El Mezquital - A community's struggle for Development

by

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This is one of ten case studies that were part of an IIED research programme on “Urban Poverty Reduction Programmes: Lessons of Experience”. The research was undertaken with support from the UK Government’s Department for International Development/DFID (project number R6859) and from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The publications that are the result of this work are listed at the end of this paper.

The ten case studies demonstrate the important roles that local institutions have (or can have) in contributing to poverty reduction in urban areas. They show that:

• many aspects of poverty need to be addressed, including not only inadequate livelihoods, income levels and asset bases but also poor quality and often insecure housing, inadequate infrastructure and services, inadequate legal protection of poorer groups’ rights and “voicelessness and powerlessness” within political systems and bureaucratic structures;
• there are often positive multiplier linkages as actions to reduce one aspect of poverty can help reduce other aspects;
• there are many possible entry points for reducing poverty (including some for which little or no external funding is needed) and many kinds of local organizations or institutions can contribute to this;
• the form of the local institution that can reduce poverty varies with context; they can be community organizations, federations of community organizations, local NGOs, local foundations, municipal authorities or, on occasion, national government agencies or local offices of international agencies;
• one of the critical determinants of the success of poverty reduction initiatives is the quality of the relationship between “the poor” and the organizations or agencies that have resources or powers that can help address one or more of the deprivations that poorer groups suffer; and
• sustained poverty reduction requires city and municipal government agencies and political structures that are more effective, more accountable and more able to work with low-income groups and their community organizations.

International agencies need to develop or expand funding channels to support local institutions that can deliver for low-income or otherwise disadvantaged groups (including the organizations, associations and federations formed by these groups as well as local NGOs and local government agencies) while also remaining accountable to them. This should also support the capacity of these institutions to widen the scale and scope of poverty reduction programmes and recognize the fact that much poverty reduction depends on new attitudes and actions by local government institutions.
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SUMMARY

Background

El Mezquital is a large informal settlement in Guatemala City with over 20,000 inhabitants. Externally funded, community-based programmes have brought considerable improvements in housing, infrastructure and services since its formation by a land invasion in 1984. This paper considers both the positive and the negative experiences of this settlement’s development process from its formation, growth and consolidation up to 1999. It assesses the interventions of external agencies (local government, national agencies, international NGOs and official donor agencies including the World Bank and UNICEF) including their impacts and their relationships with community organizations. It draws primarily on interviews and focus group discussions with the inhabitants of El Mezquital and with staff from agencies that have supported programmes within the settlement.

El Mezquital was formed in 1984 by an invasion of some 1,500 families who moved onto a 35-hectare site next to an existing residential settlement. They succeeded in resisting attempts by police and local residents to evict them, and this was the only successful land invasion in Guatemala City at the time. Many families who came to El Mezquital had also taken part in land occupations in 1982 or 1983 but had been evicted. When attempts to evict the invaders failed, the settlement attracted more settlers, and expanded and consolidated, with management boards set up in the different sub-divisions. Each management board had representatives on a settlement-wide association and there were various other community organizations for sectors, streets or micro-zones. The government provided no support and the settlers had to rely on illegal connections for water and electricity. Support was received from a range of national and international non-governmental groups, in part in response to a typhoid epidemic in 1985-86. There were often tensions and conflicting goals between the many different community organizations within El Mezquital.

Development Initiatives

The settlement-wide community organization sought support from the government’s National Reconstruction Committee to develop the first programme for urban improvement. Relatively little support was received and progress was slowed down by the dissatisfaction among many residents with what the government offered. The residents developed their own cooperative (COIVEES) which organized the construction of the first well and two large water tanks with support from UNICEF and the Swiss government. This cooperative also developed a piped water distribution system. The Catholic Church, which had also supported many community initiatives, provided the land for the well and the tanks. COIVEES also received support from the Inter-American Foundation to build 65 new houses. In 1994, support was provided by the World Bank, UNICEF and the National Reconstruction Committee for a Programme for the Urban Development of El Mezquital (PROUME) and this included the following components:

- Infrastructure: including sewers and sewage treatment plants, rainwater drains, pavements for pedestrians, the introduction of electricity and the creation and maintenance of green areas. Community members contributed to their implementation.
- Drinking water: to continue the COIVEES water project and to extend it to one of the unserved sub-divisions. This included sinking two new wells.
- Support for the construction of 1,000 new houses and the improvement of 500 houses, to be funded through a loan system.
- Creating a main road through the settlement with access to the market.
- Relocation of families who lived in areas which impeded development but to areas with similar conditions within the settlement. Three hundred and fifty families were selected for moving and two fully urbanized new sub-divisions were developed for them which were integrated into the settlement.
Designs and plans for basic social infrastructure were developed, including an integrated centre for women’s needs (FUNDAESPRO); a fire station; a primary school; a basic education institute; and four multi-purpose halls. The total cost of the project was US$ 6,654,160, with 73 per cent coming from the World Bank, 22 per cent from the government, 3 per cent from the community and 2 per cent from UNICEF. Not all the planned projects were carried out.

Today, after 15 years of community work, almost all the families in El Mezquital have access to good quality, piped water supplies. The settlement’s cooperative supplies a much better, cheaper and more reliable service than that provided in most residential areas in Guatemala City. Ninety-five per cent of families have electricity in their homes and virtually all houses have sewers and drains.

El Mezquital is also well-known for its community-based Integrated Health Programme. This was based on the work of elected community health workers, called reproinsas, within each micro-zone (each of which had around 50 families). They worked part time and were trained to provide basic health care, including immunization, oral rehydration for diarrhoeal diseases, health advice and support for groups with particular health needs (including children and pregnant mothers). The reproinsas also supported other initiatives, including literacy programmes. This served as a community-based health care model that was expanded into other informal settlements in Guatemala City.

**The Role of Government**

Although, in theory, government agencies should have had a major role in infrastructure and service provision, they actually had the least significance in supporting the interventions that improved conditions, and the interventions that were carried out were often done so in a clientelistic fashion.

The main reasons for this were:

- The incapacity or unwillingness of government agencies to respond to the needs of the community (for instance, the state water agency refused to supply water because the settlement was “illegal”).
- Government agencies’ under-estimation of community capacity, which included opposition from the state-run health centres to the work of the community health workers and a lack of support from government employees for community development processes. Government attitudes were shaped by a long-established fear of and lack of trust in community organizations.
- The political manipulation or exploitation of the community’s organizational capacity by successive governments. Two governments tried to use El Mezquital as a showcase to legitimize themselves.

**The Role of Other External Agencies**

The support from international agencies and NGOs allowed considerable improvements in infrastructure and service provision. It also supported important processes of community empowerment, including greater status and possibilities for women. Among the international agencies, the role of UNICEF’s Urban Basic Services Programme had an important role, both before PROUME and in influencing the form that PROUME took (although UNICEF funding formed a small part of the total funding as most external funding came from the World Bank).

However, there were also limitations in most of the international support, including:

- The limited scope provided by many international agencies for community participation, especially in project design. Most external agencies’ strategies have been top-down and non-participatory, with no transparency in terms of how decisions were made and resources allocated. PROUME provided little scope for community participation and showed little awareness of internal processes and power relations within the community. It
set up its own community organization rather than work with existing organizations, which
caused considerable dissension within other community organizations.

- Some projects that were planned and never implemented (including the fire station, the four
  multi-use halls and the creation and maintenance of green areas).
- The problems that the international support failed to resolve, especially regarding the very
  limited employment possibilities. PROUME was regarded by its principal funders as an
  infrastructure project. An employment survey was carried out with the intention of seeking
  ways of supporting employment in partnership with the community but its proposals were
  never considered.

There are also the different perceptions between the external agencies who regard their work as
done (because the project is finished) and the inhabitants who still face many deprivations. In the
absence of effective, accountable local government institutions able to provide continued support,
the inhabitants feel abandoned. Seeing poverty reduction in terms of a single project-based
intervention fails to recognize the importance of supporting long-term processes within low-income
settlements that allow one success to stimulate and support others.

**Replicability**

The processes of community organization, such as COIVEES and the community-based health
promoters, have stimulated innovations in other areas. By 1999, there were more than 700
reproinsas working in 16 areas of Guatemala City and the COIVEES model was being tried in two
other settlements. The Slum Improvement Programme created in 1997, and working in various
low-income settlements within and around Guatemala municipality, is based on the PROUME
model.

Thus, the history of El Mezquital shows both the potentials and the limitations of community-
based, externally supported interventions. After 15 years of struggle, the community organization
has achieved much – legalization of the land (underway), water, sanitation, electricity and housing
improvements. However, many still live in precarious, overcrowded housing, and employment
opportunities are very limited. There are many street children and there are serious problems of
violence and drug addiction. Although the role of women within the community has developed and
changed, principally due to the work of the community health workers, the power structure within
the household remains male-dominated. There is a need for external agencies to support a
participatory redefinition of development objectives in El Mezquital and to support the development
of a new community agenda that would address the principal social and economic problems
including violence, drug addition, unemployment and the lack of educational opportunities.
El Mezquital – a community’s struggle for development
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I. BACKGROUND

THIS REPORT IS based on research carried out in El Mezquital during 1999. The research sought to identify the positive and negative experiences of the “development process” that took place in this large informal settlement over the last 15 years, both in terms of acquiring basic services and social infrastructure and in terms of empowerment and community mobilization.

Guatemala is ranked 117th by the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (1) and is amongst the lowest of the countries considered to have achieved an intermediate level of development. It is characterized by high levels of inequality in both rural and urban areas. In Guatemala City, the middle-income residential areas provide a sharp contrast to the many precarious settlements which are home to populations whose living conditions are hazardous and whose settlements are often on sites ill-suited to residential neighbourhoods. Even within such informal settlements, there are marked inequalities in the distribution of resources and in the quality of living environments.

There is little accurate documentation on these informal settlements. A recent study identified 161 areas characterized as precarious, housing a population of approximately 250,000 people out of a total population of 823,301 in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City. (2) In addition, the study identified 176 barrios populares (low-income neighbourhoods) where there had been some improvements, such as formal housing, but which still showed high levels of poverty. The study revealed another critical point: of the 161 areas identified as precarious, 111 had been formed since 1992. Despite this, the government’s economic policy tends to consider the market as the principal economic actor whilst the state fails to carry out any visible or tangible role, whether it be in promoting development or in curbing inequalities.

This paper focuses on the different sub-divisions of the settlement of El Nuevo Mezquital (commonly known as El Mezquital and referred to as such in this paper) in the south of Guatemala City. The settlement is the result of the single successful land invasion in Guatemala during the 1980s and is one of the largest in Central America (approximately 3,500 families). As El Mezquital has developed over the years, it has had to strengthen its community organization and generate a capacity for negotiation with governmental and non-governmental organizations.

II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

THIS PAPER seeks to identify the positive and negative experiences of the “development process” in El Mezquital, also to disseminate this within a society where the space for discussion and debate has been very restricted and where poverty, marginality and precariousness continue to increase. It focuses on describing the development of El Mezquital and the very limited role of government agencies. Quotes from focus groups or interviews are in italics. The original report in Spanish is also available. (3)

The research on which this paper draws aimed to:

• document and synthesize the nature of community organization in El Mezquital;

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3 Available from the Human Settlements Programme, IIED, 3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H ODD, UK.
• analyze the interventions and impact of external organizations, including international, governmental and non-governmental;
• evaluate the successes and failures of the case of El Mezquital in tackling poverty.

The research was carried out using focus groups and individual, in-depth interviews with members of the community and organizations who have been involved in the development of El Mezquital. The fieldwork was carried out between May and August 1999. There were 12 focus groups and eight individual interviews, involving 62 individuals. Focus groups had a maximum of ten participants, who were drawn from sub-committees within the cooperative in El Mezquital, from community organizations such as women's groups, from youth groups (boys and girls separately) and from community discussion groups. The Catholic Church was instrumental in helping the researchers contact some of the poorest members of the community, who were part of various religious groups. Interviews were carried out with community leaders, professionals who had been involved with developments in El Mezquital, representatives from slum dwellers' organizations and the local Catholic priest. In addition, existing literature on El Mezquital and other precarious settlements was reviewed.

At the end of the study, the field workers organized a “validation and reflection workshop” in which the preliminary results of the research were presented: 31 people took part, most of them from the community of El Mezquital. Some had taken part in the interviews. During the workshop, five working groups were formed which discussed the preliminary research results and presented their conclusions. The results from the workshop enriched the final report. The time limit for the research, which took place over three months in 1999, was the principal constraint.

III. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION IN EL MEZQUITAL

a. Stage 1: Establishment 1984-1986

The Invasion Itself

IN 1984, A group of some 1,500 families invaded land surrounding the colony of El Mezquital, in the south of Guatemala City (zone 12). The colony had been built during the 1970s by the National Housing Bank (BANVI) as a residential area for low- to middle-income people. The land covers an area of 35 hectares: to the north is the Central de Mayoreo (market place and bus station); to the west, the sheer drop of the El Zacatal ravine (with seasonal drainage) and the colony of El Mezquital; and to the south, the Villalobos river joins the Frutal gorge (a permanent running sewer). At the time, the only access to the settlement was by foot, since it was not reached by any of the city bus routes.

Part of the land that was occupied belonged to the colony of El Mezquital and had been set aside for recreational or environmental protection purposes. The rest belonged to a private landowner. The area was considered uninhabitable because it was so close to the ravines and because of the seismic instability of the area.

The settlers were diverse, both ethnically (Quiché, Mame and mixed race) and with regard to their birthplace – coming from many different departments of Guatemala. What they shared was poverty. Doña Esperanza Morales,(4) from the Board of Education of the cooperative in El Mezquital, describes why she took part in the invasion:

"I lived in zone 3, where we were renting. But when you don't have work, you cannot go on renting because they kick you out, because you can't pay. And another thing was the electricity, because they put it on at 6pm and at 10pm they turn it off again. In the dark, if the children or some animal got sick, it was a problem. Another thing was the water; there wasn't any, they only gave you drinking water. So for washing we had to go to a public tank. So then, when we heard that they were invading El Mezquital, my husband and I

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4 Committee member of the housing cooperative (Cooperativa Integral de la Vivienda Esfuerzo y Esperanza – COIVEES), interview, May 1999.
started talking about it, and I said to him I'm going, because we need to invade for our children's sakes."

The land invasion took place in various stages: first the sub-division of El Exodo, then later El Esfuerzo, Tres Banderas and Monte de los Olivos, and then, finally, La Esperanza. The different invasions reflect slightly different dynamics. For instance, El Exodo was a more organized invasion whilst in La Esperanza the process was more gradual, as smaller, individual groups heard that an invasion was taking place and they decided to try their luck. The initial invaders gave shelter to newcomers, on the grounds that the more settlers there were, the greater their lobbying capacity and their chances of avoiding eviction.

The sites that were occupied and the form of their occupation reflect different economic situations and levels of organization. The poorest households ended up on the steep slopes of the ravines and in the areas around the sewage and waste water outlets, whilst some of the central areas of El Mezquital show relatively high levels of development and physical infrastructure. La Esperanza is the most remote area with the most dangerous topographical conditions; in the years that followed the invasion, the most severe disease outbreaks (typhoid) and the highest levels of violence were recorded in this sub-division. Today, when members of the community of El Mezquital refer to the sub-division of La Esperanza, they usually call it “that place down there” (in Spanish, allá abajo), a phrase which refers not only to the geographical position of the area but also to its economic and social remoteness.

Consolidation of the Invasion

The community’s first actions centred on defending their land occupation. In addition to attempts by the police to evict them, the invaders had to confront threats from other local communities – specifically those of the colony Monte Maria, a residential area of medium/high-income levels. Relations with those living in the original colony of El Mezquital were also tense, since the invaders occupied the colony’s green area. In the early days, the settlers had to carry out protection vigils.

El Mezquital was the only successful land invasion during the 1980s, that is, the only one to resist eviction. The main reasons for this were the large number of families involved and their level of organization. Over the course of several months, more than 4,500 families (some sources even suggest as many as 9,000) settled in the area. Although coming from different places and cultures, with different histories and even different ideologies, the population united around basic objectives.

Other factors also favoured the invasion, including the political context with the decline of the military executive of Mejía Víctores after the prolonged “Scorched Earth” campaign (1980-1983) and the subsequent attempt at legitimization, in which El Mezquital served as a showcase. Thus, from 1986 onwards, the weak Christian Democrat government of Vinicio Cerezo needed the support of the popular sector to develop whilst also responding to the historical pressures that had brought it to power, namely political democratization, increasing autonomy of the civil government from the military and the redistribution of wealth.

The specific interests of the private landowners were another factor. The owners of the land occupied by the invaders had also owned the land on which the original colony of El Mezquital had been built and they had sold this to the National Housing Bank (BANVI). The invasion gave economic value to an area considered uninhabitable and at high risk. It became a good business opportunity for the owners: years later, the government paid them more than US$ 1 million for the land.

When the state failed to evict the first settlers, the settlement expanded and consolidated, which strengthened community organization. Different sub-divisions had management boards (juntas directivas) and these collaborated in the creation of the Association of United Residents of El Mezquital (AVAUME), which was composed of two representatives from each sub-division. In addition to AVAUME and the different management boards, there were also organizations at the sector, micro-zone and street level. The process of land invasion and later settlement consolidation
led to a strengthening of the community organization to the point where this organization became an important pressure group.\(^5\)

However, tensions and contradictions characterized the Association almost from the outset. In each sub-division, there was more than one management board, including some which represented purely private economic interests. The Association’s reputation suffered from the lack of communication and low level of dialogue with the population. Parallel committees and groups opposed to the management boards emerged, representing the different visions and interests of the population as well as different perspectives regarding community work. For example, the Reflection Group, supported by the Catholic Church, spoke out about the dubious dealings and corruption of the management boards, as well as against two government agencies, the National Reconstruction Committee (CRN) and the National Housing Bank (BANVI). At this first stage, community organization was not one organic group but various groups, with an heterogeneous composition and varying conflicting priorities. A certain degree of confrontation still exists today.

During the first months, the inhabitants faced very serious health problems from the high levels of overcrowding, the lack of water and the unsanitary living conditions. A typhoid epidemic in La Esperanza in 1985-1986, during which 160 children died, increased the urgency of resolving the problem of lack of water. As Lair Espinoza commented: “If today the settlement has a precarious health situation, at that date it was like a refugee camp.”\(^6\)

Between 1984 and 1986, the community organization received support from a wide range of organizations. It successfully lobbied the health centre in Villa Nueva to provide 500 community latrines. The National Movement of Settlers\(^7\) supported the community in the creation of the management boards and the land legalization claims. Other organizations also supported the community, such as the Society for the Integral Development of the Guatemalan Family;\(^8\) Faith and Joy\(^9\) (a religious organization); FUNDESCO (the Foundation for Community Development);\(^10\) UNICEF Basic Urban Services Programme; MSF (Doctors Without Borders);\(^11\) the Ecumenical Foundation of Guatemala Hope and Fraternity;\(^12\) and the Catholic Church which, from the outset, provided spiritual and social support.

The extent of the need was heightened by the lack of government response to the problems. Although the government decided not to evict the settlers, it offered no support, citing the illegality of the settlement as a justification for not providing services. The settlers were forced to steal in order to survive. They broke into the central water distribution pipe belonging to the Municipal Water Board (EMPAGUA),\(^13\) which separated the colony of El Mezquital from the settlement. Their first attempt left residents of the original colony without water, creating further tensions between the two settlements. After this, the settlers made illegal connections, hiding the taps beneath their beds so that visiting water engineers would not notice them. Some time later, the government authorized the

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6 Dr Espinoza was director of UNICEF’s Basic Urban Services Programme in Guatemala until 1997. This programme gave support to improving basic service provision in El Mezquital and many other settlements – see Espinosa, Lair and Oscar A López Rivera (1994), “UNICEF’s urban basic services programme in illegal settlements in Guatemala City”, *Environment and Urbanization* Vol 6, No 2, October, pages 9-29. This quote is drawn from an interview with Dr Espinoza in May 1999.

7 MONAP – Movimiento Nacional de Pobladores.

8 SODIFAG - Sociedad para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia Guatemalteca.

9 Fey y Alegría.

10 Fundación para el Desarrollo Comunitario.

11 Médicos Sin Fronteras.

12 Fundación Ecueménica Guatemalteca Esperanza y Fraternidad.

13 Empresa Municipal de Agua.
installation of the first community taps. MSF (Doctors without Borders) donated three pipes for each installation.

Similar tactics were used to obtain electricity connections. The settlers put up numerous illegal connections to the main electricity posts. When the electricity company cut off their connections, a group of children from the settlement went on a protest march to the city centre, bearing a placard which read: “If the children are the future, we need to be able to read.” In this way, by the end of 1986, the settlement had consolidated although the basic problems still remained.

With regard to education, the residents interviewed described the long struggle they had to obtain their first school and with no government support. One resident, from the Administrative Board of COIVEES commented:

“There is a lack of communication with the government. I will give you an example: we struggled for a long time in La Esperanza. I had a colleague who worked as a volunteer for a long time in the school and, at last, we managed to get her a teacher's salary. Up until now, she has given classes in the Rising Sun school but the government has given no support at all.” (14)

In the absence of governmental support, organizations such as Faith and Joy and the Foundation for Community Development (FUNDESCO) collaborated in the construction of the school.


At the beginning of 1987, drinking water was supplied to the settlement by water tankers, public taps or by residents of the colony of El Mezquital who sold it at a high price. There was no street lighting and the electricity supply reached barely 40 per cent of the population (through illegal connections). There were five small private clinics and only one health post provided by the Ministry of Health. There were no telephones, roads, street-cleaning services or green areas for the 4,500 families living there.

In 1987, the community organization, AVAUME (Association of United Residents of El Mezquital) met with the government’s National Reconstruction Committee (15) to develop the first Programme of Urban Improvement of El Mezquital. This programme defined green areas, reservations and environmentally protected areas, an area for sports grounds and, in each sub-division, a site for a multi-purpose hall. It also defined pedestrian streets, main and adjoining streets, and regulated the layout of the different plots. In practice, the development of this plan by the National Reconstruction Committee working with the community organization effectively gave the latter official government recognition.

However, this first programme included one component that was unacceptable to many members of the community, namely the size of the plots. Whilst the government wanted to offer plots of six by ten metres and a rapid provision of services, the community rejected this proposal and lobbied for larger plots. The Church, through Father Luis Rama, supported this movement and helped form the Six by Twelve Group, as the smallest plot size the community would accept was six by 12 metres. Although this struggle was ultimately successful, with the notable involvement of community organizations and the support of the Catholic Church, it also led to some contradictory situations, including groups of residents invading new areas for a second time. Esperanza Morales, at that time a member of the Six by Twelve Group, commented:

“The government were trying to offer us six by ten metres but everybody resisted because can you imagine, five children and two parents just wouldn’t fit. We wanted a bigger place, and we deserved it, and we had the right to fight for something good. But there were a lot of people who said no, we shouldn’t fight, they were very conformist. We had a lot of problems, confrontation with the technicians who came

14 COIVEES, focus group, June 1999.
15 The National Reconstruction Committee was formed after the earthquake of 1976 to coordinate reconstruction efforts. After the earthquake, it continued to work in precarious areas until it was closed down in October 1994 as a result of the reductionist policies of the state.
to measure the plots. In my case, for example, my husband is dead and so I am single, and they said that I didn’t have the right to a plot as I would not be able to pay for it. Just because I was in the Six by Twelve Group. Then they said that they would give me building materials, sheet iron, if I stopped fighting, but I did not give up because I thought about the time when my children would be grown up. They put me in the middle of plots which were only six by ten metres and in a place where water was always coming into the house, and so one night, with three other families, I went and invaded a different part, where we made plots of six by 12 metres, we all did, and we would not leave that area. The people who had six by ten metre plots were those who did not want to fight, who were afraid, who did not want problems with the government. If we always plod along doing what we are told, we are just like donkeys. If we had not struggled, we would still be renting somewhere.”

While the developments by the National Reconstruction Committee were being carried out, the community began to work to improve the housing and infrastructure in the neighbourhood. The community worked with a newly created Inter-institutional Committee for Precarious Areas (COINAP)(17), UNICEF and others, using participatory work methods. Together, they designed the first housing prototypes which were built in 1989. Through MSF and UNICEF, the community obtained funding for the construction of five houses. Due to a favourable exchange rate and careful administration by the community, six houses were built with the money.

In 1989, under pressure from the community, the government agreed to sell them the land they occupied. It was transferred initially to the National Housing Bank (BANVI) and the National Reconstruction Committee, before being allocated to individual residents. This marked a turning point in the struggle to legalize the land. At the same time, some families began to move to other settlements (eg. Villalobos, Ciudad Peronia) in order to escape the high levels of overcrowding.

Emergence of the Cooperative

This stage of growth required changes in the organizational structure of the community. The concern that some management boards might be mis-using funds and the new development projects taking place meant that a new type of management was required. A selection of community representatives, with support from UNICEF, travelled to Mexico to see and hear about the experiences of community organizations in that country. Finally, it was decided that the most suitable structure would be that of a cooperative, whose work would be subject to constant monitoring, including audits of how funds were used, and it would be guided by the principal of serving the community with equal rights and responsibilities for all members.

The Guatemalan General Law of Cooperatives states that these are not allowed to be profit-seeking and that they must attempt to promote education, community integration and the establishment of social services. In addition, each member must have the right to one vote and the management of the funds must be regularly inspected by the general inspector of cooperatives. In El Mezquital, this mechanism helped to avoid the kind of corruption and abuse in the management of funds which had occurred with the management boards. Hugo Paredes, currently a member of the Housing Board of the Cooperative, stated:

“The Cooperative began because we were in a precarious situation. At that time, there were a lot of management boards and they all went around knocking on doors collecting money in the name of the community but who knows what happened to that money...”

16 COIVEES, interview, May 1999.

17 The creation of COINAP was an attempt to establish some coordination between the different organizations working in El Mezquital. Its members came from the public and private sectors. For more details, see reference 6, Espinoza and López Rivera (1994).

18 Housing Committee, COIVEES, focus group, June 1999.
The Cooperative was officially opened on the 20th October 1990, the date when Guatemala commemorates the anniversary of the October Revolution. It was named the “Integrated Cooperative of Housing, Esfuerzo and Esperanza” (COIVEES), Esfuerzo and Esperanza being the names of two of the sub-divisions in the settlement. The title indicates the emphasis that was to be placed on the issue of housing. The organization was structured according to its own principles and the existing legal norms into the following boards:

- Administrative Board, directing the Cooperative;
- Supervisory Board, responsible for ensuring the smooth running of each of the sub-committees in COIVEES;
- Education Committee, in charge of informing new members of the Cooperative regarding their rights and responsibilities;
- Water Board, responsible for ensuring the provision of drinking water;
- Credit Board, in charge of analyzing, supervising and approving loan applications by members;
- Building Materials Board, responsible for the manufacture of tiles and the distribution of building materials for all the projects which come under the Cooperative's mandate;
- Housing Board, in charge of planning, carrying out and supervising the construction of houses, and providing advice on how to address technical problems relating to the construction of housing units.

There was some conflict between this new management structure and the management boards. Some of the management boards were opposed to COIVEES on the grounds that this new organization restricted their former levels of power. Lair Espinoza suggested that the management boards showed a lack of vision in this respect and prevented the development of:

“...an organizational umbrella, which the management boards would have provided and beneath which the Cooperative and other interest groups could have united.” (19)

COIVEES' first actions focused on the provision of water. Dona Marina Dueñas, recalling the days before regular water service was achieved, said:

“In La Esperanza, we had ten minutes of water per family; you ended up with a splitting headache collecting it. Sometimes, I had to go and get water in the middle of the night, and I was very frightened."

COIVEES constructed the first well and two water tanks with financial support from UNICEF and from the Swiss government who provided around 1,000,000 Quetzales (about US$ 250,000 at that date). Negotiations with the Church took place to allow the well to be dug and the water tanks to be installed on Church premises with a lease of 25 years. The well was 869 feet deep and each water tank had a 175 cubic metre capacity. The initial distribution network covered 325 domestic connections and ten communal taps in La Esperanza, 76 domestic connections in Monte de Olivos, 17 in Tres Banderas and 40 in El Esfuerzo. From the outset, El Exodo, which relied on water from the Municipal Water Board (EMPAGUA) and illegal connections, cut itself off from this project, partly because of the private motives of the management boards who were in charge of collecting the monthly fees, which never reached EMPAGUA.

COIVEES also sought to address the problem of precarious housing with support from the Technical Consultancy Firm (ECOTEC) which developed a project with the Inter-American Foundation to build 60 new houses between 1991 and 1993. Just as in 1989, careful management of the funds allowed an extra five houses to be built on top of the original 60.

Reproinsas

At almost the same time as the Cooperative organization was beginning work, the Integrated Health Programme, which began in 1986, was going through a process of consolidation. This programme arose from the need to confront the serious health problems in the community and the indifference or inefficiency of the relevant government bodies. It was based on a system of micro-zones or


20 Administrative Board of COIVEES, focus group, June 1999.
sub-divisions, each comprising approximately 50 families, into which the community had divided itself. In each micro-zone, the families elected one person as their representative on the Integral Health Programme. They became known as reproinsas\(^{(21)}\) and all those who were elected were women.

The reproinsas received part-time training for one year, with the support of UNICEF, for example in recognizing the symptoms of dysentery, in providing oral rehydration therapy, vaccinations, hygiene and other basic health care. They provided health care for the sick, including during the night, and thus built up a very good relationship with the community. Their first achievement was to increase levels of immunization. From the outset, they set about making other changes within the community, not only in health but also in other social areas such as literacy schemes.

The reproinsas model heralded the beginning of a more complex organization which was replicated in other areas of the city. In 1990, the first community pharmacy was founded, as was the Foundation of Courage and Prosperity (FUNDAESPRO)\(^{(22)}\) to provide a network of reproinsas across the city, which rapidly expanded into other precarious settlements. By mid-1999, there were between 600 and 700 reproinsas in 11 precarious settlements in the city, working in psychology, legal advice and literacy, the latter in coordination with the National Literacy Commission\(^{(23)}\). The reproinsas also began to change the perception and status of women through their role in public activities, through moving out of the private sphere and through their major role in community development.

On the negative side, the reproinsas found it difficult to combine their community work with their other responsibilities – for instance, many were responsible for taking care of their children and the household chores and many also worked in the formal or informal sectors. This led to many women dropping out of the programme within two years.

**Women United for a Better Life (UPAVIM)**\(^{(24)}\)

UPAVIM was an organization that went through a similar process to that of the reproinsas in El Mezquital. This organization was founded in 1988 to address the problem of children's health and the situation of women living in extreme poverty and those exposed to domestic violence. It received support from churches in the USA. The springboard for this was the work in the parish clinic of La Esperanza, in addition to the organizational experience of the Reflection Group and the Six by Twelve Group. UPAVIM started in loaned office space with three members and a small handicraft workshop. A few years later, before the beginning of the Programme for the Urbanization of El Mezquital (PROUME), the group had managed to construct and inaugurate a four-storey building.

The creation and growth of UPAVIM showed three important characteristics:

- the search for economic sustainability by the organization members (all women), which would allow them to survive and to confront problems such as domestic violence;
- work focused in the sub-division of La Esperanza, where the community was in most need, and it thus became a point of identity for the community in question;
- UPAVIM developed without support from either the government or international organizations such as UNICEF or the World Bank and, hence, it had a degree of financial independence – not total but certainly critical – which gave the organization a certain sustainability.

This stage of growth in the community, both quantitative and qualitative and later referred to by the community as the “bridge-phase”, served as a springboard for the achievements and projects to come.

\(^{(21)}\) From the Spanish Representante del Programa Integrado de Salud.

\(^{(22)}\) Fundación Esfuerzo y Prosperidad.

\(^{(23)}\) Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización – CONALFA.

\(^{(24)}\) Unidas para Vivir Mejor – UPAVIM.

At the end of the 1980s, the National Reconstruction Committee submitted a proposal to the World Bank requesting a loan for a municipal development programme in what it termed “precarious areas”. This loan was approved in November 1989 but was never paid out due to the closure of the World Bank programme in Guatemala. In 1993, the original project was taken up once more and, at the invitation of COIVEES and UNICEF, a World Bank evaluation mission visited El Mezquital. According to Mario Alfonso Bravo, this visit served the purpose of “...ascertaining the participation of the community and community organizations in developing, managing, implementing and administrating community projects.”

After a long period of negotiation and preparation, the project started in March 1995, supported by an outlay of one million Quetzales (equivalent to US$ 200,000 at the time). It was called the Programme for the Urbanization of El Mezquital (PROUME) and it included components for:

- infrastructure: including: sewers and sewage treatment plants, rainwater drains, pavements for pedestrians, the introduction of electricity and the creation and maintenance of green areas and environmentally protected areas;
- drinking water: to continue the COIVEES water project and to extend it to El Exodo, one of the sub-divisions;
- housing improvement: to construct 1,000 new houses and improve 500 houses;
- creating a main transport road through the settlement with access to the market: to be carried out by a private construction firm under the responsibility of the National Reconstruction Committee;
- relocation of tenants: this was aimed at those families who lived in areas which impeded developments, for example, in the middle of where a street was planned. They needed to be relocated to areas of similar conditions to the rest of the settlement. A total of 350 families were selected for moving.

Designs and plans for basic social infrastructure were developed in response to the expressed needs of the different groups. These included:

- an integrated centre for women’s needs (FUNDAESPRO);
- a fire station (Power Group);
- a primary school (management board of Tres Banderas);
- a basic education institute (management board of El Esfuerzo and COIVEES);
- four multi-purpose halls (management boards of Monte de los Olivos and El Exodo, Environment Group and Reflection Group).

The total cost of the project was US$ 6,654,160, provided by the institutions shown in Table 1.

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25 Bravo, M et al. (no date), *El programa de urbanización de El Mezquital: PROUME. Una experiencia de coordinación comunitaria e institucional, y modelo autogestionario para vivir mejor*, COINAP/UNICEF, Guatemala, page 43.
Table 1: The Amount of Money Contributed or Loaned from Different Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Amount of money contributed or loaned (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>117,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRN and the Office of Human Settlements and Housing (Dirección de Asentamientos Humanos y Vivienda - DAHVI)</td>
<td>1,470,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>188,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)</td>
<td>4,878,267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Housing improvements**: The new housing and the improvements to existing housing were to be funded through a loan system to which, in principal, the whole population had access whether or not they were members of the Cooperative. Credit was provided to cover the cost of building materials, hiring a qualified builder and also a certain amount for paying family members to cover the costs of the hours of work invested. Each family whose loan request was approved was entitled to up to US$ 2,250, to be repaid over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 9.5 per cent. However, not all families could take out the loan since they would not be able to pay it back.

**Drinking water**: Two new wells were sunk, the first in El Exodo (1,002 feet deep, providing 280 gallons of water per minute) and the second in Lomas de Villalobos (1,000 feet deep, providing 260 gallons of water per minute). This meant that water was supplied to the community throughout the year. In contrast, in the neighbouring colony of El Mezquital, the service provided by EMPAGUA, the Municipal Water Board, is highly irregular with water sometimes only available for three or four hours a day.

**Infrastructure**: The infrastructure was installed with the help of community labour. Once “urbanized”, plots of 72 square metres were sold to residents for 4,500 Quetzales (currently under US$ 700) if the full price was paid immediately or for 8,000 Quetzales (about US$ 1,100) if paid over a 15-year period. Payment was still dependent on the final legalization of property deeds and, at the time of writing, this still had not yet begun.

In addition to the five initial sub-divisions, PROUME relocated residents whose houses were in the way of the redevelopment – about 350 families in all – and two fully urbanized new sub-divisions were developed for them – Ocho de Marzo and Lomas de Villalobos – which became integrated into the settlement.

**Community work**: PROUME was the outcome of a multi-institutional effort and community input. The management boards in each sub-division were responsible for mobilizing and coordinating the voluntary work needed to install the infrastructure. This meant holding frequent meetings to inform residents of plans, and to discuss them. This also meant work that had to be carried out at night and at weekends, 70 per cent of which was carried out by women and children. A committee of management boards (26) was also created, involving three representatives from each sub-division.

The Cooperative (COIVEES) was responsible for:

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26 Comisión de Juntas Directivas de Asentamientos – CJD.
• receiving and managing the funds from UNICEF and the National Reconstruction Committee, and administrating loans to residents;
• obtaining the building materials for carrying out the PROUME projects;
• administrating the implementation of the projects and loans;
• collecting loan repayments;
• gathering all the relevant information for auditing the accounts, and checking and reviewing the different projects;
• presenting to UNICEF a three-monthly report regarding expected costs or any other form of expenses to be withdrawn from the programme funds.

For their part, the main responsibility of the government (via the National Reconstruction Committee and DAHVI (the Office of Human Settlements and Housing) was to act as intermediary for channelling government funds to the community, to construct the main road access to El Mezquital, the stretch of road adjoining the market area and the introduction of electricity to those households still lacking it.

The World Bank provided most of the funding. UNICEF’s Urban Basic Services Programme provided training and technical assistance for those community organizations managing the implementation of the projects; UNICEF initiated and coordinated support from other local and international organizations, and administered and channelled resources from the World Bank to the project management committees in the settlement.

PROUME carried out most of the projects that had been planned, with only a small delay in the two-year timetable initially stipulated. Of the 1,000 originally planned, 450 completely new houses were constructed. The rest of the funding was used to improve existing housing. The two new wells that had been sunk extended the provision of water to the whole community; pavements, sewers and rainwater drainage were installed in all the sub-divisions; and the planned relocation of those who lived on sites needed for redevelopment took place.

On the 15th May 1997, the FUNDAESPRO clinic was inaugurated with funds from PROUME, and was named the Integrated Centre for Family Development, (27) (initially planned as the Integrated Centre for Women’s Needs). During the first year, the clinic was open only for consultancies in the mornings but in the second year it was open all day. New sections were opened up for a laboratory (privately run), for legal advice (supported by University of San Carlos) and for a dental project and a mental health project. The efficient and well-kept clinic, like the wells, shows the quality of development in this settlement. However, PROUME also left work unfinished, and thus a certain amount of dissatisfaction exists within the community.

d. Stage 4: Situation in 1999

Since the end of the PROUME project, COIVEES has carried out various different kinds of project including a building block manufacturing enterprise (begun in 1998, this initiative only lasted three months due to a part being broken and stolen and never replaced) and a waste collection project, which relied on one or two waste collection lorries which, unfortunately, provided only an irregular service. They also produce community bulletins regarding their work and the particular needs and priorities in terms of basic service provision. (28) And they developed a proposal for a new housing project that was submitted to the Inter-American Foundation, but this did not receive funds. COIVEES also worked with students from the Mirna Mack High School to carry out a survey of the situation and needs of the population.

Community organizations such as the network of reproinsas carry on growing. During the 1980s, their level of activity decreased, mainly because of the heavy work burden on the community health workers, but they have gradually recovered former levels of activity even without the provision of salaries or other forms of economic support. This is largely due to the growing awareness and organization of the women who are part of the programme and to the support of the FUNDAESPRO network. Currently, there are 80 reproinsas working in El Mezquital, but with

27 Centro de Desarrollo Integral de la Familia – CEDIF.
practically no access to medicines (because of a lack of funds). The capacity-building for each worker lasts two years and they are trained by FUNDAESPRA staff. Recently, workers have been trained in HIV/AIDS prevention as well as legal training for dealing with violence against women, both domestic and from within the community.

In some ways, reproinsas is a women's organization, not because the workers themselves are women but because they confront concrete problems faced by women. At the end of the 1980s, perhaps without realizing it, the Integrated Health Programme and the reproinsas started off a complex and profound developmental process: from being a project for others, and from their role in development, in the public arena and in community organization, they created a space for reflection regarding identity and the particular problems faced by women. This process, which took place only gradually, met with resentment and opposition from many men within the community, and even from family members of the reproinsas themselves. However, the process gradually began to bear fruit. In one of the focus groups carried out with reproinsas, one worker stated:

“Individually, each one of us has grown, and each one grows together with her children. Now the little girls don’t grow up so timid, their mothers work and they too benefit from it, and the little boys too. I am a very different person now to what I used to be. I was really shy, I wouldn’t talk to anybody.”\(^{29}\)

Edgar Hidalgo, consultant to UNICEF, recalled such an example:

“In one of the first training modules for the reproinsas, somebody asked why all the men had holidays but the women didn’t. With the support of Lair Espinoza, they organized holidays, some women took their husbands and children, some went alone. The whole thing led to trouble at home, beatings from husbands and conflicts but the women still went. Every year they organized a lunch and went for a long weekend because they had the right to some time off. Most of the ones that I knew have since said to me, ‘If my husband wants to shout at me or hit me, he’ll think twice about it now.’”\(^{30}\)

The Reproductive Health and Self-Esteem Group for Women’s Development,\(^{31}\) coordinated by reproinsas, runs a one-year course of two hours per week for groups of young women (ten per group), teaching them to know themselves and develop self-esteem. Their activities and goals are:

“Knowing ourselves better, having self-esteem, knowing our bodies and our private parts, sharing experiences with other young women, understanding how to feed ourselves, with vitamins, and trying to prevent so much pregnancy amongst adolescents.”\(^{32}\)

UPAVIM (Women United for a Better Life) currently has 67 members, more than 50 of whom work in the handicraft workshop. They also have a clinic, a nursery (with 64 children), a laboratory, a healthy child programme (where children's weight is measured once a week), a dental clinic, a women's breast-feeding programme (training 24 women in breast-feeding) and a scholarship programme which helps support 650 children in their studies. The main funding for this comes from the handicraft workshop and donations from North American religious organizations. UPAVIM continues to work for the financial independence of women and the work hours are flexible to accommodate the other chores and needs of the women. They are currently working to build a school next to their building. The organization has a Board of Directors in each project and a general Board of Directors which oversees the whole programme; there are monthly evaluation meetings and general meetings twice a year. Moreover, every two years there are elections for committee members of UPAVIM.

\(^{29}\) Reproinsas, focus group, July 1999.

\(^{30}\) Dr Edgar Hidalgo, consultant, interview, July 1999.

\(^{31}\) Grupo Salud Reproductiva y Autoestima de la Mujer para Superarnos Mejor.

\(^{32}\) The Reproductive Health and Self-esteem Group for Women’s Development, focus group, July 1999.
UPAVIM provides an environment where women’s dignity and self-esteem can develop. As the president declared, “...the possibility of earning a salary, albeit small, allows us to make decisions in our homes.”(33)

In El Mezquital, the reproinsas and UPAVIM are both examples of capacity-building and of empowerment of women. This process can be seen, for example, in the way women came to occupy positions of power within the community (the current president of the Cooperative is a woman), although the majority of those interviewed stated that this empowerment had yet to fully reach the domestic sphere and what Pérez Sainz refers to as “redefinition of the hierarchies within the household”.(34)

In the focus group carried out with members of UPAVIM, one of the women commented that they could make decisions but that “...we still dare not make the final decision”,(35) referring to existing problems within the household.

Alongside these developments, the principal problems of El Mezquital mentioned by the interviewees are of a socio-cultural nature relating to the lack of social development. They include:

- violence: including domestic violence, rape of youth and children;
- drug and substance abuse: including marijuana, cocaine, crack, glue-sniffing and alcohol. Drug addiction has increased among children aged between seven and 15 according to the reproinsas: “Young people today have started killing people and robbing people in order to be able to get drugs. Also there are many very young mothers, 13 or 14 years old, and they too take drugs and gather together on street corners to mug people;”(36)
- the submissive role of women: a subject which came up most often with the women’s focus groups;
- the lack of green spaces, recreation areas and facilities: most of these were not finished by PROUME and this problem particularly affects young people. According to Anleu and González, the lack of freedom, private space and recreation is one of the principal reasons why children leave home;(37)
- the existence of a high percentage of street children and delinquent youth: groups such as Casa Alianza, which works with street children in Guatemala City, claim that most of the children they work with come from colony Limón and from El Mezquital. The extent of this problem is illustrated by the fact that, in 1995, La Novena Integral Development Unit began a programme aimed at stopping the children and youth of El Mezquital from becoming street children, a programme which was later reoriented towards reducing social risk factors for children and adolescents;(38)
- the lack of employment and informal or casual employment: several of those interviewed commented that some families only eat once a day and even then only the basic staples (tortilla and beans). In some of the focus groups which included youths, girls commented that it was sometimes difficult to continue studying due to a lack of funds. Doña Julia Olivas de Fernández, a reproinsa and coordinator of various community groups, commented that: “...here the majority of household heads are low-income and there are also more children than adults and there are a lot of unmet needs. I would like people from outside to come and see, not just to come and visit the church or an institution but they

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33 UPAVIM, focus group, July 1999.
35 UPAVIM, focus group, July 1999.
36 Palua Juárez, Faith and Solidarity Group, focus group, June 1999.
should get the people together and see what their needs are, they should approach the poor people and see the hardships that they suffer.”\(^{(39)}\)

- precarious housing: there are still houses built entirely from sheet metal and wooden boards with a dirt floor, thus creating health problems for the inhabitants. Through PROUME, 400 new houses were funded and many were improved. But not everybody had access to the loans. In addition, not everybody approved of the house designs and building materials – preferring instead a more solid construction which would allow for the later addition of a second level. Hugo Paredes from the Housing Board of the COIVEES commented that: “60-65 per cent of the community have built their houses, the remaining 30-35 per cent haven’t because of a lack of means, economic resources, and we hope that they will somehow be able to have this possibility through the Cooperative;”\(^{(40)}\)
- overcrowding: the average size of the plots is now six by 12 metres, which is inadequate to house families and creates personal, social and behavioural problems;
- low educational provision: most of the education in the settlement is in private institutions which are too costly for the majority of households. The lack of education affects employment opportunities and the general development of the inhabitants;
- lack of health services: the health post belonging to the Ministry of Health and Public Assistance, situated in Tres Banderas sub-division, functions irregularly – mainly for vaccination purposes – and is without medical personnel. Some of those interviewed also claimed that it is about to shut down permanently and the service will be transferred to another settlement in the area. The reproinsas provide a much better service, as do the different clinics belonging to the organizations active in El Mezquital, namely those of CEDIF (Integrated Centre for Family Development), the clinic of the Catholic Church and that of UPAVIM women’s organization, although the cost is sometimes beyond the population’s means.

### e. Observations

After 15 years of community struggle, the work accomplished has left a profound physical imprint on the community. It no longer resembles the 1984 settlement of families who had little when they arrived. Since 1984, the community organization has achieved most of its original objectives: legalization of the land (underway), water, sanitation, electricity, housing improvement, objectives which ran alongside a determined organizational structure. The management boards of the settlement sub-divisions were especially committed to legalization of the land whilst the Cooperative focused on housing improvement and provision of water.

In this new phase, most of those interviewed stated that they had no clear idea of the objectives. Others said that, although the achievements are many, much remains to be done in terms of housing, education, employment and violence. Moreover, there was no apparent process of reflection within the various organizations regarding changes in their organizational structure in order to adapt them to this new phase. Neither AVAUME (Association of United Residents of El Mezquital) nor the management boards have been restarted or replaced by other community-based organizations, creating a vacuum which COIVEES, the largest and most consolidated of all the community organizations, cannot fill, since its nature and goals are different.

Just as at the end of the 1980s, when the organization made a qualitative leap forward which allowed it to embark on a new growth process and to take on PROUME, today such a change in organizational structure and objectives is needed if the community is to move ahead in addressing the current problems listed above.

In some sectors, the prevailing feeling is one of satisfaction with the goals already achieved. Two of the interviews carried out with members of COIVEES illustrate this. A member of the Water Board of COIVEES stated:

> “The main problem we had was at the beginning because there were no basic services. We didn't have water, we didn't have electricity, streets, transport, they

\(^{(39)}\) Julia Olivares, Faith and Solidarity Group, focus group, July 1999.
didn't want to legalize the settlement and a whole range of problems. That was at the beginning. But now, in contrast, the thing is, what do we want if we have everything already? It's been a great achievement because we've had a lot of help. It really has been a success. Now there's no pollution, everything is really nice, we've got electricity and they are making up the deeds to legalize the land."(40)

Indeed, a member of the Administrative Board stated the same thing: "During my lifetime, our dreams have been realized but now there are other dreams. I came here aged 31 and frankly, I came here to get away from my past life, to wipe the board clean, leaving everything. I came here empty-handed and in those days I didn't have a single grey hair. But we came to work for our communities so that we could carry out this true dream. But I feel satisfied because I have been on the committee of the Cooperative for eight years and I believe that the little that we have done, we have done it with a good will. Cooperative committee members who give their hearts to work for the community are few and far between."(41)

This attitude is fully understandable, particularly from the point of view of those who built the community up from nothing and, in so doing, went through a process of personal development. However, this should not mean that current problems should be disregarded.

IV. THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

DEVELOPMENT IN EL Mezquital has been based upon the interaction of different organizations – government institutions, NGOs, international organizations and community organizations. It has taken place on the understanding that living conditions in the settlement cannot be genuinely improved single-handedly by the market, the state, international cooperation or the community when working in isolation. However, the organizations did not always share the same vision, objectives or work programmes and there were moments of confrontation.

a. Government Interventions

According to the majority of those interviewed (both within the community and with non-community stakeholders) the government played the least significant role both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Few interviewees referred to government interventions and when they did it was almost always in reference to the obstacles they put in the path of community work. The comment of Marina Dueñas, president of the Administrative Board of COIVEES, sums this up: "The government did nothing, absolutely nothing."(42)

There is little evidence of government intervention or support in El Mezquital, from the beginning to the present day; only one health centre with a part-time nurse for an area covering 3,500 families and a few schools. It seems little when compared to the social infrastructure built through the organized work of the community. Any visitor to the settlement will notice a visual contrast between, on the one hand, the water tanks set up by COIVEES, painted with bright colours and significant scenes of community life, or the well-maintained three-storey building of FUNDAESPROM and, on the other hand, the government buildings such as the health centre in Tres Banderas (one of the sub-divisions of El Mezquital), its roof made of sheet metal, its windows broken and in a state of disrepair. According to those interviewed, the attitude of the state can be characterized by an underestimation of community capacity, by political or partisan manipulation, and by all parties showing an incapacity to respond to the needs of the community which,
ultimately, received a better response from international organizations. The government’s actions were shaped by:

- the trend towards privatization and the particular economic model being adopted;
- financial constraints due to the inadequate taxation system which fails to generate enough resources for development. Successive attempts at tax reform have generated political instability and attempts at political coups (for example, May 1987 and early 1998);
- weakness of the government in the face of traditional power groups, eg. army and economic groups who are generally disinterested in housing issues and development for the poorest groups;
- the lack of a coherent, integrated development plan for Guatemala City;
- the government’s own fear and lack of trust in community organizations in a country where, since 1954, popular organization has been considered the enemy from within.

These are characteristics of governments as apparently different as those of General Mejía Víctores, at the end of the “Scorched Earth” era, and the contemporary one of Alvaro Arzú, the government that signed the peace accords in December 1996. Regarding the current government’s ability to respond, Gellert and Palma comment: “A decrease in institutional capacity can be seen, both in the actual number of government institutions as well as in the number of areas covered. In comparison with 1988, the situation in 1997 shows a notable lack of sectoral ministries, like those of health, education, public works. The social programmes of these ministries have for the most part been transferred to social funds. However, these funds are destined primarily for rural areas.”

With regard to government institutions such as COINAP, the Inter-institutional Committee for Precarious Areas, the interviewees showed the same lack of knowledge as to its role and interventions although, at the individual level, some of the technicians and workers from this organization built up a good working relationship with the community. COINAP was founded in February 1987 with the aim of coordinating the work of the public and private sectors within Guatemala City. It covered five main areas of work:

- the Integrated Health Programme;
- the Productive Project Programme (including the following projects: pharmacy; community shops; pig-rearing and slaughter; Nixtamal mill and bakeries. Of these, only the pharmacy was sustainable);
- community mobilization and education;
- water and the environment (including drains);
- research and systematization.

**Underestimation of Community Capacity**

Professionals had little respect for community skills and capacity and this attitude was directed chiefly at the community leaders and those responsible for the various developments in the settlement. This lack of understanding was experienced by the reproinsas who encountered: “...a lack of institutional flexibility, little recognition and acceptance of the community’s concerns and criticisms on the part of the technicians, difficulty in integrating these technicians into local work teams, as well as a lack of understanding of the process of self-development and independence of FUNDAESPRO.” When interviewed, Edgar Hidalgo added that the medical doctors employed in the state-run health centre were systematically opposed to the reproinsas’ work, claiming that they tried to tell the doctors what to do.

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Manipulation

There are various examples of the opportunistic exploitation of the organizational capacity of the community and of attempts to manipulate the community according to specific party-political interests. The de facto government of Mejía Victores (1984-1985) and that of Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1990) tried to convert El Mezquital into a showcase in order to use it to legitimize their weak and discredited governments (during the 1987 and 1988 coups). The government of Serrano Elias also wanted the Cooperative to support their actions.

Incapacity to Respond to the Needs of the Population

The early experiences of the community with the government set the pattern for their subsequent relationship. The lack of response to demands for water and electricity forced the community to look for alternative sources of support and, above all, to fall back on their own resources. From the very beginning to the present day, the community has been forced to rely upon its own solutions to the varying problems confronting it, with no significant government input. This was the case when the community approached EMPAGUA to request water, to be told that, since they were illegal settlers, they had no rights. This led to the community illegally tapping into water pipes, as mentioned earlier.

Since then, faced with even the gravest problems, the community has sought solutions with minimal government input. Neither in water provision nor in the general community urbanization nor in housing construction has the government played a significant role. In this sense, the attitude of the government and government bodies has been more that of observer than facilitator. They have shown little capacity for resource mobilization, a lack of understanding of and poor relationship with the community itself and little capacity to meet the population’s needs, including those to which it is constitutionally bound.

In particular, Guatemala’s continuing fiscal problems (the country has one of the lowest levels of income tax in Latin America) have resulted in a serious lack of resources for development. At the local level, autonomy has been reduced and there have been few advances in decentralization, combined with severe budgetary constraints. This has generated insecurity, particularly as there has been a visible reduction in international support within El Mezquital and in Guatemala as a whole, rendering active state intervention in community development ever more necessary.

b. National and International NGOs and International Agencies

In contrast to the role of local government, from the very beginning other organizations were involved in the work and the main achievements in the community. Those most frequently mentioned by the community are:

- the Foundation for Community Development (Fundación para el Desarrollo Comunitario) known as FUNDESCO;
- Doctors without Borders (Médicos Sin Fronteras) known as MSF; and
- the Catholic Church (with the support of various local priests), which supported groups such as the Reflection Group and the Six by Twelve Group.

In addition, there are other groups which worked for a limited time in El Mezquital or which started work some time after the invasion, including:

- Faith and Joy (Fey Alegría), the religious organization which constructed a school;
- the Society for the Integral Development of the Guatemalan Family (Sociedad para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia), known as SODIFAG;


47 The Six by Twelve Group was a movement to oppose the government programme for urban improvement which wanted to offer plots of six by ten metres; the Six by Twelve Group demanded that the smallest plots be six by twelve.
the Guatemalan Ecumenical Foundation Hope and Brotherhood (Fundación Ecuménica Guatemalteca Esperanza y Fraternidad) known as ESFRA;

- La Novena Integral Development Unit, known as UDINOV; and

- the technical consultancy firm ECOTEC.

For these external organizations, community acceptance had to be earned. The UNICEF programme director commented that it took a year’s work with the community before it began to accept him. These organizations generally established better working relations with the government than the community had. Some of the community's most basic achievements, such as the introduction of water services, the first latrines, technical support in creating the cooperative and the reproinasa programme were due, in part, to external support.

Amongst these organizations, UNICEF’s Urban Basic Services Programme played an important role. The programme started off as an experiment in El Mezquital in 1986 and was terminated when PROUME came to an end. The programme not only had to win over the community's confidence but also had to get around problematic issues such as the institutional structure and work methods of UNICEF and the UN, which were not always compatible with the needs and context of El Mezquital. It must be noted that it was more often the driving force of certain local technicians, rather than centralized decisions, which ensured that the work moved ahead.

The initial plan of UNICEF’s Urban Basic Services Programme, which was modified over the years, sought to improve material living conditions as well as working conditions. The programme's first priorities included ownership of the land and site suitability for housing, housing provision, public services and social infrastructure. Secondary issues included action to increase income levels, the settlement's proximity to the work place and the provision of basic staples (maize, rice, beans etc.)

When PROUME began, supported by World Bank funding, it drew on the work of the UNICEF Urban Basic Services Programme and completed some of its components, in particular improvements to the physical infrastructure. PROUME's size (as measured by the amount of funds managed, the character of pilot projects, institutional coordination and large-scale community participation) makes it a good focus for an analysis of the relationship between community and external organizations.

The concrete achievements of PROUME were described earlier. But there were also projects which were initially planned and never carried out which led to considerable dissatisfaction. These included social infrastructure projects, such as the fire station, the four multi-use halls and the creation and maintenance of green areas and environmentally protected areas (which eventually disappeared). There were also projects carried out which were not satisfactorily implemented, such as the drains which, according to the community, were too small and were constantly blocked.

Other criticisms of PROUME included the failure to consider employment initiatives, the lack of community consultation and the interaction with community organizations.

**Failure to Consider Employment Creation Initiatives**

Despite the fact that, initially, the Urban Basic Services Programme considered one of its fundamental components to be the improvement of employment conditions, PROUME restricted itself to the provision of infrastructure. Moreover, during the development of PROUME, the technicians, at the request of the community, developed new projects which were submitted to the World Bank, UNICEF and PROUME but which were never implemented. For one UNICEF consultant, the debate at the time was about “...cementing poverty, putting a roof over its head or, alternatively, giving people a better life which would involve addressing the economy.” The consultant added that during the development of PROUME, an employment survey was carried out to develop a partnership with the community; however, the proposals that were developed were never even read. PROUME temporarily improved the employment situation in the community, with up to 1,000 people on the payroll at one stage, but it was a short-term project and the employment

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48 Interview with UNICEF consultant, May 1999.
levels were unsustainable. For some of those interviewed, these achievements were insignificant compared to the size of the sum invested.

**Lack of Community Consultation**

Criticisms in this area concerned designs for the new housing, which were not suitable for building a second level extension and were thus rejected by some. In addition, the community felt that they were not sufficiently consulted about productive and employment initiatives, for which they blamed the donors and technicians for failing to listen to the community. For the UNICEF consultant, PROUME was based upon a fundamentally flawed method of consultancy: “If you count them up, the people who were consulted were those on the management boards and committee members of COIVEES, 30 people in all out of a community of more than 3,500 people.”

The lack of consultation also included a lack of transparency about the different projects, the changes made along the way and the destination and allocation of the funds.

**Intervention in Processes of Internal Community Organization**

With regard to PROUME’s interaction with community organizations, when it began, the Association of United Residents of El Mezquital (AVAUME) only existed in name and the different management boards (about ten at that time) were not united. PROUME therefore decided to found another organization that would bring them together, namely the Committee of Management Boards of the Settlement, known as the CJD.

This decision caused a lot of dissent with the old AVAUME, since it involved the creation of a community organization by an external organization and ignored the community's historical processes. Nor did this new organization manage to resolve the problems which already existed between the different management boards of El Mezquital, which were based on personal interests, corruption and lack of legitimacy nor, indeed, the disputes between the management boards and the cooperative, COIVEES. Thus, while PROUME was active, the community organization demonstrated its highest levels of organizational capacity in terms of managing, administrating and carrying out projects yet, at the same time, had a serious political weakness.

Some of the deficiencies mentioned above were sparked off by opposition to PROUME in 1997. At this time, a group of residents gathered in front of PROUME offices (buildings which were formerly the People's Library of Monte de los Olivos) whilst members of the governing board of PROUME were inside. The governing board consisted of representatives from UNICEF, the government's Office of Human Settlements and Housing (DAHVI), management boards and COIVEES. The protesting crowd prevented the board from leaving the offices, threatening to lynch them or burn the building down whilst they were still inside. They demanded that PROUME be terminated. This emergency situation lasted for an entire day and was only resolved by the intervention of the police, the state and the United Nations Verification Mission to Guatemala, MINUGUA.

One member of the Faith and Solidarity Group who was also, at the time, on the Committee of Management Boards, was one of those locked inside the building. She recalls:

“They wanted to lynch us. They kicked me and punched me, pulled my hair. They wanted to burn us. They even took the drinking water and spat and urinated into it. This took place from 8am until 5pm, until representatives from the Public Ministry arrived with the police, and we had to make a bargain with the people outside.”

The deal they struck meant the total disbanding of the Committee of Management Boards and the closure of PROUME headquarters. In 1999, when the research for this paper was being undertaken, the building remained empty and unused.

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49 Interview with UNICEF consultant, May 1999.

50 Comisión de Juntas Directivas de Asentamientos.

51 Faith and Solidarity Group, focus group, June 1999.
Some of those interviewed attributed the confrontation to UNASGUA, the Union of Guatemalan Settlements, a popular city-wide organization. Nevertheless, the director of UNASGUA denied having anything to do with the incident, claiming instead that a leader from one of El Mezquital's sub-divisions was responsible and had used the UNASGUA name to incite the people for his own personal motives.\(^{(52)}\) The UNASGUA director claimed that this same individual later deceived residents from other informal settlements close to El Mezquital, promising them various services, which were never carried out, in exchange for money. The reasons for this violent end to the PROUME project, however, should be sought within the community and the actual programme, especially in its lack of transparency and the vertical, top-down relations it imposed. Thus, PROUME showed that external intervention can destabilize a community organization if it does not take into account the priorities, organizational processes and existing power relations within the community.

A final point regarding international organizations concerns the level of support they gave after PROUME. One community leader considers this support to be virtually non-existent:

*"Here, we are really lacking in supportive organizations and yet, El Mezquital is one of the most marginalized areas. Before, they gave us some support, for example PROUME but now that project is finished they have forgotten all about us in El Mezquital."*\(^{(53)}\)

This last point is linked to a perception of El Mezquital, shared by both the government and international organizations, in terms of the extent to which they believe that the objectives have been achieved. The experience in El Mezquital can be read in two ways. One points to the great potential to improve housing conditions and basic infrastructure and services through community-directed programmes supported by external agencies. The other, that it did not address other aspects of poverty, especially inadequate incomes and income-earning opportunities, and had very limited influence on public agencies. The combination of economic difficulties and non-responsive local authorities meant that the capacities for community action developed during PROUME could not be capitalized on to help address the other aspects of deprivation.

V. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN TACKLING POVERTY

THE RESIDENTS RECALL that when they arrived in El Mezquital, the invaded area was “filthy and stripped of vegetation”. The initial invasion by thousands of families aggravated these conditions. The lack of water, the discarded waste, the precarious living conditions (for example, the shacks which offered little protection against the elements, generally built from bamboo, cardboard and waste materials) and the overcrowding resulted in a very low quality of life as well as high levels of mortality and morbidity, particularly for the children.

Since then, there have been significant developments. After 15 years of community work, supported by external organizations, almost all the families in the settlement have access to water. COIVEES supplies 2,537 water meters with clean, good quality water 365 days per year, a much better service than most residential areas receive in the rest of the city, including middle- and upper-income areas. The cost of getting connected to the water system is 550 Quetzales for members of the Cooperative and 650 Quetzales for non-members. The cost of water supplied by COIVEES is relatively low compared to the other providers. According to Francisco Chitamul, from the Water Board of COIVEES, the Cooperative tries to keep the price stable as a form of subsidy to the residents. There are still groups in the settlement whose water is supplied by EMPAGUA, which provides a more irregular service, and in La Esperanza there are still some communal taps supplying the poorest families who do not have in-house connections. Ninety-five per cent of families have electricity in their homes. The entire population of El Mezquital, some 3,500 families, has sewers and rainwater drains in their areas (although there are still problems with drains, especially in La Esperanza).

\(^{(52)}\) Interview with director of UNASGUA, July 1999.

\(^{(53)}\) Faith and Solidarity Group, focus group, June 1999.
The cultural and personal changes are not so easily quantifiable but they have important implications. The inhabitants’ struggle reinforced their group identity and led to skill development and community organization. Marco Paniagua considers that:

“These people will never in all their lives forget their mobilization, participation and the way they worked together like ants in the community. They are conscious that they themselves did this and, in terms of identity, this is very valuable although you cannot measure it. Of course, you can measure the negotiation capacity of the 24 leaders who started off the project. They abused the professionals, they chucked the government out of the community, they totally changed the traditional submissive relationship of settlers towards the government. They learnt a lot about how to get people together, how to use participatory techniques, communication and accountancy, and there they still are. It would only take another project and they would be back there organizing people once more.”

In one of the focus groups, older people of low socio-economic status showed adeptness at managing technical development vocabulary, including economic terms and concepts. In the same way, reproinsas and women from UPAVIM demonstrated that they had lost their timidity and had raised their self-esteem. In particular, the researchers noted how these groups of women would speak frankly in front of the research team regarding intimate issues such as their bodies, alcohol problems or domestic violence.

Since 1984, El Mezquital has improved the quality of life in many areas (health, housing, mortality levels) whilst in other ways it has not advanced and has even deteriorated in part (recreation, levels of consumption, work conditions). The population, for the most part, has acquired an adequate physical space (housing), with adequate infrastructure but not adequate incomes or employment opportunities. There is adequate basic infrastructure in most of the settlement and some areas of social infrastructure, yet the residents have not managed to fully overcome the precariousness of their situation and their poverty.

El Mezquital serves as an unprecedented example of development in Guatemala from the mid-1980s. Experiences such as those of COIVEES, UNICEF's Programme of Basic Urban Services and PROUME (Programme for the Urbanization of El Mezquital) are today considered to be “model” experiences and are frequently used as a reference for other settlements' developments. The economic situation has improved for residents through the work of the community organization, the supportive external organizations and, in part, the state government. Moreover, these experiences generated both individual and collective skills. Nevertheless, fundamental problems such as education, housing, employment and violence still remain to be resolved, either partially or in full.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

a. Community Organizations

THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS in El Mezquital achieved the only successful, large land invasion to take place in Guatemala during the 1980s. They successfully lobbied and worked to get basic services, infrastructure and health services. They acquired collective skills in negotiation – with international organizations, NGOs and, to a lesser extent, governmental bodies; also in management, and personal skills such as budgeting, public-speaking, travelling to other countries, overcoming timidity and general learning skills.

The community organizations in El Mezquital also experienced problems of division and conflicts between community and personal interests, resulting in a lack of legitimacy for many community leaders.

Community organizations in El Mezquital also showed a weak capacity for intervening in governmental policy; their real strength lay in negotiation with international organizations. For the

future, given the decrease in international cooperation in the area, this constitutes a serious concern.

Women have come to occupy positions of power in the community organizations and have begun a process which involves addressing their particular concerns and needs. However, there has as yet been no development in terms of addressing the power relations within the household. Since the achievement of the main successes in the settlement (the legalization process, electricity, much improved basic services including water and sanitation, improved housing for many), the community organizations have not re-assessed their current situation and concerns, implying the need for a new prioritization of problems and needs in order to re-orient their future actions.

b. External Organizations (including government)

In relation to the community, governmental bodies have shown:

- an underestimation of community capacity;
- attempts to manipulate the community according to party political interests; and
- low capacity in responding to community needs and a lack of commitment to the development of El Mezquital.

NGOs and international organizations, especially PROUME, have shown, in addition to the infrastructural achievements:

- inadequate levels of consultancy with the community, above all in programme design;
- a lack of awareness regarding the internal processes and power relations going on within the community; and
- interventions addressing some aspects of poverty (principally those concerning basic infrastructure) but have not dealt with poverty in an integrated, organic way.

As yet, there has been no evaluation of loan repayments from PROUME. At present, external organizations have decreased their support to El Mezquital, based on the belief that the level of development achieved is adequate.

c. Poverty Reduction

The population of El Mezquital has experienced an improvement in quality of life in terms of better health, housing and a lower mortality rate, whilst other aspects have not improved, including consumption levels, employment and work conditions and provision for recreation.

The different poverty reduction strategies in El Mezquital have not resolved the problem of unemployment nor have they sufficiently raised the income level of the community residents. The problem of poverty in El Mezquital has not been addressed in an integrated manner and there has been a lack of attention to the underlying causes of poverty.

d. Replicability

El Mezquital, in response to the enormous initial needs of its inhabitants, developed novel processes of community organization such as COIVEES and the reproinsas, which have expanded beyond their original purpose. Currently, there are more than 700 reproinsas in 16 areas of Guatemala City and the COIVEES model is being tried out in two other settlements in Guatemala. The Slum Improvement Programme was created in 1997, based upon the PROUME model, working with settlements and poor areas in and around the municipality of Guatemala.

The replicability of the El Mezquital experience and its programmes and initiatives should take into account the following points:

- the specific context of each settlement regarding its origin, social composition, power relations and organizational structures;
- the difficulties experienced in El Mezquital, including personal interests and what was, at times, a top-down, unrepresentative decision-making process;
- a consideration of the issues that remain unresolved in El Mezquital, particularly the lack of employment opportunities, low income levels and the lack of an integrated poverty
reduction approach (namely one that addresses income and employment issues, living conditions and quality of life, access to education, health care and basic services, recreation, consumption levels and nutrition). Without the issues of employment and income being addressed, integrated poverty reduction will never really be achieved.

The following observations appear to be pertinent for the community of El Mezquital:

- a failure to re-define the key developmental objectives and to re-structure the existing organizations accordingly: these organizations remain structured according to past priorities and may thus be liable to conformity and stagnation;
- the importance of developing a new community agenda which would involve re-organizing and re-prioritizing community organizations and addressing the principal social and economic problems such as violence, drug addiction, unemployment and lack of educational opportunities.
ANNEX 1: Chronology of Events within El Mezquital

1982: First attempt at invasion. Two hundred families occupy land in the south of the city within an upper-income residential area; they are evicted.

1983: Second attempt at an invasion, on state-owned serviced land. Also evicted.

1984: 1,500 families occupy “green recreation areas” in the already existing El Mezquital colony. Soon, there are 2,353 families in what was originally El Nuevo Mezquital but which later became known as El Mezquital.

March 1984: El Exodo is the first sub-division to be founded within the invasion site. This was followed by Monte de los Olivos, El Esfuerzo and Tres Banderas. La Esperanza emerged last, the inhabitants coming from an unsuccessful invasion of land where the Central de Mayoreo market is now located. They were dislodged by anti-riot police. The bulk of the whole settlement's invasion took approximately one month.

1984-1985: The National Movement of Settlers (MONAP) and the local priest support the creation of the AVAUME (Association of United Residents of El Mezquital). In the early stages of creating the management boards for each of the sub-divisions, many cases of corruption, anarchy and abuse of power on the part of army-sponsored leaders emerge, to the point of creating paramilitary groups. The Reflection Group emerges in opposition to this abuse.

1984-1985: First contact is made with the health centre in nearby Villa Nueva, which provides 500 public latrines. Governmental institutions give their first support (500 communal latrines, a health post, communal taps) but in a non-participatory, uncoordinated way, encouraging clientelism.

1985: UNICEF’s Guatemala office produces a study on precarious settlements within Guatemala City, identifying priority work areas which include El Mezquital.

1985-1986: Typhoid epidemic in El Mezquital. One hundred and sixty children die. UNICEF and MSF (Doctors without Borders), with permission from the government, enter the settlement and seek to address the epidemic, as does FUNDESCO (the Foundation for Community Development). They work on short-term projects, in isolation, and attempt to address immediate needs. At this point, community participation is used only to carry out the work.

1986: UNICEF begins its Urban Basic Services Programme in Guatemala City. El Mezquital is selected because of the number of residents, the precarious living conditions, the existence of local organizations and community interest in working together to solve the problems. UNICEF bases the programme upon the following principles: adapting the methodology to take on board community participation; coordination of the work between a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations; and the presence of community organizations.

1986: The beginning of the Integrated Health Programme (supported by UNICEF), initially with distrust and friction on the part of the community due to prior negative experiences with external organizations, but this develops as a successful and later much copied model of community-based health care.

November 1986: On the government's initiative, MSF (Doctors without Borders) starts working in El Mezquital. They request funding for the construction of a health centre.

February 1987: COINAP (the Inter-institutional Committee for Precarious Areas) is founded by the government to support and coordinate a city-wide programme for illegal or informal settlements, involving private and public sector representatives and NGOs.
June 1987: The Association of United Residents of El Mezquital (AVAUME) is awarded legal status.

1987: As the community develops, the community organizational structures are adapted under the umbrella of the National Reconstruction Committee. In 1987, the National Reconstruction Committee appeals to the World Bank for support.

1988: From this year onwards, funding possibilities are sought.

1988: The foundation of UPAVIM (Women United for a Better Life) within El Mezquital, to address the problems of children’s health and the situation of women living in extreme poverty and exposed to domestic violence. It receives support from churches in the USA and, over time, develops a clinic, a nursery, a handicrafts workshop and a scholarship programme.

1989: The first community pharmacy is founded to support the Integrated Health Programme and the work of the community health workers (reproinsas).

1989: The design of the first housing model and the construction of five houses with UNICEF's support. This opens the way for support from the Inter-American Foundation.

November 1989: The Guatemalan government and the World Bank agree upon a municipal development project but cannot carry it out because of the closure of the World Bank Guatemalan programme.

October 1990: The cooperative COIVEES (Integrated Cooperative of Housing Esfuerzo and Esperanza) is founded within El Mezquital (Esfuerzo and Esperanza are the names of two of the sub-divisions within El Mezquital). This has within it various boards including one for water, one for building materials, one for credit and one for housing (to plan and supervise housing construction).

1990: Creation of FUNDAESPRO (the Foundation of Courage and Prosperity) as a result of the community health workers’ (reproinsas) efforts.

1990: Housing project supported by the Inter-American Foundation (60 units); and the first water well and water tanks constructed by COIVEES, with support from UNICEF and the Swiss government.

1992: 1,100 families are moved to Villalobos II to reduce overcrowding.

March 1992: Formation of the sub-division 8 de marzo, which becomes part of El Mezquital.

June 1993-July 1994: World Bank staff visit El Mezquital and decide to support the urban development programme there – PROUME (Programme for the Urbanization of El Mezquital) – according to the initial agreement of 1989. Negotiations take place. No attention is paid to the divisions among the community leaders and groups, some of which date back to the time of the invasion. These later prove to be problematic.

June 1993-January 1995: PROUME is developed and planned, and different procedure manuals are developed. It receives official approval in July 1994 and includes components for infrastructure (piped water, sewers, drains, paved roads, electricity), housing improvement, relocation of tenants and those whose homes had to be moved, and community facilities (see Box 1).

March 1995: After various delays, implementation of PROUME begins. After signing the agreement, there is a long waiting period before the first funds arrive. At the end of 1994, the first funding instalment is received (equivalent to US$ 200,000 at the time) by COIVEES. However, legal
problems and opposition from a group in El Exodo (based upon private interests and long-standing disputes) delays the purchase of the building materials. Only in March 1995 does the project begin.

**January 1996:** A change of national government brings changes for PROUME too. The National Reconstruction Committee is replaced by DAHVI, Office of Human Settlements and Housing, which produces further delays in the distribution of funds to COIVEES.

**May 1996:** The Coordination Authority of El Mezquital emerges, aiming to bring together the different organizations working in the area in the post-PROUME phase.

**May 1997:** Inauguration of the Integrated Centre for Family Development, belonging to FUNDAESPRO (Foundation of Courage and Prosperity).

**June 1997:** PROUME ends.

**October 1997:** The World Bank carries out an audit of PROUME.

**November 1997:** The Slum Improvement Programme, planned on the PROUME framework, begins work in precarious areas.

**April 1998:** Waste collection programme begins.

**October 1998:** Creation of building block manufacturing enterprise to produce low-cost blocks and create employment.

**1997-1999:** COIVEES housing project proposal for building 200 houses is submitted to Inter-American Foundation but rejected.
### ANNEX 2: List of Institutions and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVAUME</td>
<td>Association of United Residents of El Mezquital – Asociación de Asentamientos de Vecinos Unidos de El Mezquital</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANVI</td>
<td>National Housing Bank – Banco Nacional de la Vivienda</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIRF</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento (dependencia del Banco Mundial)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>World Bank – Banco Mundial</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDIF</td>
<td>Integrated Centre for Family Development – Centro de Desarrollo Integral de la Familia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEUR-USAC</td>
<td>Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of San Carlos – Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>CITGUA</td>
<td>Ciencia y Tecnología para Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJD</td>
<td>Committee of Management Boards of the Settlement – Comisión de Juntas Directivas de Asentamientos</td>
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<tr>
<td>COINAP</td>
<td>Inter-institutional Committee for Precarious Areas – Comisión Interinstitucional para la Atención a Areas Precarias</td>
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<td>COIVEES</td>
<td>Integrated Cooperative of Housing Esfuerzo and Esperanza – Cooperativa Integral de Vivienda “Esfuerzo y Esperanza”</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONALFA</td>
<td>National Literacy Commission – Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAHVI</td>
<td>The Office of Human Settlements and Housing – Dirección de Asentamientos Humanos y Vivienda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOTEC</td>
<td>Technical Consultancy Firm – Empresa de Consultoría Técnica</td>
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<td>EMPAGUA</td>
<td>Municipal Water Board – Empresa Municipal de Agua</td>
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<td>ESFRA</td>
<td>Ecumenical Foundation of Guatemala Hope and Fraternity – Fundación Ecuménica Guatemalteca Esperanza y Fraternidad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Inter American Foundation – Fundación Interamericana</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNDAESPRO</td>
<td>Foundation of Courage and Prosperity – Fundación Esfuerzo y Prosperidad</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNDESCO</td>
<td>Foundation for Community Development</td>
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<td>INE</td>
<td>National Institute of Statistics</td>
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<td>JD</td>
<td>Management Boards</td>
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<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission to Guatemala</td>
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<td>MONAP</td>
<td>National Population of Slum Dwellers</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Doctors without Borders</td>
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<td>PIS</td>
<td>Integrated Health Programme</td>
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<td>PNUD</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROMEBAH</td>
<td>Slum Improvement Programme</td>
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<td>PROUME</td>
<td>Programme for the Urbanization of El Mezquital</td>
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<tr>
<td>REPROINS</td>
<td>Representative of the Integral Health Programme</td>
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<td>SODIFAG</td>
<td>Society for the Integral Development of the Guatemalan Family</td>
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<td>UDINOV</td>
<td>La Novena Integral Development Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASGUA</td>
<td>Union of Guatemalan Settlements</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Childrens Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF-PSBU</td>
<td>UNICEF Basic Urban Services Programme</td>
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<td>UPAVIM</td>
<td>Women United for a Better Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAC</td>
<td>University of San Carlos, Guatemala</td>
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**PUBLICATIONS - THE CASE STUDIES AND OTHER BOOKS AND PAPERS ON URBAN ISSUES**
a. The Working Papers series on poverty reduction


Towards the end of 2001, three other case studies will be published:
- The Children’s Council and Other Innovations in Barra Mansa, Brazil
- The work of Development Workshop in Luanda, Angola
- Lessons of Experience From CARE PROSPECT’s Urban Poverty Reduction Programmes in Lusaka, Zambia

HOW TO OBTAIN THESE: Printed versions can be obtained from http://www.earthprint.com/ for US$9 each plus postage and packing (for the UK $5 for first item, $2.50 for additional items; for Europe $6 for first item, $3 for additional items; for elsewhere $10 for first item, $5 for additional items).

Electronic versions may be obtained at no charge from IIED’s web-page: www.iied.org. If you have any difficulties obtaining these, e-mail us on humans@iied.org with details as to which working paper you want.

b. Other publications from this research programme

This will be available from August 2001 for £10 from the Publications Office, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK, e-mail: C.A.Fowler@bham.ac.uk The paper may also be viewed on http://www.bham.ac.uk/idd/activities/urban/urbgov.htm

Shorter versions of the working papers on PRODEL and on El Mezquital have been published in IIED’s journal *Environment and Urbanization*:


HOW TO OBTAIN THESE: These papers may be obtained electronically from the web at www.catchword.com; http://www.catchword.com/titles/09562478.htm takes you straight to *Environment and Urbanization* On-line. Access to the paper in the April 2000 issue is free; access to the two papers in the April 2001 issue costs $6 each.

c. Other publications on urban poverty

**Rethinking Aid to Urban Poverty Reduction: Lessons for Donors:** The April 2001 issue of *Environment and Urbanization* includes evaluations of urban projects or programmes funded by US AID, the World Bank, DFID, Sida, NORAD and UNICEF, along with papers considering the constraints on donor effectiveness. There are also papers on participatory budgeting in Brazil, a fund for community initiatives in Uganda, poverty mapping in Argentina, mapping infrastructure deficiencies in Salvador, community-based watershed management and links between poverty and transport.

**Poverty Reduction and Urban Governance:** The April 2000 issue of *Environment and Urbanization* includes 12 papers examining the links between poverty and governance in particular cities. Among the interesting points of commonality or contrast are: the great range of political structures, with some having governments that are clearly more accountable and responsive to urban poor group than others; the very limited powers, resources and capacities to raise revenues available to urban governments; the complex political economy within all the cities which influences who gets land for housing, infrastructure and services; and the capacity of anti-poor local government policies and practices to harm the livelihoods of many low-income groups within their jurisdiction.

HOW TO OBTAIN THESE: The printed version of these two issues can be obtained from http://www.earthprint.com/ for US$18 plus postage and packing (for the UK $5 for first item, $2.50 for additional items; for Europe $6 for first item, $3 for additional items; for elsewhere $10 for first item, $5 for additional items). The papers from both issues may be obtained electronically from the web at www.catchword.com; http://www.catchword.com/titles/09562478.htm takes you straight to
Urban Governance, Partnerships and Poverty: A research programme undertaken by the University of Birmingham, IIED, The London School of Economics and Cardiff University in collaboration with teams in ten cities in the South has produced a great range of theme papers, case studies, cross-city analyses and other studies - see http://www.bham.ac.uk/idd/activities/urban/urbgov.htm for more details.

d. Urban publications with Earthscan


HOW TO OBTAIN THESE: These are available from Earthscan Publications, 120 Pentonville Road, London N1 9JN, UK; e-mail: earthinfo@earthscan.co.uk; web: www.earthscan.co.uk; also available in bookstores. In USA, they are available from Stylus Publishing LLC, PO Box 605, Herdon, VA 20172, USA, e-mail: StylusMail@PressWarehouse.com. In Canada, they are available from Renouf Publishing Company, 1 - 5369 Canotek Road, Ottawa, Ontario K1J 9J3, Canada, e-mail: orderdept@renoufbooks.com. The Earthscan web-site also has details of Earthscan representatives and agents in all other countries.

e. Other Working Papers series

There are three other Working Papers series, in addition to the Series on Poverty reduction in urban areas:
1. Working Papers on Rural Urban Interactions and Livelihood Strategies with case studies from Tanzania, Mali and Nigeria and briefing papers which will be available after August 2001.
2. Working Papers on *Urban Environmental Action Plans and Local Agenda 21s* with case studies from Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Namibia, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and the UK.

3. Working Papers on *Urban Change*: By late 2001, this will include papers on: Bangladesh; Colombia; Egypt; Ghana; Mexico; Pakistan; and South Africa.

HOW TO OBTAIN THESE: Printed versions can be obtained from http://www.earthprint.com/ for US$9 each plus postage and packing (for the UK $5 for first item, $2.50 for additional items; for Europe $6 for first item, $3 for additional items; for elsewhere $10 for first item, $5 for additional items).

Electronic versions may be obtained at no charge from IIED’s web-page: www.iied.org. If you have any difficulties obtaining these, e-mail us on humans@iied.org with details as to which working paper you want.

f. Other IIED publications on urban issues

*Environment and Urbanization*: Now in its 13th year, this is one of the most cited and widely distributed international journals on urban issues. Each issue has a special theme and includes: 9-14 papers on that theme; a guide to the literature on the theme and profiles of innovative NGOs (in some issues) and Book Notes — summaries of new books, research reports and newsletters, and how these can be obtained (including those in Spanish, French and Portuguese).

| Frequency: | Twice yearly (April and October of each year) |
| No of subscribers: | 2,600 |
| Subscription prices: | One year: institutions - £60 or US$100; individuals £26 or US$44 |
| | Two year: institutions - £102 or US$170; individuals £44 or US$74 |
| | Three year: institutions - £148 or US$246; individuals £64 or US$108 |

*Half price subscriptions* available to subscribers from Latin America, Asia (except Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and Africa and to students (xerox of current student card needed as proof).

*Postage for subscriptions*: The above prices include air mail post; subscriptions can start at any point in the year.

*World Wide Web*: The contents page of the latest issue and the summaries of all papers in French, Spanish and English, the editorial and the book notes section are on http://www.iied.org/eandu/ This site also includes details of subscription prices and the price of back issues.

*Environment & Urbanization On-line*: The full text of the current issue and many back-issues are available on the web at http://www.catchword.com/titles/09562478.htm Institutional subscribers get free access to all on-line issues; to do so, they must register at www.catchword.com.