Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development

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Workshop Report on Armed Conflict and Natural Resources: The Case of the Minerals Sector

London, 11 July 2001

Co-hosted by MMSD & The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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International Institute for Environment and Development

World Business Council for Sustainable Development

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Introduction

An experts workshop on armed conflict and natural resources, with particular reference to the minerals sector, was held at the London offices of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on July 11 2001. Co-hosted by IISS and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) Project, the workshop was the first of a series which will explore the interface between the minerals sector and armed conflict, the minerals sector and human rights, and the minerals sector and corruption. The workshop was attended by over 30 experts, representing the minerals industry, governments, non-governmental organisations and the academic world. Participants came from as far afield as Indonesia, Canada, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Peru. Case studies presented at the workshop focused on experience in Papua New Guinea, on the issue of conflict diamonds, and on the role which voluntary principles and binding agreements can play in lessening and resolving conflict.

It was widely agreed at the workshop that armed conflict could become an increasingly significant factor for the minerals industry in the future, not least because the demand for minerals located in politically unstable areas of the world, where ownership is often poorly defined, is likely to increase. Some major operations are also nearing the end of their productive lives, and mine closure often heightens tensions and leads to disputes which can escalate into violent conflict. "Ten years ago," suggested a representative of a mining company, "it would have been unthinkable that a group like this could have met to discuss these issues."

Conflict is invariably the enemy of sustainable development. It can lead to the loss of lives and livelihoods, to the abuse of human rights, and to political and economic turmoil which hinders development. Conflict matters to mining companies because it nearly always costs them money. They must hire security personnel and put in place systems of management to deal with conflict which are often expensive. And it matters to mining companies because their association with conflict, however unwitting, can harm their image and affect share prices. In some cases mine infrastructure is vulnerable to attack like the powerline at Bougainville. Where critical infrastructure is vulnerable, no amount of security can protect a mining operation. A 2001 survey of the mining industry, prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers as a non-industry sponsor of the MMSD project, revealed that political instability, and especially armed conflict, was a key reason given for withdrawing operations by 78% of the companies surveyed. Companies are also increasingly recognising that their social "licence to operate" will be derived from the respectability of their operations. Without that licence to operate, the propensity for conflict tends to increase. In extreme cases it may bring operations to a halt, as attacks on workers did at the copper mine on Bougainville Island, PNG, in 1989.

The nature of conflict may vary from full-scale civil war – which may or may not be triggered by mining operations – to minor skirmishes. It is important at the outset to distinguish between conflicts which stem from the activities of the minerals industry, and conflicts which are directly or indirectly financed by the minerals industry. In the formal sector, the creation of vast open pits, the appropriation of land without adequate compensation, the failure to negotiate with local communities: these may fuel conflict, but conflict is not part of the business plan. In contrast, in the informal sector, the digging of diamonds in rebel-held territory in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola is providing the rebels with the wherewithal to purchase arms and perpetuate long and bloody conflicts. There was also much discussion at the workshop on the distinction between mining operations as a cause, a catalyst, or just a contributing factor to conflicts.

Conflict in and around mining operations usually stems from poor governance, or what has been described as "a governance deficit". Often the worst conflicts are those which occur in areas referred to as failed states – Angola, Sierra Leone and the like – but even in states which are not plagued by civil war, poor governance often leads to conflict. Mining is often a frontier activity. Frequently, mining operations take place in remote areas, far from capital cities, where there is little or no infrastructure, other than that provided by the mining company, where few if any services are provided by the government, and where national governments may have little influence. Companies or governments may also have little understanding about the customs and traditions of those living there. These areas may harbour secessionist movements, especially where the distribution of revenues is perceived to be inequitable and unjust, and mining companies can find themselves caught in the crossfire. Add to this a lack of competence or capacities among government officials within the minerals sector, and you have a recipe for conflict.

Fuelling and Funding Conflict

What are the key factors which lead to conflict? A participant provided a macro-view, and identified three "globalising drivers". These are water, energy and democracy.

Large mining operations invariably require vast quantities of water, and their demand almost always exceeds that of any other group in the same location. Disputes over the allocation of water may thus lead to conflict. Likewise, mining also requires considerable quantities of energy, and in some situations these demands can also spark off conflict.

The freedoms which flow from political liberalisation are likely to lead to the break up of many nation states. At present there are some 220 nations recognised by the United Nations, and a participant suggested that the number could rise to 300 by the year 2040. “When democratising, people are more likely to get stroppy,” he said. Many of the countries which are likely to experience civil war and fragmentation are rich in minerals. This process will inevitably affect the minerals industry, and is already beginning to do so in places like Aceh, Indonesia.

Another participant argued that the contest over land and land use rather than water had been a significant source of conflict. In Africa and elsewhere, companies in the extractive sector were at times not sufficiently sensitive to the spiritual relationship between the local communities and the land, and to the value of the land to certain groups.

Frequently a whole range of factors – some global, others local and site-specific – contribute to conflict in and around mining operations. That a whole variety of factors can come into play at the same site is exemplified by the experiences of the world’s largest copper mine for 18 years on Bougainville, operated by Bougainville Copper Limited. The mine contributed massively to the economy of PNG, but was closed down in 1989 following armed attacks on its workers. Although the mine was the cause of some of the ills which have beset Bougainville over the past 30 years, it cannot be held solely responsible.

There was much to be learnt from the mistakes which were made. A failure to consult with local people is seen as a major factor contributing to the conflict, as is the failure to understand the mores of local communities. In Bougainville, local people were not involved in negotiations, either over the take over of the land, or the operating of the mine. A participant at the workshop maintained that the fault here was largely that of the colonial administration, rather than the mining company. When the operating agreement was ratified in 1974, PNG was an Australian colony, and the administration forbade direct land dealings between indigenous landowners and foreigners. From the earliest days through to eventual closure, there were protests over the way in which land was appropriated.

Most Bougainvilleans at the time had no concept of exclusive possession, and resented the fact that the minerals belonged to the state. Royalties from the mine went directly to the government of PNG (which returned a small slice to the Bougainvilleans), and local people felt that they were being denied a fair share of the spoils. The value of the mine’s production between 1972 and 1989 was approximately K5.2billion (USD1.73billion in today’s terms), amounting to nearly 44% of PNG exports during that period. Approximately 62% of net cash generated by the project was paid to the national government. Less than 5% went to the province. “The local disadvantage of having a mine were not shared by the wider community,” suggested a participant, “whereas the profits were.”

The issue of the benefit sharing and distribution was highlighted as a significant problem for mining companies. Even if a mining company wants to see a larger share of the rental returned to the local community, this might not happen where the initial development contract was not drawn up to favour the local communities. When the state owns the mineral rights, the decision as to how to use the revenues is its, not the mining company’s. “The local communities want a slice of the action, but the government provides the licence and takes the revenues, so mining companies are often caught between the two,” a participant said. This may set local communities against mining companies. In these situations, the role of regional or national governments should thus not be overlooked.

Conflict between different groups living around a mine can also adversely affect mining operations. For example, at the Porgera gold mine in PNG, tribal fights often lead to disputes which affect the mine, and the mine operators must take into account inter-clan rivalry. 23 separate sub-clans live within the 2,200-hectare mine site, and they are continually jostling one another for advantage. If one clan finds that another is getting more favourable treatment – in terms, for example, of employment at the mine – it may disrupt work in the hope of getting a better deal for itself. "Who benefits, and who doesn't? This is a key issue," explained a participant. "If you get the formula for distribution of wealth between the mine operators, the community, and government correct, you are on the road to success. If you get it wrong, you will have severe problems."

The very nature of large-scale mining means that it will be disruptive, both environmentally and socially. An open pit mine creates huge craters; the overburden smothers large areas of land; and in areas which are geologically unstable and productive land is scarce, tonnes of mine tailings and waste create such environmental deterioration that it can also lead to resentment and conflict.

Mining operations often attract large numbers of outsiders to areas which have previously experienced little immigration. Many participants at the workshop identified this as a common source of conflict. For example, at the Freeport-McMoran copper and gold mine in Irian Jaya or West Papua in Indonesia, the population in the area has risen from 1,000 to 110,000, largely as a result of opportunities created by the mine. At Porgera, PNG, the population of the squatter settlements around the mine rapidly grew from 4,000 to 18,000. A population explosion can also lead to increased pressures on the land, to resentment among the indigenous community, and conflict between the indigenous population and settlers.

The introduction of a cash economy, as well as the development of the 'boom town', can also bring about rapid social changes and problems. In Porgera, for example, some of the local landowners who had profited from the mine acquired ten or more wives, inevitably creating tension within the community. Naturally, those who fail to benefit economically from the presence of the mine are likely to harbour grudges against those who do, as well as against the mine itself.

As discussed earlier in the report, poor governance, or the lack of any governance, together with insufficient understanding of the local community, were considered by participants at the workshop to be major contributors to armed conflict in and around mining areas. These areas may also harbour secessionist movements. In Bougainville, many Bougainvilleans were unwilling participants in PNG, both when it was under Australian rule, and later when it became independent. The struggle against the mine was in part a struggle against the PNG government, and indeed some Christian missionaries encouraged Bougainvilleans to consider themselves part of the Solomon Islands, rather than PNG, and told the islanders that the minerals belonged to local landowners, not to the Crown.

In addition, a mining company may be operating in areas where the government with whom it negotiated the contract is no longer in control over the same territories. Where the governance structure or governments changed but the nature of the mineral contract has not, mining companies will be caught in rapidly deteriorating and intractable situations.

Mining companies operating in areas of tension or conflict often hire their own security forces, or seek protection from existing forces. Sometimes the security forces can become part of the problem. It was suggested that in Indonesia three types of security forces exist in his area: the military, the police, and the company's own security staff. "If you have got a serious conflict," a participant explained, "and you bring in the military, it becomes a problem if some individuals stay too long. You must have rotation of troops." The fact that 75% of the military's budget in Indonesia must be raised by the military itself – in practice through a combination of both legal and illegal activities- extra sets of incentives, sometimes conflicting, will need to be considered. When security personnel misbehave, or behave heavy-handedly, trouble often follows. Frequently the security personnel will be outsiders, with little sympathy for local customs and traditions.

In some places the profits made from the exploitation of natural resources are used to fund conflict. In Cambodia revenues from timber extraction helped to support the activities of the Khmer Rouge, and in several African countries – notably Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia – the trade in diamonds has helped to support the activities of various rebel movements. These diamonds are known as conflict diamonds. They have been mined or stolen by forces in opposition to democratically elected or internationally recognised governments.

Global Witness, a non-governmental organisation which has been campaigning for a system of certification which will discriminate against the trade in conflict diamonds, estimates that UNITA, the rebel movement in Angola, earned $3.7 billion from the sale of conflict diamonds during the years 1992-97. Its profits for 1999 were estimated at $150-200 million, and they may have been as high as $300 million in the year 2000. The revenues from conflict diamonds have helped UNITA to establish a highly sophisticated military operation. Diamonds have also helped to transform Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front into a well-equipped fighting force. The numbers of civilians and military personnel who have died – or been mutilated and injured – in the various wars funded partly by conflict diamonds runs into the hundreds of thousands.

Preventing Conflict

At the workshop, participants discussed a range of measures that have been instituted, or could be in the future, to lessen tension around mining operations and reduce conflict. This is a brief summary of the discussion.

"Every mine is different," suggested one of the participants, who advocated a 'one mine at a time' approach to resolving conflict. It was important, he suggested, 'to stay close'; to understand the problems peculiar to each locality and design solutions and strategies which are locally appropriate. "Forums like the United Nations are too distant," he argued.

This was a view which was contested by others at the workshop. It might make better sense to act case by case, rather than mine by mine, not least because it is often difficult to work out where a mine begins and ends. This is especially true for small-scale artisanal mining, and for the extraction of diamonds, which are scattered in alluvial deposits over vast areas.

Since mining generates rent and therefore rent-seeking behaviour, there is a "whole commonality of issues" that must be systematically considered. Tackling the specific problems which occur at one mine may do nothing to solve problems which are nationally, or even internationally significant, and which are the root cause of local problems. For example, if a dispute over land tenure contributed to conflict, the solutions will need to be applied nationally, not just at the site of one mine.

After some vigorous debate it was finally accepted that it was not a matter of either/or, of acting globally or acting locally. Tackling conflict involves a multiplicity of approaches, from the global to the local. However, a participant did point out that it would be leaving things too late if individual mining companies, and the governments and communities they worked with, waited for "the global issue to filter down" before tackling the problems which confronted them locally.

Communication, participation and transparency were seen as essential prerequisites to averting conflict, and their significance was highlighted by events in PNG. The problems experienced by the copper mine on Bougainville alerted other companies in the region to the importance of working with local communities. Among those who took the lessons learned there to heart was the management of Porgera mine. Both the mining company and the government of PNG, learning from the experience on Bougainville, went out of their way to ensure that local communities were consulted at every stage of mine development, and that they received adequate compensation for the inevitable disruption, social and environmental, caused by the mine.

In the early stage of the permitting process a Mining Development Forum was established to record and address the concerns of government both National and Provincial and the local community. This, according to a participant, was "transparent, thorough and inclusive." Instead of setting time limits, as companies do in the Western world, the company allowed the process to run for as long as was required, and anyone who wanted to be heard was heard. The forum led to the creation of a Mining Development Contract, which dealt with every aspect of the operation, from environmental plans and the provision of community facilities to power generation and the setting up of training schemes for local people. Agreements were brokered between the national and provincial governments, and between the government and landowners to ensure that everyone received a fair share of royalties, or just compensation in the case of landowners.

The Mining Development Contract was akin to marriage vows: great on paper, but would they work in practice? Not surprisingly, the mine has had its share of problems – there was a huge build up of outside contractors in the initial phase, and squatter settlements rapidly developed, with all their attendant vices – but the serious efforts made by the company to involve the community in all aspects of the operation have undoubtedly paid off. A former manager estimated that he spent three-quarters of his time dealing with social and community issues, and just a quarter on technical issues. This gives a good indication of where the company's priorities lie, and the importance of good relations with communities.

The importance of working with local communities was stressed by participants from other parts of the world. If mining companies are to operate in a way that respects sustainable development then they must interact as much as possible with local communities. Such "inter-cultural dialogue" is essential. The mantra should be: "communicate, communicate, communicate." This of course can be a time-consuming process, but without good relations between mining companies and communities, conflict is far more likely.

Another issue which must be tackled locally is mine closure, which was highlighted as a potential flash point for conflict. "Right at the outset," suggested one participant, "companies need to work out the costs of mine closure, and plan for it." Closure if not well planned can be traumatic. Thousands of people may suddenly find themselves jobless and communities whose prosperity has been based solely on mining can find themselves without any significant economic activity.

At Porgera mine, closure is an important part of the company's long term business plan. There is a particular concern about today's youth, who allege their needs have been ignored, and about some "stakeholders who might have lost out." These young people, who were children when the mine opened more than a decade ago, are questioning whether it has been fair for their parents or grandparents to be exhausting Porgera's mineral resources. The company's goal now is to have an orderly and well-planned closure. There is a need, suggested a participant, to "create a vision for the future" which the mine operators, community and government can support.

The bigger the mine, the greater the potential problems caused by closure. As stated above the population in the area where Freeport-McMoRan operates in Indonesia rose from around 1000 to 110,000. When the mine closes, the impact will be felt by the entire community, so the company is already planning for the future. 1% of revenues, $18 million a year, is being put aside to tackle mine closure.

Two participants, both working for Western governments, suggested that carefully targeted overseas development assistance can help host governments to improve their standards of governance, but it was pointed out that Western views of governance are not always kindly received. "In the country where I work," a participant explained, "the government doesn't want good governance – it is not on the agenda." In his region the only effective governance, in his view, comes from the minerals and the oil and gas industries. Good governance implies transparency, honesty and fairness, and such qualities are not in the best interests of those who wish to use political power as a means of enriching themselves.

It was also pointed out at the workshop that there is a limit to how far Western governments can go in foisting their own values on other parts of the world. The last thing many countries want is a lesson in morality from their former colonial masters. This raises the question too of how and whether any judicial arbitration from, say, the civil suits in the United States through the Alien Tort Claim Act will be interpreted back in Bougainville. Can one country's judicial standard be applied inter-culturally?

A participant also asked whether companies in practice have better capacity to address the issue of governance deficit. How much should companies be taking on? Will they necessarily do a better job than governments or international organisations in capacity building? If mine managers need to spend up to 75% of their time on social and community issues, are they adequately trained to play such a role? What about the role of the international community like the United Nations, the World Bank or other donor governments? Could or should they form partnerships with companies on the ground?

Conflict prevention is clearly an important goal for all involved, from governments to international organisations to companies operating in the area, though the world is yet to uncover a formula that works across geography and cultures. Lessons from mining companies are that without consultation, communications, participation and transparency, the propensity for conflict will definitely increase.

Voluntary Principles Versus Binding Agreements

There was much discussion – and plenty of disagreement – about the relative importance of voluntary principles and binding agreements when it comes to resolving minerals-related conflicts. If there was a consensus it was that there are no "magic bullets": voluntary action may sometimes be the correct path to take, but binding agreements have a role to play too.

Initially, discussion focused on the issue of conflict diamonds. United Nations sanctions against the trade of Angolan conflict diamonds were introduced in June 1998, and these were adopted by the European Union in July 1998, and thus binding on its 15 member states. However, the sanctions had a very limited impact, and conflict diamonds continued to be traded, often quite openly, by dealers in Tel Aviv, Antwerp and elsewhere. Media pressure led to De Beers – which is responsible for 40% of diamonds mined worldwide, and purchases a further 20% – voluntarily clamping down on its purchases of conflict diamonds, and the Kimberley Process, involving industry, governments and non-governmental organisations, is now underway.

The De Beers Group and NGOs like Global Witness would like to see the process culminate in self-regulation through a legally endorsed chain of warranty which will oblige those who sign it to abide by a set of rules. They are also calling for an internationally recognised certification regime, along the lines of those already put in place through partnerships between the industry and the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone, which will in time effectively outlaw the trade in conflict diamonds.

A participant suggested that De Beers' desire for binding agreements might be related to the fact that they would give the company a competitive advantage over smaller operators. A major problem with certification systems is, for example, that they generally favour the large companies, and discriminate against the small.

Misgivings were voiced regarding the definition of conflict diamonds as "diamonds that are mined or stolen by forces in opposition to democratically elected or internationally recognised governments." The implication of this definition is that democratically elected and internationally recognised governments do not use mineral profits for nefarious purposes. "A lot of regimes which are internationally recognised shouldn't even be recognised by their own mothers," a workshop participant suggested. For example, the government of Sudan derives much of its revenue from oil, and converts this into weaponry with which it wages war on its own people, yet there are no sanctions against Sudanese oil. Likewise the internationally recognised government of Angola receives $1.8-3.0 billion a year in oil revenues, yet "it is hard to see any notable contribution which oil money has made to development." Angola is the fourth richest country in the world in terms of its natural resources, but it is among the poorest performers in the UNDP's Human Development Index. Another participant noted that even Amnesty International, an NGO with particular expertise in this area, seldom calls for sanctions, except in countries where the military rulers are brutalising civilian populations.

A representative from industry conceded that some democratically elected/ internationally recognised governments do misuse their mineral revenues. "But let's go one step at a time," he said. The Kimberley Process, and the measures already in place, are discriminating against rebel forces of peculiar ferocity who are not even willing to sit at the negotiating table. In other words, these guys are beyond the pale.

The Kimberley Process was seen as a success story, albeit one which is still being written. But is it a model or merely an example? Could similar processes be put in place to prevent the sale of other minerals when they are mined, traded and used in ways which the international community excoriates?

In any event, clamping down on conflict diamonds was probably much easier than clamping down on, say, the trade in coltan, which is leading to bloodshed and the devastation of wildlife in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Diamonds are a luxury product. The media finds them "sexy", and this helps campaigners. 60% of diamonds pass through the hands of one company. It would be much harder, for example, to set up a process of certification for minerals of strategic importance, especially those for which there are no substitutes, and for minerals for which there is a multiplicity of uses, and where the distribution channels are not concentrated in the hands of a few companies. Take coltan. It has many uses – in mobile phones, play stations and the nuclear industry – it is strategically important – and no company controls the market.

Recently, however, pressure from a group of 12 Belgian NGOs in the form of a text message campaign led to the airlines Sabena and Swiss Air suspending their cargo flights carrying "blood coltan" from the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is thus still possible to influence trade even with those minerals that are regarded as least amenable to a Kimberley type process.

There are also a number of ways in which non-governmental organisations and others can force and/or cajole multinational companies to pursue "corporate social responsibility." As mentioned earlier, several companies have been sued in the civil courts of the US for human rights violations committed in another country under the US Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789; and some others have been forced to change their behaviour by shareholder resolutions.

The combination of campaign and dialogue had been quite successful, according to one participant, who felt that multinational corporations were working towards “being a more positive force that returns value to both shareholders and stakeholders." His own company had established a corporate code of conduct covering social development, employment and human rights, and had hired an outside consultant to ensure that staff abide by the code. International voluntary codes – such as the UN Global Compact and the US/UK Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and Security – while setting important aspirational standards for corporate policies and codes of conduct – do not have independent monitoring mechanisms. Since there has been concern about "the spectre of unreasonable regulation", the industry is trying to take major steps forward, voluntarily. "Let's work on what is right," a participant argued. "Step by step we will move forward." He added that voluntary codes of conduct need to be independently verified; otherwise they will be seen as worthless.

This view was contested by a representative of an NGO working in this area. "I don't see how voluntary agreements will ever work," he said. Companies and NGOs might build up good working relationships, but the relationships were likely to founder when the personnel changed. "Imagine if John Brown left BP," he said. "We might get someone far less sympathetic in charge." The diamond industry, he added, had accepted the need for legally binding regulations in the Kimberley Process.

It would be simplistic to suggest that it was a matter of either/or, of having either voluntary principles or binding agreements. "We need a combination of incentives, voluntary initiatives and legislation," said a representative of one mining company, since different initiatives serve different purposes at different levels.

The workshop ended with a discussion about whether there should be no-go areas where mining companies should not operate, as their presence could fan the flames of conflict. A number of participants agreed that there had been some clear-cut cases where companies shouldn't be doing business. For example, it has become clearly unacceptable to buy diamonds from UNITA. That said, the security/conflict situation in a country could change over time. What happens if a company goes into a country in times of peace, invests heavily, then finds itself caught up in an armed conflict? Should it stay, or should it go?

If multinationals were always going to play it safe, "they'd only invest in the first world." Furthermore, when the majors pull out of strife-torn countries, they may not be doing the people there a favour. For example, in Papua New Guinea the majors are now moving out, only to be replaced by smaller companies – "and these are not the sort of guys who’ll come and sit round a table like this."

In any conflict situation, as a participant pointed out, "there will be right on both sides". The workshop highlighted a set of issues setting the stage for further discussions and activities. These include the need for capacity building; whether and how the international community and the host governments can play a positive role in partnership with companies around mining operations in unstable areas; and whether the Kimberley process on conflict diamonds could set an example for other minerals among others. The workshop made clear that there has been a shift in attitudes in favour of dialogue, challenging the sector and its stakeholders to look hard at how collectively they can lessen conflict.

Agenda

Armed Conflict and Natural Resources Workshop:

The Case of the Mineral Sector

London, July 11 2001

Coffee and Welcoming Remarks: 9:00 am

Mats Berdal, IISS and Bernice Lee, MMSD

Session One: 9:15 am – 10:45 am

Armed Conflict and Business:
Is Conflict Fuelled by the Activities of the Natural Resource Sector? If so, why and how?

Chair:	Mats Berdal, IISS
Speaker:	David Harries, Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre
Discussant:	Jason Switzer, International Institute of Sustainable Development

Coffee

Session Two: 11:00 am – 12: 45pm

The Case of Papua New Guinea

Chair:	Caroline Digby, MMSD
Speakers:	Peter Taylor, Bougainville Copper Ltd, on Bougainville
	Douglas Fraser, consultant, on the Porgera Mine

Lunch

Session Three: 2:00pm – 3:45 pm

Conflict Diamonds: The Case of Angola

Chair:	Mats Berdal, IISS
Speakers:	Alex Yearsley, Global Witness
	Andy Bone, De Beers Group

Coffee

Session Four: 4:00 pm- 5:45pm

Voluntary Principles and Beyond:
Challenges, Dilemmas and Policy Options

Chair:	Richard Sandbrook, MMSD
Speakers:	Fraser Wheeler, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
	David Lowry, Freeport-McMoran

Reception

List of Participants

Charles Alao	Centre for Defence Studies, KCL, UK
Mats Berdal	IISS
Andy Bone	De Beers Group, UK
John Bray	Control Risks Group
Shawna Christianson	DFAIT, Canada
Caroline Digby	MMSD
Dan Dreiling	Freeport-McMoran, USA
Wayne Dunn	Liu Institute for Global Studies, Canada
Peter Eggleston	Rio Tinto, UK
Doug Fraser	Consultant, Canada
Lucy Amis	International Business Leaders' Forum, UK
Simon Handelsman	Consultant, New York
David Harries	Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Jakarta
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal	London School of Economics, UK
Nick Killick	International Alert, UK
Bernice Lee	MMSD
Daniel Litvin	Consultant, UK
David Lowry	Freeport-McMoran, USA
Malcolm Keay	Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK
Jonas Moberg	Foreign Ministry, Sweden
Juan Ossio	PUCP, Lima
Charlie Pye-Smith	Rapporteur
Richard Sandbrook	MMSD
Melinda Simmons	DFID, UK
Fiona Strens	MOD, UK
Jason Switzer	International Institute for Sustainable Development, Geneva
Peter Taylor	Bougainville Copper, Papua New Guinea
Salil Triparthi	Amnesty International, UK
Andre Van der Bergh	BHPBilliton, South Africa
Halina Ward	Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK
Fraser Wheeler	FCO, UK
Andrew Woodcock	FCO, UK
Alex Yearsley	Global Witness, UK

Workshop Objectives

This workshop, co-hosted by the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London on July 11 2001, aimed to identify the critical issues that surround armed conflict and the natural resources sector and to provide suggestions on policy options. The workshop brought together experts from companies, research institutions, non-governmental organisations and governments. There were a series of presentations at the workshop followed by discussions. The written output from the workshop will feed into MMSD's final report, scheduled for March 2002.

Specific objectives of the workshop were to:

- Understand the range of perspectives and interests on issues related to armed conflict and natural resources in the mining and minerals sector;
- Identify existing initiatives at policy level and in practice, and the policy options;
- Identify further research and information needs, and potential follow up activities.