A pro-poor urban agenda for Africa: Clarifying ecological and development issues for poor and vulnerable populations

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Summary

1. INTRODUCTION
How can international funders best support the development efforts prioritized by the poorest and more vulnerable groups in Africa? Far too little attention has been given to supporting the local organizations on whose performance solutions to most environmental and development problems depend. These organizations include associations and federations of small farmers, homeless people and shack dwellers. They include hundreds of thousands of informal savings groups. They also include NGOs and local government agencies that have learnt how to work in partnership with poorer groups. Perhaps this failure to support pro-poor local organizations is also a key reason why decades of development and environmentalism have failed to halt the destruction or damage of local and global natural systems.

This report is based on papers, presentations and discussions developed by IIED for the Ford Foundation in support of its environment and learning agenda for grantees, and the larger community. It explores ways in which strategies led by the urban poor and their allies might increase liveability of their communities while reducing stress on the planet’s ecosystems.

In this report, “poor” individuals or households are those with incomes and asset bases that are insufficient for them to meet their needs or to cope with stresses (such as rising prices), or shocks (such as a natural disaster or serious illness). Many such groups are not poor in other ways – for instance in terms of culture or social relations. Many are poor because of external influences over which they have no control.

The objectives of this report are to:
1. demonstrate why urban areas in Africa should receive more attention;
2. show how an understanding of urban areas has to include an understanding of rural–urban linkages;
3. discuss how to ensure attention within this to environmental issues (both “Green” and Brown”);
4. explain the corresponding need for external funding agencies to develop specific local funding structures that allow far more influence to those with unmet needs;
5. consider what this implies for addressing HIV/AIDS, including protecting those who are most at risk;
6. examine how a more place-based, locally rooted understanding of needs and possibilities, and a commitment to participation, should influence donor agendas.

2. URBAN CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN AFRICA
The general trend in Africa is towards increasingly urbanized nations – that is, increasing proportions of national populations living and working in urban areas. Although it is still common for discussions of Africa’s problems to concentrate on rural areas, 40 per cent of Africa’s population – 350 million people – now lives in urban areas. Generally, the more successful a national economy, the more urbanized its population. Although Africa now has many large cities, much of the urban population live in thousands of small urban centres.

- Housing and living conditions are very poor for large sections of the population in almost all cities and smaller urban centres. It is common for 30–60 per cent of people in African cities to be living in illegal settlements with very high levels of overcrowding and little or no basic infrastructure.
- Around half of Africa’s total urban population lacks adequate water and sanitation; most urban centres have no sewers at all while for most of those that do have sewers, these only serve 10-20 percent of their population.
- Where poverty-lines make allowance for the high-costs of non-food needs in urban areas including rent for housing and payments for water, use of toilets and transport, it is common for half the urban population in a nation to be below the poverty line.
• Mortality rates for children under five remain high for much of the urban population; the average for most nations’ urban areas is more than one in ten children dying before the age of five and in many low-income urban areas, it exceeds one in four.
• Proximity to services does not imply access; low-income urban dwellers may live close to water mains and hospitals but they often have as little possibility of using these as rural dwellers.

3. BEYOND THE RURAL/URBAN DIVIDE

“Rural” and “urban” populations and economies are often viewed as quite separate, and in competition with each other for investments, services or other forms of support. But, for most of Africa, this is very misleading. Towns and countryside are linked and interdependent, and increasingly so.

• Many urban enterprises rely on demand from rural consumers, while many rural producers rely on urban markets and services.
• Many rural households rely on family members working in urban centres – increasingly young women – and many urban dwellers retain strong social and economic links with rural areas.
• These “multi-local” and diversified, “multi-activity” households arise sometimes from increasing prosperity but also often in response to worsening economic conditions.
• While many young people are not continuing their family-farming tradition, tens of millions of urban residents now depend on agriculture, for either household consumption or for income.

These transformations are often accompanied by growing social polarization, with poor and vulnerable groups often unable to maintain or increase their asset base. A commitment to poverty reduction – and to poverty prevention – requires a differentiated understanding of the impact of diverse rural–urban linkages on different groups, and the identification of policies and initiatives that can support the poor in obtaining more stable and productive livelihoods.

4. INCORPORATING THE BROWN AND THE GREEN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDAS INTO AFRICA’S URBAN EXPANSION

Most key environmental issues fall within what can be termed “Brown” and “Green” agendas. The longstanding Brown agenda focuses on reducing direct threats to human health, particularly by improving water, sanitation and housing, and the more recent Green agenda focuses on reducing more indirect threats, by preventing resource degradation and the loss or deterioration of natural life-support systems. International environmental concerns have become very Green, while the Brown agenda remains the more obvious priority for urban Africa – and particularly for its most deprived communities.

One of the challenges for urban environmental improvement in Africa therefore, is to combine the two agendas – rather than viewing them as alternatives.

• For example, effective water conservation in one part of an urban system can increase water resources available to the urban poor.
• Current and planned investments in urban infrastructure in Cape Town in South Africa could integrate improving conditions for the urban poor while also reducing the city’s overall ecological footprint, including reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.

5. THE WORK OF THE URBAN POOR FEDERATIONS IN AFRICA

One of the most significant initiatives today in urban areas of Africa in addressing poverty and in contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is the work of organizations and federations formed and run by the urban poor.

• These federations are made up of hundreds or thousands of small savings groups, largely run by women, who form the building blocks of local federations that can develop into city-wide and national federations.
• Savings groups provide their members with emergency credit and by learning to manage finance together, they develop the capacity to undertake projects – for instance building homes or upgrading their settlements. Successful projects act as centres of learning for all other savings groups – and also as demonstrations to local governments and other official bodies of what they
can do. All the federations seek partnerships with local governments and where local governments respond positively, these can work at a much larger scale. The federations are also the means by which the poorest people can become active agents rather than “beneficiaries”.

- Federations in Africa have improved housing and extended provision for water and sanitation into the homes of tens of thousands of low-income urban households through upgrading and new house development.
- Federations have many advantages in terms of cost-savings and economic efficiency: they make external support go further by their capacity to lower unit costs, to recover costs for many initiatives and to use external funds to leverage support from local governments.

6. HIV/AIDS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TREATMENT, PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

- Urban centres in Africa have the highest prevalence rates in the world for HIV/AIDS, and in many cities the rates are several times higher than those in surrounding rural areas. Urbanization can contribute to a context of risk and vulnerability to HIV infection but this need not be so, as many African nations have urbanized rapidly, without high rates of infection.
- Three-quarters of those living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are young women. Adolescent girls and young women in urban areas are particularly vulnerable, being the group most likely to have HIV passed to them, and most likely to pass it on to others.
- One of the main reasons for high and rising levels of HIV/AIDS is the failure to protect girls and young women from infection, including that arising from rape and other sexual abuse.

“I am in primary school but at night I have to come out on the streets to get money to feed my younger brother and sister. My parents died last year and the relatives came and took everything. I was left with a room and my brother and sister. I don’t get any help from anyone.”

(Girl, Tanzania)

The best strategy for addressing HIV/AIDS and its underlying causes also helps to address poverty, powerlessness, malnutrition and many other health and development problems. Reducing the vulnerability of young people, especially girls, to HIV/AIDS also means reducing their vulnerability to many other risks. Critical components for any HIV/AIDS programme include safe spaces for girls in and out of school, better employment opportunities, greater scope for child and youth participation, and easily accessible, good-quality, non-stigmatizing health care. All these have great importance for other aspects of development.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Official development assistance has not been successful in channelling significant funding to pro-poor local organizations. Most aid comes from the bilateral aid agencies of governments in high-income nations, either directly or through multilateral banks and agencies, and tends to go to national governments. Creative institutional rethinking is needed, for large centralized “foreign” agencies to support diverse local processes that are best able to benefit the urban poor.

What can push the big international funders and national governments in this direction? Above all, citizen groups and local governments demonstrating alternative models that show their strengths and capacities, including greater capacity to negotiate appropriate external support. The international philanthropic community has enormous potential to support this, not least because what it does will influence and catalyse interest from others – both within African nations and among external funders.

Other key potential roles for the foundations and donors could include:

- contributing support to innovative initiatives undertaken by national and local governments, and official development assistance agencies, to support these alternative models;
- in nations or cities where there is no urban poor federation, to provide flexible support for urban poor groups to experiment and learn and draw in support from federations in other nations;
- networking among other donors/foundations to increase support for these approaches.
To have an urban-focused programme in Africa with a strong component supporting the organizations and federations of the urban poor carries some risks. Any urban programme in Africa will be criticized in some quarters for “not being rural”. This can be avoided, by having an “urban + rural + their interconnections” focus which includes attention to smaller urban centres and peri-urban areas. Working with the organizations and federations formed by the urban poor is also not easy where national and local governments are hostile to them and it needs external funders who are prepared to take this risk to show more conservative funders what is possible.

In conclusion, perhaps the single most important issue for external assistance to Africa’s urban areas is to show how to support the development of stronger local organizations that really deliver for poorer groups, are accountable to and can work in partnerships with them, and have the potential to scale up through a multiplication of locally driven initiatives. This includes support for the organizations formed by the urban poor. Such an approach must demonstrate to the official development assistance agencies what it means to shift from seeing “the poor” as clients or targets to which “development” and “environmental management” must be delivered, to recognizing them as active agents with knowledge, resources and rights to influence what is done and how external assistance is used. This can transform the quality, scale and cost-effectiveness of development assistance. It can also be a central part of building more effective governance systems – but from the bottom up.
1. INTRODUCTION

How a “problem” is conceived influences any “solutions” that may be developed. And whether “solutions” work depends not only on whether the right solutions are identified but also on whether there are organizations capable of supporting their implementation. For Africa, far too little attention has been given to supporting the local organizations on whose performance solutions to most problems depend. These local organizations include local governments, NGOs and grassroots organizations. Even when attention has been given to this, it has often been to try to recreate inappropriate models, because they worked somewhere else.

To be engaged in Africa is to be confronted with many obvious problems among which those of poverty, very large preventable disease burdens and environmental degradation loom large. But for all of us who are engaged, directly or indirectly, in research, interventions or recommendations for Africa, how useful is our conception of “the problems” and how realistic are our recommendations for solutions? And do our recommendations reflect the great diversity within Africa of local circumstances and possibilities? For instance, we know that more robust and sustainable livelihoods and stronger asset bases for poorer groups are both key to poverty reduction – but it is difficult to know what kinds of intervention actually support these, at least on a scale that has a significant impact. We know that improved services for water, sanitation, health care, schools and safety nets are another key – but again, do we know what service providers and what funding structures can actually ensure these, in very different kinds of locations? We know that local organizations are important for those living in large cities, smaller urban centres, peri-urban areas and rural areas for services and access to credit, and for the protection of civil and political rights. We know that in urban areas, local governments can be major contributors to reducing poverty – but they can also be major causes of poverty through evictions, harassment of informal enterprises and refusal to provide services in informal settlements. But do we know how the interventions we recommend actually contribute to more pro-poor, accountable and effective governance and service providers on the ground?

Box 1: Who are “the poor”?

In this paper, “poor” individuals or households are those groups with incomes and asset bases that are insufficient for them to meet their needs and to cope with stresses (e.g. falling wages or rising prices) or shocks (e.g. a disaster, failure of the rains, an income-earner seriously ill or injured). The inadequacy in this terminology should be acknowledged, although it is difficult to find an alternative word that will not be misunderstood. Many such groups are not poor in other ways – for instance in terms of culture or social relations. Many are poor because of external influences over which they have no control.

In addition, on what basis can international funding agencies prioritize? How do we weigh the relative importance of the “Brown” environmental agenda, focused on environmental health issues, versus the “Green” environmental agenda, focused on ecological sustainability and the rights of future generations? What about livelihoods, especially income improvements, versus services such as health care, schools, water and sanitation? In regard to concentrating on the macro issues of economic growth and larger aid flows, or the micro issues – the quality and extent of provision for services and safety nets on the ground in each locality? In regard to AIDS in relation to the other diseases that have very large contributions to disablement and/or premature death?

Then there are the rural versus urban arguments. Rural proponents rightly emphasize that 60 per cent of Africa’s people live in rural areas and that it is here that virtually all the continent’s food and much of its exports are produced, and also where most extreme poverty is concentrated. Urban proponents rightly
emphasize that a large and growing proportion of Africa’s poverty is among its urban population, and also that an increasing proportion of Africa’s population lives in urban areas and that all nations’ future economic success depend on better-managed urban centres and systems. But what neither rural nor urban proponents generally acknowledge are the multiple connections between rural and urban areas – as increasing numbers of households rely on both rural and urban income sources, and as agricultural prosperity can be among the most successful underpinnings of urban development.

Inevitably, each professional working for or in Africa sees through lenses influenced by their training, beliefs and personal experience. Most professionals have strong opinions about what the “solutions” should be – even for locations or nations in which they have never worked. Energy experts see solutions in cleaner fuels, health specialists promote targeted interventions that they consider most cost-effective in terms of deaths and disabilities prevented per dollar spent, water specialists see water shortages as the key constraint, specialists in water and sanitation and transport promote their own projects and sectors, land specialists promote land titling, governance specialists focus on national administrative reform, education specialists claim that schooling plus enhancing human capital is the key intervention, economists seek “pro-poor growth” (although they may not be sure what this actually means), and each rural development specialist has their own idea of what best supports agricultural development. There are a few people on the periphery of this reminding us that urban is also important – although they have not had much of an influence on general debates about Africa’s future.

Within these debates and discussions about Africa’s future, despite claims that “participation” is important, there is generally little space for those identified as having “problems” to influence how these problems are viewed and addressed. Perhaps this professionalization of the identification of problems and solutions has increased with the attention given by international agencies to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For instance, the Millennium Project, whose many volumes seek to show governments and international agencies how to meet the MDGs, has so many recommendations for what should be provided, expanded, distributed, reformed, launched, eliminated, established… but not much on listening, supporting, enabling, empowering and protecting. If external funding agencies are committed to participation, especially of the poorer groups on whose “needs” their operations are justified, what does this imply about how they have to change their institutional structures and their relationships with the organizations formed by “poorer” groups? What mechanisms must be set up to ensure accountability to these groups as well as to funders? In particular, how can generally very centralized international agencies set up to fund relatively few, large, expensive interventions through national “recipient” governments support the local processes that benefit poorer groups in ways that respond to the diverse particulars of each setting?

It is possible to view most of Africa’s problems as linked to the inadequacies of national government structures and systems, the lack of aid and the lack of economic growth. This is what the conventional aid agenda focuses on. But it is also possible to view most of these problems as a failure of government, aid and economic change to support the local organizations that benefit poor groups (including these groups’ own organizations) and to check the local and extra-local organizations that ignore or impoverish them. Most of the local organizations that do benefit and represent poorer groups are invisible to development assistance, even though they have greater importance for meeting local needs than activities funded by development assistance. They include organizations formed by smallholder farmers, small-scale traders and forest enterprises, landless agricultural workers, pastoral herders, fishing communities, indigenous peoples and “slum” and shack dwellers. They include hundreds of thousands of informal savings groups. They also include more formal organizations such as voluntary organizations, NGOs and local government agencies that have learnt how to work in partnership with poorer groups and their organizations. Perhaps this failure to support pro-poor local organizations is also a key reason why decades of development and environmentalism have failed to halt the destruction or damage of the natural systems on which virtually all food, fresh water supplies and a stable climate depend.

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1 See for instance Bigg, Tom and David Satterthwaite (editors) (2005), How to Make Poverty History: the Central Role of Local Organizations in Meeting the MDGs, IIED, London.
This report is based on papers, presentations and discussions that drew in many people. A series of key background papers is listed in Box 2, and a workshop was held in South Africa in February 2005, hosted by the Sustainability Institute and the Community Organizations Resource Centre. This brought together representatives of the Ford Foundation, people from institutions supported by the Ford Foundation, and other researchers and practitioners “to catalyse constituencies for strategies led by urban poor and their allies to increase liveability of their communities while reducing stress on the planet’s ecosystems.”

Box 2: List of background papers

Kayuni, Happy M and Richard I C Tambulasi, “The key issues in regard to urbanization and environmental change in Malawi”
Mabala, Richard, “From prevention to protection for AIDS: addressing vulnerability in urban areas”
Mitlin, Diana, “Inter-dependency and synergy in poverty reduction”
Nkhoma, Sikhulile, “Malawi Homeless People’s Federation”
Oucho, John, “Urban and demographic change in East Africa”
Sabri, Amal, “Poverty and livelihoods in Minya, Egypt”
Sabry, Sarah, “The Social Aid and Assistance Programme of the Government of Egypt – a critical review”
Swilling, Mark, “Sustainability and infrastructure planning in South Africa: a Cape Town case study”
Tacoli, Cecilia, “Beyond the rural–urban divide in Africa”
van Donk, Mirjam, “Positive urban futures in sub-Saharan Africa: HIV/AIDS and the need for ABC (A Broader Conceptualisation)”

OBJECTIVES OF THIS REPORT

1. To demonstrate why urban areas in Africa should receive more attention, and to summarize the main urban trends in terms of increasing urbanization and how this is affected by political and economic change (Chapter 2). The report also outlines living conditions in African cities, and clarifies the nature of urban poverty.

2. To show how an understanding of urban areas has to include rural–urban linkages and an understanding of possible complementarities between rural and urban development (Chapter 3). The report seeks to move the focus of attention from “rural”, or “rural versus urban”, to “rural + urban + their interconnections” (including how many livelihoods cross rural–urban boundaries), and what this implies for an urban policy that considers both environment and development. This includes a discussion of how to have an urban policy that strengthens rural communities and how rural prosperity can be the main underpinning of urban development.

3. To discuss how to ensure attention to environmental issues within this, including both “Green” and “Brown” perspectives (Chapter 4). Africa cannot afford to ignore Green issues but external pressure to prioritize them must not be allowed to dictate environmental priorities. For instance, it is important to maintain attention on what is often termed the “Brown” agenda – concerned with the very large environment-related disease burden that falls most heavily on rural and urban poor groups. This will be illustrated by a case study of Cape Town to show the importance of Green perspectives for poorer groups’ future incomes. One particular concern where “Brown” and “Green” agendas come together is in the use and management of natural resources in peri-urban areas. Here, there is often potential for increased employment and income generation in response to urban-based demand for goods such as high-value agricultural produce and livestock, or services such as tourism and enhanced freshwater resources. However,
there are also threats to low-income groups and rural communities from commercializing land markets, and pollution.

4. **To explain the corresponding need for external funding agencies to develop specific local funding structures that allow far more influence to those with unmet needs.** Funding agencies can best respond to a more place-based, locally rooted understanding of needs and possibilities through allowing more influence to poorer groups in each location to determine what is done and how. This would be a profound change for most international agencies. The individuals, households and communities on whose needs the whole development business is based have very little influence on development priorities. The knowledge, resources and capacity to mobilize and manage that they can bring to development and better environmental management are usually ignored. How can this be changed? Here, there is a particular interest in the current and potential role of organizations and federations formed by “slum” and “shack” dwellers (Chapter 5). This will be illustrated by a summary of what these federations are doing in Africa, and reference to the work of one of the less well-known federations – in Malawi. The kinds of local support structures that such an approach needs will also be discussed. Consideration will be given to how these federations can become (or are becoming) part of a broader alliance able to influence government and international agencies.

5. **To consider what this implies for addressing AIDS and protecting those who are most vulnerable to HIV infection.** This requires a perspective that recognizes differences between rural and urban contexts, and the importance of rural–urban interconnections (Chapter 6). This is not to pretend that AIDS/HIV is necessarily the most serious health problem – for much of Africa, other diseases contribute more to premature death or serious disablement. Nor is it to suggest that AIDS can be discussed independent of other issues, including the influences on HIV infection of under-nutrition and other diseases, and of under-funded, non-existent or inappropriate health care facilities. But the catastrophic impact of AIDS in certain nations, and its rising incidence in most nations, means that it has to be addressed. In addition, many of the best means by which AIDS can be prevented, and those who are infected or orphaned can be supported, are through interventions that also address other development problems.

6. **To examine how a more place-based, locally rooted understanding of needs and possibilities, and a commitment to participation, should influence donor agendas.** If most donor agencies are too centralized to be able to support hundreds or thousands of local initiatives, what funding mechanisms and intermediary institutions are needed to support such an approach? And beyond this, what pro-poor alliances and coalitions can be supported and enhanced within each African nation? By what means can external donors support the organizations formed by poorer groups, and the broader social movements and alliances that they can develop, that really do make development strategy and investment pro-poor and pro-sustainable development? And what do they do in nations where there are no such urban-poor organizations?

Within this, the discussion will encompass official bilateral and multilateral agencies, and also the role of local and national philanthropy within African nations, and of international funding bodies that are outside “official development assistance” (including foundations and key international NGOs). This will include some discussion of agency structure; clearly, a commitment to supporting more place-based, locally rooted initiatives in which urban poor organizations are fully engaged is not easily achieved by international agencies where most decisions are still made in the head offices. This sort of support is also difficult to fit within most international agencies’ official log frames, desire for measurable outputs and fear of “risky” projects. In addition, official bilateral and multilateral agencies’ structures were set up to channel funding through national governments. Are there means by which these highly centralized (although often decentralizing), foreign-expert-driven official agencies can support strategies led by urban poor and their allies to increase the liveability of their communities while reducing stress on ecosystems?
Thus, this report seeks to suggest the kind of urban strategy by which external funders can contribute to improving conditions for the poorer and more vulnerable groups in Africa and to ensure better environmental management within and around urban areas. The report identifies where local government and external support can combine and seek linkages between:

- stronger economic or asset bases for poorer groups within and around urban centres;
- much improved health (and the services that contribute to this); and
- better management of natural resources, including reducing damage to resources and waste sinks in and around urban centres.

This has to be an urban strategy that is pro the rural poor and pro good natural-resource management – where existing and potential positive rural–urban links are enhanced, and negative links reduced.

2. URBAN CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN AFRICA

URBANIZATION

Perhaps the two key points in relation to urban development in Africa are the scale of its urban population (now larger than the urban population in North America) and the scale of urban poverty. Most future population growth is likely to be in urban areas; better-functioning and better-governed urban centres are also key elements of poverty reduction and of stronger regional and national economies.

The general trend in most of Africa is towards increasingly urbanized nations (i.e. increasing proportions of national populations living in urban areas). Although it is still common for discussions of Africa’s problems to concentrate on rural areas (and even to ignore urban areas), two-fifths of Africa’s population now live in urban areas – and the urban population is now around 350 million people. However, in many nations, this trend towards increasingly urbanized populations is slower than most experts had anticipated. Africa is certainly less urbanized today than the UN predicted it would be 15–20 years ago, largely because nations do not urbanize rapidly if their economies are not growing.2 Censuses held in the last few years show that most of the large cities had smaller populations than had been anticipated. There is also great diversity within Africa of levels of urbanization and rates of increase in these levels (see Table 11 in the Annexe).

In general, the more successful a national economy, the more urbanized its population and production structure. Figure 1 shows this, with the nations with the highest per capita incomes generally being more urbanized. But it also highlights the diversity – some nations with more than half their population in urban areas have relatively low per-capita incomes, while others are more wealthy but less urbanized. Perhaps these are the two characteristics that need most emphasis – the diversity within Africa in the level of urbanization (and in the rate at which it is increasing), and the association between economic success and increased levels of urbanization.3

2 The UN Population Division estimates city populations when census data are not available – by projecting past growth trends into the future. Such projections often greatly over-state populations, with city figures revised downwards when new census data become available. Fifteen years ago, the UN Population Division estimated that Nairobi and Dar es Salaam would have 4–5 million people by 2000 – but they proved to have around half this, according to recent censuses. The UN estimated that Addis Ababa had a population of 5 million by the late 1980s but the 1994 census recorded around 2.1 million inhabitants. In 2001, the UN estimated that Tabora in Tanzania had 1.5 million inhabitants in 2000 – but the 2002 census showed that it had 127,887 inhabitants. The UN suggests that Lagos has a population of around 11 million now (twice its population in 1991, when the last census was held) and is likely to grow to 16–20 million by 2015 – but this is unlikely, in part because Lagos is no longer the federal capital and the factors that underpinned its rapid growth from the 1960s to the 1980s are no longer present. There are still some surreal UN projections floating around – for instance that Nairobi will have 19 million people by 2025.

3 However, the association between economic success and increased urbanization levels may be stronger than Figure 1 suggests, for two reasons. First, there are different criteria used by each government to define urban
Figure 1: The association between per capita income and level of urbanization in African nations in 2000/2001

NOTES AND SOURCES: Somalia, DR Congo, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Liberia are not included because there are no data available for them on per capita GNI. This figure needs interpreting with caution, because of the different criteria used by each government to define urban populations and thus to measure urbanization levels. Levels of urbanization are from United Nations (2004), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, United Nations Population Division, ST/ESA/SER.A/237, New York, 323 pages; per capita incomes are from World Bank (2002), Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World; Transforming Institutions, Growth and Quality of Life; World Development Report 2003, World Bank and Oxford University Press, New York, 250 pages.

populations, including those that over- or under-state urbanization levels. For instance, Egypt has nearly a fifth of its population in settlements with between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, with many urban characteristics, yet this group is still classified as ‘rural’. Second, for many nations listed in Figure 1, their urbanization level is estimated, because no recent census data are available.
This diversity in levels of urbanization is not surprising, since it reflects the diversity in economic structures and current or past economic performance. Today, urbanization (i.e. increasing proportions of a national population living in urban areas) is driven mainly by an economic logic: the increasing concentration of income-earning opportunities (and of profit-seeking enterprises) in particular urban areas. In general, the faster an economy grows, the more it urbanizes – although this is driven by rapid urban growth in particular cities and smaller urban centres, not in all urban centres. Nations do not urbanize much if their economy is faltering or declining. There are exceptions, for instance war or civil strife can drive population movements from rural to urban areas; when peace comes however, generally many or most rural dwellers who fled to cities move back home.4

THE INFLUENCES ON URBAN CHANGE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The dimensions of urban change for many nations in Africa are often unknown because there is no recent census (or occasionally censuses that are inaccurate because their figures were heavily manipulated politically). Many of the UN figures for African city populations for 2000 are really guesses, because the last census for which data are available was held during the 1980s or early 1990s.5

In the absence of accurate and up-to-date data on urban populations, many myths have been generated about urbanization in Africa. It is often said to be unprecedented in its speed – which is not true. Nor is there the data to say that sub-Saharan Africa is the “only region” that urbanized rapidly without economic growth. (A paper published by the World Bank in 2000 claimed this was so for the 1990s6 but since this paper had no census data for any nation after 1992, it is difficult to see the basis for this claim.) Nor are most of its largest cities growing at unprecedented speeds. Reviewing the last 100 years, many of the most rapidly growing cities in the world are actually in the USA – Houston, Dallas, Miami, Phoenix, Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Many African cities did grow very rapidly around the time that they achieved political independence but this was largely because colonial governments had restricted the right of their population to live in urban areas, so urban populations had been kept artificially small.

A large part of Africa’s urban population lives in small urban centres. At least 60 per cent of Africa’s urban population (and around a quarter of its total population) lives in urban centres of less than half a million inhabitants7 – and a large proportion lives in urban centres with between a few thousand and 100,000 inhabitants. Many of these are not growing rapidly.8

In discussing urban change, it is important to distinguish between increasing urbanization levels (the increasing proportion of the national population living in urban areas) that is caused by net rural-to-urban migration7 and is driven mainly by economic changes, and urban population growth, which is caused mostly by natural increase. In most large cities, natural increase contributed more to their population growth than net in-migration during the 1980s and 1990s; the population growth rate of many large cities has also been cut significantly by premature deaths linked to AIDS and the incapacity or unwillingness

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5 The tables in the annexe on the urban populations in African nations and the population of their largest cities draw on the most recent UN Population Division data – United Nations (2004), World Urbanization Prospects: the 2003 Revision, Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Affairs, ESA/P/WP.190, New York, 323 pages. The date for the most recent census used is included in the tables, showing how many of the ‘city populations’ for 2000 are estimated as the last census was 10–20 years ago.
9 Reclassification of settlements from ‘rural’ in one census to ‘urban’ in the next census can contribute to increases in recorded urbanization levels too; however, net rural-to-urban migration is the main driver.
of governments and international agencies to provide those infected with appropriate treatment (see Chapter 6).

Around the time of independence, urbanization was driven not so much by economic change as by political changes: the removal of apartheid-like controls on people’s right to live and work in urban areas in some nations, the development of government services and bureaucracy; and trying to build an industrial base. The effects of this on urbanization acted for only a relatively short period, however. Dar es Salaam’s population grew very rapidly when Tanzanian men were allowed to choose to live there and their partners and children were allowed to live there with them – and this produced very rapid population growth for the city for a period, but not for long.10 One of the reasons why the UN projections overstate city populations is because they assumed that the very rapid city-population growth rates that occurred around independence would continue for decades.

In seeking to understand current urban trends and their spatial distribution, it is important to consider:

- pre-colonial urban patterns: many pre-colonial cities may have lost importance but in the many African nations with strong pre-colonial cities and urban systems, most of these cities and systems are still important – perhaps most especially in Nigeria and most nations in North Africa;
- colonial urban patterns, and their underlying political and economic logic: including support for the export of natural resources, restriction of Africans’ right to live or work in urban centres, and large white-settler populations in some nations;
- pre- and post-independence political changes, which boosted urban growth rates, especially in national capital cities and, for larger more populous nations, many key regional capitals;
- structural adjustment and the downsizing of governments during the late 1980s and 1990s, often slowing urban population growth rates as these cut the economic/employment base of national capitals and some other cities.

CITIES

The number of large cities in Africa is growing rapidly: in 1950, there were only two cities with more than a million inhabitants (Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt); by 2000, there were 35. Africa also has an increasing proportion of the world’s large cities. In 1950, it had three of the world’s hundred largest cities; by 2000, it had eight.11

However, again, there is the problem that there is no recent census data available for many cities. Table 9 in the Annexe which shows the change in population for Africa’s largest cities between 1800 and 2000 also gives the year of the last census for which data were available. For Kinshasa, it was 1984; for Luanda, 1970; for many other cities, the late 1980s or early 1990s. Table 9 also lists each city’s compound growth rate for the 1990s – and shows that many cities had relatively slow population growth rates – including many with population growth rates of less than 3 per cent a year and some with less than 2 per cent a year. This is not the “rapid growth” and “rapid in-migration” that is often said to be a characteristic of urban change in Africa. However, it is worth noting the column in this table showing each city’s average annual increment in population during the 1990s; this is a reminder that very large cities with slow population growth rates can still have large annual increments in their population.

Housing and living conditions are very poor for large sections of the population in almost all cities and smaller urban centres. It is common for 30–60 per cent of the population in cities to be in illegal settlements with very high levels of overcrowding and little or no provision for basic infrastructure and services.12 Concentrating people and their homes in cities provides many potential economies of scale

and proximity for providing piped water, sewers, drains, health care, schools, and so on. Conversely, in the absence of good infrastructure and services, concentrating people and their wastes leads to great increases in environmental health risks. This helps to explain the very high rates of infant and child mortality evident in most African nations in their urban populations (Table 12 in the Annexe). Where data are available on under-five mortality rates for low-income areas in cities, these can be more than 250 per 1,000 live births, that is more than one in four children dying before the age of five.

For most city households, the only possibility of getting their own home is usually to get land illegally and build illegally. Much of the land around many cities is held with no formal title. It is often complex to get land for housing, and often with a clash of traditional land-allocation systems, where elders or chiefs allocate land, and monetized systems (although the two often merge as holders to land rights require monetary payments close to market value when they allocate land). Most households cannot get loans to help finance the acquisition of land and building their own home – because they have no collateral (the land they get does not come with an official document saying that they own it) and their income is too low or variable to meet the conditions of any formal loan-giving agency.

There are very large inadequacies in provision for water, sanitation, drainage and garbage collection for much of the urban population.
- Most urban centres in sub-Saharan Africa have no sewers; in those that do, the system typically serves only 10–20 per cent of the population.
- For all of Africa, it is estimated that between 100 and 150 million urban dwellers (c. 35–50 per cent of the total urban population) lack adequate provision for water, and 150–180 million (c. 50–60 per cent) lack adequate provision for sanitation.\(^{13}\)
- Large sections of the urban population have no access to toilets so they defecate in the open or into plastic bags; this is so common that in most cities there is a widely used term for this (for instance “flying toilets”, as these bags are thrown away, or “precious packages”).
- Public toilets with 500–1,000 persons per toilet are also common – and very rarely are these well maintained.
- There are huge deficiencies in the availability of health care for much of the urban population; even where health care is available, it is often unaffordable for many, or it lacks the staff and medicines needed to be effective.

Most city and municipal governments have very little or no investment capacities, as most or all of their revenues go to cover recurrent costs. For many urban centres, this also means little capacity to maintain what little infrastructure there is, so conditions are actually worsening. For instance, it is common to find piped-water systems with declining reliability and declining water quality.

Given these problems, the ingenuity of poorer individuals and households to address them is notable, if opportunities are there, especially if there are possibilities of working together. Within this, of particular significance is the work of the urban poor or homeless peoples’ federations in many sub-Saharan African nations – including South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Kenya (see Chapter 5 for more details).

**URBAN POVERTY**

Levels of urban poverty are high in most nations, and often also understated by official statistics because of inappropriate definitions.\(^{14}\) The scale and depth of urban poverty in any nation is much influenced by how poverty is defined. For instance, during the late 1990s, there were at least four figures

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\(^{13}\) This statistic is for 2000 but the proportion served is unlikely to have increased since then. UN-Habitat (2003), *Water and Sanitation in the World’s Cities: Local Action for Global Goals*, Earthscan Publications, London, 274 pages.

for the proportion of Kenya’s urban population who were poor – ranging from 1 per cent to 49 per cent.15 In Ethiopia, the proportion of the urban population with incomes below the poverty line in 1995/6 could have been 49, 33 or 18 per cent, depending on what figure was used for the average caloric requirement per person.16

Table 1 shows the high levels of urban poverty in some nations – for instance between half and three-quarters of the urban population in Chad, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, and close to half in Kenya and Madagascar. But it is difficult to believe that nations such as Tanzania and Burkina Faso have levels of urban poverty that are much lower, unless this is largely the result of different definitions of poverty. For instance, the poverty line for Burkina Faso seems to have been based only on the cost of food (as if poor urban dwellers need income only for food), whereas in Chad it was based on a poverty line that was twice the food poverty line, in recognition of the fact that avoiding poverty means meeting costs for non-food essentials.

Table 1: Levels of urban poverty and the criteria used to define and measure poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Percentage of the urban population below the poverty line</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Seems to be based only on the cost of food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>17.9 (10.9 for Douala; 13.3 for Yaounde)</td>
<td>Based on a poverty line that was 1.54 times the food poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Based on a poverty line that was twice the food poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>33 (varying from 72 in Dessie to 25 in Dire Dawa; for Addis Ababa it was 30); rose to 37 in 1999/2000</td>
<td>Based on a total poverty line that was 1.78 times the food poverty line, and a 2,200 daily calorie intake for food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>13.4 (Greater Banjul), 32.5 (other urban)</td>
<td>Based on an overall poverty line that was 1.66 times the food poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>19.4 (3.8 in Accra)</td>
<td>1.29 times the extreme poverty line, based only on the cost of food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Based on 2.1 times the food poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>Based on 1.5 times the cost of food, and with allowances made for urban areas’ higher expenditures on food (in part because of less self-production) and non-food items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>26.8 (20.6 in Nouakchott; 37.8 in other cities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>62 (Maputo City 47.8)</td>
<td>1.66 times the food poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>52 (Niamey 42; other urban 58)</td>
<td>1.5 times the extreme poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>44–59, depending on the zone</td>
<td>Based on income level needed for food, but not clear if allowance was made for non-food needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>17.6 for Dar es Salaam; 25.8 for other urban centres</td>
<td>Based on the “basic needs” poverty line that was 1.37 times the food poverty line; urban poverty with regard to lack of basic services is much higher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Between 12 and 30.5, depending on the urban centre</td>
<td>Based on 1.66 times the cost of food for urban centres and 1.43 for small towns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>Primarily on minimum food basket?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE AND NOTES: This is drawn from a table in Satterthwaite, David (2004), *The Under-estimation of Urban Poverty in Low and Middle-Income Nations*, IIED Working Paper 14 on Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas, IIED, London, 69 pages. The details are drawn mostly from official publications – for a full list, see this original document. In many of the nations listed, there are two poverty lines: a food poverty line (often called the extreme poverty line), which is based only on the cost of a minimum food basket to satisfy calorific needs; and an absolute poverty line, where some allowance is made for non-food needs. Where two such poverty lines exist, the figures in this table are based on the absolute poverty line. The figures in this table should not be compared between nations because of the (often very large) differences in the criteria used to set poverty lines.

15 Sahn, David E and David C Stifel (2003), “Progress Toward the Millennium Development Goals in Africa”, *World Development* Vol 31, pages 23–52 suggest that 1.2 per cent of Kenya’s urban population was poor in 1998 – although anyone with any knowledge of urban areas in Kenya would find this absurd. Official statistics suggested three different poverty lines in 1997: hardcore poverty 7.6 per cent; food poverty 38.3 per cent; absolute poverty 49 per cent.

Most of the poverty lines listed in Table 1 are likely to under-estimate the scale of urban poverty, especially where the cost of non-food necessities is high – i.e. in most urban centres, and particularly in most large cities.

- Many low-income households in cities spend 20–33 per cent of their income on renting a single room; the payment of rent for housing is rare in rural areas and, if paid, is likely to take much less of a low-income household’s income.
- Many low-income households in large cities live far from income-sources, so transport costs to and from work and services often take up 5–15 per cent of their income.
- Many low-income urban dwellers have to spend 10–20 per cent of their income on purchasing water from vendors or kiosks, and on using public toilets.\(^\text{17}\)

In addition, access to health care and to schools may be more expensive in urban areas, as charges are higher than in rural areas. Keeping children at school and accessing health care and medicines often takes a significant part of the income of low-income households for which there is no allowance in setting poverty lines. Or such households’ expenditures on these are cut by not being able to get treatment for those who are sick or injured, and withdrawing children from school. However, it is difficult to compare rural and urban areas because lack of access to infrastructure and services is often the result of distance for rural populations, and exclusionary social and political structures for urban populations.

Finally, there are all the aspects of poverty that are not measured by income- or consumption-based poverty lines, including lack of assets (especially those assets that allow individuals or households to cope with stresses and shocks), lack of access to services and lack of citizen entitlements including the possibility of voting and being protected by the rule of law.

The best evidence for this under-estimation of urban poverty is found in rates of infant and child mortality, being some of the most sensitive indicators of living conditions and nutritional levels. These suggest that that most of the populations in most urban centres are not much better off than rural populations – as discussed in the next section below. In addition, the separation between “rural” and “urban” is often not clear-cut – physically, economically or socially – although government structures usually assume that they are. For instance, many poor and non-poor households depend on both rural and urban economic activities for their income and asset base, and many urban enterprises depend on rural demands (see Chapter 3 for more details).

\textbf{WHY THERE SHOULD BE URBAN BIAS IN DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS}

This chapter has sought to show how the scale and depth of deprivation in urban areas have been obscured by:

- aggregated data that compare conditions for all rural populations and for all urban populations, and that do not look at differentials within rural and urban populations;
- inadequate data, e.g. with no adjustment in income-based poverty lines for high-cost cities;
- inappropriate data, where key aspects of deprivation are not considered.

However, it may be that prevailing methods for measuring poverty also under-estimate its scale and depth in rural areas.

One key issue for any international agency is whether there is “urban bias” in the sense that urban populations are privileged over rural populations – for instance with better public services. Many international agencies avoid investing in urban areas because they think that their populations benefit from “urban bias”. But this bias is not much in evidence in most urban areas in Africa – as suggested by the figures given above for housing conditions and lack of services. A large proportion of Africa’s

\(^{17}\) Satterthwaite 2004, op. cit., discusses this in more detail, including listing the studies that have shown these high costs.
population suffering from very high under-five and maternal mortality rates and from malnutrition, TB and other major diseases lives in urban areas. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are generally higher in urban areas – and often much higher (see Chapter 6).

The discussion of urban bias generally fails to consider whether it is the whole urban population that benefits – or just specific groups in specific urban centres. There may be or have been urban bias in development policies but without these bringing benefits for most of the low-income urban population. The fact that urban centres concentrate public service provision is also not necessarily evidence of urban bias. Low-income urban dwellers may live 50 metres from a sewer and 100 metres from a hospital and secondary school but with as little possibility of using them as a rural dweller who lives 20 kilometres from the nearest sewer, hospital or secondary school. In addition, urban-based secondary schools, hospitals and government services are often held up as examples of “urban bias” yet they often serve both rural and urban populations.

Since most middle- and upper-income groups live in urban areas, one would expect averages to show an “urban advantage” i.e. that there is less poverty in urban areas and better housing conditions and service provision. But in most nations in sub-Saharan Africa, the actual “urban advantage” seems surprisingly small – and it may be that conditions for large sections of the urban population are as bad as those for most of the rural population.

There is evidence of some “urban bias” in infant and child or under-five mortality rates, since these are generally lower in urban areas than in rural areas. But this does not mean that such rates are lower for poorer households in urban areas. Take Kenya and consider three indicators: infant mortality rates, under-five mortality rates and the prevalence of diarrhoea with blood among young children (which indicates serious systemic infection). Table 2 shows that problems are more serious in rural areas than in urban areas – and that conditions in the capital, Nairobi are better than in other urban areas in Kenya. Almost twice as many infants or children under five die per thousand live births in rural areas as in Nairobi. The higher prevalence of diarrhoea with blood among young children in Nairobi compared to rural areas is a worry but it does not remove the conviction that conditions are much better in Nairobi.

Table 2: Infant and under-five mortality rates and diarrhoea prevalence in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Infant mortality (per thousand)</th>
<th>Under-five mortality (per thousand)</th>
<th>Prevalence of diarrhoea with blood in children under 3 in the 2 weeks prior to interview (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (rural and urban)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal settlements in Nairobi</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibera</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embakasi</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This picture changes, however, when the same indicators are added for conditions in Nairobi’s informal settlements – where half the city’s population lives. Infant and under-five mortality rates are much higher in Nairobi’s informal settlements than the average for rural areas. The prevalence of diarrhoea with blood is nearly four times higher. In Kibera, the largest informal settlement in Nairobi (with over half a million inhabitants), all three indicators are particularly high. In Embakasi, they are even higher, with one child in four dying before the age of five.
Nairobi is not only the capital city but also a city that is very healthy for most middle- and upper-income groups because they have good provision for water, sanitation and health care. The economies of scale and proximity mean that improving conditions in Nairobi’s low-income settlements is relatively cheap per person served. The weak, ineffective, unrepresentative, unaccountable city government can be suggested as the main immediate cause of high infant and child mortality rates in Nairobi. Table 2 is not suggesting that urban poverty is worse than rural poverty, or that, in Kenya, there are more poor urban than rural dwellers. But it is showing that in Nairobi alone there are probably more than a million urban dwellers living in very poor conditions. This casts doubt on the statistics that suggest very low levels of poverty in urban areas in Kenya.

Table 3 compares infant and child mortality rates for urban and rural populations in a range of African nations. There are two surprises in this table. The first is that infant and child mortality rates are so high in urban areas in nations such as Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda and Zambia. Remember that these are urban averages and that infant and child mortality rates for richer urban groups are likely to be under 20 per thousand live births. So if more disaggregated data were available, it would probably show one child in four dying before the age of five in most low-income settlements in urban areas.

The second surprise is that in many nations there is not much difference between rural and urban areas in terms of infant and child mortality rates. If urban areas have economies of scale in health care and environmental health services, concentrate richer groups and are meant to benefit from urban bias in government expenditures and services, why is the urban advantage so small? It may be that the poorest half of the urban population in some nations has higher infant or child mortality rates that the poorest half of the rural population.

Table 3: Infant and child mortality rates in rural and urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (and year)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (age under 1 year)</th>
<th>Child mortality rate (age 1–4 years)</th>
<th>Urban/rural comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin (1996)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African R. (1994/5)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad (1997)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (1994)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea (1995)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (2000)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon (2000)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (1999)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (1998)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar (1997)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (2000)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (1996)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (1997)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (1992)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leaving aside the rural–urban comparison, what is also striking about the figures in Table 3 is how high infant and child mortality rates are in both rural and urban areas in many nations. Perhaps it is more shocking for them to be so high in urban areas because health care facilities are concentrated in urban areas and it is easier to reach urban populations with good-quality provision for water and sanitation and health care that includes the full range of immunizations, pre- and post-natal care, access to oral rehydration salts and targeted nutritional supplements.

Perhaps the final point here is that “urban contexts” are different from “rural contexts”. While recognizing the importance of rural–urban links (as discussed in Chapter 3), it is also important to recognize the differences in context between most rural and most urban areas – and these contextual differences are important for effective poverty reduction. Chapters 4–6 focus on key aspects of this urban context, as they discuss the most appropriate policies for urban areas relating to environmental improvement, working with urban civil society and addressing HIV/AIDS.

3. BEYOND THE RURAL/URBAN DIVIDE20

INTRODUCTION

“Rural” and “urban” populations and economies are often considered to be in competition with each other for investments, services or other forms of support. But, for most of Africa, this is very misleading. Much of the urban economy depends on providing goods or services to rural producers or consumers – and a prosperous rural economy and a prosperous local rural population can provide a powerful stimulus to local urban development. Urban development in turn often means a more diverse and efficient set of enterprises providing goods and services to rural and urban producers and consumers. More prosperous urban centres should also support more competent local governments that in turn ensure better services for both rural and urban populations – for instance in education, health care, the rule of law, communications and engagement in government. In addition, many (poor and non-poor) households have rural and urban components to their lives and livelihoods. For many rural households, urban prosperity can mean more part-time, seasonal or temporary income-earning opportunities.

But here, international agencies are faced with a difficulty in knowing how to act. Rural–urban linkages in terms of flows of people and goods, money and information between rural and urban areas are central to both rural and urban change. So too are the social relations through which many of these links are organized. But it is difficult to generalize about rural–urban linkages, since they vary so much from place to place, being much influenced by local geographical, economic and ecological conditions and social structures.


20 This chapter is drawn from a background paper prepared by Cecilia Tacoli (IIED).
WHAT WE KNOW

Within the economic sphere, many urban enterprises rely on demand from rural consumers, while many rural (agricultural, forest and fish) producers rely on urban markets and urban goods and service providers. In addition, a large number of urban-based and rural-based individuals and households rely on some combination of agricultural and non-agricultural income sources for their livelihoods. This may involve straddling the rural–urban divide in terms of location, by moving between town and countryside for varying periods of time, or sectorally, by engaging in agriculture in urban centres or in non-farm activities in rural settlements.

Economic crisis and reform have affected both rural and urban populations over the last three decades. Family-farm production (which still provides most of Africa’s agricultural produce and the livelihoods for most of its population) has often suffered from increases in the prices of agricultural inputs and more difficult access to credit, as well as growing competition in domestic and international markets. The urban labour market has changed, following large-scale retrenchments of public-sector workers in many nations. Fewer job opportunities, increases in food prices and service charges, and cuts in public expenditure – especially health, education and infrastructure – have contributed to the increase of urban poverty. In general, people have responded by changing their livelihood strategies along two main lines: increased mobility accompanied by strong social and economic links with home areas in what can be described as “multi-local households” (often reinforced by HIV/AIDS, with rural-based relatives acting as care providers for orphans and those who are ill); and high levels of multi-activity and income diversification, especially among younger people.

But the intensification of rural–urban linkages is not only the consequence of economic hardship. In many places, it is also part of dynamic processes of economic, social and cultural change. Such processes affect different groups in different ways, creating winners but also often increasing social polarization and marginalization, with poor and vulnerable groups often unable to strengthen or even maintain their asset base. A commitment to poverty reduction – and to poverty prevention – requires a differentiated understanding of the impact of rural–urban linkages on different groups, and the identification of policies and initiatives that can support the poor in obtaining more stable and productive livelihoods.

RURAL–URBAN LINKAGES AND FARMING

For much of Africa’s rural population, farming is still the primary activity but its significance in rural households’ incomes is declining. For example, in much of West Africa, farming accounts for just 30–40 per cent of household revenue, both in cash and in kind. At the same time, an important stimulus to higher agricultural productivity in many nations has been the growth of demand for food by urban consumers – which includes demands for diverse and often higher-return goods – from basic grains to maize, cowpeas, sesame, fresh vegetables, fruit and flowers. Urban centres are the largest and fastest-growing market for food producers, and in West Africa, over 80 per cent of the total agricultural production is consumed within the region. Domestic or regional urban markets are generally more stable than international markets for agricultural commodities with regard to both demand and prices.

Much of the current debate on the future of the agricultural sector in Africa focuses on the choice between agri-business and family farming. The conventional view is that large commercial farms are better suited to increasing agricultural productivity, despite their very poor performance in the region in recent decades and the inefficiencies in their use of water and other inputs. This perception also overlooks the fact that large-scale commercial farming is itself highly differentiated, with some running profitable businesses while others are primarily interested in profiting from state incentives. The latter suffer serious difficulties when such support is withdrawn and access to inputs and foreign exchange becomes harder. Family farms have usually shown greater flexibility in responding to changing external circumstances, provided that they have sufficient access to assets such as labour, land and credit.

21 Club du Sahel (2000), Urbanization, rural–urban linkages and policy implications for rural and agricultural development: case study from West Africa, SAH/DLR.
Access to markets is also crucial. With the exception of export crops, trade in agricultural produce is usually not controlled by large, well-capitalized traders. Especially for highly perishable horticultural produce directed to urban markets, the marketing system in most African nations is dominated by small-scale traders (Box 3). These provide a vital link to markets for small and diverse production flows, which cannot be handled efficiently by large-scale trading organizations. Especially for small-scale farmers, they often provide essential access to credit. But the losses due to limited processing and conservation facilities (such as cold storage) are a constant risk for these informal credit systems, as they affect traders’ limited financial liquidity and hence their capacity to offer credit to producers.

Box 3: The role of traders in central Mali

In central Mali, wholesale traders are an important source of credit for horticultural producers. But despite growing demand from the urban centres, production and marketing are prone to a number of risks. The most important of these, linked to the highly perishable nature of the produce, is loss due to the lack of storage and conservation facilities. Wholesale traders also often sell to retailers on credit, and they tend to absorb losses at both the transport and retail levels. This in turn affects their financial liquidity and their ability to offer credit to producers, for which they are often the only source. This vicious circle has negatively affected horticultural production around the capital city, Bamako, despite growing urban demand and increasing producer prices.


Small-scale farmers’ access to markets obviously depends on physical infrastructure: even proximity to an urban centre cannot guarantee access to markets when the road is washed away by rain, or its condition is so bad that no trader will venture through it. While road networks and affordable transport are essential, storage and processing facilities are important, especially for the high-value but often highly perishable horticultural produce that is more likely to increase the incomes of small-scale farmers. Farmers also need information on consumer demand and market-price fluctuations, and it is often small-scale traders who provide this – but their role in this and in marketing and supporting production is often overlooked.

**PERI-URBAN FARMING AND ACCESS TO LAND**

Farming in peri-urban areas benefits from proximity to urban consumers and markets. With lower transport and storage costs, and less time spent getting produce to market, farmers can diversify to crops which generate a much higher income per unit area, such as fruit, vegetables and flowers. But at the same time, rising land values, in part driven by competition for land and fresh water from non-agricultural uses, can negatively affect small-scale farmers, especially those with no clear title to the land they farm, or who farm as tenants.

Throughout most of Africa, peri-urban agricultural land is becoming scarcer and more valuable, as a result of expanding urban centres and populations. In addition, most sub-Saharan African farmers do not have formal title to the land they farm. Formal land-titling systems are also expensive to implement and they usually favour those with political power – and often act to dispossess farmers who have cultivated that land for decades and whose family may well have first cleared the land.22 Within and around urban centres, the state often acts as if it has absolute authority over the allocation of land for urban development, physical infrastructure, plantations and large-scale irrigation schemes, although this often conflicts with those who occupy and use the land and those who have customary rights to land allocation.

Generally, customary rights (with land management and allocation by traditional authorities such as village chiefs and village councils) are more likely to apply to rural areas, whereas statutory rights (formalized land titling and registration) are more likely to dominate in urban centres. Formal and

informal market transactions are increasingly important under both tenure systems, especially in peri-urban areas where the two systems often overlap.

Under customary tenure, non-landowners can access land through a variety of secondary rights arrangements, ranging from sharecropping to tenancy and the borrowing of land. These arrangements can be extremely important for both migrants and indigenous farmers with scarce labour. By allocating temporary rights to migrants to cultivate plots, small-scale farmers can effectively hire labour without incurring cash costs. For this system to work well for all parties, it usually requires a clear structure with clear rules for all involved. Instances of this are usually more common in peri-urban areas specializing in high-value crops and with easy access to markets, where even small plots can be profitable.

Urban expansion also affects farmers through the demand for land for non-agricultural uses – for residential areas and for commerce, industry, urban infrastructure, building materials and waste disposal. Urban wastewater and solid wastes may benefit farmers nearby as a source of organic matter; farmers are often prepared to pay for solid wastes. Cultivation on degraded soils has often been revived due to this practice, but plans in many cities to promote large-scale composting would make it too expensive for local farmers and would probably force out small enterprises and associations that play a complementary and innovative role in waste management. In addition, farmers lacking secure land tenure in places where informal land markets emerge, linked to urban expansion, have little incentive to ensure the safe disposal of dangerous elements in solid waste.23

Small-scale peri-urban farmers also face competition for land from wealthier urban residents. These wealthier households are generally more interested in land for residential purposes, but they may also be attracted to the potential profits from farming, or short-term opportunistic farming, as they buy land in advance, waiting for the built-up area to expand and land prices to rise.

Where urban residents acquire peri-urban agricultural land for farming, there are usually both positive and negative impacts. They may introduce modern farming equipment, which the villagers cannot afford, and which is no longer provided by agricultural extension services. Demand for waged farm labour by urban farmers with no time or family labour often increases employment opportunities for local residents. But this may also increase the costs of waged labour for smaller farmers. With limited access to credit and labour, small farmers may move out of family farming to become waged labourers or to migrate.24

Land markets in peri-urban areas can open up access to groups traditionally excluded or, at best, marginalized from access to land under customary tenure, such as younger generations and women. However, this primarily benefits wealthier individuals and households. The land that is purchased is generally the best in terms of location and productivity, so it is increasingly the poorer-quality and worst-located land that is available under customary tenure. Moreover, decisions on sales of land under customary tenure are made by traditional authorities, often with little if any consultation with current users. This increases insecurity of tenure for small-scale farmers, which in turn negatively affects further investments and growth.

**Income diversification**

In most rural locations, there has been an increase among rural households in the time devoted to, and the income share derived from, non-farm activities. The proportion of rural households’ incomes derived from non-farm sources, including migrant remittances, is between 30 and 50 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, reaching as much as 80–90 per cent in some regions, such as Southern Africa.25

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Rural non-farm activities include all activities outside agriculture, such as services and manufacturing, including those related to transforming and processing agricultural produce – but do not include wage or exchange labour on other farms (sometimes classed as “off-farm”\(^\text{26}\)). It also includes all forms of work – self-employment, wage employment, full-time, part-time, formal, informal, seasonal and occasional. These may take place in a variety of locations: the home; rural-based workplaces; urban-based workplaces to which rural workers commute; and multiple locations, as with itinerant activities such as trading.

Such diversification is not new. Nor is it a purely rural phenomenon, and the reliance of tens of millions of urban residents on agriculture, either for household consumption or as an income-generating opportunity, is well documented.\(^\text{27}\) However, its importance for employment and for its contribution to household income is under-estimated. National employment data usually record only a person’s primary activity, and this does not reveal how individuals engage in multiple activities, or how the mix of these activities may vary over time – for instance seasonally. A survey on employment patterns in southern Tanzania showed that over two-thirds of respondents living in villages and in the intermediate town of Lindi were engaged in more than one income-generating activity, including both farming and non-farm activities.\(^\text{28}\)

An increase in non-farm rural employment is often triggered by prosperity. Diversification can increase the incomes and asset bases of households with productive land and access to urban networks, who often re-invest profits from urban-based activities in agricultural production, and vice versa. Non-farm employment may be linked to agricultural growth and increased demand for manufactured goods and services by a wealthier rural population. This, in turn, can be a major stimulus to the growth of local towns. National changes such as domestic trade liberalization may provide opportunities – as in Tanzania since the mid-1980s, where it spurred the growth of small-scale trade. It may be linked to demand for services by wealthier urban-based residents and enterprises (for example, domestic services and work in restaurants and bars, especially for women).

But household diversification may also be triggered by hardship – for instance, small farmers turning to other work as their farming incomes fall, or perhaps because of lack or loss of land, labour or capital. Here, diversification seeks to reduce risk, overcome seasonal income fluctuations, and respond to external and internal shocks and stresses. Land ownership can become increasingly unequal, as large farmers and wealthier urban households purchase land rights from smallholders. The poorest households become less able to spread risk as they lose farming as part of their portfolio of activities. The poorest groups (often women) face discrimination in getting access to land, and may have more reliance on non-farm income sources. However, households that rely only on farming are also often at risk, especially in rainfed-agriculture areas where they are dependent on the weather.

As wealthier households diversify, multi-activity takes place within the household, where individuals specialize in specific sectors of activity but resources are used to facilitate investments across sectors. By contrast, poor and vulnerable individuals may lack the skills and education to specialize in any activity, and often engage in a multitude of low-paid income-generating occupations to make ends meet.

Within households, gender and generational differences in access to and control over assets often influence the higher levels of diversification among young people and women. For example, family farming is usually under the control of older men. Young people, especially young women who often do

\(^{26}\) Ibid.


not even inherit the land, may prefer the greater independence associated with individual activities (Box 4). In addition, farming is an increasingly unattractive option for both young men and women in much of Africa, especially where returns are low.

**Box 4: Income diversification, gender and generation**

In Tanzania, domestic trade liberalization has opened up opportunities in small-scale trade. Although the returns are often low, particularly in the poorest regions, these opportunities have been taken up by young women, who are otherwise expected to work as unpaid labour on their family's farm, which they would not expect to inherit. Young men are also moving out of farming and often to petty trade. This is due not only to the decline in farming incomes, but also to the frustration at the almost absolute control still held by older men over land and farming decisions. At the same time, widespread access to information, changing financial expectations and a view of farming as “un-modern” affect patterns of income diversification. In southeast Nigeria, young men from rural settlements are expected to find work, at least for a period of time, in the numerous small urban centres in the region, to avoid being derided for being lazy.


Services and trade typically provide most non-farm incomes. Manufacturing usually accounts for around 20–25 per cent and this is likely to decline due to competition from cheaper imports. In southeast Nigeria, traditional cloth weaving has long been an additional source of income for local women, and one that had managed to retain a market niche in the face of competition from imported goods. However, there are major constraints on production from a lack of backward linkages with agriculture (for example, local production of cotton yarn) and insufficient local infrastructure (such as reliable electricity supply in the rural settlements).

Services and trade tend to concentrate in small and intermediate urban centres, and have benefited from liberalization and the demise of central marketing boards for agricultural commodities, which controlled trade as well as most transport services between rural settlements and urban centres. Manufacturing in small and medium-size enterprises has also increased in response to the contraction of large formal-sector enterprises, although many rural non-farm enterprises employ fewer than five workers and face constraints on their growth such as shortage of capital, limited demand, poor marketing ability, inadequate space, and lack of information, technology, skills and management capability. Small and intermediate urban centres may stimulate the growth of these enterprises by offering larger markets and better-quality infrastructure, such as piped water, electricity, post and telephone services.

**Migration**

Rural-to-urban migration flows are the immediate cause of urbanization but this is only one aspect of migration, which includes rural-to-rural, urban-to-urban and urban-to-rural flows. Rural-to-urban migration is often assumed to be the dominant migration flow but much, if not more, movement is between rural areas, often short term and linked to the agricultural calendar. Because rural–rural movements do not generally require as many financial and social resources and new skills as rural–urban

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32 Urbanization understood as an increasing proportion of the national population living in urban centres is almost entirely the result of net rural-to-urban migration; this should not be confused with the growth in the urban population to which natural increase contributes (and in most nations, natural increase now contributes more to urban population growth than does net rural-to-urban migration).
migration, it is often undertaken by the poorest groups. It also tends to go unrecorded because of its circular nature. In most African nations, there are also strong urban–rural migration flows, often linked to retirement but also to the retrenchment of public-sector workers in many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and to seasonal movements by low-income urban residents for work as wage labourers on commercial farms. Movement from one urban centre to another (i.e. urban–urban migration) is also more frequent than usually thought. Finally, while there is far more internal migration (within national boundaries) than international migration, international migration has particular importance for remittances. In some parts of the continent such as the Sahel, cross-border regional movement and overseas migration is probably more important than internal migration.

The causes of migration are often considered in terms of economic “push” factors (economic hardship in areas of origin) and “pull” factors (economic opportunities in destination areas). But cultural and social factors also influence not only the direction but also the nature of movements. Access to resources in home areas is likely to be influenced not only by wealth but by gender and generation. Labour markets at destination are also usually segmented along lines of gender, age and ethnicity, the latter often reflecting migrant networks’ control over specific sections of these markets. Moreover, not all migrants leave because they have no access to resources in home areas, and not all migrants end up in low-paid, unskilled jobs in urban centres, despite the suggestion of prevailing stereotypes.

One important rural–urban link is remittance flows from household members working in urban areas. These are an essential part of the incomes of many rural households in Africa. This has long been the case in Southern Africa, but is increasingly important in most other regions. In the Sahel, generally one in every two households has at least one migrant member, and remittances are often the most important source of family cash to cover basic expenditure (food, health and education), the purchase of consumer goods such as radios and bicycles (which in turn can be used for income-generation), and investment in inputs and livestock. But as remittances’ role in rural livelihoods increases, their amounts have generally declined due to higher costs of living and difficulties finding well-paying jobs for those remitting the funds.

Increasing dependence on remittances has had wide-ranging consequences. For example, the independent migration of young women (i.e. movements not motivated by following a husband or father) is traditionally frowned upon in many places but it has become far more acceptable, provided that these young women send remittances home. Hence, while young men remain the bulk of migrants in many African regions, young women moving independently are the fastest-growing group of migrants. However, for African women migration is often linked to their subordinated status, especially in access to assets, and this contributes to their vulnerability (Box 5).

**Box 5: Women’s independent migration and vulnerability**

The number of women moving independently (not following male relatives), especially young unmarried women, is growing in Africa. In part, this is because of demand in “new” sectors, such as the growing service industry, which includes waitressing in local bars and restaurants (often major employers in small and intermediate urban centres, especially market towns) and work in international tourist resorts. This category also includes the “entertainment” industry, often a euphemism for prostitution. Whatever the job, there is often a strong stigma attached to female employment in places which are mostly considered disreputable. As a result, many young female migrants tend to move to places further away from their home areas and avoid the local urban centres, so that they will not risk ruining their own and their family’s reputations. But this also often means that support networks are less readily available for these young women.

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Women who migrate independently are under more pressure than their male counterparts to feel responsible for their families at home. They are more likely to send larger proportions of their incomes as remittances. Less disposable income is likely to increase their vulnerability, as cheap accommodation is often in insecure locations and of very poor quality, especially in urban areas, and health services are often unaffordable.

Gender also affects decisions to migrate from rural to urban areas for women who, through widowhood or separation, head their own households. For rural women who find themselves without a male partner, economic survival can be problematic since they usually have only limited access to land, and work in rural non-farm activities is often confined to the most marginal and low-paid sectors. In Biharamulo, a small urban centre with a population of 20,000 in northwestern Tanzania, almost 30 per cent of urban households are headed by women, compared with only 7 per cent in the surrounding villages.

The significance of remittances in much of Africa reinforces the strong links between migrants and non-migrant relatives. But in many parts of Africa, links with home areas are considered part of one’s identity, and sociocultural factors are as important as economic considerations. While in many cases it would be socially unacceptable for migrants not to send remittances and gifts, these exchanges allow migrants to maintain a foothold in their home area and ensure that they will be welcome upon their return, whenever that might be. For successful migrants, this is often planned to coincide with retirement, and investing in home areas is part of an accumulation strategy to increase their asset base. For low-income migrants to cities, investing in home areas is part of a survival strategy and helps provide a safety net against the economic and social insecurity of urban life. For instance, in Old Naledi, a low-income neighbourhood in Botswana’s capital, Gaborone, despite their financial difficulties, one-third of all resident households own cattle that are kept in their home villages and looked after by relatives, and one half of households retain land in their home area. In Durban (South Africa), many low-income migrant households maintain strong ties with home areas as a safety net in times of economic hardship or against violence and crime.

These strong links, which are often maintained over considerable periods of time, have profound implications for urban policies, including housing policies, as well as for rural development policies. They should not be interpreted as a lack of commitment by migrants to their urban homes; rather, policies and initiatives should recognize and support the rational strategy of spreading risk and diversifying assets.

CONCLUSIONS

The nature and scope of rural–urban linkages in Africa (as elsewhere) are constantly changing and evolving as they reflect economic, social and cultural changes. They are often influenced by environmental change and pandemics in both the rural and the urban contexts; in many places, they are also influenced by conflict or insecurity. There is a growing recognition of their significance at several levels – for household livelihoods, local economic development, national economic growth, and poverty-reduction strategies.

For most of the continent, agriculture remains central to most people’s livelihoods and to national economies. Although non-agricultural activities are increasingly important within national economies and within many households’ livelihoods, farming is likely to remain the mainstay for the foreseeable future. An important stimulus to agricultural diversification and intensification is the (usually growing)

demand from urban residents. Rural and urban distinctions have become increasingly blurred, with households and individuals straddling the rural–urban divide in terms of occupations and residential choices, and with local and national economies benefiting from exchanges of goods and services between urban centres and rural settlements.

But these transformations are often accompanied by growing social polarization, with poor and vulnerable groups often unable to maintain or increase their asset base. A commitment to poverty reduction – and to poverty prevention – requires policies that protect and enhance poorer groups’ livelihoods and asset bases. Land is generally the most important asset: individuals and households may engage in various income-generating activities often in both rural and urban locations – but land is what gives social identity and security. Linked to land is access to other natural resources such as water, and to infrastructure. Along with health, education is also a critical asset, as it supports diversification into non-farm activities through the acquisition of new skills. Finally, social networks are especially strong in the continent, and in many cases underpin migrants’ links with their home areas as well as the relations between traders and producers.

People need to be able to combine activities and resources in both rural and urban areas, not only in one location. Indeed, it is the multi-local and multi-activity nature of their livelihoods that increases options and decreases risk. From this point of view, assets are the building blocks of livelihood strategies. Special attention needs to be given to women and to younger generations (both women and men). In many respects, and especially with regard to income diversification and migration, these are the groups where change is happening faster, but also where vulnerability can be both a cause and a consequence of it.

4. INCORPORATING THE BROWN AND GREEN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDAS INTO AFRICA’S URBAN EXPANSION

INTRODUCTION

Most key environmental issues fall within what can be termed “Brown” and “Green” agendas:

- the longstanding “Brown agenda” focuses on reducing direct threats to human health and well-being by improving the quality of people’s living environments (e.g. better sanitation and housing, and less industrial pollution); and

- a more recent “Green agenda” focuses on reducing more indirect threats to human well-being by preventing resource degradation and the loss or deterioration of natural life-support systems (in a “Deep Green” variant, natural systems are protected for their own sake).

International environmental concerns have become very Green, while the Brown agenda remains the more obvious priority for urban Africa – and particularly for its most deprived communities. The fact that 30–50 per cent of the population in most urban areas in Africa lives in homes of very poor quality, lacking good provision for water and sanitation, was noted in Chapter 2. Thus, one of the challenges for urban environmental improvement in Africa is to combine the two agendas. Particularly in low-income urban communities, this places local engagement and participation at the centre of urban environmental improvement – as drivers of the Brown agenda and partners in the Green agenda.

As with any agendas for change, both the Green and the Brown agendas involve losers and winners, and who wins and who loses depends as much on how the agendas are pursued as on their stated priorities. For instance, a city government may pursue a Green agenda that primarily benefits middle- and upper-income groups (and may even impoverish large sections of the lower-income population as they are forced from their homes and settlements as these are in designated “Green” areas or parks or reserves).

39 This is based on a background paper prepared by Gordon McGranahan (IIED) – and also draws heavily on Swilling, Mark (2005), “Sustainability and infrastructure planning in South Africa: a Cape Town case study”, background paper prepared for the Ford Foundation, to be published in Environment and Urbanization, Vol 18, No 1, April 2006.
Alternatively, it may pursue a Green agenda that actively supports efforts to reduce environmental risks for low-income groups – for instance from extreme weather events – and to reduce poorer groups’ vulnerability to rising prices of natural resources.

In Africa as elsewhere, governments that neglect the environmental health burdens that fall on the low-income groups (i.e. the Brown agenda) tend to pursue Green agendas that are less favourable to these same low-income groups. Different groups have different priorities, and the agendas themselves are far from neutral. To a large degree, however, the conflicts between the Brown and Green agendas are socially constructed. Firstly, the middle-class/Northern character of the Green agenda reflects who dominates the agenda internationally, and is not inherent to an agenda grounded in a concern for natural life-support systems and future generations. Secondly, the superficially sharp physical contradictions that often arise between the two agendas – between for example improving access to water (Brown agenda) and decreasing water withdrawals (Green agenda) – reflect the use of extremely blunt policy instruments, and a failure to pursue either agenda vigorously.

Table 4 provides a crude characterization of the two agendas. For the Brown agenda, the aspects emphasized in relation to water, air, solid waste, land and human wastes are all familiar to those working to improve conditions in low-income settlements. The aspects emphasized in the Green Agenda are of growing importance, are more clearly the responsibility of environmental agencies, and often affect a broader “public”. In most low-income settlements, however, even from the perspective of public benefits, the Brown agenda remains the priority. Box 6 illustrates the need to take both the Brown and the Green agendas seriously, with reference to Malawi, one of the poorest nations in Africa.

| Table 4: Stereotyping the Brown and the Green agendas for urban environmental improvement |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Characteristic features of problems high on the agenda: | The “Brown” environmental health agenda | The “Green” environmental protection agenda |
| First-order impact | Human health | Ecosystem health |
| Timing | Immediate | Delayed |
| Scale | Local | Regional and global |
| Worst affected | Lower-income groups | Future generations |
| Characteristic attitude to: | Manipulate to serve human needs | Protect and work with |
| People | Work with | Educate |
| Environmental services | Provide more | Use less |
| Aspects emphasized in relation to: | Inadequate access and poor quality | Overuse; need to protect water sources |
| Water | High human exposure to hazardous pollutants in home and workplace | Acid precipitation and greenhouse gas emissions |
| Air | Inadequate provision for collection and removal | Excessive generation and lack of recycling |
| Solid waste | Inadequate land supplies for low-income groups’ housing | Loss of natural habitats and agricultural land to urban development |
| Land | Inadequate provision for safely removing faecal material (and waste water) from living environment | Loss of nutrients in sewage and damage to water bodies from its release of sewage into waterways |
While the two agendas need not be in conflict, environmentalists – and in particular environmentalists who picked up their ideas in high-income countries – have to be careful not to adopt or promote the same strategies in low-income settings as they do in affluent settings. To take just one example, the main beneficiaries of the Brown agenda ought to be the urban poor, who under the right conditions are fully capable of articulating and pursuing their own interests. The main beneficiaries of the Green agenda, on the other hand, ought to be future generations and non-human species, and representing their interests is a different story. Experience representing the interests of future generations and endangered ecosystems and species does not provide a sound foundation for supporting the interests of the urban poor. Even in affluent countries, the groups most at risk from environmental hazards have had to work hard to represent their interests in environmental policy debates (e.g. via the environmental justice movement). In countries where the environmental burdens of disease are far greater, and the levels of resource consumption and waste generation far lower, it is all the more important for those most affected to play a leading role.

Box 6: Urbanization and environmental change in Malawi

Urban environmental problems in Malawi are certainly much more concentrated on “Brown”-agenda than on “Green”-agenda issues – yet there is a need here too to incorporate certain key Green-agenda issues into urban planning and management. Malawi’s urban population has grown more than tenfold from 1966 to the present, from 260,000 to around 3 million (and a quarter of the nation’s population). This very rapid growth has not been accompanied by a growing capacity of local government or other local institutions. Initially, much of the rapid urban growth occurred in Traditional Housing Areas – plots demarcated by a government body (the Malawi Housing Corporation) with a pit latrine, access roads and piped water within 1,000 feet of each plot. But this land development could not keep up with the growth in population – and today, there are up to ten dwellings on each of these plots. From the early 1990s, much of the growth in housing took place in squatter settlements where there is insecurity, very inadequate or no provision for water and sanitation, and a lack of provision for access roads. Among the more serious environmental problems faced by urban centres in Malawi are the inadequacies in provision for water, sanitation and drainage and of household waste collection and disposal. But there are also problems related to deforestation driven by land clearance for housing and for fuelwood supplies for brick making and for domestic use (most of the urban population uses fuelwood for cooking and heating).

SOURCE: Kayuni, Happy M and Richard I C Tambulasi (2005), The Key Issues in Regard to Urbanization and Environmental Change in Malawi, background paper for the Ford Foundation, 8 pages.

Local environmental health risks versus global ecological footprints

A crude but important indicator of whether the inhabitants of any area are suffering from Brown-agenda problems is the burden of disease associated with environmental health hazards (including water-, air-, food- and vector-borne diseases, chemical pollutants and physical hazards). According to the World Health Organization, the disease burden in Africa in 2000 was about four times that in Western Europe, per person. Estimates were made of the contribution to the burden of disease of a selection of environmental risk factors: unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene, outdoor air pollution, indoor smoke from solid fuels, lead and global climate change. The results are displayed in Figure 2. Overall, the burden of disease per person from these environmental health risks was about 75 times higher in Africa than in Western Europe. While urban Africans are on average healthier than rural Africans, and there is enormous variation across the continent, such figures probably do reflect the environmental health disadvantage of deprived urban settlements, without adequate water, sanitation, waste removal or clean fuels.
Figure 2: Comparing environmental health risks in disability-adjusted life years lost per person per year (2000)


Alternatively, the ecological footprint is probably the best indicator of the extent to which people in an area are contributing to Green-agenda problems. An ecological footprint measures a population’s natural-resource consumption, in terms of the area required to produce the food and fibre it consumes, absorb the waste (including carbon dioxide) it produces, and provide the space for its infrastructure. The results of a recent attempt to estimate ecological footprints internationally in 2001 are summarized in Figure 3. On average, Africa’s ecological footprint was estimated at 1.2 hectares per person, while that of Western Europe was 5.1 hectares.

Such averages hide very large variations between cities and between the relative contributions of different groups within cities. For instance, Cape Town in South Africa, one of the wealthiest cities in Africa, has an average ecological footprint of 4.28 hectares per person – comparable to the average for Canada. Most urban centres in low-income nations in Africa will have a much lower ecological footprint than this; in general, the smaller the high-income population and the larger the low-income population, the smaller the ecological footprint. Most low-income urban households in Africa have very small ecological footprints because their consumption levels for fuel, water and resource-intensive goods are so low, they use the most fuel-efficient forms of transport and they generate very little waste. In Cape Town, the wealthiest group of residents (representing 7 per cent of Cape Town’s households) have an ecological footprint that is at least 15 times higher than that of the lower-income population.40

BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL – CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN AND AROUND THE CITY

There are a number of environmental issues that, in terms of scale and impact, lie in between the local environmental-health burdens often associated with urban poverty, and global ecological footprints often associated with affluent urban lifestyles. There is little information systematically collected on these issues. There is evidence that larger urban centres of Africa have to get their water from greater distances. There is somewhat ambiguous evidence that urban wood demands are leading to deforestation around urban areas where charcoal is used (there is evidence that large quantities of wood are used in the production of charcoal for urban consumption, but the impact on the forests depends on how the wood for charcoal production is harvested, which is not well documented). Urban pollution is responsible for various downstream, or downwind, environmental problems. And peri-urban areas often face a particularly wide range of environmental burdens, and often include development that is beyond the responsibilities of the urban authorities, as it lies outside their jurisdictional boundaries.

From an ecological perspective, peri-urban areas are often more diverse than either the more built-up areas of the urban centre or the more distant cropland. Numerous and changing forms of agriculture can combine with adapting agricultural settlements, new housing, industrial sites, waste dumps, excavations, empty and “unused” land. New housing is often poor-quality informal settlements with mostly low-income groups, although most cities also have exclusive high-income residential developments in parts of their suburbs or “exurbs” including gated communities. While not as serious to human health as the burdens of inadequate living environments in the poorest settlements, and not as serious a threat to global ecosystems as affluent consumption patterns, these peri-urban environmental issues can easily become critical.

NOTE: The countries included as Western Europe are slightly different from those in Figure 2 above.

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COMBINING AGENDAS I: MANAGING WATER DEMANDS

Internationally, worries about inadequate supplies of fresh water have received a great deal of attention in recent decades, and these provide a good example of a topic where there is much confusion between problems at different scales, and conflicts of interests within the sector as well as between users.

Especially during the 1990s, but to some degree up to the present day, international water-policy debates centred on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and Private-Sector Participation (PSP) or Public–Private Partnerships (PPP). There has been talk of a global water crisis driven by water scarcity, and targets have been set to halve the share of people without sustainable access to safe water and basic sanitation by the year 2015. For the most part, problems of access to water are only indirectly related to water-scarcity problems, and neither need have much to do with private-sector participation.\(^\text{43}\) As illustrated in Table 5, it can be worth keeping the different agendas distinct, even if they can often be combined.

Table 5: Different agendas and managing water demands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guiding Concern</th>
<th>Green: The conservation argument</th>
<th>Brown: The hygiene argument</th>
<th>Neoliberal: The marginal-cost pricing argument</th>
<th>Grassroots: The community-action argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key insight</td>
<td>Water stress is a growing problem in most parts of the world, due to excessive water consumption.</td>
<td>Water-related diseases still constitute a large share of the global burden of disease.</td>
<td>Water is a scarce commodity, with an economic value in numerous alternative uses.</td>
<td>Adequate water is a basic need, without which people cannot live healthy and fulfilling lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributory factors</td>
<td>There are numerous unexploited opportunities for saving water without reducing the services water provides.</td>
<td>Achieving health depends on how water is used as well as how much water (of adequate quality) is provided.</td>
<td>Piped water is typically priced well below its (marginal) economic cost.</td>
<td>Dis-organized (poor) communities are at a disadvantage in both addressing their own water needs and negotiating with outsiders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand-side consequences</td>
<td>Householders using piped water often cannot tell how much of their water is going to which purposes, are not aware when they are wasting water, and do not have the means of judging water-conserving technologies.</td>
<td>Householders cannot discern the health consequences of their water-use practices, and often rely on social norms, which, especially in crowded and generally hazardous living environments, may be unhealthy.</td>
<td>Water is often treated as a social good, with provision organized as a non-commercial enterprise. Even commercial providers rarely bear the costs of water withdrawal or operate in a competitive market.</td>
<td>Water utilities are not responsive to the needs and demands of low-income communities, especially if they are located in informal settlements. Local organization is often suppressed for political reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Conservation education and promotion should</td>
<td>Hygiene education and promotion should become an</td>
<td>Piped-water pricing should be based on long-run marginal</td>
<td>Poor communities should mobilize (or be mobilized) around</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

become an integral part of piped-water provision. (Integrated Water Resource Management)

integral part of water provision. (Public Health)

costs, giving users the incentive to manage their own demand efficiently. (PSP)

local water issues, and providers should be responsive to community as well as individual demands. (CBOs)

Even within a single city, it is technically possible to get more water to the urban poor, while also introducing water-saving measures where wastage is a serious problem. Similarly, it is organizationally possible for communities to take more control of their own water services, even as water prices and water markets are being reformed to serve conservation efficiency and public-health goals. Indeed, if the alternative approaches could be combined effectively, water conservation in one part of the system could mean more water for the urban poor, hygiene education could help residents use water more efficiently, and better-organized communities might even press for economically efficient price reforms.

There are also likely to be measures that can help provide a better basis for demand-side management generally. Housing insecurity, and legal and political systems ill suited to the needs of the “informal” city, work against all forms of demand management in low-income settlements. Local residents do not trust outsiders, even those claiming to be working for their benefit, and better local organization is often perceived by the government as a threat rather than part of a solution. Under such conditions, the more technocratic approaches to demand-side management are unlikely to make much headway on their own, and the politics of water provision is highly dependent on the broader political setting. (This should not be taken to imply that water improvements must await political improvement – in some circumstances water-system improvements can help to signal or cement political shifts.)

**COMBINING AGENDAS II: EXPERIENCES WITH LOCAL-AGENDA-21-LIKE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA**

One of the most significant international innovations in addressing urban environmental problems in the 1990s was the emergence of a new kind of city-wide initiatives to address environmental problems – the Local Agenda 21 (LA21). These came out of the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. They were seen as the means by which local action plans could be developed within each city and town to implement the many recommendations that were within Agenda 21 – the “action plan” that governments endorsed at the conference. They were meant to support “good local governance” for environment and development. The more successful cases have been associated with politicians and civil servants with strong commitments to democratic practices, greater accountability to citizens, and partnerships with community-based organizations (CBOs) and NGOs.

LA21s remain at the periphery of urban governance – probably more so in Africa than elsewhere. In some cases, tensions between the Green and the Brown agendas may have undermined the initiatives. Some of these “local” environmental initiatives were very much promoted from the outside – perhaps in the form of a “sustainable city” project or a “localizing Agenda 21” project of UN-Habitat, or a Local Agenda 21 sponsored by ICLEI, or perhaps a Green City project. At meetings held to examine some of these experiences, common complaints were that the agenda was not really African, or that the variations among the projects reflected variations that the cities and towns had had to adapt to, not variations they had imposed.

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On the other hand, many of the principles of LA21 remain at the centre of urban governance innovations, and many of the experiences with LA21-like activities were very positive. Moreover, many locally driven activities have in effect adopted the principles of LA21 without the label – at least in the sense that they are furthering the environmental improvement of Africa’s cities.

**Combining Agendas III: The Example of Cape Town**

The interaction between Brown and Green issues can be illustrated by considering the current and planned investments in urban infrastructure in the city of Cape Town in South Africa. The South African government sees its role as a key investor in infrastructure in cities, as part of a strategy to reduce poverty and to underpin economic growth. For Cape Town, one of South Africa’s largest and most successful cities, this implies very large investments, both to support the city’s capacity to attract new investment and to address a large backlog of needs. Box 7 lists some of the targets for the city.

**Box 7: Infrastructure Targets for Cape Town**

1. Water: in-house water supply for all by 2014. Progress towards target:
   - 2004: 78% of formal houses, 12% informal houses
   - 2009: 76% of formal houses, 40% of informal houses
   - 2014: 100% of all houses

2. Sanitation: full water-borne sewerage for all houses by 2014. Progress towards target:
   - 2004: 98% of formal houses, 56% of informal houses
   - 2009: 97% of formal houses, 39% of informal houses
   - 2014: 96% of all houses

3. Energy: An energy supply to all houses. Progress towards target:
   - 2004: 26% of formal houses, 8% of informal houses
   - 2009: 67% of formal houses, 55% of informal houses
   - 2014: 100% of all houses


However, these ambitious targets are set with no attention to greater eco-efficiency and sustainable resource use. In effect, it is assumed that the resources and waste sinks will be available, and that prices for fresh water, fossil fuels and food will not rise. As noted already, Cape Town also has a large ecological footprint (comparable to that of Canada, per person), which also means a heavy dependence on non-renewable resources, especially oil. Each time oil prices rise, it takes income from Cape Town’s households both directly in the higher prices for oil-based fuels (petrol, diesel, kerosene) and indirectly in the higher prices for goods that have high oil inputs in their production and distribution (including many foodstuffs). This affects lower-income households directly, and also undermines Cape Town’s economy.

There are also worries about maintaining freshwater supplies in Cape Town, and there are serious cost implications for increasing bulk supplies. But a large expansion in the housing stock, and increasing numbers of people adopting the water-use patterns of the “middle-class” would certainly increase unit costs and strain supplies. If supplies are constrained and higher-cost water sources have to be tapped, it is likely that poorer groups will bear a disproportionate burden. In addition, with a strong government commitment to support a large part of the population shifting from shacks to good-quality homes, the spatial character of this transformation has profound implications for Cape Town’s oil future – will it be through low-density, sprawling and automobile-dependent suburbs, or through more compact settlement patterns well served by public transport. More specifically, low-income groups housed in conventional

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45 Drawn from Swilling 2005, op. cit.
housing designed for residents with high water and oil consumption patterns are highly vulnerable to growing scarcities and higher prices. Moreover, done right, a greater focus on more efficient use of resources and reduction in wastes (including more recycling and local food production) has benefits in terms of local employment creation.

**INTEGRATING AGENDAS TO BENEFIT THE POOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT**

Thus, it is important to incorporate Green perspectives – but rooted in local knowledge and with an awareness of the need to avoid these conflicting with Brown or other pro-poor perspectives. Applying well-known and well-tested measures to housing design and construction can significantly reduce water use and fuel consumption for heating, cooling and lighting. Land-use management can encourage settlement designs that reduce the need for private car use and incorporate features that reduce water use and support groundwater recharge. In many neighbourhoods they can also support more local production. Thus, a strong government commitment to infrastructure and to improving housing for low-income groups can incorporate some key Green perspectives which reduce Cape Town’s vulnerability to resource scarcities and protect its lower-income population from the price rises that will come with such scarcities. Box 8 is based on a checklist for designing interventions in Cape Town, adapted to be relevant in a wide range of urban settlements.

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**Box 8: Achieving environmentally sustainable neighbourhoods**

A focus on environmentally sustainable neighbourhoods, both in terms of new neighbourhoods and in terms of bringing resource-saving, waste-reducing measures to existing neighbourhoods, can be supported by action on ten points:

1. Transition to renewable energy alternatives and increased energy efficiency. Example technologies include solar water heaters, compact fluorescent lighting (and related fittings), windmills, photovoltaic systems (connected to the grid) and liquid petroleum gas stoves.

2. Waste reduction via re-use of all waste outputs as productive inputs. This has implications for the local economy and employment, as waste separation at source across all households and businesses creates a new recycling industry.

3. Sustainable transport, with a major focus on public transport. Reduced expenditure on roads and increased expenditure on efficient and safe public transport systems creates resilience to increasing oil prices, and provides the basis for an economically competitive city.

4. Sustainable construction materials and building methods. Different building materials can be rated so that the ecological and social cost of formal-sector building can be calculated in advance. This reinforces the local economy because an easy way to reduce the ecological footprint of a building is to source local materials. It is also improves accountability.

5. Local and sustainable food. Dependence on long-distance food-supply chains from non-organic agricultural sectors creates an excessive ecological footprint. One obvious solution is to create neighbourhood-level spaces for food markets where farmers and growers can sell directly to households.

6. Sustainable water use, and re-use of treated sewerage. Demand-side management technologies (e.g. low-flush systems, aerated tap nozzles) and rainwater-harvesting systems are available, and grey-water re-use systems are also viable at household and neighbourhood level. Neighbourhood-level sewerage treatment systems are often viable, with the treated effluent feeding into nurseries, orchards or back into the houses to flush the toilets. At city level, improved leakage management and long-term access to an affordable bulk supply are usually key priorities.

7. Enhancing biodiversity and the preservation of natural habitats. Natural biodiversity can be a key asset of urban areas, and measures to increase biodiversity can also enhance ecosystem services.

8. Valuing authentic cultural diversity, community and citizen participation. These issues are not only important in their own right, but are also critical if the full benefits of environmental sustainability are to be achieved across the whole society.

9. Equity and fair trade at all levels (global, regional and local). A perspective focused on equity and fair trade considers value chains and how these can be restructured to advantage smaller players and build local economies. Local credit systems, through to sophisticated ways of linking waste streams from
certain industries to the input streams of others are some of the ways in which employment is created without depending purely on new investment.

10. Health, well-being and soulfulness. The positive side of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is that it has stimulated a social and cultural movement that is starting to change the way we understand health, diet, sexual practices and care of the sick and dying. This, in turn, should reinforce community building, “slow food” movements and child-centred planning, and validate the “deep ecology” connection to nature, beauty and soulfulness.


Many of the measures described would also help to limit greenhouse-gas emissions. This might seem to be of little relevance to Africa – which compared to other regions has contributed little to the greenhouse gases currently in the atmosphere. Priorities for reducing emissions have to be in the wealthiest nations and in the low- and middle-income nations with large and rapidly expanding economies. But the large and growing body of scientific evidence suggesting the need for large cuts in total greenhouse-gas emissions will require action from all nations. For Africa, with so many rapidly growing urban areas, this means encouraging and supporting urban expansion and building designs that de-link improved living standards from increased emissions of greenhouse gases. Acting on this now, within a “Brown agenda” commitment to much-reduced environmental health burdens, can significantly reduce future greenhouse-gas emissions. Depending on how international negotiations on climate change proceed, measures to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions could also provide the basis for financial transfers from other countries.

5. THE WORK OF THE URBAN POOR FEDERATIONS IN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant initiatives today in urban areas of Africa in addressing poverty and in contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is the work of organizations and federations formed and run by the urban poor. In a number of nations, these federations are engaged in many community-driven initiatives to upgrade slums and squatter settlements, to develop new housing that low-income households can afford and to improve provision for infrastructure and services (see Table 6). In several of these countries, federations are seeking to support livelihood improvements, although this aspect of their work has not developed in all contexts. Federation groups are also working with governments to show how city redevelopment can secure tenure and access services for the poor. In some countries, this is in the context of the threat of eviction.

In recent years, there has been a notable growth of grassroots activities in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2000, there were four active Federations there – in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya (although the Kenyan Federation was weak) – with an emerging process in Uganda. By 2005, the Kenyan federation had strengthened considerably, and initiatives are also underway in Angola, Ghana, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, with more recent interest being shown from countries as far apart as Mozambique and Ethiopia. A number of international agencies have been supporting this process since its inception in the early 1990s, and others (including the Ford Foundation in the case of South Africa and Kenya) have joined more recently. Some city and national governments have also offered support.

Table 6: Examples of urban poor federations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Year founded</th>
<th>Number of members, size of loan fund, plots secured</th>
<th>Support NGO, and federation-managed funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA: <em>uMfelanda Wonye</em> (South African Homeless People’s Federation)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>c. 100,000**, US$ 0.9m, 20,000 plots</td>
<td>uTshani Fund (for housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE: The Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>c. 45,000**, US$ 0.4m, 3,000 plots</td>
<td>Dialogue on Shelter, Gungano Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA: Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia</td>
<td>1998*</td>
<td>13,000, US$ 150,000 2,500 plots</td>
<td>Namibian Housing Action Group, Twahangana Fund (for land, services and income generation) with state funds for housing (Build Together Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA: <em>Muungano wa Wanvijiji</em> (Kenyan Homeless People’s Federation)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>c. 25,000</td>
<td>Pamoja Trust, Akiba Mashinani Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI: Malawi Federation</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20,000 220 plots</td>
<td>CCODE – Centre for Community Organization and Development, Mchenga Urban Poor Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
* The Namibian process began in the early 1990s; the Federation and the NGO divided in 1998.
** These are both maximum figures. Not surprisingly, activities in Zimbabwe have slowed considerably in the present climate. The South African Federation has been facing particular challenges in recent years, and membership has fallen.

These federations are made up of savings groups formed and managed by urban poor groups. The savings schemes come together into federations to further their interests (primarily financial redistribution, and new and improved urban development policies). The savings groups are the means by which social relations between local residents are transformed and scarce financial capital accumulated. Each savings group also provides a place where members can discuss their development needs and how they might meet them. Women are particularly attracted to these groups because of their focus on services and housing improvements. These savings groups are the building blocks of what begins as a local process and can develop into city-wide and national federations. To give some examples:

- At its strongest, the South African Homeless People’s Federation represented 1,500 autonomous savings and credit groups with an active membership of more than 100,000 families. Their projects have provided housing and/or land tenure for over 14,000 households.
- The Kenyan federation has 137 savings groups in over 60 settlements in nine different urban or peri-urban areas and more than 25,000 members. It is developing its work in upgrading projects as the federation groups become stronger. Housing activities have started.
- The Zimbabwe federation represents 1,600 savings schemes with 45,000 members; most live in holding camps, squatter settlements, backyard shacks or hostels, or are lodgers. It had many housing projects underway, working with local authorities, before the vast forced-eviction programme implemented by the Zimbabwean government from May 2005.47
- The Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia has over 300 savings groups with 12,350 member households; most live in informal settlements or backyard shacks, although 2,300 member households have acquired land for housing.

Box 9 illustrates how federations develop in Malawi – which is one of the newer federations.

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Box 9: The Malawi Homeless People’s Federation

The Malawi Homeless People’s Federation emerged with support from an NGO formed by a Malawi professional who had spent six months working with the NGO supporting the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation. The Malawi Federation began through a savings group formed in a slum community in Lilongwe in May 2003 – and this encouraged other groups to form. As group savings grew, members were able to start providing micro-loans at group level.

The development of the Malawi federation was supported by an exchange visit from the Zimbabwean federation in May 2003, and by November 2003 over 80 savings schemes had started. The savings groups made their own rules and regulations regarding the operations of these funds – unlike the microfinance institutions with which they had previously worked. Members of the Malawi federation visited Zimbabwe in October 2003, and this further strengthened the process. The Mchenga Urban Poor fund was set up to support federation savings groups – and partnership with the cities of Lilongwe and Blantyre were developed. Savings groups mentored by the savings groups in Lilongwe were also formed in many other cities, including in Mzuzu, Zomba, Mzimba, Salima and Kasungu.

The federation members mostly fall into two categories: those who rent accommodation in slums and backyard shacks and those who “own” land. After an enumeration implemented by the federation, Lilongwe City Assembly in April 2005 offered the federation 211 plots on which to build low-cost houses.

SOURCE: Nkhoma, Sikhulile (2005), Malawi Homeless People’s Federation, background paper prepared for the Ford Foundation.

THE SAVINGS GROUPS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES

The savings groups that make up each federation manage savings and credit efficiently, but also this collective management of money and the trust it builds within each group increases their capacity to work together. Each savings group within a federation has the example of what other savings groups are doing (or have done) from which they can learn.

In present-day urban living, development opportunities are governed by the ability of individuals and households to operate within the market and/or within state rules, regulations and resources. State rules and regulations in regard to access to land and housing and to employment are often not strictly or directly applied – for instance a very large proportion of low-income urban households in Africa live in illegal settlements and work within the informal economy.

With high levels of commodification in land, services and housing markets, there is little that individuals or households can do without finance. Advancement depends on the ability to earn an income and to pay for needed commodities. Working within savings groups allows many costs to be reduced – for instance the cost of land for housing with infrastructure,\(^{48}\) the costs of installing infrastructure, the cost of building materials and other items needed for housing construction, and unit costs for most services. However, a considerable number of the poorest members cannot afford complete housing so housing has to be built incrementally. South Africa is an exception, because of a capital subsidy provided by the government; if poor households can access this and can manage construction themselves, it allows a complete house to be built.

Individuals and households with low incomes and little or no capital assets have very little possibility of advancement unless they are part of a larger group that can help meet their needs as well as giving them more negotiating power. Strong local organizations combined with federation-managed urban poor funds are mechanisms by which this happens and by which multiple needs can be addressed. Urban poor funds offer groups loans at subsidized rates for collective purposes such as land purchase and infrastructure development. These allow multiple needs to be addressed (Table 7).

\(^{48}\) Purchasing land on which 50 or more plots can be developed and infrastructure provided can produce serviced plots that are much cheaper than when a single household seeks to purchase such a plot in the market.
Table 7: Urban poor funds and the multiple needs of poorer groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of poverty</th>
<th>Poverty-reduction strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate income/livelihoods</td>
<td>Support for enterprise development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of material assets</td>
<td>Support for land acquisition and construction of housing, or support for securing tenure of land already occupied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor-quality housing</td>
<td>Support for housing and infrastructure investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate public infrastructure</td>
<td>Savings groups negotiating with the authorities for improved infrastructure, supported by community investment and management; also direct investment by communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate basic services</td>
<td>Negotiations with service providers, direct investment by the community in services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited or no safety net</td>
<td>Emergency loans available within savings groups to cope with sudden loss of income or drop in income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate or no rule of law</td>
<td>Stronger community organizations can contribute to a moral framework and greater security in low-income settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voicelessness/powerlessness</td>
<td>Stronger community organizations, federations and networks; political negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the federations support their savings groups to develop initiatives for land acquisition and service improvement. Housing may be supported for members with higher incomes. Expansion happens as more and more savings groups undertake initiatives inspired by what they see others doing. Most initiatives have much lower unit costs than conventional government or international-agency initiatives, or add more value for similar unit costs. They also seek to make external resources go as far as possible – for instance by using international funding to leverage land, infrastructure, technical support or financial contributions to the urban poor fund.

As they develop, federations set up their own urban poor funds to help members acquire land, build homes and develop livelihoods. These funds may be where members’ savings are deposited and where external funding from governments and international agencies is managed. These funds help to ensure that external finance is used and managed by the federations. A contribution to the federation fund from a city or national government agency signals a change in government attitude and the beginning of a partnership. Joe Slovo, the first housing minister in the first democratic South African government, contributed to the housing fund of the South African Homeless People’s Federation.

All the federations are also part of a transnational movement, as they work with each other and with urban poor organizations in other nations that are developing their own federations. Together with their support NGOs, they have formed their own international umbrella organization – Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) – to secure an international voice for the urban poor. The experience of the federations to date (and of SDI) is that federations need to develop a support NGO that works in partnership with them – for instance, Dialogue on Shelter in Zimbabwe, Pamoja Trust in Kenya and the Centre for Community Organization and Development in Malawi.

**WORKING WITH EXTERNAL AGENCIES**

For the federations that make up SDI, and others which seek to support people-centred development, the critical issue is how to engage with the state in ways that enable the leadership of the community to be protected and maintained. All the federations seek relationships with governments, especially local governments. Large-scale programmes are not possible without the support of government – but the possibilities for the urban poor of getting government support and using it well are much increased if they are within organized savings groups with capacity to work and manage finance collectively. In addition, for the high proportion of their members who live on land without secure tenure, getting such tenure also depends on agreements that have to be negotiated with government. The federations also need to develop their relationships with local government to prevent repressive and anti-poor policies and regulations – especially in protecting poorer groups from forced eviction from their homes and from
harassment in their livelihoods – for instance through arresting informal traders or demolishing the markets they use. The massive evictions in Harare and virtually every other urban centre in Zimbabwe and the imprisonment of informal vendors in May–June 2005 are an example of how destructive government can be. While the scale of these evictions and the extent of the repression of the informal economy were unusually large, there are similar anti-poor and anti-squatter government policies and attitudes in most African nations.

A key part of the work of all the federations and of SDI is to change the policies and practices of international agencies, so that they support community-driven development. These federations provide national governments and international agencies committed to reducing poverty and meeting the Millennium Development Goals with representative organizations of the urban poor with whom they can work. The federations are currently contributing greatly to significant improvements in the lives of millions of slum dwellers, and so contributing to meeting MDG Target 11. Their work is also contributing to meeting other MDGs, including reducing infant and child mortality, addressing major diseases, improving provision for water and sanitation and promoting greater gender equality.

The significance of the federations

The significance of these federations can be seen in:

- The scale of their work – in some nations, the federations’ programmes are reaching tens of thousands of people.
- How their work and their willingness to develop partnerships with governments are changing the approaches of city and national governments and international agencies. Their explicit strategy is not to replace government but to make government more effective. Where city authorities recognize the potential of working with federations, the scale of what is possible greatly increases. For instance, the city authorities in Durban have made a commitment to a city-wide process of upgrading, working with the South African Homeless People’s Federation and its many community savings schemes in the city. This is significant both for Durban (a city with more than 2 million inhabitants) and in terms of demonstrating the possibilities of city–community partnerships within South Africa. However, to date, the federation groups are still struggling to secure land from this partnership.

- Their redefining of participation. The savings groups are at the centre of these federations and all the initiatives they take; nearly all the federations have support NGOs but it is the savings groups and the federations that have the lead role. Women have central roles in all the federations, through the focus of the groups and their way of working. The federations strive to ensure that the poorest households can join, and use strategies such as daily saving and a concentration of secure tenure and services to orientate the process towards addressing the needs of the poorest.

- Their capacity to lower unit costs through strong elements of self-help and negotiating new regulations. The fact that they contribute their own financial resources (as well as labour) helps to ensure high levels of local ownership over improvements and assets. Lending strategies ensure that external support goes further, and help to recover costs for many initiatives, thus greatly reducing the need for external funding.

From clients or beneficiaries to active agents

For governments, working with federations implies not only political will but also changes in how politicians and bureaucrats perceive “poor people” and their organizations. Government staff (and staff from international agencies) often view the “poor” as “clients” or “beneficiaries”, not as people with knowledge and resources, whose individual and community processes can, with appropriate support, really improve their lives. It is difficult for politicians to shift from patron–client relationships, particularly as many of them benefit from this system and do not see any alternative.

49 In India, federation programmes are reaching hundreds of thousands of urban poor groups.
Lowering costs and cost-recovery

There are obvious advantages to initiatives that keep down unit costs and that recover costs, because they enable limited funding to reach more households. For all community-driven developments, it is important to minimize the gap between the cost of “significant improvements” (whether through upgrading or new housing) and what poor people can afford. The federation experiences to date show that:

- Upgrading may be better than moving to new peripheral locations, partly because it is usually cheaper, and partly because it avoids disrupting the inhabitants’ livelihoods and social networks. However, where settlements are very dense, finding alternative and well-located sites may be a solution.
- If upgrading is not possible, land sites for secure tenure should be sought nearby, with all possible means to keep down unit costs – for instance, through supporting self-help, allowing incremental development of housing (with permission to remain in shacks) and infrastructure, and permitting smaller plot sizes and community involvement in installing infrastructure.
- Not surprisingly, it is difficult to access the locations that would best suit poorest groups – but it is often possible find land for new housing in reasonably convenient locations. Government agencies often have suitable land, although negotiations on actually being allowed to use it may be long and complex.
- It is important to avoid credit wherever possible because this always imposes financial costs on poor households. Good practice here involves helping poor people to avoid loans, or minimizing the size of the loan they need – for instance by keeping down unit costs.
- Credit can be provided to benefit the poorest groups, avoiding the tendency of micro-credit to benefit better-off groups within the poor. Various means can be used to achieve this – for instance, savings prior to development to minimize loan requirements, allowing repayments through very small daily contributions, and group measures to help those having difficulties repaying.

Locally driven development programmes can be significantly more effective and efficient for a number of reasons:50

- Local people may contribute a specific proportion of the costs through sweat equity and through generating the information needed (enumerations, mapping) which can be very expensive if done by professionals.
- People may make specific contributions of material resources such as existing building materials for housing construction.
- Management costs arising from tasks undertaken by community leaders are unlikely to be to fully costed (and these are often not charged for at all, as the work done is unpaid).
- Maintenance is likely to be absorbed into the programme (at least partially).
- Local people take responsibility for maintaining standards and resolving problems.
- Groups see what else is needed and strategize (with government departments, donors or other bodies) to address emerging needs.
- Collaboration with the state on such locally owned programmes has been known to increase tax revenues.

Getting land or land tenure

Addressing poor people’s housing needs depends on getting land or tenure of the land that they already occupy. Getting land for new housing in locations that suit savings groups (especially locations well suited to their livelihoods) is almost always difficult. In most cities in Africa, there is suitable land owned by government agencies, and it is primarily political obstacles that prevent its use for housing for

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50 Baumann, Ted and Diana Mitlin (2003), “The South African Homeless Peoples’ Federation: Investing in the Poor”, Small Enterprise Development Vol 14, No 1, pages 32–41. This paper estimates the value added by community use of the state subsidy programme. The greatest benefits were received by the additional value of the houses constructed.
low-income groups. The federations have used many different strategies to address this. In South Africa, the 27-point plan developed in 1997 outlined the steps that should be used prior to land invasion. Strategies include undertaking detailed surveys of informal settlements and vacant areas in and around cities both to provide the information needed to upgrade existing settlements and to identify land for new housing. The Namibian Federation has recently completed a land audit with the local authorities across Namibia, identifying the numbers of shacks in towns and cities across the country.

One of the reasons for the large gap between what housing plots cost and what poorer groups can afford is the official standards and regulations – for instance on minimum plot sizes and infrastructure standards. The work of the federation in Namibia shows how changing these can increase possibilities for land acquisition by poorer households (Box 10).

Box 10: Supporting pro-poor changes to city government’s standards and regulations

In Windhoek, between 2000 and 2003, there were significant changes in the approach taken by the city government towards low-income housing developments, which were influenced by the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia. This included allowing smaller housing plots and lower infrastructure standards. The change in the city government’s policies was influenced by strong community organization, community-driven initiatives that demonstrated what was possible, and the Namibian federation’s willingness to form a partnership with the city government. The change also built on the fact that the city authorities had a long-established policy of supporting self-help and community projects – but these needed to change if they were to reach the poorest groups and increase in scale. The Namibian federation and the support NGO took key government staff members to South Africa to see what the South African Homeless People’s Federation had done. The city authorities then recognized the limitations of their government-funded serviced-site programme, and the extent to which well-organized community savings groups could help to implement new projects more cheaply and efficiently. Reaching the poorest groups required a cut in the cost of official solutions, since the city authorities had to recover costs from the land they developed for housing.

The new policy shows a willingness to overturn conventional approaches to standards and regulations (for instance, in plot size and infrastructure standards), in order to reach low-income groups with affordable improvements in tenure security, water and sanitation. Two new options were developed:

1: a rental plot of 180 square metres, serviced with communal water points and gravel roads, and with the rent charged being just sufficient to cover the financing costs for the land investment plus water services and refuse collection;

2: group purchase or lease of land with communal services and with minimum plot sizes allowed that are smaller than the official national minimum plot standard of 300 square metres.

Families living in areas with communal services have to establish neighbourhood committees to manage toilet blocks. These acknowledge the importance of representative organizations, and seek to offer improvements to the lowest-income groups while still achieving cost recovery. Federation groups (and other communities) are now able to purchase public land as a group, increasing densities and slowly upgrading their plots with water and sanitation services.


Water and sanitation

Many federations have improved and extended provision for water and sanitation into the homes of thousands of low-income households through upgrading and site development. Federations have also pioneered community-designed and managed public toilet blocks, where space or finance constraints prevent improved provision to each household. This was first developed in India, where federations have supported hundreds of community toilet blocks that serve millions of people. Similar toilet blocks are now being tried out by federations in Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, drawing on the

experience in India. However, these blocks (where developed) have been exceptional, and the vast majority of federation developments in Africa have on-plot sanitation, or locally developed toilet blocks.

**Going to scale**

Individual community organizations are unlikely to get governments to change their policies, even if they can negotiate some concessions. Federations with hundreds or thousands of community organizations have more chance of success. Changes in government policy and practice are usually required in order for federation programmes to “go to scale”, and this has been achieved in some places by a combination of strong community organizations able to show the government, through demonstration/precedent-setting projects, how working with the federation can address a city government’s own development challenges. In Africa, this combination has produced city-wide changes, and the work of the Homeless People’s Federation in South Africa has influenced national housing policy towards supporting the “people’s housing process.”

City-wide consultations, data-gathering and pilot projects strengthen the horizontal linkages between urban poor communities so that they engage collectively with city governments in discussing city-wide programmes. Rather than each urban poor group having to negotiate with the politicians or civil servants responsible for their district, these allow negotiations at the city level that can address the urban poor’s problems of land tenure, infrastructure, housing and services at the city scale. This is not easily achieved. In the beginning, city governments and professionals find it difficult to see urban poor organizations as key partners with mutual interests. But this kind of city-wide process allows the jump in scale from isolated upgrading projects to city-wide strategies, and builds the relationship between urban poor organizations and local governments to support a continuous process.

**Tools and methods**

All the federations use savings and credit groups, pilot projects, community-driven surveys/maps and community exchanges, both to strengthen the federations (and their ability to meet the development needs of their members) and to change the attitudes and approaches of governments and international agencies. The pilot projects allow federation groups to try out initiatives – and if they work well, they are visited and discussed by other groups, many of whom return home and try out similar initiatives.

Community-directed household, settlement and city surveys are important in helping communities look at their own situations and consider their priorities, as well as providing government and other external agencies with the maps and detailed data needed for projects. Government agencies usually have little or no detailed data about informal settlements.

Exchange visits between savings groups and other groups interested in learning more about the federations are important because they spread knowledge about how urban poor groups can do things themselves. They also help draw large numbers into the process of change, allowing the savings groups to federate and create strong personal bonds between communities (so that they learn to work with each other, rather than seeing each other as competitors for government resources). Although exchange visits are primarily to support community organizations, civil servants and politicians are also invited to take part – and these visits have often shown the professionals new ways of working. For instance, many professionals have visited Windhoek to see how the city government’s changes to plot sizes and infrastructure standards (described in Box 10) have made plots more affordable for poor households. The visits to Asian nations have also proved important – for instance the Kenyan railway authorities

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visited Mumbai to see how the Indian Railways supported community-managed resettlement for those living very close to the railway tracks and in constant danger from trains.\textsuperscript{54}

All the federations use precedents developed by their members to help change government policies and practices. It is much easier to negotiate with government officials when they can see the results of a new house design, a functioning community toilet or a detailed slum enumeration. When one local government has accepted a change in approach, other officials can be brought there to see how it works.

**Changing the change process**

The tools and methods described above seek to create a more equal relationship between poor communities and external agencies in identifying problems and in developing solutions. They also demonstrate to external agencies the capacity of urban poor groups, including the many resources they can contribute to making government initiatives more successful.

The federations avoid any formal political alliance. This can bring considerable disadvantages as politicians steer government support towards those in their party and prevent support going to communities that did not back them. But this keeps the federations open to everyone and protects their capacity for independent action. It allows them to negotiate and work with whoever is in power locally or nationally. The federations’ politics has been called the politics of patience – negotiation and alliance building, with confrontation used as part of a longer-term strategy. As noted above, any large-scale success depends on support from government. Civil servants and politicians who have come to recognize the value of the federations’ work are invited by the federations to speak with them at local and international events.

**Do community-driven processes have a downside?**

Community-driven approaches have been criticized for absolving national or local governments from their responsibilities. But the work the federations do is not to support autonomous development but to get engagement with government. In this case, redistribution is a central purpose of federating activities. One of the key features of the federations’ work is their demonstration to governments of more effective ways in which the government can act, and of the potential of partnerships between government and community organizations. The federations have also demonstrated a capacity to change the approaches of city governments and some national governments. Federations have also been criticized for increasing aid dependence – but they do the opposite, as they demonstrate solutions that require far less international funding.

The federations have had failures or limited successes. No large-scale movements formed by people with the least income and influence, and which encourage their member organizations to try out new initiatives, can avoid these. There are projects that fail, community organizations that cease to function and loan-repayment schedules that are not maintained. But one of the key roles of the federations is to learn how to cope with these problems, and how to avoid them in the future.

These movements also generate opposition. Many slums have powerful vested interests that oppose representative community organizations. Many politicians dislike the federations because they will not align with their election campaigns; many contractors dislike the federations because they threaten their profitable (and often corrupt) relationships with local governments.

State agencies may be suspicious of the promises of urban poor groups and believe that they will not deliver their contribution. They may find it difficult to support one particular initiative because they fear they will be inundated with requests from other communities (and be accused of favouritism). Alternatively they may have their own structures and organizations through which they prefer to work with local communities, and their own programmes that they wish to deliver. There may be an

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\textsuperscript{54} This resettlement programme moved only those who lived very close to the tracks.
assumption among officials and politicians that they should be “in control” and that the poor are not or should not be treated as equal participants in the process. Thus, even local politicians sympathetic to urban poor needs may be reluctant to support partnerships with them, unless these are organized within the politician’s own political party.

The local federations and their support structures need to work together at national level, since development dynamics constantly shift control back to the state. The experience of local groups is that they have to struggle to ensure that the low-income women who self-organize their savings schemes maintain their leadership role. Supportive city and national federations, together with the professional NGO groups that work with them, help to give the women the confidence they need, provide advice and challenge state officials. They also assist with the reflection needed within community organizations so that the members understand the processes involved and can challenge them, when necessary.

The Role of Official Development Assistance Agencies and Philanthropic Organizations

The work of all official aid agencies and development banks is justified by claims that their work is addressing the needs of “the poor” – the very people who form these federations. But these aid agencies and banks have difficulties working with the federations because their structure is designed primarily to work with and through national governments. If international agencies wish to support community-driven development, they need to change the way in which their support is provided. Some have done so – for instance, by channelling funding through the federations’ urban poor funds or intermediary institutions within recipient nations. To date, one or more federation groups in Africa have received funding from DFID, Sida, USAID and UN-Habitat, while federations in Asia have received funding from DFID, Sida, UN-Habitat, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. But most external funding for the federations has come from international NGOs and private foundations because official agencies’ structures and processes are ill suited to supporting community-driven development.

The costs of significantly improving the lives of hundreds of millions of slum dwellers in Africa, based on the costs of programmes funded by governments and international agencies, will be hundreds of billions of dollars. Most of this would also have to come from international agencies. But if estimates are based on federation initiatives, the cost is much less, and local resources (from communities and government) can cover a much higher proportion.

Changing government approaches is often more important than generous international funding. This does not mean that international funding is not needed, or that international agencies are unimportant. But these agencies’ roles need to change so that they can be effective in supporting federation activities.

What governments and international agencies can do

Governments and international agencies need to recognize the importance of this combination of community-driven processes at neighbourhood level linked together by federations that can work at the city scale. They need to learn how to support:

- community initiatives and learning cycles that can develop into valuable precedents;
- intra-city, inter-city and international exchanges for community members and, where relevant, city and national government representatives;
- community-driven slum surveys and enumerations (for local action and for city-wide initiatives);
- city-wide plans that involve all urban poor communities and their organizations.

If international agencies adopted the principles that underlie the federations’ learning cycles, this suggests that they should:

- support innovation and pilot projects for community-driven processes in all nations, especially where representative organizations of slum dwellers are ready to try new approaches;
- support learning from such initiatives within each city and nation, and see what this implies for their policies within that city and nation;
• see how greater scale can be achieved without diminishing strong community-driven processes, i.e. going to scale is not so much by replication or expansion as by multiplication, and support city or municipal authorities that want to support community-driven approaches;
• consider how the city development strategies, and the poverty reduction strategy processes that they support, can involve the federations; despite the claim that these support “participation”, few of them have recognized the federations as potential partners in ensuring participation;
• spread learning and shared experience among international agencies.

Perhaps the most essential contribution is to respond to the federations’ processes through an open engagement that enables a dialogue about the best way to distribute funds. As described above in this chapter, the federations’ umbrella organization, SDI, seeks to set up processes that reinforce the collective, enabling the community to go back to the state and negotiate for more, once a specific phase of development is complete.\(^\text{55}\) For example, a group may negotiate for land, then it has to install infrastructure; this strengthens the group so that it is then able to negotiate for additional services.

**Contribution of philanthropic organizations**

Federation experience shows the power of development finance when its use is driven from below, within supportive contexts to catalyse learning, build knowledge and ensure the effective use of money. Much development finance prevents this, with most funding delivered according to formal agreements with rigid timetables.

There is a need for local, national and international funders who understand the requirements of community organizations and federations, for project and non-project support, and who can provide support that urban poor federations need but that the official aid agencies and multilateral banks cannot provide. However much these official agencies would like to support the federations, their structures and procedures limit their capacity to provide funding for non-project support and to respond quickly to requests for support for diverse initiatives. It is generally possible for official agencies to support the federations only when the federations have become larger and more organized.

Therefore, there is a particular need for support for federations or emerging federations from international NGOs and local and international foundations. This support can best complement support available from other sources if it allows for flexibility and local decision-making.

- **Flexibility to try out different approaches** – to try one strategy, and then to change tack when or if it does not work, or if the context changes
- **Flexibility in the timing of support.** Local groups need to have a capacity to postpone use of funding, and avoid the pressure to spend at predetermined times, or suddenly to draw down funds as local contexts change or new opportunities emerge (for instance the election of a mayor offering support). The timetables and monitoring procedures for external funding often make it difficult for local processes to control when funding is used.
- **Flexibility around the form of funding available** – which has to support all possible ways of getting government support. National and local government funds are likely to be very specific in what and how they fund, so external funding must be available in a form that complements this. Community-driven development has to get government funding involved – but other funds are needed to finance those aspects that state funds will not. As federations get stronger and negotiate better arrangements with the state, so external funding needs to switch to support other areas.
- Finally, federations need funding mechanisms that recognize the supremacy of **local decision-making** in the context of accountability.

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\(^{55}\) D’Cruz, Celine and Diana Mitlin (2005), “Shack/Slum Dwellers International: one experience of the contribution of membership organizations to pro-poor development”, paper presented at WIEGO/Harvard/SEWA workshop, January.
6. HIV/AIDS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
TREATMENT, PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

Urban centres in sub-Saharan Africa have the highest prevalence rates in the world for HIV/AIDS. There may be much discussion about this “crisis” but there are few signs that it is actually being treated as such. And when there are responses, these are often poorly focused – for instance failing to focus on the groups most vulnerable to infection, and failing to provide the treatment needed by those who are infected.

There is also a tendency to focus on individual behaviour as the key “problem”. In response to this, “education” is often presented as the key to prevention, when some of the highest rates of infection are among those groups of the population most aware of the risks – young people living in urban areas. Perhaps one reason for the inadequacy of the response by international agencies is that they have no urban policy or are reluctant to work in urban areas (believing that urban populations benefit from “bias”). But for HIV/AIDS, rates of infection are usually much higher in urban areas, and any policy of treatment, prevention and protection should have a strong urban component. And, as Chapter 2 described, there is little evidence that lower-income groups in urban areas benefit from any bias.

It could be argued that focusing on HIV/AIDS alone is not appropriate, given the very large health burdens and premature deaths arising from malnutrition and other diseases – especially acute respiratory infections (including measles), diarrhoeal diseases, tuberculosis and malaria – and from injuries and premature deaths from accidents and violence. But a focus on HIV/AIDS is needed for at least two reasons.

1: The speed with which the health impact if HIV/AIDS: it is mostly HIV/AIDS that is responsible for the dramatic drops in average life expectancy in many sub-Saharan African nations in the last 10–15 years.
2: The best strategy for addressing HIV/AIDS and its underlying causes also helps to address malnutrition and many other health and development problems. Reducing the vulnerability of young people, especially girls, to HIV/AIDS also means reducing their vulnerability to many other risks. Critical components for any HIV/AIDS programme include safe spaces for girls in and out of school, better employment opportunities, greater scope for child and youth participation, and easily accessible, good-quality, non-stigmatizing health care. All these have great importance for other aspects of development.

AIDS AND URBANIZATION

The lack of consistent and reliable data on the geography of HIV/AIDS hinders an assessment of the epidemic’s trends in urban and rural areas. But levels of HIV infection are known to be higher in urban areas, and especially in large cities. This is not a new observation. In the early 1990s, urban areas were identified as the main locus of HIV spread in sub-Saharan Africa, and it was estimated that 25–33 per cent of the urban population in the worst-affected countries was HIV-positive, compared to less than 5 per cent in rural areas. By 1992 AIDS was already the leading cause of adult mortality in some African

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56 This chapter is based on two background papers prepared for the Ford Foundation: van Donk, Mirjam (2005), “‘Positive’ urban futures in sub-Saharan Africa: HIV/AIDS and the need for ABC (A Broader Conceptualisation)” which is published in Environment and Urbanization Vol. 18, No. 1, April 2006 and Mabala, Richard (2005), “From prevention to protection for AIDS: addressing vulnerability in urban areas” which will be published in Environment and Urbanization Vol. 18, No. 2, October 2006.
Towards the end of the 1990s, HIV prevalence in urban areas was found to be four times higher than in rural areas. Recent UNAIDS data confirm this, for instance, in 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa the HIV prevalence rate among women attending antenatal clinics is higher in urban areas than in predominantly rural districts. In 12 of these countries, the urban HIV prevalence rate significantly exceeds rural infection levels, varying from around 1.5 to almost 5 times higher. In Kenya, the urban HIV prevalence rate is estimated at 17–18 per cent, whereas the rural rate is five percentage points lower. Evidence from six countries shows that HIV infection levels in urban areas can be 1.4–3.0 times higher than in rural areas for 15–49-year-olds.

In some countries, these urban/rural differentials in HIV prevalence rates have become less stark over time. For example, data on South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland suggest a parallel spread of the epidemic in urban and rural areas. This trend points to the intricate linkages between urban and rural areas, for instance through population flows, circular migration and households with members in both rural and urban areas. During a visit to a rural district in Kenya, a team from the UN Millennium Project heard that rural households no longer received remittances from migrants “the only things coming back from the cities were coffins and orphans, not remittances.” Sociodemographic linkages may hide the full scale of HIV/AIDS in urban areas – for instance as sick urban residents move to rural areas for care.

VULNERABILITY TO HIV INFECTION IN URBAN AREAS

Urban residents tend to show higher levels of awareness of HIV/AIDS and of ways to avoid HIV infection than rural residents, so factors other than knowledge and awareness of HIV/AIDS need to be considered as explanatory factors for the concentration of HIV/AIDS in urban areas. One important factor is the high concentration in urban centres of poor people with serious health problems other than HIV/AIDS, and immune systems compromised by malnutrition and other disease burdens. Urban populations should have a health advantage over rural populations. Urban concentrations bring potential advantages for health and disease control because of lower unit costs for health-promoting infrastructure (water, sanitation, drainage) and services (health care, education, garbage collection), and often higher average incomes – and thus capacity to pay for these. Where these advantages are acted on, an urban advantage becomes evident – in, for instance, infant, child and maternal mortality rates and death rates that are significantly lower in urban areas than rural areas. But in the absence of effective urban “governance” for environmental and public health and with high levels of urban poverty, the potential urban advantage can be greatly reduced or even become an urban penalty. For instance, in 19th-century Europe, before health care and environmental health systems improved, cities often had higher levels of infectious diseases and higher death rates than rural areas; they were also the locations for the emergence of new diseases. One of the key issues for sub-Saharan Africa is that treatment and prevention of, and protection against, HIV/AIDS and other diseases should be easier in urban areas; it is the failure of governments to act appropriately that explains the much higher levels of infection in urban areas.

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60 Harpham and Molyneux 2001, op. cit.
61 There are worries that supposedly ‘rural’ sero-samples tend to be biased towards larger settlements in rural districts and as such are not representative of the rural sector – so UNAIDS prefers the term ‘outside major urban areas’ rather than ‘rural areas’.
64 Sachs, J (2005), “How to End Poverty”, *Time* 165 (11), March 14, page 33.
Health status influences vulnerability to HIV infection in a number of ways. Low health status means that the virus has a better chance of becoming established – and low health and nutritional status are likely to accelerate the onset of AIDS-related illnesses and death.

- Those with TB, a history of malaria, untreated STDs, under-nutrition, lack of essential micronutrients, worms or bilharzia are more susceptible to all infectious diseases, including HIV.
- HIV-positive persons suffering from these conditions are more likely than otherwise healthy individuals to transmit HIV.
- HIV at the individual level may be transmitted in a variety of ways but, for the population as a whole, the epidemic is due to conditions that favour HIV transmission or that make a population more susceptible to infection.65

Someone infected with a sexually transmitted infection (STI) has a higher susceptibility to HIV infection. A study comparing differences in HIV spread between four urban areas in Africa found no obvious differences in sexual behaviour that could account for the divergence in HIV spread but the two towns with the highest HIV prevalence rates also had significantly higher levels of STI infection.66

Obviously, any person’s health status is influenced by the accessibility of appropriate health care services and, in the case of HIV prevention, of reproductive health services and HIV prevention methods (e.g. condoms, STI treatment, prevention of mother-to-child transmission). To the extent that such services are inaccessible, inappropriate or unaffordable for specific groups of urban residents, the vulnerability of these groups to HIV infection is increased.

**Rapid urbanization is not necessarily a key factor in high levels of infection.** Virtually all sub-Saharan African nations have experienced very rapid growth not only in their urban populations but also in the proportion of their populations living in urban areas over the last few decades (see Chapter 2). In some cases, for instance in Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho and Kenya, rapid urbanization might help to explain how HIV has reached such epidemic proportions. But there are many countries with rapid urbanization and low rates of infection. So rapid urbanization may contribute to a context of risk and vulnerability to HIV infection in certain countries, particularly where receiving areas have been unable to cope with the increase in demands for services, infrastructure and economic opportunities. To the extent that urban population growth is the result of natural population growth, this is clearly indicative of unprotected sexual intercourse, which enhances the risk of contracting HIV among sexual partners and of HIV transmission from mothers to babies.

**The high concentrations of youth and young adults in most urban centres may be a more useful explanation than rapid urban growth for disproportionate HIV infection levels in urban areas.** Many urban centres also have above-average concentrations of adult men who are single or who have left their partners in rural areas, and prolonged separation from one’s spouse or sexual partner seems to be an exacerbating factor in HIV spread. But the relationship between migration and HIV/AIDS is not simplistic, nor necessarily unidirectional, i.e. not just the result of the (often male) migrant’s behaviour during periods of absence from their sexual partner.67 Also, a high concentration of young people in itself is not sufficient explanation for high rates of HIV infection; it must also relate to the failure of development investments to provide them with more opportunities – including a failure to support their strengths and potential as constructive contributors to society. By contrast, those interests who seek to do them harm by recruiting them into military service or involving them in criminal activities recognize

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and use their capabilities. In addition, blaming young people for being the driving force of the HIV epidemic removes adult culpability from the framework of understanding around young people.

It is also not known how urban rates of infection are influenced by people infected with HIV moving to urban areas in the hope of accessing better care and services, or to escape stigma in their home communities. The lack of health facilities in rural areas, especially testing centres, may also mean that many rural residents remain unaware of their HIV status.

Poor housing conditions, high levels of overcrowding and living in illegal settlements characterize the lives of most urban residents in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 2). Residents of illegal settlements may start sexual intercourse at earlier ages, have more sexual partners, and be less likely than other city residents to know of or adopt preventive measures against HIV infection. A study in Nairobi found that economic deprivation and precarious living conditions contributed to enhanced vulnerability to HIV infection.

Another aspect of the urban context that may facilitate the spread of HIV is single-sex (often male) compounds that house migrant labourers, soldiers or members of the police. Overcrowding and lack of privacy mean that there are few opportunities for intimate relationships. Within such contexts, masculine identities tend to be closely intertwined with a strong sex drive and sexual conquests, with little room for safe-sex practices.

Unemployment, lack of secure income and income inequality have been identified as core determinants of vulnerability to HIV infection, particularly in as far as these are associated with inadequate access to appropriate services, inability to afford HIV prevention methodologies or access to health care, power imbalances, frustration and disillusionment, and a preoccupation with immediate survival needs. In contexts where daily survival is continuously negotiated, it is unrealistic to expect people to take seriously the as yet invisible threat of ill health and death some time in the future. However, care is needed in assuming links between absolute poverty and HIV infection, for instance because of high prevalence among many professionals. In many instances, it is inequality rather than absolute poverty that is the problem; for instance, unequal power relations help to explain higher prevalence among certain groups – especially young girls.

Urban economies are often linked to rural and other urban economies, including cross-border economies, through transportation networks. Such networks not only facilitate flows of goods and people, but also of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS. Cities and towns along main transportation routes tend to show higher HIV infection levels than do surrounding areas.

Attention needs to be given to specific urban conditions that encourage sexual behaviour that facilitates (or possibly hinders) the spread of the epidemic and the extent to which urban populations have access to (and make use of) appropriate HIV-prevention methodologies. This requires an understanding of the sociocultural and economic settings that influence behaviour, agency and social interaction – and

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71 Zulu et al. 2004, op. cit.
specifically sexuality and sexual practices. But care is needed not to seek simplifications and distortions. There is a tendency to blame urban sexuality for the spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa—which for some is indicative of “immorality.” But more Americans start having sexual relations at an early age than Africans, and some high-income nations have among the highest teenage pregnancy rates in the world. It has also been suggested that urbanization is associated with a loss of social control and a reduced influence of moral systems, including diminished elder authority, on individual behaviour.

**DIFFERENTIAL VULNERABILITIES, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS**

Obviously, not all urban residents are equally vulnerable to HIV infection, or to its consequences. A number of (overlapping) social groups can be identified that, for different reasons, have disproportionate levels of vulnerability to HIV infection. These include: girls and women, especially those in their mid-teens to late twenties (and their babies/infants, through mother-to-child transmission); migrants, and their sexual partners in rural and urban areas; slum residents; unemployed youth, particularly those who have dropped out of school, or who are low-skilled or semi-skilled; men living in single-sex or predominantly male compounds (e.g. soldiers, migrant workers, even prisoners); and commercial sex workers.

**Three-quarters of those living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are young women.**

- Adolescent girls and young women in urban areas are particularly vulnerable; they are the group most likely to have HIV passed to them—as well as most likely to pass it on to others.
- Prevalence rates for girls are generally 2–4 times higher than those for boys; in the 15–19 age range, prevalence rates among girls are 6 times higher than for boys.
- It must also be remembered that at the age of 12, except for those infected through parent-to-child transmission (and sexual abuse), almost no adolescents are HIV positive. Six years later, in high-prevalence countries, 10–20 per cent are infected.
- The rates are especially high in major cities; for instance, among young pregnant women (aged 15–24) in capital cities in Southern Africa, the rates in 2002 or 2003 were 32 per cent in Botswana, 28 per cent in Lesotho, 39 per cent in Swaziland, 24 per cent in South Africa and 22 per cent in Zambia.
- The difference in infection levels between men and women tends to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas, and most pronounced among those aged 15–24 years, with young women showing significantly higher levels of HIV infection compared to their male peers.

**One of the main reasons for the high and often rising levels of infection is the failure to protect adolescent girls and young women from infection, including that arising from rape.**

In some countries, up to 33 per cent of girls report that their first sexual experience was coerced. According to a United Nations International Crime Victim Survey, women in Africa experienced higher levels of rape and attempted rape than women in other major regions. Although comparisons between urban and rural areas are scarce, a government survey conducted in South Africa found that women in urban areas were more at risk of sexual violence. Gender inequity and inequality in all spheres—coerced sex, gender-based violence, rape, disempowerment of women, higher male spending power and female poverty driving women into commercial sex—and the male ethos of risk-taking over responsibility—all make women exceedingly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Few of the protective factors (for instance sports clubs for men, and savings groups for women) serve adolescent girls.

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76 Collins and Rau 2000, op. cit.; and UN-Habitat 2004, op. cit.
78 UN-Habitat 2004, op. cit.
80 Quoted in UN-Habitat 2004, op. cit, page 146.
Adolescent girls often experience high levels of sexual violence at school – from fellow pupils, people around the school (or during their journey to and from school) and teachers. Rarely do school authorities take steps to address this.

"Here you are not allowed to say 'no'. If you refuse, you are raped"
(Girls from Mukuru, Nairobi)\textsuperscript{82}

Many adolescent girls in urban areas live with no parent. In many sub-Saharan African nations, between 20 and 45 per cent of girls aged 10–14 are living in urban areas without their parents. This exposes many to sexual abuse, and socially isolated girls are more likely to have been forced to have sex than those who are socially connected. Discussions with unmarried girls aged 10–19 in low-income areas of Addis Ababa found that only 13 per cent felt that they had a place to meet safely with friends (compared to 47 per cent of boys). Many said they had been raped and that their first experience of sex was forced.

Certain groups may be particularly vulnerable – for instance domestic workers and sex workers.

"Of course we always use condoms with our clients. The problem is when the clients go home and we have to sleep on the street. If you sleep alone, you are raped by one or many boys. So you have to have a boyfriend to protect you. And because he is a ‘boyfriend’, not a client, he will never use a condom."
(15-year-old girl living on the street in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia)\textsuperscript{83}

One key aspect of gender inequality in urban areas is unequal access to and ownership of assets, such as housing and land. Lack of (independent) access to housing means that women have less influence on their partners’ actions and (sexual) behaviour. It also compels women to stay in abusive relationships.\textsuperscript{84} Women’s subordinate socioeconomic and legal status is mirrored in sexual relations, where women are often not in a position to insist on their partners’ faithfulness, or on safer sex. The feminization of urban poverty manifests itself in a disproportionate number of women in informal and casual jobs, and a growing number of female-headed households among those without any source of income and/or without access to a public safety net (including healthcare and child care).\textsuperscript{85} This leaves women vulnerable to abuse, especially where their subordinate status is entrenched in law.

In such contexts, sexual bargaining or sexual networking may become an essential livelihood strategy. The commercial sex industry is often a significant component of the urban economy, and HIV prevalence rates among commercial sex workers in a particular town or city significantly exceed that of the city population in general. Recent UNAIDS data for seven African countries shows that commercial sex workers in the capital city have HIV infection levels that are between 4 (Kenya) and 32 (Benin) times higher than the average national adult HIV prevalence rate.\textsuperscript{86} Commercial sex workers are often not in a position to negotiate safer sex, even though they may be very aware of the risk of HIV infection as a result of targeted awareness campaigns.\textsuperscript{87} Sexual networking is often a last-resort survival strategy for poor women and girls (often in relation to “sugar daddies”) in exchange for money, food, clothes, gifts or protection.\textsuperscript{88} Sexual networking clearly points towards a situation of unequal power relations, if not powerlessness, where it is highly unlikely that safer sex can be demanded.

Thus, whether marginalized or mainstream, in or out of school, living with parents or not, girls in urban areas are highly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, including being forced to engage in survival or transactional sex in order to access necessities, education or a decent life. These facts are in the public

\textsuperscript{82} In discussions with Edwina Orowe, a UNICEF youth intern in Kenya, while talking to the girls about why they all had babies by the age of 16, 2004.
\textsuperscript{83} As reported to Richard Mabala, 2001. This account was revalidated by other girls living on the street, in a workshop in 2005 in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia.
\textsuperscript{84} UN-Habitat 2004, op. cit
\textsuperscript{85} UN-Habitat 2004, op. cit
\textsuperscript{86} UNAIDS 2004, op. cit, page 194.
domain; the casual nature of sexual harassment and abuse is witnessed by people every day on the buses, on the streets, in the markets; and the figures for new infections of HIV/AIDS clearly show one of the outcomes.

Children

Children from poor households (especially HIV-affected poor households), AIDS orphans and street children may be particularly vulnerable to HIV infection. Children from HIV-affected households may be sent away from home as a “cost-cutting” measure, or they may need to start working to contribute to household income.89 AIDS orphans may be compelled to contribute financially to their new homes – unless no one has been willing or able to look after them, in which case they are likely to be living on the streets. Sex work and occasional sex in exchange for money or something to eat may be the only source of income or food for these children. Also, without the protective environment of their homes, these children face increased risk of violence and abuse, including sexual abuse.

In many nations, HIV/AIDS is a major cause of orphan-hood; in some it is increasingly becoming the major cause, and the numbers of orphans are huge. For instance, in Malawi, there are more than a million orphans in a nation with just 11.5 million inhabitants: almost half of these children have been orphaned by AIDS. A large proportion of orphans look after their younger siblings, living in very difficult circumstances. An assessment of orphans in Botswana found orphan suicides, destitute children eking their living out of garbage dumpsites, and a growing number of child-headed households. In a context of intense social and economic pressures, orphans were increasingly reported to be mistreated and abused by care-givers, deprived of their inheritances by opportunist relatives and neighbours, forced to drop out of school to perform domestic labour or bring home wages, pressured into entering commercial sex work and vulnerable to other sexual abuse.90

“I am in primary school but at night I have to come out on the streets to get money to feed my younger brother and sister. My parents died last year and the relatives came and took everything. I was left with a room and my brother and sister. I don’t get any help from anyone.”

(Girl, Tanzania)91

Refugees and internally displaced persons

Refugees and internally displaced persons are also faced with enhanced vulnerability to HIV infection. Although they are more commonly located in rural areas, urban areas may be involved in two ways: people moving to urban areas fleeing from natural disasters or armed conflict; and refugee camps located on the outskirts of towns and cities. In refugee camps, condoms and other HIV prevention tools may be scarce, STI treatment may not be available, and women and girls (and boys) are highly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and violence, often inside as well as outside the camps.92

THE LIMITS OF CONVENTIONAL RESPONSES TO THE EPIDEMIC

Conventional responses to HIV/AIDS prevention (which get most of the funding for prevention) emphasize individual behaviour change. Among young people, this has largely been promoted by media campaigns, youth centres and peer education and has centred around “ABC: Abstain, Be faithful, use a Condom”, with emphasis particularly on A – and in some instances with C discouraged or even dropped.

89 UNAIDS 2004, op. cit.
91 Reported to Jo-Angeline Kalambo, UNICEF youth intern in Tanzania, investigating the situation of girls, 2000.
There is nothing inherently wrong with the ABC messages but they do not go far enough. They make no distinction between the different needs of men and women, and fail to offer African girls real options that are attuned to the reality of their daily lives.93

- Abstinence is unrealistic in an environment where boys are encouraged to be sexually aggressive and girls are kept in ignorance about their own sexuality. Calls for abstinence are meaningless when sexual activity is coerced or when women or girls have to resort to sex for survival.
- Being faithful works only if both partners play by the same rules (or played by those rules before they became faithful to one another, or both tested negative before becoming faithful).
- Condom use is almost invariably a male decision, and many men remain deeply reluctant to use condoms. In addition, because of the manner in which they have been marketed, condoms are associated in many people’s minds with commercial or casual sex; to demand a condom is to identify yourself with commercial sex.

Emphasis on ABC does nothing to address the vulnerabilities identified in this chapter. And because it does not address these vulnerabilities, ABC becomes both gender-biased and stigmatizing.

- It does not recognize that many people become infected through no fault of their own. If a person is HIV+ it must be because they were unable to “change their behaviour”.  
- It is largely a male strategy, as girls rarely have the choice to abstain or use a condom.

**Youth centres, peer education and other targeted health promotion**

These can be very effective in some ways. When interviewed, most young people report that they like being taught by their peers, and it is clear that young people need their own spaces where they can meet and carry out their own activities. But youth centres and peer education have not been very effective in reducing young people’s vulnerabilities.

- Peer educators are often given only very superficial training – a set of messages to go out and deliver to their fellow youth. They can easily be manipulated by adults to repeat stigmatizing messages. Changing the messenger does not make the message more valid.
- The most vulnerable adolescents and young women are the very people who are never reached by these interventions. For example, Population Council research in Addis Ababa showed that it is the older boys who benefit from youth centres. The girls, especially the younger girls, benefit very little – and the most invisible, such as adolescent domestic workers, hardly benefit at all.94 
- Preliminary findings from a recent study in Tanzania show declining HIV prevalence rates for boys but not for girls, since the girls have not been reached by the interventions. As with many other interventions, the analysis of the problem may be gender-sensitive but the intervention becomes male-biased (and, in this case, generation-biased). Even when interventions reach girls, they often do so long after the girls have become (or been forced to become) sexually active.
- A focus on girls’ education at schools misses the high proportion of girls who do not attend school in their adolescent years. In addition, being in school is insufficient unless the school environment is safe, and the nature of teaching is also drastically changed.

**Universal treatment and support for those infected**

Low-income groups tend to have the least capacity to cope with the consequences of AIDS-related illnesses and death, often for reasons similar to those that enhanced their vulnerability to HIV infection. Those with means can afford to pay for life-enhancing and life-prolonging treatment, or are likely to have access to some form of income even if they can no longer engage in productive work. But for most urban dwellers in Africa, such support is beyond their means, and out of their reach.

The immediate consequences of HIV/AIDS-related morbidity have been well documented: the need for treatment and appropriate care; higher medical costs (whether treatment is sought in the formal or

informal health sector); increased pressure on other family members (commonly women and girls) to look after the sick; a loss of productive time and possibly income or food security; and stigma, exclusion and discrimination if HIV status is known or suspected.

The direct consequences of HIV/AIDS-related mortality include: widow- and orphan- hood; funeral costs; loss of income or livelihood (if the deceased was an income-provider); loss of entitlements and assets such as a house or land, and other forms of security (particularly if the deceased was considered the male head of household); breakdown of household structures and pressure on households to accommodate those affected by an AIDS-related death; new groups of poor people (e.g. widows, AIDS orphans, elderly care-givers); and, again, stigma, exclusion and discrimination if the cause of death is known or suspected.

Urban residents’ coping strategies for dealing with these immediate consequences include: diverting income from other personal needs (e.g. food, clothing, transport, rent, basic services) or from needs of other household members towards medical and funeral costs of the HIV-infected relative(s); selling assets and borrowing; income substitution, which may include sexual networking; and, return to rural areas for care or support. These coping strategies may be the only viable or rational options for individuals and households in distress to pursue but they have obvious negative implications for the human rights, development and overall well-being of individuals (especially women and children) and households.

The multiple impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic undermine community resilience to cope with shocks and stresses, and erode the urban fabric. As a result, there is greater demand for more external support and services, and for qualitatively different services and support for HIV/AIDS-affected individuals, households and communities. For example, the extra demand for health care is concentrated in an age group that is usually least affected by a high disease burden. Not only are there more people needing health care but their needs are also for more complex, varied and demanding treatment regimes and care. Furthermore, as more households fall into deeper poverty as a result of HIV/AIDS, the need for secure tenure, basic services and food security increases. Yet, many HIV/AIDS-affected households no longer have an adult who – in policy terms – can be considered a breadwinner, care-giver, beneficiary or account holder, which makes the provision of equitable urban services much more complex.

These demands put significant pressure on city-level organizations, including the local state and organizations of the urban poor, to provide the required safety nets. Yet, in urban areas with relatively high HIV infection levels, city-level organizations are also likely to be eroded from within due to higher levels of absenteeism among HIV-infected and -affected staff and a high attrition rate as a result of HIV/AIDS-related death or resignation/dismissal (following reduced capability to execute tasks). This also means a loss of skills, capacity and organizational memory, which is particularly difficult to replace. At the same time, organizations are faced with increasing costs as a result of HIV/AIDS, such as higher medical costs, replacement costs, retrenchment packages and death benefits. While both organizational costs and the external demand for support and services are likely to increase, the local revenue base is likely to contract as HIV/AIDS-affected households are unable to pay local taxes, levies and service charges. Collectively, these undermine the capability of city-level organizations to execute their mandate. This, in turn, puts greater pressure on urban communities and households to mobilize the necessary support, usually on a voluntary basis – just as HIV/AIDS is usually undermining traditional support networks and community resilience, not least because of the stigma and prejudice associated it.

This is not to say that communities passively undergo the HIV/AIDS epidemic. There are innumerable examples of communities mobilizing to provide care, look after orphans or campaign for the realization of specific rights to reduce vulnerability to HIV infection. Yet, there are also countless instances where communities seek to cope with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in ways that are excluding; where ill health, death and devastation stemming from HIV/AIDS give rise to systems of meaning that apportion blame.
and sanction rejection of those affected by the epidemic. The result is greater social polarization, following both existing and new social fault lines.

Interventions to minimize the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on individuals, households, communities, organizations or institutions are different from those to prevent or minimize HIV spread. Within the area of biomedicine and health, equitable access to reproductive health services and technologies, STI treatment and a vaccine are interventions that have particular relevance for the prevention of HIV infection, whereas access to anti-retroviral treatment is about ensuring that those infected with HIV can live longer, healthy, productive and dignified lives. Access to education, secure employment and a decent income are essential parts of protection from HIV/AIDS – but also essential for households affected by HIV/AIDS – and the forms in which these are needed obviously differ. However, it is often the same (formal and informal) organizations that have central roles in prevention and in support for those who are infected – so there are important overlaps, if these organizations are strengthened.

**DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS FOR PREVENTION**

Without addressing living conditions and the vulnerability of adolescent girls and young women, other strategies will not work. The issue is not only prevention but also protection. Improving street-lighting may help to protect girls from rape and sexual abuse at night, access to water closer to home can reduce the exposure of girls to possibilities of sexual abuse. Ensuring that there are sufficient schools in the neighbourhood reduces exposure of girls to sexual harassment on the way to and from school, including on public-service vehicles. Improving girls’ access to meaningful livelihoods will mean that they do not have to resort to transactional or survival sex.

**Participation**

Participation is needed, in part, to ensure that the needs and priorities of male and female children and adolescents get listened to and addressed. But participation is also a form of protection in itself.

- Participation develops capacity. The practice of participation by adolescents develops their psychosocial skills such as assertiveness and negotiation that enable them to protect themselves more effectively in risky situations.
- Participation builds solidarity. It empowers the vulnerable to act together in their own cause.
- Joint participation leads to stronger and more meaningful personal relationships between children and young people.
- Inclusion and participation reduces the isolation that often leads to greater abuse.
- Participation in political and civic processes such as local councils, neighbourhood committees, local civil-society organizations and local events presents views that would not be heard, and puts protection issues on the table. It provides space for the views of the vulnerable and for the issues of abuse. For example, in various city consultations with young people, they identified dangerous areas and took action to address this. The Mayor of Addis Ababa was so impressed by the findings of the Girls’ Forum that they were offered a space to present their findings in their own television series.
- When adolescents and young people are given the chance to participate, they become the protectors of their younger siblings.
- Umbrella organizations for young people enable others to take up and support their causes.
- Participation in interactive media that give space to young people enables hidden issues to be brought to the fore and discussed.
- Youth organizations can provide safe spaces for children and young people.

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Youth–adult participation

The movement for children’s rights, including rights to participation, is often compared to the movement for women’s rights – but there is a critical difference in that women have an actual or potential political power that children lack. If the movement of young people to address their vulnerability and participate actively in their communities is to succeed, they need a partnership of supportive adults in their communities.

It is not only governments that have marginalized young people. Children and teenagers have no space in most civil-society organizations, even in organizations that claim to be working for young people. Yet civil-society organizations have key roles in prevention and protection. For instance, in Lusaka, commentators have attributed the dramatic fall in infection rates among young women – halved since 1993 – to the proliferation of civil-society initiatives. In many countries in the midst of, or anticipating, severe epidemics, civil society has been a crucial catalyst and resource for the response.\(^97\)

If the role of civil society has been important in confronting HIV/AIDS where political leadership has been strong, it has been indispensable in the many countries where it is weak. Leadership on HIV/AIDS issues has more often come from the community than from the top. There is a need for all civil-society organizations to address the vulnerability of young women and men to HIV/AIDS, including those that are addressing other aspects of deprivation such as the organizations and federations of the urban poor. Even if it is preventing their eviction or securing housing or sanitation that brings them together, success is meaningless unless their daughters and sons are protected from HIV/AIDS. Developing programmes working for and with their daughters to protect vulnerable girls should not be a burden, as experience in other areas where young people are given the space to participate fully in meaningful activities has shown that they are the most active in promoting them. Their participation will add greatly to the innovation, creativity and energy of the organizations. Existing programmes can add several key areas for the protection and development of adolescent girls and young women,\(^98\) including those outlined in the following sections of this chapter.

Safe spaces

Girls need a safe place apart from family (if they have one) and school (if they go to school) where they can meet, learn and provide support to one another. This can be done first by rethinking current youth-serving efforts with a gender and generation focus, for example by having girls-only youth clubs/centres, or girls-only days, hours or activities at the clubs. Girls may benefit from specific identity, leadership and activities at the centre. Also, this would answer the initial fears of many adults that youth centres are where girls are corrupted. Girls also need their own recreation and sports activities (many recreational activities favour boys over girls).

Schools

For those who attend them, schools themselves need to become safe spaces. This can be achieved through active parent–school interaction in two areas:

1: Addressing the culture of sexual harassment and abuse in and around schools. Local adults often know what is happening but have not considered how they can address the behaviour of pupils, taxi drivers, teachers and traders who prey on girls. This can be a simple initiative – as for example in a Tanzanian scheme where pupils selected a guardian from among the teachers. This guardian was trained to support the girls, and as a result sexual harassment (and even schoolgirl pregnancy) declined significantly.


2: Changing the curriculum to ensure that pupils get adequate information at an early age and the life skills to put it into practice, including assertiveness, self-esteem, critical and creative thinking, negotiating skills and resistance to peer pressure. Teachers might worry about how “the community” might react to this but some research has shown that “the community” actually wants the teachers to address this. All this requires the courage of parents and other adults to resist the temptation to selective moralizing which castigates the sexual activities of young people without castigating what made them start these activities in the first place.

Livelihoods

Girls and young women usually have very few employment opportunities open to them. For a girl with little or no education, the only opportunities are often domestic work, or working in a bar where they are likely to be subjected to a culture of sexual abuse and exploitation. Community dialogue and action on this area could help significantly.

International concerns about child labour and exploitation have generated a negative attitude towards girls’ work and may have created some bad outcomes for girls. Efforts to improve working conditions for boys and girls in regulated industries may force children into more hazardous employment. Inspections of work environments in free trade zones have often revealed disgraceful conditions but too little attention has been paid to the question “compared to what?” For many adolescent girls, wage-earning work (under the right circumstances) could represent a step up in the working world.

A good example of an appropriate response in this area can be found in Thailand, where the transmission of HIV through sex workers was cut dramatically. The authorities could have tried to close down all the brothels, putting thousands of women out of work and ending their remittances to families. Instead, they developed the “one hundred per cent condom” campaign, and followed it up with visits to brothels by health inspectors to ensure that the campaign was enforced. In other words, they protected the young women while they looked for alternatives. Of course, this does not address the causes which made them turn to sex work in the first place but it put “protection first”.

Since prospects of formal employment are usually slim, many livelihood initiatives for women have encouraged self-employment and entrepreneurship through capacity development and micro-credit. Care is needed not to load vulnerable girls with loan-repayment obligations they cannot meet when their actual need is for social support, mentors, voluntary and easily accessible savings and emergency funds, support in times of crisis and low-risk livelihood and employment opportunities. A phased model has a better chance of protecting girls by allowing them to begin with entry-level savings clubs and to select their level of risk as they become ready to access more demanding economic options. On this basis of the above, Mensch et al. make a series of recommendations:

- Create girls-only spaces as a primary prevention strategy for girls at highest risk, offering health and social support while building basic livelihood skills and providing savings opportunities. These spaces should be where girls can find friends and adult mentors, learn basic skills and access entitlements, and plan for seasonal stresses such as school fees and food shortages.

- Provide a variety of financial products and services that allow girls at highest risk to protect their security while building their economic base. Destitute girls have a far greater interest in savings and emergency loans than in establishing businesses and taking credit.

- Include younger and more vulnerable girls by establishing savings groups and creating a safe learning space and a stable group environment specifically suited to them.

Protection for all

There is a need to promote and organize community dialogues on sensitive issues such as adolescent domestic workers and other workers in the informal sector. Safe spaces for domestic workers can be

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100 Mensch et al. 1998, op. cit.
created, such as Sunday domestic workers’ clubs (which are often best developed with the employers) with voluntary-service options, orientation on legal rights and establishment of rescue centres for girls and young women in abusive employment situations.

Overall, for the right to child protection to be respected, abusive practices must lose their traditional acceptance. It is unrealistic to expect widespread individual deviation from behaviour that is socially sanctioned. However, draconian legislation and attempts to impose change are likely to be resisted, so these initiatives can only succeed through movements, coalitions and partnerships. This is where community-based organizations are key in creating the dialogue and environment for change.

Research

As noted above, there is little research on populations especially vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Even in surveys, there is little disaggregation to allow a deeper understanding of the issues of adolescent girls and young women. There is a need for vulnerability mapping of these groups, engaging them in the evaluation of vulnerability, and determining their priorities for addressing that vulnerability and participating in the implementation. This can draw on the pioneering work of the federations of the urban poor (see Chapter 5) in different countries in community mapping and enumerations.101

Raising awareness leading to action

The need to reinforce the movement towards communication for social change, rather than individual behaviour change, requires communication that:

Turns upside down the customary lines of communication: instead of the vulnerable and marginalized being the targets of other people’s communication, they should become the communicators. This is participation as protection; by being given the chance to communicate their issues and challenges, the vulnerable (in this case adolescent girls and young women) are able to change the environment in which they live. But this also requires links that allow the voices of young women (and other voiceless groups) to reach the more powerful.

Recognizes and addresses the social causes of people’s behaviour: the inequity, disruption, and lack of social cohesion. This includes the need to focus more on social contexts, including government policy, socioeconomic status, culture, gender relations and spirituality.

The Communication for Social Change Consortium has summed up the principles and approach as follows:

• Sustainability of social change is more likely if the individuals and communities most affected own the process and content of communication, and are agents of their own change.
• Communication for social change should be empowering, horizontal (rather than top-down), give voice to the previously unheard, and be biased towards local content and ownership.
• Emphasis should shift away from persuasion and information from outside technical experts, and towards dialogue, debate and negotiation on issues that resonate with members of the community.
• Emphasis on outcomes should go beyond individual behaviour to social norms, policies, culture and the supporting environment.102

This is highly relevant to the situation of adolescent girls and young women among the urban poor in Africa. They own no process, are largely unheard, are not given the chance to become agents of their own change and have not been asked for their views. The few interventions that aim to help this group may disregard the constraining factors that dominate their lives. Therein lies the challenge to grassroots and civil-society organizations, especially those that have used similar methodologies in their own struggles for equity in other areas. For example, some of the positive steps identified by the World Report on Violence and Health that are most relevant for girls and young women include:

• modification of the physical environment, such as improving street-lighting, creating safe routes for children and youths on their way to and from school;
• extracurricular activities for young people such as sports, drama, art and music;
• training for police, health and education professionals and employers to make them better able to identify and respond to different types of violence;
• community policing to create partnerships between police and various community groups;
• programmes for specific settings, such as schools, workplaces, refugee camps and care institutions, which focus on changing institutional environments by means of appropriate policies, guidelines and protocols.\textsuperscript{103}

If the girls and young women are given the space to provide their own analysis, they will identify many more interventions. And, in answer to those who say that this is more work for already overworked organizations: the girls are the best human resource you can get.

Local governance

These interventions can be effective on the scale needed only with the support of local government institutions (and national government as well) so civil-society organizations need to influence and work with them. The problems associated with rapid urban growth can be addressed only through developing accountable local institutions in cities, and effective governance is more important in the lives of most people than good national or global governance. Once again, it is a question of changing focus so that addressing vulnerability is included on the agenda.

Globalization

This emphasis on local action and local institutions should not obscure the fact that the local situations which make adolescent girls and young women so vulnerable are conditioned by the globalized economy. Continuing debt, inequity in terms of trade, the alliance between some national elites in low- and middle-income nations and their masters in high-income nations contribute to the increasing vulnerability of girls and young women – for instance in its most extreme form as sex tourism involving under-age girls.

Donor agencies

The priorities and prejudices of donors (and allies in governments) can also have a detrimental effect on the response to HIV/AIDS. Donors generally want short-term results, or evidence that action is being taken. Thus, individual behaviour-change programmes not only suit their prejudices but are also visible on billboards lining the road. In addition, as AIDS climbs the policy agenda, it is increasingly absorbed by the machinery of national and international organizations working on development and public health. The liberal outlooks and progressive strategies that characterized early civil-society action become subsumed within the more unwieldy hierarchical structures of government or UN decision-making. With larger sums of money being available, the trend is towards dividing the funds between a few recipients for optimum administrative efficiency.\textsuperscript{104} Smaller, or more local organizations (and young people’s organizations) lack the visibility and institutional capacity to compete with the internationals. This is very unfortunate, as an effective response depends on them.

CONCLUSION

Leaders at all levels like to use words such as “crisis”, “emergency”, “disaster” when talking about HIV/AIDS, yet there are few signs that it is treated as an emergency. If there is a cholera outbreak, immediate steps are taken to stop the spread of the disease. Yet adolescent girls are growing up and becoming infected with HIV/AIDS with no emergency allocation of funds to address the problem. Nor do we see a re-evaluation of development priorities to address the problem either – including in the


\textsuperscript{104} Panos 2003, op. cit., pages 38–39.
education sector where very few education ministries have put HIV/AIDS and life-skills programmes into the syllabus. An emergency response also requires identifying the most vulnerable to the disease and protecting them from it.

On the other hand, AIDS does differ from rapid-onset emergencies. It is best characterized as a development crisis emerging over a long period and requiring sustained attention and energy to tackle it. A great deal of additional funding is required over decades. In this context, rather than an emergency response, there needs to be a clear long-term strategy. This strategy lies in guaranteeing appropriate treatment and support services to all those who are infected, while also addressing vulnerability and transforming the conditions that create the vulnerability – which means that the local and the global have to work more closely together.

7. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION
Most unmet needs in urban areas in Africa relate directly or indirectly to the limitations or failures of local organizations. Addressing these needs depends on much-improved performance by local organizations – including government agencies, NGOs and a range of community-based organizations including informal savings groups and residents’ associations. A large part of this improved performance requires addressing the needs and priorities of those who lack good provision for water, sanitation, health care (and essential drugs), schools, secure homes and adequate incomes. Perhaps as importantly, those with unmet needs have to be able to influence what these organizations do and hold them to account. For instance, as Chapter 6 described, this has to include local organizations supporting those with HIV/AIDS and protecting those most at risk – in which those who are infected and those who are most at risk have central roles.

Perhaps more than anything else, as a first stage, what is needed in urban areas in Africa are strong examples of how to support the development of pro-poor organizations that address poorer groups’ needs and are accountable to them. This has to include support for the poor’s own organizations, both in what they do and in what they demand. Chapter 5 focused on the work of urban poor federations in Africa, in part because of what they have already achieved, and in part because of their potential to build genuinely pro-poor, inclusive and accountable institutions that strengthen alliances between urban poor groups. There is a need for clearer ideas of “how” external agencies can support such initiatives in a way that maximizes best use of local resources and capacities, and minimizes the need for external funding.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN URBAN AREAS
The justification for supporting the organizations formed by the urban poor is easily made – but this support also has to recognize the need for these organizations to change their relationships with local governments. One key characteristic of most urban areas is now much the lives and livelihoods of low-income groups are affected, directly or indirectly, by local governments. Local government agencies, or the local offices of higher levels of government, determine whether their rights are protected and their entitlements are met. Local government rules and procedures determine the ease with which urban poor households can:

- send their children to government schools, and afford to keep them there;
- get treatment and appropriate medicines when ill or injured;
- be connected to water, sanitation and drainage networks;
- have street lights and electricity in their neighbourhoods;
- get land on which they can build their own home legally, or otherwise have to build illegally – often on a dangerous site (because they would be evicted from any safer site) – and can avoid eviction;
- vote, or even whether they can get their names on the voting lists;
- have access to politicians and civil servants;
- be protected from violence and other crimes (and corruption) by a just rule of law;
• set up and run a small enterprise;
• influence development projects, especially those that threaten their homes or livelihoods.

Thus, a critical question is how to make local government organizations more pro-poor – or less anti-poor. Or, to phrase it another way, how to change the relationship between those with unmet needs and local (city and municipal) government.105

This is not to suggest that local government can or should provide for all needs. But as well as its role as a provider of services, it also has a major influence on how local markets operate, including those that have particular importance for low-income groups – for instance, for land for housing, for spaces where informal enterprises can operate, for water and, in many instances, for formal building materials. It can have a major influence on the effectiveness and accountability of local NGOs or other local organizations that provide services. And it has a major influence on the scale, scope and effectiveness of what organizations formed by the urban poor can do. Table 8 compares and contrasts the two extremes in terms of government organizations that do or do not have a pro-poor agenda in urban areas; it includes consideration of government agencies that are local in the sense that they do or should provide local services, even if their local offices come under the jurisdiction of provincial or national government agencies.

Table 8: Examples of supportive and unsupportive local government organizations in urban areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local organizations that are supportive</th>
<th>Local organizations that are unsupportive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schools (pre-school, primary and secondary)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Schools with high user charges (formal or through informal payments requested) and that avoid admitting children from urban poor areas (for instance through requiring pupils to have official addresses which excludes children from families living in illegal settlements). Actual school construction/funding of teachers in areas of new settlement.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools that are accessible to all and with costs kept down for those items that poorer households find difficult to afford (e.g. fees, school uniforms, text books); special provisions to help low-income families keep their children at school and to ensure gender equality may be needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary health care centres, hospitals and emergency services</strong></td>
<td><strong>Health services that are available and easily accessible to all, with strong outreach programmes for poorer areas, special programmes for vulnerable and at-risk groups (especially young women and girls – see Chapter 6) and provision to keep down costs for users. Special outreach for those with AIDS/HIV, to provide counselling and supply needed drugs without stigmatizing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services that are available and easily accessible to all, with strong outreach programmes for poorer areas, special programmes for vulnerable and at-risk groups (especially young women and girls – see Chapter 6) and provision to keep down costs for users. Special outreach for those with AIDS/HIV, to provide counselling and supply needed drugs without stigmatizing.</td>
<td>High user fees and locations and opening hours which make them difficult to use, especially for working populations. Staff members who are judgemental and antagonistic to “poorer groups” or to other particular groups (for instance adolescents or specific ethnic groups). Inappropriate or no services for those with AIDS/HIV and for those most at risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Providers of water, sanitation, drainage, household waste disposal and electricity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Service providers with a focus on ensuring adequate provision for all – with differential service standards and support for community partnerships to ensure that all poorer groups are reached, where the resources are insufficient for universal provision through conventional systems. A focus on ensuring that the bulk infrastructure (e.g. water and drainage mains) is in place, within which informal or community systems can operate.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service providers with a focus on ensuring adequate provision for all – with differential service standards and support for community partnerships to ensure that all poorer groups are reached, where the resources are insufficient for universal provision through conventional systems. A focus on ensuring that the bulk infrastructure (e.g. water and drainage mains) is in place, within which informal or community systems can operate.</td>
<td>Service providers who have little or no interest in reaching poorer groups within political systems that do not ensure that they do so. Piped water supplies, sewers, drains and waste collection often available only to richer groups (and often provided at below cost). Refusal to provide any services in illegal settlements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105 Of course, changes are also needed from national governments and international agencies, and within global trade regimes. But their effectiveness is largely determined by whether they make local bodies more effective in meeting local needs, and more responsive and accountable to those with unmet needs.
Public, private or NGO providers of safety nets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public, private or NGO providers of safety nets</td>
<td>No local organization providing safety nets or supporting community-managed safety nets – or provision that is inadequate with poor coverage.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official provision for safety nets to help those who cannot work or those with inadequate incomes to meet needs, or official support for NGO or community provision of safety nets (including emergency credit). These have particular importance in nations or cities with high prevalence of HIV/AIDS.</td>
<td>No local organization providing or supporting credit that is available to low-income groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public, private or NGO finance agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance programmes for individuals and support for community-managed finance for poorer households provided in ways that also wherever possible avoid creating debt burdens on poorest groups.</td>
<td>No local organization providing or supporting credit that is available to low-income groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The police, the legal system and local government bodies involved in ensuring the rule of law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providers (including police services in informal settlements) that protect poorer groups' civil and political rights. Services that also seek to be supportive of poorer groups’ livelihoods and to lessen discrimination and work towards greater gender equality.</td>
<td>Those who do not serve poorer groups (for instance, with no police service in informal settlements) or oppress them. It is common for poorer groups living in illegal settlements to be evicted and for informal enterprises (for instance hawkers and sellers in informal markets) to be harassed. It is also common for migrants to be regarded as a problem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The local government systems for voting and accountability to citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The right to and the possibility of voting for local government; political and bureaucratic systems in which poorer groups have access to senior politicians and civil servants to ensure their rights are respected. This includes protection from forced eviction, appropriate support in an emergency and attention to reducing corruption.</td>
<td>Local government is not elected – or if it is, in many countries, those living in illegal settlements are denied the vote (for instance because they lack an official address). Politicians and the bureaucracy are unresponsive to demands of poorer groups and to possibilities of working in partnership with them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How governments define and measure poverty, and how local organizations act on this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local processes in which urban poor groups are involved that define and measure poverty and use this to support local poverty-reduction strategies that seek to reach all poor groups; urban poor groups’ involvement in monitoring poverty levels and evaluating effectiveness of poverty-reduction strategies.</td>
<td>Poverty defined and measured by a national government agency, usually based only on consumption levels and with little allowance when setting poverty lines for the cost of non-food necessities. Poverty measurements based on representative national samples so there are few or no relevant data for local organizations, including local governments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Developed from a table in Satterthwaite, David (2005), “Meeting the MDGs in urban areas; the forgotten role of local organizations”, Journal of International Affairs Vol 58, No 2, pages 87–112.

Where local governments fail to ensure provision of services, local non-government organizations and private enterprises often have importance for large sections of the urban population, providing schools, health centres, water supplies and household waste disposal in informal settlements. But these services are often of poor quality. Again, local government has or could have considerable influence on the quality and coverage of these services. A supportive government framework for local services can improve their quality and coverage – as illustrated by the partnerships developed between local governments and urban poor federations referred to in Chapter 5.

106 See, for instance Sabry, Sarah (2005), “The Social Aid and Assistance Programme of the Government of Egypt – a critical review”, background paper prepared for the Ford Foundation, showing the limitations of an official safety-net programme both in what was provided and in not reaching many of those in need. This was published in Environment and Urbanization Vol. 17, No. 2, October 2005.
In urban areas, local governments have importance not only for their capacity to reduce poverty but also to perpetuate or increase it. This is illustrated by the sudden, massive eviction and demolition programme undertaken by the Government of Zimbabwe, which began in May 2005 – first in Harare and then in other centres. The destruction and demolition targeted “shanty towns” in high-density suburbs, and informal vending and manufacturing operations. Within the first week, 20,000 vendors were reported to have been arrested. Throughout June 2005, homes and businesses were destroyed in more than 52 sites, and no settlement in Zimbabwe designated as urban was spared. Some 700,000 people across the country lost their homes, their sources of livelihood, or both. Hundreds of thousands of women, men and children were made homeless, without access to food, water, sanitation or health care. Education for thousands of school-age children has been disrupted.

This is an extreme example of governments creating or exacerbating poverty – but some of the anti-poor attitudes that underpinned this process are widely held within governments, as can be seen by the number and scale of evictions in urban areas in other African nations. Such anti-poor attitudes underpin the forced evictions of millions of low-income households each year, leaving people homeless and often injured by the violence of the eviction, and entrenching patterns of poverty, discrimination and social exclusion. All government evictions come with some official justification that they are done “for the public good”: to help support city regeneration, to improve health and safety, to develop needed city infrastructure – or to redevelop areas that allegedly have criminal networks. Perhaps the strangest aspect of this is that those whose homes are bulldozed also want improved health and safety, better infrastructure and a more successful economy; most also want the rule of law. Many would be happy to move – since they live on land at risk of floods or landslides, or on pavements – as long as they are fully involved in determining to where, when and how. There are also many precedents to show how a real engagement with urban poor groups can allow land to be freed for infrastructure and for urban regeneration but in ways that benefit the urban poor too, so their needs and priorities are also part of the “public good”.

One of the ironies of urban development in Africa is the inaccurate stereotyping of poorer groups by governments. These are the groups that are responsible for building most new houses and building much new infrastructure (although this usually has to be done illegally because legal requirements and official standards are so inappropriate). The urban poor provide the city with cheap labour and a great diversity of cheap goods and services. They move in response to changing patterns of economic opportunity, which again serves to strengthen the economy. Yet many government officials and politicians stereotype poor people as “the problem” or a danger to the city – which can be seen in their statements and policies that are anti-squatters, anti-migrants and anti-hawkers.

**Urban Poor Organizations and Federations**

Chapter 5 described the importance of local organizations formed by urban poor groups – through how these organizations can influence local governments, and through what they can do themselves. In many nations, representative organizations formed by urban poor groups have demonstrated new ways to build and improve homes, and improve provision for water, sanitation, drainage, and solid waste collection, that are both cheaper and of better quality than conventional government or private-sector provision. Most have done this in ways in which women have central roles in decisions and implementation – also in ways that allow the poorest groups to be included.

Local non-government organizations often have important roles in working alongside these groups and other urban poor organizations that are less formalized. Most of the federations also manage their own urban poor funds, that are a means by which local groups can add capital to their savings and secure investment funds for their own projects (which are used as precedents to show local governments and

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107 Details of this are drawn from the official United Nations report, Tibaijuka (2005), op. cit.
other agencies what they can do). These urban poor funds also serve as a conduit for external funding – and that allows such external funding to be accountable to them. As Chapter 5 described, perhaps of even greater significance than what the federations do, is what they offer local governments and external funders as potential partners.

The savings schemes set up and managed by urban poor groups need local government to provide sources of finance for local improvements (as either grants or soft loans). They need the bulk-infrastructure investments – for instance roads, water and drainage systems – into which their community-driven improvements can fit.\footnote{Where local governments or other local service providers lack the capacity to provide piped water and provision for sanitation and wastewater removal to each house or house plot, they can concentrate on providing the trunk infrastructure from which community organizations can develop the neighbourhood/street infrastructure.} They also need a structure to be able to work collectively with local government at the level of the city (i.e. not as individual communities), thereby enabling local communities to learn from one another and to work with the city on municipal poverty-reduction strategies.\footnote{Note the example of Durban given in Chapter 5. One important non-African example is in Thailand, where an official government agency supports urban poor organizations to work together and with city government on city-level strategies – see Boonyabancha, Somsook (2005), “Baan Mankong: going to scale with ‘slum’ and squatter upgrading in Thailand”, Environment and Urbanization Vol 17, No 1, pages 21–46.}

**Livelhoods**

Chapter 1 noted how more robust and sustainable livelihoods and stronger asset bases for poorer groups are obvious needs for poverty reduction – but also how it is difficult to know what kinds of intervention actually support these, at least on a scale that has a significant impact. Different chapters have pointed to parts of the solution: financial support available for household and for group enterprises; local governments that are more supportive of (or less destructive to) informal enterprises and improved infrastructure in low-income settlements – good water supplies, sanitation, all-weather roads and electricity are a great boost to many small enterprises.

There may be untapped opportunities for supporting local production, for instance provision for farmers’ markets or allowing urban agriculture on land not needed for building, which can also have positive ecological benefits. If city governments have the capacity to support waste reduction, reuse and recycling, and energy and water conservation (and better watershed management), this generally has positive employment benefits. The urban poor federations also need support in trying out ways to generate livelihoods. Chapter 6 highlighted how much-increased livelihood opportunities for young women and men are important for HIV/AIDS prevention – and also for those who are infected. Again, this will generally depend on the space and scope for community-driven responses in which young men and women have influence. But better livelihood possibilities in urban areas are much influenced by economic performance, and it is difficult to know what to do or to recommend in stagnant or low-growth economies.

**What role for international agencies?**

Official development assistance has not been successful in channelling significant funding to pro-poor local organizations. Most aid comes from the bilateral aid agencies of governments in high-income nations – whether they spend this directly in their bilateral aid programmes, or channel it through multilateral development banks (for instance the World Bank and the regional development banks), other multilateral agencies (including the United Nations’ many specialized agencies) or international NGOs. These official international aid agencies and development banks were not set up to support local organizations and processes. Their whole structure and mode of providing grants, soft loans (with grant elements) or non-concessional loans were never designed to support the kinds of pro-poor local organizations that can, or already do, make a difference to those with the least income or asset base, whether these organizations are community organizations, local NGOs or local governments.
In large part, this is the legacy of the 1950s conception of development assistance which centred on capital to help national governments invest in productive activities and infrastructure supported by “expert” foreign technical assistance. Although the understanding of how international agencies can support development has changed greatly since the 1950s, the basic structure of how funds are transferred from official donors to “recipient national governments” has changed much less. NGO funds tend to go to Northern agencies, although many such agencies now work with local NGO partners.

- Most official development-assistance agencies still have structures that are largely to provide national governments with large lumps of “capital” (as loan or grant).
- Most development assistance relies on national “recipient” governments to manage the use of this capital.
- All official development assistance agencies are under strong pressure from the governments that fund them to keep down their staff costs. This stems from an assumption that an “efficient” aid agency is one that spends as low a proportion of its total budget as possible on staff costs. For the World Bank and the regional development banks, keeping down staff costs relative to total loan amounts is also a priority, as it is in any bank.

Combine this need to spend large sums of money, or to loan as much money as possible, with these agencies’ formal relationship with national governments, and the limited possibilities of them supporting local processes becomes obvious. This is now being reinforced by the large transfers made direct from aid agencies to national governments as budgetary support. This practice has an official justification of supporting recipient government priorities (and in strengthening the democratic process), but it is also much linked to convenience and the reduced staff time needed to manage the large transfers within international agencies. The institutional structures of official aid agencies and development banks are largely incapable of supporting the diverse local processes that really deliver for the poor (except in a few showcase projects).

One important characteristic of “good” development assistance is to minimize reliance on external funding. The potential scale of any initiative is maximized if it draws mainly on local funding sources – and if external funding supports the mobilization of local resources (including leveraging resources from local governments). In theory, official bilateral agencies and multilateral banks might applaud low demands for funding but, in practice, this undermines their need to spend large capital sums or give large loans. The official development-assistance structure is biased not only against supporting local processes but also against minimizing dependence on external funding. This suggests the need for some creative institutional rethinking about how large centralized “foreign” aid agencies and development banks can support local processes that address poverty, with great diversity of the actual forms it takes between locations.

What can push the big international funders and national governments in this direction? Perhaps above all, citizen groups and local governments demonstrating alternative models that show their strengths and capacities, including greater capacity to negotiate appropriate external support. Key potential roles for the funders could include:

- contributing support to innovative initiatives undertaken by national and local governments, and official development assistance agencies, to support these alternative models;
- in nations or cities where there is no urban poor federation, to support urban poor groups to experiment and learn;
- networking among other donors/foundations to increase support for these approaches; if there is to be a major change in the effectiveness of urban policies in Africa, how foundations support initiatives to help change the policies and practices of African governments and other international agencies has great importance.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ At one level, this is obvious. But it is not easily made operational. For instance, in our work with several UNICEF country offices, it was obvious that their funding was too limited to have a major direct impact on children’s welfare. But these offices had the knowledge and capacity to enable the much larger external-funding flows from other agencies to address this. However, the institutional structure and incentives for staff performance did not encourage such an approach.
To have an urban-focused programme in Africa with a strong component supporting the organizations and federations of the urban poor carries some risks. Any urban programme in Africa will be criticized in some quarters for “not being rural”. This can be avoided however, by explicitly taking the “urban + rural + their interconnections” focus outlined in Chapter 3, which includes attention to smaller urban centres and peri-urban areas. Working with the organizations and federations formed by the urban poor is also not easy, especially where national and local governments are hostile to them.

Thus, in conclusion, perhaps the single most important issue for external assistance to Africa’s urban areas is to exemplify how to support the development of stronger local organizations that really deliver for poorer groups, are accountable to and can work in partnerships with them, and have the potential to scale up through a multiplication of locally driven initiatives. This includes support for the organizations formed by the urban poor. Such an approach must demonstrate to the official development assistance agencies what it means to shift from seeing “the poor” as clients or targets to which “development” and “environmental management” must be delivered, to recognizing them as active agents with knowledge, resources and rights to influence what is done and how external assistance is used. This can transform the quality, scale and cost-effectiveness of development assistance. It can also be a central part of building more effective governance systems – but from the bottom up.
ANNEXE: URBAN STATISTICS FOR AFRICA

SOURCES for Tables 9–11: Data from 1950 to 2000: Historic data are from IIED’s database on city populations. Statistics on urbanization and city populations for 2000 are speculative for many nations where there has been no recent census (or occasionally censuses that are inaccurate because they were heavily manipulated politically).

Table 9: Africa’s largest urban centres in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban centre</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date founded</th>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Compound growth rate for the 1990s</th>
<th>Annual increment in population (thousands) 1990–2000</th>
<th>Last census used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>2436</td>
<td>10398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>8665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>Dem. Rep. of the Congo</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>4745</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>3949</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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SOURCE: Drawn from Demographic and Health Surveys; table provided by the Population Information Program, The John Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, Baltimore, USA.