discussed over the past few years, including whether there would be one or more time frames (the latter had been proposed), what they could be (variants of 5 or 10 year periods, or potentially both), or to whom they would apply (all Parties, developed countries, or different time frames for developed and developing countries). Parties will continue to consider common time frames in 2019 starting at the June conference in Bonn, Germany (SB50) with a view to adopting a decision on the issue at COP25.

The final negotiation issue related to NDCs was on the NDC registry. Parties agreed that the current interim NDC registry would become the official NDC registry, that the registry would contain a second, separate part for adaptation communications (with a ‘portal’ hosting both registries), and that the registry wouldn’t have an advanced search function that allowed searching within NDCs. The limited search function has some implications – it means anyone accessing the registry can see, sort and download NDCs but won’t be able to search across them. This makes comparing efforts in the NDCs of different countries or even between NDCs of the same country more difficult and less transparent.

Considering the prominent role of NDCs in the overall Paris Agreement design and the mitigation focus at the heart of NDC guidance, it’s hard to ignore the overall mitigation focus under the Paris Agreement. However, the Paris Agreement in principle covers mitigation, adaptation, finance and other types of support in a more balanced way than ever before and there’s scope to address other issues such as the LDC priority of adaptation in other areas.

Adaptation communications and adaptation

The guidance for adaptation communications is fairly light in comparison to other parts of the implementation guidelines. It generally gives high-level guidance around the purpose of the communications and how they can be submitted. Whether adaptation communications should include forward-looking information, such as plans and priorities, or backward-looking information or both was debated for some time. Parties eventually settled on a generally forward-looking scope for adaptation communications and effectively left backward-looking information to be shared through the ETF as an aspect of reporting more generally. But there isn’t a strict separation of forward- and backward-looking information. Parties have the option to include “additional information” in their adaptation communications which can have backward-looking scope, for example on progress and results achieved. And similarly, some forward-looking information could be shared under the ETF.

The purpose of adaptation communications is straightforward: to increase the visibility and profile of adaptation, to strengthen adaptation action and support, to provide input to the GST and to enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions. These general themes reflect the broad priorities on adaptation for most developing countries, including LDCs. Adaptation communications and other relevant information on adaptation will be synthesised and contribute to reviewing the overall progress in achieving the global goal on adaptation. Beyond that, the guidance essentially confirms what Parties had already agreed: that an adaptation communication is voluntary, won’t pose an additional burden on developing countries, won’t be subject to review and can be a stand-alone communication or communicated as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, such as NAPs, NDCs, or National Communications (NCs). However, if a Party chooses to communicate one they’re expected to update it periodically and should communicate it in time to inform each GST.

The main technical aspect of the guidance is a list of 9 general elements in a half-page annex. On the one hand, the general nature of the guidance gives Parties more flexibility to provide the information most relevant to their circumstances and to shape it how they feel is most appropriate. On the other hand, the lack of detail will make it more difficult to identify trends, common challenges and priorities or to aggregate adaptation efforts for consideration in the GST or to gauge progress towards the global goal on adaptation. That dearth of detail relative to the guidance on NDCs, for example, could also indicate the lower priority and profile adaptation has historically been given relative to mitigation. This mismatch is something developing countries have continuously sought to address but may have missed an important opportunity with this guidance.

However, the guidance can be developed further going forward. The Adaptation Committee (AC) is tasked with developing draft supplementary guidance for communicating adaptation information to be considered by the Subsidiary Bodies for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBs) at COP28 (2022). The CMA will also take stock of the guidance and revise it, if necessary, at CMA8 (2025). Parties will have an opportunity to make submissions about their experience with the guidance and the secretariat will prepare a synthesis report based on those submissions. The CMA will take the submissions and the synthesis report into account when it takes stock of the guidance.
Finally, Parties agreed that adaptation communications would be housed in a separate part of the same registry used for NDCs.

**Ongoing work on developing methodologies related to adaptation**

After years of LDCs and other developing countries pushing for greater emphasis on adaptation to deal with the impacts of climate change, the Paris Agreement eventually included an obligation to recognise the adaptation efforts of developing countries. But more work is needed to do that in any concrete way.

Therefore, just as important as reviewing the guidance on adaptation communications, Parties are undertaking work on adaptation which will allow them to better reflect their needs and efforts and raise the profile of adaptation more generally. This includes work on better assessing needs, better recognising efforts, facilitating the mobilisation of support and reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support. For the LDCs, this work is the more practically relevant work on adaptation under the UNFCCC. More experience and better methodologies for assessing needs and recognising efforts and a clearer picture of how support is meeting adaptation needs will go a long way to raising the profile of adaptation more generally going forward.

The secretariat, in collaboration with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) and other partners, will develop (by April 2020) and regularly update an inventory of relevant methodologies for assessing adaptation needs related to action, finance, capacity-building and technological support in the context of national adaptation planning and implementation. Parties and observer organisations can submit views on the development and application of such methodologies, all of which will feed into a technical paper that will be prepared by the AC with the engagement of the IPCC.

To better recognise adaptation efforts, the secretariat is tasked with including relevant helpful information in its synthesis report prepared for the GST. The secretariat will also prepare a report summarising that recognition and, under the guidance of the AC and LEG, will prepare synthesis reports every two years starting in June 2020 on specific adaptation themes, focusing on relevant lessons learned and good practices.

With respect to facilitating the mobilisation of support for adaptation, the CMA didn’t go much further than a few soft invitations; it invited Parties and relevant entities to enhance national frameworks and enabling environments to improve access to international support and enhance private sector involvement, invited them to identify and remove perverse incentives that could result in non-resilient investments and planning, and invited relevant funds and entities in balancing support provided between adaptation and mitigation activities.

Recognising that there’s still a lot of work to be done to develop methodologies for reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support, the AC and LEG, Parties, UN institutions and other relevant stakeholders are invited to continue working on developing the knowledge base for these methodologies. And while the AC and LEG, in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), will continue to compile existing methodologies on reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support, Parties and other relevant entities are invited to submit information on relevant gaps, challenges, opportunities and options to the AC and LEG by April 2020.

Although the decisions taken in Katowice try to raise the profile of adaptation efforts and the support flowing for them, they don’t set out concrete ways of doing that – as was initially envisaged by proponents of the global goal on adaptation and adaptation communications.

**Enhanced Transparency Framework**

The guidance for the ETF generally covers reporting and review under the Paris Agreement and was one of the most complicated and cross-cutting in the implementation guidelines. It introduces a single set of rules that apply to all Parties (moving away from a general differentiation between developed and developing countries) with the caveat that there is flexibility for developing countries that need it in light of their capacities.

Regarding reporting, the ETF guidance includes detailed guidance for each category of reporting under the ETF, covering mitigation and adaptation action, finance and other areas of support. Under these common guidelines, all countries have to report on their national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and progress in implementing and achieving their NDCs every two years. This includes indicators used to track progress, the accounting approach used and an assessment of how a Party achieved their NDC at the end of each NDC cycle, among other things.

One the main debates at COP24 was deciding which countries “needed” flexibility and Parties eventually agreed that Parties can decide for themselves but they’ll need to explain how they apply it, what the capacity constraints justifying it are, and provide timeframes for improvements. LDCs and SIDS have the added flexibility of submitting BTRs at their discretion because of their unique capacity constraints. All other Parties are expected to apply the guidance in full by 2024.

While transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC historically focused on mitigation, the ETF guidance includes clear rules for optional adaptation reporting, which is a positive step for raising the profile of adaptation overall. The guidance encourages Parties to report on progress made in adapting to climate
change and outlines information they can provide. This is particularly important for LDCs whose NDCs nearly all contain a significant adaptation component. Tracking and reporting on adaptation might be challenging but is an opportunity to highlight adaptation efforts, challenges and support needs not met. It could also uncover capacity constraints and information gaps to overcome and any progress towards meeting adaptation goals.

LDCs will of course need to build capacity to get the most out of adaptation reporting. The Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) and other support institutions have a significant role to play in this by supporting LDCs in increasing their transparency-related systems and capacity.

For the first time, Parties will also be able to report on how they tackled loss and damage, although developed countries aren’t required to provide information on support they provided for loss and damage specifically – this would have been very useful for LDCs and SIDS, who have been advocating for more transparency around loss and damage in general and addressing the large support gap that currently exists. Nonetheless, ensuring loss and damage was reflected in the implementation guidelines and creating a space to report information on it was a top priority for LDCs. Having a specific heading on loss and damage in the ETF guidance will give this priority issue for LDCs more visibility and raise its profile in general.

It was also agreed that a technical expert review (TER) team will review the information in a Party’s BTR. The technical nature of the reviews means that reviewers can’t judge the adequacy of countries’ climate action and support, the appropriateness of indicators chosen to track progress nor a Parties’ decision to apply flexibility in a certain case. The TER will, however, consider a Party’s implementation and achievement of its NDCs and check that information provided is transparent, coherent, and consistent with the guidance. The TER will also pay particular attention to the circumstances of developing countries and help to identify gaps and capacity building needs. LDCs in particular can choose to be reviewed as a group, where a single team will review BTRs from several LDCs as part of the same process. This creates opportunities for peer learning, experience-sharing and exchange among LDCs which share some overriding circumstances, constraints and gaps.

In terms of further work, by 2020 the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) will develop complementary elements to the ETF guidance, such as common reporting tables, report outlines and a training programme for TER members. This work will begin at SB50 in June 2019.

ETF timeframe for superseding the current transparency system

When the ETF would eventually supersede the existing monitoring, review and verification (MRV) system wasn’t a straightforward technical question. It had the potential to derail the negotiations because differentiation and timing were important political dimensions to consider. Whether the ETF would completely replace the existing system, when, for whom and whether it would be along one or more timeframes were key considerations.

For the LDCs, who were pushing for scaled up early action from all, the sooner Parties began to use the more complete and robust rules for the ETF, the better it would be for overall transparency under the Paris Agreement. However, this had to be balanced with the reality that developing countries face many challenges in regularly reporting under the existing system and the ETF was increasing the amount of detail and frequency of reporting considerably for developing countries.

In the end, Parties agreed that the ETF rules would supersede and replace the existing reporting and review guidelines for all Parties to the Paris Agreement along the following timeframes: developed countries will have to submit their final biennial reports (BRs) under the existing system by 31 December 2022 and developing countries will have to submit their final biennial update reports (BURs) under the existing system by 31 December 2024; and all countries will have to submit their first biennial transparency reports and national inventory reports, if submitted as a stand-alone report, by the end of 2024. NCs, which are required under the UNFCCC, are still a useful tool for reporting information and national circumstances, and rather than do away with them, Parties chose to keep them but have the option to submit NCs and BTRs as a single report where they coincide in time and with relevant supplemental chapters included. For countries that aren’t Parties to the Paris Agreement, they can continue to use the existing system but are encouraged to use the arguably better and more robust rules of the ETF.

A practical consideration to keep in mind is how the ETF guidance – the broad nature of the guidance, the flexibility given to Parties and especially the timing around when Parties have to apply it – could affect the overall success of the Paris Agreement. The transparency system under the Paris Agreement and the quality of information coming through is a core element of how the whole system works: through reporting, we understand what countries are (or are not) doing; through the GST process, we then get an idea of how closely our efforts are (or are not) keeping us on track to achieving the overall goals of the Paris Agreement; and through their next NDCs, countries in principle are informed by the GST to align future actions with getting on track to achieve those goals. An implication of the ETF guidance being applied as late as 2024 for most countries and as late as 2022 for developed countries is that 2028 (the year of the second GST) could be the first time that there’s a reliable and more complete set of information from the ETF going to the GST process.
But will that be too late to get an important part of the picture for guiding our future actions and NDCs? There are practical and historical reasons for taking a delayed, staged approach to applying these rules. The reality is that many developing countries struggled to report even every 4 years under the existing system and some found it challenging to submit just 1 BUR over the past decade – so expecting more detailed reporting every 2 years too soon wasn’t a very realistic option. Nonetheless, getting on course to limit warming to 1.5°C or even 2°C above pre-industrial levels will need urgent and bold action, and that action will need to be based on sound and current information. Waiting until around 2030 to see the whole Paris Agreement feedback loop in action reduces the likelihood that temperatures can be kept under 1.5-2°C above pre-industrial levels and is very worrying for many LDCs and SIDS.

Global stocktake

The GST has an important role in keeping Parties’ efforts (action and support) aligned with the overall goals of the Paris Agreement. What we knew about the GST coming out of Paris in 2015 was that it was going to be held every five years (from 2023), it needed to take into account the best available science and equity, it was concerned with gauging collective (rather than individual) progress in relation to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, it would inform the preparation of NDCs, and it would be inclusive, transparent and facilitative in nature. The details of how it would work were left to be developed.

Like the negotiations on NDC guidance, the GST negotiations became very heated and deadlocked in the lead up to COP24, with concerns that the GST was lagging behind other issues and becoming overly political. Some of the key issues along the way were how exactly to consider equity and science in the GST, how broad of a scope the GST should have and whether to consider issues such as loss and damage, what inputs and outputs were needed to make the GST effective, and how to structure the overall process.

In the end, the GST is a three-phase process that will span about 18-24 months from beginning to end (Figure 1). The phases are straightforward: information collection and preparation, followed by a technical assessment, and finally a consideration of outputs. Using the first GST as an example and working backwards to illustrate the general timing of the process, the consideration of outputs will be held during the COP in 2023, the technical assessment phase would span the two or three consecutive sessions immediately after.
before the consideration of outputs, and the collection and preparation phase would start one session before that but could continue in parallel with the technical assessment phase. The GST will generally be under the auspices of the CMA with support from the SBs and will also engage through a technical dialogue to provide expert consideration of inputs. The process as a whole will be refined over time as needed with an emphasis on learning-by-doing.

The process will generally be structured around the thematic areas of mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, which broadly correspond to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in Article 2.1.a-c: limiting global temperature rise, increasing adaptive capacity and building resilience, and aligning finance flows with low-GHG and climate-resilient development. Equity and the best available science will be considered in a cross-cutting manner throughout the GST and not as stand-alone tracks in the process. Similarly, and importantly for LDCs and SIDS, efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage can be taken into account where relevant under each thematic area.

In general, the GST will take into account relevant work under all three of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, and its outputs will focus on assessing collective progress that can inform the updating and enhancing of actions and support. The outputs at each phase should also summarise opportunities and challenges for enhancing action and support, as well as lessons learned and good practices.

From an LDC perspective, the GST guidance is a good outcome that accommodates their top priorities: ensuring the process has access to a broad range of relevant information and produces outputs that can be used to enhance ambition from one NDC cycle to the next (including an invitation to Parties to present their NDCs, informed by the outcome of the GST, at a special event under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General); a consideration of equity throughout, including as a source of input, during the process and in informing the outputs; and having space for assessing collective efforts related to loss and damage. For example, information on barriers and challenges, including support gaps, and information on fairness considerations are important sources included in the guidance. Parties are also able to make voluntary submissions to be considered in the GST, including on inputs to inform equity considerations.

Another important feature of the GST guidance is that the CMA will ensure adequate funding for the participation and representation of developing countries in all activities under the GST, including the technical dialogue, workshops, roundtables and sessions of the SBs and CMA that feature GST activities so that LDCs, SIDS and other developing countries can effectively participate in it.

The process and phases in more detail

During the information collection and preparation phase, there will be a call for inputs which should be submitted at least 3 months before their consideration in the technical assessment. This first phase will end at least 6 months before the consideration of outputs, with an exception for critical information that isn’t available before then. In preparation for the technical assessment phase, the secretariat will develop synthesis reports on the state of GHG emissions and mitigation efforts undertaken by Parties; on the state of adaptation efforts, experiences and priorities; on the overall effect of NDCs communicated and progress made in implementing them; and on finance flows, means of implementation and support, and mobilisation and provision of support. Relevant bodies and institutional arrangements will also prepare synthesis reports of information related to their relevant areas of expertise.

During the technical assessment phase, the technical dialogue will be open, inclusive, transparent and facilitative. All inputs will be fully accessible by Parties, who’ll be able to engage and discuss with constituted bodies, institutional arrangements and experts, to consider inputs and to assess collective efforts. Summary reports will capture the outputs of the technical dialogue for each of the three thematic areas, and an overarching factual synthesis of these reports will be prepared.

Finally, the consideration of outputs phase will consist of high-level events where the findings of the technical assessment will be presented and their implications discussed and considered by Parties. The outputs of the GST themselves should: identify opportunities for and challenges in enhancing action and support in collective progress in relation to the thematic areas of the GST as well as possible measures and good practices; and international cooperation and related good practices; summarise key political messages, including recommendations for strengthening action and enhancing support; and be referenced in a decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA, and/or a declaration.

A list of sources of input is also included in the GST guidance. It’s generally split into a list of types of information (e.g. information relating to the state of GHG emissions, or efforts related to loss and damage) and a second list outlining where information could come from (e.g. synthesis reports, reports of SBs, or submissions from Parties).

Committee for facilitating implementation and promoting compliance

The negotiations on the modalities and procedures for the committee under Article 15 (the mechanism for
“facilitating implementation and promoting compliance”) were among the smoothest and most constructive. A number of the early sessions were used to try to conceptualise what facilitating implementation and promoting compliance could mean, considering that the Paris Agreement explicitly rules out nearly every attribute of traditional compliance mechanisms (the Kyoto Protocol compliance system, for instance, had a clear enforcement element and some typically punitive measures like penalties for not meeting targets). This turned out to be challenging, with Parties proposing a variety of creative, pragmatic or ideological views that resulted in a wide range of often irreconcilable options. An important takeaway from this exercise is that creative ambiguity and conceptual uncertainty in provisions, however cleverly drafted, aren’t the same thing. The first opens up a little leeway to find harmony in views with a common understanding to guide that process whereas the second can easily cause more confusion and higher chances for divergence by creating a conceptual free-for-all that will need more time and energy to address.

With options and details growing in number but realising that there wasn’t going to be enough time to agree every detail related to the committee, Parties opted for the more pragmatic approach of agreeing the overarching issues that needed to be decided by Parties at COP24 and mandated the committee to elaborate its rules of procedure (with an indicative list of things to cover) for consideration and adoption by CMA3 (2020).

Broadly speaking, the guidance covers what the committee can’t address matters relating to an issue. When addressing systemic issues, the committee will have to report back on and include any relevant recommendations. The CMA can also ask the committee to consider systemic issues and bring them to the attention of the CMA with any relevant recommendations in the final TERs.

The core features of the committee and how it’ll function were already agreed in 2015; the committee is expert-based and facilitative in nature; it will function in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive way; it has to pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties; its work has to be guided by the Paris Agreement’s provisions, including Article 2 (which contains the long-term goals of the Agreement); and it will report to the CMA annually.

The committee will be composed of 12 members and 12 alternate members, with 2 co-chairs elected from among them, all for terms of 3 years. They’ll serve in their individual and expert capacities, and the committee will meet at least twice a year starting in 2020.

In terms of decision-making, a quorum of 10 members present is needed to adopt decisions, and decisions can be adopted by ¾ members present and voting as a last resort (if efforts to reach consensus aren’t successful). Confidentiality and neutrality were considered important for the effective functioning of the committee and in that regard, the elaboration and adoption of decisions will be closed to all but the committee and the secretariat, and any information received in confidence has to be protected.

There are two general ways the committee can start to consider an issue: based on a self-referral or automatically in clearly prescribed situations (generally procedural obligations under the Paris Agreement). Self-referral: after a preliminary examination, the committee can decide to consider an issue where a Party makes a written submission with respect to its own implementation or compliance issues. Automatically: the committee will consider an issue if a Party hasn’t submitted or maintained an NDC; hasn’t submitted a mandatory report or communication under the ETF or Article 9.7 (relating to the provision of financial support); hasn’t participated in the facilitative multilateral consideration of progress (FMCP); or hasn’t submitted a mandatory communication related to Article 9.5 (relating to up-front information on financial support that Parties will provide). In short: the committee can automatically consider issues only if Parties didn’t comply with any of their – very few – strictly binding procedural obligations under the Paris Agreement. And in cases where there are significant and persistent inconsistencies in the information submitted with the ETF guidance, the committee can choose to engage, with the consent of the Party, in a facilitative consideration of issues based on the recommendations in the final TERs.

Although the previous paragraph sums up the scope, triggers and initiation in what looks like a simple paragraph, the issues of scope and initiation and the interlinkages between them were the essential core of the negotiation related to the committee. For most Parties, including the LDCs, some of the earlier proposals to limit initiation to self-referral were a clear red line. Experience from other multilateral environmental regimes showed that where self-referral was the only option Parties almost never self-referred and there was limited effect where they had. Making sure there was an option for the committee to do its work without the need for self-referral was essential. And the addition of a systemic issues function (see immediately below) gives the committee a more relevant role in making the Paris Agreement more effective overall.

The committee was also given a special role to consider systemic issues. These are issues related to implementation or compliance which affect a number of Parties. The committee can identify these kinds of issues and bring them to the attention of the CMA with any relevant recommendations. The CMA can also ask the committee to look at systemic issues, which the committee will have to report back on and include any recommendations. When addressing systemic issues, the committee can’t address matters relating to an
individual Party. The systemic issue function was one of the ideas championed by LDCs among others because issues which affect a lot of Parties could be important signals where the Paris Agreement as a whole might be less effective than envisaged or needs the attention of the CMA.

The guidance includes an indicative list of measures that the committee can take, which include engaging with a Party to identify challenges, make recommendations and share information, assisting a Party to engage with other bodies or arrangements under the PA, making recommendations, including recommending the development of an action plan, or issuing findings of fact.

At all stages of the process, the committee has to try to engage constructively with and consult the relevant Party. It also has to pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties at all stages of the process, including in determining how to consult with a Party, what assistance can be provided to support a Party’s engagement with the Committee, and what measures are appropriate in each situation.

From an LDC perspective, the consultative and facilitative nature of the process is very important. Parties could, for example, ask for help to develop an action plan or give their consent for committee recommendations to be communicated to relevant other bodies or arrangements. Similarly, the committee will provide flexibility with regard to the timelines of the procedures and should provide assistance to a developing country Party to participate in relevant meetings if the Party requests.

The guidance will be reviewed at CMA7 (2024), taking into account the experience in implementing it and recommendations from the committee.

**Climate finance**

There were a few finance-related outcomes coming out of COP24 and, for LDCs, the climate finance package was going to be a critical part of the rules and ambition. The big question: was support going to actually flow to developing countries, to scale it up and to report on it is clear under the Paris Agreement. One of the new features relating to support under the Paris Agreement is that Parties who don’t have any legal obligation to provide support but do so are encouraged to provide relevant information for transparency. It’s important to emphasise that for these Parties, providing support is still on a voluntary basis, and so is the option of providing the relevant information.

**Information on support provided or mobilised**

Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement requires information on support for developing countries to be reported every two years. This information covers support that’s provided or mobilised through public interventions. So, even where a country doesn’t directly provide support, public interventions (which could include incentives, policies or regulation mechanisms, for example) that cause support to be provided to developing countries counts, but there needs to be a clear and causal link between the public intervention and the mobilised support. Developed countries have to provide this information, and other countries that choose to provide or mobilise support are encouraged but not obligated to do the same.

Generally, a country reporting on support provided and mobilised needs to give information on its national circumstances, including the systems and policies it has in place and how it’s increasing transparency of its reporting on support. More specifically, it has to give clear information on its assumptions, methodologies and definitions, including how it counts support as being provided or mobilised, how it avoids double counting that support, and very importantly, how it defines public and private finance and how it considers private finance mobilised by its public interventions, how the support is in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and how the country is showing a progression in the level of support it’s providing or mobilising. The ETF guidance includes a long list of this kind of contextual information to provide.

And of course, the ETF also has a long list of information that countries have to provide on the actual support provided or mobilised. This has to be provided in tables that are still to be developed. It includes obvious kinds of information such as how much was provided, when, to whom it was provided, how it was provided (in other words what channels or financial instruments were used), where the support comes from, the nature of the support (i.e., grant or loan-based, for example), and what it was provided for (even down to the relevant sector or subsector).

One of the concerns that LDCs have consistently raised is that without a common understanding of what “climate finance” means, ideally by agreeing a definition, Parties are still effectively counting and comparing different things. This makes double counting more difficult to avoid and reduces the overall transparency around support being provided and received under the UNFCCC. This has implications not only on transparency related to reporting but also on how well we’ll be able to aggregate or compare support under the GST. It’s something that Parties need to consider more seriously in the near future.

**Indicative information on projected levels of climate finance**

Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement requires indicative information to be provided on projected levels of public
finance that will be provided to developing countries. The information should include both quantitative and qualitative information, as it applies to each Party and depending on its availability. Similar to information provided under Article 9.7 developed countries have to provide this information, and other countries that choose to provide support are encouraged to do the same but it’s not strictly required.

A list of the types of information that should be provided is included in the annex to the guidance on indicative information under Article 9.6 and builds on the existing strategies and approaches information that developed countries have been providing under the UNFCCC.

Parties will provide this information every two years starting in 2020 and it’ll be posted onto a dedicated online portal. Starting in 2021, the secretariat will prepare both a compilation and synthesis of the information to inform the GST and will organise in-session workshops and prepare a summary report on each workshop. Although the specific focus of the workshops is unclear, it’s likely to involve a constructive consideration of the information posted without passing judgement or reviewing the information in any technical sense.

The CMA will then consider the relevant compilation, synthesis and summary report starting at CMA4 (2021) and convene a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance beginning in 2021 that will be informed by the summary reports and the biennial information provided by parties. The deliberations of the dialogue will be summarised so they can be considered at the next CMA session.

An important aspect of the information from an LDC perspective, and from a developing country perspective generally, is the focus on providing information on how financial support supports country-driven strategies and the needs and priorities of developing countries.

The CMA will consider updating the types of information in the annex at CMA6 (2023) on the basis of experiences and lessons learned by Parties.

**Setting a new collective quantified goal on finance**

The existing collective quantified finance goal is USD 100 billion per year (approximately GBP 76 billion) and is to be provided by developed countries starting in 2020. It was agreed in 2009 without much process or transparency around how the figure was arrived at. Before 2025, Parties will have to set a new goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year. At COP24, developing countries were looking to start that discussion and set some high-level milestones around how and when the next collective quantified goal on finance would be set. Developed countries were hesitant to do so, on the one hand because they wanted to focus on other issues that needed deciding at COP24 and on the other hand because their conception of how that goal would be set, who would be setting it and who would be contributing to it was very different from how developing countries saw it.

In the end, and disappointingly for LDCs, Parties decided to postpone starting negotiations on this issue until CMA3 (2020).

**Adaptation Fund**

For LDCs, the Adaptation Fund (AF) has been an important institution under the UN climate regime. Through its varied sources of funding, which included a share of proceeds from transactions under the Kyoto Protocol’s market and trading mechanisms, and its innovative enhanced direct access modality, LDCs were better able to access funds for adaptation projects.

However, with the Kyoto Protocol essentially in wind-down mode and little to no transactions in the foreseeable future, the fate of the AF had been unclear. Since 2015, Parties were taking a step-by-step approach to deciding what happens with the Fund. From year to year, Parties progressively agreed that the AF “should” serve the Paris Agreement subject to relevant future decisions, and finally at COP24 that it “shall” serve the Paris Agreement under the guidance of, and be accountable to, the CMA from 1 January 2019’. There were two reasons that this became more complicated than it needed to be, and they were whether and how the AF would serve both the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol (under which it was established), and how it would operate going forward in terms of its institutional arrangements (including its board membership and sources of funding).

It’s now clear that the AF is destined to serve only the Paris Agreement, but the time frame for that exclusivity is uncertain. In Katowice, Parties confirmed that the AF would exclusively serve the Paris Agreement as soon as the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement become available. Unfortunately, negotiations on issues related to Article 6 weren’t concluded at COP24 so we’ll have to wait and see what the final outcome of those negotiations will be when they continue in 2019.

In terms of the AF’s institutional arrangements, Parties clarified that the AF would keep getting the share of proceeds under Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol if available and that only Parties to the Paris Agreement could serve on the AF Board. The Board was tasked with further considering its rules of procedure and any other relevant matter related to its arrangements. These additional matters will be discussed at SB50 and considered by the CMP and CMA at the next COP.

**Long-term finance**

During the COP, an in-session workshop on long-term finance was held, focusing on articulating and translating needs identified in country-driven processes into projects and programmes, the roles of policies and enabling
environments for mitigation and adaptation finance, and facilitating enhanced access.

The next in-session workshop will be held in 2019 and will focus on the effectiveness of climate finance, while the 2020 in-session workshop will focus on the provision of support for adaptation and mitigation actions related to the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. The summary reports on these workshops will inform the next biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance in 2020.

**Standing Committee on Finance**

The report of the SCF is a good overview of financial flows but makes very clear the gaps and uncertainties in climate finance information and why it's difficult to get a good, complete picture at the moment. Some of the key takeaways from the report are that Africa is still lagging behind in terms of getting support and accessing climate finance, adaptation is still second-best to mitigation despite efforts to bring more balance between the two, and loans and other lending instruments are still more popular with funders than grants and concessional loans. These facts are particularly significant for LDCs, the majority of which (33 out of 47) are African countries and who as a group have a poor track record of accessing climate finance generally (due to their significant constraints).

The SCF did however make some recommendations in its 2018 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, which aim to address some of the above gaps. The recommendations essentially focus on: improving climate finance information for better reporting, tracking, comparability and transparency in general; improving harmonisation of climate finance information across international organisations, funders, public and private actors; and encouraging more holistic approaches regarding priorities, development and policies in general.

Going forward, every four years the SCF will do two things: map the available information relevant to Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement (aligning finance flows with low-GHG and climate-resilient development), as part of its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows; and starting in 2020, prepare a report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

**Technology**

At COP24, Parties adopted the technology framework that was established under the Paris Agreement. It'll be implemented by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) under the guidance of the CMA, and they'll report on progress in their work and challenges and lessons learned in implementing the technology framework in their joint annual reports to the COP and CMA.

The purpose of the technology framework is to provide overarching guidance to the work of the technology mechanism (consisting of the TEC and CTCN) and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its work in the context of the long-term vision on technology under the Paris Agreement – of fully realising technology development and transfer to improve both resilience to climate change and reduce GHG emissions.

It aims to do this by: bringing coherence across various actions by relevant institutions under the UNFCCC and beyond; through inclusive approaches that take into account the special circumstances of the LDCs; by being results-oriented in terms of its output, outcome and impact; by addressing the transformational changes envisioned in the Paris Agreement to meet its long-term goals; and by enhancing transparency (for example, through planning, resource management and reporting on activities and support).

It'll focus on accelerating and scaling up technological innovation, facilitating the implementation of collaborative technology development and transfer and actions identified in planning tools and processes (e.g. technology needs assessments – TNAs), fostering the creation and enhancement of enabling environments and capacity-building, enhancing collaboration and stakeholder engagement, and enhancing the provision and mobilisation of support for technology development and transfer.

Parties also adopted modalities for a periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided of the technology mechanism. The review will start at CMA4 (2021) and aim to end by CMA5 (2022). Its outcomes should serve as an input to the GST and should guide improved effectiveness and enhanced support to the technology mechanism. The outcome and/or recommendations coming out of the periodic assessment of the technology mechanism must be considered when updating the technology framework.

**Capacity-building**

Capacity-building is a very important issue for LDCs, whose limited capacities are a significant impediment to taking effective action on climate change. Capacity-building as an issue has evolved slowly over the life of the UNFCCC regime, with countries having a better understanding of what it needs to cover and how best to do it, and with a range of institutions being created to help deliver it.

In Katowice, the COP considered the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building’s (PCCB) annual technical progress report. The PCCB will continue its 2018 focus area on preparation of NDCs for 2019, including by recognising and continuing to address capacity-
building gaps related to crosscutting issues, such as human rights and just transition, gender responsiveness and indigenous peoples’ knowledge, in the context of the implementation of NDCs. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) will thematically align future meetings of the Durban Forum on Capacity Building with the annual focus area of the PCCB, taking note of the recommendation of the PCCB contained in its 2018 technical progress report.

With the PCCB established at COP21 and its terms of reference adopted at COP22, the minimal technical preparation on capacity-building was effectively done before COP24. Parties also didn’t take a decision on capacity-building under the CMA although it had a mandate to consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building. This decision will be taken this year instead.

At the end of the day, however, financial resources going to building capacity are far too low, and countries with the least capacity consistently find it the hardest to benefit from capacity-building institutions. Earmarking capacity-building support for LDCs and removing structural or procedural impediments to getting that support are challenges that are still not being addressed well enough. In fact, the need for capacity-building is so great and the evolution of the international system is so slow that LDCs established their own initiative to help address their capacity-building needs – an LDC universities consortium on climate change (or LUCCC)

Cooperative mechanisms under Article 6

The design of the rules related to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement will have a big effect on whether the Paris Agreement is effective in the long-run, because avoiding double counting, ensuring environmental integrity and incentivising ambitious efforts are all crucial for achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. This guidance covers three things: rules for how Parties can generally cooperate in implementing their NDCs; rules for using the mechanism already established for promoting mitigation and supporting sustainable development; and rules for using non-market approaches in implementing NDCs.

However, this strand of the implementation guidelines was a particular dark spot at COP24. Parties were unable (or maybe more accurately, unwilling) to agree and adopt the above set of rules. On the closing plenary floor, Brazil was at the centre of a high-tension stand-off that put the whole Katowice package of outcomes in jeopardy. In the end, nothing was adopted in relation to Article 6, and Parties agreed to continue those negotiations at SB50 in June with a new deadline to finish this work by COP25 in December. Despite this technical setback, the fact that nearly all other Parties refused to accept clearly weak rules on markets with so much at stake was important to underline the importance of market mechanisms that actually contribute to, rather than undermine, environmental integrity and the effectiveness of the whole Paris Agreement.

To better understand some of the issues being considered, it’s helpful to first look back at the experience with using market mechanisms before the Paris Agreement. These mechanisms were introduced to give countries some flexibility in how they met a portion of their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. For example, market mechanisms allowed a country to earn credits (units) by taking measures to remove or avoid GHG emissions in another country. They could redeem these credits to offset against their targets: the more units a country redeems, the more credits it gets towards meeting its target. These mechanisms also allowed countries to exchange or trade units with other countries, who can redeem them against their targets. As a result, a comprehensive accounting system was developed to track who had which units, when units changed hands or were redeemed, verification that a project actually reduced or avoided emissions before units were issued, and each country’s general progress towards meeting their targets.

From an LDC perspective, there were three main takeaways from the Kyoto Protocol experience: the original allocation of units created a surplus of units that meant many countries didn’t have to do much more than business as usual to meet their targets; mechanisms for trading units generally work when there’s a scarcity of units to generate demand for units and incentivise mitigation action where units can’t be acquired to offset against a country’s target; and in retrospect, units were issued under the Kyoto Protocol for projects that didn’t have much on-the-ground mitigation benefit. All of these factors undermine environmental integrity and dis incentivise ambitious action.

Going back to the negotiations at COP24, although guidance related to Article 6 covered a range of technically complicated issues, the main disagreements leading to the final stand-off were around accounting rules for when Parties use cooperative approaches and how to address legacy issues related to the clean development mechanism (the CDM – one of the market mechanisms previously established under the Kyoto Protocol). Both of these issues relate directly to the overarching need to avoid double counting and ensure environmental integrity when using Article 6 to implement NDCs.
Regarding the accounting issue, a vast majority of Parties considered corresponding adjustments (essentially a ledger system to keep track of mitigation outcomes or credits that are transferred) necessary to avoid double counting actions and results. In other words, when voluntary cooperation results in a mitigation outcome, it’s important that only one Party claims it against their NDC by requiring a Party transferring an outcome to reflect that transfer through a corresponding adjustment. Without requiring corresponding adjustments, it’s easy to see how things could be double counted by outcomes being used against a Party’s own target and then transferred to another Party for them to use against their target.

Regarding the legacy of credits from the CDM, we’re essentially talking about a surplus of left-over Kyoto Protocol credits which some Parties wanted to carry-over to the new system for crediting and trading to meet targets in NDCs. We already know the hazards of cheap, surplus credits flooding the new system (i.e. Parties would have to do little if anything beyond using and selling existing credits to meet their NDC targets), and their impact becomes even more dangerous considering the global level of ambition is still far too low without any surplus units already in the system.

For LDCs (who aren’t expecting to be major players in global emissions trading), ensuring environmental integrity is the most critical aspect of the negotiations related to Article 6. Compromising on environmental integrity or disincentivising ambitious action will make it far more likely that global temperatures rise higher than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and the resulting impacts will only continue to disproportionately hurt LDCs and other vulnerable countries. This is why, in addition to requiring corresponding adjustments, the LDCs have consistently called for a cancellation of surplus units from the Kyoto Protocol and to establish a central oversight body to monitor activities undertaken under cooperative approaches.

Recognising that LDCs weren’t able to take advantage of the financial benefits under previous markets mechanisms, some LDCs are also thinking of ways they could get in on the action without opening up loopholes that larger emitters can exploit. Although this seems difficult to envisage since LDCs don’t typically have strict or quantitative targets to account against, it isn’t necessarily impossible to come up with some creative options. All of these issues (and more) will be picked up again at SB50.

Loss and damage

There were no issue-specific negotiations on loss and damage within the PAWP. However, a top priority for LDCs and other vulnerable countries was to make sure that loss and damage is considered across the implementation guidelines. To a large part, the LDCs and SIDS were successful in creating spaces for information related to loss and damage to be considered throughout the guidelines. For example, Parties will be able to report on information related to loss and damage under the ETF for the first time, although there is no scope for reviewing that information. Loss and damage will also be considered under all tracks of the GST when relevant. The one area where loss and damage is still not at all prominent is with respect to support for loss and damage activities: there is still no requirement that Parties providing support have to provide information on loss and damage-specific support.

Outside the implementation guidelines, negotiations on loss and damage continued in relation to the activities of the Executive Committee (ExCom) and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). Parties reviewed the report of the ExCom, which includes recommendations from the Task Force on Displacement (TFD), that was established in 2015 to look at issues related to climate-induced displacement and has been implementing its workplan since 2017. At COP24, the ExCom decided to extend the mandate of the TFD and will elaborate updated terms of reference for its work at its next meeting.

More generally, building on the work of the WIM to move beyond increasing knowledge on issues related to loss and damage is important. Supporting on-the-ground efforts for assessing climate risks or addressing actual loss and damage due to climate impacts are still lacking within the UNFCCC regime.

LDC work programme

The COP decided to update the elements of the LDC work programme to better reflect the needs of LDCs. The most notable elements include supporting LDCs in preparing and developing successive NDCs and supporting the process of formulating and implementing national adaptation plans and related relevant adaptation strategies.

Parties also requested the LEG to support relevant bodies and programmes in implementing the work programme, including by continuing to consider South-South cooperation.

Local communities and indigenous peoples’ platform

The key outcome on the local communities and indigenous peoples’ platform was the establishment of a facilitative working group to further operationalise the platform and move forward the implementation of its functions. The Platform’s functions are generally focused on increasing knowledge sharing, the engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities, and the integration of their knowledge, practices, innovations and priorities in climate policies and actions.
The working group will meet twice per year and will include 14 representatives. What should be considered remarkably progressive for the UNFCCC is that half of the representatives in the working group will represent each of the seven UN indigenous sociocultural regions (i.e. non-Party representatives). And the focus of the upcoming in-session workshops on enhancing the participation of local communities ties directly to the SBSTA’s mandate to consider and make a recommendation on how to add at least three more representatives to represent local communities and an equal number of Party representatives by COP26 (2020).

For LDCs and SIDS, which each have a dedicated representative on the working group, including additional voices of people and communities with unique approaches, practices and knowledge in addressing climate change gives those at the most local level more visibility and prominence all the way up to the international level.

2.2. Political outcomes

Outside the PAWP and other technical outcomes coming out of COP24, there were some political outcomes to round out the Katowice Climate Package.

The highest profile of these were the outcomes related to the IPCC 1.5 Report and the Talanoa Dialogue. These were both very high on many Parties’ priorities throughout 2018. LDCs and other vulnerable countries had expectations for a strong call from COP24 to not only raise ambition but to turn that ambition into real action and real support. This was based on the clear warnings from the scientific community about the escalating climate crisis as well as the real-world impacts and opportunities shared during the Talanoa Dialogue.

The other outcomes to note were related to the facilitative dialogue on pre-2020 ambition and implementation, as well as the outcome of the Leaders’ Summit that the COP presidency was organising in the months leading up to the COP.

Looking to the political outcomes as a whole, it’s difficult to see the need and clear urgency for action reflected in any significantly meaningful way.

IPCC 1.5 Report

For vulnerable countries, the stark warnings of the scientific community (captured in the findings of the IPCC) are important for framing ambition and action in relation to the scale and urgency of the climate crisis. LDCs and SIDS pushed for a clear COP decision with explicit calls to action that were aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. However, COP24 didn’t result in a specific decision focusing on the IPCC 1.5 Report.

Instead, the portion of the COP24 outcome relating to the IPCC 1.5 Report and the discussions leading to it were among the lowlights of COP24. Parties couldn’t agree how to refer to the report and its findings or how to use them going forward (if at all). It was widely reported how a small group of countries refused to welcome the report or its findings. They instead wanted to note the report, welcome its timely completion or express gratitude to the IPCC for fulfilling its mandate by preparing the report. In a negotiations context, the subtle difference in these options has an important impact: welcoming the report gives it and its findings a positive framing and mild endorsement, whereas the alternative suggestions effectively dismiss its substance and relevance by focusing on the procedural elements of the mandate and its delivery. A vast majority of Parties viewed the reluctance to accept the substance of the report as a dismissal of science and science-based decision-making. Rather than setting a dangerous precedent by accepting wording that undermines the substance of the report and its importance, many Parties took the floor to state for the record that despite not being able to come to a consensus agreement on the wording, they unequivocally welcome the report and its findings and reject attempts to dismiss science. The LDCs were among those going on record.

In the final outcome in relation to the report, Parties expressed gratitude to the IPCC for preparing the report and welcomed its timely completion (the suggestions of the report detractors), but also invited Parties to make use of the information in the report under all relevant agenda items going forward and requested the SBSTA to consider the report at the next negotiation session. However, there were no concrete requests or clear next steps in terms of how this report could or should inform the level of ambition and action expected of Parties.

Talanoa Dialogue

Like the outcome on the IPCC 1.5 Report, there was no specific decision relating to the Talanoa Dialogue and only a few paragraphs in a general COP decision. The Talanoa Dialogue was established in Paris in 2015 as the facilitative dialogue to address the gaps between the aggregate ambition described in countries’ NDCs and the long-term temperature limit adopted in the Paris Agreement. Many who came to the conference in Katowice, therefore, expected further political signals on ambition (e.g. enhanced NDCs) or a continuation of the Talanoa Dialogue possibly leading into the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement, especially in light of the findings in the IPCC 1.5 Report. The LDCs and SIDS pushed hard for a political declaration coming...
out of the Talanoa Dialogue to signal to the world that Parties were willing to increase their ambition in line with their past rhetoric.

However, the part of the decision relating to the Talanoa Dialogue simply takes note of the outcome, inputs and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue, and of their potential to generate greater confidence, courage and enhanced ambition, while inviting Parties to consider these in preparing their NDCs and pre-2020 ambition and actions. From an LDC perspective this was a missed opportunity for industrialised countries and other large polluting nations to show real leadership by committing to increasing their ambition.

Ultimately, the push from LDCs and SIDS for a stronger decision outlining how to take forward the outcomes of the Talanoa dialogue didn’t succeed. Some of the concrete actions and steps proposed for the outcome (but which weren’t part of the final text) included urging Parties to update their existing NDCs by increasing their ambition, urging countries to increase their support to developing countries for increasing their own ambition and building resilience, and for Parties to demonstrate their raised ambition and commitments by the UN Secretary-General’s climate summit (September 2019).

**Stocktake on pre-2020 ambition and implementation**

Earlier mitigation action increases the likelihood of limiting global temperatures in the long run. The issue of pre-2020 ambition and implementation is predominantly about the mitigation pledges that developed countries undertook in the past decade and the support they committed to providing to developing countries for their own actions in the pre-Paris Agreement era. Unfortunately, with all Parties focused on negotiating the post-2020 regime under the Paris Agreement since 2012, pre-2020 action seemed to have been sidelined.

Effectively driven by developing countries, Parties agreed to hold two facilitative dialogues on pre-2020 ambition and implementation as a complement to the facilitative dialogue (later turned into the Talanoa Dialogue) that was going to look at efforts in relation to the post-2020 regime. At COP24, the first stocktake on pre-2020 ambition and implementation was held, and another will be held next year at COP25. The purpose of this year’s stocktake was to consider the mitigation efforts and provision of support in the pre-2020 period. Parties made submissions in advance of the stocktake that the secretariat captured in a synthesis report. The general thrust of the submissions was that there was progress in honouring pre-2020 pledges (relating to both action and support) but that some Parties won’t meet their emission targets or provide the level of support expected by developing countries, and even if they did, the pre-2020 pledges themselves aren’t ambitious enough to get us on track to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C or even 2°C.

Well into 2019, the window of opportunity to take early (pre-2020) action is closing fast. We also know that pre-2020 efforts have generally been lacking in ambition and urgency. And with Paris Agreement implementation just over the horizon, it seems wildly optimistic to expect anything bold from any Parties pre-2020 since so much stock and ambition is being diverted to NDCs and efforts under the Paris Agreement. So, in some ways, the pre-2020 stocktakes are as much symbolic as pragmatic, and a forum that some developing countries hoped would highlight the relative lack of ambition from developed countries going into 2020. With a drastic change in how differentiation is reflected in the Paris Agreement (more parity in obligations between developed and developing countries and an expectation of unconditional mitigation efforts from developing countries for the first time), it’s not too hard to see why developing countries would like to see more action from developed countries before the Paris Agreement goes into implementation mode, and conversely why developed countries are counting down until the calendar ticks 2020.

**High-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance**

The third high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance was also held at COP24. It highlighted a few general themes, including the urgent need to scale up the mobilisation of finance, to increase finance for adaptation and to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the SDGs.

**United Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit**

On the back of the IPCC findings in the 1.5 Report, the momentum generated by the Talanoa Dialogue and the clear need to raise pre- and post-2020 ambition, some Parties expected something in the COP24 outcomes that strongly encouraged Parties to update their current NDCs in advance of the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit in September 2019. As the last big event before COP25 or the beginning of the Paris Agreement implementation, this summit seemed like an ideal platform for Parties to come to the table with revised NDCs that took into account the outcomes of the Talanoa Dialogue and the findings in the IPCC 1.5 Report. However, the COP24 outcome only included an invitation to Parties to attend the summit and showcase their enhanced ambition. Some Parties will undoubtedly revise their NDC, and some (including some LDCs) have already committed to doing so, but how many and how much closer we’ll
collectively be to the level of ambition we need to limit warming to 1.5°C are still big question marks.

Leaders’ summit and political declarations

Leading up to the COP, Poland (as COP President) prepared three high-level political declarations for leaders to sign on to during the COP. These were led by the COP Presidency and weren’t going to be negotiated outcomes or texts. The declarations covered three topics: just transition, e-mobility and forests, in the context of the transition to low-carbon societies.

Of the three declarations, only the one on just transition was captured in the COP24 outcomes. Parties simply noted the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration, which recognises the necessity of taking into account the need for a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs. There’s no doubt that a low-carbon transition will need to consider more than just emissions in its calculus and won’t be as simple as introducing a carbon tax or commoditising emissions; a fair distribution of opportunities and burdens from the transition, people’s rights, livelihoods and expectations also have to be considered, and all of this without losing sight of the overarching need to make the transition as soon as possible for the benefit of the whole planet. However, the Silesia declaration seems to take a narrow view of just transition that focuses on the livelihoods and jobs of people in industries that will feel the impact of a low-carbon transition and does not in any comprehensive way address the economic, social and cultural aspects of society more generally.
Looking ahead
3.1. Raising ambition and taking action are crucial

For the next two years, the top three priorities for many countries seem to be, ambition, ambition and ambition. More ambition is definitely needed, but ambition alone won’t help us address the worsening climate crisis. It’s important that ambition becomes real-world action (real-world reductions in GHGs, real increases in resilience, and real support flowing to countries to do these things) and that action yields results (to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels).

How we define ambition and how we consider success going forward is crucial. The Paris Agreement’s long-term goals include a warming limit of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. At the time the Paris Agreement was being negotiated, limiting warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels was the baseline of most of the available science and the underlying assumption countries used to prepare their INDCs—many of which were simply repackaged as countries’ first official NDCs for implementation. The reason was that 2°C above pre-industrial levels was considered both ambitious and in line with safe levels of global warming. If the UNFCCC had a single overarching objective, it was to avoid dangerous levels of global warming, and 2°C appeared to be the limit to doing that. Fortunately, the LDCs and SIDS fought hard to make sure the Paris Agreement also included a more ambitious 1.5°C temperature limit, although some Parties considered it unachievable or visionary and optional at the time.

Fast forward a few years and the recently published IPCC 1.5 Report makes clear that 2°C can no longer be considered a defense line, let alone a safe threshold. Even 1.5°C shouldn’t be considered safe, and at most should be considered only a defense line that we should avoid approaching. One of the other underlying messages in the report is that we need to consider our actions along very long timeframes. On this point, we only need to reflect on the fact that every bit of warming we allow going forward is more or less locked in for the long-term. But if there’s a silver lining to the IPCC 1.5 Report, it’s that our past emissions to date still haven’t locked us into global warming above 1.5°C. In other words, 1.5°C is achievable, and we even have options to avoid overshooting that limit as the temperature stabilises in the long run. Of course, another underlying message from the report is that there are no easy wins, and the scale of effort required is unprecedented in history, although not impossible. So it’s clear that ‘short-term-ism’—prioritising short-term political considerations or looking for easy wins—is unlikely to yield the results we need at a global scale. This is where long-term planning becomes important to be able to envision the year 2100 with global temperatures at most 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and working backwards to plan our actions and gauge our ambition accordingly.

It’s unclear how the IPCC 1.5 Report will be considered going forward. An optimistic outlook would suggest that the key message of the report—a resounding call to keep temperatures below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels—already had the impact it needed to have inside and outside the UNFCCC, even if there was little formal recognition of it within the UNFCCC.

Similarly, the spirit of the Talanoa Dialogue did seem to survive COP24, even if the official outcomes didn’t give it much of a role going forward in the negotiations. At the national level, some countries are convening their own Talanoas, and the idea of sharing knowledge and experience and inclusive decision-making is resonating.

3.2 Opportunities for engagement

Looking to the opportunities for engagement, there are a range of political and high-level meetings in 2019 that countries and others can leverage to strengthen these messages. The September climate summit that the UN Secretary-General is convening will be the most important. What happens at this summit will colour the many meetings leading into COP25 in December and even the efforts going into 2020. This is opportunity number 1 for countries and other actors to send a clear signal that the science is clear, that it’s warning us to do so much more and that science can’t be undermined for political posturing.

A second opportunity is around the ongoing technical work in the UNFCCC negotiations. Looking to the COP24 package, the outcomes were predominantly technical and focused on the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement. While parts of the guidelines could and should have been stronger, they provide a good basis to start implementing the Paris Agreement. The guidelines were largely complete but there are areas that need further work in 2019. From an LDC perspective, the negotiations on the use of markets and emissions trading mechanisms (under the cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement) will be among the top priorities for 2019. These are the most technically complex of all the implementation guidelines, and there is a lot at stake for many Parties and actors. The primary concern will be ensuring environmental integrity when using these mechanisms while still creating opportunities for Parties and a range of other actors to use these mechanisms to supplement ambitious action for additional impact. Closing the potential loopholes in these mechanisms is still a big concern for LDCs going forward.
Another area that LDCs in particular should focus on is continuing to raise the profile of adaptation. In the context of the negotiations on adaptation communications, it was predominantly developing countries themselves that opted for less detail and less prescriptive guidance to avoid an additional burden on developing countries. Similarly with respect to reporting on adaptation (and even loss and damage). Although it’s important not to overburden developing countries, there needs to be a distinction between avoiding undue burden (which is more about efficiency and prioritising the things that matter most) and avoiding any additional burden (which generally maintains the status quo). This has to be a balance that developing countries decide, but if changing the status quo and raising the profile of adaptation is a priority for developing countries, there are actions that will create additional burdens that have to be considered – the important thing is to ensure that any additional burdens aren’t undue burdens and that the benefits outweigh the cost of shouldering those burdens.

On technical work related to adaptation more generally, there is a lot of work needed to develop better methodologies for assessing needs and recognising efforts. This work is underway, but so much more is needed, and it should be led by developing countries who are on the front lines of climate impacts. Recognising and integrating the knowledge and experience of communities in LDCs and other developing countries, including indigenous peoples and local communities, is important to making these methodologies relevant to the realities of planning, assessing and taking adaptation actions.

2019 is also an important year for work on loss and damage. Although loss and damage is still conceptually siloed within the UNFCCC regime, or sometimes inelegantly wedged under adaptation, developing countries did well to incorporate loss and damage considerations into the most important strands of the implementation guidelines. Looking just around the corner, Parties will be looking to start negotiating the future of this issue and the future governance of the WIM, and this starts at SB50 when Parties will start developing the terms of reference for the 2019 review of the WIM. And looking a little further ahead, an important next step will be to look to the future work of the WIM and consider how to start shifting some of its focus from simply learning and increasing understanding around loss and damage to more concrete efforts to actually address it as a priority issue for LDCs, SIDS and so many other developing countries struggling to deal with the impacts of climate change.

Finally on the technical front, SB50 will be the next opportunity to discuss matters related to science and review in the climate regime, including specifically the IPCC 1.5 Report. Following the face off around the report and its findings at COP24 Parties will have another opportunity to affirm the importance of science generally and this (and any future) reports in global decision making. It’ll be important to use the space to discuss this issue to agree how best to use science generally and from this report to inform future actions and avoid a repetition of the political stand-off around the report itself.

### 3.3 Leading the way to a global transition

Looking to the UNFCCC regime more generally now that it’s in its 25th year, Parties, negotiators and climate-conscious citizens of the world should look back with a critical and honest eye. We need to celebrate the important progress and achievements we’ve made over the 25 years as a global community. But increasingly, we need to be very concerned that we aren’t making the leaps we need to make or being as brave as we need to be in these negotiations. We also need to acknowledge that too often, we celebrate symbolic victories and rhetorical wins, and that so many negotiators head into negotiation sessions strategising how to avoid weak outcomes (or even no outcomes in some cases) rather than genuinely expecting strong ones.

However, looking outside the negotiations we can see a flurry of activity at all levels. It’s impressive and grand in total scale, but not always coordinated, which is limiting its effectiveness. If the UNFCCC regime should do anything, it should set the highest bar for those outside to aim for and for the billions around the world to see how committed their governments are to addressing the climate crisis and making the transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient societies.

In that context, the transition that each country will have to make will be country-specific, and has to be fair. This will mean taking into account every aspect of society, including social, economic, and cultural dimensions. We need to re-think the social contract between citizens, businesses and governments, the nature of supply chains, economic policies, and social protection, among other issues, because playing at the fringes won’t get us on the right track and approaches lacking that level of boldness or scope aren’t likely to avoid or prepare us for the worst impacts of climate change to come.

The national transition to a low-carbon society also needs to be in the context of an equitable global transition that minimises global impacts that are felt predominantly by poorer countries and communities. Global solidarity and cooperation are essential and are at the heart of the UNFCCC regime itself. Doing the most each country can benefits everyone and supporting those that need it does the same.
Finally, time is ticking and countries won’t have long to put in place the policies, laws and systems they need to start implementing their actions and delivering results that will keep the world safe for generations to come. None of this will be easy, and any easy wins have already been plucked. In fact, we know that it’ll be very challenging and we know that there’ll be tough choices ahead to make at the individual, community, national and international levels. And the longer we hold off making those tough decisions, the harder they’ll become and the narrower our options will be when the climate crisis and its impacts worsen. Lastly, we have to make sure that we’re making decisions based on the best information available, and this has to be based on science and the data that’s driving the scientific community’s research and work.

The bottom line is that slow, incremental progress just won’t cut it and business as usual with a few tweaks isn’t enough to address the climate crisis. We need truly innovative approaches and large-scale efforts, but innovation can’t be forced and won’t likely come from the same people continuing to do the same things – innovation is a product of an environment that encourages creativity and bold actions that often go against the grain. This means decision makers that are serious about tackling the climate crisis have to start incentivising creativity and innovation through better planning, stronger political leadership, and by putting real money on the table to put climate change at the forefront of their policies.
## Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Adaptation Committee</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
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<td>APA</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Biennial report</td>
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<td>BTR</td>
<td>Biennial transparency report</td>
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<td>BUR</td>
<td>Biennial update report</td>
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<td>CBIT</td>
<td>Capacity building initiative for transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean development mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<td>COP24</td>
<td>Twenty-fourth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTCN</td>
<td>Climate Technology Centre and Network</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>Enhanced transparency framework</td>
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<td>ExCom</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMCP</td>
<td>Facilitative multilateral consideration of progress</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse gas</td>
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<td>GST</td>
<td>Global stocktake</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least developed country</td>
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<td>LEG</td>
<td>Least developed countries expert group</td>
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<td>MRV</td>
<td>Monitoring, review and verification</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National adaptation plan</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>National Communication</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
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<td>PAWP</td>
<td>Paris Agreement Work Programme</td>
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<td>PCCB</td>
<td>Paris Committee on Capacity-Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body (under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement)</td>
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<td>SB50</td>
<td>Bonn climate conference (Fiftieth session of the Subsidiary Bodies)</td>
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<td>SBI</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
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<td>SBSTA</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small island developing state(s)</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
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<td>TER</td>
<td>Technical expert review</td>
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<td>TFD</td>
<td>Task Force on Displacement</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>Technology needs assessment</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIM</td>
<td>Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage</td>
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**IPCC 1.5 Report**

IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
Notes

i. IPCC, Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 °C, Summary for policy makers, see https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policy-makers.


iii. LDC Universities Consortium on Climate Change (LUCCC), see http://www.luccc.org.
The Katowice Climate Conference has come and gone, and a busy 2019 calendar headed by the UN Secretary-General’s September climate summit is already in full swing. It’s important to not only look back at the developments of 2018 with a focus on the package of outcomes from COP24 but also look forward to the key moments of 2019.

This issue paper puts the climate crisis, the prevailing political context and the LDC perspective into frame; it looks at the Katowice package of outcomes and delves into the implementation guidelines adopted at COP24; and it looks at 2019 and beyond regarding opportunities and some reflections. Important context and history of the negotiations and the process are provided where relevant.