



## Environment at the heart of Tanzania's development



Lessons from Tanzania's National  
Strategy for Growth and Reduction  
of Poverty – MKUKUTA

Paschal Assey, Stephen Bass, Blandina Cheche, David Howlett,  
George Jambiya, Idris Kikula, Servacius Likwelile, Amon Manyama,  
Eric Mugurusi, Ruzika Muheto and Longinus Rutasitara

# Environment at the heart of Tanzania's development

Lessons from Tanzania's National  
Strategy for Growth and Reduction  
of Poverty – MKUKUTA

Paschal Assey, Stephen Bass, Blandina Cheche,  
David Howlett, George Jambiya, Idris Kikula,  
Servacius Likwelile, Amon Manyama,  
Eric Mugurusi, Ruzika Muheto and  
Longinus Rutasitara

**Copies of this report are available from:**

Earthprint Limited, Orders Department, P.O. Box 119

Stevenage, Hertfordshire, SG1 4TP, UK.

Email: [iied@earthprint.com](mailto:iied@earthprint.com) [www.earthprint.com](http://www.earthprint.com)

Tel: +44 (0)1438 748111 Fax: +44 (0)1438 748844

A pdf version can be downloaded from [www.iied.org](http://www.iied.org)

**Further information is available from:**

Stephen Bass, Natural Resources Group

International Institute for Environment and Development

3 Endsleigh Street, London, WC1H 0DD, UK.

Tel: +44 (0)20 7388 2117 Fax: +44 (0)207 388 2826

Email: [stephen.bass@iied.org](mailto:stephen.bass@iied.org)

**Citation:** Assey *et al.* 2007. *Environment at the heart of Tanzania's development: Lessons from Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA)*. Natural Resource Issues Series No. 6. International Institute for Environment and Development. London, UK.

Design by Eileen Higgins, email: [eileen@eh-design.co.uk](mailto:eileen@eh-design.co.uk)

Cover photos and images throughout report by Judy Rogers

Printed by Russell Press on totally chlorine free 80% recycled paper

ISBN: 978-1-84369-656-8

ISSN: 1605-1017

## Natural Resource Issues Series

If poverty is to be reduced and livelihoods improved, significant shifts in policies, institutions and markets will be required to encourage sustainable natural resource management. How to go about this is a major challenge facing governments and civil society groups. Much guidance is available for farming, forestry, and fisheries, but in reality livelihoods depend upon many forms of natural capital and are not amenable to sectoral interventions. This series of reports aims to present material on key crosscutting themes of significance to many natural resource sectors, including water, soil, biodiversity, carbon and climate.

Other reports in the Natural Resource Issues Series are available from IIED on request and can be downloaded from [www.iied.org](http://www.iied.org):

1. Rural livelihoods and carbon management. 2000. Bass *et al.*
2. Laying the foundations for clean development: preparing the land use sector. A quick guide to the clean development mechanism. 2002. Auckland *et al.*
3. Integrating global and local values: a review of biodiversity assessment. 2002. Vermeulen, S. and Koziell, I.
4. Local action, global aspirations: The role of community conservation in achieving international goals for environment and development. 2006. Roe *et al.*
5. Towards better practice in smallholder palm oil production. 2006. Vermeulen, S. and Goad, N.

# Contents

Foreword from the Permanent Secretary	ii
Preface	iv
Acronyms and abbreviations	vi
1. Overview – multiple threads in the story of integrating environment and development	1
2. The awareness transition – environment becoming recognised as a foundation for development	5
3. The planning transition – policy and planning processes becoming more closely integrated	11
4. The aid transition – Tanzania increasingly in the driving seat of development assistance partnerships	23
5. A more effective tool kit – methods and tactics used to integrate environment	25
6. Taking stock – results of environmental mainstreaming to date	33
7. Facing the future – challenges posed by the ‘implementation gap’	39
8. Lessons from environmental mainstreaming to date	45



# Foreword from the Permanent Secretary

The cause-and-effect relationships between environmental degradation and poverty are now widely recognised. Environmental degradation leads to widespread poverty, as it reduces the availability of clean water, productive soils, and other goods and services upon which so many people depend for their health and livelihoods. Equally, poverty is a major cause of environmental degradation as it undermines people's will and capacity to manage resources sustainably.

MKUKUTA (Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania) or the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), which is the centrepiece of development policy for Tanzania, explicitly focuses on sustainable development as the underlying principle and emphasises the environment as a foundation for sustainable growth and poverty reduction. MKUKUTA has specific goals on environmental sustainability and includes 15 environmental targets. The Vice-President's Office plays the lead role in mainstreaming environment into poverty reduction processes and into sector plans and budgets. As a background to this role, the Vice-President's Office has a number of key accomplishments, as well as pursuing ongoing initiatives. These include the National Environmental Policy, the Environmental Management Act, and other associated regulations, programmes and plans.

## ii


*The National Environmental Policy* was adopted by the government in 1997. It identifies six major environmental problems, namely: land degradation; deforestation; loss of wildlife habitats and biodiversity; lack of accessible, good quality water for both urban and rural inhabitants; deterioration of aquatic systems; and environmental pollution, particularly in urban areas. These environmental problems have serious implications for quality of life and social well-being, as they undermine socio-economic development and national efforts towards the eradication of poverty.

The legislative framework for environmental management has been improved to provide for broad participation of all stakeholders and for their enhanced coordination, smoothing the path to improved environmental management. *The Environmental Management Act* (EMA #20) of 2004 stipulates roles at all levels of government from Local Government Authorities to line ministries and provides for: environmental planning and management; pollution prevention and control; environmental information, research and public participation; international obligations; compliance and enforcement; environmental management tools including environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental assessment, and economic instruments; and environmental quality standards. A number of environmental regulations have been promulgated and several environmental management tools are being codified and drafted to facilitate coordination, sound environmental planning, and implementation of the Environmental Management Act. Several environmental programmes and projects have been undertaken under

the auspices of Vice-President's Office including environmental programmes for Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, and plans and programmes for the implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.

Recently, the Vice-President's Office undertook a broad-based capacity needs assessment for implementing the Environmental Management Act, which culminated in a capacity building and implementation programme for the Act. The implementation programme views capacity in its broadest sense, including both upstream interventions, e.g. strengthening of enabling framework, and downstream interventions, e.g. implementation in the field, with links between them. Furthermore, as a means for measuring progress in linked poverty reduction and environmental management targets, the Vice-President's Office has overseen the development of Poverty-Environment Indicators, which are integral to the MKUKUTA monitoring system.

Such initiatives coordinated by the Vice-President's Office have laid a strong foundation for leading the process of mainstreaming environment into Tanzania's development. This timely publication reviews what Tanzania has achieved – and how we have achieved it – and lays out the challenges for the future.



**Abubakar R. M. S. Rajabu**  
Permanent Secretary  
Vice-President's Office

January 2007



## Preface

This paper was initiated in response to growing recognition in Tanzania and abroad of the successes achieved in ‘mainstreaming’ environmental issues into Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty – MKUKUTA. The paper is the product of a Tanzanian ‘learning group’, comprising authors from government and non-governmental backgrounds, facilitated by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). We aim to offer the first record of an ambitious and unprecedented Tanzanian initiative to integrate environmental issues into development policy and practice. Such a reflection is long overdue – we ourselves were hampered by few records having been kept as the MKUKUTA process unfolded. We offer a ‘lessons learned’ approach rather than a formal evaluation or academic thesis. We look at failures as well as successes – although we are convinced that the MKUKUTA experience is largely very positive. Indeed, we believe it offers an iconic and enduring (and perhaps rather rare) example of a nationally-developed policy process which delivers – in practice – what the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy principles describe in theory.

Through this paper, we hope to validate the environmental mainstreaming process thus far in Tanzania. Moreover, we aim to be forward-looking, encouraging vigorous implementation and scaling up of effective approaches to bridge the implementation gap. Finally, we wish to offer inspiration to other developing countries, especially in Africa. We suspect that, in all countries, there are several actors and initiatives which are beginning to link the twin great endeavours of environmental management and poverty elimination, which too often are separate from each other. Our own experience of lesson sharing amongst diverse stakeholders was a rich one, and we would like to encourage similar exchanges through learning groups on ‘environment and development’ at national and international levels.

iv

We acknowledge the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, and several bilateral and multilateral agencies (notably DFID, DANIDA, European Commission, the Royal Norwegian Government, UNDP and UNEP) for their roles in bridging development and environment. DFID, WWF-Tanzania and IIED directly supported the work of our learning group. In particular, we thank WWF-Tanzania for organising the learning group workshop, Gareth Martin and Sam Higton at DFID for developing the project to support the working group, and Nicole Armitage at IIED for editorial assistance.

Views in this paper constitute a broad (but not always complete) consensus amongst the authors in their independent capacities and are not necessarily the views of their or other organisations. The authors’ backgrounds are summarised below:

*Mr Paschal Assey* was an Assistant Director in the Poverty Eradication Division of the Vice President’s Office until April 2005 when he became the Director of the

Division. He is now seconded to the Millennium Challenge Account, Tanzania programme, as an Outreach and Communications Coordinator, in the Ministry of Finance.

*Mr Stephen Bass* is Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), having been DFID's Chief Environment Adviser until 2005. He was the facilitator of the learning group which produced this paper.

*Mrs Blandina Cheche* is the Poverty-Environment Officer in the Division of Environment in the Vice-President's Office and was formerly based in the Poverty Eradication Division from 2004 to 2006. She is a member of the MKUKUTA Secretariat.

*Mr David Howlett* was seconded from DFID to UNDP Tanzania from 2002 to 2005 and worked as the poverty-environment adviser in the Poverty Eradication Division of Vice-President's Office and was a member of the MKUKUTA Secretariat. He now works for DFID's Central Research Department.

*Dr George Jambiya* is an academic at the University of Dar es Salaam and also works with WWF (Tanzania) as their Poverty-Environment Policy Officer. He helped coordinate several of the CSO consultations on the MKUKUTA.

*Professor Idris Kikula* is based at the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam, and is a former Principal of UCLAS (University College of Lands and Agricultural Studies). He was one of Tanzania's original 'environmental champions' and formerly Chair of the National Environmental Management Council. He is also a member of the Environment Working Group.

*Dr Servacius Likwelile* was the Director of the Poverty Eradication Division and led the process to develop the MKUKUTA until March 2005, when he became the Executive Director of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF).

*Mr Amon Manyama* works for UNDP Tanzania and is Head of their Poverty Unit. He is also a member of the MKUKUTA Secretariat.

*Mr Eric Mugurusi* is the Director of Environment in the Vice-President's Office. He led the process to develop the Environmental Management Act and also chairs the Environment Working Group (on behalf of the Permanent Secretary of VPO) which oversaw the Public Expenditure Review of the Environment.

*Mr Ruzika Muheto* is Director of Environmental Planning and Research in the National Environment Management Council where he also heads the poverty environment sub program of the Council and was actively involved in the preparation of EMA 2004. He is a member of the Environment Working Group.

*Dr Longinus Rutasitara* is an academic at the University of Dar es Salaam and has supported the MKUKUTA Secretariat.





## Acronyms and abbreviations

ALAT	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
COWI	Consultancy within Engineering, Environmental Science and Economics
CSO	Civil society organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPG	Development Partners Group
DPG-E	Development Partners Group on the Environment
EIA	Environmental impact assessment
EMA	Environmental Management Act
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
EWG	Environment Working Group
FBO	Faith-based Organisation
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania or NSGRP (National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty)
MoF	Ministry of Finance
NEMC	National Environment Management Council
NEP	National Environment Policy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
O&OD	Opportunities and Obstacles for Development
PER	Public expenditure review
PMS	Poverty monitoring system
PRS or PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper)
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
VPO	Vice-President's Office

# Overview – multiple threads in the story of integrating environment and development

This study was initiated in response to widespread interest generated by the apparent successes in ‘mainstreaming’ environmental issues into *Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* (MKUKUTA – Box 1). Our close examination of Tanzania’s experience compels us to dispense with the idea of a single narrative attributing success to one intervention operating independently. Instead, if environment is indeed now more closely woven into development in Tanzania, we believe this is the result of several transitions over the last decade. Thus, like any good story, we explore several sub-plots – stories of real change in three main areas:

*Environmental awareness* – once considered marginal to the political priorities of poverty reduction and economic growth, environment is beginning to take centre-stage as a fundamental contributor to development. In part, this is due to the increasing visibility of environmental problems in both urban and rural areas, and consequent public concern – and President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete has now established the environment as one of his ten political and economic priorities. The MKUKUTA environmental mainstreaming programme has enabled a leap forward in awareness amongst decision-makers by marshalling many facts, figures, opinions and ideas, and by linking the protagonists. We explore this in Chapter 2.

*Planning and strategy processes* – once technocratic exercises supporting a few priority sectors, thus largely excluding environment and other cross-cutting issues as well as their stakeholders, national planning processes have become more holistic, consultative and driven by stakeholder demands. The MKUKUTA process has drawn on a range of planning mandates and initiatives in the fields of poverty, finance and environmental legislation and has improved their linkages. (Chapter 3)

*Partnerships with development assistance agencies* – once shaped largely by diverse and changing donor objectives and conditions, are increasingly being driven by Tanzania. The government has been promoting effective self-reliance, encouraging its development partners in their concerted efforts at harmonisation, alignment and joint assistance. The MKUKUTA process enabled Tanzanian stakeholders to command the new terms and discourse of aid effectiveness to raise the profile of environmental mainstreaming – helped by ‘environmental champions’ amongst development partners. (Chapter 4)

An increasingly key player in these sub-plots is the Vice-President’s Office (VPO), which has developed a coordination role in environmental mainstreaming alongside other cross-cutting issues. VPO has understood the major transitions taking place in these three areas, engaged with the broad range of affected stakeholders, offered

process innovations, and thereby facilitated real change. The various *tools and tactics* employed by VPO and others are explored in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 offers a *stock-take of progress*, outlining how the transitions made to date have effectively spanned a 'planning gap'. With the environment established as central to the MKUKUTA, Tanzania's development is now following a more secure and sustainable path.

However, the environmental integration story is not yet over. The country now faces an 'implementation gap', requiring the environmental mainstreaming intentions of the MKUKUTA to be routinely reflected in budgeting, investment and governance reforms. In Chapter 7, we explore this gap in terms of further transitions to come, noting where recent progress offers a strong foundation:

- *The environmental investment gap* – the need to identify priorities amongst the MKUKUTA's many targets, thus making up for severe under-investment in environmental assets for pro-poor growth and livelihoods. Work to date has already engaged the Ministry of Finance as a leader in environmental mainstreaming and has consequently secured a significantly higher environment budget – which has increased by over five times between 2005/06 and 2006/07.
- *The environmental capacity gap* – the need for information/monitoring systems and institutional development which enable environmental authorities and management bodies to meet new responsibilities for securing environmental services in support of development. Work to date has readied the two main national environmental authorities (Division of Environment and the National Environmental Management Council) for the institutional streamlining and new roles that are required, but local environmental capacities will also need considerable attention if poor people's diverse environmental needs are to be met.
- *A power shift towards localisation and environment-dependent stakeholders* – the need for environmental governance reform that will enable poor people to have clearer environmental rights and responsibilities, access to resources and effective relationships ('4Rs'), as well as tackling associated social exclusions. The MKUKUTA has conducted the biggest-ever national consultation on environmental issues: the challenge is how to maintain this momentum and empower people to take part in MKUKUTA implementation.

2

Finally, Chapter 8 stands aside from the details of the Tanzanian story. It offers a reflection on those *lessons learned* which seem to us to have broad applicability to all countries' efforts at environmental mainstreaming.

## Box 1. Key facts about the MKUKUTA

- The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (*Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania* – MKUKUTA) was approved by Cabinet in February 2005 for implementation over five years.
- It is the successor to Tanzania's 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper' (2000).
- It is informed by Tanzania's own earlier Vision 2025, which sets a long-term development vision (1999). But it also commits to the achievement of the international Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
- National ownership and consultation with stakeholders were essential features in developing the MKUKUTA – attributes which will continue into implementation and future policy-making. This has resulted in the strategy reflecting stakeholders' concerns.
- The MKUKUTA is predominantly outcome-focused, emphasising improved collaboration among all the sectors and stakeholders that could help to achieve those outcomes.
- Key desired outcomes include improved growth and governance. The strategy pays particular attention to reform laws and customs that hinder growth and negatively affect vulnerable groups.
- The strategy requires increased resources. As such, the national budget is becoming aligned to MKUKUTA and a Joint Assistance Strategy is being developed between the government and its development partners.
- The MKUKUTA has paid special attention to mainstreaming cross-cutting issues: namely gender, HIV/AIDS, disability, children, youth, elderly, employment, settlement – and environment.  
(VPO 2005)



The impacts of climate change will become increasingly visible in Tanzania

## The awareness transition – environment becoming recognised as a foundation for development

*Poverty and environmental problems are both children of the same mother, and that mother is ignorance. (President Ali Hassan Mwinyi 1998)*

Until recently in Tanzania, the 'environment' was seen either in a negative light, i.e. as a constraint to development, or as an issue that was not central to development, e.g. concerning wildlife conservation and planting trees. In the last few years, however, environment's contributions to the political priorities of health, livelihoods, economic growth and security are increasingly being articulated and pursued. The fact that some environmental problems have become so bad that they are now visible – and indeed are hurting many poor people and their elected leaders – has helped to raise attention to the highest political levels.

The 1997 National Environment Policy (NEP) was seminal in identifying six major environmental problems facing Tanzania:

- Land degradation
- Accessibility of water
- Air and water pollution
- Loss of biodiversity and habitats
- Aquatic systems degradation
- Deforestation



Environmental risks such as flooding are set to increase with climate change

This list of problems was very informative 10 years ago, but it has been continually repeated in most official and NGO documentation up to the present day. This is triply disturbing. Firstly, because these problems have not yet lessened but are getting worse – most notably drought and deforestation. Secondly, because further problems such as climate change and the extensive environmental pressures of refugee settlements are emerging, and yet the list remains static. Thirdly, because the way in which environmental issues have been repeatedly expressed only as *problems* has taken attention off the *positive* attributes of environmental assets as producers of welfare and revenue. Although the NEP identifies several poverty-environment links, promotes environment as a key foundation for sustainable development, and identifies sector ministries as key players, such observations were not immediately followed up in recommendations or implementation.

## Better technical information on environment-poverty links

Tanzanians are now more aware that their country, and notably their poorest compatriots, are highly dependent upon the quality of environmental management and the control of environmental hazards. The Tanzanian Participatory Poverty Assessment consulted people at all levels and concluded that the three biggest poverty-creating forces are poor governance, economic factors and *environmental* factors (ESRF 2003). The first Public Expenditure Review for the Environment (VPO 2004), and studies for the World Bank country economic memorandum (World Bank 2005), all revealed the significance of people-environment links, and their economic impacts. These documents offer some compelling facts:

6

- *Environment as livelihood assets* – natural resource use provides the main source of livelihood for 76% of rural people, and fuelwood provides 95% of energy for the entire population. Yet fertile soils, forests and clean water are declining; 47% of rural households are using unprotected sources of drinking water; and accessing distant water sources entails heavy workloads.
- *Environmental security and sustainability of key growth sectors* – agriculture accounts for 45% of GDP and 60% of export earnings. On top of this high dependence, which has endured for many years, we now need to add tourism, mining (as Tanzania's fastest-developing sectors growing at 7% p.a. and 17% p.a. respectively) and fisheries. Yet all these sectors have been suffering environmental degradation.

The studies have also revealed the significant losses that may result if the six environmental problems listed above are not tackled, e.g.:

- *Loss of government revenue* – estimates say that US\$1 billion is lost annually from degradation to forestry, fisheries, and wildlife resources.
- *Decline in economic growth rates* – it is reckoned that the 2003 drought cut growth by 10%.

These findings would suggest that the likely increased frequency and severity of the NEP's six environmental problems raise real concerns for the future. If we add the emerging problem of climate change, the losses may mount up to intolerable levels. For example, several El Nino-related floods have already been suffered and the Maziwi Island off the coast of Pangani in Tanga, which was a major breeding ground for turtle and fish, has already been washed away by rising water levels.

However, such information is inadequate on its own. Its employment within the political discourse is key. Here, environmental champions have played a key role.



**Access to water is a poverty and environment issue**

## Environmental champions improve awareness and inspire political change

Environmental champions both inside and outside government have been critical drivers of political discourse on the environment, and increasingly also drivers of partnerships for action. In the early 1990s, a multi-stakeholder group of intellectuals felt that environmental issues could not be addressed through narrow technocratic processes alone. Rather, environmental issues had to be put directly on the mainstream political agenda. By 1995 the group had shaped an 'environmental manifesto' with which they lobbied all political parties. It is possible that this manifesto may have influenced the high-profile shaping of the new and critical Department of Environment within VPO and subsequent political discussions. The political profile of environmental issues has certainly increased through Tanzania's third and fourth phase Governments.<sup>1</sup> Recently, a very significant change has been

1. The first post-independence phase government was led by President Nyerere, the second commenced reforms and was led by President Mwinyi. This was followed by the third phase government of President Mkapa, and today's fourth phase government of President Kikwete.



captured in the latest political manifesto (2005), which builds on the MKUKUTA policy of environmental action for poverty reduction, identifies 12 environmental challenges, and lays out 22 measures to address them.

An increased political profile has yielded a positive feedback effect, which bodes well for the future: once an environmental issue has been successfully lodged as a key component of the formal political agenda, space is opened up for environmental arguments to enter the debate, further encouragement is offered to environmental champions, greater credibility is attached to civil society organisations (CSOs) and stakeholders with environmental knowledge, and a legitimate incentive is also created for public servants to engage more keenly on the issue.

8



**A campaign by the media led to the exposure of illegal logging**

## Many other drivers of improved awareness

*Media interest in environmental impacts.* The fact that environmental impact assessment (EIA) has increasingly been employed for projects and programmes is a sign that environmental awareness has been improving amongst decision-makers and donors. This was accelerated by the Environmental Management Act (2004), which made EIA practice mandatory for the first time in Tanzania. But the impact of EIA has not been restricted to a bureaucratic awakening. The media has raised attention about the potential environmental impacts of key projects, has stressed what these impacts can mean for people's livelihoods, has promoted and followed the EIA process and has encouraged increased public involvement.

The number and quality of media stories on poverty-environment links is on the rise, driven by their increasing visibility and costliness – and perhaps by associated intrigues. An early example was the EIA of the Rufiji prawns project. Through media engagement in the story, environmental concern permeated to the grassroots, and led to much healthy politicking (Box 2).

## Box 2. The Rufiji prawns project – an EIA awakens public environmental concerns

In 1995, a proposal to develop large-scale prawn farming was made for an area close to the Rufiji Delta. It would have meant extensive resettlement, loss of agricultural land and consequently food production, long-term pollution of the land and water, loss of breeding ground for marine fauna, and a resulting decline in local fisheries. The National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) had the foresight to apply EIA as a safeguard against damage to *both* the environment and the social well-being of communities. The EIA included public consultations at local level and public hearings. These revealed a resounding rejection of the project by local communities, who strongly believed the project was going to leave them in abject poverty. Even though the government had proposed many mitigation conditions, the consultations made it clear that these conditions could not be implemented with adequate assurance of the project's fundamental viability. So the project did not take off. This outcome confirmed the use of EIA as an instrument that can safeguard the welfare of the people through highlighting their dependence on access to productive environmental assets and sound environmental management.

Later examples include media engagement in the problem of excessive logging (the 'logging scam') which had been proceeding unabated in Coast and Lindi regions. The media made the enormity of the situation clear, especially in terms of the likely long-term impoverishment of local communities from such environmental crimes, and notably those who depend most on forest resources. The outcome of such media activity has been a much more highly sensitised public, and a significant community pressing for the use of EIA for developmental, as well as environmental, purposes.

*Information on field programmes that deal directly with poverty-environment issues.* Lessons from several field programmes have served as illustrations, and often as inspirations, to help stakeholders approach environmental issues in the MKUKUTA in very practical terms. Much of this field experience was uncovered by consultations within government and with NGOs. One example was the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project, which highlighted many 'brown' environmental issues (water pollution from industrial and domestic waste) as well as 'green' issues (invasive water hyacinth) and their effects on the livelihoods of three million fishermen. Perhaps more significant was how poor people – through the participatory poverty assessment and consultations held by the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) review – raised practical issues concerning the environment and enriched information on field programmes with their own perspectives and ideas.

*Local government reform, decentralisation, and empowering local councils.* These processes have empowered local government to make key policy decisions and raised expectations for change. They have begun to get to grips with environmental issues. The government's participatory planning approach – Opportunities and Obstacles for Development (O&OD) – has been particularly effective. Together with local environment committees, O&OD has created space for communities to take stock of poverty-environment issues and to generate ideas for mainstreaming environment in local development. This has substantially raised awareness at local levels – leading to proposals for training district planning officers in environmental issues and environmental reviews of district development plans.

*Growing concern about constraints facing institutions that manage public goods.* On the one hand, community institutions for natural resource management have eroded over the years, with increasingly evident impacts on poor farmers in particular. On the other hand, new programmes for participatory resource management have been insufficiently scaled-up, revealing big constraints to the production of public environmental goods. For example, participatory forest management still covers only 1% of forest reserves and community wildlife management areas are still only at a pilot stage. The gap between the promise of these approaches for achieving both human and environmental well-being and weak implementation has encouraged many people to lobby for the environment having a higher priority in policy processes such as the MKUKUTA.

*Strengthened role of civil society organisations.* The last decade has seen an increasing role for CSOs in Tanzania in many areas of development. Several local organisations have focused on environment and increasingly its links to people's livelihoods. The more established environmental NGOs (e.g. WWF and IUCN), which in the past tended to focus on conservation and self-contained environmental issues, have engaged more on development and poverty reduction issues. These have served to increase public attention on the environment and its linkages to poverty.

It is notable how many of these drivers of environmental awareness are local or non-governmental in origin, and how effective media processes can support them. Ultimately, however, their aspirations have the fullest effect if government processes are receptive and supportive. The next chapter explores the major transitions that have recently occurred in government-organised policy and planning processes, enabling development to integrate environmental concerns.

## The planning transition – policy and planning processes becoming more closely integrated

Here we tell the story of how the MKUKUTA was able to harness key policy and planning initiatives in poverty reduction, together with other initiatives in environmental management, to ensure these twin endeavours become better linked. One clear observation from such a feat is that Tanzania's famed planning expertise – in part a legacy of President Nyerere's goal of self-reliance – has truly come of age. It has been particularly progressive through an overt focus on the inclusion of stakeholders and affirmative attempts to tackle exclusion.

### Planning before the MKUKUTA – a quick review

To understand the MKUKUTA's innovations, it is important to trace its precursors. The precedents and provisions of three development policy processes are especially relevant – Vision 2025 (1996), the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (1997), and the follow-up Poverty Reduction Strategy (2000). They are outlined below. These, and many other key development and environmental initiatives, are also identified in Table 1.

*Vision 2025* – This is a compelling and enduring national policy framework that has exerted a consistent influence on – and a direct inspiration for – many subsequent government initiatives. Its aspirations are for high and shared growth, quality livelihoods, peace, stability, unity, and the bold aim of eradicating poverty by 2025. Vision 2025 calls for widening the space for national (as opposed to external) ownership of initiatives, and especially for effective participation and partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Vision 2025 recognised the importance of environment and sustainable development, but precise ways forward were not well incorporated at the time.

*The National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES)* – This was the first strategy in Tanzania to be aimed directly at poverty reduction, and was very much a Tanzanian product. Developed to articulate Vision 2025's poverty eradication goal, NPES aimed to improve economic productivity and employment, especially through agriculture, industry, housing and water supply. It recognised environment as a key cross-cutting issue, and promoted the principle of 'results orientation', ultimately, however, neither of these two aspects were well implemented. The NPES was eventually rejected by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as insufficient for Tanzania to qualify for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. This decision obliged Tanzania to embark on a new, and substantially donor-driven, poverty reduction strategy process in 2000 – the PRSP:

**Table 1.** Timeline of environment and poverty reduction initiatives – towards integration

Date	Environment	⇔ Some key influences ⇔	Poverty reduction
1994	National Environmental Action Plan	⇔ World Bank (requirement to qualify for International Development Association resources – IDA10)	
1995	Political manifesto on environment; National conference on poverty and environment in the political agenda	⇔ Tanzanian environment champions present manifesto to all parties ⇔ Arrival of multiparty elections enables this	
1996	Division of Environment comes under VPO with Poverty Eradication Division	⇔ High-level Tanzanian political leadership ⇔	Vision 2025 (published in 1999)
1997	National Environment Policy	⇔ Environment actors separate from development Development actors separate from environment ⇔	National Poverty Eradication Strategy (under Vision 2025)
2000	Institutional and Legal Framework for Environmental Management and Planning	World Bank (HIPC); macro-stability; ‘priority’ sectors, not environment ⇔ Government identifies the National Poverty Eradication Strategy as a guide ⇔ ⇔ World Bank	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2000-3
2001	Consultations and development of ‘Integrating Environment Programme’	⇔ VPO identified environment gap in PRSP ⇔ Informal discussion group on environment links donors ⇔ World Bank, DFID, UNDP poverty-environment initiatives support Tanzania in lead up to WSSD ⇔	Poverty Monitoring Master Plan, Tanzania Assistance Strategy
2002	‘Integrating Environment Programme’ starts		
2003		Annual Poverty Monitoring highlights PRS gaps ⇔ NGOs highlight PRS gaps in cross-cutting areas such as environment ⇔	PRS review
2004	Public Expenditure Review (PER) on Environment; Poverty Monitoring poverty-environment indicators	⇔ MoF – what contributes most to poverty reduction? ⇔ ⇔ High-level leaders/donors ‘reopen’ poverty ⇔ ⇔ VPO/UNDP Integrating Environment Programme ⇔	
2005	Environmental Management Act; Natural resources for growth study (COWI, World Bank)	⇔ World Bank environment institutional project National ownership, not just government ⇔ ⇔ Civil service/local authority reform ⇔ ⇔ Development Partners Group/Joint Assistance Strategy, reinvigorate environmental interest ⇔	MKUKUTA (NSGRP) 2005-9
2006	State of the environment report; Environment capacity assessment of government by Poverty Environment Initiative	⇔ Devt Partners Group ⇔ ⇔ VPO coordinating role consolidated ⇔	Poverty Reduction Budget Support/Poverty Reduction Support Credit 2006-10

*The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)* – As a requirement to obtain debt relief, the PRSP was understandably influenced by the World Bank – even if it was still presented as a means to implement the NPES. The PRS shifted attention to social goals rather than economic growth, and favoured six priority sectors (education, health, water, roads, judiciary, and some aspects of agriculture) as well as HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue; lands were later added as the seventh priority sector. Prepared by a government committee from 12 ministries, the PRSP involved some consultation (800 people, primarily at national level) but with minimal local or parliamentary involvement. It was not as specific as the earlier NPES on poverty-environment links, in part due to limited involvement of both environmental authorities and environmental NGOs. In spite of some methodological improvements and rigour, in some senses, the PRSP was therefore a retrograde step after the NPES.

## The MKUKUTA – a new results-based approach to planning

Through the MKUKUTA, a significant transition has been made, moving far away from previous one-off ‘master planning’ influenced by external or top-down interests, towards a more holistic, demand-driven, continuous improvement approach. The MKUKUTA’s development generated a wide sense of ownership amongst stakeholders (if not yet a fully bottom-up approach). We have identified several process ingredients for its success:

*The MKUKUTA was led at the highest political level – the President himself* made clear his expectation for timely delivery of results, calling for regular briefings and offering feedback. This encouraged considerable investment in intellectual inquiry, public consultation and cross-sectoral debate.

*Parliamentary and political engagement ensured political issues such as the environment were appropriately handled.* In contrast to the PRS, which was largely a technocratic exercise, the PRS review and the development of the MKUKUTA was established as a political process from an early stage. Parliament and its relevant committees were briefed and engaged in the process. It was important for the increased national ownership of the MKUKUTA that the accountability should reside with Parliament, and not with technocrats and development partners – as had tended to be the case with the PRS.

*The process was coordinated at a high, non-sectoral level – by VPO.* Its position was ideal for mainstreaming multiple concerns, its mandate covering both poverty reduction and environment (at the time it housed both the Poverty Eradication Division and the Division of Environment). However, VPO coordinated (rather than conducted) the work of preparing the MKUKUTA, encouraging and enabling other actors to become involved e.g. through the production of a guide to help them mainstream environmental issues into their work on the PRS review (VPO 2004a). The day-to-day work of the MKUKUTA was run from VPO’s Poverty Eradication Division, sending a clear ‘poverty first’ message to all participants (indeed, some have observed that environmental actors became engaged with MKUKUTA a little late).

*The MKUKUTA Technical Committee and Secretariat was a multi-departmental initiative, which included NGOs.* The Technical Committee and Secretariat used their strong positional powers to run the MKUKUTA process to good time, to facilitate the wide range of consultative and analytical tasks (where necessary managing the lobbyists to ensure equity), to review inputs received, and to ensure that cross-cutting issues such as environment were well reflected in analysis, debate and recommendations. The Secretariat was a crucial facilitator and motivator. We believe it has helped to wire the players together better, for more integrated work in the future.

*Formal home-grown strategic planning principles were agreed –* stressing national ownership; political commitment to democratisation and human rights; maintenance of macroeconomic and structural reforms; building on sector strategies and cross-sectoral collaboration; building local partnerships for citizens to engage in policy dialogue; harmonisation of aid; equity and sharing of benefits; strengthening of macro-micro links and decentralisation; sustainable development; and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues (such as the environment) that matter to livelihoods, growth and security.

In part this reflects a real determination at a high level to respond to the relative failure of the PRS to embrace such principles. The MKUKUTA principles emphasise integration of issues and interaction of stakeholders, which has proven effective in opening many minds to cross-cutting issues such as environment. Attempts were made to apply these principles throughout the strategy cycle, from analysis to budgeting. While this helped to generate a broad, inclusive agenda, it has also increased the challenge of priority setting, since there are so many principles.

14

*South-South learning enriched the process.* In developing the process for mainstreaming environment in the MKUKUTA, Tanzania had the opportunity on several occasions to meet with other African countries facing similar challenges. This included workshops supported by donors (e.g. World Bank and DFID workshops on poverty-environment links), bilateral country visits, and normal day-to-day contact



**It is important for donors to work together with government to help mainstream environment**

with neighbours. One example was a visit to Uganda, to learn from the process of revising Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan and the role of their Environment and Natural Resources Group. Tanzania built on this experience in establishing its own Environment Working Group.

*Many types of participatory, analytical and decision-making tools and spaces were employed, which enabled a wide range of stakeholders to become engaged in ways that best suited them. We will explore these tools further in Chapter 5. The key to success lay in sectors (within government and CSOs) being asked to make their own inputs in their own way, albeit to broad guidelines.*

*Cross-cutting issues were an explicit focus of the PRS review. To help this, VPO set up a cross-cutting working group to provide advice and inputs. This proved invaluable not only in ensuring inputs on each issue, but also in enabling different cross-cutting groups to work together and learn how to mainstream issues in a more holistic manner.*

*The drafting team was critical in formulating the MKUKUTA document. As such, its positional influence was extremely high. The drafting team was chaired by VPO and was composed of individuals from academic and research institutions, CSOs, government and private sector. Team members were chosen based on their competencies and representation of stakeholders. They were predominantly Tanzanian, with only three non-Tanzanian residents and (unusually for such exercises) no foreign consultants. Mechanisms were put in place to avoid bias: for example, the analysis, arguments and recommendations had to be supported by cited evidence, and drafts were quality-assured by sectoral and cross-cutting stakeholders.*

15

*The MKUKUTA's results were organised into a logical framework that is designed to lead directly into budgeting and work planning. Three visionary clusters were identified: 'Growth and reduction of income poverty'; 'Quality of life and social well-being'; and 'Governance and accountability'. For each cluster, a framework follows the logic: goals> targets> interventions> packages> contributing actors> indicators. The extensive use of the MKUKUTA may partly be the result of this good logic, helping everyone to understand who is doing what, why they are doing it, and what the results should be.*

The MKUKUTA's results therefore stand in contrast to its predecessor, the PRS:

- *The MKUKUTA has generated a strongly self-reliant agenda once more, reflecting Vision 2025. Indeed, a long-term objective is to reduce dependence on aid, aiming at sustaining broad-based, sustainable growth at 6-8% per year to 2015, whilst emphasising equity and good governance at the same time.*
- *It offers an informed political consensus on poverty reduction, and not merely a governmental technical planning exercise. Actors include not only government ministries, departments and agencies, but also local government, communities,*



private sector, CSOs, and development partners. Their involvement in MKUKUTA development bodes well for their active engagement in its implementation.

- *It is strongly linked with national processes and the machinery of government, rather than being a stand-alone exercise.* It both influences, and depends on, the Public Expenditure Review and Medium Term Expenditure Framework, the Joint Assistance Strategy, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Poverty Reduction Budget Support, and Poverty Reduction Support Credit.
- *It has succeeded in broadening the agenda for poverty reduction and making it outcome-based.* Having dispensed with the privilege accorded by the PRS to seven priority sectors, with their associated protected budgets and a low incentive to integrate cross-cutting issues such as the environment, the MKUKUTA can focus on key outcomes. Many stakeholders can contribute to these outcomes – and indeed *must* contribute if they are to be funded. Environment, human rights and governance issues feature strongly among the outcomes.

## How the MKUKUTA linked poverty and environmental policy initiatives

16

We have seen how the MKUKUTA process was designed to be conducive to cross-cutting issues such as environment. Global experience suggests that *actual* mainstreaming of environmental issues takes time and is usually the result of several processes, rather than a single planning exercise. In the MKUKUTA's case, environmental mainstreaming work was not self-contained – in contrast to many countries where environmental planning for development happens at the margins, rather than at the centre. It built upon the foundations established in the previous decade by the environmental champions and the National Environmental Policy. It sought – and achieved – far more significant participation of environmental authorities and environmental NGOs than was the case with the PRS. And it very actively engaged with several exercises, in order to influence them and gain from them – technically, politically and in reaching both the public and key decision-makers. Later in this chapter, we examine the environmental mainstreaming work associated with four key initiatives:

- The Poverty Reduction Strategy Review
- The Public Expenditure Review (PER)
- The development of the Environmental Management Act (EMA)
- The development of the poverty monitoring system (PMS)

First, however, we explore two facilities available to the MKUKUTA for engaging with the four initiatives:

- VPO's Integrating Environment Programme – a catalyst and coordinator
- The multi-stakeholder Environment Working Group – a forum for information-sharing and dialogue

## The VPO/UNDP Integrating Environment Programme – key catalyst for integrating poverty-environment issues within the MKUKUTA

The MKUKUTA's underlying principles urged a focus on cross-cutting issues. This presented a real challenge in how these could best be assessed, prioritised and mainstreamed across the MKUKUTA's plans. To support the mainstreaming of just one cross-cutting issue – the environment, the Government of Tanzania developed a four-year programme in association with UNDP.<sup>2</sup> This programme included activities to:

- Increase understanding about the environmental issues affecting people's livelihoods and economic development.
- Assess environmental expenditure and revenue, and environmental provisions in planning instruments.
- Develop poverty-environment indicators, to inform national systems for poverty monitoring and environmental/agricultural databases.
- Build capacity at national and local levels to better address poverty-environment issues in interventions.
- Develop guidance to environmental stakeholders on how to play their roles, and to all stakeholders on how to mainstream environmental issues.
- Improve coordination – linking a range of planning and development initiatives together; and helping government to establish and support an Environment Working Group with broad membership.

17

VPO proved to be an effective location for coordinating the environmental mainstreaming work of the MKUKUTA. If a single environment organisation had led this work, it would have run the risk of the process being seen as environmental 'special pleading' or 'territory-building', or at least might not have been integrated fully into MKUKUTA's deliberations. Having organised the MKUKUTA's system of inter-departmental working towards poverty reduction, and holding the national environmental mainstreaming mandate, VPO was able to link the two and engage environment-dependent stakeholders. Furthermore, VPO's high standing enabled it to convince an extremely significant player – the Ministry of Finance (MoF) – to take responsibility for bringing poverty-environment issues into core agendas. Environmental advocacy alone would not have achieved this.<sup>3</sup>

VPO's coordination of environmental mainstreaming did not supersede or marginalise the environmental authorities; rather, it helped to reinforce solidarity amongst them, and closely linked the MKUKUTA to the concurrent development of the EMA – consequently reinforcing both strategies.

2. This programme was supported by Danida, DFID, the UNDP Poverty Environment Initiative, and the Royal Norwegian Government through the UNDP Drylands Development Centre. The UNEP Poverty Environment Programme provided subsequent support.

3. The emerging successes of the VPO/UNDP Integrating Environment Programme led to it being asked to take a lead on further cross-cutting issues including gender and HIV/AIDS.

The environmental mainstreaming work was led by VPO's Permanent Secretary, in close collaboration with the Director of the Poverty Eradication Division, the Director of the Department of Environment and the Director-General of the National Environment Management Council. They organised many of the major process elements, ensuring good links right from grassroots to cabinet level. Staff from the Poverty Eradication Division and the National Environment Management Council cross-checked many inputs into the MKUKUTA to ensure sufficient environmental coverage.

The work was facilitated by a VPO/UNDP-appointed advisor of the Environmental Integration Programme. He played a facilitation, back-stopping technical role, keeping the process on track by ensuring stakeholders had access to environmental information, analysis and options, and were able to give the environmental mainstreaming process due attention. A critical role was to support the drafting team. This technical assistance post was unusual in being demand-driven, working principally to VPO and not to the development assistance agency (in this case, UNDP) or funders (DFID and DANIDA). Furthermore, VPO was directly involved in selecting the advisor. Positioning the advisor post in this way was vital in ensuring that the MKUKUTA developed through local perspectives, needs and ideas and avoided any scent of externally-imposed agendas.

18

## The Environment Working Group (EWG) – linking the stakeholders

VPO established and chaired this group, in line with its mandate to ensure that government policy processes are well-informed of environmental matters. VPO's initiative was motivated by three needs: to shape and rehearse the environmental aspects of the MKUKUTA; to improve consensus amongst environmental stakeholders who had not been fully organised before at national level; and to coordinate with many donors who were increasingly expressing varied interests on environmental issues.

The EWG promotes environmental integration in development policy and plans, within the context of pro-poor growth. It brings together government sectors including representation of Local Government Authorities, NGOs, CBOs, private sector actors and donor technical leads. The group has proven effective, offering a new, national-level opportunity for working together, finding common ground, exploring new ideas, and developing a unified voice on the environment throughout the MKUKUTA process.

The EWG works closely with the Development Partners Group on the Environment (DPG-E). The DPG-E was set up in 2004 to better coordinate donors' activities on the environment, and is represented on the EWG. During the PRS review and development of the MKUKUTA, the DPG-E worked to ensure environmental issues were discussed by the main DPG and included in the DPG's submission to government on the MKUKUTA.

## Environment in the PRS review process – reviewing ‘what works’ and ‘what stakeholders think’

As the 2000-3 PRS drew to a close, a one-year review was conducted to inform its update. This PRS review proved important in four ways. Firstly, it adopted a set of review principles that referred back to Vision 2025, calling for strong national ownership, and demanding a practical, outcome-based focus on ‘what works’ in-country. Such principles were bound to shape the next-phase PRS (later to be named the MKUKUTA). Secondly, the PRS review offered an empirical platform for the subsequent MKUKUTA to learn about the results of past externally-driven plans, and thus to make the case for a return to truly country-driven approaches. Thirdly, being coordinated by VPO which holds the environmental mainstreaming mandate, it would not be too difficult to expand the scope of the review’s inquiry into environmental issues. Finally, it provided an organised means for emerging criticisms of the PRS to be aired and for shaping a new approach.

Even as the review started, the expectation was that an updated PRS should be more comprehensive, more pro-poor, with thematic and stakeholder gaps filled, national ownership strengthened, and cross-cutting issues better addressed (VPO 2004). Concerns along these lines had already been expressed through a sequence of annual PRS progress reports. Furthermore, many people in Tanzania and abroad had been criticising the PRS for neglecting to promote major investment in the environment – a common finding of PRSs in many other countries (Bojo and Reddy 2003).

Once the PRS review began to reveal that environmental issues were going to be a long-term priority and thus figure strongly in the new PRS (MKUKUTA), this created space and offered strong incentives for many types of stakeholders (not just priority sectors) to energetically explore environmental problems and potentials. VPO offered a set of environmental questions to prompt sectors in making their submissions for the PRS review. The list recalled the opportunities that environment offers for increased economic growth and poverty reduction, in both rural and urban contexts, and emphasised the protection of environmental resources to achieve sustainable growth. This helped dispel older notions of environment being a brake on development, and began to shape the MKUKUTA’s positive approach to the environment.

## Environment in the Public Expenditure Review (PER) – the Ministry of Finance seeking value for money from environmental investments

For some time, public sector reform processes in Tanzania have been promoting outcome-based approaches and results-based management. Public finance reform, too, has stressed performance budgeting. Key tools for this have been public expenditure reviews and medium term expenditure frameworks. The PER system is designed to assess the value for money achieved from alternative government investments. It is comprehensive, identifying multiple sources of revenue including non-tax revenues, and now allows for an expanding agenda beyond priority sectors that tend to have protected budgets.

Under the PRS, there had been a requirement for each of the priority sectors to undertake an annual PER. The Ministry of Finance had not been seeing key environmental values, expenditures or revenues showing up in early PER submissions at either sector or macro levels. Given the economic importance of natural resource management to Tanzania, MoF had hoped to see a substantial increase in non-tax revenue collection. It therefore called for an inquiry on environment, energy and land within the PER exercise.

The PER for the environment sector aimed to 'establish levels, trends and distribution of environmental expenditure by government; and to establish the level of environmental expenditure required to meet the country's environmental priorities and poverty reduction objectives' (VPO 2004). Conducted by Norconsult using figures for two financial years 2000-2, it turned out to be a critical turning point in highlighting:

- the considerable potential for environmental resources to contribute to revenue;
- significant under pricing, and very low revenue collection in e.g. fisheries and wildlife<sup>4</sup>;
- the low share of revenue going to districts;
- the relatively low levels of investment and recurrent expenditure on environmental assets and improved revenue capture;
- how some environmentally sensitive 'priority' sectors, in spite of identifying environmental needs, spent nothing on environmental management; and
- the constraint to environmental integration posed by established government budget formats and codes.

Through the environment PER, the potential for investing in environmental management for poverty reduction has become clearer to MoF. The importance of an environmental PER has also become clear to the environment authorities, as a means to claim an appropriate share of the national budget. The environment PER consequently proposed a significantly increased medium-term expenditure framework for the environment, emphasising those sectors and local government authorities that deal with poverty-environment issues. The official environment budget has now grown considerably – from Tsh1,076,707,300 in 2005-6 to Tsh5,675,971,000 in 2006-7.<sup>5</sup> The Strategic Budget Allocation System now links public sector expenditure planning to the MKUKUTA in a way that both focuses on outcomes and clarifies different ministries', departments' and agencies' responsibilities. All of this has helped to take the MKUKUTA far out of the realms of planners' dreams and into real daily operations.

4. e.g. only 5-10% of potential forest revenue is collected

5. Equivalent to US\$854,000 and US\$4,501,000

## Developing the Environmental Management Act (EMA) – linking environmental institutional reform with the poverty reduction agenda

At the same time as Tanzanians were conducting perhaps their biggest ever developmental planning process, the MKUKUTA, the most significant environmental reform process was also under way – development of the EMA. It would seem obvious that linkages between the two exercises are crucial if environment is to be effectively mainstreamed in the MKUKUTA and, in turn, if poverty reduction objectives are to influence the mandates and operations of environmental authorities.

While both processes were organised by VPO, development of the EMA and the MKUKUTA were not formally linked. Each was lengthy, holistic and participatory to almost unprecedented degrees. Thus it may well have been cumbersome to formally integrate them (especially given the numerous other exercises in e.g. health and education that could have been similarly linked). Furthermore, the EMA process had commenced some time before the development of the MKUKUTA.

Instead, the links between the EMA and MKUKUTA processes were more informal, and focused on specific activities – and were perhaps no less effective for it. Many people involved in EMA development workshops were also involved in MKUKUTA workshops, and vice versa. This reduced some bureaucratic friction and transaction costs. The EMA consultations brought poverty-environment issues into sharp focus, providing information and evidence on the environmental contributions and vulnerabilities of poor people. This information was also used in preparing the MKUKUTA. In turn, some of MKUKUTA's interventions directly support implementation of the EMA, including building capacity at the local level to apply the EMA and to strengthen the collection and analysis of poverty-environment indicators.

The resulting EMA offers a new, sharper legislative base for environmental protection, management and investment, as well as clearer roles and powers for environment authorities. But it also directly engages with poverty reduction endeavours by:

- emphasising the environmental vulnerabilities and dependence of poor people;
- requiring mandatory use of strategic environmental assessment and EIA;
- requiring annual 'state of the environment' reporting; and
- requiring sectoral ministries, departments and agencies to operate their own environment sections.

## Developing the Poverty Monitoring System – integrating poverty-environment indicators

If poverty eradication is a policy goal, then the precise definition and indicators of poverty will influence what is done to eradicate it. When the government established the PMS in 2001, its main purpose was to monitor progress in implementing the first Poverty Reduction Strategy. Environmental indicators were not initially included, in spite of poor people’s disproportionate dependence on the environment.

However, the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan, which laid out the design of the PMS, also identified the need to develop appropriate poverty-environment indicators in the PMS. A study was commissioned to develop such indicators for refining the PMS to monitor implementation of the MKUKUTA at community, district and national levels. Initially 10 indicators (Box 3) have been included in the MKUKUTA monitoring system. Other poverty-environment indicators will be monitored at sectoral and local government authority levels. The indicators are quantitative and measurable and relate directly to their respective MKUKUTA goals. Thus there is a much greater likelihood that future policy considerations of poverty will be informed by its environmental dimensions. If this is to be realised, however, another problem needs to be addressed: measurement of all the poverty-environment indicators is not yet routine and complete.

22

### Box 3. MKUKUTA indicators on environment

<b>Goal</b>	<b>Promoting sustainable and broad-based growth</b>
Indicator	Proportion of enterprises undertaking EIAs complying with environmental regulations
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Reducing income poverty of both men and women in rural and urban areas</b>
Indicator	Proportion of households whose main income is derived from the harvesting, processing and marketing of natural resource products
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Provision of reliable and affordable energy to consumers</b>
Indicator	Proportion of households in rural and urban areas using alternative sources of energy to wood fuel (including charcoal) as their main source of energy for cooking
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Increased access to clean, affordable and safe water, sanitation, decent shelter and a safe and sustainable environment</b>
Indicators	Population with access to piped or protected water as their main drinking water source (30 minutes maximum collection time for walking and filling) Proportion of households with basic sanitation facilities Proportion of schools with adequate sanitation facilities Number of reported cholera cases Total area managed by mandated local institutions for community-based natural resource management
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Structure and systems of governance as well as the rule of law are democratic, participatory, representative, accountable and inclusive</b>
Indicators	Proportion of females from small-holder households with land ownership or customary land rights Total value of revenue received from concessions and licenses for natural resources (forestry, fishing, wildlife, mining)

## The aid transition – Tanzania increasingly in the driving seat of development assistance partnerships

In many developing countries until the recent past, development assistance agencies have sometimes played disproportionately dominant roles in national comprehensive planning processes – not only forcing the pace of planning but also tending to promote particular issues or even policy positions from the outside. On the few occasions where donors promoted the environment, this may have been due to external environmental interests e.g. global public goods such as rare biodiversity, or donors' environmental safeguard mechanisms. This kind of external push has not served countries' environmental interests well, as most of them are intimately woven into national and local circumstances.

### Tanzania's strong influence on development partners

Tanzania's relationships with development assistance agencies, in contrast, have become much closer to being effective, transparent partnerships – which is more conducive to the subtle task of integrating environmental concerns with development aspirations.

23

In the years following independence, and particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, Tanzania's relations with donors were characterised by both dependency and conflict, with donor agencies involved in almost all aspects of policy and governance. This situation began to change following an independent review of Tanzania's aid relations – the 1995 Helleiner Report, which was scathing in its criticism of donor interference in the country's affairs. In subsequent years, the government began to put mechanisms in place to take stronger control of policy processes. These included: the preparation of a detailed national framework for development assistance, the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania; the establishment of a five-month annual 'quiet period' during which donor visits and meetings are discouraged, in order to allow government space for budget preparation and parliamentary debate; and the creation of the Independent Monitoring Group, which periodically conducts reviews of relations between the government and its donors. When the Tanzanian government embarked on the MKUKUTA, it used these and other instruments to take firm control of the process from the start. It demonstrated fluency in the discourse concerning aid harmonisation and alignment agendas, and dexterity in commanding associated incentives – the World Bank's own rhetoric being recited most effectively in justifying Tanzania's own, home-grown MKUKUTA approach as the follow-up to the PRS. (Geoghegan 2007)

### Well-coordinated, supportive donors – with their own environmental champions

Effective donors have shifted to a supporting position, knowing that this would help the donor vision of country-led MDG-based strategies to become a reality. The OECD-DAC aid harmonisation and alignment agreements have offered a powerful framework



for effective aid, creating strong peer pressure to respect a powerful country-driven process in the MKUKUTA and to avoid – or to appear to avoid – interfering with it. This may have been particularly reinforced in Tanzania by (former) President Benjamin William Mkapa's personal involvement in the OECD-DAC work and his very strong assertions in Rome (and later Paris) on the primacy of country-driven development.

Donor coordination architecture has been key to exercising a more positive role. It has been constructive and helpfully managed. The key component has been the Development Partners Group (DPG), comprising donor country office heads who meet regularly with senior government officials. This was set up to improve both donor-to-donor coordination and to ensure coherent communications with government.

In relation to the MKUKUTA, donors have played no part in formal decision-making, but they have been supportive:

- Having exhorted, in the spirit of Paris and Rome, that a revised PRS (i.e. the MKUKUTA) must be country-led, donors encouraged the Tanzanian government to act on this, without interfering in the resulting process.
- Although aid practice is not of a uniform standard, more aid is now harmonised, aligned, and subject to national budget control (budget support and HIPC relief amount to about 50% of all aid).
- Although donors did not engage much in the MKUKUTA's first round of consultation (and thus were not involved in identifying the fundamental issues to be tackled), they did make a common formal submission under the DPG – like other stakeholders – in the second and third rounds (and thus helped to focus the options and means for delivery).
- Discussions held by the DPG and its sub-groups have generated donor advice but not donor conditions.

24

This is not to say that donors have been passive on environmental issues. Having listened to criticism that donor influence on the earlier PRS may have resulted in the neglect of environmental issues, they responded by helping to design and subsequently support the VPO's Integrating Environment Programme. The DPG sub-group on environment (DPG-E) has served to recommend coherent policy positions across the donors, with the three or four most active donors in a sense providing donor 'environment champions'. Under the Joint Assistance Strategy, there are also opportunities to harmonise the environment screening tools and systems of different donors, and to move towards supporting and using Tanzanian capacities and procedures – particularly as these now have a legal and mandatory basis under the EMA. Several donors have been working together to integrate environmental issues in the Performance Assessment Framework for the PRS Credit/Budget Support, and to support environmental capacity building. However, other donors wanted to exclude environmental issues in the first Performance Assessment Framework, and some donors' policies on the environment still constrain how constructively they can respond to the MKUKUTA's environmental targets and interventions.

In the case of the MKUKUTA in general, and its environmental mainstreaming work in particular, the more overt aspects of donor dominance have now dissipated. Indeed, we might say there has been a resurgence in Tanzanian self-reliance, and good examples of donor alignment behind Tanzanian interests.

## A more effective tool kit – methods and tactics used to integrate environment

Any really effective national strategy will involve not only extensive change, but also broad consensus that the change is worth making. Achieving this requires close and equitable interactions between stakeholders; good information and analysis about conditions, risks and potentials; clear communications about the overall process; and effective decision-making about priorities. In this chapter, we look briefly at the methodologies that the MKUKUTA employed to meet these needs. Some were specific to environmental mainstreaming (particularly information, analysis and communications). But many of the effective approaches were common to all aspects of the MKUKUTA (particularly consultation) – which in itself helped to bring environment into the heart of its work. Figure 1 summarises the consultation and drafting process of the MKUKUTA and highlights the key components relevant to the environment.

### Achieving effective stakeholder interactions – multiple means for consultation

*It is a maxim that effective strategies are prepared by those who will have to lead the associated changes.* This presents real challenges for a ‘national’ strategy such as the MKUKUTA. The MKUKUTA process rose to that challenge. It was unprecedented in its multi-stakeholder character, consulting far more local authorities and community groups than the PRS in 2000. It was able to both consult and influence:


25

- local governments – through meeting 18,000 participants in 168 villages (four in each of 42 districts);
- CSOs – through discussions with 1,000 participants;
- the general public – through 25,000 completed questionnaires;
- environmental NGOs – through joint position papers; and
- parliamentarians – through debates of the Select Committee on Environment and briefings for MPs in Parliament.

*The MKUKUTA invested heavily in these consultations* – partly in time (much more time was allocated for this than during the PRSP) and partly in funds. The local government consultation process run by the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (ALAT) alone cost around US\$400,000.

*The MKUKUTA’s approach was that consultation should be done by the constituency itself*, as far as possible, using the constituency’s preferred media. In previous policy processes, government had organised all consultations itself, so this was a major break from normal practice. Being a new approach, self-organised consultation was not always quick to materialise. Having waited two months for stakeholder proposals to run consultations, and receiving none, the MKUKUTA Secretariat decided to organise a familiarisation workshop to stress the value of stakeholders and sectors

Figure 1. Three rounds of consultations on the development of the MKUKUTA



making their own submissions, and then to develop a consultation guideline. This resulted in over 80 detailed submissions, and importantly several of these addressed poverty-environment linkages.

For example, ALAT led the MKUKUTA consultations at local authority level. Consultations were held amongst diverse NGOs, which helped to develop a common NGO agenda, communicate with a louder voice than previous lobbying by individual NGOs, and ensure they were complementary and less competitive with each other. Although the government had some resources to facilitate all consultations, certain NGOs saw the value in contributing some of their own funds to make the best use of this opportunity.

*Specific poverty-environment consultations were also held.* The VPO's Integrating Environment Programme supported zonal consultations on poverty-environment issues. NGOs were commissioned to run consultation workshops in three zones, to which a wide range of stakeholders were invited. In practice, these developed into consultations on a wider range of issues and also fed directly into several stakeholders' separate submissions.

*Faith-based organisations (FBOs) were extensively involved.* The MKUKUTA was announced in nearly all Catholic churches, as well as in other churches and many Muslim groups. Responses were brought together into single submissions by umbrella organisations of the respective faiths, for example, BAKWATA (the Muslim council of Tanzania).

*Questionnaires were also employed to capture individual ideas.* After testing a tightly focused questionnaire, this was redesigned to ask open questions on: big changes in the last three years resulting from poverty reduction efforts; bottlenecks to further progress; and factors to consider in developing the MKUKUTA. Of 500,000 printed questionnaires, 25,000 were returned and analysed by the National Bureau of Statistics.

*Consultations were designed to progressively accumulate, consolidate and focus issues.* Three rounds of consultation were used at the district level (Figure 1). The first round aimed at bringing all relevant issues to the table. For example, sample village surveys took place within the districts and usually resulted in narratives, with no formal quantification or ranking of issues having been invited. This was the main route for grassroots actors to feed into the MKUKUTA process, and very many issues were often picked up, with some district reports being quite extensive. District material was synthesised by district planning offices, which fed into regional reports prepared by regional planning offices, which in turn were analysed as a whole by VPO. The second round of consultation on apparent priorities and possible interventions helped to shape consensus. The third and final round helped to fine-tune responses (but bringing new issues to the table was by now discouraged).

*All of this amounted to a significant survey burden, for which the government was not yet fully prepared.* VPO organised training for ALAT facilitators (two community development officers from each region), which assured some consistency and may have reduced bias or inappropriate filtering. Environmental issues were included within this training. But performance was (unsurprisingly) uneven.

*Feedback on each individual consultation was, however, limited.* There was no direct feedback to villages, although some feedback was offered through key messages from local radio stations and Poverty Policy Week.

*The results of consultation tended to confirm those of the earlier participatory poverty assessments.* Lack of basic services including water and energy, weak law enforcement (particularly employment, land and environmental laws), and lack of access to capital were revealed as key problems. Most issues that were raised in consultations were reflected in the final MKUKUTA; a validation process was conducted by the drafting team and by stakeholder meetings to cross-check the MKUKUTA's contents with survey results.

*The whole consultation process helped stakeholders to rethink their own priorities.* The net effect of three rounds was to enable stakeholders to learn and, where necessary, to shift position. A key example is that of environmental NGOs. Where some of their priorities had been fixed on nature protection or conservation, the consultations' revelation of the significance of livelihood issues led to a rethink of policy. In this way, consultation has driven learning and, potentially, closer collaboration between stakeholders. We believe the process has appealed to Tanzanians' strong sense of 'togetherness' – where loyalty to the country overrides loyalties to other identities and fixed interests.

*It is a sign of success that, as the MKUKUTA progressed, the level of most institutions' participation improved.* Initially, the Secretariat invited key organisations, plus a few key individuals, to participate in developing the MKUKUTA. However, some officers who were subsequently despatched to meetings were neither especially knowledgeable nor senior enough to commit their organisation to the significant changes that the MKUKUTA was aiming for. As the MKUKUTA progressed, more senior and/or more knowledgeable individuals were increasingly targeted and were encouraged to stay with the process. This ensured consistency as well as effectiveness.

*This positive experience now means that many stakeholders expect participation to become a constant feature of MKUKUTA implementation,* as well as a precedent for future national policy processes. Although the MKUKUTA did not make huge strides towards deeper grassroots participation, it compared very favourably with the PRS. It made good use of existing democratic systems, e.g. parliamentarians played active roles, and O&OD procedures were used to collect information and guide local level consultations. The generally positive experience of local consultation suggests that more could now be done on terms suited to local

groups (see Chapter 7). But it also gives rise to questions about how far such consultation can, in fact, really change the terms of debate regarding the major problems and needs facing Tanzania – and therefore how, by whom, and on whose terms consultation might be organised in future.

## Good information and analysis – exploring and managing the complexities of poverty-environment links

*The MKUKUTA involved identifying, generating, analysing, presenting, and managing a vast amount of information.* Much of the important new information arose from the consultations rather than from literature or commissioned studies. Good consultation results were compelling, having the associated power of known stakeholders, identifiable districts or case studies behind them – sometimes including stakeholder priority rankings. Some consultations, such as those involving environmental NGOs, also included bespoke studies and analysis as part of their submission, i.e. the information offered was not merely the result of a quick ‘talk-shop’ or an opinion survey.

*VPO commissioned expert studies, but only to fill key gaps in knowledge about poverty-environment links.* It did not make the common strategic planning mistake of commissioning dozens of unconnected, discursive background papers. Rather, it chose to seek new, hard facts and figures on current situations and trends: some of these proved to be very compelling, particularly quantitative analyses aimed at the PER and the World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum. These revealed key figures on growth and environment links, including quite how much potential natural resource revenue the government was losing (Chapter 2). Other studies were aimed at options for the future, e.g. the study on the potential of strategic environmental assessment to improve routine development planning, and the study on poverty-environment indicators.

*The principal analysts were VPO and the MKUKUTA Drafting Team.* With a holistic, multi-stakeholder process naturally generating large amounts of data, VPO’s biggest challenge was synthesising diverse stakeholder views. In addition, much of their analysis was synthesis work, bringing together both the commissioned expert studies and existing (international) literature on poverty-environment links. The latter potentially offered a head start for the MKUKUTA, but needed contextualising for Tanzania.

*Throughout the process, a significant information management burden has developed.* In large part, this has not yet been resolved – the potential to build poverty and environment baselines and management information systems just could not be realised in the time available. This challenge will be returned to in Chapter 7.

## Clear communications – making the environment a real concern

Two issues explain why attention was given to communication in VPO's environmental mainstreaming work. Firstly, the environment has generally been treated as marginal to everyday concerns, as complex, and/or as uncertain, and thus it has often been accorded low priority. Secondly, participatory strategy processes rely heavily on diverse stakeholders understanding one another and being kept up to date on progress, and conversely they can fall apart unless communication channels are effective.

Thus it is not surprising that many who were involved in VPO's work on environmental mainstreaming at times described their work as one big communications task, making the ground fertile for improving understanding, interest and political will on poverty-environment issues. Key tactics were:

- *Discourse and language*: Taking care to frame environmental issues as part of wider aspirations and challenges, linked to health, livelihoods, incomes, growth and security – rather than as a separate affair of environmental protection.
- *Guidance*: Developing numerous checklists, guidelines and indicators to clarify links between environment and poverty – thereby helping stakeholders to express their views as well as to structure analyses.
- *Transparency*: Improving stakeholders' access to current MKUKUTA documentation in good time, and therefore also to emerging thinking – thus continually opening up the process.<sup>6</sup>
- *Faith-based organisations*: Greatly expanding the network for the MKUKUTA through wide membership – enabling VPO to work with and through others.
- *Media*: Ensuring print, TV and radio personnel were present at many MKUKUTA events – particularly where there was ministerial involvement.

30



Getting environment on the political agenda in Tanzania has been crucial

6. For example, whilst gender and energy interest groups did not initially think that their concerns would be well covered, good communication began to engage them.

- *Popular appeal:* Expending a lot of effort (latterly) on newsletters and producing Kiswahili materials – which also influenced English-speaking elites.

*Finally, the identity and branding of the MKUKUTA proved to be important.*

After the public build-up of expectation for a second PRS, there was some initial confusion when the name changed to MKUKUTA towards the end of the process. However, the MKUKUTA title became very quickly used (having a Swahili resonance and tonality if not meaning). It also signalled a distinct shift from the PRS, which had been too strongly associated with donor interests.

## Effective decision-making – identifying priorities

*The MKUKUTA's decision-making process and sequence followed precedents from other Tanzanian national planning processes:*

- *Cabinet* was the body for final approval – during the process it closely considered progress reports on MKUKUTA and an overall Cabinet Paper on its draft recommendations, issued directives on gaps to be addressed, and conferred final approval.
- *An Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee* of permanent secretaries made decisions on the overall quality of the analysis and recommendations before submitting it to Cabinet – as well as linking MKUKUTA to the budget process.
- *The MKUKUTA Editorial Team* decided on the overall shape of the document and its presentation of priorities. Bringing three particularly influential permanent secretaries into the editorial team quickened the process.
- *The MKUKUTA Drafting Team* made decisions on how to present the policy options – although inevitably they also made a range of (lower-level) decisions on the content of those options. They called in technical experts for support on particular issues.

31

*Priority-setting is always a challenge for multi-stakeholder, multi-issue exercises such as the MKUKUTA – particularly where issues such as environment, that tend too easily to be excluded, are concerned. MKUKUTA's approach to setting priorities was not pre-determined. However, from the outset, three clear messages set the boundaries for priority setting:*

- *Normative strategic planning principles* would help to shape the strategy (Chapter 3). Some of these would seem to point to priority-setting criteria, notably an emphasis on human rights, macroeconomic and structural reforms, cross-sectoral collaboration, decentralisation, and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues.
- *Extensive consultations* would be the primary means to set goals and targets. Consultees' ranking of commonly expressed needs, and the extent of support for draft policy options, also offered priority-setting criteria.
- *Tanzanian concerns would be dominant.* The whole MKUKUTA approach set decision-making boundaries firmly within the field of Tanzanian concerns, i.e. a participatory process that engaged so many Tanzanian stakeholders, used their



inputs, supplemented them with independent information, and kept everyone well informed. The process was country-led, with no foreign consultants being employed to write the MKUKUTA. The government made a clear stance on focusing on growth and governance, also setting strong signals for what the Tanzanian priorities might be.<sup>7</sup>

Although these three messages offered broad guidance, they embraced such a wide range of factors that, as the work progressed, emerging issues had to be discussed on their own merits. Multi-stakeholder discussion and the cluster framework proved helpful:

*Multi-stakeholder discussion* had the advantage that an issue had to be discussed in depth, and could not be too quickly dealt with through simple screening criteria. Fundamentally, the MKUKUTA was not so much a technical process as a political one, where stakeholders' consideration of context shapes priorities as much as any preset list of criteria.

*As the work was being finalised, the cluster framework, in a matrix form, served as a helpful way of grouping issues, and then creating a narrative for each.* The cluster framework was directly inspired by the *2002 Millennium Project* – the international review of progress towards the MDGs. The resulting cluster defines the overall priorities in terms of generalised, qualitative outcomes.

32

*Finally, many decisions on priorities were left for the implementation phase.* Although this has meant that MKUKUTA emerged with 108 targets, this inclusiveness has kept stakeholders engaged and committed, since they can see their interests represented. For implementation, the MKUKUTA document also lays out eight criteria that will 'guide its prioritisation or sequencing'. Three of the implementation criteria should prove to be of particular help for identifying environment priorities i.e. 'mainstreaming cross-cutting issues', 'addressing more than one outcome', and 'large multiplier effects'. However, some of these criteria are mutually exclusive, and so it is not possible to score plans according to how many criteria they might meet. We return to this in Chapter 7, when we consider the challenge of defining a critical path through 108 MKUKUTA targets.

---

7. There was even some consideration of dropping the term 'poverty reduction' because of its negative overtones – some wanted to focus on improving the quality of life.

## Taking stock – results of environmental mainstreaming to date

It is too early to make definitive observations about any direct impacts *on the ground* arising from MKUKUTA's environmental mainstreaming work. However, we can already observe results in terms of confirmed environmental targets and commitments, a great shift in debates on environment, increasingly inclusive policy and planning processes, and changes in governance. We touch on these below.

### Result 1 – clear environmental targets in the MKUKUTA and other key policies and plans

The environmental mainstreaming work has produced an extensive set of environmental targets and interventions under each of MKUKUTA's three clusters of broad outcomes:

- *Environmental targets*: 15 out of the 108 targets in the MKUKUTA involve direct environmental action (Table 2); and five further targets include indirect environmental action.
- *Environmental interventions*: many are identified for contributing not only to the above, but also to non-environmental targets e.g. interventions on access and control over natural resources and reduction of corruption (notably for illegal logging) support cluster 3 on governance and accountability.
- *Environmental monitoring*: poverty-environment indicators have been prepared for the Poverty Monitoring System.

33

Integrating environmental issues throughout the MKUKUTA in this way has helped to improve their relevance, to reduce their apparent complexity, to clarify how they fit operationally, and to enable key players to pick them up as priorities. And they have certainly been picked up at high levels – the latest (2005) political manifesto builds on the MKUKUTA's environment provisions, identifying 12 environmental challenges and 22 measures to address them, with particular steps to address land degradation and safeguard water catchments. A committee of ministers responsible for environmental management has also been established. A separate approach to environmental issues would have been folly, given the momentum and reach of the MKUKUTA process.

<b>Table 2. Specific environment targets in MKUKUTA</b>	
<b>Cluster 1: Growth and reduction of income poverty</b>	
<b>Goals</b>	<b>Environment targets</b>
2. Promoting sustainable and broad-based growth.	1. Reduced negative impacts on environment and people's livelihoods. 2. Reduced land degradation and loss of biodiversity.
4. Reducing income poverty of both men and women in rural areas.	3. Increased contributions to incomes of rural communities from wildlife, forestry, and fisheries.
<b>Cluster 2: Improvement of quality of life and social well-being</b>	
<b>Goals</b>	<b>Environment targets</b>
3. All men, women and children are able to access clean, affordable and safe water, sanitation, decent shelter and a safe and sustainable environment, and thereby reduced vulnerability from environmental risk.	4. Increased proportion of rural population with access to clean and safe water from 53% in 2003 to 80% in 2009/10 and less time spent on collection of water. 5. Increased proportion of urban population with access to clean and safe water from 73% to 90% as above. 6. Increased access to improved sewerage facilities from 17% in 2003 to 30% in 2010 in urban areas. 7. Reduce households living in slums without adequate basic essential utilities. 8. 100% of schools to have adequate sanitary facilities by 2010. 9. 95% of people to have access to basic sanitation by 2010. 10. Cholera outbreaks cut by half by 2010. 11. Reduced water-related environmental pollution levels from 20% in 2003 to 10% in 2010. 12. Reduction in harmful industrial and agricultural effluents. 13. Reduced vulnerability to environmental disasters. 14. Soil, forest and aquatic ecosystems that people depend upon for production and reproduction conserved. 15. Reduction in land degradation and loss of biodiversity.

## Result 2 – a shift in debates about the environment and poverty

It is informative to identify those kinds of narrative on environment that gained ascendancy in the MKUKUTA process, and those that did not. Prior to the MKUKUTA, the 1997 National Environment Policy had fully accepted the analysis that poverty and demographic factors were the main causes of environmental degradation: *'Poverty is a habitual cause of environmental degradation as it undermines people's capacity to manage resources wisely'*. If livelihood approaches had occasionally been adopted by some environmental actors, this was generally as a means to achieve conservation objectives; in contrast, conservation was not considered as a means to achieve livelihood objectives. The MKUKUTA completed the about-turn that was beginning to be expressed in various quarters (Chapter 2): i.e. it focused debate on the developmental values of the environment for livelihoods, security, health, and economic growth. It has now firmly established

environmental issues in a more positive light as opportunities for securing developmental values. The debate on environmental solutions has become primarily institutional and financial, where before it was technical.

However, the more political elements of a legitimate environmental narrative are not yet prominent in the MKUKUTA. Although they are not excluded from it, more might have been said about poor people's positive environmental contributions, about distributional issues in terms of who currently benefits from environmental assets and who bears the costs and risks, and about issues of power such as corruption and elite capture of certain resources. This finding is common to the experience of PRSs in many developing countries (Waldman 2005).

Furthermore, whilst there is certainly more emphasis on the environment and other cross-cutting issues than in the PRS, it is notable that the MKUKUTA adheres to many developmental paradigms associated with the PRS. The emphasis on economic growth and market-led approaches remains in place, and the environmental targets and interventions support this. In this sense, the MKUKUTA remains a strategy in which prevailing economic models are considered inviolable. Although it is not yet a strategy in which *ecological limits* are considered inviolable, the MKUKUTA's healthy inclusion of fundamental issues of human rights and social welfare bodes well for future debate on developmental paradigms and their environmental consequences. And, as we note below, its firm consultative processes offer scope for continued debate – including from grassroots – on these difficult themes.



**Environmental mainstreaming takes time**

### Result 3 – a new, holistic, consultative policy process setting a precedent for integrating environment in future development paths

The process of preparing the MKUKUTA was valuable in itself, offering as it did many opportunities for environmental and poverty reduction stakeholders to interact. Through this, the MKUKUTA has achieved a real step-change:

- Developing an approach focused on agreed outcomes – rather than an exclusive ‘priority sectors’ approach.
- Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues – thereby putting a strong premium on interaction between sectors and inviting involvement of environmental interest groups.
- Promoting a self-reliant approach – whether at a national level in managing donor aspirations, demands and respective contributions, or at local government level in carrying out devolved roles effectively.
- Adopting a ‘national consensus’ rather than a ‘government plan’ approach – ensuring real ownership of national growth and poverty reduction plans.
- Achieving greater solidarity between many stakeholders on key issues – including between environment stakeholders.
- Managing the change process – bringing together several arenas for change in donor relations, sector priorities, machinery of government, community voice, and helping them to contribute to one another.
- Working within existing capacity – with procedures for consultation, analysis and decision-making that are designed locally to suit the current situation (albeit challenging it), and with stakeholder involvement helping to avoid the common problem of policy inflation / capacity gap.
- Linking the strategy to both the budget and the budget tracking system – with the result that the environment budget has already increased.
- Engaging key institutions more routinely on matters of environment and poverty – notably the Ministry of Finance and others through the EWG.
- Promoting a more inclusive, holistic approach – opening space and listening to all, which has helped to improve attention to sensitive issues, as well as to empower environmental stakeholders.

*This last point is key: stakeholders had many incentives to engage with the MKUKUTA process, and notably to address environmental issues within it.* The engagement of a wide range of ‘environmental champions’ is certainly one of the overriding reasons for MKUKUTA’s success. They played active roles for different reasons. In the past, participation in multi-factor national planning exercises has commonly been a matter of bureaucratic necessity on the part of government officials (shaped by general incentives for doing a job well, and perhaps by the prospect of hanging onto power in the more prominent agencies). But it has tended to offer little more than a brief lobbying space for civil society and business (sometimes all this being lubricated by loose funds from external parties). In contrast, the MKUKUTA opened up the process to wider input, offering real prospects for several constituencies to make inputs more or less in their own time:

- The government’s commitment to change, and to tackling poverty-environment problems, was clear to stakeholders in the MKUKUTA design and presentation – stakeholders believed change was possible, and so they engaged willingly.
- With the 2005 election approaching, the MKUKUTA offered a good opportunity for constituencies to influence the political debate.

- Civil society could see that the process would enhance visibility for their causes – and offered prospects for engaging without the need for confrontational approaches.
- Sectors knew that budget allocations were going to be closely linked to the MKUKUTA – increasing the need to engage with it. Many government stakeholders did not initially contribute to the MKUKUTA as they believed a ‘PRS2’ would result – i.e. aimed mainly at the donors. The MoF’s message that the MKUKUTA would affect their budgets compelled them to engage.
- Finally, adequate time and some resources were available for most constituencies to contribute within their own schedules – although the task was still too extensive for some.

## Result 4 – institutional and governance change

There are already significant impacts of the MKUKUTA in how institutions are shaping up, with a more integrated approach to the inclusion of environment in planning and budgeting, more effective engagement of the Ministry of Finance in supporting environmental investments, better synergies between environmental organisations, and their improved links with organisations focusing on poverty reduction. In this sense, the Tanzanian experience involving policy and institutional change towards more inclusive approaches differs from that of many developing countries, where environmental integration in PRSs or their equivalent has been defined in terms of technical solutions (Waldman 2005).

37



**With a rising awareness of its importance, environment is being integrated in all education curricula**

The machinery of government is beginning to change, with the rolling out of the VPO/Division of Environment's *'Guidelines for Mainstreaming Environment into Sector and Local Government Authorities' Plans and Budgets*. This covers ways to support rural and urban communities, broadening the platform for continued debate, developing solutions based on indigenous knowledge, generating new information, and employing poverty-environment indicators. It has already inspired environment guides in other agencies including the Tanzania Social Action Fund and the Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project.

Environment is becoming integrated into all education curricula through the National Environmental Education and Communication Strategy. The National Environment Management Council is intensifying its awareness campaign in collaboration with other sectors. There is increasing activity by non-governmental environmental groups, including support to income or employment generation through e.g. planting of trees and collection and re-cycling of waste. NGOs are now (potentially) able to access increased government environment budgets. The Ministry of Finance has responded to the costs of environmental pollution from plastic waste by imposing higher taxes and/or prohibiting the import of certain plastics.

These are good beginnings, but more needs to be done if there is to be no gap between the MKUKUTA's commitments and action on the ground.

## Facing the future – challenges posed by the ‘implementation gap’

These are exciting times in Tanzania. The MKUKUTA has leaped vigorously across a ‘planning gap’ – offering a more holistic, inclusive, operationally relevant strategy than any previous national plan. It has good public support. Now several challenges make up what we might call an ‘implementation gap’. These are – setting priorities, ensuring policy coherence with the EMA, localising the governance of both the MKUKUTA and the EMA, developing essential capacities and systems, and getting investments to flow. We introduce our early thoughts on these below, noting where the MKUKUTA has already improved Tanzania’s fitness for each challenge.

### Prioritising amongst the MKUKUTA targets

This is a key challenge, since there are over 100 targets in the MKUKUTA ‘catalogue’, all of them seeming to meet genuine needs for improvements in so many areas. Interviewed by ‘The Economist’ in September 2006, President Kikwete took over an hour just to outline the most basic needs facing Tanzania – more schools, universities, hospitals, roads, clean water, etc. It will clearly be a challenge to ensure that environmental issues continue to be prioritised.



**The challenge lies in making optimum use of the land to produce food, fibre and water**

Firstly, it will be important to ensure that prioritisation frameworks are not unduly biased against poverty-environment issues e.g. in setting discount rates that count against long-term investments, or in emphasising macro-level growth goals over



micro-level livelihoods goals. Secondly, it will be necessary for stakeholders to be able to demonstrate the environmental components of basic needs. Thirdly, environmental risks such as climate change will need to be factored into risk-based prioritisation. Finally, trade-offs between some of the MKUKUTA targets also present a challenge: they will become increasingly necessary, given that not all targets can be implemented everywhere. Some targets are already beginning to clash. For example, in some places MKUKUTA targets for increasing irrigation (to double agricultural outputs and improve food security) are conflicting with environmental and hydro-power targets since there is just not enough water. It will therefore be important to avoid inappropriate use of standard implementation packages irrespective of environmental conditions in each locality/case. Thus mainstreaming environmental information in local/sector planning will be key – understanding the local ecology and development pressures, locating and mediating possible conflicting issues, as well as making use of improved technology. This will present capacity burdens on environmental authorities both nationally and, increasingly, locally.

### Policy coherence between MKUKUTA and EMA

The MKUKUTA covers a huge number of themes. It would not have been realistic to achieve complete policy coherence across all of these within the one MKUKUTA planning process. This will take more time. One major issue regarding poverty-environment links is that two initiatives – the MKUKUTA and the EMA – have been progressing with considerable energy, but they have emphasised different sides of the poverty-environment coin:

40



Beehives in a baobab tree: natural resources are crucial to rural livelihoods

- The MKUKUTA promotes a *can-do* approach to the environment for growth and livelihoods, emphasising the importance of rights to environmental assets (notably land). Furthermore, the MKUKUTA is a planning framework – with money attached over a five-year timeframe.
- The EMA, in contrast, is particularly clear on many *can't-do* limits to the use of natural resources and public environmental goods, with associated regulations. The EMA is a legal framework – with a long time horizon.

Tanzania is now faced with balancing the MKUKUTA's emphasis on environmental use with the EMA's emphasis on environmental protection. On the one hand, these differences in emphasis can be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Among the key challenges, already recognised by the 2005 political manifesto, are: environmental degradation caused by the invasion of livestock keepers into areas of water sources; invasion of farmers onto mountain slopes; felling of trees for illegal log sales; and other land use conflicts. In practice, many of the trade-offs between environmental protection and use will again turn out to be locally specific, and decisions can only be taken on a case-by-case basis. The sustainable livelihoods framework is useful for decision-making, especially as both EMA and NEP support both livelihood safety net and environment protection roles.

On the other hand, the MKUKUTA's and EMA's different emphases open up a legitimate discussion on the prevailing development paradigm. Indeed, we suspect that major national issues may arise in the future, requiring more than local or case-specific trade-offs. If the impacts of climate change take hold across the nation, or – more positively – if global markets for biodiversity and carbon storage expand greatly, we will want to ensure that environment is placed at the very heart of the development model. The ideas and processes produced by the MKUKUTA and its environmental mainstreaming work offer an excellent platform for thinking through that future.

## Environmental governance – localising both MKUKUTA and EMA

The World Bank suggests that 'the single most important recommendation to capture and maintain natural resource based growth in Tanzania is to reform environmental governance' (World Bank 2005). There is much to commend this notion. Indeed, the MKUKUTA itself looks forward to stronger community leadership in environmental management. To achieve this will entail a shift in power towards local levels, especially to environment-dependent stakeholders – enabling poor people to have clearer environmental *rights* and *responsibilities*, access to *resources*, and effective *relationships* ('4Rs'), as well as tackling associated social exclusions. This would suggest a much more rapid scaling up of participatory forestry and community wildlife areas than has been achieved to date, and the further development of participatory regimes. Many of these regimes may be best developed through local organisations articulating their own ideas on poverty-environment issues within the three MKUKUTA clusters. MKUKUTA and EMA

development have so far been dominated by high-level champions and central government: now further insights, commitment and behaviour change are needed from the bottom up. This will require support for CSOs and local government agencies to mobilise local actors and to amplify their voices. When the MKUKUTA was being developed, stakeholders were *invited* into the process – largely on the organisers' terms, even if they did manage to run some of the consultations. Perhaps during MKUKUTA implementation the challenge is for local stakeholders to *create* their own policy spaces.

## Developing environmental systems and strengthening capacity

Many processes developed in the MKUKUTA planning stages offer a good basis for building more permanent systems for continuous improvement, so that environmental priorities set during MKUKUTA formulation remain priorities in implementation:

*Keeping policy space.* The MKUKUTA has conducted the biggest-ever national consultation on environmental issues. Indeed, its main products to date have included analysis and debate. The challenge now is to shape a continued participation system that maintains this momentum and empowers those stakeholders who have had relatively little access to policy processes thus far. The MKUKUTA itself calls for progressing beyond one-off consultation to routine, institutionalised participation – creating space for discussion, ideas generation and feedback. Engaging with local organisations in MKUKUTA implementation would help to both develop this space and shape the debate. So also would support to further parliamentary debate on poverty-environment issues.

42

*Continued coordination and momentum.* VPO's Integrating Environment Programme, and its coordinator and advisor, were key dynamos for poverty-environment integration. They are no longer in place. Yet the wide range of institutional change that now needs encouraging and coordinating suggests that the need for a MKUKUTA Secretariat has not, in fact, disappeared.

*Strengthening and streamlining the functions of environment organisations.* New types of capacity are needed to deliver the MKUKUTA's outcome-based, holistic approach. Already, environment organisations are more engaged in poverty work. They are ready for change, largely as a result of the MKUKUTA process, but much work of strengthening and streamlining has still to come.

*Strengthening local and sector environmental capacities.* The MKUKUTA's capacity aspirations focus rightly on the local level. The EMA also prescribes local-level roles and requires local government authorities and sectors to appoint experts, officers, and inspectors – many of whom are not yet in place or may have very low capacity. The theme of linkages should continue – integrating both MKUKUTA and EMA into existing district planning mechanisms, linking council environment and development committees as far as possible, and linking with the existing machinery of

government such as PLANREP (a planning and reporting system) and medium-term expenditure frameworks. Sectoral integration will also depend upon a significant increase in capacity for conducting and responding to strategic environmental assessments. This would do well to build on the 2004 strategic environmental assessment of four sectoral programmes conducted under the Poverty Reduction Support Credit for cash crops, land tenure, roads and business licensing.

*Developing an effective poverty-environment information and monitoring system that is integrated with development monitoring.* Revenue and livelihood opportunities are lost as each year passes without good track being kept of forests, fisheries, wildlife, and water supplies. The EMA-mandated environmental monitoring system needs to be developed, notably building a relevant baseline. The environmental monitoring system also needs to link to the Poverty Monitoring System (which itself needs reconciling with other key monitoring tasks such as the PER and Performance Assessment Framework). A streamlined set of poverty-environment indicators could link the two. In the short term, to maintain a focus on poverty-environment issues, each annual Poverty and Human Development Report might usefully focus on a different environmental issue. Developing a fully integrated system is a long-term affair, however, which would benefit from being structured around a sound logic: the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment framework could help – a respected new international approach that links human and environmental well-being through the concept of ecosystem services.

43

*Developing an independent watchdog function.* At present, the funding and political climate in Tanzania makes it easier for CSOs to thrive as a partner of government, e.g. as service provider, rather than as a watchdog on environmental issues. But independent watchdog roles may be increasingly valuable to improve transparency and accountability in the use of particularly valuable environmental assets such as forests, water bodies and fisheries, complementing the above official environmental information system.

## Getting investments to flow into environmental management

The MKUKUTA has achieved considerable success in securing an increased budget for the Department of Environment, but the ultimate indicator of success will be when other sectors see increased budgets and expenditure on poverty-environment actions. Attracting real investment will entail progressing beyond the generic case for investing in environment (made well through the PER) to creating much more locally- or sector-specific cases. This will require some hard questions to be answered.

The key question – ‘what difference does changing environmental expenditure make to growth, livelihoods and revenue, as well as to the value of environmental assets over the years?’ – is as yet unanswered for specific resources and sectors. The metrics and assessment systems are both missing. In the short term, improving the capacity of environment authorities to offer basic information for PERs will be helpful. In the medium term, some kind of wealth accounts would help to keep

track of environmental assets and to prove the worth of environmental investments. Both of these should link to the national environmental information system.

The PMS review suggests that there has been little involvement of the private sector in MKUKUTA implementation to date. But if private investment is to be attracted, good investment advice will be needed on, e.g.:

- likely cash flows from investing in nature and natural cycles;
- what value can be added through environmental management;
- what are possible exit strategies for investors (and therefore who might be the most appropriate long-term managers of environmental assets); and
- market developments in environmental goods and services.

Furthermore, developing long-term finance vehicles will be an important task. Development partners may be well placed to catalyse these changes. After all, if MDG7 (to ensure environmental sustainability) is one of the most off-track MDGs, this fact would warrant at least benchmarking the quantity and quality of aid that supports environmental investment, if not (for coherence with budget support) setting up particular environmental funds.

## Lessons from environmental mainstreaming to date

It should now be clear that a large number of events, initiatives and conditions have constituted the Tanzanian experience of environmental mainstreaming. Moreover, many of them were deliberately drawn upon and woven together by the MKUKUTA, which has resulted in a much greater leap forward in integrating environmental needs into development. They included:

- one ministry – VPO, having the responsibility for both environment and poverty;
- a group of environmental champions that had begun to form in the 1990s;
- a programme to integrate environment into the PRS starting a year before the major PRS review;
- a strong Development Partner Group on the Environment formed;
- a government that wanted to improve self-reliance in responding to local needs and opportunities;
- a participatory poverty assessment which clearly stated that environment was a priority need for poor people; and
- a Ministry of Finance that wanted to investigate environmental expenditure and revenue as part of the PER process.

45

Thus our principal lesson is that environmental mainstreaming is achieved by a wide range of drivers and brings together a number of tools and tactics. It will succeed in proportion to the drivers' ability to work in a coordinated way with each other and with mainstream interests. In many ways, therefore, environmental mainstreaming is a political and institutional process. In contrast, it is unlikely to be achieved through a single technical project or other initiative alone.

As a primarily Tanzanian learning group, we realise that the Tanzanian story is very much one about the national context. We are confident that it will be informative for all readers, but we are reluctant to elevate all of our learning to the status of generic lessons. However, we have identified a dozen key lessons that do seem to stand out as being globally applicable:

### *1. National leadership is essential for environmental mainstreaming:*

Environmental mainstreaming takes time and is best driven by national or local champions within and outside government. These champions need to be able to work together and preferably are empowered with a high-level mandate. External partners can help support this through building partnerships with environmental champions both within the environment sector and outside it, offering technical assistance according to demand, sharing lessons, and providing catalytic financial support. But they cannot, and should not, attempt to lead the process.

2. *The 'environment' needs to be framed as a major component in poverty reduction – and not as a brake on development:* A key challenge is to see people as part of the solution to halt environmental degradation and to build environmental assets to support livelihoods of livestock keepers, farmers, and other poor groups. This involves changing the views of environmental agencies, NGOs and others away from a focus on environmental protection to one of seeing environment as a driver of growth and a foundation for livelihoods. This may entail changes in environment institutions themselves – simple things such as the creation of units or posts responsible for poverty-environment issues. It may also entail investing in environmental guidance which is tailored to the different sectors and localities in a country – generic global lists and guides are less useful.

3. *Trade-offs between development and environment cannot be avoided:* Development activities can help environmental conservation, and vice versa, and such win-wins should receive priority attention. However, the scope for win-wins is not inexhaustible, and there are ecological limits and basic welfare needs which should be protected. Debates and decision-making procedures need to lead towards some of these fundamental trade-offs, even if they are not the initial focus of environmental mainstreaming.

4. *Generating evidence and sharing knowledge on poverty-environment links is key:* Awareness of poverty and environment linkages is essential to bring about changes in people's perceptions and behaviour, but these linkages tend not to have been fully explored in most countries. This calls for research, analysis, and sharing of new and existing knowledge with decision-makers (and the general public) to demonstrate the livelihood and economic significance of environmental issues. More quantitative data can be particularly important for key decisions, notably, economic estimates of the interdependence between poverty reduction and environmental management.

5. *All stakeholders need the chance to explore their environmental contributions and sensitivities:* The great diversity of ways in which different sectors and stakeholders view and act on environmental issues is both a benefit and a management challenge. Many sectors will not have a clear understanding of what 'environment' means, and may feel that they are doing nothing on the environment when they actually are (e.g. water and health sectors). To counter this, debate and useable national and local guidance on what environment means to each sector – as opportunities, dependences, and threats – will be essential.

6. *Listening to – and promoting – the voices of poor people is central to effective mainstreaming:* In contrast to many sectors (see 5 above), poor people do tend to recognise many of the links between poverty and the environment. Local consultations which clearly articulate the views of poor people, and enabling these voices to be heard at higher levels, can accelerate environmental mainstreaming more generally by driving home human dimensions. Because of the potential power of such voices, the work of synthesising or otherwise filtering by government

authorities and CSOs requires particular skills, means of independent assurance, and clear caveats. The whole process of raising up voices of poor people takes time, financial resources, and political commitment, but builds real ownership and effective strategies and policies. Without it, environment is likely to be treated as a marginal, technical concern.

*7. The private sector needs to be involved throughout:* A lesson derived from an area where Tanzania has perhaps been less successful is the challenge of engaging the private sector (from small to large enterprises) in environmental mainstreaming. Without effective engagement, it will be more difficult to attract private investment and create incentives for innovation, technological development and behavioural change. Private sector 'environment champions' and drivers of change need to be identified and engaged early on in the process.

*8. Donor harmonisation and budget support need to be informed of, and responsive to, poverty-environment links:* Improving donor harmonisation, as a means to deliver more effective assistance to national governments, is crucial for implementing many national poverty reduction processes. Such processes are now increasingly supported by direct budget support under common or joint assistance strategies. In developing them, donors need to actively engage on environmental issues – notably by asking key questions on poverty-environment links – so as to inform the policy dialogue between donors and government. Ideally at least three to four (major) donors in a country should maintain a focus on environment and poverty issues.

*9. Technical assistance should respond to demands, and enable local capacities:* Technical assistance for environmental mainstreaming should be demand-driven. It works best in areas where it is needed by national and local stakeholders, and where it is timely. If this is supplied by external expertise it needs to be time-bound and focused on using and building local capacities.

*10. Budgets count!* Effective engagement of ministries in environmental mainstreaming can only be assured when it affects their budgets. The acid test of success in environment mainstreaming is when environmental issues have teeth by being included in the budget process, in sector budgets (government and others'), and in expenditure tracking systems. Environmental organisations in particular will need to have good knowledge of budgetary and financial processes – something which currently is often weak.

*11. Alliances with stakeholders of other cross-cutting issues can be mutually rewarding:* Environment is not the only cross-cutting issue which is commonly neglected in PRSs and other national planning processes. For example, gender and HIV/AIDS face similar challenges in mainstreaming – and, of course, cross-cutting issues themselves are interlinked. Bringing different cross-cutting groups together during the policy processes can: (i) help groups to learn from each other on the tools and best practices of mainstreaming; (ii) build alliances between groups to



better address shared issues (e.g. the environment and gender, children and HIV/AIDS); and (iii) reduce the transaction costs of those who would otherwise be expected to conduct several separate mainstreaming exercises.

*12. The timing of mainstreaming work is key:* Environment needs to be addressed at the beginning of a process. It can be useful to map various key national policy or planning processes, and their openness to environmental issues, and then seek entry points at the beginning of relevant review and/or new processes. This may mean having to wait for the start of a new process, sowing the seeds for future mainstreaming, and being strategic in using the openings and opportunities created (rather than implementing major initiatives at the end of an old process).

**In conclusion,** Tanzania's MKUKUTA has been pivotal in beginning to erase a depressing picture – of *degradation* of the environment; *disconnects* between environment-dependent stakeholders and those who set policy; *debilitated* environmental authorities; and *depleted* environmental budgets. It has shifted from a situation of *exclusion* of environmental concerns and stakeholders (found commonly in many countries), to one that values their inclusion. Moreover it has begun to form a new, inspiring picture – of a broader, more robust approach to poverty reduction that also recognises and responds to environmental needs and opportunities. This new picture will surely serve to make Tanzania's development paths more secure in the future, especially as it is one that key players such as the Ministry of Finance – and increasingly also the public – are observing and acting upon, thanks in large part to the environmental mainstreaming successes of the MKUKUTA.

# References

Bojo, J. and R.C. Reddy. 2003. Status and evolution of environmental priorities in the Poverty Reduction Strategies: A review of 50 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. World Bank Environmental Economics Series paper no. 93.

Economic and Social Research Foundation. 2003. Vulnerability and resilience to poverty in Tanzania: summary of the 2002/3 Tanzania Participatory Poverty Assessment.

Geoghegan, T. 2007 (forthcoming). Making aid work better for recipients – and improving national planning processes for sustainable development in the bargain. IIED Sustainable Development Opinion Paper.

Vice-President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania. 2005. National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.

Vice-President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania. 2004. Public Expenditure Review of Environment Financial Year 2004.

Vice-President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania. 2004a. Guide and Action Plan to mainstreaming environment into the Poverty Reduction Strategy review.

49

Waldman, L. 2005. Environment, politics and poverty: lessons from a review of PRSP stakeholder perspectives. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.

World Bank. 2005. Study on growth and environment links for preparation of the Country Economic Memorandum (CEM).

## Environment at the heart of Tanzania's development

Poor people are disproportionately dependent upon environmental assets such as clean water and fertile soils. They are also highly vulnerable to environmental hazards such as climatic extremes and pollution. At the same time, environmental and natural resources make a significant contribution to economic growth. It is therefore essential to 'mainstream' environmental concerns into development. Yet desk reviews of Poverty Reduction Strategies have indicated that environment is effectively absent in most countries' strategies. What is the truth behind this, and what can be done about it?

The authors of this paper reveal how national leadership, local champions, and numerous initiatives, events, and conditions constitute the Tanzanian experience of environmental mainstreaming. Many of these drivers were drawn into Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA), enabling a significant leap forward in integrating poverty reduction and environmental management. The authors explain how this inclusive approach was achieved. They reflect on what has been accomplished, the challenges to come, and offer lessons that may help countries beyond Tanzania.

'Environment at the heart of Tanzania's development' is published in association with the Vice-President's Office of the United Republic of Tanzania.

## Natural Resource Issues Series No. 6

ISBN: 978-1-84369-633-9

ISSN: 1605-1017

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA  
VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE



International  
Institute for  
Environment and  
Development