


Evaluating Eden Series No 6

**COMMUNITY
WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT
IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA:**

Challenging the
Assumptions of
Eden

Christo Fabricius
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December 2001

"We, the Heads of State and Government of Independent African States, fully conscious that soil, water, flora and faunal resources constitute a capital of vital importance to mankind; confirming, as we accepted upon declaring our adherence to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, that we know that it is our duty to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour; fully conscious of the ever-growing importance of natural resources from an economic, nutritional, scientific, educational, cultural and aesthetic point of view; conscious of the dangers which threaten some of these irreplaceable assets; accepting that the utilization of the natural resources must aim at satisfying the needs of man according to the carrying capacity of the environment; desirous of undertaking individual and joint action for the conservation, utilization and development of these assets by establishing and maintaining their rational utilization for the present and future welfare of mankind; convinced that one of the most appropriate means of achieving this end is to bring into force a convention; have agreed as follows:..." *African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (15 September 1968)*

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Executive summary

Historically, conservation and wildlife protection in southern Africa aimed to preserve pockets of biodiversity while at the same time protecting the interests and powers of European governments. The creation of southern Africa's conservation estate was seldom done in consultation with local people and seldom earned the consent or respect of these peoples. This orthodox approach to conservation emerged from a realization by colonial administrators that their hunting was resulting in the decline and possible extinction of many wildlife species. The result was legislation to conserve wildlife, making subsistence hunting illegal and entrenching recreational hunting as a socially exclusive activity. This caused intense conflicts between conservationists and local people, human rights violations, and the erosion of indigenous wildlife management systems. Conservation soon became charged with political conflict.

These social conflicts inevitably started endangering the future of protected areas, and this has been one of the major reasons for the recent popularity of a new approach. The new model entails allowing communities access to natural resources from which they previously had been barred; sharing revenue from the use of natural resources with communities; making conservation pay for costs of wildlife management as well as community development programmes; involving communities in decision-making; and recognising communities' historical rights of tenure to resources and land.

Others factors affecting the shift in emphasis towards greater participation and devolution of control have included:

- the pressure to promote development through wildlife utilisation in rural areas;
- a desire and need to diversify the economy;
- a lack of resources for law enforcement;
- community pressure and subversiveness;
- pressure for land reform;
- a desire by conservation organisations to acquire new land;
- political expediency.

Without exception, provincial and national governments have begun building the concepts of community-based natural resource management into their policies and strategies. Community wildlife management or CWM became the dominant conservation and development paradigm of the 1990s and its principles have been confidently adopted by international aid agencies and lending organisations. However, in more recent times policy-makers, academics and practitioners have questioned the new approach. There is an emerging debate about the success or failure of this new wave of theory and practice regarding communal management of wild resources as a form of rural development. Many of the projects implemented during this paradigm shift – including some of those touted as major success stories – seem to be experiencing problems. These range from lack of delivery of benefits large and tangible enough to make significant impacts on people's livelihoods to a

lack of strong community cohesion and stable local governance, to loss of biodiversity.

A regional 'desk-top' overview, followed by seven more detailed case studies, was undertaken between 1996 and 1999 under the auspices of IED's *Evaluating Eden* project in southern Africa, to explore the myths and realities of CWM. The following key questions were addressed:

- What was wrong with the orthodox approach?
- Does community wildlife management meet expectations in its contribution to community development and to biodiversity conservation?
- If not: are we dealing with a failing model or a sound model that requires fine-tuning?
- What can we learn from the experiments of the past decade and how, in the light of these lessons, can CWM policies and practices be improved?
- What are the challenges for the new millennium?

The case studies deal with a wide range of contexts, i.e.: joint venture partnerships in the Okavango Delta, Botswana; conservancies as common property institutions in Namibia; Integrated Conservation and Development at Madikwe in South Africa's North West Province; land restitution in the Kruger National Park, and struggles for land and resource tenure on the Eastern Cape coast (two independent studies), South Africa; and a synthesis of the strengths and weaknesses of the CAMPFIRE movement in Zimbabwe.

The research brought to light a number of flaws in the conventional dogma and assumptions about CWM:

- Projects labelled CBNRM or CWM are characterised by widely diverging goals and contexts, in terms of their reasons for establishment, control of access, level of community participation, type of land and resource tenure, level of community cohesion and distinctiveness, extent of donor support, and their revenue-generating potential. It is extremely dangerous to extrapolate from one initiative to another. Different role players have different end goals, and measure success differently. Government officials, communities and private investors have very different perceptions about scarcity of natural resources, and of human impacts on biodiversity. This lies at the root of many of the conflicts observed.
- The ecological, social and economic achievements of CWM vary greatly over time, and are highly influenced by unexpected events. Evaluations done in "snapshot" fashion invariably lead to wrong conclusions.
- The term "community" is nebulous and poorly defined, and is often used by donors and project managers to group together people living in the same geographic area who have little else in common. People living in different villages or different parts of a village often have vastly different problems, skills and aspirations, and even within seemingly homogeneous communities there exist many different communities of interest or livelihood clusters.
- CWM is in many instances accompanied by intra-community conflicts and fissures, often precipitated by competing factions who want to intercept a good share of the benefits before it reaches the rest of the community. The greater the benefits the greater the potential for conflict over them. In addition, the local organizations, set up as a site for encouraging better local governance, often become melting pots of acute conflict.
- There exists a huge communication gap between the holders of formal knowledge (scientists) and informal knowledge (communities). Communities are often unaware of the scarcity of biodiversity resources on a macro scale, especially when such resources are locally abundant. Local users often firmly believe that marine, forest and terrestrial wildlife resources can continue to sustain intense harvesting levels, even though this conflicts with scientific data. Scientists and conservationists, on the other hand, tend to assume that resources that are being unconservatively used are automatically being over utilised. These differences inevitably lead to conflicts when harvesting restrictions or quotas and joint management agreements are negotiated.

- The recipients of benefits from wildlife rarely make the link between good wildlife management and benefit flows. Local people seldom reinvest dividends from wildlife in wildlife management, and the assumption that benefits automatically lead to a sense of ownership and custodianship does not appear to hold.
- The assumption that donor funds are put to best use to build institutions, to improve the efficiency of CBNRM, needs to be treated with caution. The option of helping individual entrepreneurs, thus stimulating job creation in rural areas needs also to be explored.
- The combined financial benefits and total revenues generated by CWM are misleadingly high, when compared to their net contribution to household incomes. But although household incomes from wildlife are small by developed country standards, this can make a substantial contribution to the livelihoods of impoverished people living on the edge of subsistence.
- The non-financial benefits, such as political empowerment, biodiversity conservation and increased cultural awareness, are more important than the financial benefits.

The lessons learnt from this study were:

Donors:

- Donor funding is most useful in the early stages of initiatives, as seed funds.
- Funds for training are most useful when communities have a sense of permanence and long-term guarantees of resource security.
- The need for institution-building needs to be carefully investigated before funds are invested in local institutions.
- The role of government as administrator and facilitator should not be underestimated; it is a good investment to increase the capacity and skills of officials and key individuals in the community.
- There is a need for skilled facilitators, and donor funds can play a major role to assist with this.
- Sudden injections of funds can be misappropriated or lead to conflict.
- A disproportionate amount of donor funding is used to pay the salaries of facilitators.
- Biocentric agendas often lead to increased poverty and reduced powers in communities.

Facilitators:

- High-quality, light-touch facilitation is a key ingredient in the success of CWM.
- Government remains an important role player.
- Communities' training needs should be carefully determined before training programmes are designed and implemented.
- Communities define and redefine themselves on an ongoing basis, and all communities consist of sub-units that have different needs and aspirations; to lump diverse groups together into single communities invariably leads to conflict.
- All role players need to commit resources and contribute something to the bargaining table.

Communities:

- Communities need to increase their bargaining powers by laying claim to assets that they can put on the 'power table.'
- Communities' rights are entrenched in the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International Convention on Human Rights and the Indigenous People's Convention and they should use these conventions in their negotiations.
- There is no substitute for land ownership.
- Appropriate facilitators play an important role and need to be recruited.
- Fractures within communities should be anticipated when financial benefits become substantial, and strategies need to be formulated to deal with these before conflicts arise.

Wildlife professionals:

- Law enforcement is one of the cornerstones of sustainable common property resource management and cannot be neglected.
- Monitoring is essential, and participatory monitoring can be a useful tool to sensitise all role players to trends in natural resources.
- Collaborative management should be expected to be a slow and expensive process: to fast-track it is to invite disaster.
- As few promises as possible should be made.
- The principles of sustainable common property resource management should be adopted at the outset.
- Skilled facilitators are valuable.
- Alliances between communities, the private sector, NGOs, donors and government departments should be promoted.
- As many local people as possible should be employed.
- Information should be provided to local people about the broader (national and international) scarcity or abundance of the resources at stake.
- Clear CWM policy directives should be given to officials, and other role players need to be informed about policies and policy changes.

Policy-makers:

- Land and resource ownership is important, to give a sense of permanence to communities and to lower their discount rates.
- Policies should promote the forging of linkages between communities and other role players.
- Contradictions in policies between different government departments and parastatals should be avoided.
- Policies should be made accessible to all role players, specifically the least powerful ones with most at stake.
- International agreements that impede rural development and prevent sustainable natural resource use should be avoided.
- Communities should be allowed to define themselves, geographically or otherwise.

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1. Introduction

The network of protected areas that exists in southern Africa has, by and large, emerged because Western needs and values were imposed on indigenous people whose livelihoods depended on the use of wildlife resources inside the protected area (Crush 1980; Anderson and Grove 1987; Beinart 1989; Bell 1987; Ranger 1989; McShane 1990; Venter *et al.* 1994). Historically, the protection of nature in southern Africa, along with most other parts of colonial Africa, was undertaken by creating natural resource islands that excluded local people and clashed with their survival strategies (Venter *et al.* 1994). The aim of this conservation strategy was to protect the interest of various power blocks within the colonial state but also, in the long-term, to ensure the survival of pockets of biological diversity so that future generations could appreciate Africa's natural heritage (Beinart 1989; Carruthers 1989; Venter *et al.* 1994).

Over the last decade, conservationists throughout southern Africa, and indeed both the developing and the developed world, have moved away from the centralised 'blueprint' approaches to wildlife management of the colonial era. In this period, there has been a search for more viable and effective options that could simultaneously conserve biodiversity and cope with budget and staff constraints. Conservation agencies have also increasingly been faced with groups of rural people who now frequently exercise one of their most effective survival strategies – a capacity for subversiveness – as democracy and new political rights have become entrenched in the sub-region.

Two new schools have emerged over the last decade in response to these pressures: community based natural resource management (CBNRM) and one of its satellites, community based wildlife management (CWM). These paradigms place an emphasis on the need to promote rural development by encouraging residents of communal lands to use wildlife in a way that promotes economic growth and stimulates a flow of benefits into their communities.

The aims of CWM can be summarised as:

- Obtaining the voluntary participation of communities in a flexible programme that incorporates long term solutions to problems arising from the use of natural resources.
- Introducing a new system of group ownership and territorial rights to natural wildlife resources for the communities resident in the target areas. The management of these resources should be placed under the custody and control of resident peoples.
- Providing appropriate institutions under which resources can be legitimately managed and exploited by local people for their own direct benefit. These benefits can take the form of income, employment and production of venison.
- Providing technical and financial assistance to communities that join the programme to enable them to realise their objectives.

The focus of CWM is not merely the wise management of natural resources. As important, if not more so, is the emphasis on community development, local self-government and the creation of local institutions for the management of common property resources.

These and similar principles have been eagerly embraced by governments, donors, NGOs, conservation agencies and, of course, some rural communities. Provincial and national governments have begun building the concepts of CBNRM into their policies and strategies. There are few exceptions: even in the last remnants of 'Eden,' conservationists are adapting to the new move away from centralised control. CWM became the dominant conservation and development paradigm of the 1990s and its principles have been confidently adopted by international aid agencies and lending organisations.

However, in more recent times policy-makers, academics and practitioners have questioned the neo-liberal approach. Numerous scholarly studies are discovering flaws in various CWM programmes and projects that have been implemented in the region: flaws in sustainability of use, equitability of distribution and the actual size of benefits generated (Iltis *et al.* 1999; Hulme and Murphree 1999). A number of new areas of enquiry have opened up in the light of these apparent flaws:

- What was wrong with the orthodox approach?
- Are all the assumptions of CWM valid, i.e. does CWM meet expectations in its contribution to community development and to biodiversity conservation?
- If not, are we dealing with a failing model or a sound model that requires fine-tuning?
- Most importantly, what can we learn from the experiments of the past decade, and in the light of these lessons, how can CWM policies and practices be improved?
- What are the challenges for the new millennium?

Buggs (2000) sums up these issues:

Community-based natural resource management programmes have been implemented throughout the world including Botswana in the past decade. Eagerly embracing the theory and principles of common property theory and decentralisation, the primary goals of the Botswana Natural Resource Management Programme are to: 1) increase rural economic development and 2) improve natural resource management through improved attitudes to wildlife. However, there have been few examples of long-term success of community-based initiatives as these have a high incidence of degeneration through time. The assumptions underlying the programmes, specifically that improved incomes will improve attitudes towards wildlife, require systematic research and validation.

Thus, there is clearly an emerging debate about the success or otherwise of this new wave of theory and practice regarding communal management of wild resources as a form of rural development. Empirically, there is little doubt that many of the projects implemented during this paradigm shift – including some of those touted as major success stories – are experiencing problems. These range from lack of delivery of benefits large and tangible enough to make significant impacts on people's livelihoods to a lack of strong community cohesion and stable local governance.

1.1 The case studies

A number of southern African case studies were conducted under the auspices of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) *Evaluating Eden* project to address these questions. The participants took a critical and in-depth look at the social, environmental and economic achievements (or lack thereof) of CWM in seven case studies, and attempted to uncover the underlying micro- and macro-scale factors affecting the performance of CWM.

1.1.1 Joint venture partnerships in the Okavango Delta

In Botswana, Lesley Boggs studied two communities (Khwai and Sanaye) in the Okavango Delta, to find out whether or not financial benefits from wildlife lead to greater satisfaction and willingness to take responsibility for wildlife management among rural villagers. Although the benefits from wildlife management were substantial to these people, they still had a long way to go before taking full responsibility for their wildlife resources. She also found that high benefits did not necessarily lead to greater contentment in community members; trust between joint venture partners, government, community leaders and 'ordinary' community members was a crucial factor affecting people's satisfaction and sense of ownership, and that there was a need to better understand power and its various manifestations. Power struggles existed between generations, between traditional and new leaders, between birthright and education rights, between ethnic groups, between communities and joint venture partners. These had to be acknowledged and monitored so that appropriate changes could be made when necessary. Her data suggested a strong correlation between participation and awareness of the link between good wildlife management, tourism and economic empowerment. Boggs (2000) concluded that the problems surrounding CWM were multifaceted, complex and case-specific and that the real solutions had to lie in a series of systematic changes that span the multiple layers of government. Solutions should also encompass the political, historical, and social realms of Botswana. The flaws were not so much the CWM model but rather the human error in implementing it, coupled with unrealistic expectations. One of the changes she advocated was that benefits should be earned rather than handed out as rights.

1.1.2 Conservancies as common property institutions in the arid zones of Namibia

In Namibia, Brian Jones evaluated the effectiveness of conservancies on communal land as natural resource management institutions. Conservancies originated on freehold land when a number of farmers began cooperating in the management of wildlife on adjoining properties. Following the independence of Namibia from South Africa in 1990, the new government introduced policy and legislation to give the same rights over wildlife to communal-area farmers as were already enjoyed by freehold farmers. In their early stages, communal area conservancies faced a number of problems in becoming established, including: the definition of community and of conservancy boundaries; competing interest groups within communities; competition between new conservancy institutions and established institutions; differences in scale between appropriate social units and resource management units; uncertain land tenure; and unequal levels of support available to assist all the communities wishing to form conservancies. A number of Namibian communities have found pragmatic ways to overcome these problems. These have included: resolving long-standing land disputes with neighbours; subsuming internal differences in order to gain common benefits, and redefining their relationships with existing and emerging institutions at a number of levels. The government has also played a mediating role in assisting with conflict resolution. While the government has put in place a suitable environment for conservancies to form, it remains to be seen how they will perform in practice. Jones found that individuals and communities are not driven solely by financial profit, and that their motivations for managing wildlife include agricultural diversification to minimise the many risks associated with an uncertain environment, and cultural values placed on wildlife.

1.1.3 Integrated Conservation and Development in semi-arid savannah at Madikwe

In South Africa's North-West Province, Hector Magome and others investigated the benefits produced by Madikwe Game Reserve and the challenges to community conservation. Madikwe was created to provide economic returns to both local neighbouring communities and the North-West Province of South Africa, under the assumptions that wildlife-based tourism was the best

economic use for that area, and that the conservation value of the land would in the process be increased. The strategy was to create an equal partnership between the Parks Board, the private sector and the community. Wildlife-based tourism was seemingly the best economic use of the acquired land because: 1) the degraded land was marginal for agricultural production, and 2) the wild animals introduced had increased significantly in numbers and market value. However, tourism has not grown as anticipated. Only a fraction of the expected 15 lodge operators had invested in the project by 1999, and Madikwe was still some 30 years away from reaching its potential. This delay in the delivery of intended benefits to the community resulted in tensions and conflict. Nevertheless, by creating 170 high-quality jobs, the reserve already surpassed the 80 poor-quality jobs that would have been created by the cattle ranching option. The equal partnership concept with the community was seriously flawed, suggesting that this aspect was not given sufficient thought during the planning and implementation stages. The 'community' was not as homogeneous as previously assumed, rights and tenure were not defined, and the Parks Board and the private sector had far more power than the community had. The Madikwe project was in reality held up by the stronger partners, the Parks Board and the private sector, while the somewhat weaker community dangled along. Integrating conservation with community development meant burdening the protected area with broader issues of rural development. Community participation in conservation was complex, difficult and expensive as it depended on external, macro-level factors over which local role players had little control. Madikwe's performance was strongly influenced by the entire performance of South Africa, a country in transition.

1.1.4 Land restitution in the Kruger National Park

In the Northern Province of South Africa, Conrad Steenkamp studied the process leading to a community's ownership and collaborative management of a portion of the Kruger National Park. The Makuleke land claim is an important case study because it is one of a handful of restitution cases that have been resolved in terms of South Africa's land reform programme and, more importantly for the purpose of the *Evaluating Eden* project, demonstrates the potential to use conservation and associated development programmes as a means of restitution in Africa. In terms of the original objectives of South African National Parks (SANP) – the recently re-named organization responsible for the management of the Kruger National Park – the Makuleke land claim was a major threat. SANP failed to maintain exclusive control over the area claimed by the community and failed to restrict community interests to the periphery of the park. The claim also threatened to set a negative precedent involving de-proclamation of part of a national park. The success of the Makuleke land claim would have probably contributed to the wave of new claims for the Kruger National Park (and other parks) land. But during the course of negotiations around the claim, SANP and the Makuleke leadership changed their objectives. SANP underwent some significant policy changes along with the country's adoption of a new constitution – as well as a name change that symbolised its new policy approaches. The Makuleke leadership never wavered around their fundamental demand for the title of the land to be returned but they indicated a growing willingness to use their land, once it was restored to them, for conservation and nature tourism purposes. SANP shifted its original objective of maintaining control towards maintaining biodiversity in the Pafuri area – if necessary through a contractual agreement with the Makuleke community.

The negotiated 'win-win' solution helped mould SANP's redefined policies, objectives and interests. The agreement not only demonstrated SANP's commitment to new policies, but the conservation agency also became party to a contractual park agreement of international significance. The Makuleke community had in turn gained access to a significant economic resource and realised the opportunity to revive their cultural linkages with the land. The most important and significant outcome achieved, however, was the explicit restructuring of the power relations between the park and the local people.

1.1.5 Struggles for land and resource tenure on the Eastern Cape Wild Coast

1.1.5.1 Dwesa

On South Africa's Eastern Cape Wild Coast, Herman Timmermans investigated the differing perceptions about resource scarcity between conservationists and people living in eight neighbouring villages at Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserves on the Eastern Cape seaboard. The key role-players include: seven communities, the reserve managers, six government departments, non-governmental organisations and natural scientists. For several decades, the communities have been involved in intensive conflicts with conservationists over land and access to resources. A feature of this case has been the exacting nature of the negotiations that have involved a diverse range of role-players. Community members have increased bargaining powers by using legislation and services that they are entitled to under the Land Act and have attained better security of tenure. The drawn-out negotiating process and its inability to deliver on-the-ground action thus far has had negative socio-economic and biological outcomes in the study area, although some local political progress has been made. Thus, the short-term outcomes have been mainly negative: infrastructure is deteriorating, tourism is shrinking rather than growing, resources continue to be plundered by poachers, and the protected area continues to be poorly managed.

1.1.5.2 Mkambati

In the same region of South Africa, at Mkambati, Thembele Kepe and others analysed the prospects for CWM for communities who neighbour Mkambati Nature Reserve. In the Mkambati area the history of settlement by and dispossession of the nature reserve land from the local communities initiated a struggle over resource tenure that has continued to this day. An ambitious Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) project, which hinges around ecotourism with a significant component of community participation, has been proposed. While the nature reserve is important for local livelihoods, this is predominantly through illegal use by the community as part of their livelihoods, rather than structured participation. Wildlife tenure could thus be viewed as only one of the 'sticks' making up the 'bundle' of resource tenures available to rural people. The question of what is legitimate access to and control over biodiversity resources by local communities has become a source of intense conflict. Hence, sections of the local population have over the years made use of local informal institutions such as ukujola (legitimized stealing) to justify their illegal collection of resources. In Mkambati a host of interest groups has pursued a number of competing objectives to improve their control over and access to the natural resources of the area. In doing so they have engaged in power plays, and entered into complex and shifting relationships with each other at different moments in time, ranging from alliances or collaboration, at one end of the spectrum, through wary neutrality or relative indifference, to outright hostility and confrontation, at the other end. The case study illustrates how the prospects for successful community-based schemes will depend on how wildlife tenure articulates with other resource tenures, on how this impacts on rural livelihoods and on the relationships between local and non-local institutions. The evidence from Mkambati contradicts the argument that the main actors lack the capacity to make CWM initiatives work. What matters more is whether or not they perceive the incentives and have the social and political will and skill to succeed with CWM.

1.1.6 The strengths and weaknesses of CAMPFIRE as a social movement in Zimbabwe

Richard Hasler evaluated Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) by analysing the different phases of the project from an early discourse

about community-based wildlife management through to 'co-management' of different stakeholders (state, community, private sector) and on to the later phase of the project described in recent reviews as 'the CAMPFIRE social movement.' Through CAMPFIRE, wildlife and wildlife habitat have become important human development issues in Zimbabwe. However, because of contradictions and flawed assumptions, the large scale of the project is also a major weakness since many problems concerning bureaucratisation, equity and political sustainability remain unresolved. 185 local communities representing 200,000 households in wildlife-producing wards are involved and therefore the project has a potentially large constituency. CAMPFIRE has attracted grants to the value of US\$44.1 million. However, the funding has also created problems associated with an over-bureaucratised district- and national-level programme, which has not devolved meaningful rights of ownership to ward and village.

The benefits from wildlife utilization at the household level are highly variable, and sparsely populated wards and districts adjacent to protected areas have the potential to earn more income than those that are densely populated and removed from the core biodiversity areas. From an ecological perspective, the area of Zimbabwe's land that was devoted to wildlife management grew from 12% in 1979 (all within officially protected areas) to 33% in 1999 as a result of the CAMPFIRE programme and the establishment of conservancies on private land. One of the achievements of the CAMPFIRE programme is the monitoring of wildlife populations in communal areas, and so far this has shown that wildlife populations in CAMPFIRE areas appear to be stable. The increased clearing of wilderness areas for cash crop production is a major threat to wildlife resources. It is intertwined with the history of land use in Zimbabwe and more recently with macro-economic changes, leading to increased crop production in marginal areas. Donor agency reviews indicate that CAMPFIRE is a qualified success in terms of its social, economic and ecological impacts. The main recommendation in all the reviews is that CAMPFIRE needs to devolve legal rights and management functions to the local (village) level in order to foster the sustainable management of wildlife by people affected by wildlife.

1.2 Conclusion

It is clear that many of the trends – positive and negative – that have emerged from the case studies are influenced by complex combinations of highly specific factors, unique to a particular place and time, by external factors beyond the control of local role players, and also by history. This makes generalisation, prediction and prescription difficult and, indeed, dangerous. Although we can learn from a comparative approach to case studies, there is no blueprint.



2. Impacts of the Orthodox Conservation Approach

The creation of southern Africa's conservation estate during the colonial period – and the apartheid era in South Africa – frequently meant the exclusion of indigenous people from national parks and forest reserves so that the protection of animal species and their habitats could be ensured without human interference. The making of these reserves was seldom done in consultation with people who lived in or along their borders and seldom earned the consent or respect of these peoples (Abel and Blaikie 1986). The result has been a widespread feeling of apathy, if not outright hostility, by indigenous peoples towards the conservation authorities responsible for these practices (Anderson and Grove 1987; Beinart 1989; Camilleri 1989; Koch, Cooper and Coetsee 1990; Ranger 1989; Infield 1992).

Skukuza, the name given to the first and most famous rest camp in the Kruger National Park, enshrines the link between conservation and forced removals in the minds of rural people. Skukuza (meaning "he who sweeps clean") was the title given to the park's first ranger, Major James Stevenson-Hamilton, by Tsonga tribesmen evicted from their homesteads while the reserve was being created (Koch *et al.* 1990). Many people in South Africa still refer to the entire park by this name (Nwaila interview, 12 May 1999). Elsewhere, on the border of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park in Natal, a peasant was asked what he thought of conservation attempts in the area. The old man lifted his arms, crossed his wrists, and said: "Handcuffs" (Koch *et al.* 1990). According to a Herero elder living in the northern parts of Namibia: "When my cattle were starving Nature Conservation chased them out of the Skeleton Coast Park – the last place where there was still food. They said the area was for wild animals and they would shoot cattle that came in. I had to put my cattle in a kraal and watch them die, knowing that just down the river, inside this park, there was fodder. So why doesn't Nature Conservation keep its elephants away from our food?" (Jacobsohn 1991).

Similar attitudes can be found scattered across the southern African landscape.

The alienation of indigenous peoples by conservation authorities has been reinforced by the sharp discontinuity that has developed between the social and economic situations inside and outside African nature reserves. Nature reserves (today) generally represent active economic centres with high income-generating potential based on sustainable land use practices. In contrast indigenous people surrounding nature reserves generally have low income-generating potential, and are poorly educated... As population numbers increase and the demand for resources grows, the frequency and intensity of conflict between protected areas and local indigenous people will increase. (Venter *et al.* 1994)

The countries of southern Africa – Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa – were subjected to European colonisation from the 17th century to the early 20th century. The first serious attempts to create areas of protected wildlife took place in the Cape in the middle of the 19th century. Since then conservation policy has been through a series of mutations that have followed changes in the political framework.

The period of colonial conquest in the early and mid 19th century was generally characterised by extensive conflict between settler and African communities over access to natural resources: land, wildlife, water and forests. Game animals were an important resource for both social groups in this period – both for their subsistence value as well as the value that animal products could realise through growing trade networks that accompanied European colonisation.

Although not well documented, there is some evidence that elaborate wildlife resource management systems prevailed among indigenous African people before the arrival of European colonists. Examples include the royal hunting preserves of the amaZulu and amaSwazi people, and the kgotla system of land management practised by the Batswana people. According to some writers, the productive systems of most African societies in the pre-colonial period rested heavily on the abundance of natural and wildlife resources that surrounded them. As a result, people in Africa generally revered nature and incorporated it into their worldview. Most of their political systems included a set of rules and procedures designed to regulate the use and management of natural resources.

It is too often assumed that the traditional systems were characterised by a free-for-all anarchic exploitation of resources. While it is possible that in some exceptionally richly endowed regions with very sparse populations, the regulatory may have been minimal or even non-existent most communities had evolved systems which in varying degrees conserved resources and ensured their equitable distribution among households. (Ghai 1992)

It is because most African societies found themselves living in nature in this way that rivers, mountains, forests, trees and groves all over Africa are sacred places for worship and burial (Ghai 1992). The colonial approach to conservation generally had a punitive and detrimental impact on these systems of environmental care.

Also the penetration of merchant capital into the interior of the subcontinent and the acquisition of guns by African people created changes in indigenous patterns of hunting. Expeditions of explorers, hunters and missionaries relied on game meat for their survival. Products of the hunt, especially ivory, were also traded throughout the subcontinent – often in collaboration with African leaders. Local chiefs and their followers in some regions began to intensify their hunting expeditions in order to capitalise on the growing trade in ivory and other animal products during the colonial period. At the same time, British administrators and the wealthier settler farmers engaged in hunting for the sake of recreation and sport. In most of the colonies, under the combined impact of these intensified hunting activities, the numbers and the diversity of wild game went into a tailspin. Some writers speak of a “killing spree” by African and settler hunting parties that was exacerbated by competition or cooperation between these groups (Carruthers 1989).

*From 1800 to 1950, most of the region was gradually given over to the extensive ranching of cattle, sheep and goats to the exclusion of most large wild herbivores. Individual animal species responded differently to these changes. Some, such as impala (*Aepyceros melampus*), which thrive under “degraded” conditions, actually benefited, whereas the numbers and distribution of sensitive species such as roan antelope (*Hippotragus equinus*), sable antelope (*Hippotragus niger*) and tsessebe (*Damaliscus lunatus*), were severely reduced. (Grossman et al. 1992).*

The first signs of preservationist sentiment emerged from the ranks of colonial administrators on the Indian Ocean islands off the east coast of the subcontinent. The small size of these islands – used by ships plying the Cape trading route from Europe to the Middle East – made it possible for their rulers to comprehend the destruction that was taking place as deforestation set in. Toward the middle of the century they began to show concern about the deterioration of natural resources, especially woody biomass. Some of the most comprehensive early conservation legislation was developed on these islands and then exported to the Cape Colony (Bainart 1989; Carruthers 1989).

These early preservationist ideas crystallised into a general policy shift among colonial administrators and wealthier members of the European settler populations at the turn of the century. Alarmed by the dramatic decline in animal numbers that was taking place, these began to argue in favour of systematically protecting selected wildlife areas and the game that existed there. Predatory attitudes to hunting as a form of subsistence or accumulating profits through trade gave way among the colonial elite to notions of "the hunt" as a socially exclusive form of recreation. This coincided with a growing scientific and aesthetic interest in preserving wildlife.

In 1900 foreign ministers representing the African colonial powers – Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain – gathered in London to sign the world's first international conservation treaty: the Convention for the Preservation of Animals. In its report on the conference *The Times* of London described the situation in southern Africa.

It is necessary to go far into the interior to find the nobler forms of antelope, and still further if the hunter wants to pursue the elephant, the rhinoceros or the giraffe. It is perfectly clear that very soon those animals, unless something is done to prevent their extermination, will be stamped out as completely as the dodo. To some extent this process is inevitable. The advance of civilisation, with its noise and agitation, is fatally disturbing the primitive forms of animal life. Commerce, moreover, discovers continually some new demand for trophies of the chase. The horns, the skins, and the plumage of beasts and birds have an increasing market value. It is not surprising, therefore, that men of science have become alarmed at the prospect of the extinction of many of the most interesting and characteristic types of zoological development. (Bonner 1993).

In the early part of the century an influential lobby of landowners, mining magnates and colonial administrators in the colonies secured tighter legislation for the preservation of game reserves largely to protect wildlife (Beinart 1989).

Africans and poorer whites – those for whom hunting was still of some importance in subsistence and survival – were finally to be excluded from hunting on private lands and in the new game reserves. Hunting for subsistence or trade goods – 'biltong hunting' – was conceived as laziness, a term increasingly identified with the capacity to avoid wage labour. Trespass onto private land to hunt animals, which still in law belonged to no-one, became poaching. (Beinart 1989).

Beinart argues that because whites have had disproportionate political power in South Africa, game reserves were usually located in the segregated ethnic homelands or on lands made marginal by poor soils, malaria and tsetse fly. People in these areas were poor, so that the costs of introducing conservation projects were far less than in white-dominated and agricultural regions. And indigenous people lacked the political power to resist removal of rural communities to make way for reserves. Conservation thus became a highly politicised issue, "bound up with the political imperatives of segregation: stemming African urbanisation, maintaining the migrant labour system and 'developing' Africans within their 'own' areas" (Beinart, cited in Koch *et al.* 1990).

The colony of Rhodesia, later to become the independent states of Zimbabwe and Zambia, was colonised in the late 19th century by British settlers. This facilitated the extension of the preservationist laws that had been developed in the Cape Colony, north into the British colonies across the Limpopo River. In Rhodesia, tribal areas became buffer zones where subsistence hunting and commercial hunting was allowed around most protected areas.

In the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola legislation to create formally protected wildlife areas was only passed in the 1960s and 1970s. In Mozambique, the Banine, Zinave and Maputa Elephants Reserves were promulgated only in 1969 (Meneses 1994). In Angola, proposals were made in the same period to create a network of new protected areas that would set aside 6 per

cent of the land and protect up to 90 per cent of the country's biological richness. War in the post-colonial period ensured these plans were stillborn (Huntley and Matos 1992).

In each of the colonies of the region, however, conservationist legislation was diametrically opposed to the holistic relationship between people and their environment that characterised the culture of most indigenous African societies. The development of agriculture and livestock by local peoples were seen as "unnatural" and ecologically unsound. The causes of rural development problems were seen as unsustainable land-use methods and population densities in African settlements (Bell 1987).

Extensive overgrazing and deforestation affected segregated reserves and tribal lands created to accommodate African people who had been expropriated. This alerted travellers and missionaries to the dangers of overgrazing and deforestation. This grouping, which had an important influence over British conservation policy at the time, asserted a strong interventionist role for the state in protecting natural resources. The main emphasis fell on the need to restrict exploitation of wildlife resources rather than on ways in which they could be utilised and renewed.

In terms of the colonial paradigm of conservation, subsistence hunters became defined as "poachers" – often by the very same settler population that had once relied on this form of economic activity for its survival (Crush 1980). The emergence of paramilitary conservation authorities, funded by the state and devoted to the armed policing of protected areas under their control, was a logical outcome of this preservationist way of conceiving the relationship between man and nature.

The type of wildlife legislation and administration patterns that emerged in most parts of southern Africa made it impossible for ordinary rural folk in many areas to live a normal existence without breaking some conservation law. Enforcement strategies ignored local sentiment that poaching was often a rational response to the fact that parks were fenced off and inaccessible while there were food shortages in the surrounding villages (Crush 1980). In many southern African states armed confrontations between poachers and rangers became common-place by the middle of the 20th century (Bell 1987).

Because of these types of conservation practices, wildlife protection in southern Africa has become charged with political conflict. As Abel and Blaikie (1986) point out, the conservation estate in the region lay at the centre of a series of contested social relationships.

Government policy has created areas called national parks that are officially designated for a particular and exclusive use. However competing groups such as local hunter-cultivators or commercial poachers also have claims upon these natural resources and manage sometimes to press them successfully... Viewed in this way a particular national park at any moment is like the resultant in a parallelogram of forces in an analogy with elementary physics. The forces are contradictory and unequal, the strongest having the greatest influence upon the way resources of a national park are used. Each is used by different groups in a different direction (Abel and Blaikie 1986).

It must be acknowledged that the orthodox blueprint approach, although perhaps outdated at present, served its own function. It is fair to say that without the command and control approach formally protected areas would probably not have been established in southern Africa. The top-down approach and private landowners did indeed save several species from the brink of extinction. Formal protected areas made an important contribution to the survival of white rhinoceros, black wildebeest, roan antelope, oribi, tsessebe, bontebok and sable antelope in the sub-region. Carnivores such as lion, leopard, cheetah and many large birds of prey rely on wildlife reserves for their core home ranges, and it would have been incompatible for people and these species to continue to peacefully co-exist. Whether wildlife reserves would have been necessary in the absence of

colonial intervention and the destructive hunting practices that came with it, or whether tradition would have been adequate to protect the continent's wildlife, is open to debate.

But it is also now widely accepted that the particular style of conservation management that emerged in southern Africa during the colonial period generated a range of social conflicts that now endanger the future of protected areas – and this was one of the major reasons for the popularity of the new CBNRM approach.



3. The Evolution of CWM in Southern Africa

3.1 The collaborative management movement

Since the mid-1980s (and earlier) conservationists in developing countries have come to realise that their governments lack the financial and human resources to effectively conserve wildlife. Wildlife numbers were declining as land was transformed through overgrazing and cultivation, creating a high risk that wildlife would become restricted to “islands” of protected areas where authorities and local people fought continuous battles for control over and access to wildlife. Although a number of visionary conventions and declarations were formulated by African states during this period (for example the African Convention in 1968 cited earlier), real transformation in natural resource management in southern Africa only took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a wave of democracy swept across the sub region. This increased pressure on state and conservation agencies to consider the demands and pleas of local communities for greater recognition and improved access to wildlife and other natural resources. The implementation of innovative programmes, aimed at removing or reducing the conflict between protected areas and people, coincided with a shift in international thinking on conservation issues.

At the 1982 World Congress on National Parks in Bali, professional conservationists adopted the idea that their work should be community-friendly and promote development. The congress called for increased support for communities through education programmes, revenue-sharing schemes, participation in the management of reserves, and the creation of appropriate development schemes near protected areas. The World Bank's 1986 policy on wild lands recognises that the protection of natural areas must be integrated into regional economic planning. In 1985 the World Wildlife Fund launched its Wildlife and Human Needs Programme, which consists of some 20 projects in developing countries that attempt to combine the interests of both conservation and development. Another important milestone was the Earth Summit in 1992, an output of which was the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD was one of the first international conservation policies that demonstrated this move towards people-centred conservation; two out of three of its principles (the fair and equitable sharing of benefits and sustainable use) imply that people are an integral part of conservation.

These projects attempt to ensure the conservation of biological diversity by reconciling the management of protected areas with the social and economic needs of local people. The smaller Integrated Conservation Development Projects (ICDPs) include biosphere reserves, multiple-use areas, and a variety of initiatives on the boundaries of protected areas, including buffer zones. Larger projects include the implementation of land-use plans with protected area components, as well as large-scale development projects with links to nearby protected areas. (Wells and Brandon 1992).

Inspired by a number of innovative projects in which rural groups were able to improve their livelihoods through the use of wildlife – most notably the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe – government officials and NGOs began to realise that biodiversity resources play an important role in the lives of impoverished rural people, and that the productive use of plant and animal resources can play a role in rural development (Matzke and Nabane 1996). Throughout southern Africa and the rest of the world, authorities began experimenting with new approaches to the management of natural resources. In the mid-1980s, examples of good private-sector wildlife management and forestry practices outside of protected areas were noticed and documented. Meanwhile, governments and parastatals in East Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique switched to new approaches (SASUSC 2000).

It is now widely accepted that the particular style of conservation management that emerged in southern Africa generated a range of social conflicts that now endanger the future of protected areas. It is also becoming clear that there has been a marked academic neglect of the social aspects of protected area management. This over-concentration on the biological and ecological aspects of wildlife protection has contributed to the hazards that face conservation in the region. As McShane (1990) points out: “If the complex of social and biological influences and interactions that come with human occupation and use of a region are not understood and adequately incorporated into conservation plans, failure will be the long-term consequence” (see also Venter *et al.* 1994 and Kiss 1990).

3.2 Factors influencing the shift in emphasis

Many of the studies commissioned for the *Evaluating Eden* project helped to uncover in better detail numerous factors that influence the policy of governments, NGOs and parastatals in the region. These include:

- *The pressure to promote development by using wildlife in rural areas.* This took a variety of forms but it is generally agreed that the pioneering work in Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programmes (which were supported by a powerful research and analytical framework developed at the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe) played a pioneering role. Similar programmes were started in Zambia in the Luangwa Valley and on conservancies on communal land in Namibia. In South Africa, the principles of integrating development with conservation were implemented, ironically, in some of the then independent homelands: the Mthomusha Game Reserve in KaNgwane and the Pilanesberg and Madikwe Game Reserves in Bophuthatswana, where state resources were used to create new protected areas (unlike the programmes in other countries where wildlife based development programmes were based on communal land). In Mozambique, communities, donors and NGOs designed and implemented the Tehuma-Tchato Reserve, primarily as a rural development initiative.
- *A desire and need to diversify the economy and move away from an agriculture-based system to tourism and natural resource use.* In Botswana, the government realised that livestock development programmes promoted by government were taking place at the expense of traditional resource use by remote rural communities (Boggs 2000). More recently in South Africa, the government has launched a number of Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) to diversify the rural economy, notably the Wild Coast SDI (Timmermans 1999; Kepe *et al.* 2000), the Maputo Corridor and the Lubombo SDI – all of which are aimed at stimulating new nature tourism industries based on the landscape, wildlife and other natural assets of these regions. All three programmes stress the need for rural residents, previously excluded from the mainstream of the rural economy by discriminatory practices, to participate as entrepreneurs and beneficiaries in the new resource-based industries being stimulated.

- *A lack of resources for law enforcement inside protected areas and the desire to conserve wildlife populations outside protected areas.* This dynamic was evident throughout the sub-region, and was the original impetus for the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE movement, the early Namibian conservancies, the move away from centralised government control and the allocation of concessions to communities in Botswana, and more recently, the development of joint management institutions at Dwesa on the East Cape Wild Coast, South Africa. The steep decline in numbers of habitat-specific, slow-breeding and conspicuous species such as black rhinoceros, elephant and sable antelope was becoming evident and conservationists started fearing that they were losing the battle. A number of initiatives, for example the community game guard system driven by the NGO Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) in Namibia, demonstrated that communities could indeed contribute to curbing illegal activities (Jones 1999a). At Dwesa and Cwebe and other localities in the Eastern Cape, South Africa such as Kowie Nature Reserve (Timmermans 1999; C. Fabricius pers. obs.), communities made promises to police themselves, which came as a great relief to conservationists under siege.
- *Community pressure and subversiveness.* The strongest tactic by rural groups in this period was their capacity for subversiveness. This was especially evident in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa when residents of settlements around the Dwesa, Cwebe and Mkaibati reserves staged spectacular invasions of these reserves and began plundering shellfish in the marine reserves and decimating wildlife inland as a symbolic act of defiance (Timmermans 1999). We are currently witnessing a similar strategy by residents of the Dukuduku Forest near St Lucia in KwaZulu Natal where the rural poor are insisting on the right to live in these forests and exploit the natural resources there. Subversiveness remains the only way for many landless communities to increase their power levels and level the playing field, so to speak.
- *Pressure for land reform.* During the early and mid-1990s a number of communities also began lobbying around land reform and began organising to claim back title to land in protected areas from which they were removed in colonial and apartheid times. The Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park, the Rienvasmaak land claim against the Au-grabies National Park, the San Bushman land claim in the Kalahari Gemsbok Park and the Mdluli land settlement in the southern parts of the Kruger National Park are all examples of the popular pressure for integrated wildlife and development programmes to become an important aspect of land reform. A number of NGOs began to play an important support role in this regard (Wynberg and Kepe 1999).
- *A desire by conservation organizations to acquire new land for conservation.* In some cases conservation agencies were able to expand the size of a protected wildlife estate by going into negotiations with local residents and agreeing at "contract parks" in which communal land was incorporated into game reserves so that it could be used for conservation and development purposes. In South Africa, the Richtersveld and West Coast National Park along with the more recent agreement with the Makuleke people around the northern parts of the Kruger National Park are examples of this dynamic (Archer 1999, Reid 2001).
- *Political expediency and recognition by governments that rural voters are important.* In Zimbabwe, the government soon started claiming responsibility for the successes of CAMPFIRE and simultaneously gave its district councils an increasingly controlling role in the programme (Hasler 1999). In Zambia, the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDIP) gained the acceptance of President Kenneth Kaunda on the basis of its political benefits (Barry Dalal Clayton and Richard Bell pers. comm.). The Madikwe Game Reserve in the Northern Province of South Africa was initially established to fast track development in the former homeland of Bophuthatswana, in line with the South African politics of the late 1980s. More recently the Makuleke land claim, through which a portion of land inside the Kruger National Park was trans

ferred to a community (Steenkamp 2000) showed that the politics of land reform played an important role in expediting the claim. The Minister of Land Affairs wanted to demonstrate that the pace of land reform was not as slow as was claimed at the time. Simultaneously a new National Parks Board had been appointed and South Africa National Parks, the parastatal responsible for the management of Kruger, had to demonstrate its commitment to democratic values. In Namibia communal conservancies were established, following the example of successful conservancies on white-owned freehold land (Jones 1999a), in part because of an attempt by the post-apartheid Namibian government to redress the imbalances of the past.

In summary, the model that began emerging entailed:

- Allowing communities access to natural resources from which they previously had been barred.
- Sharing revenue from the use of natural resources with communities (through a variety of ways that includes hunting or consumptive use, tourism or non-consumptive use along with various forms of harvesting resources such as thatch grass and firewood).
- Making conservation pay for costs of wildlife management as well as community development programmes.
- Involving communities in decision-making.
- Recognising communities' historical rights of tenure to resources and land.

3.3 Wildlife as a common property resource

Centralised and privatised control of resources has been the predominant management strategy since the early 20th century. This already established strategy was strengthened by Garrett Hardin's widely acclaimed 1968 theory described as *The Tragedy of the Commons* in which Hardin argued that common ownership of a resource cannot succeed, as the innate human desire to maximise individual benefits will inevitably cause overuse of a common resource leading to ultimate resource degradation. Partly because of frequent and chronic declines in state managed resources and in direct challenge to Hardin's theory, in the last decade there has been a growing body of theory and discussion in the social sciences dedicated to the study of local management and decentralisation. Central to this shift is a body of theory collectively known as common property theory (CPT) which argues for the potential success of commonly managed resources and identifies several broad but crucial criteria for success in commonly managed natural resources (Boggs 2000)

Many natural resource managers and policy makers do not appear to be aware of the basic principles of common property theory that underpin the new framework of CWM. Nor are they all aware of the broader debates and intellectual challenges to this foundation. However, it is clear to all that CWM is evolving, as is our knowledge about it. Before exploring these debates, we should understand what the central principles are.

First, the following have been outlined as the CAMPFIRE principles (Murphree 1998):

- Effective management of natural resources is best achieved by giving it focused value for those who live with them.
- Local people are the real managers of the environment, and they should derive benefits from natural resources which exceed the costs.
- Differential inputs must result in different benefits.
- The size of the benefit should be proportional to the input or cost of looking after wildlife.
- There must be a positive correlation between quality of management and the magnitude of benefit.
- Good management of resources should be rewarded by matching benefits.
- The unit of proprietorship should be the unit of production, management and benefit.
- The structures which preside over the sharing of benefits should be the same institutions which are responsible for the management of resources.

- The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-political constraints.
- Small institutions increase the efficiency and willingness to take responsibility and decrease the likelihood for corruption. They enhance a sense of 'collective identity' and make it more practicable to enforce rules.

It will be noted that the first three principles above deal with incentives, and ways to institutionally capture them. The last two principles flow from the advocacy of communal property regimes, locate them in a larger context and deal with governance (Murphree 1998).

Second, Oström (1990) documented these widely accepted principles for establishing lasting common property institutions:

- Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have rights to use resources must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the resource itself.
- Rules governing use or provision of the resource must be appropriate to local conditions: Rules for using the resource or providing it to resource users, such as restricting time, place, technology and how much can be used, must be appropriate to the resource itself, including availability.
- Collective choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in changing the rules.
- Monitoring: Monitors of the rules and the use of the resource are either resource users themselves or accountable to the users.
- Graduated sanctions: Resource users who break the rules are likely to face various degrees of punishment, depending on the seriousness and context of the offence. Punishments are decided by other resource users, by officials accountable to them, or by both.
- Conflict resolution mechanisms: Resource users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local mechanisms to resolve conflicts among users or between users and officials.
- Recognition of legitimacy: Government supports, or at least does not challenge, the rights of resource users to devise their own institutions.
- Nested enterprises (for common property resources that are part of larger systems): Resource use or provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested institutions, where rights and responsibilities are clearly defined.

These rules are valuable and have been used to initiate conservancies on communal land in Namibia (Jones 1999a), and to promote common property associations in South Africa (Sturgeon pers. comm.). However, we are discovering that a more rigorous social analysis of the processes of political and economic change at the country level, and the specific social, political and biological conditions at the local level, is required, rather than adopting sets of rules in a blueprint fashion.

Murphree (1998), for example, makes the critical point that the CAMPFIRE approach is based on the specific demographic conditions that apply in parts of Zimbabwe:

Small institutions increase the efficiency and willingness to take responsibility and decrease the likelihood for corruption. They enhance a sense of "collective identity" and make it more practicable to enforce rules. From a social dynamics perspective scale is an important consideration: large-scale structures tend to be ineffective, increasing the potential for inefficiency, corruption and the evasion of responsibility. Conversely, a communal resource management regime is enhanced if it is small enough (in membership size) for all members to be in occasional face-to-face contact, enforce conformity to rules through peer pressure and has a long-standing collectively identity.

He goes on to note that –

CAMPFIRE has been developed in a national context by nationals for a national objective. The

intent has never been that of a package export of the programme in its specifics to other countries.

It is clear that the new, more open approach to wildlife management has come to stay and that there is no turning back. Dialogue and participation is the expected norm in southern Africa, and the expectations among communities and politicians are high.

Of one thing there can be no doubt, however: the old orthodoxy of conservation purely as state-enforced protection, which evolved in the colonial era and was continued by the elites who took control of independent Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, is no longer presented as a viable option by any serious actors. (Hulme and Murphree 1999).



4. Brief Country Perspectives

4.1 Botswana

Botswana has the great advantage in that it did not experience the same kind of colonial land expropriations that took place during the colonial era in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Low human population densities also meant that little pressure was placed on wildlife populations in most of the tribal or communal lands. The main cause of competition over wildlife estates – a conflict that rose sharply after independence in 1964 – was the rapid expansion by black and white local elites of cattle ranches of which Botswana has the largest in the world.

Competition over wild animal use also rose sharply in the 1970s with the development of the safari industry and a rapid escalation in wildlife values.

This competition was exacerbated by a rise in meat hunting by an emergent national elite, equipped with modern equipment. Under the existing legislation access to this type of hunting was relatively open and local communities experienced the frustration of having their land base eroded and their wildlife exploited without benefit to themselves. (Murphree 1998).

Conservationists faced a similar problem to the one that prompted the emergence of CAMPFIRE in that rural residents did not have the opportunities and structures to encourage them to manage and use wildlife for their own benefit and social development. Land authorities in Botswana are the District Land Boards who have a much wider geographic area under their jurisdiction than do the Rural District Councils in Zimbabwe. Thus, in Botswana, the devolution of rights and responsibilities over land and wildlife to communities required extended negotiation. This resulted in an agreement that land boards would provide long-term (10-year) leases of designated land to communities at nominal rates. These communities would then be legally entitled to lease tourism concessions and hunting rights to operators at market rates (Rihoy 1995). The first such entity or Community Trust was established in the Chobe enclave in 1994, comprising five villages. Such community trusts have stronger legal proprietorship than wards in the CAMPFIRE programme, and in this dimension Botswana can be said to have more closely approximated the communal property-rights regime ideal than Zimbabwe.

There are still anomalies that interrupt the performance of CBNRM programmes in Botswana, however:

Some resource-use activities (such as wildlife management in protected areas) are owned and controlled by the state while others (grazing on flood plains outside of the buffalo fence) are communal property. Some resource activities have been privatised through leasehold agreements (e.g. Community Wildlife Concession Areas) while others are subject to a virtual open access regime

(access to fishing and veld products). In many cases the different resource use options such as fishing, wildlife, agriculture and tourism have to contend with overlapping tenure regimes and the challenge for community-based wildlife management initiatives is to clarify and differentiate the various claims on the same resource. Thus, wildlife resource utilization in the Okavango Delta can be simultaneously a state resource (national park), a privatised resource (a leasehold agreement over a community wildlife area) a communal property resource (decision making concerning the leasehold agreement and the distribution of the benefits from it) and an open-access regime (poaching of wildlife in remote un-policed areas). Frequently there are overlapping jurisdictions and competing rights concerning access. (Hasler 1998).

In Botswana there are a number of different policy documents and laws, which, together, provide opportunities for government to allow communities to gain rights over wildlife and tourism. The Botswana approach combines rights to obtain quotas and hunting licenses from the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) with rights to obtain leases over land for commercial purposes from land boards. These policy directives ensure that communities' interests are promoted.

The Policy on Wildlife Conservation of 1986 calls for the greater involvement of local people in wildlife management and utilisation as well as for rural people to gain greater benefits from wildlife use. It does not, however, spell out how this might be achieved. The Wildlife, Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 provides for the declaration of Wildlife Management Areas and Controlled Hunting Areas and provides for permission for wildlife use on communal land to be given by tribal land boards. The Tribal Land Act of 1968 enables tribal land boards to give out leases for commercial purposes. Policy directives, such as the SAVINGRAM on community tourism and hunting development, provide for leases over hunting and tourism to be given to communities who form a representative legal entity.

Rights are dependent upon designation of an area as a community hunting area (CHA) otherwise the lease is negotiated between the land board and the private sector directly. District-level government agencies play a significant role in the process of a community negotiating a joint venture with a private company. According to the Joint Venture Guidelines, communities have to wait for endorsement of the joint venture approach by the District Development Committee. The District Council is assigned a role in negotiating with the private sector on behalf of the community, e.g. informing operators of a community's objectives. The Joint Venture Guidelines make it clear that: "Wildlife remains the property of the State, and although wildlife management is to be decentralised, wildlife utilisation and any form of off-take will be subject to the DWNP's decisions regarding the quota for each area. Close liaison with the DWNP is therefore important."

The present framework for providing rural communities with rights over wildlife and tourism depends to a large extent on the goodwill of government at a number of different levels. The President can, for example, remove the wildlife management area (WMA) status, which protects wildlife as a land use. The Minister of Commerce and Industry can make regulations that affect the WMA on issues such as grazing and keeping of livestock. Consultation on these issues is expected to take place at the district level. Controlled Hunting Area status can also be removed or changed by government according to whether or not the current policy approach is to favour communities or the private sector.

4.2 Malawi

Malawi is a small country (118,482 sq km) with a population of 9.6 million, giving a population density of 81 persons per sq km of which 78% are rural. Because there is little wildlife in communal lands the main CWM emphasis is on the relationships between protected areas and their neighbouring communities.

Until recently, Malawi had not integrated the interests of local communities into its conservation policy. Malawi (like South Africa) is now faced with "hard-edge" boundaries for its protected areas and there are serious conflicts between the protected areas and adjacent communities. In order to resolve this Malawi is exploring resource sharing and co-management possibilities. Managers of protected areas are exploring various co-management options with the intention of devolving decision-making to local-level management systems that include the rural communities. It is expected that by doing this the protected areas will be able to fulfil their aims of conserving biological diversity while addressing the needs of "resource-hungry" neighbouring communities.

The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 provides the policy and legal environment for these programmes. The Act provides for consumptive and non-consumptive use of protected area resources if these are in the best interests of conservation of the protected area. It also allows the establishment of a conservation fund to collect public revenues generated through use of wildlife and allows disbursements from the fund to selected beneficiaries (including neighbouring communities). Some work has been done by UNDP (5th Country Programme 1993) to develop community institutions for wildlife management in selected Local Impact Areas (LIAs) but a noticeable feature of all of the projects below is a lack of emphasis on institution building.

Projects are currently being developed and implemented in the following areas:

1. Kasungu National Park (European Union)
2. Nyika National Park and Vwaza Marsh Wildlife Reserve (KfW and GFF)
3. Nkhosokota Wildlife Reserve (JICA)
4. Nankumba Peninsula (World Bank)
5. Lower Shire Parks and Reserves, i.e. Lengwe, Majete and Mwabvi (World Bank).

All of these projects are basically similar in that their stated aims are to improve the standard of living of adjacent communities through sustainable use of the protected-area resources. An extension programme is incorporated into each project. The planning and implementation of these projects has started but it would be premature to assess their success at this stage.

4.3 Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the larger countries in southern Africa covering some 800,000 sq km with a population estimated at 17.5 million of which 70% live in the rural areas. Mozambique is emerging from both the destructive effects of two decades of war, which started shortly after the transition from colonial rule by Portugal, and the effects of centrally planned economic and political strategies. Peace was achieved in 1992; multiparty elections were held in 1994 and the country's economic policies are now moving rapidly towards free market approaches.

Although endowed with one of the richest combinations of natural resources in Africa – land, water, forest, wildlife and coastal elements – that hold great potential for development, Mozambique is now listed as among the poorest countries in the world. Mozambique has, since the early 1960s, set aside 11.4% of its surface area for various wildlife conservation zones. Most of this conservation estate was expedited by colonial legislation passed in Lisbon, which continues to provide the main conservation framework today. Decree no. 40040 of January 20, 1955 provided for the protection of Mozambique's soils, fauna and flora. This was followed by the publication of wildlife regulations in Legislative Diploma 1982 of June 1960. This gave the colonial government custodianship over all natural resources and provided for a complex system of wildlife protection zones. These are:

- National Parks (Parques Nacionais)
- Integrated Nature Reserves (Reservas Naturais Integradas)
- Partial Reserves (Reservas Parciais)
- Special Reserves (Reservas Especiais)
- Wildlife Defence Zones (Zonas de Vigilância).

In addition, legislation was passed in 1969 that allowed the delimitation of special hunting areas, known as *contadus*. National Parks provide for tourism development but exclude all other forms of wildlife utilisation. Integrated Nature Reserves require special entry permits. Partial Reserves prohibit the killing of wildlife except for scientific or other authorised purposes. Special Reserves provide protection for one or more species of wildlife, while hunting in these can only be authorised by veterinary authorities. Wildlife Defence Zones provide protection for rare or endangered species and can be upgraded into Special Reserves (Catterson *et al.* 1991).

Mozambique currently has four National Parks, five game reserves, 12 hunting areas (*contadus*) and 14 forest reserves, covering a total area of 89,602 km² – although the current legal status of these areas is uncertain. Most were designated between 1960 and 1971. They were mainly selected because of large assemblages of wildlife within them; little consideration (with the partial exception of Gorongosa) was given to infrastructure development, tourism marketing and the protection of biodiversity other than wildlife. Comparatively little effort was put into developing these areas along the preservationist lines of the former British colonies in the region (Catterson *et al.* 1991). Most of the reserves and parks exist only on paper and have substantial numbers of people living inside them.

Another anomaly deriving from Mozambique's history of decolonisation is that, although the Frelimo government annulled all colonial laws when it came to power in 1975, little new legislation has been passed since independence in terms of wildlife conservation. Thus it is only in recent years that Mozambique has begun to give serious policy attention to community wildlife and tourism programmes. The National Directorate for Forestry and Wildlife (DNFFB) in the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the Ministry of the Environment and the Institute for Rural Development, have begun to take a cautious, experimental approach. A new land law has been passed that explicitly allows for the decentralisation of resource management and retention of benefits to provincial and district levels. A pilot project is being implemented with the community of Bawa in the Tete Province, located at the headwaters of the Cahora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi River near the border with Zimbabwe. The project, locally entitled *Tchuma Tchato* (meaning "our wealth"), is facilitated by a DNFFB officer and has been supported by the IUCN, IDRC and the Ford Foundation. Interestingly, the *Tchuma Tchato* project was initiated in 1994 with an exchange visit between the leadership of a CAMPFIRE project at Masoko in nearby Zimbabwe and the "natural resources council" of Bawa. The Bawa council also travelled to Masoko, examined their management techniques and had another round of debate with the Masoko wildlife committee. Since it was initiated, the *Tchuma Tchato* programme has received more than 30 visits from representatives of other villages on the banks of the Zambezi River and the shores of Cahora Bassa Dam who seek to establish similar programmes.

It is an interesting feature of evolving CBNRM in Mozambique that policy and legal changes are taking place in tandem with implementation (and sometimes led by projects) as opposed to the more usual development of policy and legal aspects prior to programmes. Given the complex political, policy and legal changes occurring in Mozambique, pilot programmes will probably continue to play an important role in advancing the policy and legal framework for CBNRM in Mozambique. (Cruz 1995 in Koch 1998).

4.4 Namibia

Namibia's wildlife policy developed in a way similar to that of Zimbabwe. The owners of alienated commercial farms and ranches were accorded use rights over wildlife in 1967. As in Zimbabwe the wildlife industry boomed after independence into a multi-million dollar game farming, tourist and hunting enterprise. In 1991 the Ministry of Environment and Tourism produced a policy to promote the creation of conservancies similar to those that emerged in Zimbabwe. This document – which explicitly accepts the five principals of CAMPFIRE – defined conservancies as follows:

A conservancy is a group of farms on which neighbouring landowners have pooled their resources for the purpose of conserving and utilising wildlife on their combined properties. The conservancy concept does not have to be restricted to the commercial farming areas, but can be extended to communal land as well (Government of Namibia 1996).

Because Namibia does not have local government structures that are as clearly defined as they are in Zimbabwe, that country has used the conservancy model to create the management context for wildlife and natural resource in communal lands. The promulgation of the 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act provides that:

Any group of people residing on communal land and which desires to have the area which they inhabit, or any part thereof, to be declared a conservancy shall apply to the Minister of Environment and Tourism... (Government of Namibia 1996).

A community can thus acquire the authority necessary under Namibian wildlife legislation to manage and utilise wildlife and natural resources within the designated conservancy area. The group's membership must be listed and be structured as a conservancy committee, served by a conservancy constitution. The key institutional ingredients are: listed membership, constitution, designated boundaries, administrative and financial competence, sustainable management and utilisation objectives, accountability, and transparency. The Minister retains regulatory oversight and ultimately may use such external sanctions as withdrawal of recognition, amendment or withdrawal of conditions. The conservancy legislation only confers use rights over wildlife and tourism resources to communities. It does not confer communal ownership to the land itself, and in this respect Namibia's CBNRM status resembles that of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme. However, it should be noted that Namibia's CBNRM programme differs from that of Zimbabwe in that it does not experience the tension that exists in Zimbabwe between district government and village or ward level (Hulme and Murphree 1999).

Namibia's policy and legislative environment goes further than any other in southern Africa in terms of giving secure rights over wildlife and tourism directly to local communities. Communities have to define themselves, enabling the development of cohesive social management units with incentives for individuals to cooperate together, rather than be defined by artificial administrative units that potentially force people together who would not normally co-operate. The rights given to communities are exclusive and relatively strong. In the case of wildlife that may be hunted, communities gain conditional ownership of game with the State continuing to set quotas for all consumptive activities. In the case of tourism, concessionary rights automatically go to a conservancy on registration by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET).

The conservancy policy and legislation is flexible enough to make provision for the variety of socio-cultural and ecological conditions that exist in Namibia. The legislation does not prescribe the size of a conservancy nor does it prescribe how a conservancy committee should be appointed. It leaves communities to decide who should represent them on the conservancy committee. Therefore communities are able to shape their conservancy according to the social and ecological conditions of their own areas and choose their committees in a manner consistent with their own cultural norms.

Because communities are dynamic, and change over time, the flexibility of the legislation enables communities to change and adapt the manner in which they choose their committee.

Although the policy and legislation give strong and exclusive resource rights over wildlife and tourism, they clearly do not give secure and exclusive land tenure. If communities are not able to control access to their land, even with state backing, it will be difficult for them to control access to their resources. The current system of "open access" to communal land in Namibia provides a threat to the opportunities for sustainable resource management provided by the conservancy approach. Without exclusive group land rights, other people can move into a conservancy area and settle on the land, using resources being conserved by the existing residents. The current version of the White Paper on Land Reform addresses this issue by providing for communal area residents to gain exclusive group tenure and by specifically enabling conservancies to apply for "ownership" of their land.

4.5 South Africa

In South Africa numerous community wildlife management initiatives had originated as pilot programmes in the former independent black homeland states. One such programme began in 1984 on the southern border of the Kruger National Park in the former KaNgwane homeland. This is the Mlhetomusha Reserve that was created in 1984 on land owned by isiSwati-speaking Mplakeni people. The local chief and his councillors initially feared the community would lose their grazing land because of the declaration of a game reserve but they were won over to the alternate idea of ecotourism/conservation when KaNgwane conservation officials pointed out that the area was mountainous and without enough water for all-year grazing. The promise of new jobs in the project also helped convince the tribal leaders and they gave their consent, naming the new project Mlhetomusha ("the new law or the new way of doing things"). Some 200 jobs were created, most of them filled by people from the nearby villages. Meat, and the wood to cook it, is provided once a year for a large celebration in the reserve. 60 per cent of income from an upmarket lodge in the game park goes to the tribal authority, which remains the owner of the land. Another early attempt to initiate a CWM scheme in South Africa is the Pilanesberg National Park, located in the former Bophuthatswana homeland. The small park, about 58,000 hectares in size, is ringed by some of South Africa's most luxurious hotels and casinos including the Lost City, Sun City and the Marula Lodge.

The Pilanesberg reserve was opened in 1979 in controversial fashion as it involved apartheid-style removals. The reserve was located in an undemocratic homeland run until recently by the government of Lucas Mangope. A study conducted in 1984 found that the creation of the Pilanesberg reserve caused serious problems for the original inhabitants and people living in settlements surrounding the park. According to the study, the reserve's original inhabitants lost access to grazing land for cattle. Subsequently, the parks board initiated serious efforts to make the reserve benefit the communities that live on its borders. It has encouraged community development organisations (CDOs) in the settlements around Pilanesberg. These independent institutions, with representatives nominated by the tribal authority and an equal number chosen from among ordinary residents, make key decisions about management and the use of revenue derived from the park. This initiative is seen as an effective way of reconciling the need for popular participation with traditional structures of local government. The former Bophuthatswana National Parks Board established reserves in other parts of the homeland, including the Madikwe Game Reserve in 1991. (The paper on the Madikwe Game Reserve by Magome *et al.* in this collection points, however, to the problems that stemmed from exporting the CDO model – with its assumptions of community cohesion – and applying it to the very different social reality that existed in the Madikwe area.)

After the country's democratic transformation in the 1990s and the abolition of the homeland system, these experiments started being replicated. The new government's Reconstruction and Develop-

ment Programme provided a new vision for South Africa, and conservationists embraced it. Reluctance existed in some quarters where people feared land invasions and increased poaching. Peer pressure from other government departments, budget cuts, loss of law enforcement staff, and in some instances a genuine desire for more sustainable practices and conflict management were other factors at play here. The terms "community participation" and "benefit-sharing" found their way into the policy documents of many government departments, including the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the Tourism White Paper, various provincial White Papers and policy documents, and most recently in the mission statements of some spatial development initiatives. Protected areas have not been immune to land restitution: several cases of claims to conservation land by communities have played an important role in emerging trends.

4.6 Zambia

The evolution of CWM policy in Zambia has been partially in response to a massive decline in elephant and rhino populations due to illegal hunting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which motivated the granting of benefits as an enticement for conservation by rural communities. An important workshop held in 1993 in the Luangwa Valley (The Lupande Development Workshop) resulted in a Presidential Directive that led to the creation of the Administrative Management Design (ADMADe) Programme for Game Management Areas (GMAs) and the Luangwa Integrated Development Project (LIRDIP). In the same year Zambia provided policy support for CWM through its Policy for Wildlife in Zambia, which established an administrative and financial framework for the further development of the ADMADe programme. The implementation of ADMADe relies on two institutional instruments: Wildlife Management Authorities (WMAs), which are a local-level administrative institution, and the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (WCRF) which is a centralised funding mechanism (Rihoy 1995). A feature of the ADMADe programme (now being challenged) is the central role of traditional authority (chiefs) in decision-making and revenue distribution.

The key factors giving rise to CWM in Zambia have been:

- the need by state agencies to involve communities in curbing unsustainable resource use and protecting for state protected areas;
- the demand by rural populations in Zambia for access to resources;
- a critical shortage of capital available for rural development.

CWM initiatives in Zambia have tended to be more centralised than other countries in the region in respect of their policy on the devolution of management authority, tenure and access rights. The distribution of benefits is only partial and the use of benefits is tightly controlled: the State retains 40 per cent of all monies earned from wildlife in GMAs and adjacent protected areas to cover management costs and a further 25 per cent for administrative costs. This has resulted in increasing pressure from rural communities who wish to have greater control over their resources and financial management.

4.7 Zimbabwe

CAMPFIRE has its legal origins in the promulgation of the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act. The preamble of this Act indicates the objective "to confer privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife, fish and plants" (Government of Zimbabwe, 1975). The Act designates these "owners or occupiers of alienated land" as "appropriate authorities" over wildlife, effectively making farms and ranches into proprietorial wildlife units, combining "ownership", management, cost and benefit. Zimbabwean wildlife policy continues to accord a place to more conventional conservation approaches. At the time of Independence in 1980 the Act was confined to the commercial, freehold sector. Small-scale black farmers, many of them living in the underdeveloped but wildlife-rich periph-

ery of the country, did not receive the privileges and benefits of the Act. It was clearly discriminatory and in 1982 the government amended the Act allowing the Minister to appoint a rural district council "to be the appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may be specified."

The Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) continued to implement a programme they had initiated in 1978, designated WINDFALL (Wildlife Industries New Development for All). The basic premise of WINDFALL was that human/wildlife conflicts would be reduced and attitudes to conservation improved in communal lands if the benefits of wildlife were returned to communities living with wild animals. This was to be done by making meat from culls in the adjacent national parks available to local inhabitants and by returning revenues from safari hunting to the relevant district councils. WINDFALL largely failed to achieve its objectives. Little meat found its way back to local communities, and only a small proportion of the proceeds survived the circuitous routes of bureaucratic accountability before returning to district councils, let alone to original communities. Even more fundamentally, WINDFALL failed to generate local participation in decision-making and the sense of local proprietorship. The money that found its way back to source communities was seen as a government handout, conveying little sense of the relationship between the money and the management of wildlife resources... DNPWLM strategists were well aware that WINDFALL was not the vehicle for the replication of game ranching success in communal lands. They were also aware that the issues involved were more economic and institutional than ecological. Thus they sought the advice of economists and social scientists in a dialogue that over time coalesced into a conceptual 'think tank.' (Murphree 1998).

So from WINDFALL, CAMPFIRE emerged. The game ranch experience was modified for the communal land context.

Fundamental to this formulation was a tenurial assumption. It was postulated that neither the current status of state tenure nor the alternative of the individualisation of tenure would viably address the requirements involved for the transplant. State tenure could not provide the required institutional profile. Individualisation of communal land holdings, extended to common pool resources, would result in a fragmentation of management to levels where any possible benefits would be negated. The only viable alternative was a third tenurial category: a societally sanctioned communal common pool property regime legitimated by title or lease granted to it as a body corporate. (Murphree 1998)

In 1989 the first two CAMPFIRE districts (Nyaminyami and Gutu) were granted "appropriate authority" to manage their wildlife resources. At the time of writing, 36 districts have been granted such authority.

CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe was the first programme to recognise that conservation of natural resources requires the sustainable use and management of those resources by "producer communities". The development of CWM within CAMPFIRE is primarily the result of a non-prescriptive process that has allowed for a broad interpretation of the legislation and from progressive ideas from within the government wildlife agency that recognised the inadequacies of state management and control. Another strength of CAMPFIRE has been its implementation. For this the programme has been able to draw on a pool of highly skilled local expertise from a range of government departments and NGOs. The development of CWM in Zimbabwe has relied on:

- a model for successful wildlife conservation and management provided by commercial farmers on private land;
- progressive concepts subsequently influencing policy and legislation;
- a broad interpretation of the legislation;
- a realisation by state authorities of their own inadequacies and of the appropriate levels of for effective management;

- highly skilled personnel within government and NGOs;
- a sense of proprietorship by producer communities, which when pooled results in a group of resource managers with considerable political weight.

A weakness in CAMPFIRE is that the decentralisation process has stopped at the level of the district council – which effectively prevents communities from achieving full tenure rights over their resources. Despite efforts in 1994-95 to persuade the Ministry of Environment and Tourism that further legal provisions for devolution to ward and village levels were needed, there has been little policy or legal progress in CAMPFIRE since its inception.

The success of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme has inspired CWM initiatives in other parts of the region. It is important to note that this success was initially achieved with a minimal amount of legislation, no formal policy document and little donor funding. In fact, the relative performance of CAMPFIRE districts in the efficiency and effectiveness of wildlife management today appears to be inversely proportional to the amount of donor inputs received.



5. Challenging the Assumptions

The papers commissioned for this series, along with a range of other new research being conducted in the region, raise a series of new issues and challenges for the paradigm upon which CWM was based. The case studies conducted under this particular project have led us to question the latter-day assumptions that benefit sharing, devolution of power and establishment of institutions would automatically lead to more sustainable wildlife use by communities. This does not mean that CWM needs to be thrown out the window, but rather that initiatives need to be implemented with caution and sensitivity, and that an adaptive management approach should be used.

5.1 Incongruent goals and contexts

Policy-makers, donors and other role players, conventionally label initiatives that deal with the management of biodiversity resources on communal land CWM or CBNRM. The impression can be easily created that such initiatives are homogeneous and therefore that they require similar approaches in their management and implementation. This study has shown that CWM projects and initiatives in the sub-region are extremely varied and that they are influenced by a large variety of contextual factors (Table 1). Some of these factors (those at the bottom end of the table) are dynamic, and it is possible to influence their parameters through intervention. Others (those at the top end of the table) are more static and impossible or difficult to change or influence. These factors include:

- the reason for the initiatives' establishment (mainly conservation, a mixture of politics and conservation, or mainly politics and development);
- how access is controlled (mainly by the state to entirely by the community);
- the level of participation (no participation, coercion, to community-driven);
- type of land tenure (freehold, private, to communal);
- the level of community cohesion (large, divided and diverse to small, homogeneous and cohesive);
- extent of donor support (high to low);
- the revenue-generating potential at the locality (low to high).

The positions of initiatives along these continua dictate the approach that should be adopted by policy makers, facilitators and practitioners. It would be dangerous to extrapolate from one initiative to another, unless their contexts are similar.

Our own research and that of others has shown that the end goals of CWM initiatives are often not explicitly stated. And when stated they vary greatly, both between role players, as well as over time. *It depends on whom you ask, and when you ask them.*

Table 1. The goals and characteristics of community wildlife management (CWM)

CRITERION, AND POSITION ALONG CONTINUUM				
Dwe Mka Mainly biodiversity conservation	Ric	Cam	Oka Nam Mak	Mad Mainly politics and development
Mad	Dwe, Mka	Ric	Oka Nam	Mak Cam
Freehold	LAND TENURE			Communes
Dwe	Mad Mka	Ric	Cam Mak	Nam Oka Small, homogeneous, cohesive
Large, diverse, divided	COMMUNITY'S COHESIVENESS			
Mad	Ric Nam Ric Mak	Cam Mka Dwe		
Low	COMMUNITIES' CAPACITY			High
Mka Dwe Low		Cam Mad	Ric Mak Oka	Nam High
	Ric Dwe Mka	Mak	Mad	Cam Oka Nam High
Mka, Dwe	Mad	Ric	Cam	Oka Nam Mak Community control
Top-down, state control	CONTROL OF ACCESS			
Mka Dwe No participation, coercion	Mad	Ric	Cam	Mak Oka Nam Community-driven
Nam Cam Oka	Mad	Mak	Ric	Dwe Mka High
Low	DONOR SUPPORT			

FLEXIBILITY AND POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE

Note: Criteria are arranged along a gradient of 'inertia' to change, from the most inert at the top to the most flexible and easiest to change at the bottom.

Cam = CAMPFIRE, Dwe = Dweza, Mad = Makuleke, Mak = Makenke, Mka = Mkomoti, Oka = Okavango cases (Kwa and Sankuyu), Nam = Namibian conservancies, Ric = Richtersveld National Park.

The important challenges for CWM are:

- clarifying the desired outcomes and end goals;
- coming to terms with the fact that different role players have different end goals; and,
- foreseeing that their end goals may change over time.

A lack of clarity and respect for the different role players' end goals lies at the root of conflicts in CWM initiatives.

Recent insights by several authors reveal that communities, although they may go along with CWM initiatives, do not necessarily subscribe to the same goals as governments and donors. For example, Murobedzi (1999) found that communities in the Masoka Ward in the Dande Communal Lands

in Zimbabwe do not reinvest their dividends in wildlife management, even though the wildlife-generated revenue per household is among the highest in that country. Rather, their goals are to farm with livestock and to benefit from modern development by encouraging population growth in Masoka Ward. Similar developments have taken place in the Okavango Delta where some communities earn large dividends from wildlife tourism programmes on their land, but are "risk-adverse" when it comes to reinvesting their revenues in further tourism projects, choosing instead to bank it or invest it in other forms of land use; the Rural District Council, on the other hand, sees good wildlife management as a priority. Nevertheless, revenue from wildlife contributes substantially to the district's income, much more so than local taxes.

These incongruent and varying end goals can lead to serious conflicts between the different role players, and play an important role in shaping people's perceptions. At Dwesa, in South Africa, conservation professionals were interested in preserving the forest and inter-tidal resources, whereas communities strived towards increased levels of utilization. The actions of these two groups were shaped by these opposing end goals, with predictable conflicts (Timmermans 1999).

There is no blueprint.

Table 2. Role players and the outcomes they strive towards in community wildlife management (CWM).


Role player	Desired outcome
Primary resource users (communities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved or continued access to natural resources Land ownership Financial and material benefits Get jobs Gain control and power Political recognition and 'self-determination' Generate aesthetic and cultural benefits Conserve resources for future generations
Management agency (e.g. government or parastatal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conserve resources Generate aesthetic and cultural benefits Resolve conflicts Reduce management costs Gain control and power Contribute to rural development Score political points or avoid embarrassment Get more land
Private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Profit financially Contribute to rural development Manage and resolve conflicts
NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribute to rural development Conserve resources Improve human rights Benefit financially
Donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribute to rural development Conserve resources Politics

5.2 Fluctuating achievements

CWM initiatives, like all development projects, are dynamic and go through cycles of achievement or under-achievement and success or failure. These achievements can be evaluated in two main dimensions: achievements that benefit people (mainly economic, social, cultural and political) and achievements that benefit wildlife populations and habitats (Figure 1). Thus, any attempt to evaluate their success should be sensitive to temporal variations in these two dimensions – in fact, to evaluate a community wildlife management initiative based on its accomplishments at a particular point in time, in snapshot fashion, can be misleading and uninformative.

Within the context of the southern African *Evaluating Eden* case studies, we realised that the most important lessons were those which assisted us in understanding why an initiative may display an upward swing toward positive achievements for both people and wildlife, versus a downward swing, towards negative results. Evaluating the progress of CWM is more informative than trying to measure its ultimate success or failure. For example, communities at Dwesa and Mkambati are currently well advanced in claiming back land from which they had previously been removed. Simultaneously, the South African government has committed itself to accelerated rural development through the Spatial Development Initiatives or SDIs along the Wild Coast. Twelve months hence these two initiatives may be at entirely different positions along the continua illustrated in Figure 1. In Botswana, at Sankuyo, replacement of an old tribal chief by a younger one appeared to have had a drastic effect on local people's outlook on the project and their level of ownership over a short period (C. Fabricius pers. obs.). In the Eastern Cape, likewise, it was observed that people's attitudes and perceptions could change rapidly. Conservationists became involved in environmental education and extension work with the Glenmore community adjacent to the Great Fish River Reserve (Fabricius and Burger 1997). Inhabitants received minimal benefits in the form of short-term employment and free visits to the nature reserve over a period of 12 months. An attitude survey by Ainslie (1995) found that 67% of the people surveyed in Glenmore supported the existence of the nature reserve, against an average of less than 40% in the other neighbouring communities where people had not received any benefits.

Figure 1. Imaginary time-line for a hypothetical community wildlife management (CWM) initiative.



Notes: The dotted line represents fluctuations in the benefits to wildlife, while the solid line represents fluctuations in the benefits to local communities. The downward-pointing arrows represent negative events that cause a decrease in achievements, whereas upward-pointing arrows represent positive events that cause an increase in achievements.

5.3 Complex communities

Community noun; a body of people in the same locality; the public in general; people having common rights, etc.; a body of persons leading a common life, or under socialistic or similar organization; a group of people who have common interests, characteristics or culture; a monastic body; any group of plants growing together under natural conditions and forming a recognizable sort of vegetation.

The 'C' in CWM does not exist as an entity – it is nebulous, fluid and elusive, and often a figment of the imagination of project managers and donors seeking quick fixes. The common belief among donors and project managers is that it saves time to group people together, because of the simplicity of working with fewer groups. Our findings suggest the opposite: if the groupings within a community and the differences between groups are not well understood or taken into account, then conflicts emerge that are difficult to mend.

Some of the common problems in the sub region are:

- Project managers tend to combine different villages into single entities, only for facilitators or project managers to discover that the groups vary greatly in terms of their skills, socio-economic backgrounds and attitudes. At Madikwe, the Parks Board formed a single community development forum to address the needs of three communities that actually differed in their attitudes and socio-economic profiles (Magome *et al.* 2000). Each village was unique and had its own dynamics that affected its behaviour and attitudes towards Madikwe – a contrast to the false assumption of the Parks Board that these villages represented one single homogeneous community with the same social and economic needs. To some extent, this flawed assumption has contributed to delaying the effective participation of these three villages at Madikwe.
- Within communities, there exist large differences between different user groups and entities. In the Mkambati area, Kepe *et al.* (2000) identified seven communities of interest who earn their livelihoods in different ways. These "livelihood clusters" had different needs, and although all the clusters used natural resources in some way or another, only two of the groups made direct use of biodiversity resources. For project managers to approach the entire community as an entity would be a mistake. The newly initiated Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) attempts to facilitate rural development through tourism along a 100-km stretch of coastline between Mkambati and Dwesa.

The needs of three villages at Madikwe, South Africa, ranked in order of priority:

Lekgopung

- development of village infrastructure
- creation of job opportunities
- provision of school bursaries

Supingstad

- creation of job opportunities
- development of the village
- bursaries lumped with other small needs

Molatedi

- school bursaries
- creation of job opportunities
- development of the village.

Source: Magome *et al.* 2000

Although Common Property Associations (CPAs) are being initiated to deal with smaller groupings, these are probably still too coarsely defined to adequately deal with the diversity of livelihoods found inside villages.

- There is also a tendency to define communities along geographic boundaries but this could be erroneous as well. In Namibia, several communities were grouped together into the same conservancy because of the legislative requirement that conservancies should have clearly defined boundaries. A geographic definition of boundaries was used, which did not correspond with the local political boundaries. This roused dormant disputes over land, and the ensuing struggle over land and group membership hamstringing the development of the conservancy for a long time (Jones 1999a).
- Common property theory, upon which the basic premises of CWM are based, assumes that communal use of wildlife and other natural resources both depends upon and also reinforces a sense of cohesion among the user groups or communities. Indeed, there are numerous documented cases in Africa and other parts of the world where such collective use of resources translates into community strength and solidarity. For example the Makuleke people, who have displayed high degrees of internal solidity and solidarity during and after their struggle for land rights in the Kruger National Park, it may be argued, otherwise forged their identity and independence during a time when their livelihoods depended on an intricate system of natural resource utilisation – hunting, fishing, harvesting wild fruits, making palm wine – in what is now the Pafuri section of the park.

Our case studies provide extensive evidence that under some conditions integrated conservation and development projects in many parts of the subcontinent are accompanied by intra community conflict and fissures – often galvanised by group competition and fracturing to intercept the benefits that flow into the ‘community’ from these projects. In Zimbabwe, Muromhedzi (1999) and other researchers recorded tensions between village and district councils over access to CAMPFIRE’s hunting dividends. There are documented cases where groups band together to exclude others – outsiders, new arrivals, single mothers and their children who are not accepted as constituting households – from access to revenues derived from the use of wildlife.

In Botswana, Boggs (2000) demonstrates that in the communal wildlife areas of Khwai and Sankuyo a whole set of new internal conflicts have emerged within the owner communities in response by the CWM programme’s efforts there to create new wildlife management institutions. Hasler (1999) demonstrates that the definition and demographic profile of communities can be constantly shifting – often defining and redefining the boundaries in response to the implementation of integrated conservation and development programmes. Thus, when new people move into successful CWM areas, sometimes the revenues derived from wildlife are used to move out of the community and invest elsewhere.

South African case studies are replete with such examples, indicating that in the absence of other sources of revenue and development, community-based organisations that are set up to manage CWM programmes frequently convert into sites of conflict and tensions over access to the often-meagre benefits that flow from the programmes.

5.4 Imperfect local knowledge

*Rural communities, scientists and policy makers understand the concept of resource scarcity differently. Rural people’s perception of scarcity is shaped by what they see around them, rather than by a more global understanding of the status of resources. A striking example is that of Komo farmers’ perceptions of the riverine rabbit (*Bunolagus monticularis*) in the 1960s and 70s. This rabbit is endemic to a very small area of the interior of South Africa and has very narrow habitat require-*

ments; it is widely regarded as South Africa's rarest mammal (Smithers 1983). But before its endangered status was explained to the farmers, they thought it occurred everywhere because it was locally reasonably abundant. Moreover, it occurs only in dry riverbeds, adjacent to which most roads and homesteads in the Karoo are built. This further influenced their perception of its abundance. If affluent farmers with access to libraries and radio could have held misconceptions about the rarity of a species, then remote rural communities are likely to be even more poorly informed (Boggs 2000).

This difference in perception was observed in Botswana, where communities in the Okavango Delta were unaware that wildlife is declining throughout Botswana (Boggs 2000). Therefore, there was weak support for community law enforcement and enforcement did not feature in the communities' game management plans. In reality, however, there is great concern over wildlife numbers in northern Botswana, as pointed out by various scientific reports.

Table 3: Perceptions within two communities regarding wildlife population change in Botswana over the past ten years

	% who believe wildlife populations have decreased over past 10 years	% who believe wildlife populations have increased over past 10 years
Khwai	13%	87%
Sankuyo	8%	92%

At Dwesa, local communities believe that the sea and coastline is constantly replenished by a divine being (*uXamata*) who keeps it in equilibrium. A strong belief among local people is that intertidal resources can be sustainably harvested at high levels.

The prevailing view among local people (as expressed in workshops and meetings on the issue) is that the shellfish stocks within the reserve are plentiful and that these stocks could never become depleted as access is controlled by uXamata, the Xhosa equivalent of a Supreme Being. Because of the size of the gap between this view and that of the reserve managers (and scientists as we will see below) the issue of shellfish harvesting has proved one of the most difficult resource-based issues to resolve and remains an emotional issue constraining the development of trust and co-operation between the local players. (Timmermans 1999).

Scientists, on the other hand, have discovered that the marine resources at Dwesa are unique because they represent a transition zone between tropical and cooler inter-tidal communities, and because they have not yet been invaded by any exotic commercial species of mussel. Research has determined that the mussel beds take a long time to recover after heavy harvesting.

5.5 Problematic preservationists

Scientists, the public and policy-makers sometimes believe that a resource is highly sensitive to over-utilisation, whereas local people who have been using it for decades believe that a resource may be resilient to harvesting. The current CITES debate about elephant harvesting is an example. Northern Hemisphere NGOs and pressure groups believe that elephants are special and scarce and will become extinct when hunted and that trade in elephant products will lead to increased illegal use. CAMPFIRE communities and southern African scientists, on the other hand, have learnt that it is indeed possible, in fact essential, to harvest elephants without permanent damage to populations, and that the revenue generated in this way can contribute to conservation and rural development. These differing perceptions about risk has led to serious conflicts, reflected in the past decades' CITES debate about whether or not trade in elephant products should be legalised (Husler 1999). The conse-

quence of powerful lobbying by northern pressure groups is that rural people are constrained in what they are able to do with their resources because of national and international legislation. The Makuleke community, for example, do not automatically have the right to consumptively harvest wildlife in the Pafuri area, even though they have won back land rights in this part of the Kruger National Park (Steenkamp 2000, Reid 2001).

5.6 Questionable custodianship

Evidence from Zimbabwe and Botswana demonstrates that, even in fairly successful CWM areas, there is sometimes no direct awareness of the value of wildlife. Says Boggs (2000):

In response to the question: who owns and manages the land and wildlife, out of 23 heads of household surveyed in Sankuyo, 92% report the answer to be government, 4% God, and 4% say it is the community. In Khwai, out of 31 surveyed, 68% report government, 16% say it is the BaSuruwa, 7% say it is God, 6% say is their community, and 3% report it is all people of Botswana. This indicates a continuing perception that the responsibility for wildlife management does not ultimately fall with the communities. Behaviours towards wildlife and wildlife protection can also be expected not to have changed.

CBNRM was designed to change this attitude, but interestingly, after three years of CWM, both Khwai and Sankuyo membership overwhelmingly perceive the management and ownership of the land and wildlife resources still to be the ultimate responsibility of the government.

Of crucial importance to good natural resource management, is that the recipients of benefits should make the link between the benefit and the resource base. The majority (60 and 61 per cent) of the Khwai and Sankuyo communities in Botswana did not think there was a relationship between financial benefits and wildlife (Boggs 2000).

5.7 Unpredictable governance

Fundamental to an investigation of CBNRM is an understanding of the theory and assumptions underlying political decentralisation. Decentralisation implies a process of redistribution of power and transfers responsibilities from top (central government) to bottom (rural communities) and makes the important assumption that this process will result in improved management of natural resources. There is some convincing evidence that CWM programmes like CAMPFIRE not only lead to environmental sustainability but pioneer new forms of stable local governance in rural parts of Africa.

There are, however, numerous counter examples. In South Africa in particular growing evidence indicates it is naïve to believe that community-based organisations can provide the forum for local government and management institutions to decide on how to use and distribute the benefits that flow from ICDPs. Madikwe, Mthethomusha, Pilanesberg, Ndumo, Kosi Bay, Dwesa, Cwebe - all case studies of fairly long-standing community conservation programmes in South Africa - demonstrate that at certain times the community-based organisations initially set up to manage revenue from tourism or other wildlife usage rather become the sites of acute intra-community conflict.

This evidence is not just academic: it poses serious strategic considerations for practitioners of CWM. So far there are two revisions or nuances to CWM theory that may, under certain conditions and under certain moments in time, be considered:

1. External monitoring and setting of rules that limit and control local manipulation of community-based organisation for factional interest may often be necessary. In some cases, when the state (especially at local level) is well resourced and seen as legitimate, it can play this role. In South

Africa's land reform programme, the Department of Land Affairs is explicitly designated as monitor of new communal property associations. Local government is explicitly identified as the institution to oversee development – and must frequently intervene, or sometimes wait to acquire the means for intervention in a “top down” manner, to ensure that village level committees function in an equitable way. NGOs and other trusted or impartial brokers can sometimes play this mediation role.

2. Mediation services to resolve internal community conflict around CWM are often required on a substantial scale. In short, experience has shown it is not wise to rely simplistically or romantically on the CWM assumption that devolution to the smallest local group will inevitably result in good governance and management.

In many cases CBNRM projects appear to be caught between intra-community conflicts and under capacitated (even predatory) local governments. The lack of stable and institutionalised municipal governance in many parts of Africa may well be either the Achilles heel or the critical factor for success factor of such projects. There is no blueprint approach for dealing with the problem, only the need to devise careful strategies that are informed by specific historical circumstances and not hindered by blind adherence to convention and orthodoxy.

5.8 Ill-considered donor investments

The above evidence and patterns beg another question. CWM programmes have been accompanied by extensive investment of donor and NGO money and human resources in the creation of appropriate local institutions for community management of natural resources. Data from Zimbabwe demonstrates that CAMPFIRE, for example, is dependent on very high levels of aid flow. The ratio of revenue received through international aid to revenue generated through wildlife is more than four to one (US\$45 million received in total aid versus US\$8-10 million generated).

There is little doubt that most of the CWM programmes in the sub region are providing new and important models of rural governance and there is no suggestion that these sources of aid be curtailed. However, given the expense of these programmes, it is suggested that generators of benefits other than communally managed programmes should also be considered. It seems particularly important to consider:

- Individual entrepreneurs or small groups of entrepreneurs that set up SMMEs and other forms of privately owned small businesses. These can effectively take advantage of out-sourced business opportunities from wildlife areas and tourism lodges (e.g. laundry, bush-clearing, cultural activities such as theatre groups, etc.) (Koch 1994).
- The wage mechanism is often the most effective form of delivering benefits from conservation to rural households. Lodges and game reserves are important employers of labour in rural areas. Typically a game lodge in South Africa will pay between 4% and 10% of its turnover to a landowner (in some cases communities) in the form of lease fees, while the wage bill is often closer to 30% of turnover. Sometimes the lease fee from lodges goes into new community organisations where it can and is often intercepted and diverted from the intended beneficiaries. Wages that do go directly into the household – often with affirmative gender and poverty alleviation criteria – can benefit the most marginal groups in communities. CWM should not ignore the need to favour best wage conditions through organised labour and to train people to command the best and highest paid jobs in tourist game lodges.

It is fast becoming a truism that communities lack the management capacity to manage wildlife enterprises, and the development of that capacity is high on donor agendas. But do communities want to develop their management capacity? Recently, the chief at one of the three villages at

Madikwe, South Africa protested against a \$650 000 aid programme being dedicated to ICDPs and requested to be given the discretion to use the funds for other development projects (Magome *et al.* 2000). The most likely reason why they have resisted this type of long-term investment in their futures is because the future is heavily discounted: the future is uncertain and in the case of Madikwe there are unresolved claims to the land which makes it even more uncertain. An interesting observation is that where communities have been granted or are about to be granted land rights (and therefore greater long-term security), such as at Dwesa and Makuleke, they are much more amenable to training: in both instances above community members listed training as one of their priorities (Timmermans 1999; Steenkamp 2000).

The empirical evidence suggests that two of the central assumptions of CWM – of ‘Viden’ – need to be treated with caution: that benefit flows from wildlife utilisation will result in respect for wildlife and that devolution of power to user groups is the best way to promote local governance and cohesion.

5.9 Over-estimated financial benefits

Our research supports the misgivings about the financial benefits from CWM at the household level; in most instances they are extremely small. There are notable exceptions, however. In the few instances where small communities co-exist with abundant or high-value resources the dividends can be high. In Sankuyo in the Okavango Delta, the total benefit from wages, lease agreements, hunting quotas and levies to 50 households was P935,000 (US\$233,000) or US\$4,700 per year per household in 1998 (Boggs 2000). The estimated household income from harvesting cochineal by a community of 230 San people in Botswana, is estimated at US\$600 per month (Jones 1999b).

But in very large communities where harvesting is strictly controlled, the household benefits are negligible, in empirical terms. The average maximum possible household benefit (including shared benefits) from CAMPFIRE across Zimbabwe in 1996 was Z\$100 per annum, or less than US\$5. The actual household benefit was estimated to be Z\$45 (Hasler 1999, quoting WWF Zimbabwe). The total replacement value of wild resources per household at Dwesa is about R125 (US\$20) per month (Timmermans 1999). At Madikwe, the only source of revenue is employment; 131 people (4% of the community) are employed at an average salary of US\$350 per month (Magome *et al.* 2000).

However, the size of benefits to communities needs to be compared against people’s options and other local income opportunities. For example, in 1989 a household dividend of Z\$200 (US\$45 in 1990 terms) was paid from CAMPFIRE revenue to each household in the Masoka District. This represented a 56% increase on household income from cotton (Murphree 1999). The total annual replacement value of thatch and building materials removed from forests in Cwebe, South Africa is R60,000 annually (Timmermans 1999). This is shared between 485 households and amounts to an annual savings of R125 each. But this small amount can make a significant difference to people living on the edge of subsistence (the households who primarily use such resources fall into this category). The same is true for the subsistence use of mussels: a small portion of shellfish per month can provide people with essential microelements and is often the only source of protein to some families. At Madikwe, the average salary from an alternative land use (cattle ranching) would have been US\$70 per month, and only 80 jobs (2.6 per cent of the community) would have been employed.

Furthermore, tourism-led development projects have long life cycles and rarely provide short-term benefits (Koch 1994). Magome *et al.* (2000) predict a 2% per annum return on investment at Madikwe, which means that the project will take 30 years to produce meaningful benefits to communities. Meanwhile, some question the sustainability of the high short-term dividends being provided in the Okavango Delta (Boggs 2000).

5.10 Under-estimated non-financial benefits

The greatest benefits in all the initiatives encountered were non financial ones. It can indeed be surmised that those initiatives that do yield high financial dividends are unsustainable exactly because the non-financial benefits are secondary.

Ashley (1998) identified three main types of benefits to communities from CBNRM in Namibia:

- capacity building and empowerment
- more secure livelihoods
- cultural and aesthetic values and maintenance of local traditions.

More specifically, she highlighted a number of specific non-financial achievements, including:

- adaptable institutions
- well defined membership
- accountable leaders and improved participation that included women
- cohesive groupings
- new skills
- natural resource management systems
- experience and confidence in dealing with outsiders
- recognition
- pride and a sense of ownership and control.

These changes empower communities to manage their natural resources, and, more broadly, to take control of decisions and developments around them. This can be seen in their greater ability to voice their needs to others and take on broader land-use planning. CBNRM institutions are proactively pursuing community interests and provide building blocks for local development that go well beyond the initial scope of CBNRM. CBNRM enhances the livelihood security of rural households. It provides invaluable opportunities for rural diversification to families who are cash-strapped, hit by periodic drought, and dependent on marginal agricultural land and multiple livelihood activities. CBNRM activities enhance food security and drought-coping by improving local management of veld forests, stimulating wildlife/tourism enterprises which generate income during drought, and addressing wildlife damage to agriculture. (Ashley 1998)

In many parts of Namibia wildlife does not compete economically with livestock, and Jones (1999a) concludes that conservancy members on freehold land must be motivated by non-financial incentives such as aesthetics and risk minimization. Community members at Dwesa, Cwebe and Makuleke, South Africa have cultural, moral and political motivations for claiming back land from which they had been previously removed (Timmermans 1999; Steenkamp 2000). They spend very high proportions of their time in committee meetings, negotiations and other time-consuming activities associated with emerging land claims. At Mkambati, able-bodied men illegally hunt wildlife to improve their status in the community, and most community members make use of wild resources in an attempt to diversify their livelihoods (Kepe *et al.* 2000).

A general trend across all case studies was the creation of new institutions as a result of CWM, and the increased cohesion among communities as a result of the struggle for land and resources. This was particularly evident in the Namibian communal conservancies (Jones 1999a), and at Makuleke (Steenkamp 2000) and Dwesa (Timmermans 1999) where locally-developed regulations and rules to guide decisions about membership, as well as strong local leadership has emerged as a result of struggles over resources and land. New local institutions at Sankuyu, Botswana have enabled the community to dismiss unwanted joint venture partners, expel committee members suspected of being unethical and negotiate with government and joint venture partners for more beneficial business and harvesting arrangements (Boggs 2000).



6. Factors Affecting the Success of CWM in Southern Africa

6.1 The administrative / institutional capacity domain

6.1.1 Local institutions: their nature and their strength

Local institutions (at the village level) are generally weak in southern Africa. In cases where they have been developed as part of a project plan, initiatives tend to have better prospects for being sustainable. Some reasons for institutional weaknesses are:

- *Skilled people move to the cities in search of jobs.* In the Okavango Delta, Boggs (2000) found that young people move out of the community as soon as they've been trained. A reverse trend, of people moving back to rural areas, however, is observed in Zimbabwe because of the weak market economy (Muromhedzi 1999).
- *Intra-community conflicts.* In Namibia this has led to problems with the establishment of conservancies (Jones 1999a) and conflicts surfacing between young, impatient members who insist on immediate benefits, while older, more patient people are inclined to be content with longer-term, cultural benefits. At Madikwe, South Africa, Magome *et al.* (2000) found that a power difference between villages was so great that collective goals could not be achieved and institutions consequently broke down.
- *Communities may have been split through social engineering.* This is particularly clear at Dwesa (Timmermans 1999), Madikwe (Magome *et al.* 2000) and Makuleke (Steenkamp 2000), where the legacy of separate development has resulted in historical patterns of migratory labour, the impact of which is still felt today in rural areas. The result is a delay in getting initiatives legitimately established, difficulties in communication, lack of management skills, and shifts in donor priorities towards training and capacity development.

The most important function of local (community-level) institutions is to enable communities to have greater bargaining power, and the ability to manage conflict better. Where local institutions exist, they enable communities to boot out unscrupulous partners. Communities in the Okavango Delta (Boggs 2000), and adjacent to the Kruger National Park (Steenkamp 2000) have managed to get rid of unwanted partners, and negotiate good deals with government and parastatals because of the strength of their own institutions. In Namibia, strong common property institutions in the form of conservancies assisted communities in overcoming disputes over membership and benefit-sharing (Jones 1999a). At Dwesa on the Eastern Cape seaboard (Timmermans 1999) and Madikwe in the North West Province (Magome *et al.* 2000), communities have gained leverage in relation to that of officials due to their institutional development.

Local institutions in the sub-region seldom fulfil an administrative function, and communities rarely have the institutional capacity to self-administer wildlife initiatives. In our case studies, this function is taken over by district-level government (e.g. CAMPFIRE, Hasler 1999), by outside facilitators such as NGOs dealing with land and natural resources (Archer 1998; Steenkamp 2000; Magome *et al.* 2000; Timmermans 1999), or a combination of outside facilitators and communities, for example in the case of communal conservancies in Namibia (Jones 1999a). In instances where there is no administration or facilitation, for example at Mkambati (Kepe *et al.* 2000), progress tends to be severely delayed and conflicts escalate.

6.1.2 The level and types of skills of officials

We have observed a swing in the sub-region over the past five years towards an improvement in the skills, training and understanding of officials and NGOs concerning CENRM. There is greater acceptance of the role and importance of community participation in wildlife management, and this became clear at Makuleke (Steenkamp 2000), Dwesa (Timmermans 1999), Madikwe (Magome *et al.* 2000), South Africa, and in the case of Namubian conservancies (Jones 1999a). Throughout the sub-region officials are beginning to play a constructive role as facilitators of CWM rather than as obstructers. Yet one of the main problems emerging is the division within government departments around the philosophy of CWM, mainly in South Africa. When clear policies and directives exist (e.g. in Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe) this is less of a problem.

6.1.3 Appropriate facilitation

The right type of facilitation is one of the most important critical success factors in southern Africa. Initiatives which are characterised by high-quality, light-touch facilitation such as the "five-star" conservancies in Namibia display more of the characteristics of success than those where facilitation is either too direct (Jones 1999a). Facilitation that is too strong can lead to the disempowerment of the community: for example, Boggs (2000) concluded that benefits in the Okavango Delta came almost in the form of handouts, while Magome *et al.* (2000) discovered that facilitators arrived too late in the life cycle of the initiative.

6.1.4 Enforcement and monitoring

Law enforcement is neglected in many of the CWM initiatives in the sub-region, and illegal harvesting of wildlife is a problem in most case studies except for the most intensively managed ones such as Madikwe (Magome *et al.* 2000). Lack of law enforcement obviously leads to the depletion of wildlife resources: communities at Dwesa (Timmermans 1999) and Mkambati (Kepe *et al.* 2000) had a severe impact on wildlife and shellfish resources. Also, illegal hunting can reduce the international credibility of initiatives, for example CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe has been criticised for turning a blind eye to illegal hunting. Most importantly, a lack of enforcement or resistance against it displays a lack of commitment on the part of role players as to the sustainability of their part in the initiatives. Communities in southern Africa are not yet involved in participatory monitoring, which could make an important difference to people's awareness of their impact on natural resources. The community game guard system in Kaokoland, Namibia, is the only case study encountered where communities have assisted with law enforcement, and, even here, salaries and donor funding are an important incentive (Jones 1999a).

One of the reasons why law enforcement appears to be a low priority is because communities generally believe that wildlife resources are abundant. Communities in the Okavango Delta (Boggs 2000) and at Dwesa (Timmermans 1999) did not believe that wildlife and shellfish resources, respectively, were declining and felt that it was their right to utilise them, whether legal or not. Another reason

for weak enforcement is that most wildlife departments and parastatals in the sub-region have experienced significant budget cuts over the past decade. Not only does this prevent them from policing resources, but also monitoring rarely takes place and where it does it is infrequent. The CAMPFIRE programme is an exception wherein technical experts undertake regular monitoring, yet monitoring remains infrequent due to funding shortages (Hasler 1999).

6.2 The financial domain

6.2.1 Donor money

Donor funding plays an important role early in the life cycle of a project by providing seed funding for facilitators, basic infrastructure and training. In the case of CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe), the Namibian conservancies, Madikwe and Makuleke (South Africa), facilitators remunerated through by donors have played a crucial role in marketing and popularising CBNRM initiatives, resolving conflicts and assisting communities with negotiations and technical preparations such as drafting legal agreements. Sporadic injections of donor money however tends to lead to conflict over the use of funds (for example communities at Madikwe contested the use of an overseas grant for training). Large amounts of donor funding can also lead to the over-expansion of NGOs or progress that is too fast for communities to keep track and stay on board. Donor funding is often attached to an agenda leaning towards conservation rather than poverty alleviation; this was evident at Makuleke, and to some extent the Namibian conservancies and CAMPFIRE. This '*crypto-conservationist*' agenda (a term first used by Marshall Murpluce, C. Fabricius pers. comm.) means that communities are not free to use funding as they see fit.

6.2.2 Revenue-generating potential

Communities tend to have high expectations of jobs and other forms of income, mainly because of early promises, often made to coerce communities into agreeing to cooperate. The existence of false promises was evident at Madikwe, Richtersveld National Park (Archer 1998), and at Dwesa (Timmermans 1999). Since these promises are seldom realized it becomes the task of project managers and facilitators to undertake damage control. Where resources have a high unitary value (e.g. mega herbivores and large carnivores) and communities are small (less than 100 households) the income per household from wildlife can be high. For example, communities in Botswana are receiving substantial incomes from wildlife resources (Boggs 2000). Agencies often provide figures about total financial benefits to the community and omit household benefits, because the latter is in many instances embarrassingly small.

6.2.3 State / government budgets

One of the main obstacles to CWM in the region is the lack of resources for meaningful engagement by an important role player: government. Although officials are willing to adopt new approaches, they can be hamstrung by lack of funding. Where funding cuts are less severe or donor funds can be mobilised (e.g. South African national parks at Makuleke and Richtersveld, and various government departments in the case of the Namibian conservancies) officials are able to play their rightful role. In such instances co-management institutions tend to function, enforcement and monitoring becomes possible and staff morale is reasonably high. Where funding shortages are acute (for example at Dwesa and Mkarabati in the Eastern Cape) officials tend to be reactive and lack motivation, law enforcement comes to a virtual standstill and in-service training is lacking.

6.2.4 Non-financial benefits

It is becoming increasingly evident that many of the main benefits from CWM in southern Africa are non-financial, yet such benefits are highly rated by communities. These include:

- *Development of leadership.* For example, at Makuleke strong community leadership has become a crucial success factors in negotiations with authorities (Steenkamp 2000).
- *Political empowerment and recognition.* For example, communities participating in CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe) and at others Makuleke (South Africa) have become politically very powerful, and CAMPFIRE is regarded by some as a socio-political movement in rural Zimbabwe (Hasler 1999).
- *Improvement of relations between communities and authorities.* This was observed in the case of Makuleke and Dwesa and the Namibian conservancies, mainly because of “forced” communication in the early stages and improved understanding of each others’ positions later on.
- *More biodiversity conserved.* This was one of the major benefits observed in most of our case studies. This was especially true for initiatives on communal land such as through CAMPFIRE, the Okavango Delta, the conservancies in Namibia, or initiatives where communities agreed to incorporate their land into parks or nature reserves, such as at Richtersveld and Madikwe.
- *Improved security of access.* This has been another important non financial benefit, especially for people living on state owned land. Communities at Richtersveld National Park, Makuleke, in the Okavango Delta, associated with CAMPFIRE and the conservancies in Namibia have all benefited from increased security and increased livelihood security. Whether or not this translates into better wildlife and ecosystem management remains to be seen, however.
- *Training and subsequent entry into the job market.* This is noticeable in many of the case studies (notably Makuleke, CAMPFIRE and Sankuyo in the Okavango Delta).
- *Increased sense of identity.* This has been one of the most important non-financial achievements of CWM in the context of the present case studies. The Makuleke community in particular has defined itself as an entity as a result of their land claim in the Kruger National Park, and the people at Dwesa have re-defined themselves as a community consisting of numerous different villages because of their struggle for land and natural resources.

6.3 The social and political domain

6.3.1 Policies that work

The southern African sub-region has made major strides to improve CWM policies. The greatest achievements of latter-day policies have been to:

- Delegate the right to utilize and control wildlife on communal land to local communities, as for example in Botswana and Namibia, or districts in the case of CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe.
- Create mechanisms for the formation of common property institutions. In Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa legislation enables legal institutions to be established, with positive consequences for people and wildlife as explained earlier.
- Define pre-conditions conducive to good common property resource management, and stipulate them as a prerequisite before communities can attain rights of access to wildlife. Authorities in Namibia and Botswana in particular have taken account of the lessons from common property theory and have built them into policies.
- Enable communities to own land with a high level of biodiversity and utilizable resources, for example at Makuleke and Dwesa.
- Provide guidelines to officials to facilitate the adoption of a more open, process-based approach to conservation, as evident with the South African National Parks and in certain Eastern Cape areas.

The policy shortcomings in the sub-region are that wildlife management is still highly sectoral, and the functions of the different sectors and departments in all countries and provinces are not clearly spelt out. There is much room for improved collaboration between government departments, service providers and parastatals throughout southern Africa.

6.3.2 Power balances

Although there are still significant power imbalances between governments, NGOs and communities (with communities at the short end), the power balance in southern Africa appears to be steadily shifting towards communities. It will be difficult to attain a complete balance of power and it needs to be accepted that communities will almost always be at a power deficit when resources with national and international stakeholders are under contention.

We have come to realize that most communities have few assets to put on the table. Rural economies rarely revolve around cash, and communal land cannot be put up as collateral. The wildlife resources on communal land do not belong to communities and therefore government has to decide about off-take quotas and regulations. One of the few means communities have to improve their power base is their subversive capacity, which has been used to good effect at Dwesa, Mkambati, Madikwe, and Makuleke in South Africa, and in Namibia.

6.3.3 Land and resource tenure and ownership

Land ownership is one of the most contentious issues in southern Africa, and here a number of breakthroughs have taken place. Communities have won back land at Makuleke, the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park and Dwesa from which they had previously been removed, and land claims have been lodged against portions of Madikwe and Mkambati. These communities tend to have taken the initiative in requesting training and setting up joint management structures and also possess a longer-term perspective on natural resources. But land ownership remains an important issue to rural people: South Africa has observed an unanticipated surge in land claims linked to wildlife areas.

6.4 The natural resource base / ecological domain

6.4.1 Rates of extraction

One of the shortcomings of CBNRM is that it is generally unknown whether or not the rates of wildlife extraction are optimal, sub-optimal or too high. The general trend when quotas are set is for authorities to be extremely cautious (for example at Sankuyo and in CAMPFIRE initiatives). Another strategy employed by authorities is to facilitate the combination of non-consumptive use (mainly photographic tourism) and consumptive use (hunting). This trend was evident at Madikwe, Sankuyo, among the Namibian conservancies and in many of the CAMPFIRE areas, while the Makuleke community have not been given any hunting rights in the contractual management of the Pafuri area of the Kruger National Park. One of the reasons for this caution is the suspicion that high levels of illegal use continue to take place. Other reasons are that wildlife is rarely monitored and the fine-resolution data needed to generate sustainable yield models are not available. The rates of extraction are linked to the ability of authorities to police resources: where law enforcement is neglected and financial benefits are low, levels of illegal use can be unsustainably high, for example at Dwesa and Mkambati.

6.4.2 Potential for alternative land use

In those parts of southern Africa with high agricultural potential, such as the higher-rainfall areas of Zimbabwe (Hasler 1999) and the Eastern Cape seaboard (Timmermans 1999), the dangers of land transformation are always present. But the threat of land transformation might be over-emphasised by NGOs who would like CWM to remain high on donor agendas: most CWM initiatives in southern Africa are in low-productive, non-arable areas. The revenue from many of the initiatives has already exceeded the benefits that could be derived from alternative forms of land use. At Madikwe the potential for commercial agriculture is extremely limited whereas the communal conservancies in Namibian and Richtersveld National Park are too dry for any form of agriculture. Livestock ranching in the Okavango Delta is impossible because of the dangers of foot and mouth disease.



7. What Have We Learnt?

7.1 Lessons for donors

- Donor funding is most useful in the early stages of initiatives, as seed funds.
- Funds for training are most useful when communities have a sense of permanence and long-term guarantees of resource security.
- The need for institution-building needs to be carefully investigated before funds are invested in local institutions.
- The role of government as administrator and facilitator should not be underestimated; also, it is a good investment to increase the capacity and skills of officials and of key individuals in the community.
- There is a need for skilled facilitators, and donor funds can play a major role to assist with this.
- Sudden injections of funds can be misappropriated or lead to conflict.
- Biocentric agendas often lead to increased poverty and reduced powers in communities.

7.2 Lessons for facilitators

- High-quality, light-touch facilitation is a key ingredient in the success of CWM.
- Government remains an important role player.
- A disproportionate amount of donor funding allocated to communities is used to pay the salaries of facilitators.
- Communities' training needs should be carefully determined before training programmes are designed and implemented.
- Communities define and redefine themselves on an on-going basis, and all communities consist of sub-units that have different needs and aspirations; to lump diverse groups together into single communities invariably leads to conflict.
- All role players need to commit resources and contribute something to the bargaining table.

7.3 Lessons for communities

- Communities need to increase their bargaining power by laying claim to assets that they can put on the "power table".
- Communities' rights are entrenched in the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International Convention on Human Rights and the Indigenous People's Convention. They should use these conventions in their negotiations.
- There is no substitute for land ownership.
- Appropriate facilitators play an important role and need to be recruited.

- Fractures within communities should be anticipated when financial benefits become substantial, and strategies need to be formulated to deal with these before conflicts arise.

7.4 Lessons for wildlife professionals

- Law enforcement is one of the cornerstones of sustainable common property resource management and cannot be neglected.
- Monitoring is essential, and participatory monitoring can be a useful tool to sensitise all role players to trends in natural resources.
- Collaborative management should be expected to be a slow and expensive process; to fast track it is to invite disaster.
- As few promises as possible should be made.
- The principles of sustainable common property resource management should be adopted at the outset.
- Skilled facilitators are valuable.
- Alliances between communities, the private sector, NGOs, donors and government departments should be promoted.
- As many local people as possible should be employed.
- Information should be provided to local people about the broader (national and international) scarcity or abundance of the resources at stake.
- Clear CWM policy directives should be given to officials, and other role players need to be informed about policies and policy changes.

7.5 Lessons for policy-makers

- Land and resource ownership is important, to give a sense of security to communities and to lower their discount rates.
- Policies should promote the forging of linkages between communities and other role players.
- Contradictions in policies between different government departments and parastatals should be avoided.
- Policies should be made accessible to all role players, specifically the least powerful ones with most at stake.
- International agreements that impede rural development and prevent sustainable natural resource use should be avoided.
- Communities should be allowed to define themselves, geographically or otherwise.



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Evaluating Eden was initiated to take forward the debate on community wildlife management, by widening the geographical focus and looking beyond the literature.

The **Evaluating Eden** project is a collaborative research project supported by the Development Directorate (formerly the DGVIII) of the EC and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs—DGIS which aims to explore the myths and realities of community-based wildlife management. The project is coordinated by IIED with regional research teams from collaborating institutions in South and South-East Asia, South and Central America, West, Central, East and Southern Africa, Canada and Australia.

The **Evaluating Eden** Series contains reports from each of these regions together with individual case study reports and theme papers.

The Biodiversity and Livelihoods Group of IIED aims to develop and promote tools, processes and institutions to create positive synergies between biodiversity conservation and development. The work focuses in particular on improving the integration of biodiversity and livelihoods policies and understanding the value of biodiversity to different groups. The Group also aims to strengthen the ability of marginalised groups to realise the full spectrum of values of biodiversity. BLG undertakes policy research, capacity strengthening and awareness raising activities, working with other programmes at IIED and with a range of Southern and international organisations.