

## Annex 5. Review of approaches to partnership governance and operation – informing the development of a global forest partnership

### 1. Purpose of this paper

#### 1.1 Rationale for investigating partnerships

Forest ecosystems are less extensive than they once were. Expanding populations have reduced their global area by one half over the past three centuries. Demands on diminishing forest resources are growing, increasingly globalised and spread over multiple goods and services. Today there are increasingly conflicting claims by multiple actors, communities, companies and states. Each expresses a wide variety of needs, notably for cultural traditions in sustaining forest-based livelihoods, for the generation of income within emerging cash economies, and for environmental sustainability. There is not enough forest space left for each actor to get what they need in isolation. Those who were once in sole control of forests increasingly have to address the legitimate claims and diverse values and principles of others. At its worst this can lead to oppression or conflict. At its best, this can lead to effective 'partnerships' with others both now and for future generations. Indeed, there is an growing trend to partnerships, for example:

- *Governments have privatised many aspects of forest ownership, management and/or enterprise, and have entered into joint ventures with business or local communities (a trend evident in every one of the 76 countries surveyed by IIED – Landell-Mills and Ford 1999).*
- *Companies have entered into deals with communities for forest co-production or protection (again, a rising trend – 57 examples in 23 countries were surveyed by IIED – Mayers and Vermeulen 2001).*
- *Communities have mobilised around strong cultural traditions and customary rights for example in the Global Alliance on Community Forestry to forge new devolved power sharing arrangements. The area of forest under community ownership or management in developing countries has doubled over the last five years to 25% of the total forest areas (White and Martin 2002).*
- *Supply chain actors have formalised partnerships, often transnationally, to ensure the security of supply of forest goods to agreed quality and sustainability standards – so that it is now often supply chain partnerships which compete with one another, rather than individual forest companies (www.gftn.org, 2008).*

- *International bodies* with mandates and programmes covering aspects of forestry – environmental, trade, labour, technical support, etc – have formed partnerships to improve their influence, coordination and delivery (e.g. the Collaborative Partnership on Forests to enhance cooperation and coordination on forest issues among UN and Bretton Woods partners, or The Forests Dialogue to link together leading NGOs and businesses in order to break deadlocks on key issues).
- *Networks* have been formed and activated, globally and regionally, bringing together communities of interest such as indigenous peoples (e.g. the Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests) or forest researchers or advocates of community management (e.g. the Katoomba Group on markets for environmental services)
- *Powerful non-state policy has been forged by multiple interest groups working together to compensate for weaknesses in state policy*, notably in setting sustainability standards and certification – policy that has become at least as influential as formal state policy (e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)).
- *State policy has become more formally influenced by other stakeholders* through e.g. permanent multi-stakeholder round tables and participatory appraisal. In many instances, the participation of non-state actors in regional and global institutions has increased their ability to influence policy at the national level. In this way, partnerships have a policy role – they are not merely operational

To label all such initiatives ‘partnerships’ may be unjustified in strictly technical terms – at least in their early stages. Often one stakeholder takes the initiative, with limited roles or powers for other ‘partners’. Some initiatives may be time-bound ‘deals’ or one-off ‘programmes’. Others may comprise informal networking among ‘participants’. However, any one of these types can potentially also progress towards higher value added partnership approaches – where a clear set of partners agree joint agendas and roles, and evolve together.

These various types of partnership can be distinguished from non-partnership approaches by their particular emphasis on the following:

1. *credibility* – gaining and demonstrating multi-stakeholder support;
2. *diversity* – accepting that there are different and at times diverging interests that need to be expressed and represented;
3. *equity* – participation in cost- and benefit-sharing at various levels

That is not to say that partnerships are primarily about equity, diversity and mutual efforts to find credibility. They can also bring new attributes to:

4. *effectiveness* – exercising partners’ comparative advantages and allowing them to focus on their areas of core competence;
5. *efficiency* – improving coordination, exercising economies of scale and synergies, mobilising the most suitable resources, reducing redundancy, and joining efforts; and/or
6. *sustainability* – employing different partners relative strengths in order to integrate environmental, social and economic concerns.

These six attributes are increasingly in demand to manage the pressures exerted by a more and more complex world. It is not, therefore, surprising that a majority of respondents to the GFP consultation have agreed that a partnership approach to global forestry initiatives is the right way forward. But how ambitious should such partnerships be? We can recognise a spectrum – from the purely managerial (improving efficiency) to the highly political (seeking major changes in purpose, or indeed maintaining the *status quo*).

The aim of many partnerships is purely *managerial*, to share skills and costs that will improve the quality and efficiency of delivery of many forest goods and services, for example the partnerships of established forest stakeholders (governments and corporations) to bring stability to forest products trade.

However, an increasing trend can be observed towards partnerships with *political* aims, to facilitate consensus building, to improve partners' influence on policies and institutions affecting forests, and indeed to change those policies and institutions to improve the distribution of forest costs and benefits. One can look for example at the partnerships of more marginalised players (indigenous peoples and environmental activists) to shape institutional alternatives to the dominant paradigm of 'national democracy promising the growth benefits of globalisation' (Christie 2008). These can range from facilitating wide ownership of the need for broad changes in the sector, to focused advocacy to change specific policies.

Respondents to the GFP consultation have stressed that there is scope for both types of partnership aim, although indigenous peoples and NGOs have tended to favour political aims. On the one hand, some would like to see clearer roles and responsibilities for better management (coordination of policy and delivery) among the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), increased international financial and development assistance flows, more efficient knowledge sharing and more effective collaborative action on the ground. On the other hand, many other respondents would like to improve the political influence of forest-dependent and vulnerable groups in radically altering national or corporate policies, international institutions and related financial decisions. Indeed, some respondents within international institutions and finance bodies agree that stakeholder voices should be better heard. And all seem to agree that a strong global partnership dealing with forests in an integrated manner would usefully raise the profile of and attention to forests and forest issues. This points to the need for a participatory development of gfp to explore and test the spectrum of managerial and political possibilities for a partnership, and if/how they might be combined.

That participatory development of gfp will need to consider a number of questions. What *kind* of a partnership is needed, who should be the gfp *partners*, how can they best bring their *comparative advantages* to bear, what forms of partnership *governance* would enable them to work well together, how can they *add value*, and what *instruments* can be employed by partners to realise their potential? Many respondents have offered advice on these questions (section 2 of the main report). However, given the highly varied partnership experiences of different respondents, and often their short duration, it is important to supplement respondents' advice by reviewing the literature on key partnerships to date. This literature is neither highly extensive nor yet in a form that permits a comprehensive review of all major partnership types on a comparative basis. However, it does offer particular lessons that can inform gfp (and also points to areas where future comparative research may be helpful).

*In this annex we aim to identify the added values* that have been achieved through partnership approaches to forestry, how these have been achieved, and drawbacks and other constraints faced – with a view to informing partnership governance and operational options for gfp.

## 1.2 Exploring diverse partnership types

Given the global scope of gfp, we have focused on the lessons arising from different forms of *international forest 'partnership'*, notably but not only:

- UN Forest Forum (where partners are national governments)
- Collaborative Partnership on Forests (UN and other international agencies)
- World Bank forestry partnerships FLEG, PROFOR, WWF Alliance, and CEPF (WB, NGOs and donors)
- Forest Stewardship Council (private partnership involving social, economic and environmental chambers of 600-plus NGO, CSO and business members)
- Global Forests and Trade Network (NGOs and businesses)
- Asia-Pacific Forest Partnership (national governments, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, private sector and inter-sectoral partnerships)
- Congo Basin Forest Partnership (a consortium of 29 national governments, international and intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and private sector)
- Forest Governance Learning Group (individuals from multiple organisations)
- Global Alliance on Community Forestry (CSOs and NGOs)
- The International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests (CSOs and NGOs)
- The Forests Dialogue (CSOs, NGOs and private sector)

To broaden the spectrum of possible governance models and partnership mechanisms, and bearing in mind the need for gfp to influence other sectors, we have also drawn lessons from global initiatives *outside the forest sector*:

- Agriculture – notably the Global Crop Diversity Trust (GCDT), [www.croptrust.org](http://www.croptrust.org)
- Disaster risk reduction – the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), [www.gfdr.org](http://www.gfdr.org), a multi-stakeholder grouping with governments, WB/UN and NGOs
- Energy – notably the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) and the Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP)
- Fisheries – PROFISH, the Global Program on Fisheries funded primarily by the World Bank and hosted by the FAO.
- Health – notably the Global Program for Avian Influenza Control (GPAI), and the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the 'Global Fund'), [www.theglobalfund.org](http://www.theglobalfund.org)
- Water – notably the Global Water Partnership (GWP), [www.gwpforum.org](http://www.gwpforum.org)

This brief analysis has also benefited from the World Bank's multi-sector review of its own varied partnerships in several sectors, including material produced by an independent evaluation by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank's involvement in global programmes (World Bank, 2002), and discussions on the current work of the Independent Evaluation Group on the review of Global and Regional Partnership Programs. It was also informed by other reflections on the establishment, operations and impacts of Type 2 Partnerships arising from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).<sup>4</sup>

Finally, noting how many of the Type 2 and other types of partnership were facilitated by governments or intergovernmental agencies (often for political ends), and to improve relevance and responsiveness to local actors, we also draw broad partnership lessons from different forms of *spontaneous and/or local forest 'partnership'*, notably:

- Local community–community business partnerships or associations
- Company–community forest partnerships

<sup>4</sup> Type 2 Partnerships are partnerships and initiatives to implement Agenda 21 that do not depend on (difficult to achieve) individual intergovernmental negotiations – considered an important element of the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The partnerships need only be agreed by those, directly involved, who commit themselves to taking the partnerships forward and making them a success. They complement the WSSD Programme of Implementation and help translate the commitments into action.

- Public–private forest partnerships
- Joint forest management and Participatory Forest Management agreements between government and communities

## 2. Lessons from forestry and other partnerships to date

Here we review lessons of the various governance models and instruments used by partnerships in forestry and related fields – their added value as well as any negative impacts, the constraints they face as well as how these have been handled. Such lessons can inform credible, effective, efficient, equitable and sustainable governance options for gfp.

### 2.1 Partnership creation and design – drivers and aims

It is axiomatic that the types of partner and their precise aims will influence the kind of partnership. Small or local partnerships may arise through the shared needs of members – especially in response to some external threat or opportunity, e.g. the emergence of multiple small community associations at the Amazon frontier in response to the requirement of new financial mechanisms (Macqueen et al. 2006). In many cases, however, a partnership is shaped largely through the agency of one ‘*driving*’ partner. Related issues of symmetry, comparative advantage, purposiveness and ownership arise:

*Symmetry:* It is rare that a partnership is symmetrical, at least initially. We can see this with partnerships formed through the relatively powerful agencies of development banks, aid agencies, corporations, and national forest authorities:

- Many partnerships set up by *development banks* are driven primarily by the banks’ business models e.g. the common need to attract and disburse large funds, but also increasingly to manage social and environmental impacts and improve public credibility in relation to these issues. In the case of the World Bank where (apocryphally) ‘forestry is 2% of the budget but causes 98% of the Bank’s problems’, a range of knowledge and financial partnerships have been set up to improve levels of business, sustainability and credibility. In such cases, the partners are primarily (co-)funders or service providers. In a few cases, however, the interests and powers of the other partners – though very different – are equally powerful and the partnership may take the form of a vehicle for mutual influence, sometimes over contested policy ground and at other times to exploit comparative advantage (e.g. WWF-WB Forest Alliance).
- Partnerships set up by *bilateral donors* are driven by the (changing) requirements of aid effectiveness. At present this is dominated by the agenda of the Paris Declaration which calls for ‘country ownership’ and leadership of the development process, donor ‘alignment’ with host countries’ national development plans, ‘harmonisation’ with other donors, ‘mutual accountability’ between donor and recipient, and coherence with foreign policy, environmental policy and other policies of the donor government. This is increasingly shaping national-level donor–recipient partnerships. Bilaterals are also often partners in global arrangements to improve the delivery of global public goods alongside poverty reduction, and/or to simplify global regimes so as to make them easier to govern and/or fund (witness the current efforts to set up large carbon funds). Here, partnerships are often among ‘shareholders’, favouring bilaterals as the major funders, usually with a stronger voice than the ‘stakeholder’ partners in developing countries who seem to have a lesser role. Often such partnerships are the idea of the bilateral; they may coincide with recipient countries’ needs or at least be benign, but more often they will be a vehicle for promoting

a 'new' policy idea and gradually gaining 'buy-in' from partner countries, e.g. the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade initiative aiming to tackle illegal logging. In a few cases, they may be little more than a politically correct form of conditionality, locking the 'partner' into certain objectives and ways of operating.

- Many partnerships set up by *forestry corporations* are also driven primarily by their business models. Lacking access to forest land, or being unwilling to bear the risks of forest ownership and management in localities where the risk profiles are otherwise too high, corporations develop deals with local private forest owners, farmers or communities to produce their wood requirements through outgrower schemes, to protect the corporation's own forests from hazards such as fire and vandalism, or to provide management services such as planting and weeding. Initially most of these might best be described as 'deals' offered by the companies, where the community receives income for wood sold, or is allowed access to company forests to procure non-wood products. However, with increasing knowledge, experience and participation on the part of community/farmer organisations, real partnerships such as joint ventures have evolved, and others have extended down the supply chain. (Mayers and Vermeulen 2001)
- In-country partnerships set up by *national forest authorities* also tend to be shaped by government's concerns for maintaining or improving forest cover while cost cutting or shedding responsibility for land management. Thus, for example, many joint forest management schemes have offered relatively poor forest land to communities for predetermined management objectives, not always coinciding with local needs or capabilities (Landell-Mills and Ford 1999). There are, however, instances where the initiative for the partnership comes from the communities, and where the partnership arrangement strengthens customary and community-based management regimes by giving them legal status and creating a mechanism for implementation (Macqueen et al. 2006).
- International networks set up by *forest NGOs* to strengthen community forestry have also often been driven by the particular social or environmental agendas of those NGOs. However, it has been encouraging to note the emergence of some networks / partnerships that have been better linked to communities or even driven by those communities – but with obvious increased need for support to allow that to happen – and innovative ways to redress asymmetries in language and information and communication technologies (Colchester et al. 2003).

As experience with these forms of partnership grows and knowledge of their pros and cons spreads, *the initially 'weaker' parties can become better able to call the shots* – to make the offer, or to negotiate the terms. For example, farmer associations are now making offers to local forest companies for partnership; and communities in successful joint forest management schemes are making bids for better forest land, and to engage in more commercial activities (RECOFT 2007). Community initiatives at global level have begun to raise the profile of community partners in deals with (local) government – notably Shack Dwellers International with local government and now international donors, as well as more recently the Global Alliance on Community Forestry with forest departments. Hence none of these forms of partnership involving a powerful player need intrinsically be asymmetrical. Indeed, one potential role for a gfp is to act as a facilitator for identifying, improving or forging new partnerships on the basis of equity, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

While the process of partnership evolution can lead to the empowerment of some of the 'weaker' partners, this is not inevitable. Proponents and facilitators of multi-stakeholder partnerships must also remain

aware of the danger of a progressive marginalisation of these partners. In many of the partnerships that involve civil society actors at global and regional levels, for example, large international NGOs typically occupy the space at the expense of weaker, less formally organised non-state actors. Without mechanisms specifically geared towards preserving and enhancing equity and participation in a partnership, the balance of power can be broken in favour of the stronger parties, and the resultant forms of 'civil society involvement' can become an obstacle to genuine stakeholder participation (Colchester et al. 2003).

In addition, there is a wide range of *networks* in which the tenets of partnership may be more or less strong. Forestry networks cover a range of functions – capacity builders such as RECOFTC and CICAFOC, information clearing houses such as FTFP and RDFN, and advocacy groups and movements such as WRM (Colchester 2002). One approach that has been gaining ground, in environmental, health and social justice movements in particular, is that of loose, non-hierarchical, *multi-stakeholder 'people's movements' or Global Action Networks* (GANs, [www.gan-net.net](http://www.gan-net.net)). GANs such as the U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice consist of diverse stakeholders working together on a common issue by creating consensual knowledge and action. Their strategies tend to be global and multi-level in scale. Their work involves interdisciplinary action-learning and reflective action (to produce synergies between knowledge development and practice). They build multi-stakeholder, cross-sectoral, inter-organisational networks (linking international agencies, governments, businesses, civil society organisations and other actors while still utilizing hierarchies or markets as appropriate). They aim to generate systemic change through a range of non-violent, boundary-crossing and diversity-embracing activities (agenda setting, knowledge generation, capacity-building, resource mobilization, conflict resolution, education, certification, etc.). The GAN movement recognises the public good in areas of global sustainability and security, while ensuring the empowerment of marginalised groups and harnessing the energy of potentially divergent private interests. One criticism of such loose networks is that they are not good at driving forwards decisive action in a coherent way. But – as 'people's movements' – they can also be quite fertile, endure when conditions are negative, and resilient to changing circumstances (Adams, 2008).

*Comparative advantage and synergy:* In theory, partnerships work through exploiting the principle of comparative advantage and synergy. Partners come together so that each plays the role it is best suited to, focusing on its areas of core competence, and benefits from the roles played (better) by others. This will inevitably involve some partners cutting out any roles that they are less well suited to, and giving attention to joint efforts at planning and budgeting to attain synergies. The World Bank's reviews of its various partnerships have identified its comparative advantage well – cross-sectoral convening and capacity, developing and operating financial instruments, influencing treasuries, analytical expertise, and some aspects of governance reform. Comparative advantage is one of the key issues driving the CPF – a range of international forest organisations, mostly within the UN system, have joined forces to improve influence and effectiveness. However, it has not yet ironed out redundancy or enabled each organisation to play to its strengths, and until recently has been a relationship-maintaining partnership focused more on the notion of 'collaboration' (cf. its title) than on specific actions where comparative advantage can be employed. A gfp could well be a vehicle to support institutional change within the CPF, by bringing CPF members into closer partnership with forest stakeholders focused on key countries or themes.

*Purposiveness:* At the opposite end of the spectrum from a relationship-maintaining partnership is a purposive, outcome-oriented partnership. Here, a clear and genuine goal is shared – reflecting strong but as yet unmet demands and associated needs to form political alliances. Partners work together towards that goal, often putting aside other differences. FSC and GFTN are good examples of purposive partnerships – FSC aiming at filling a real global gap in forest standards and certification, and GFTN at improving trade in certified products. The CPF has also been able to work well when driven by purposive

goals – usually involving only a few members at a time, as in the case of the Coordinated Forest Sector Response to the Climate Change Agenda.

*Ownership and commitment:* There are a number of factors that contribute to creating a much needed sense of ‘ownership’ of a partnership among its shareholders and stakeholders, including the aim and rationale discussed above, the governance and operations of the arrangement, and the very process used in its creation. Partnership approaches seem to be an increasingly attractive response for politicians and bureaucrats who are faced with urgent demands or new issues, but who may lack the resources (or the political will) to act directly to disband existing organisations and/or to start up something new. In this sense, partnerships can be a distraction from the need to make tough decisions. Without strong ownership of all ‘partners’, the partnership may not be able to develop and pursue the balanced agendas that sustainable forestry requires over the long term. For example, few of the ‘Type 2’ partnerships launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 are still vigorous: some were driven too strongly by short-term political needs to announce initiatives to tackle new issues (and to obviate the need for government alone to act). Ownership of some Type 2 partnerships is low even by the immediate partners; some are still subsidised or otherwise strongly influenced by outside parties with heavy political or financial weight (Bass 2004).

In contrast, there is a very wide range of *spontaneous* forestry ‘partnerships’ in information- and knowledge-sharing, advocacy and other forms of mutual help. Many of these are informal and/or traditional in character; others use modern ICT media. Their spontaneity often makes them symmetrical, and driven by pure comparative advantage in pursuing highly purposive goals. Without altering their character through outside interference, this ‘thick soup’ of partnerships could be better understood, linked together and otherwise supported through a gfp. Thus a gfp might look for such partnerships and mobilise them, rather than necessarily brokering new ones. Empirical evidence in e.g. Vermeulen *et al.* (2003) suggests 10 characteristics of successful spontaneous partnerships (Bass, 2004):

1. *Demonstrated mutual respect* of each partner’s legitimate aims.
2. *Fair negotiation process* where partners can make informed, transparent and free decisions.
3. *Learning and adaptive approach* – allowing disagreement and experimentation.
4. *Predictable and secure partner benefits* commensurate with contributions.
5. *Long-term commitment* to optimise returns from the partnership.
6. *Equitably shared risks* – in economic, social and environmental terms; in balancing the short, medium and long term; with a range of low-, medium- and high-risk investment opportunities, to attract both cautious and bold partners.
7. *Sound business principles at the core* – not merely public relations exercises.
8. *Develop the weaker partner* – relationships focused on improving assets, rights and responsibilities, capacities and comparative advantage of the poor.
9. *Nesting of partnerships* within wider national and local land-use and development frameworks.
10. *Transparency and accountability* – with independent scrutiny and evaluation.

### 2.2 Partnership governance – functions, principles and structures

Governance determines how power is exercised, how decisions are made, how stakeholders are included, and how decision-makers are held accountable. It includes the structures, functions, processes, rules and norms that have been put in place to ensure that an initiative is run in such a way that it achieves its objectives in an effective and transparent manner (World Bank 2007). Six core *functions of governance* can be suggested (World Bank 2004; 2007):

- 1) strategic direction
- 2) management oversight
- 3) stakeholder participation
- 4) risk management
- 5) conflict management
- 6) monitoring, audit and evaluation.

All of these functions can apply to partnerships, but they also interact with the governance functions of the individual partners. In addition, implicit in 5 and 6 above is the need for management to be adaptive.

There are also seven generally accepted *principles of good governance*:

- legitimacy, accountability, responsibility, fairness, transparency, efficiency, and probity (UNDP 1997).

Again, all of these principles apply to partnerships. However, the principles of legitimacy, accountability, responsibility, and fairness are particularly germane to ensuring roles, costs and benefits are spread appropriately between partners. The principle of efficiency applies especially to the principal purpose of partnerships – that it will achieve outcomes that individual partners cannot achieve when acting alone.

Several types of *governance structure* have been employed to achieve these functions and meet the principles in the context of partnerships. Their precise form is often closely associated with the driving forces for forming the partnership (see 2.1 above). The World Bank's two basic partnership categories are useful, i.e. (1) shareholder-driven governance structures; and (2) stakeholder-driven governance structures.

*Shareholder governance model*: membership on the governing and executive bodies is limited to organisations that sponsor or pay for the programme – in the case of global programmes, typically international/regional organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, bilateral donors, and private foundations. This model may promote efficiency and donor buy-in, but at some possible cost to legitimacy, fairness and stakeholder buy-in.

*Stakeholder governance model*: membership is extended to other groups, such as developing countries, NGOs, and the private sector, and other stakeholders who are potentially affected by the programme and therefore have a stake in its effective functioning. This model may promote legitimacy and fairness at some possible cost to efficiency and donor buy-in (even if it adheres to the principles of the Paris Declaration). It may also face collective action problems when the number of participants is large and the cost and difficulty of organising and reflecting diverse interests to pursue a common goal are high. Within each category, there are mechanisms for others to be represented as advisors or secondary participants in implementation – if not partners in decision-making. Stakeholders can be included in a shareholder structure through, for example, consultative fora or advisory groups. Funders can be included in a stakeholder structure through, for example, a steering committee or review group, as in the case of the Global Water Partnership (GWP), where there is a specific category of Financial Partner, in addition to the constituting Consulting Members.

The experience of various global partnerships suggests that there is a need for clarity on *the criteria and conditions of membership* in a partnership, as well as mechanisms to review membership, especially in partnerships that involve large number of organisations. For example, in an external review of the GWP, it was noted that the ‘neutral multi-stakeholder platform’ that it offers globally and locally is valuable; however, ‘there [was] a lack of clarity about membership or partnership within GWP and as a result, the brand name may be vulnerable to casual or improper use’ (Hoare *et al.* 2003). The GWP was set up to act as an international ‘network of networks’, to encourage learning and sharing of experience globally, with 11 regional partnerships. On the one hand, this makes it difficult to ‘control’ how the GWP is presented; on the other hand, its formal governance also does not allow it to benefit from creative flux that characterises very loose GANs.

In other cases, one or more of the partners may have reasons to leave the partnership after a while and transfer it to other shareholders or stakeholders; in those instances, these partners would need to have clear and transparent exit strategies and mandates to transfer partnership.

Almost all of the global partnerships have governing, executive and advisory bodies, along with a management team. The wider group of stakeholders (beyond the partners) may or may not be given a formal and statutory role. Typical *structural features* of these partnership programmes include:

- *A governing council.* This makes the major decisions on strategy and business plan. It is often composed of only shareholders such as donors (e.g. PROFOR, CEPF, ESMAP) but there are also other arrangements. The International Tropical Timber Council ensures a balanced representation of tropical timber producing and consuming countries, which makes it a unique arrangement of national stakeholders. The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund (MPMF) is governed by an executive committee where the voting structure is designed to ensure that neither donors nor recipients can dominate. The GEF Council has both donor and recipient countries represented in equal shares. The Global Fund has an international Board that includes representatives of donor and recipient governments, NGOs, the private sector (including business and foundations) and affected communities. Many initiatives have voting rules but they have never (e.g. MPMF) or seldom (e.g. ITTO) been used.
- *Management/executive board/steering committee with or without function sub-committees.* This is included in many partnerships to improve efficiency in implementing decisions made by the governing council (e.g. Global Crop Diversity Trust, MPMF, FSC), often in fund-raising and programme planning. In the case of the Global Crop Diversity Trust, there is an Executive Board composed of nominees from the main stakeholders (including a quarter nominated by the donors), and it assumes the main governance functions. Sub-committees are sometimes established around key partnership functions e.g. grant allocation (IFAD). Whether an executive board exists or not seems to influence the tasks and responsibilities of the governing council.
- *A consultative group.* This tends to have different roles in different organisations, but is primarily a way of ensuring that the partnership understands and responds appropriately to a wide range of stakeholder needs (e.g. ESMAP and ITTO have consultative groups with private sector and civil society stakeholders). This confers relevance and credibility. But a consultative group does not usually make key decisions.

- *Technical advisory group or (thematic) groups.* These can have similar advisory tasks to a consultative group. They usually comprise a narrower set of players often representing scientific (e.g. GEF STAP or the Technical Committee of the GWP) or other professional interests, but sometimes the wide range of stakeholders (e.g. ESMAP, NFP Facility, CDF, IFAD). In the case of ESMAP, there are actually two advisory bodies, a Consultative Group that brings together all the contributing organisations, and a three-person Technical Advisory Group. The quality and tasks of the advisory bodies tend to vary considerably, from advising on purely technical aspects to strategic and policy issues. Some advisory bodies are reactive (providing advice only when requested) and other proactive (providing advice when the group sees a need for it). Some have a strong role and may even lead to micro-management of the programme (e.g. ESMAP).
- *Donors' Groups.* The participation of donors in governance can be handled in a variety of ways. Donor agencies are often central to the governing bodies, especially with a shareholder model. Some partnerships see the need to establish dedicated donor's groups with more limited mandates: e.g. the Global Crop Diversity Trust has a Donors' Council that 'advises the Executive Board on fundraising and other financial matters related to the activities of the Trust, provides a forum for the expression of the views of donors on the operation of the Trust, and provides financial oversight of the operations of the Trust'. This guarantees transparency and financial diligence without giving the donors too central a role in shaping the work of the partnership. There are other instances (e.g. the Global Fund) where development partners are *ex officio* members of the governing body, but without voting rights.
- *Secretariat.* Some kind of permanent secretariat or management unit with a Chief Executive Officer is also a common element (e.g. GEF, MPMF, CDF, IFAD), with three core functions: facilitating the partnership, coordinating the activities, and promoting/communicating the partnership and its work. This may be hosted by one of the partners (e.g. the World Bank hosts GFDRR, PROFOR, and FLEG), jointly by two partners (e.g. Global Crop Diversity Trust is co-hosted by FAO and Biodiversity International) or alternatively be at arms-length from any one of them, even if it includes staff seconded from partners (e.g. GWP). Hosting arrangements can also be made on a rotating basis among partners (e.g. the Congo Basin Forest Partnership). The secretariat needs to be structured and held accountable for being able to operate in ways that are consistent with the spirit of the partnership, e.g. given the right degree of flexibility if the partnership is about emerging issues and responding with agility to opportunity, or with a rigorous quality management system if the partnership is about small grant allocations.

*Partners* vary in number from just two in the WB-WWF Forest Alliance to many hundreds in the FSC or GWP.

*Stakeholders* – who range from the 'partners' to 'participants' to 'clients' to 'beneficiaries' in terms of how active they are in partnership governance – are represented in the governance of many partnership programs, particularly in the consultative or advisory groups, but in the governing council only in few cases (e.g. Global Crop Diversity Trust, FSC and Global Fund). In general, developing country actors tend to have limited roles or no role in global programme governance. Where there are exceptions (e.g. MPMF, GEF, ITTO, Global Fund and FSC), this is often because special provision has been made, e.g. finance for translation and travel, and extra communication efforts, and extra time to enable consultation within their constituencies.

*Civil society participation* to date in global and regional partnership has been dominated by large international NGOs. Many respondents in this survey expressed concern about this. However, many others have cited INGOs as playing valuable roles in introducing innovation and encouraging better stakeholder participation at country level. Some partnerships are aware of the risk of INGOs (inadvertently) squeezing out national or local NGOs and pay special attention to the representation and participation of direct beneficiaries (communities), even when these are not formally organised. The Global Fund has done some pioneering work in this regard, having dedicated seats on its governing body to representatives of affected communities and non-state actors. But civil society and community representation and participation require much more than inclusion on a board or council, and more specific guidelines and lessons in this respect are provided at the end of section 2.3 below.

*Decentralisation* is a key issue typically faced by global partnerships, covering regional and national representation (in order to reflect the high diversity of conditions and needs among regions and countries), and relationships with local actors. Several global partnerships have addressed this issue by encouraging the establishment of regional or national bodies. For example, by 2004, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) had established 32 country-level partnerships, 16 area water partnerships and regional water partnerships in 13 regions (Rana and Kelly 2004)<sup>5</sup>. The civil society-led Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts is based on a regional structure, with 15 regional networks housed and facilitated by a member organisation on each region. In the forest sector, unique opportunities exist in many regional partnerships in key forest regions, and in thematic networks that can be the basis for local anchoring.

The inclusion and growth of a two-tier structure, for example with the creation of regional or national partnerships that are part of a global arrangement, can lead to the eventual creation of two distinct but connected institutions, as in the case of the Global Water Partnership, which has evolved into two parts: a Global Water Partnership Network (the Network) and the Global Water Partnership Organisation (GWPO), where the Organisation functions as a support system for the Network. Complex partnerships with multi-level structures can enhance impact, credibility and relevance, but they can be faced with issues of sustainability and high costs, which may actually reduce efficiency, and in this sense defeat one of the original purposes of partnership creation.

*We can conclude* that most global forest partnerships have principally shareholder-driven governance models, with a dominance of large international NGOs if civil society has been involved at all, of national authorities if government has been involved at all, and of large companies if business has been involved at all. Too few are stakeholder-driven, especially by forest stakeholders in developing country. This conclusion may be considered when shaping the 'niche' of gfp – especially to meet the six criteria of credibility, diversity, equity, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

<sup>5</sup> This may reflect the GWP's special mandate to be established 'as a network of networks' (Hoare *et al.* 2003).

### 2.3 Partnership instruments – the ‘tool kit’

In addition to the partners and the governance structure, much of a partnership’s added value may be conferred by the different instruments that it uses to develop and carry out its aims:

- *Vision, mission statement, charter, principles and standards* – to express the partners’ common position, as a basis for adherence to the partnership. These may include internal principles to describe how partners will work together e.g. those of The Forests Dialogue, and/or external principles to express desired forestry outcomes e.g. FSC’s principles and criteria for Forest Stewardship or Integrated Water Resource Management as the basis and rationale for GWP’s work. In some instances, as with the Global Crop Diversity Trust (GCDDT), the policy framework is provided by an international agreement, in this case the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In the case of a global partnership, the vision statement should attempt to reflect some form of international consensus on the vision that is aspired to. This may be relatively undemanding, in order to attract participation – which may consequently be inclusive but add little further value through the partnership in terms of changed outcomes. Or it may be more stringent, in order to attract progressive players – which may add value through advocacy and example, but risk slow achievement of outcomes.
- *A constituting document* (which can take the form of a partnership agreement, a memorandum of understanding, by-laws or terms of reference) – to set out the agreed legal and administrative aspects of partnership, sometimes beginning with a statement of vision, purpose and standards, and providing a definition of functions, structure, membership criteria, main funding arrangements and basic rules of operation (including time frames and mechanisms for reviews and assessments). In cases where the partnership is a new legal entity, the document will define the terms of its constitution and incorporation. In some cases, more specific terms are also required, for example to deal with intellectual property in the case of research and knowledge-based partnerships. These constituting documents establish a formal basis for trust between the partners, but in practice it is the successful application of many other instruments that builds that trust. One additional area to which the facilitators of new partnerships should pay attention is the question of *who within the partner organisations approves the constituting document* (chief executive, governing board, general assembly), as this may be a significant factor for legitimacy and transparency.
- *An image and a brand*, to build the identity of the partnership, to ensure that it is not confused with other organisations (as is, indeed, often the case, see for example the history of the relationship between the Global Water Partnership and the World Water Council) and that its vision and mission are conveyed in clear terms to all stakeholders. Sometimes this will be tightly controlled e.g. the licensed use of FSC’s logo. At other times, perhaps with a potential gfp, the purpose of the partnership is to be more inclusive – more of a movement than an organisation – and such control of partnership identity will not be desirable.
- *Dialogue processes and task forces* – to set agendas, conduct diagnostics, explore and develop common positions on key issues, and manage conflicts. These may be among the partners themselves, e.g. UNFF dialogues are circumscribed by the fact that UNFF is primarily a forum among nations (with limited scope for participation by major groups) or CPF’s regular strategy meetings. Or they may involve a wider group of stakeholders. In the case of the CEPF, a formal Working Group has been established among partner organisations

in order to provide advice and guidance on a range of aspects including technical issues, fundraising and operations (World Bank 2007a). FLEG and WB-WWF Alliance have motivated and facilitated an intensive dialogue with a wider group (producer-exporter and consumer-importer nations), which has led to the design of joint and voluntary strategies to promote the international trade of legally and sustainably sourced wood.

- *Cross/inter-disciplinary methods and guidelines* – to enable partners in different sectors, disciplines or policy traditions to articulate how to meet the vision or standards, to enable partners to work better together, and to find synergies. For example, the GPFLR developed a framework for assessing restoration priorities, and the WB-WWF Alliance developed a governance diagnostic. The PEFC and some other certification schemes promote management system approaches to encourage improvement under a wide variety of conditions, and to provide a focus for social, economic and environmental interests to work together.
- *Information, knowledge management and learning* – to improve ground-truthing, networking and advocacy as well as many other synergies through combining partners' knowledge. To be effective, this needs to be both demand- and problem-driven – able to respond to a multitude of *ad hoc* knowledge requests 'from real people on real issues', including partners' staff in the field, and not merely act as a one-way campaign. This also necessitates multiple channels of communication – an inherent advantage of partnerships. For example, the Forest Governance Learning Group (FGLG) exists primarily to bring together forest stakeholders from multiple backgrounds to share experience of improvements in forest governance, and to make the findings publicly available. Few international partnerships have yet succeeded in making information available to forest stakeholders on the ground – to communities and SMEs. But new initiatives such as Forest Connect are emerging that aim to build such capacity and to act as conduits for stakeholders' own voices (Macqueen 2008). Attempts to harness modern ICT solutions have not yet been exhausted. There is a clear niche for gfp here.
- *Networks, brokers or intermediaries* – to link together the partners' different constituencies, especially within specific countries and for given issues. Brokers may be especially important at the stage of developing the partnership, as WWF was for GFTN, and IIED was for FGLG. Certain networks could themselves be partners in the arrangement (e.g. Biodiversity International in the Global Crop Diversity Trust) or they can be external agencies that have a special link with the partnership. Brokers with experience at country and grass roots levels are likely to be needed to help facilitate stakeholders exploring and shaping a gfp from the bottom up – but they will also need to be experienced at engaging with international levels.
- *Coordination mechanisms* – to harmonise partners' work and improve their effectiveness. This is the emphasis of the CBFP, improving communication and coordination among its many governmental and other members on their policies, programmes and projects. This is achieved through joint programming, information sharing, analyses of common issues and negotiated agreements to integrate and harmonise policies, programmes and projects. It is also an emphasis of the CPF.
- *Pilot projects, innovation programmes and 'start engines'* – to experiment with new kinds of activity that derive from partnership deliberations. These may lead to country/thematic strategies and help to generate activity menus (below) when pilots prove ready for scale-

up. Such projects are particularly useful in demonstrating on-the-ground impact, which is typically a weakness of global partnerships, in part because it takes time for a partnership to organise and start delivering results. The International Model Forests Network provides both this kind of facility and networks for shared learning between progressive forest managers in different countries.

- *Country or thematic strategies, activity 'menus' and/or results frameworks* – to present a clear, shared picture of the outcomes that the partnership is aiming for, and to form a basis for engagement with country or issue stakeholders. These seem to work best where they display a holistic understanding, but focus on key areas where the partnership can add value (increasingly this is in the area of paying for environmental services), and on accepted entry points e.g. PRSs as a vehicle for mainstreaming forestry issues. For example, the Global Program for Avian Influenza Control (GPAI) includes a menu of activities that the partners can jointly deliver, from which countries can choose to suit their needs. Reviews of many partnerships suggest the need to focus more on in-country targeting, benchmarking and capacity development (World Bank 2002). This can be helped with the formulation and adoption of specific criteria to select target countries, as is done in the case of PROFISH.
- *Shared funds, either as central financing mechanisms or through flexible financing frameworks* – to enable joint planning and review among partners, to implement joint actions directly or through grant programmes, and to respond to participants' demands. These can increase synergies and responsiveness. Concerns about conflict of interest and self-dealing may arise in cases where the granting partner can also be a grantee, even where such grants are subject to independent review. The lack of such a shared finance and planning facility among the World Bank's various forest partnerships may explain why closely related programmes work in parallel, with fewer links than might be expected e.g. the policy-level work of the WWF–Bank Forest Alliance and the field-level investments of the CEPF.
- *Monitoring, evaluation and change systems and procedures* – which will, in most instances, be guided by the policies of the partner organisations, but which need to be spelled out in reference to the partnership. In addition to the accepted criteria for measuring partnership *outcomes* (e.g. efficiency and effectiveness in delivering added value), there will be a need for targets and indicators that relate specifically to the partnership arrangement itself (e.g. degree of participation of partners in governance arrangements and other equity principles). The evaluation procedures and processes used by partnerships should, as much as possible, be separate and independent from those of the constituting partners. For a gfp, they might well be stakeholder-driven criteria.
- *A forum, a place and a moment to debate, orient, validate and energise the partnership and its work* – most successful partnerships have regular events that are more than simply business meetings of the partners. The Global Fund, for example, has a Partnership Forum that met in 2004 and 2006, bringing together a broad range of stakeholders to discuss the Fund's performance and make recommendations on its strategy. The FGLG has an annual international meeting that brings together members of national teams who themselves meet roughly quarterly. The UNFF is characterised (perhaps too much) by its annual meeting. One could envisage that a gfp would wish to convene such a global forest gathering, either as a new event addressing stakeholder empowerment or progress in international institutions and funding, or as an expansion of something that is already on the global calendar.

In addition to these tools and mechanisms, individual partners can put in place *means to enable partnership activities to influence the partner's own policy and institutional change*. In some cases this can be of direct benefit to the partner, for example World Bank forest partnerships creating demand for Bank lending. At other times the partnership may present a constructive challenge to the partner's current policy and operations. A major potential for a gfp could be to serve as a learning vehicle, to help national and international institutions identify and undertake some of the institutional changes they will need to make to become more relevant, effective and credible in meeting future challenges. In such a case, it would not be expected that all staff of partner organisations would immediately welcome the gfp – another reason for a step-by-step approach.

*The participation of non-state actors*, especially local communities, civil society organisations and networks, and the small business sector, is increasingly expected but beset with difficulties. Indeed, while it is now accepted that these stakeholders should, whenever possible, be given a place in the governance of global institutions and managing their programmes, very few institutions actually succeed in creating the conditions required for genuine and effective participation and representation. The experience of several global and regional partnerships provides the following lessons (eg. Colchester *et al.* 2003):

- Resources must be made available to facilitate participation by these actors, including for initiatives aimed at building their capacity to participate such as travel support and translation.
- In order to be inclusive, partnerships must have transparent decision-making and operational mechanisms. In many instances, this will have very practical implications, such as the appropriate orientation of new staff, the adoption of user-friendly formats for documents and the avoidance of large electronic messages that are not suited to the technological capacities of some organisations.
- Senior managers and members of the governing bodies of the partnerships must be truly committed to civil society participation, as it is primarily in the day-to-day operations and in the application of the institutional policies of the partnership that the difference will be made.
- Guidelines and criteria should be developed and used, and specific indicators of non-state actor participation and representation should be adopted and applied.

*Gender issues* should also be addressed in a systematic manner in the design and operations of partnerships. In addition to gender-related programming, which is beyond the scope of this paper, this requires gender balance in governing bodies, involvement of women's organisations in programming and governance, formulation and adoption of gender policies, and the use of sex-differentiated data and indicators in programming, monitoring and evaluation.

### **2.4 The process of partnership constitution**

As in any other sphere of institutional design and organisational development, it is not only the vision, the governance structure, the resources and the systems that determine the quality and efficiency of a partnership, but also the process that is used to create that partnership. Many of the observations made above are applicable to the process, but there are other points that may be worth noting:

- Some form of *exploratory group, steering committee, or development group* would be needed to define and refine the concept and give shape to the partnership. The composition of such a group is key, and it should be guided primarily by the criteria of competencies (both in the disciplines covered by the partnership and in institutional design), representation and legitimacy. These criteria mean that, in some instances, it might

be preferable to appoint individuals (with skills and connections) rather than institutions. As part of this process, the selection of a suitable chairperson would be critical.

- There should be *transparency and good communication* throughout the process, with both opportunities and adequate time for stakeholders to air their views, to consult with their constituencies, and to change their minds if necessary. This might involve focused consultations whenever desirable and possible, and the regular dissemination of recommendations and decisions.
- The design process should end with a *launching event* that would give visibility and legitimacy to the new partnership, and formalise the commitment of partners and other stakeholders. For example, the Global Bioenergy Partnership, which had been conceived at the G8 Summit in 2005, was launched at the Commission on Sustainable Development in 2006.

### **2.5 Partnership performance – added value and negative impacts**

A partnership brings together (i) different actors within (ii) a special governance framework implementing (iii) particular instruments. At times it will be difficult to attribute success to i, to ii, to iii, or to the partnership as a whole, often due to the catalytic way in which partnerships work. Nonetheless, for the following areas of impact a) to j), we attempt to pick out useful lessons from whichever partnerships had significant impact.

1. *Empowerment*: Empower forest-dependent (national/local) stakeholders – notably with ‘voice’, rights, resources, connections, knowledge and other capacity.
2. *Political will*: Improve the influence of forestry – notably on agriculture, energy, macro policy such as PRSs, and overall ‘political will’.
3. *Communication*: Enable effective information flows – notably within and between local and global players, producers and consumers, and between sectors.
4. *Policy development*: Enable partners’ joint decision-making – notably on strategy, targets, trade-offs e.g. between equity and efficiency, and risks.
5. *Funds*: Attract, mobilise or manage funds – notably for improving scale-up, innovation and support to hitherto marginalised players.
6. *External support*: Enable international organisations and donors to improve support to forest stakeholders – notably by influencing CASs and by changing their own policies and behaviour.
7. *Synergies*: Improve partner synergies and reduce redundancy – notably in building trust and enabling partners to use comparative advantages.
8. *Innovation*: Support creativity and experimentation – notably by creating cross-disciplinary, political and some financial space.
9. *Delivery*: Assure the provision of both global public goods – notably but not only carbon storage and sequestration – and also national/local priority needs.
10. *Transparency and learning*: Ensure transparency, learning and improvement – which should lead to mutual accountability between partners and accountability to stakeholders.
11. *Efficiency*: Ensure that the partnership structure and approach add value to what is already being done, achieving its objectives in the best possible way.

Are the more ‘*purposive partnerships*’ successful because they focus on key areas of change and apply energies to a carefully selected ‘entry point’? Or are they limited in their reach and linkages? Are the ‘*relationship-maintaining*’ partnerships promising for meta-governance change due to their emphasis on inclusiveness and bringing parties along together? Or do they merely maintain the *status quo*?

- a. *Empowerment:* Few multi-stakeholder partnerships are adequately empowering of indigenous peoples and small forest enterprises. In many cases, such groups may be completely oblivious to the existence of such partnerships. The energy of many partnerships and the ICTs that they use are just too concentrated at the ‘international’ level. CBFP has until recently been dominated by international (UN and OECD) organisations and donors, with little encouragement of local leadership – in spite of being closely linked to COMIFAC. But regional players can be helpful in empowerment: the COMIFAC’s role has been strengthened recently, and it is this regional body that speaks for the sovereignty of participating countries. With respect to civil society, participation in the CBFP has been dominated by large international NGOs, and efforts are currently being made to ensure better representation and greater involvement of local organisations and SMEs. Recent experiences in global and regional partnerships point to the central challenge of unequal power relations, and to the need for strong and deliberate efforts to ensure that the weaker constituents are empowered.
- b. *Political will:* In general, most forestry partnerships have not been able to break through to those with real influence on the underlying causes of forest problems – those who are usually situated beyond (but sometimes within) the forest sector. Illegal logging may soon be an exception. There have been parallel public and private (FLEG and The Forest Dialogue) initiatives to control illegal logging; the greater flexibility and innovation of TFD as a private partnership occasionally serving to pave the way for political change to support FLEG at a faster pace than traditional diplomacy might normally have achieved. A remaining challenge is that legality itself is often defined to serve the interests of powerful elites and large-scale industry. Partnerships are increasingly needed to expose political vested interests, and to mobilise effective campaigns to shape political will in favour of indigenous peoples and small forest enterprises.
- c. *Communication:* The larger the number of partners, the more important it is to provide them with internal channels for communication, in order to create unity of purpose and to avoid misunderstanding. The more complex or subtle the purpose of the partnership, the more critical it is to invest in good external communications to build and sustain a positive image and invite inputs. Some partnerships suffer from negative perceptions; for example, an evaluation of the GWP noted that many of its stakeholders saw it too much as ‘a donor’s club’. Learning groups that interface local, national and international levels have been very influential in helping to develop shared understanding, for example over payments for watershed services in the Caribbean (McIntosh et al. 2008).
- d. *Policy development:* Policies and procedures need to distinguish between the partnership endeavour and partners’ own endeavours. Difficulties may arise when one partner takes unilateral action in areas that are expected to be part of the partnership’s portfolio, or when one or several partners set up mechanisms or institutional arrangements that appear to compete with, or undermine, the larger partnership. The CBFP is currently faced with tensions of this nature, arising from proposals to manage a particular source of funding separately from the Partnership’s budget. Clear policy and procedures are needed to handle this. FSC has managed to create a real strategic alliance and consensus, perhaps because its governance has been deliberately structured around ordinarily conflicting interests: a balance of three chambers of economic, social and environmental members, each again equally divided into Northern and Southern representation. It developed processes to bring interests together through voting, task forces, etc, to ensure that tricky issues of

trade-off were dealt with effectively. The fact that the consensus was reflected in principles and criteria, which are to be articulated in national standards, and then implemented in the forest, has rolled out this consensus-building process 'downwards' into countries and land-holdings. However, it is notable that governments played secondary roles to NGOs and business interests – which in part explains the continued parallel approaches of FSC and government standards and audit, and the only partial influence of the former on the latter (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2006). Where contentious issues are likely to emerge, it can prove very useful to have clearly defined conflict resolution procedures. For example, these have proved pivotal to the survival of many local enterprise associations (Macqueen et al. 2006).

- e. *Funds*: The GPFI, GFDRR and the Global Fund have given special attention to devising 'menus' or 'packages' of support to countries and stakeholders that are proven both in demand terms and in their impact, thereby creating confidence among donors and enabling core support to the scaled-up delivery of 'menu items' on a large scale. The CBPF has been very successful in attracting funds to the Congo Basin, although it has not always been able to influence the channels and intermediaries used to manage the funds. The accessibility of funds to different partners within appropriate timeframes is a particularly critical issue. Pressure to reduce transaction costs can often drive calls for large multi-institutional proposals that exclude smaller institutions – for example in the GEF and EU Tropical Forest Budget lines. Yet it is often small catalytic funds (such as business challenge funds) for higher-risk activities at the local level that can help pilot and spread innovation and change.
- f. *External support*: The CPF has had some notable successes in improving the coordination of policy (for example on climate recently) but has had less impact so far in changing members' own work programmes in individual countries. In part this is due to jealously guarded sovereignties at the national level which resist the adoption of recommendations from international partnerships. There are important lessons to be learned from changing approaches to external support for enterprise development. Traditional models sought directly to change the policy environment or provide business training or financial services. But new 'market system development' approaches favour external support that facilitates rather than dictates – mobilising groups to organise around issues, to articulate their needs, and to dialogue with existing actors who have the power to help them. It is certainly worth exploring whether partnerships can be more effective by facilitating wider ownership of the need for change – rather than focusing on narrow agreements among limited groups of experts (Miehlbradt and McVay 2006).
- g. *Synergies*: Partnerships that work tend to do so either by building strongly on early successes (and on benefit sharing that rewards all partners) or by increasing the number of functional interdependencies between the partners, so that they choose to work together and continue to do so. The CBPF has been successful in improving coordination among a large range of actors (mostly international, and the Congo Basin government) in circumstances where harmonisation and alignment has been elusive. Partnerships facilitated from the outside, or as a product of political whim (e.g. many Type 2 partnerships) do not have that interdependency woven into them or exercised. Similar lessons have been learned from the lack of resilience in externally imposed business forms (e.g. government mandated cooperatives).

- h. Innovation:* A simple rule of thumb with intractable problems is to bring in new perspectives from different types of actor. Innovation is often about seeing things that others have seen but thinking about them in a different way. It is precisely for this reason that the gfp might wish to break with the traditional forest establishment and engage with diverse local actors in ways that international forest initiatives have so far failed to do adequately. Innovative partnerships might involve private sector actors, the best of which prefer to see problems as potential solutions e.g. several FSC innovations. Others involve foundations and other progressive donors who enable the space to experiment (again, FSC has benefited from this).
- i. Delivery:* In order to cover the multiple areas in which change is needed, multiple bottom-up strands of constructive engagement would need to be woven together into a coherent tapestry. Partnerships with the most aspirational goals, such as FSC, tend to have only led to niche changes – in this case, around traded products in certain markets – albeit clear changes that point to future directions. Partnerships that aim for high inclusion, such as UNFF in the case of governments, often map areas for cautious change rather than offering real means to achieve them, and need to understand the impacts of more aspirational partnerships. Global partnerships that focus on one or two forest issues have not always tackled the varied underlying causes of forest problems – they develop ‘forest solutions’ to ‘forest problems’. They need to look at success in other sectors. A contemporary case is the emerging REDD programmes which revolve around simple ideas of conserving forest – rather than intervening in agriculture, infrastructure or forest processing industry. Regional partnerships, such as the Asia-Pacific and Congo Basin Forest Partnerships, offer more potential to develop such cross-sectoral solutions. So also do those involving donors and development banks, where links can be made through, for example, PRSs.
- j. Transparency and learning:* By filling the gaps where governments are not (yet) willing or able to regulate, and by adhering to transparency principles, FSC and PEFC have been able to generate much information on the state of forests. This information is now used by FAO in the absence of good figures on the quality of forest management. It has also increased public expectations for transparency in the sector.
- k. Efficiency:* If a partnership functions as a truly collaborative arrangement, and if it makes use of the skills and resources of its partners, it can have a lean and effective administration, and should certainly avoid reproducing the organisations that comprise it. One of the efficiency issues that can easily arise is that of ‘two masters’, because the managers of partnerships – especially where housed within one of the partner organisations – often find themselves reporting to and receiving policy guidance from both the governing body of the partnership and the management of the hosting organisation. This is an issue that can be avoided through clarity in the constituting documents of the partnership, as well as in matters such as the location of secretariat.

### **2.6 Costs, constraints and weaknesses**

The analysis above indicates that there are a number of costs, constraints and weaknesses associated with partnership governance and instruments, and points to some of the ways in which they can be managed. The most difficult and enduring problems relate to issues of *participation and power*, such as transaction costs of (multiple) partners, problems of consensus on joint strategy, and cooption/control of partnerships, as well as the *ad hoc* nature of some partnerships.

Perhaps the biggest *constraint* remains the fact that level of trust between stakeholders often remain low when it most needs to be high. Low levels of trust are evident between nations: despite the efforts of the UNFF, FAO Committee on Forests and ITTO, Maini's analysis (1996) remains valid – there are fundamental differences between countries in what they seek from forests depending upon whether they are forest-rich or forest-poor, and whether income-rich or income-poor. It is also evident between forest stakeholders: despite the efforts of the FSC and other networks and partnerships rooted in sustainable development, there remain fundamental differences between stakeholders depending upon their emphasis on economic, social or environmental issues. And it is evident between organisations in the international 'forest establishment' – the efforts of the CPF being one of the few examples of what should now become more commonplace through the movement to UN reform.

Perhaps the biggest weakness that emerges from a comprehensive review of the large number of forest-related partnerships is the paradoxical insularity of each partnership (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2006):

- The lack of strategic linkages between different partnerships – partnerships hardly communicate with other partnerships and sometimes have conflicting goals, or compete to be the overall 'umbrella'.
- The weak links between private/civil society partnerships and public initiatives – meaning that often they neither work with the public system nor are fully effective in changing it.
- These features, plus the large number of partnerships, mean that no one partnership plays a strong 'meta-governance' role in organising global forest governance (which is not necessarily the same as offering a high-level 'umbrella').
- In contrast, many of the 'classical' government competences of international negotiations, law enforcement and land-use planning remain predominant – but are often neither fit for meeting 21st century needs nor adequately influenced by progressive partnerships.

Such constraints raise the possible role of a gfp in reducing insularity and in improving links, not just between forest stakeholders but also between a range of forest-relevant networks and other partnerships – invigorating UNFF and nfps, for example. A gfp could help all parties both public and private to shape the right forms of meta-governance in a refreshed forest sector (but not acting – for legitimacy reasons – in such a role itself).

The following summary table attempts to draw together some of the main lessons that this brief review of partnerships has for any future gfp. It is reproduced in section 2 of the main report.

Key partnership elements	Main lessons for gfp
<b>Partnership design</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Power</i>: Resilient partnerships address any initial power imbalances that weight decisions against particular members – but this requires concerted effort and cannot be assumed</li> <li>• <i>Comparative advantage</i>: Efficient partnerships delegate key roles to partners or others with the best ability, agree on partners not exercising unsuited roles within the partnership, and seek synergies</li> <li>• <i>Purpose</i>: Clear, specific and purposive goals are needed to assure functionality and additionality to that of individual partners</li> <li>• <i>Niche</i>: Too few global forest partnerships involve the Southern and forest-dependent stakeholders who are critical to forestry success</li> </ul>

Key partnership elements	Main lessons for gfp
<p><b>Process of partnership constitution and evolution</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Participatory development</i>: An exploratory or development group can help to refine the goals and principles of the partnership</li> <li>• <i>Independents</i>: Trusted intermediaries who have access and credibility to different stakeholders – and who can link global and grass roots levels can help facilitate partner engagement and symmetry</li> <li>• <i>Inclusion and transparency</i>: Attracting the right partners and agreeing the right goals are assured through an open approach</li> <li>• <i>Deliberation and learning</i>: The development process needs to explore and test the range of managerial and political possibilities – the choice itself affecting who the partners will be</li> <li>• <i>Launch events</i>: These give partnerships legitimacy and visibility, best used to confirm an agreed partnership following the above process</li> </ul>
<p><b>Governance structures and principles</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>'Stakeholder' forms of governance</i>: An emphasis towards 'stakeholder' governance will be needed to address weaknesses in existing international arrangements biased to 'shareholder' governance</li> <li>• <i>Donor roles</i>: However, even a stakeholder model can benefit from involving progressive donors prepared to adhere its principles</li> <li>• <i>Precedents</i>: The 'wiring' for a new partnership may well exist in existing formal or informal partnerships, which can be built on</li> <li>• <i>Negotiated approach</i>: Broadly agreed rules are essential to define leadership, accountability to membership and membership criteria. This will take time, even if it builds on best-practice precedents</li> <li>• <i>Symmetry</i>: It is key to develop this, even if the initial partnership 'drive' comes from a few partners. Language translation, travel support, time to consult, and involving local rather than international NGOs can help</li> <li>• <i>Representation</i>: Strong and deliberate processes and resources are needed to ensure fair representation in leadership and membership from indigenous peoples CBOs and small enterprise</li> <li>• <i>Secretariat</i>: Take care to avoid a secretariat hosted by one partner having to respond as much to that partner as to the partnership</li> <li>• <i>Seven principles</i>: of good governance apply equally to partnerships and can be used in structuring them: legitimacy, accountability, responsibility, fairness, transparency, efficiency, and probity</li> </ul>

Key partnership elements	Main lessons for gfp
<b>Instruments</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Interactions</i>: It is the quality of dialogue, action, learning processes, coordination and reducing insularity that will shape success</li> <li>• <i>Communications</i>: Such activities are central – holding the partners together internally and expressing the partnership ‘offer’ externally. Much more can be done through innovative ICT and media</li> <li>• <i>Innovative stakeholder diagnostics and pilots</i>: Inter-disciplinary methods can link partners and produce new ideas and activity menus</li> <li>• <i>Joint funds and planning sessions</i>: Can help make the shift from partners operating separately to working together</li> <li>• <i>A robust monitoring system</i>: Tracking the outcomes of partnership impacts on institutions and financial mechanisms can help to spread more effective activities</li> <li>• <i>Regular events</i>: These help to orientate and energise partnerships</li> </ul>
<b>Performance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Simple solutions, especially at local level</i>: Broader and more grassroots engagement, aimed at finding the simplest ways forward, is more likely to generate an attractive menu that spreads through demand</li> <li>• <i>Act globally, too</i>: Facilitation of wider mobilisation for change in international institutions and funds may deliver greater benefits than limited local interventions or agreements between experts</li> <li>• <i>Magnification</i>: A good partnership will ‘scale up’ – by identifying, mobilising, improving or forging other partnerships, and improving meta-governance of the sector</li> <li>• <i>Partner institutional change</i>: Partnerships should also change the partners themselves – a step-by-step institutional change process</li> <li>• <i>Incentives</i>: Among partners, incentives for good practice and disincentives for bad practice help to nurture political will to build on what is working and tackle what is not</li> <li>• <i>Monitoring</i>: M&amp;E should be separate and independent from those of the constituting partners – and use stakeholder-driven criteria</li> </ul>

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