



Chapter 8. CO-MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS

Socio-economic development and the management of natural resources require experimenting and learning on an on-going basis. As a matter of fact, the process of negotiating and implementing the co-management agreements is never “finished”, and some “body” or organisation needs to remain in charge of executing, monitoring and reviewing such agreements through time. Such organisation may be very similar to the negotiation platform among the parties that developed the agreements in the first place and, in fact, it may just continue that negotiation space on a more stable basis. Importantly, as the negotiation platform was pluralist and included various parties, so should be the co-management organisation.

Organisational forms vary among regions and depending on whether initiatives are self-mobilised or externally catalysed. Their composition depends on the range of institutional actors interested in the given natural and cultural resources. Their powers span from full management authority to consultative status. And their structure and rules of the game include a very large range of possibilities and may even vary through time.



8.1 Types and characteristics of co-management organisations

The co-management organisations may be of different types (e.g., a board, a council, a formal or informal association, a fund) and span different levels of authority and responsibility. They all, however, share at least two characteristics: they include at least two parties (and often many more), and they deal with the management of a given area, territory or body of natural resources. The key types of co-management organisations include:

- **decision-making bodies**— which are fully responsible for the management of a given territory, area or set of resources (examples may be a co-management board in charge of a state forest or protected area, or a trust in charge of managing an area jointly owned by several people; see Boxes 6.16, 7.11, 8.3 and 8.6);
- **advisory bodies**— which are responsible for advising decision-makers, e.g., by developing technical proposals, playing a brokering role, etc. (examples may be a committee in charge of developing a consensus over resource use thresholds and a fishing calendar or a high-level task force in charge of overseeing negotiations and managing conflicts; see Boxes 6.13, 7.15 and 8.1);
- **mixed bodies**— which hold a combination of responsibilities, such as partial management responsibility and partial advisory responsibility (an example may be an advisory or management committee responsible for advising on park management issues but fully in charge of decisions pertaining to the natural resources in its buffer zone; see Box 8.2);
- **executive bodies**— which are responsible for interpreting and implementing decisions within a broad framework provided by others (an example may be a local co-management committee in charge of applying a national legislation in a specific local context; see Box 8.4).

The key types of co-management organisations include decision-making bodies, advisory bodies mixed bodies and executive bodies....

Box 8.1 A co-management organisation with a high-level “brokering” role (adapted from British Columbia Claims Task Force, 1991)

The British Columbia Claims Task Force (BCCTF), whose 1991 Report on appropriate processes for developing treaties represents an impressive cooperative agreement in its own right, comprised three indigenous representatives (selected by indigenous peoples), two federal representatives and two state government representatives. All the recommendations of the Task Force were accepted by government, including the establishment of a British Columbia Treaty Commission (in 1992). The Commission was set up to be an “impartial body which will facilitate and monitor treaty negotiations”.¹ It includes two Commissioners nominated by the First Nations Summit and one each by the governments of Canada and British Columbia, respectively. A Chief Commissioner is nominated by all parties. The Commission does not negotiate treaties but coordinates the process, acts as an “honest broker” and provides dispute resolution services. It also allocates government funds provided for the treaty process.

¹ British Columbia Treaty Commission Act, 1995

Functions

The functions of a co-management organisation at the local level usually relate to analysing situations, appraising different types of interventions, making strategic decisions, developing plans and agreements, implementing, monitoring and evaluating activities and adjusting them on the basis of lessons learned. Co-management organisations at regional, national and international levels, on the other hand, are more concerned with enabling conditions, scaling-up concerns and institutional learning. The authority and terms of reference may be specified in legislation or in participatory management agreements, and the members of the organisations may be paid or voluntary.

Co-management organisations can be further distinguished on the basis of:

- legal status and form (e.g., board, council, authority, association, trust, company, etc.);
- functions, responsibilities and legal powers to carry them out (including decision making powers, enforcement provisions and assets owned);
- composition, including the proportional representation of the parties who nominate or elect the chair and other key members, decide what is their terms of office and in what circumstances their appointments can be terminated;
- to whom the chair and key members (e.g., the bureau) report and what are the meetings' schedules and reporting arrangements;
- funding received and by whom;
- whether members are paid, voluntary or need to pay to be members;
- whether a secretariat or some technical staff is available to work for the organisation;
- confidentiality or transparency of meetings and decision-making procedures;
- quality of the relationship between members and the "constituency" they represent (depending also on the constituency internal organising and representation procedures).

Box 8.2 **An innovative co-management organisation for Waza National Park (Cameroon)** (adapted from Borrini-Feyerabend *et al.*, 2000)

The Waza National Park, situated in the Extreme North province of Cameroon, was created some decades ago. Following the national legislation, the residents of the villages situated inside the park's territory were forcibly relocated outside, right at the park's borders (actually all communities were relocated except one, which possibly had important connections in high places...). The relocated communities never resigned themselves to the decision, in particular regarding the prohibition of collecting natural resources necessary for their own livelihood. Throughout the years they continued to claim fishing rights on the ponds excavated and managed by their ancestors inside the park, the right of harvesting certain plant products (for instance gum Arabic) from within the park, the right to take their animals to graze inside the park in times of drought, etc. The ensuing conflicts between communities and park management brought the Waza Logone project, implemented by the IUCN and financed by the Dutch Development Agency, to initiate a co-management process to secure the natural resources of the park via agreements among the different stakeholders.

The process of negotiating among stakeholders brought about the establishment of a multi-stakeholder

management structure, with the aim of approving the conventions that would regulate the management of the park and the natural resources at its periphery. Noticeably, the definition of the mandate of the structure encountered the strong reluctance of the park conservation service. After months spent in search of a suitable compromise, the parties agreed on a “double mandate”: a consulting role regarding the management of the park (whose mandate stays with the conservation service), and a full management role regarding the zone at the periphery of the park. With this double role in mind, the structure was named the Consultative/ Management Committee of the Waza National Park and its Periphery.

The Consultative/ Management Committee of the Waza National Park and its Periphery was legalised by the Minister of Environment and Forests of Cameroon with a decision pertaining to its internal organisation and functioning rules. The structure includes members possessing full rights and members with consultative powers only.

The members with full (voting) rights are:

- 4 representatives from the Park Conservation Service;
- 1 representative from the Provincial Delegation of Environment and Forests;
- 3 representatives of the Central Service of the Environment and Forests Ministry;
- 5 representatives of the men from the settled communities in the park’s periphery;
- 5 representatives of the women from the settled communities in the park’s periphery;
- 2 representatives of cattle-rearing nomads (a man and a woman) and 1 representative of transhumant cattle-rearing people interested in the pasture of Waza National Park and the surrounding plain;
- 2 representatives of youths (a man and a woman) from the settled communities in the park’s periphery.

The members with consultative powers only are:

- the mayors of the interested rural municipalities (Waza, Zina, Petté);
- the head authorities of the relevant districts (Waza, Zina, Ngodeni, Fadaré, Kossa);
- a representative of the Scientific Council for Waza National Park;
- three representatives of the Waza Logone project;
- a representative of the Management Committee of the Waza-Logone Plain (another multi-party management structure in the same province, also promoted by the Waza Logone project).

Deciding about the institutional arrangement that best suits the co-management situation (i.e., what type of organisation, composition, rules, functions, powers, responsibilities) is invariably an iterative process. To some extent, institutional arrangements arise from the reality on the ground (i.e., what is to be managed? How much is there to be shared?). On the other hand, the degree of flexibility the parties have about institutional arrangements (which includes the legal framework for decision making) determines what can reasonably be included in the agreement and the type of co-management organisation that can be developed. Examples of substantially



Deciding about the institutional arrangement that best suits the co-management situation... is an iterative process.

different types of co-management organisations are given in Box 8.1, Box 8.2 and Box 8.3 and several more are listed in Table 8.1 along with a selection of their aims, functions and powers. Noticeably, several organisations with different functions, powers and responsibilities may be needed for a particular area and act in complementary ways (see, for instance, Box 6.12, on the sophisticated co-management setting for the Galapagos Marine Reserve).

Box 8.3 An organisation created to co-manage woodlands in Scotland
(adapted from Jeanrenaud and Jeanrenaud, 1996)

Self-mobilised groups in Scotland have developed community-based organisations specifically to coordinate and implement woodland management on a wide area. In Assynt, for instance, the local farmers (called crofters) established in 1992 the Assynt Crofters' Trust, with some 130 members spread across 13 townships. The trust raised the money for the purchase of the former North Lochinver Estate by public subscription, grants and loans from public bodies. The members elected directors to the trust's board on a township basis, and the trust was then run by an executive company chairman and various officers. Since then, the trust has developed the potential of the estate, including through a native woodlands programme.

Nested co-management institutions can develop different agreements at different levels of detail within the same co-management scheme.

Nested co-management institutions can develop different agreements at different levels of detail within the same co-management scheme. In Sweden for example, the institutional framework for the management of freshwater fisheries is made up of a nested set of institutions at different organisational levels that combine government bodies and fishing associations (see Box 8.4). In Canada, the Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement created two levels of wildlife co-management boards: a Fish and Wildlife Management Board for the Yukon as a whole, and separate Renewable Resource Councils in each Yukon First Nation's traditional territory. The Board is the primary instrument for fish and wildlife management in the Yukon as a whole, and the Councils are the main bodies responsible for developing agreements on, and implementing, local renewable resource management. The structures include approximately equal numbers of government and Inuvialuit representatives, except in a few specified cases. Similar institutional arrangements are foreseen in many other comprehensive agreements on wildlife management that have been negotiated throughout the Canadian North.² Wide-ranging co-management responsibilities are usually assigned to co-management boards and extensive self-regulatory responsibilities devolved to aboriginal organisations. The complementary activities of these nested co-management organisations work towards the conservation of resources through processes that determine how much of the total allowable harvest is allocated among aboriginal peoples and other users. One of their salient characteristics is the flexible and creative use of legal and economic instruments while striving for open negotiation processes and conflict resolution.

Box 8.4 Fishing associations and the co-management of freshwater ecosystems in Sweden
(adapted from Olsson and Folke, 2001)

Local fishing associations are common in Sweden. These associations, which in many respects resemble common-property systems, manage many of Sweden's vast number of lakes, rivers and streams. National laws introduced in the 1980s and 1990s make it possible for freshwater associations not only to manage lakes and rivers but also watersheds. Fishing associations have the right to make decisions

² Nesbitt, 1997.

concerning fishing and fish conservation. The national government, however, is still in charge of broader decisions, such as instituting bans on certain fishing methods or granting permission for stocking fish and shellfish.

A detailed study of the management of the Lake Racken watershed has highlighted the key role of local fishing associations in sustaining crayfish populations and the larger ecosystem. The institutional framework for the management of crayfish populations is made up of a nested set of institutions at different organisational levels. Rules for the management of crayfish are both informal and formal, and are developed by both the local fishing associations and the government. Much of the learning by doing for the co-management of fisheries, however, is carried out by the local fishing associations, whose members develop site-specific ecological knowledge as well as adaptive organisations and rules.

Some co-management organisations are created as *interim* measures during the resolution of title claims over natural and cultural resources. For example in Canada, representatives of Inuit and Haida communities were called in to participate in processes around the management of two National Parks while their territorial claims were being resolved. Both processes ended up establishing co-management agreements.³ Similarly, in the South Moresby/ Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve, co-management structures were initially created as an *interim* dispute resolution mechanism. Nine Inuit representatives participate today in the management of the Auyiittuq National Park Reserve on Baffin Island, with three Parks Canada staff acting as advisors. The committee advises on general park management, including wildlife harvesting and interpretation programmes, and is reported to have reduced local conflicts over the area. Under the Sub-agreement on Impact and Benefits of the Nunavut Final Agreement, issues such as employment and economic benefits, zoning, and new committees are also examined.

Some co-management organisations are created as interim measures.

Composition

As mentioned, a co management organisation is necessarily multiparty, i.e., it includes at least two, and often many more, social actors. These actors may represent broadly similar or different interests (see Box 8.5).

Box 8.5 Representation of stakeholders in co-management organisations: two examples from India

(adapted from Agarwal and Narain, 1989; Agarwal and Saigal, 1996)

“Similar” actors in charge: the example of Seed village. Seed village near Udaipur in the state of Rajasthan is registered under a unique law known as the Rajasthan Gramdian Act 1971, which gives executive and legal powers to the *gram sabha* (village council). The entire adult population from 100 households is directly represented in the *gram sabha*. The *gram sabha* elects the *karyapalika* (the executive), as well as the *adhyaksh* (chairperson) for a definite period. The executive committee, which is made up of unpaid representatives from all sections of the community, cannot take decisions unless a resolution to that effect has been taken by the *gram sabha*, which meets at least once every month. Seed’s *gram sabha* has formed six committees to oversee different types of work in the village: crop loans, forest and nursery development, water resource management, legal problems and disputes, development programmes and finances. The *gram sabha* has full control over the use of land within the village boundary. In managing this territory, it also has the power to judge, penalise and prosecute. The *gram sabha* has also devised rules for protection of the village common lands by dividing them into two categories: one where both grazing and leaf collection is banned, and the other where grazing is

³ Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996.

permitted but leaf collection or harming trees is banned. This local management organisation also has jurisdiction over trees in private lands, where cutting is allowed only for domestic reasons but not for sale.

“Different” actors in charge: the example of Joint Forest Management. Forest Protection Committees (FPCs), whose members are drawn from the local communities dependent on forest resources, were first set up in the 1970s and 1980s in the states of West Bengal, Gujarat and Haryana. The National Forest Policy (1998) and the circular regarding community involvement in forestry issued by the Government of India, emphasised the increasing importance of Joint Forest Management between state agencies and local communities. For the FPCs, the important issues include adopting and implementing regulations for community collection and allocation of fuel wood, minor forest products, grazing access, labour for forestry activities, sharing the proceeds from timber and polewood harvests, and managing intra- and inter-village conflicts. The presence of primary and secondary stakeholders in the CM bodies manifests itself in the differing priorities each stakeholder group assigns to forest management as well as the form and degree of benefit sharing. For example, in most areas JFM is used as a strategy to regenerate degraded forests and improve survival in plantations; in other words, for meeting the objectives of the Forest Department, which often do not coincide with the needs and interests of forest-dependent villagers.

The capacity of a social actor— a public or private agency, a group, an organisation or an individual— to become a member of a co-management organisation depends on the social status of that actor, i.e., on the acceptance by the other members of the organisation (and by society at large) of its claims to participate in management. In other words, it depends on its recognised entitlements (see Section 2.2 of this volume). Legal issues, including customary or legal tenure, jurisdiction and authority also need to be addressed. For example, if lands are held under leasehold, the written consent of the relevant owners, tenants, occupiers and security holders (such as mortgagees) may be required in the development of a co-management institution. Some jurisdictions and legislation may require that organisations are formally incorporated as legal persons before they can take part in a management body. In other cases, the government has to recognise the validity of customary laws and allow for management authority and responsibility to be taken up not in individual but in collective ways (see Box 8.6)

Box 8.6 **The Dayak people co-manage the Kayan Mentarang National Park: a first in Indonesia!**

(adapted from Ferrari, 2003)

The Kayan Mentarang National Park (KMNP) situated in the interior of East Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) lies at the border with Sarawak to the west and Sabah to the north. With its gazetted 1.4 million ha, it is the largest protected area of rainforest in Borneo and one of the largest in Southeast Asia. The history of the natural landscape of the park is intertwined with the history of its people. About 16,000 Dayak people live inside or in close proximity of the park. These are still communities largely regulated by customary law, or *adat*, in the conduct of their daily affairs and the management of natural resources in their customary territory (*wilayah adat*). The chief (*kepala adat*) and council (*lembaga adat*) administer the customary law. All elected officials at village level and prominent leaders of the community are members of the customary council, which declare traditional forest areas with protection status or strict management regime. These are referred to as “lands whose access is restricted or limited” (*tana ulen*). Such lands cover primary forest rich in natural resources such as rattan (*Calamus sp.*), sang leaves

(*Licuala* sp.), hardwood for construction (e.g., *Dipterocarpus* sp., *Shorea* sp., *Quercus* sp.) and fish and game, all of which have high use value for the local community.

In 1980 the area was established as Nature Reserve, under a strict protection status that allowed no human activity. Later on, a study that included community mapping exercises showed the Dayak communities rightful claims to the land and its resources. This study basically recommended a change of status from Nature Reserve to National Park, where traditional activities are allowed. A WWF project identified as primary the problem of lack of tenure security, which had effectively transformed the Dayak's forest into an "open access forest", where the state could decide to allocate exploitation rights or establish a conservation area without their prior consent. The Dayak communities had very little power to defend the forest or secure their economic livelihoods against logging companies, mining exploration, or outside collectors of forest products. Under these circumstances, the project decided to give priority to activities that would lead to the recognition of *adat* claims and *adat* rights, so that indigenous communities could continue to use and manage forest resources in the conservation area. From 1996 to 2000, the project engaged in the assessment of the use and availability of forest resources with economic value, in workshops for the recognition of forest under traditional customary management (*tana ulen*), in participatory planning for zoning recommendations and the redrawing of the external boundaries of the park, in the drafting of *adat* or customary regulations for the management of the national park, and in the strengthening of local organisations.

The Alliance of the Indigenous People of Kayan Mentarang National Park (FoMMA) was formally established on October 2000 by the leaders of the ten customary lands of the park. This was to create a forum for conveying the aspirations of the indigenous communities and debating issues concerning the management of



natural resources in the customary lands of the KMNP. The Alliance is concerned with guaranteeing protection of the forest and the sustainable use of natural resources in the ten customary lands of the NP area, as well as with the protection of the rights of indigenous people and their economic prosperity in and around the park. The Alliance now legally represents the concerned indigenous people in the Policy Board (*Dewan Penentu Kebijakan*), a new organisation set up to preside over the park's management. The Policy Board includes representatives of the central government (Agency for Forest Protection and Nature Conservation), the provincial and district governments and the Alliance. The operating principles of the board emphasise the importance of coordination, competence, shared responsibilities, and equal partnership among all stakeholders. The board was formally established in April 2002 with a decree of the Ministry of Forestry, which also spelled out that the park was to be managed through collaborative management—a first in Indonesia!

Still in other cases, it is the country as a whole that must go through a process of testing various approaches on the basis of diverse views of what is possible and desirable. In this sense, co-management institutions emerge as a way of solving problems and signalling the acquired maturity of the natural resource management debate (see Box 8.7).

Box 8.7 **Major institutional change in the management of national forests in western USA**
(adapted from Wilson, R.K., 2003)

The vast majority of protected areas in the United States lie within the national system of public lands and resources. National forests differ from other forms of public lands insofar as the original rationale for their retention within the public domain includes the continuation of natural resource development for commercial purposes, as well as ecological preservation, scientific research, and endangered species protection (this is in line with the 1960 Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act).

For the first one hundred years after independence, the dominant attitudes toward public lands and resources was characterised by a process of land acquisition (colonial westward expansion), followed by settlement (the transfer of the public domain into private ownership), and relatively unfettered commercial development. By the close of the 19th century, however, the social and ecological costs of these *laissez-faire* policies were taking their toll in the form of deforestation, soil erosion, large-scale forest fires, loss of native species, and a host of urban social and economic problems. Progressive ideals were a response to this state of crisis. In general terms, progressives argued that only the federal government could provide the objectivity, rationality and expertise needed to properly regulate, manage and provide for the public good. By preventing the wasteful practices of those seeking short-term economic gain, the vast natural resources in the United States would not be squandered, but last for generations, managed according to scientific principles by a corps of highly trained and “unbiased” state officials.

Despite this policy of centralised management authority, local residents remained economically dependent on these new national forests and, in practice continued to exercise varying levels of influence over management decisions. Public participation in the management process was formalised in the 1960s and 1970s with the passage of a series of new federal environmental laws, which emphasised the need for public hearings and stressed public participation in an individual and nationalistic sense rather than in a collective or community-based sense. Avenues for “participation” were in fact designed to allow individuals to express their personal views or interests, rather than groups and communities to express collective concerns. Rather than facilitating dialogue and open discussion, public hearings tended to be linear presentations of information from federal officials to a public audience.

In the 1990s, regional socio-economic shifts created increasing tensions in many western rural communities over public land use issues. Soon it became clear that the existing institutional structure for integrating public input into forest management processes was insufficient and tended to exacerbate local disputes and alienate federal officials from community residents rather than to create an atmosphere of collaboration. In those years, on the other hand, a number of “real” partnerships— such as the Quincy Library Group in California, the Applegate Partnership in Oregon and the Ponderosa Pine Forest Partnership in Colorado— began to emerge and provided concrete examples of what might be achieved through collaboration. These different types of partnerships provided a forum where local residents and federal managers could work together to solve common problems. On the basis of their results, interest in community-based approaches proliferated rapidly across western USA. By 1997, over 90% of national forests in the United States was said to be engaged in some form of collaborative stewardship as part of their management strategy.

Scope of authority

While there may not be a stand-alone body with permanent premises, staff, budget, etc., some kind of joint organisational forum is essential if a natural resource or territory is to be managed by more than one party. Such joint “bodies” often vary in their decision-making powers. The weakest form of organisation is simply an advisory body to the “real” decision-maker (which may be by mandate a governmental agency). In such cases, the body may have strong moral force but little

real power. Some indigenous parties and organised sectors of civil society are increasingly unlikely to accept this model, given the existence of other types of organisations that can better represent their rights (see Box 8.8). Others, however, consider that advisory bodies with strong legitimacy— and especially advisory bodies in charge of developing technical proposals and arrangements— often end up strongly affecting or determining decisions despite their lack of legal mandate (see Box 6.13).

Box 8.8 Co-management organisations with different decision making powers: examples from Australia

(adapted from De Lacy and Lawson, 1997)

“Token” co-management organisations. Under Queensland’s *Aboriginal Land Act 1991* successfully claimed national parks are leased back to government and managed by a board of management. Under s.5.20(3) “The Aboriginal people particularly concerned with the National Park land are to be represented on the Board of Management.” No mention is made of who else will be on the board, how many, or what the proportional representation of those Aboriginal people shall be. In practice, anyway, the board has few real powers. Its principal function is to “cooperate” with the chief executive of the government in the preparation and revision of a management plan. Under the *Nature Conservation Act 1992*, to which the parks remain subject, real power remains in the hands of the chief executive. Management plans do not have statutory force, unless specifically determined under a separate regulation. Very few national parks have been successfully claimed under this act and Aboriginal people generally express little confidence in it. Progress has been inordinately slow.

Equitable and effective co-management organisations. At Uluru and Kakadu National Parks, similar claims, leases and board of management arrangements also apply. In these cases, however, the lease is for a limited term (five years) subject to renewal, and provides guaranteed financial compensation. The Kakadu Board of Management, for example, comprises 14 individuals, 10 of whom are Aboriginal people nominated by traditional owners. The board is responsible for preparing a management plan (which is subtly but significantly different from “cooperating in its preparation”) and making day-to-day management decisions. In practice, the traditional owners are a powerful force in the management of both parks, which are run according to both national parks law and indigenous law. Management arrangements for these parks are genuinely cooperative.

Size and level of operations

Co-management organisations can be large or small, simple or highly complex, single or multiple, and thus operate at various scales and levels. An example of a complex institutional structure for the management of a World Heritage site is given in Box 8.9. The size and level of operation of this joint management body clearly contrasts with the smaller scale village level institutions described in Box 8.4.

Box 8.9 A co-management organisation working on a large scale in Australia’s Wet Tropics World Heritage Area

(adapted from Pattermore, 2000)

In the Wet Tropics of north-eastern Australia, a complex institutional structure has been developed with the intention of achieving some community involvement in the management of the World Heritage Area (WHA), as well as a balance between the perspectives of Commonwealth and state governments. A great deal of attention was paid to the process of setting up the participatory management institutions

because of serious conflicts— between the Commonwealth and state governments, and within the north Queensland community— over the listing of the area and the compulsory cessation of logging under a Commonwealth regulation. The participatory management scheme responsible for the implementation of the Wet Tropics Management Inter-governmental Agreement is complex and multilayered. Its main components are:

The Wet Tropics Ministerial Council. As the ultimate decision making body, the Council includes two Commonwealth ministers. The portfolios represented by these ministers change from time to time, but always includes the Commonwealth minister responsible for the environment. Other ministers, such as those representing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and State Tourism may be invited to attend as “observers” from time to time.

Under the Act, the Ministerial Council’s responsibilities are:

- approving the budget;
- nominating the chairperson of the board (see below);
- recommending for approval the final management plans to the state Governor in Council.

The Wet Tropics Management Authority. The WTM Authority consists of a board, an executive director and staff. The staff and executive director are state government officers employed under Queensland public service laws. The board consists of five part-time members who are private citizens. The executive director is a non-voting member of the board. The voting members are appointed under Queensland law on the nomination of the Commonwealth (two), the state of Queensland (two) and the Ministerial Council (the Chair of the Board). While the Wet Tropics World Heritage Protection and Management Act 1993 requires only that board members not be public servants, and have experience or qualifications in a field relevant to the Wet Tropics WHA, the Commonwealth is obliged under the Wet Tropics of Queensland World Heritage Conservation Act 1994 to make at least one of its nominees an Aboriginal person.

The Authority is advised by two statutory committees: a Scientific Advisory Committee, and a Community Consultative Committee (CCC). While these committees have functions specified under the act, they do not have decision making powers. Initially the members on the CCC were chosen by the Ministerial Council. After proclamation of the act, appointment of the committees became the WTM Authority’s responsibility. There is now a formal policy and written procedures for selecting committee members. Public notices call for expressions of interest, and the policy requires the authority to choose members who provide a range of skills and interests, and are spread geographically across the entire area. Preference is given to nominees who can demonstrate the support of a community group. Where a particularly contentious issue is to be discussed at a board meeting, the authority may also hold community meetings with key stakeholder representatives from the conservation sector, tourism industry, indigenous groups or World Heritage Area landholders and neighbours. The meetings are chaired by a board member, who canvasses views on issues to be considered by the Wet Tropics Board. Each board meeting is attended by government officials representing the four Ministerial Council portfolios. The officials attend as observers and have no statutory role but are nonetheless very influential.

Co-management organisations can also be distinguished on the basis of the scale on which they operate to improve natural resource management and local livelihoods. Three levels of operation appear most important:

1. **The local level.** The focus at this level is on primary actors. Co-management organisations are usually engaged in situation analysis, appraisal of different types of interventions, making strategic decisions, developing plans and agree-

ments, and implementing, monitoring and evaluating activities. Time and resources may need to be invested in participatory processes, dialogues to elicit multiple perspectives, group learning processes, conflict resolution and the active engagement of underprivileged actors (e.g., women, the poor).⁴ The full and effective involvement of primary actors in a co-management organisation at the local level makes the whole difference between token participation/ consultation and real co-operative decision making and power sharing.



2. **The district or regional level.** The focus at this level is on providing the enabling conditions for co-management of natural resources to happen at the local level over wide areas. Co-management organisations may be set up to identify and promote needed conditions and forms of support, to encourage and promote local action, to mediate conflicts, to strengthen networks, and to facilitate exchanges and joint learning. Typical activities include the federation and coordination of local initiatives and the building and strengthening of local organisations to involve more local actors in the management of natural resources.

3. **The national and international level.** The focus at this level is on legislation, policy and institutional transformation. Co-management organisations operating on a very large scale usually include as major actors governmental agencies, large NGOs, donor agencies and representatives of first nation peoples. Their key challenge is to ensure the broad conditions and incentives necessary to establish flexible, innovative and transparent management practices. More specifically, they should refrain from imposing “participation” from above through standardised structures that may inhibit, rather than facilitate, co-management at the local level.

Ideally, co-management organisations operate at local, regional and national/ international levels in an interrelated way.

Ideally, co-management organisations operate at these three interrelated levels to secure local livelihoods and sustain natural resources.

8.2 Examples of co-management agreements and organisations



In Table 8.1 we have collected and compared a number of co-management agreements and organisations. The cases span international, national and local examples.

⁴ Pimbert and Pretty, 1995.

Table 8.1 Examples of co-management agreements and organisations

Name of, and parties to the agreement	CM organisation(s) (bodies in charge of decision making, advice, enforcing rules, etc.)	Selected aims and main clauses of the agreement, resource(s) to be managed, functions and powers of the CM organisations...
A. International CM agreements and organisations		
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd (1987)	International Porcupine Caribou Board: 8 members (4 US, 4 Canada)	Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to conserve Porcupine Caribou herd and its habitat ● to further the objectives of the agreement; ● to facilitate coordination, communication and cooperation between the parties and develop an International Conservation Plan; ● to collect, share and provide advice and recommendations to the parties concerning herd monitoring, harvest limits and data, habitat conservation; ● to ensure opportunities for customary and traditional uses of the herd and participatory management.
Agreement on the recognition of Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park between the government of the Republic of Botswana and the Government of the Republic of South Africa (1999) ⁵	Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park Foundation— composed of 8 persons in representation of the 4 high level officials in each country— with the general aim of sharing ideas, developing proposals, providing general guidance and facilitating the joint management of Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park	Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to monitor the implementation of the management plan; ● to advise about the plan; ● to foster cooperation and integration of activities; ● to receive and distribute funds.
Protocol of cooperation on the conservation of the Caspian Sea between the Government of Iran and the Soviet Union (1973) ⁶	Joint Commission on Environmental Protection of the Caspian Sea: five members including high-level experts from Iran and from the Soviet Union, with a co-chair from each side.	Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● monitoring of pollution of the Caspian Sea; ● assessment of risks and damage to biodiversity, including 400 endemic species, such as the Caspian seal, 5 endemic species of sturgeon producing the world's highest quality caviar, and the migratory bird species associated with several wetland areas; ● recommending decisions for impact prevention and abatement; ● carrying out joint research projects on the environmental aspects of the Caspian Sea.
B. National CM agreements and organisations		
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) between the Government of Canada and	Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Coordinating Committee: composed of government representatives and aboriginal parties in equal numbers and	Agreement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● aboriginal people to have exclusive harvest rights of aquatic species and furbearers on specified lands and to have priority subsistence harvesting rights on other lands within specified harvest level; ● guaranteed minimum income for fur hunters;

⁵ Sandwith *et al.*, 2001.

⁶ Protocol signed between the Department of the Environment, Iran and the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources of the Soviet Union in 1973. The Protocol was in force until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and is considered to have played a major role in maintaining a relatively high environmental quality in the Caspian.

Indian First Nations	in charge of reviewing, managing, supervising the co-management regime (advisory capacity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● local community landholding corporations to manage exclusive harvesting rights; ● authority to set harvest level in some specific areas; ● aboriginal parties pay own costs of participation from agreement compensation fund.
Memorandum of Understanding for the Joint Management of Selected Forests ⁷ Agreement between Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Forestry Department (FD) in the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources	<p>Joint Steering Committee to oversee implementation of joint management plans</p> <p>KWS and FD to nominate representatives to Committee</p>	<p>Key clauses:</p> <p>The agreement is established on a 25-year term, with joint review and updating every 5 years. It foresees joint objectives, plans and initiatives, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● patrols, training, fencing, extension work, fire plans; ● surveys and research; ● controlled and rational use of forest products; ● development and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure for minimum impact tourism and recreation, including conservation education facilities (such as nature trails); ● joint definition of areas of value; ● erecting and maintaining wildlife barriers; ● protecting tree plantations and ecological balance; ● revenue collection and use.
Inuvialuit Final Agreement on the Wildlife and Environmental Management Regime between the Government of Canada and Indian First Nations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hunters and Trappers Committee: advise the Inuvialuit game council on local issues, including wildlife requirements and quotas, issue harvesting bylaws, collect harvest data, contribute to community conservation plans and assist other committees; ● Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC): 13 representatives from 6 hunters and trappers committees and chair, appoints Inuvialuit members to advisory bodies, advises governments and assigns hunting areas and quotas, represents Inuvialuit internationally; ● Fisheries Joint Management Committee: 5 members: 2 IGC, 2 Federal Government; 1 independent chair. The committee determines harvest levels, reviews fishing data, registers fishers, allocates quotas, advises governments; ● Wildlife Management Advisory Council: 7 members: 2 IGC, 2 North West Territories (NWT) Government, 1 Federal Government, NWT Chair: advises on wildlife management, advises Ministers, IGC, Environmental Screening Committee, Environmental Impact Review Board: determines harvest quotas, and advises on international issues, prepares wildlife conservation and management plan for western Arctic region; ● Environmental Impact Review Board: determines harvest quotas, and advises on international issues, prepares wildlife conservation and management plan for western Arctic region; ● Wildlife Management Advisory Council (North Slope): 5 members: 2 IGC, 1 Yukon Government, 1 Federal Environment Representative, Yukon Government Chair: wildlife conservation and management plan, protected area planning and management; ● Environmental Impact Screening Committee: 7 members: 3 Government, 3 IGC, Government chair: examines development proposals, refers significant project to review board or elsewhere; ● Environmental Impact Review Board: 7 members: Federal chair, 3 IGC, 3 Federal Government: conducts public reviews of development proposals referred by screening committee; ● Joint Secretariat: serves all committees except North Slope; ● Inuvialuit Regional Corporation.

⁷ KWS and FD, 1991.

Wadden Sea Agreement: the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy in the Netherlands ⁸	The members comprise the nature conservation groups, producer organisation of the cockle fisherfolk, research bodies, community representatives and government representatives	Agreement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 26% of the Wadden Sea closed for fishing; ● in years of food shortage, 60 % of cockle and mussel stocks reserved for birds and a quota is set for fisherfolk; ● reduction of the fishing fleet from 36 to 22 vessels and decision to equip boats with a “black box” (a computer registering all fishing position and activity); ● producer organisations have right to sanction and fine any fisher breaking the agreed rules.
Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement (1985) between rural residents and the Government of Canada	Porcupine Caribou Management Board 8 members: 1 Government of Canada, 2 Yukon, 2 Council of Yukon, 1 North West Territories, 1 Dene/Metis, 1 IGC	Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● make recommendations on herd and habitat conservation and management, and annual allowable harvest; ● develop native users’ guidelines and training; ● promote research and data collection; ● carry out land use planning and land management; ● identify sensitive habitat areas; ● agree on rules and procedures, rights of native users, prohibition on commercial harvest; ● spread information.
C. Local CM agreements and organisations		
Fishery management agreements in Lake Aheme, Benin ⁹	National and regional government organisations, National Fishery Service, Akaja and Xha fishermen and other lake stakeholders (priests, women organisations, village representatives)	Agreement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● design new governing institutions for the lake; ● create new co-management body for the lake that involves representatives from government; ● ban some Akaja and Xha practices.
Oyster fishing agreement on wild beds in Cowes Harbor, Isle of Wight (UK) ¹⁰	Cowes Harbour Commissioners and oyster fisherman company	Basic agreement: Fishermen’s long term access to wild oyster beds guaranteed, and fisheries management rules developed.
Memorandum of Understanding establishing a Joint Land Use Regulatory Programme and Minimum Development Guidelines between the Quinault Indian Nation and Jefferson and Grays Harbor Counties ¹¹	Quinault Indian Nation and Jefferson and Grays Harbor Counties Land Use Advisory Board, comprising 2 Quinault Indian appointees, 1 Jefferson County, 1 Grays Harbor County (Canada)	Agreement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● commitment to consultation and cooperation with planning, zoning and other land use and development controls; ● geographic area subject to agreement with comprehensive plans and agreed minimum development guidelines; ● development and land use permits; ● review process, amendments, jurisdiction; ● county owned lands located on the reservation; ● technical assistance; ● joint statement of goals and policies to guide the parties.

⁸ Steins, 1997a.

⁹ Maarleveld and Dangbegnon, 1999.

¹⁰ Steins and Edwards, 1998.

¹¹ Quinault Indian Nation and Jefferson and Grays Harbor Counties, 1993.

<p>Informal agreement on management of marine resources in Killary Harbor, Connemara, Ireland¹²</p>	<p>Department of the Marine and local mussel farming cooperative and fishermen association</p>	<p>Agreement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● keep the fishing grounds free from rafts and long-lines; ● grant membership to local people only, making it impossible for non-locals and large investors to get mussel farming licences.
<p>Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Control of Aboriginal Cultural Material in Kakadu National Park¹³</p>	<p>Director, National Parks and Wildlife, Northern Land Council, Australia and representatives of Aboriginal groups</p>	<p>Main components of agreement:</p> <p>Responsibilities of parties concerning park management, Aboriginal interests, register of Aboriginal cultural material, protocol of access to register, photographs, recordings, no publication without consent, approval processes for research permits and commercial filming, storage areas, repatriation of cultural material, other protocols, no transfer of authority, native title not affected, amendment procedures.</p>
<p>Joint management agreements under Hazara Protected Forests (Community Participation) Rules 1996, Pakistan¹⁴</p>	<p>Government of the North-West Frontier Province Forest Department, and Fathebandi local community</p> <p>Joint Forest Management Committee comprising village representatives and Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife Department staff</p> <p>Audit committee comprising up to 5 beneficiaries of agreements</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to develop and ensure smooth implementation of the Joint Forest Management Plan, Plan of Operation and Land Use Plan; ● to ensure beneficiaries receive and share equitably benefits under the plan; ● to ensure effective forest protection activities, prevent trespassing, encroachment, illegal grazing and tree cutting, fires or other damage or prohibited acts. <p>Responsibilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● conflict resolution; ● producing witnesses for court hearings concerning forest prosecutions as required; ● setting up meetings and agendas; <p>Agreement to be reviewed after 5 years or as required.</p>
<p>Draft Forest Use Agreement between Uganda National Parks, represented by Mt. Elgon National Park (MENP), and the People of Ulukusi Parish, represented by the Kitsatsa Forest Use Committee of Ulukusi Parish, Uganda¹⁵</p>	<p>Parish Committee and Uganda Wildlife Authority: 4 representatives for each of 9 villages to represent interests in firewood, bamboo, honey, vegetable/mushroom; 2 elected herbalists; 2 elected pitsawers; co-opted chair, secretary for women, parish chief, ranger boundary MENP, parish-based extension worker</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to meet use and conservation needs; ● to promote acceptance of park; ● to allow swift regeneration of encroached area; ● to protect forested zone; ● to protect the area from hunting and grazing; ● to ensure local responsibility for monitoring and control of forest-use access; ● to reduce local dependence on some resources.

¹² Steins, 1997b.

¹³ National Parks and Wildlife (Australia) and Northern Land Council, 1995.

¹⁴ North-West Frontier Province, 1996.

¹⁵ Uganda National Parks and Kitsatsa Forest Use Committee of Ulukusi Parish, undated.

<p>Resolution establishing forest protection committees in West Bengal¹⁶</p>	<p>West Bengal Forest Department and local <i>Panchayat</i> (village council) Executive Committee of forest committee includes <i>Panchayat</i> member, village head, up to 6 beneficiaries, Beat Officer</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● maintain register of beneficiaries; ● hold annual general meetings and keep minutes; ● ensure protection of forests, smooth forestry works and harvests; ● prevent trespass, encroachment, grazing, fire, theft, etc. ● distribution of sale proceeds; ● monitor the enjoyment of use rights; ● Forest Department to provide investments, harvesting assistance, monitor implementation of plan, provide legal advice, other technical assistance as required.
<p>Agreement between Government of Congo and villages in and around the Conkouati-Douli National Park¹⁷</p>	<p>COGEREN— Committee for the management of natural resources, 7 government, 18 village and 2 NGO representatives</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● frame local management policies and monitor management agreement; ● evolve specific agreements for the protection of threatened species and harvest quotas; ● develop and enforce rules and sanctions.
<p>Co-management agreement for Lake Racken Watershed, Sweden¹⁸</p>	<p>Fishing Associations and representatives from government agencies</p>	<p>Agreement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● local management rules: minimum crayfish catch size changed from 9 to 10 cm, harvest time changed from two consecutive days in early August to two widely separated days at the beginning and end of the month, precautionary rules on the use of fishing gear, boats and other equipment, and number of traps per household restricted to 15; ● embed local practices (above) in a larger institutional framework set by the government: Swedish Codes of Statutes that a) provide regulations for controlling the mink population and b) place restrictions on stocking and ban certain fishing methods.
<p>Tatshenshini Alsek agreement between Champagne and Aishihik First Nations and Province of British Columbia, Canada¹⁹</p>	<p>Tatshenshini Alsek Park Management Board: 2 representatives from British Columbia, one of whom is the District Parks Manager and 2 representatives from the Champagne and Aishihik First Nations</p>	<p>Agreement: Aboriginal people will continue to harvest the resources of the lands and waters of the park for food, social and ceremonial purposes using either traditional or contemporary methods to exercise that entitlement.</p> <p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● minimise interference to natural processes and provide for the protection of fish and wildlife; ● identify commercial, economic training and employment opportunities for aboriginal people in the park; ● establish a regional centre for training in the protection, conservation and presentation of cultural

¹⁶ Government of West Bengal, 1989.

¹⁷ Taty *et al.*, 2003; Chatelain *et al.*, 2004.

¹⁸ Olsson and Folke, 2001.

¹⁹ Champagne and Aishihik First Nations and British Columbia, 1996.

		<p>and natural heritage as provided for under the World Heritage Convention;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● carry out a joint annual evaluation of the agreement to ensure that objectives continue to be met.
<p>Memorandum of Understanding between Mbeere County Council and Kenya Wildlife Service for the Management of Mbeere National Reserve²⁰</p>	<p>Joint management plan for reserve and adjacent community advisory committee: 3 Kenya Wildlife Service, 3 Council, District Commissioner, Mbeere ex-officio member</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● improve flora, fauna and tourism management; ● implement community-based wildlife management programme; ● ensure equitable distribution of revenues and other opportunities from tourism; ● maintain integrity of the reserve and its ecosystem; ● provide appropriate visitor facilities; ● encourage efficient and effective administration; ● including through rational zoning system; ● implement community based wildlife conservation and equitable distribution of revenue; ● support sustainable exploitation of wildlife resources and generation of revenue for reserve management and local development; ● support conservation education and research; ● support protection and preservation of special areas; ● minimise risks from wildlife to human life, crops, livestock and property. <p>Agreement:</p> <p>This is a 20-year agreement subject to extension, with joint 5-yearly review, amendments to be mutually approved and management plan to be updated 5-yearly; policy measures including research, infrastructure planning, patrols and protection including resource sharing, termination, preference for local employees.</p>
<p>Agreement to Manage the Soufriere Marine Management Area, Saint Lucia.</p>	<p>Soufriere Marine Management Association, a not-for-profit company with an equal number of government agencies and community organisations serving as members and directors of the company.</p> <p>Makes use of the provisions of the Fisheries Act to establish a Local Fisheries Management Area and to declare the Association as the Local Fisheries Management Authority.</p>	<p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to conserve the natural resource base of the Soufriere region; ● to enhance the equitable economic, social and cultural benefits generated from the sustainable use of the coastal and marine resources of the Soufriere region, at the local and national levels; ● to manage the conflicts that may occur among uses and users of natural resources in Soufriere. <p>Main provisions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● zoning; ● regulations of resource use; ● social and economic development programmes; ● user fees collected and used for management; ● joint decision-making by institutional members of the association; ● individual agencies retain their management authority ● a broad-based Stakeholder Committee acts as advisory body.

²⁰ KWS and Mbeere County Council, 1996.